

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

DATE : 6 December 1961

NO. : L- 258 A, B, C, D, E.

Mini
SECRET

Reur 8476. Suggest following text for S/4940/Add.16:

"Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo relating to the situation in Elisabethville.

(a) Sequels to the incidents of 28 November 1961.

1. / The first reaction of some of the Katanga authorities to the incidents of 28 November 1961 (see document S/4940/Add.15) seems to have been one of alarm, and they seem to have made efforts to re-establish their authority in a situation which their propaganda against the United Nations had created, but which, as had been demonstrated to the world, was dangerously out of control. On 30 November "L'Essor du Katanga", a newspaper close to the regime, published on its front page an article entitled "Regrets du Gouvernement katangais au sujet de l'arrestation des trois (sic) fonctionnaires de l'ONU".) The article expressed the regime's regrets at the "malentendu" which had given rise to the incident, but gave a considerably softened account of what had happened to Mr. Ivan Smith, the acting representative of the United Nations in Elisabethville, and Mr. Urquhart, Special Assistant to the Officer-in-Charge of ONUC. The article alleged among other things that the United Nations car in which they were riding had aroused the suspicion of the Katanga paracommandos because it passed three times in front of the residence of General Moke, the Commander-in-Chief of the Katanga Gendarmerie; this was not the case.

2. The same issue of "L'Essor du Katanga" published an interview with Mr. Munongo, ^{so-called} Minister of the Interior in the Tshombe regime, in which he stated that the Katanga authorities desired a peaceful solution, and suggested that the Acting Secretary-General should come to Katanga to observe the situation in person. After again asserting Katanga's claim to independence, Mr. Munongo continued:

"Certes, nous sommes gravement menacés, certes, nous devons nous attendre au pire. Mais cela ne veut pas dire que les hostilités avec l'ONU ont de nouveau recommencé. Nous ne voulons pas faire couler le sang inutilement. Si l'on arrive à une solution pacifique nous serions très heureux."

He then deplored the death of the Indian soldier murdered on the night of 28 November, and emphasized the need of discipline in Katanga. He concluded as follows:

"Les coupables seront donc recherchés et punis suivant la loi. Si l'ONU nous attaque, cela sera différent. Nous devons nous défendre. Tant que l'ONU ne nous attaque pas, nous devons rester tranquilles. Peut-être que l'ONU comprendra qu'on peut arriver à une solution bonne pour tout le monde sans devoir faire une nouvelle fois la guerre."

3. But the Katanga regime was not successful in its efforts to regain mastery of the situation. There were many signs that the Katanga forces, and in particular the paracommandos, remained out of control. Inflammatory rumours circulated at an ever-increasing rate in the next days, and gave rise to an inference that extremist elements, probably including mercenaries, were exploiting the situation created by the propaganda campaign of the Katanga authorities, and were systematically increasing the excitement of the Katanga troops in an effort to provoke an outbreak of hostilities with the United Nations. Though there has been some evidence that Major Ajeet Singh, who was kidnapped on the night of 28 November, is still alive and is being held prisoner in a Gendarmerie camp, the Katanga regime ^{was} ~~has so far been~~ unable to produce him.

4. On 1 December Mr. Tshombe, who the preceding day had received the two United Nations protests (published as annexes to document S/4940/Add.15) delivered a press conference which did not help the situation. He said that he had not been conducting a propaganda campaign against the United Nations, but after the debates of the Security Council and after the adoption of its resolution "qui consacrait la déclaration de guerre de l'ONU au Katanga", he had simply been re-establishing the truth. In a later part of his statement he stated, with regard to the beating of Mr. Ivan Smith and Mr. Urquhart: *OPERATOR TO BE CONTINUED IN*

L-258B

"... Par un plan dorénavant mis en place, certains éléments de l'ONU recherchent l'incident. Au moment où un de nos fervents défenseurs, le Sénateur Dodd, se trouve parmi nous, certains éléments de l'ONU essaient de lui démontrer que ce pays n'est peuplé que par une bande de sauvages dont les plus sauvages ont été pourvus d'armes afin de constituer une armée dont l'indiscipline éclate aux yeux de l'observateur le moins attentif.

Ces mêmes éléments de l'ONU essaient d'exciter les populations par une campagne de faux bruits... Ils croient sans doute aussi que nous ignorons qui a lancé, hier soir, sur les ondes une prétendue émission clandestine katangaise avec ses slogans incendiaires et ses appels aux armes, émanant soi-disant de moi-même. Le Gouvernement katangais a une radio officielle et le jour où il décidera une action quelconque, il n'a pas besoin de radio clandestine pour le faire connaître. Je tiens à rappeler à tous les Katangais, noirs et blancs, qu'ils ne doivent obéir qu'aux ordres officiels émanant du Gouvernement. Tout autre appel ou communication doit être rejeté. Si une telle ligne de conduite est suivie, l'ONU ne tardera pas à comprendre qu'elle fait fausse route dans la guerre psychologique comme elle s'était fourvoyée dans la guerre des armes."

5. On the same morning Mr. Tshombe sent the acting United Nations representative in Elisabethville his reply to the United Nations protest about the killing of the Indian soldier and the kidnapping of Major Ajeet Singh. The protest and the reply are published as Annexes I and II of this document. (Note: Texts already sent to Headquarters in our L-200.)

6. In the early afternoon of 1 December Mr. Tshombe left for Brazzaville; Radio Katanga announced that it was his intention to go to Brazil for a Moral Rearmament conference. In his absence he was replaced by Mr. Kimba, the so-called Minister for Foreign Affairs, with respect to external relations, defence and relations with the United Nations, and by Mr. Kibwe, the ^{Provincial} Minister of Finance, for all administrative questions.

7. During the night of 1 - 2 December Mr. Tshombe, from Brazzaville sent a suggestion to Prime Minister Adoula in Leopoldville, that the two should meet on 2 December on a boat in the middle of the Congo River. Prime Minister Adoula did not accept this suggestion, but said he would be happy to have Mr. Tshombe transported ^{by helicopter} at any time from Brazzaville to his residence in Leopoldville, and renewed assurances that he personally, the Central Government, and ONUC would afford full protection for Mr.

Tshombe's security and liberty. Mr. Tshombe was unwilling to accept this proposal. Though his associates are reported to have tried to recall him to Katanga, he ~~later~~ left Brazzaville for Paris, *on 3 December towards noon.*

8. On 4 December Mr. Kimba sent the acting United Nations representative two replies, reproduced as Annexes III and IV of this document, (Note: Texts sent to Headquarters in our L-236 and L-235) to the two protests by the United Nations published as Annexes I and II of document S/4940/Add.15.

(b) Incidents of the night of 2-3 December 1961

9. In the stress of a tense situation and under the pressure of incessant propaganda the discipline of the Katanga forces ~~has~~ steadily deteriorated. As a result, at about 4.15 on the afternoon of 2 December at the airfield of Elisabethville, drunken Katanga gendarmes molested some airport workers and a woman. For the sake of maintaining order, Indian Dogra troops of ONUC at the airfield disarmed the gendarmes who were misconducting themselves. Thereupon the remaining Gendarmerie and police jumped into trenches and opened fire on the ONUC troops. As a result, the Indians were compelled to disarm and detain them all.

10. News of this incident soon reached Elisabethville, and the Gendarmerie began to patrol the town. A Katanga armoured car accompanied by two non-Congolese was stationed off the road to the airfield. Gendarmerie also set up a roadblock at ^{the} a tunnel underneath the railroad track, on the road which leads from the town in the direction of the Baluba refugee camp and the encampment of the Swedish troops of ONUC. Both roadblocks were clearly designed to impede vital United Nations communications between parts of its forces and the town, where the United Nations headquarters is located.

11. At about 7 p.m. an Italian male nurse-driver of the Italian Hospital, who was taking sixteen Baluba hospital workers by truck to the Baluba camp and was

entirely unarmed and unescorted, was stopped at the roadblock at the tunnel. After being beaten several times he was taken to Camp Massart, a Gendarmerie camp in Elisabethville, where an officer locked him in a room with a guard to protect him from drunken gendarmes. He was finally handed over to the Italian consul in the late afternoon of 3 December by Mr. Kimba and Mr. Munongo, the Provincial Minister of the Interior. OPERATOR TO BE CONTINUED IN L-258C.

L-258C.

12. Also on the night of 2-3 December, seven Swedish, two Norwegian and one Argentine military members of ONUC were abducted by Katanga forces. The Italian driver mentioned above heard that three of them were being detained in the Katanga paracommando camp, but there was no information about the others, and Mr. Kimba, who was promptly asked to surrender them, denied all knowledge of their whereabouts. The Argentine was subsequently released on 4 December.

13. While these events were going on, United Nations representatives got in touch with Mr. Kimba and told him the facts of the situation at the airfield. They informed him that the United Nations desired only to deliver the drunken gendarmes detained at the airfield to the Katanga authorities, but that those authorities had first to clear their gendarmerie from the streets in order to avoid any incidents. If that were done, the gendarmes would be brought from the airport to the Presidential Palace in a slow convoy, and there handed over. Mr. Kimba, after some hesitation, agreed, and he and General Moke, Commander-in-Chief of the Katanga forces, went around town withdrawing the Gendarmerie.

14. The United Nations then brought all the detained gendarmes into the town and they were handed over at about midnight outside the Presidential Palace in the presence of Mr. Kimba, Mr. Kibwe, Mr. Munongo, General Moke and several consuls. Mr. ~~George Ivan Smith, the acting United Nations representative,~~ explained that the men had been disarmed and detained because of drunken indiscipline. The police held at the airfield were liberated the next morning.

(c) Events of 3 December 1961

15. On the morning of 3 December the Gendarmerie who had been temporarily withdrawn returned to the town, and still remained in the roadblocks at the tunnel and on the road to the airfield. There was random shooting in the town, and a United Nations helicopter was fired on. Moreover Mr. Kimba, instead of relaxing the tension, gave a press conference in which he made highly inaccurate allegations, which he had already made to the press the night before, that several Katangese gendarmes had been killed or wounded, and that the United Nations had begun the incident.⁸ ~~Therefore~~ The United Nations representatives determined, in the interest of the maintenance of order, to request the complete withdrawal of the Gendarmerie from Elisabethville. Mr. Kimba's initial response being negative, the consuls of the United Kingdom and the United States visited him to assure him of ONUC's peaceful intentions, and of its desire to restore normal conditions.

16. Mr. Ivan Smith, the acting United Nations representative, together with Mr. Succar of his staff, went on foot to the Presidential Palace in the early afternoon, with an escort and in the company of the consul of the United States. During his interview with Mr. Kimba, Mr. Ivan Smith gave a warning that the continued presence of Katangese armed forces in Elisabethville could lead to incidents and conflict, and requested their withdrawal to their camp within a reasonable period.

17. On the afternoon of 3 December three Swedish military personnel, a captain, a sergeant and a private, while on official duty, attempted to pass through the roadblock at the tunnel in their small car. They were fired at by the Gendarmerie, and the private, who was driving, died as the result of two bullets in the abdomen. The other two were wounded; the captain's arm was broken by a bullet and the

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INSERT para 15. ⁸

Mr. Kimba concluded, according to a monitoring report, by stating:

"Si l'ONU veut rester sur le territoire katangais, qu'elle se conforme à l'idéal que nous nous sommes tracés. Si au contraire elle désire justifier sa présence en suscitant des incidents journaliers, qu'elle sache également - il s'agit, Messieurs, d'un solennel et ultime avertissement - que malgré nous, nous serons contraints à mettre tout en oeuvre pour bouter de notre patrie les fauteurs de trouble. Nous avons fait preuve, Messieurs, et je crois que vous pouvez en témoigner, de beaucoup de patience, mais cette patience a des limites, surtout quand il s'agit de la vie de notre pays, le Katanga."

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sergeant was wounded in the abdomen and the leg. The Gendarmerie continued to fire after the car left the road and crashed into a tree. It was later learned that a doctor and three medical personnel of the Swedish Battalion, who had gone to attend the victims of the shooting, had failed to return, and they are presumed to be in the hands of the Gendarmerie. The two survivors and the body of the dead man were brought in a civilian Red Cross vehicle to the ONUC hospital in Elisabethville at about 6 p.m. OPERATOR TO BE CONTINUED IN L-258D

L-258D

18. As soon as Mr. Ivan Smith learned of the foregoing incident, he telephoned Mr. Kimba to insist again on the withdrawal of the Katanga forces from the town. Mr. Ivan Smith asked Mr. Kimba to issue an order for the immediate return of his troops to their camp, and also asked to be informed within one half hour that such an order had been given; otherwise the Katanga authorities alone would be responsible for the consequences of any measures it became necessary for ONUC to take under its directives from the Security Council to assure the maintenance of law and order. and for the protection of its own personnel. Mr. Kimba immediately interpreted these requests as an ultimatum, and issued a press communiqué stating in part that

"Le Gouvernement du Katanga rejette cet ultimatum avec la plus grande vigueur. Le Gouvernement du Katanga considère que seule la négociation peut résoudre les problèmes. Il est prêt à négocier, mais à la force il répondra par la force."

19. Late in the evening of 3 December Mr. Kimba, in a state of furious excitement, telephoned Mr. Ivan Smith and asked whether it was true that the United Nations had concentrated eighteen aircraft at Leopoldville to fly to Elisabethville. Mr. Ivan Smith replied that he had no specific information but that it was possible that the aircraft were connected with the planned rotation of ONUC troops, of which Mr. Kimba was well aware. Mr. Kimba then angrily said that if any of the aircraft flew over Katanga soil, they would be shot down. Mr. Ivan Smith replied that he

would immediately report this grave statement to United Nations Headquarters, and that any such action would of course be opposed by ONUC.

20. Mr. Ivan Smith also took the opportunity to protest strongly against the fact that a number of United Nations personnel were still held by the Katangese, and asked that immediate arrangements should be made for their release through the consuls. Mr. Kimba then charged that the United Nations was still holding twenty gendarmes from the airfield (a charge which was completely unfounded). When Mr. Ivan Smith denied holding any gendarmes, Mr. Kimba replied that if that was the United Nations position, his own position was that he did not have any United Nations personnel.

(d) Events of 4 December 1961

21. On the morning of 4 December Mr. Ivan Smith and Mr. Urquhart, ~~the Special Assistant to the Officer-in-Charge of ONUC,~~ continued their efforts to secure through the consuls the release of the detained United Nations personnel. At that time there were ^{fourteen} ~~sixteen~~ United Nations personnel believed to be in Katangese hands. They were: an Indian Major, who disappeared on the night of 28 November (see S/4940/Add.15 para.17); ^{nine} ~~eleven~~ military personnel missing since the night of 2-3 December (see paragraph 12 above); and four Swedish medical personnel missing since the afternoon of 3 December (see paragraph 17 above). Of the ^{fourteen, eleven} ~~sixteen, twelve~~ were Swedish, two Norwegian, ~~one Argentine~~ and one Indian. There are indications that they were taken by the Gendarmerie in accordance with a plan to secure United Nations hostages.

22. At the end of the morning Mr. Ivan Smith and Brigadier Raja, the commander of the ONUC Force in Katanga, made a tour outside Elisabethville to brief unit commanders and staff, and also visited the airport. At about 2 p.m. they learned that Katanga paracommandos had established a strong roadblock at the edge of the town on the road to the airport, thus cutting communications between the airport

and ONUC Headquarters in Elisabethville. The roadblock consisted of one paracommando company, which was continually being reinforced, three armoured cars and some 60-millimeter mortars. A number of Europeans in civilian clothes were also reported at the roadblock. A strong ONUC patrol was sent out to probe it, and Mr. Kimba was also informed through the United States consul that if he did not remove the roadblock and return his troops from there to their camp, the block would be cleared by force. Mr. Kimba told the consul that he was sending officers to withdraw his troops, and he later gave an undertaking to Mr. Urquhart that he would remove his troops if the United Nations would remove its own. It was understood that General Moke, the Commander-in-Chief of the Katanga Gendarmerie, and Mr. Sapwe, the Police Commissioner of Elisabethville, went to the roadblock to attempt to disperse it.

OPERATOR TO BE CONTINUED IN L-258E

L-258E 23. In view of Mr. Kimba's assurances that his troops would be withdrawn if those of the United Nations were also withdrawn, the United Nations commander decided to withdraw his troops from the vicinity of the roadblock, as a gesture of good faith and confidence in Mr. Kimba's word, and in order to prevent an incident that would have serious consequences. Mr. Ivan Smith and Brigadier Raja remained on the airport side, while Mr. Urquhart and other United Nations personnel were at Headquarters and other points in the town.

(e) Events of 5 December 1961

24. On the morning of 5 December the United Nations forces discovered that, despite Mr. Kimba's assurances, made to the consuls and the press as well as to the United Nations, that his troops would be withdrawn, the roadblock was still strongly held. Mr. Urquhart asked the United States consul to get in touch urgently with Mr. Kimba. The latter was reported to be in a conciliatory mood, and there then seemed to be some hope of solving the problem by peaceful means. Accordingly, Mr. Urquhart arranged to have a conversation with Mr. Kimba.

~~after he had held a meeting with his Council of Ministers.~~ Mr. Urquhart met with Mr. Kimba at 11.30 a.m., with the aim of further discussing the roadblock on the airport road. At this conference it was obvious that Mr. Kimba had no control whatever over his troops, but was simply engaging in a delaying action. He could only propose a continuation of discussions, and promised again that he would/
~~said he would try to~~ control his troops.

25. Even before Mr. Urquhart's last conversation with Mr. Kimba it became evident from many signs that a plan by the Gendarmerie for a full-scale attack on the United Nations was being put into effect. Gendarmerie were moving up to encircle the airport, and a Katangese Dornier plane flew over it at 10.30 a.m. There was also evidence that Mr. Kimba and Mr. Munongo, the ^{Provincial} ~~Katanga~~ Minister of the Interior, were seeking to leave Elisabethville for Jadotville. After the last conversation with Mr. Kimba it was also clear that the long efforts of United Nations representatives to restore their vital communications by peaceful means, efforts which had been made unremittingly since the early afternoon of the previous day, had failed. There was therefore no alternative but to clear the roadblock by military means.

26. For a week the United Nations personnel in Elisabethville, both civilian and military, showed the utmost restraint in the face of every kind of provocation and of growing evidence that a concerted plan of hostile action was being put into effect against them. The long delay, while peaceful solutions were sought and United Nations troops were held back from all military measures which could prejudice such solutions, left the United Nations military position anything but improved. Further forbearance could only jeopardize the lives of the personnel of ONUC.

27. Accordingly, Brigadier Raja was asked to deal with the situation. At 1.45 p.m. ONUC ~~action~~ ^{action/} began to clear the roadblock between the airport and the ONUC Headquarters in town, and the action was successfully completed by Indian troops in about half an hour. The Indian unit lost one officer killed and four men wounded. The Katanga forces lost at least thirty-eight gendarmes and paracommandos killed, and two European mercenaries were also killed.

28. An ONUC column coming from the airfield to assist in clearing the roadblock encountered heavy fire from the old airfield and Sabena guest house to the west of the road, and found the Katangese position very strong. There were other indications that the Katanga plan for a general assault was more advanced and comprehensive than had been suspected. The ONUC column withdrew for the night.

29. Meanwhile in Elisabethville, Mr. Kimba gave a press conference in which he said that all his Ministers would die at their posts. The ONUC Headquarters in the town was brought under intermittent mortar and machine-gun fire from neighboring villas, but at last report no casualties had been incurred.

cc. Mr. Norman Ho
Mr. G. Wattles

GWG/mr

OUTGOING CODE

ok / Laly
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo *Linner*

Date : 6 Dec 61

Nº : L- 257

Following from Urquhart (ELLED 271): Quote

Night relatively quiet except for 3 bombs dropped on airport at 11.30 PM with no damage and a Dornier visit 8.35 this morning. Dunnett as Doyen of Consular Corps asked me if white population should be advised to evacuate. Advised him after consultation with military but taking no responsibility that they would probably be wiser to stay put and above all avoid Jadotville and Kolwezi road. I took opportunity to urge him through the consuls to tell white population to stay out of military ventures and that our troops had clear orders not to interfere with the population provided they are not fired upon by them. In this connection one fear of white population is precipitate arrival of Central Govt and repetition of Aville. Would strongly advise you urge Central Govt to take no precipitate action in sending representative or troops but let UN establish peace, law and order as it is now trying to do. Red Cross representative has asked if arrangements to evacuate 2 areas on airport road could be made. We have advised him that clearing up operations on road now so advanced that areas will soon be safe. All here much gratified by yours and SecGen reactions and that of world press and radio so far we can judge it here. Unquote.

Q cc: Force Commander

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Kov
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo *Lin*

Date : 6 Dec 61

Nº : L- 256

SECRET

1. Our radio in Eville has intercepted following messages yesterday at 12.00Z as follows: Quote

Who has given orders Kimba. We shall once again ask about that order. This is not necessary the order is given unquote Presume this relates to orders regarding road block. Message continues. Quote 16-23 kilo south of the airfield the bridge on the way to the airfield is mined. 6 armoured cars on their way to Pt 16. 002 will be there in about 1 hour. Unquote. We are confirming whether the bridge is mined. 002 appears to be Dornier which appeared over head approx 13008. Quote Indians have advanced against us and are only 700 metres from us. ~~Wax~~ To hell with everybody. About 25 Indians. We try to make them move. They refused. They have dug in there. 700 metres from us. We cannot move from here. What shall we do unquote. This refers to Dogra P1 post on track Swedish Battalion Airfd south of airfd. Quote We cannot start from Kolwezi until 1200 hours. From Eville you must be Jadotville at 1300 hrs. Orders from Capt Musung. Act quickly Unquote. Presume this refers to reinforcements. Quote Send the patrol soonest as possible of 30 men to point 16. Sec of 16 men with 2 armd cars and sub machine guns has to be just inside of railway ~~xx~~ line. Unquote. Presume pt 16 is road over-bridge over railway to road Eville to airfd. This is a bottleneck. Quote Munongo and Kimba want immediately escort to Jadotville with about 60 men and 4 armrd cars. TNR 1055 hrs all other activities have to stop until escort provided. Unquote.

2. Further intercepted messages indicate Gendarmerie have prepared Jadotville runway to take jets. Orders have been issued to all their jets and other aircraft to concentrate on Jadotville earliest.

3. Another intercepted message at 14.20Z indicates Fuga to pay UN Forces first visit at 16.20 Z.

4. Re last message of para. 1 Raja states: Quote
It appears Munongo and Kimba intend to leave town as either they are in league with their military plan or situation out of their control Unquote.

SECRET

cc: Force Commander

[Handwritten signature]
jg

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	X SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorite Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

Outgoing Clear

1961 DEC -6 AM 7:48

O.N.U.C.

Address(es) To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
 From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
 Date : 6 DECEMBER 61

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

Nº L.255

In view comments made on question of information during Congo Advisory Committee Meeting 28 November paren see especially Mrs Rossels remarks on page fiftytwo of meeting record number sixtythree unparen following facts may be useful Stop ONUC has active public information office whose functions are aimed at following objectives Colon

To collect and make available all relevant information concerning Unations operations in Congo so that people of world and particularly the Congolese may be kept informed as to Unations main purposes cma its daytoday activities cma and its cumulative achievements Stop This is done by systematic daily briefings of reporters covering ONUC in Leopoldville and by provision of services to Congolese press and radio locally Para

Increasing efforts have been made to inform Congolese people about Unations and its activities Stop This has been done in Leopoldville through radio programs and through articles in daily and weekly newspapers well as through personal contacts with representatives of information media and information attaches of various ministries and public services Stop OPI has been seeking ways to extend its activities particularly through the presentation of material in local languages of Congo dash ../...

T. O. R.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

T. O. D.

Date :

Nº : (Contd.)

thus about onehundred articles on activity of ONUC Mission and on Unations background have been sent to provinces in Lingala cma Tshiluba cma Kikongo and Kiswahili for use by local press Stop They have met with great success and are still in great demand Para

A pamphlet in French has been printed and widely distributed with help of Congolese authorities Stop Another brochure with many illustrations calculated to appeal to local needs and tastes is in preparation Stop Considerable UN Day material paren leaflets cma school pamphlets cma UN Charters cma UN flags cma and UN photographic displays and several other brochures unparen have been widely distributed in all the provinces on occasion of UN Day last October Para

In Visual field we are starting film showings notably in Orientale Province where Unations films have been sent for presentation in Stanleyville schools Stop Same activities will be started in Leopoldville shortly Stop UN photographs have been put at disposal of local press and many of these have been reproduced Para

ONUCs broadcasting activity has expanded with improved relations with Central and Provincial Governments Stop Although time on National network restricted to daily half hour cma it has recently been possible

.../...

Nº : (Contd.)

devote fifteen minutes daily to factual explanations ONUC policy also point by point refutation of frequent distortions of this policy broadcast by Radio Katanga Para

Where previously political conditions precluded any ONUC broadcasting on provincial stations cma aye series inauguration Unations Day twentyfour October now being broadcast weekly five provincial centers cma Leopoldville cma Coquilhatville cma Bukavu cma Stanleyville and Luluabourg in French Lingala Swahili Kikongo and Tshiluba Stop Using vernacular of each area these programs are directed at Quote Man in the street Unquote Stop Simple Language dash and aye liberal admixture Congolese and other African music undash has been used to explain general aims of Unations in Congo and to describe both its concrete achievements in sixteen months of ONUCs operation as well as future projects Stop Reactions from directing personnel provincial stations already most favorable Para

Radio recordings of highlights ONUC operation also regularly sent NewYork and Geneva for worldwide diffusion French and English Stop Lack of movie cameraman has hampered information operation but Stills covering all aspects ONUC work regularly supplied picture editors NewYork ENDALL

OUTSIDE

CODE

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

LEOPOLDVILLE
5 DECEMBER 61

1961 DEC -5 PM 5:22

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 254

SEC GEN from LINNOR

Kim

LATEST INFORMATION GIVEN US ON TELEX BY EVILLE AT 1600Z IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
ROADBLOCK CLEARED BY GURKHAS AS REPORTED STOP A COLUMN COMING FROM DIRECTION
OF AIRFIELD TO ASSIST GURKHAS IN CLEARING BLOCK HELD UP BY HEAVY FIRE FROM OLD
AIRFIELD AND SABENA GUEST HOUSE. POSITION FOUND TO BE VERY STRONG. THE COLUMN
WITHDREW FOR NIGHT AND FURTHER PLAN FOLLOWS IN CIPHER. GENDARMERIE CASUALTIES
SO FAR TWO EUROPEAN MERCENARIES DEAD AND THIRTY EIGHT GENDARMES AND PARACOMMANDOS
COUNTED DEAD; OWN CASUALTIES ONE OFFICER DEAD, FOUR WOUNDED. RAJA AND SMITH STILL
WITH DOGRAS. IT IS CLEAR THAT GENERAL ASSAULT PLAN WAS MUCH MORE ADVANCED AND
COMPREHENSIVE THAN WE EVEN SUSPECTED. KIMBA GAVE PRESS CONFERENCE AT FOUR PM
STATING THAT ALL MINISTERS WOULD DIE AT POSTS. OUR HEADQUARTERS UNDER FIRE
INTERMITTENTLY BY MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS FROM VILLAS IN LOCALITY. NO CASUALTIES
OWN TROOPS AT HEADQUARTERS SO FAR. UNQUOTE.

CC/ Acting Force Commander

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

Off/Sec PRIORITY

SECRET

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 5 DECEMBER, 1961
NO : L- 253

267
Following from Urquhart (ELLEO ~~266~~).

Quote In view failure of our efforts at negotiated solution for freedom of movement and firm indications of concerted military plan against ONUC George and Eye handed over to Raja at 12.15 PM. Eye have informed consuls to inform Kimba and have briefed press on sequence of events. Made clear that for one week we have shown utmost restraint in face intolerable provocation and growing evidence concerted plan against ONUC to such lengths as seriously to risk our military position. George and Eye reluctantly have concluded we can no longer hold responsibility for further restraint. All efforts will be made subject to overriding military considerations to avoid civilian loss of life or fighting in town. We feel all possible effort for peaceful solution with Gendarmerie incited and organized by mercenaries have been exhausted. No-one regrets this more than civilians and military here. Essential these exhaustive and risky efforts for peaceful solution be given widest recognition. Raja and George still stuck with Dogras but hope return soon. Everyone here in top form. Firing started at 1.45 PM at roadblock. Unquote.

c.c. to Acting Force Commander.

JP/jf.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 5 December 1961
No. : L- 252

pk Kaur
Lin
SECRET

Reference your 8471.

1. For whatever it is worth, following information may prove of some assistance for decision regarding Van Roey. Among Elisabethville documents being examined by us, we found a note dated 29 September 1961 signed by Van Roey on note paper of Banque nationale du Katanga with following text:

"Ordre de mission. Monsieur Léopold Piérart est chargé par la Banque nationale du Katanga d'une mission à Kolwezi et Kongolo.

A. Van Roey
Directeur "

Document carries the rubber stamp of the Cabinet du Président, Etat du Katanga. Photocopy being pouched to-morrow.

2. Significance of document may lie in the official stamp of Tshombe as well as in fact that the "mission" was to Kolwezi and Kongolo at the end of September. In any case, in our opinion, normal practice in banking business does not require Director of a private bank to communicate through Cabinet of the President, or send copies of business letters to Cabinet of the President. Responsibility for at least an explanation seems to lie on Van Roey.

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

NK/mr

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York
From : LINNER, Léo
Date : 5 Dec 61
N° : L-251

OK/Koe

Shin

SECRET

Following from Urquhart (ELLEO 265): Quote

Situation 9.45 AM as follows: Hoffaker and Dunnet saw Kimba 9.15. Kimba while conciliatory produced side issues; Barricade on Jadotville road (removed last night) story of gendarme wounded last night, of which we have no information at all; etc. They beg us to hold off a little longer and believe we are near to solution. We are more doubtful. There is Cabinet Meeting from 9-10.30 this morning which Kimba is to attend, after that I will talk with him and we will see where we stand. Propose to restrict discussions at present stage solely to question of block on airport road. In continuing to try to arrange this by negotiation we have particularly in mind our detainees ~~xx~~ in Camp Massart. In connection with current situation we also recall Kimbas constant harping back with George and Succar on 3 Dec to airport problems, namely, control tower and stationing of adequate force of gendarmes at airport. He also mentioned these problems in Press Communique. Unquote

JP cc: A/Force Commander

JP/jg

CODE
OUTGOING ~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

LEOPOLDVILLE
5 December 61

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 250

SECGEN from LINNER

SECRET

1. Further our ONUC 6993 we have received following letter: Quote
Monsieur le Chargé de Mission,

Il me revient que la direction de la Filtisaf à Albertville éprouve encore quelques inquiétudes avec ses travailleurs en ce qui concerne leur protection.

Je vous jure, Monsieur le Docteur, que je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir pour assurer la protection du personnel blanc et congolais dans cette région. Dans le cadre de la politique du Gouvernement central, je me rendrai prochainement dans le Nord Katange et je travaillerai en collaboration avec l'ONU en ce qui concerne la protection des vies humaines.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Docteur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.
Pour le Premier Ministre, Le Vice-Premier Ministre, Jason Sendwe. Unquote.

2. We have reported to you in our L-239 about Sendwe's trip.

GF/jg

OUTGOING CLEAR

1961 DEC -5 PM ~~ROUTINE~~
~~PRIORITY~~
O.N.U.C.

To : SECGEN, New York
From : LINNER, Leopoldville
Date : 5 December 1961
No. : L-249

A. Linner

Following from Radio Brazzaville:

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Leopoldville Government, Mr. Matiti, has told the Press in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, that he did not believe his Government had any use for an arbitrator or a mediator in its conflict with Mr. Tshombe, the Katangan President. Mr. Matiti headed the Leopoldville delegation to the Central African Republic's National Day celebrations. Commenting on rumours that the good offices of the French-speaking African personalities would eventually be required, he said that the Congolese Government intended to settle the problem in the traditional African manner. He added that he was favourable to the 12 Nations Brazzaville Group but that he did not understand the position taken by President Fulbert Youlou of the Brazzaville Congo."

SL/cc

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, New York
Fm : LINNER, YACOB, Léo
Date : 5 Dec 61
Nº : L- 248

OK/PC/KOO

SECRET

1. Following from Urquhart (ELLED 266): Quote
Spoke to Kimba at 11.30 after Cabinet meeting. He was in the meeting of General Staff. I informed him that we had tried for 2 days conciliation to solve our difficulties but without success. We feel our good faith has been abused by presence of troublemakers since his order to lift roadblock we are informed his gendarmerie are moving up to encircle airport and Dornier flew over at 10.30. I said we had little doubt this was a concerted plan doubtless also unknown to him. He countered with some very feeble charges against us which I dismissed. He then begged me to continue conversations and to restrain our military while he would do same with gendarmerie. I said matter was now out of our hands that for normal reasons we had now to assure freedom of movement and that responsibility for what might happen was his. I also informed US Consul who will continue his effort but I fear in vain. We are now compelled to take necessary military measures one result of this will be that we shall have to withdraw our guard from refugee camp since the Brigadier needs all possible troops. Consequences of this may be very severe. We have info that Kimba and Munongo are seeking escort to go to Jadotville. Raja now taking over repeat Raja now taking over. Unquote.

2. IN further message (2339) from Raja, Smith and Urquhart following just received: Quote

Request air strike Kolwezi now. Instruct aircraft to look out for tgts area Eville and any column road Kolwezi-Eville. Shall indicate with smoke. Act required urgently. Unquote.

3. Meeting with Acting Force Commander, Air Commodore and Acting Chief of Staff now being held.

cc: A/Force Commander

SECRET

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

OK *Ram*
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Leo *Lin*

Date : 5 Dec 61

No : L- 247

SECRET

I. Following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 259):Quote

Major Singh now believed to be held by paracommandos in Kolwezi, as hostage. Only method of recovering him alive would therefore be continued pressure on the government.

2. We are continuing all possible pressure for release UN personnel.

3. Number of personnel now missing presumed in Katangese hands is now 16.

This figure includes Major Singh and the doctor and 3 medical personnel of Swedish Battalion who went to try to rescue 3 Swedes shot in tunnel Sunday afternoon. The number 16 comprises 12 Swedes, 2 Norwegians, 1 Argentinian and Major Singh. Italian driver was reported as returned. Unquote.

II. Above is in answer to message we had sent to Eville on 4 December as follows: Quote

Ajeet

1) What specific measures have been taken to recover Major/Singh without further delay since believed to be alive at Jadotville.

2) Similarly what action to obtain release of UN personnel mentioned in your 02307 believed to be at Camp Massart.

3) In your 02307 you mention 12 missing - Italian since then returned - in your ELLEO 240 you quote ten. What is correct figure ? Unquote.

J JP/jg

cc: *Force Commander*

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Rom
IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK

Fm : LINNER, LEO *Linner*

Date : 5 Dec 61

Nº : L- 246

SECRET

Following from Urquhart (ELLEO 264) : Quote

As of 8 AM this morning there are still gendarmerie at the round about roadblock on airfield road in spite of Kimba's assurances that troops would be withdrawn last night and his public assurances to the Press and Radio to this effect. Plans are therefore being made to remove roadblock. I have asked Hoffaker to contact Kimba urgently and he reports Kimba's staff as saying Kimba went to bed last night with the firm impression roadblock had been removed. Hoffaker asks us to hold off little more to give Kimba, whom he is now visiting, a chance to act. We have made it clear we cannot accept this continued restriction and will not even discuss time limits any more but will hope that before action is to be taken roadblock will be withdrawn. Unquote

cc: A/FORCE COMMANDER

JP
JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK

From : LINNEN, LEO

Date : 5 Dec 61

Nº : L- 245

OK Ramm

SECRET

Your 8479 Courrier d'Afrique in Léo has facilities for printing leaflets or pamphlets provided we run at least fifty thousand copies and providing format permits use of rotary presses. As Kiswahili is most important local language in Katanga would suggest leaflets with French on one side and Kiswahili on other as simplest most economical format. OPI Léo have own translators who can be used for this.

cc: Mr. HQ, OPI

[Signature] jg

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Date : 5 Dec 61

Nº : L- 244

OK / R...

SECRET

1. Re para 3 L-242 following received from Urquhart (ELLEO 262): Quote

In view Kimba's assurances his troops will be withdrawn from roadblock if ours are, and in view of darkness, language difficulties, and possible misunderstanding, Cmdr has decided that as a gesture of good faith and confidence in Kimba's word UN troops will be withdrawn forthwith from roadblock. In informing Kimba of this we have emphasized our withdrawal is not on basis of military weakness, because we had all strength to remove roadblock, but is done to show our sincere intentions to avoid incidents, our anxiety to spare Elisabethville an armed conflict, and to show our confidence in his undertaking to remove roadblock. We have emphasized we cannot allow our freedom of movement to be restricted. British and US Consuls have also talked with Kimba in this sense. We understand General Moke and price Commissioner Sapwe are now at roadblock arranging withdrawal of para commandos. On our side Colonel Waern is there and has been instructed to withdraw our troops. We have also made statement to Press explaining reasons for our action. Unquote.

2. Statement referred to in last sentence above is contained in L- 243.

JP/jg

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLOVILLE

5 Dec 61

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 243

SECGEN from LINNER



PRIORITY
1961 DEC -5 AM 10:29
O.N.U.C.

Following is gist of statement made orally to Press by Urquhart in Eville
at 20.00 Hrs on 4 December: Quote

Yesterday the UN Representative requested the acting President, among other things, to remove all road blocks in the interests of peace and security of the population of Eville and the essential freedom of movement in ONUC operations.

After Midday today a roadblock was established by paracommandos at a point on an essential communication line for the ONUC movement. On account of the recent incidents all ONUC people have been and are under orders to move with escorts to avoid further arrests stop One such escort ~~xxxxxxx~~ approached the road block referred to and no effort was made by the paracommandos to permit access. In an effort to avoid unnecessary conflict the ONUC people concerned returned to General Raja and myself for instructions. They were asked to await further orders. ONUC communicated with Mr. Kimba through the US and UK Consuls and transmitted the message that the road block was removed by 1800 hours local time the convoy and escort would be obliged to assure freedom of movement by clearing the road block in the normal military manner. Ample military means were available for this purpose. After half an hour I received a message that Mr. Kimba agreed to remove the road block and return the company of paracommandos to their camp and to withdraw the armed card which were deployed at the road block. We understood that the Minister and Senior Military officers would come to the roadblock and make necessary arrangements for having it lifted and for having the paracommandos and other troops moved back to the camp.

Immediately, a Senior UN Military Officer was sent to the roadblock to make the necessary arrangements with the Katangese. After one hour nobody had appeared from the other side to arrange the modalities. A further enquiry was put to Mr. Kimba; it was understood that the necessary officers from his side were on their way forward to make the practical arrangements. In these circumstances as an act of good faith and to give every opportunity for the arrangements agreed to by Mr. Kimba to be put into effect the UN convoy and escort are returning to their camp on the understanding that the roadblock will be withdrawn without further delay and that no further attempt will be made to interfere with the freedom of movement required by ONUC. Although UN had all necessary military strength to remove the roadblock, this decision has been made on the strength ~~of~~ of Mr. Kimba's assurances as a gesture of good faith and in the interests of the population of Elisabethville. Unquote.

cc: A/Force Commander
Mr. Norman Ho, OPI



JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

oh p.
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York
From : LINNER, Leopoldville *Shinin*
Date : 4 December 1961
No : L-242

Following cables received:

- (11039)
- 1) "Raja for Linner Force Cmdr Info Mil Ops Mil Info. special SITREP up to 1800 hrs. Raja and Smith visited HQ sector B 1130B Hrs for personal briefing of unit Cmdrs and staff. Visited airport on return approx 1300 hrs. Info received at 1400 hrs that para commandos established strong road block of 1 Coy supported by armoured cars and 60 MM Mors between airport and HQ Katanga Comd. Strong patrol sent out to probe and if necessary clear road block by force. Kimba meantime contacted by consuls and info that road block should be removed by 1800 hrs failing which UN would take action to remove it. Kimba promised to send Offrs out for this. Own patrol therefore ordered to hold fire in case Kimba carries out his promise. Raja and Smith now with Dogras at airport and shall return to HQ when situation clarifies. Connect our Elleo260 of date."
- 2) "(ELLEO 260) Linner Yacob from Ivan Smith Raja. Roadblock now consists of paracommando COY plus continually being reinforced, 3 armoured cars and 60 MM mortars. Correspondents report that there are number of Europeans in civilian clothes at the block and that the troops there are under impression that UN is about to attack. Kimba has informed US Consul he is sending officers to scene to regulate situation. We have asked US Consul to inform Kimba the block must be removed and the troops returned to camp or it will be cleared by normal military means. We had previously given deadline of 6 PM but in view of Kimba's statement have prolonged it. If block is not lifted we shall be obliged to remove it by normal military means."
- 3) "(ELLEO 261) Linner Yacob from Urquhart. My 260 have had 2 more apparently sensible conversations with Kimba who has undertaken to withdraw his troops from the roadblock if we withdraw ours. He and senior military officers say they are now proceeding to roadblock to disperse troops. He asks us to restrict movement in the area tonight to avoid incidents and he will do same. It is now getting dark and we are keeping our fingers crossed hoping this will work. When eye told Kimba there were Europeans in civ clothes with troops at the roadblock eye think he was genuinely angry and appeared to realize we were trying our utmost to avoid incidents. Will report further in due course."

SL:mm

cc: A/Force Commander

OUTGOING CODE

04.1.
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York
From : LINNER, Leopoldville
Date : 4 December 1961
No : L- 241

Lin
SECRET

Following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 252): "Situation in town indicates that Gendarmerie ~~rod~~ blocks and patrols had been reinforced as a show of authority but apart from that the situation is calm. Soldiers all ranks understandably furious and at Raja's and Colonel Waern's request I am going to sector B at 1130 this morning to brief battalion commanders on political and diplomatic actions being undertaken and on the critical importance of studied action which will carry with it the essential political and press support. Consular and press corps here this morning again seem solidly with us. I told them that Kimba had threatened to shoot down any UN plane which came over Katanga. Report just received from town indicates that local European population rapidly becoming heartily fed up with gendarmerie and commandos because all cars are stopped at road blocks and drunken soldiers become indiscriminately insulting. Consequently feeling seems building up among European population that they wish these road blocks could be got out of the way. If this can all be allowed to stew for a little while without incidents actually occurring and if we continue to confine ourselves to any essential local action, I can well believe that in a short time we might have a measure of the public and local support that was disastrously lacking in September."

cc: A/Force Commander

Q
PJ:mm

OUTGOING CODE

OK *Rosen*
PRIORITY

To : SEC GEN, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 4 December 1961
No : L- 240

Lin
SECRET

- 1) Following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 251): "Consuls meeting together 11.00 local this morning. Eye briefed Hoffacker and Brian briefed Dunnet on our midnight talks with Kimba and the demand we put to him for an immediate arrangement through the consuls to release missing people. After their meeting, consuls will undoubtedly meet Kimba to reinforce our protest and request. Essential that diplomatic demarches from all countries involved, supported by as many others as possible, should bring maximum pressure immediately on Kimba because the experience that Brian Urquhart had in the para commando camp proved that a direct military assault to obtain his release would of course mean death, whereas the pressure that Dunnet, Hoffacker and eye put on Kimba and Munongo forced them to get involved in arranging the release. Eye know the consuls are making a maximum effort but the more swiftly and energetically they can be buttered from every quarter the greater is our chance in getting all our people alive. Consuls also agreed Red Cross representatives would be used to the maximum. Swedish Consul also busy. They are coordinating all efforts at release with us. Have already fully briefed Red Cross representative on situation, names, etc."
- 2) Demarches at your level to Permanent Delegations most concerned would undoubtedly be of value. I am doing likewise here with Embassies.

cc: A/Force Commander

A
PJ:mm

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Date : 4 December 61

N° : L- 239

SECRET

1. Have received following letter reference N° 2948/61, dated 4 December 1961, from Prime Minister: Quote

Objet: Voyage du Vice-Premier Ministre J. Sendwe

~~Monsieur le Chef de Mission~~

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir mettre à disposition du Vice-Premier Ministre, Monsieur J. Sendwe, un avion pour le parcours Léopoldville/Albertville. /

Le départ est prévu pour le 5 décembre 1961.

Nous vous remettons ci-joint la liste des personnes qui accompagneront Monsieur Sendwe dans ce déplacement.

Je vous remercie à l'avance des facilités que vous voudrez bien accorder à ces voyageurs dans l'accomplissement de leur mission. Unquote.

2. Sendwe will be accompanied by some 12 National Deputies, Ministers of the so-called Government of Lualaba and other civil servants.

3. At last minute trip was postponed until 6 December and a UN plane is being provided accordingly.

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

Fm : LINNER, Léo

Date : 4 December 61

Nº : L- 238

okjm
SECRET

Following from Ivan Smith, Raja (ELLEO 258): Quote

Visited HQ Sector B this morning and proceeded to Dogra Battalion HQ near airport.

Since arrival strong roadblocks have been set up between airport and HQ Kat Comd

y / including gendarmerie 6 wheel armoured cars and a para commando Coy. Suspect this

was done on hearing we were away from HQ. Have sent out strong exploratory patrol

to check strength of roadblock. Shall disperse roadblock by force if necessary and

shall return to HQ by 1 or other means as soon as possible. Dornier reported flying

over area recently. Unquote.

cc: Acting Force Commander

JP/jg

OUTGOING CDEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
4 December 1961


1961 DEC -4 PM 5:31

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

L- 237

For SECGEN from LINNER



Following received from Ivan Smith and Urquhart:

" Following is text of letter from Kimba received 10.35 4 December.

"Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Etat du Katanga présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Représentant de l'ONU. Il a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance qu'il a appris de source autorisée que des compagnies aériennes rencontrent les difficultés suivantes concernant :

primo complexe de la tour de contrôle de l'aérodrome international d'Elisabethville. Les plans de vols et les avis de vols ne sont plus transmis. Les renseignements radio sur les positions de nos avions sont plus que précaires. Certains jours à 0800 heures locales il n'y a pas de contrôleur à la tour. Il est désormais impossible d'obtenir la moindre prévision météorologique pour les vols. Secundo le service anti-incendie est inexistant. Tertio le Bureau des Notam ne fonctionne plus. A cet effet nous n'avons pas été prévenus de ce qu'en date du 9/11/61 l'aérodrome de Kaminaville était fermé pour cause de travaux. Un de nos avions (le OO-CHK) a eu des flaps endommagés à l'atterrissage à Kaminaville et l'avion immobilisé durant 10 jours pour cause de réparations. Quarto la partie droite du hangar est occupée par un dépôt de vivres appartenant à l'ONU. L'entretien de nos avions doit donc se faire sous un soleil de plomb ou sous la pluie. Dans les deux cas l'entretien de ces derniers est sérieusement retardé d'une part, et d'autre part les conditions de travail

sont pénibles. Cinque les Télécoms Kolwezi sont très rarement à l'écoute sur 118.1, tandis que le radiophare et le radiobalise ne fonctionnent plus. Sexto le radiophare de Kaminaville est en panne. J'aime à croire que vous ferez tout ce qui est en votre pouvoir pour faciliter la navigation aérienne qui est dans l'intérêt de tous. Je profite de cette occasion pour vous confirmer ma lettre 110/771 du 22 novembre 1961 concernant le même sujet. Salutations." "

We are drafting reply which we shall send to Elisabethville.

GWV/mr

cc. Mr. G. Wattles

OUTGOING CLEAR

PRIORITY

LEOPOLDVILLE
4 December 61

1961 DEC -4 PM 5:31

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 236

SECGEN from LINNER




I. Ivan Smith reports (ELLEO 256): quote

Following is text of letter received 10.35 4 December. Quote:

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception du texte de votre lettre me transmise en date du 30 novembre par Monsieur le Représentant de l'ONU à Eville. Vous me reprochez les termes de mon discours du 25 novembre 1961 et vous imputez la responsabilité personnelle pour toutes atrocités qui pourraient en être la conséquence. Vous me reprochez également ces paroles quote C'est la guerre que viennent de décider à New York onze nations unquote et vous me déclarez admettre difficilement qu'il s'agisse là d'un malentendu. En exprimant ces paroles, je traduisais le sentiment profond de toutes les couches de la population katangaise. Il est difficile en effet de faire croire aux Katangais que les dernières résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité signifient autre chose. Ces résolutions qui ne nous ont d'ailleurs pas encore été officiellement communiquées, sont connues par le peuple soit dans le contexte de violents discours préalables contre le Katanga, prononcés par des représentants de pays ignorant totalement la situation et la mentalité katangaise, soit par des commentaires agressifs de la Radio Congolaise, soit à la lumière des derniers événements de septembre, ou en vertu de résolutions moins explicites, une agression lâche et sanglante fut effectuée contre nos soldats en dépit d'assurances formelles du représentant local des Nations Unies. Si vous relevez ~~xxxxx~~ certains termes de mes discours, vous n'en relevez pas d'autres. J'y ai pourtant explicitement et formellement déclaré que si par le fait des Nations Unies il y aurait état de guerre moi seul aurais le pouvoir de déterminer le moment du déclenchement des hostilités. Par cette déclaration, je tenais à prévenir tout mouvement

d'hostilité spontanée ou en provenance d'éléments dont les intérêts ne se concilient pas avec les nôtres. Cette déclaration doit être mise en regard de toutes mes déclarations antérieures et que je renouvelle aujourd'hui. Nous sommes disposés à régler pacifiquement tous nos ~~xxx~~ problèmes communs et nous ne prendrons jamais l'initiative d'une agression. Nous sommes résolus à tout faire pour éviter tout incident et espérons de votre part le même effort. Par une lettre adressée ce jour à Monsieur le Représentant de l'ONU à Eville j'exprime mes regrets au sujet des incidents dont il fut victime. Les soldats de garde à l'habitation du Général Moke et qui appartenaient au même détachement que celui que fut attaqué le 13 septembre à la poste centrale, ont été relevés par une autre unité, leur officier a été puni et les coupables ont fait l'objet de sanctions. Par même lettre je précisais les mesures prises pour éclaircir les circonstances de la disparition du Major Singh et du décès de son chauffeur, circonstances qui pourraient laisser croire à l'intervention d'éléments extérieurs profitant du passage du Sénateur Dodd pour ternir notre réputation à l'étranger. J'espère vivement qu'une collaboration sincère et notre bonne volonté commune permettront de trouver à nos problèmes une solution définitive en ~~xxx~~ sauvegardant nos intérêts. Unquote.

2. Letter referred to in last para above is as contained in L- 235

 JP:jg

PRIORITY

1961 DEC -4 PM 5:31

OUTGOING CLEAR

O.N.U.C.

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER? LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 4 DECEMBER 1961
NO : L- 225

Linier

Ivan Smith reports (Elleo 254) :

Quote Following is text of letter dated 2 December from Kimba received this morning 10.30 Quote Monsieur le Représentant, J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre du 30 novembre 1961 constituant une note de protestation contre les actes de violences commis le 28 novembre 1961 sur votre personne et sur celle de Monsieur Brian Urquhart.

Je prends acte que cette protestation contre les actes de violences commis le 28 novembre 1961 sur votre personne et sur celle de Monsieur Brian Urquhart. Je prends acte que cette protestation est élevée sur ordre de Monsieur le Secrétaire général p.i. des Nations Unies.

Dans une déclaration à la presse faite ce premier décembre, j'ai nettement défini l'atmosphère dans laquelle ces incidents se sont déroulés.

Veillez trouver annexé à la présente, un compte-rendu de cette déclaration.

Vous imputez ces incidents à la campagne de propagande menée par moi-même et d'autres autorités katangaises et vous m'en attribuez la pleine

et entière responsabilité.

Je ne puis admettre ce point de vue, j'ai moi-même toujours été partisan de solutions pacifiques des problèmes qui nous préoccupent, mais devant l'agression dont nous fûmes victimes le treize septembre dernier et devant les dernières Résolutions adoptées au Conseil de Sécurité, suite à de violentes interventions de représentants d'Etats étrangers, je ne pouvais que mettre mon peuple en garde en regard des violentes réactions suscitées par ces événements.

Un des points de mon discours fut d'insister sur le fait que moi seul pouvait constater et déclarer l'état d'hostilité, prévenant ainsi tout mouvement spontané ou venant de la part d'éléments dont les intérêts ne se concilient pas avec les nôtres.

Quoiqu'il en soit, mon Gouvernement et moi-même regrettons et déplorons vivement les incidents dont vous fûtes victimes ainsi que votre adjoint. Les auteurs de ces incidents qui ont réagi aux provocations résultant des patrouilles de soldats de l'ONU a proximité de la résidence du Général Moke nous sont connus et ont déjà été punis, spécialement l'officier qui commandait le détachement militaire.

D'autre part, par lettre en date du 1er décembre, je vous ai mis au courant des dispositions prises pour déterminer les circonstances au cours desquelles un soldat Ghurka fut tué et la disparition du Major Singh constatée.

Tout élément parvenant à notre connaissance vous sera immédiatement communiqué.

Comme vous, nous mettons nos espoirs en une solution pacifique par la négociation de nos problèmes. Notre désir d'éviter tout incident est réel, et nous espérons que de votre part, vous mettrez tout en oeuvre pour éviter tous faits qui pourraient nuire aux bonnes relations que nous tenons à voir se développer entre les Nations Unies et les autorités katan-gaises.

Salutations Unquote.

Annex mentioned by Kimba is similar to report contained under para 2 our L-190.

JP/H



OUTGOING CLEAR

PRIORITY

LEOPOLOVIDLE
4 December 61

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 234

SEC GEN from LINER

1961 DEC -4 PM 4:33

O.N.U.C.

Following received from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 247): Quote

Press correspondents brought us texts of communiques issued by Kimba ^{last night.} ~~tonight which~~
(L- 233)
~~have already been sent separately stop~~ I told them that quote ultimatum unquote a
word never used by me stop Eye told them that at my meeting with Kimba and Munongo
stressed that incidents of the kind that have been multiplying in the past few days
would increasingly occur if his armed troops remained outside their camps and I
requested him for the sake of the population of Eville to bring his troops back into
the camp within a reasonable time before nightfall stop I said we were obliged to
request it by virtue of our responsibility under the Security Council to see that law
and order are maintained and the population is protected from the indiscriminate and
provocative acts which the Katangese had been causing stop I told him also that we
requested lifting of roadblocks and withdrawal of all armed patrols indicating that
for our part we would not be using armed patrols either stop as soon as we heard that
a Swede had been murdered by gendarmes at a roadblock I communicated with Kimba and
told him such an incident could not have occurred had he withdrawn his gendarmes as
we had requested earlier in the afternoon stop I said that in view of what had
happened we now had no alternative but to insist he immediately return his troops to
camp and lift the roadblocks or the Kat authorities would be held fully responsible
for any measures it became necessary to take under our directives from Security Council
stop The press correspondents here have indicated on a personal basis how impressed
they are by the continued firmness and restraint of the ONUC operation in the face of
what appears to be deliberate provocation and with the efforts being ~~xxx~~ made in spite
of this provocation to reduce the almost hysterical atmosphere of fear and panic created
by Ministerial propaganda and exploited by mercenaries. Unquote.

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
4 December 61

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L- 233

SECGEN from LINNER

PRIORITY

1961 DEC -4 PM 4:33
O. N. U. C.

Following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 246): Quote
Following is text of two communiques issued ^{yesterday} ~~today~~ by Kimba quote:

Monsieur Evariste Kimba, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, remplaçant le Chef de l'Etat a reçu Dimanche à midi les consuls des Etats-Unis et de Grande Bretagne.

Aux cours de cet entretien, la situation militaire a été évoquée. Les consuls ont remercié le Gouvernement de Katanga d'avoir fait le nécessaire pour éviter le pire dans la journée et la nuit de Samedi. Ils ont insisté pour que de tels incidents ne se reproduisent plus. A cela, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a répondu en expliquant à ses deux interlocuteurs la véritable cause de l'incident d'hier.

Monsieur le Ministre Kimba a demandé aux deux représentants consulaires d'user de leur influence sur l'organisation des Nations Unies pour que cette dernière évite tout mouvement de troupes.

L'entretien qui s'est déroulé dans une atmosphère cordiale a pris fin à 12H35.

Cet après-midi, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a reçu le représentant de l'ONU au Katanga en présence de Monsieur Succar. Ces deux dernières personnalités ont regretté les incidents d'hier et reconnu que le Gouvernement du Katanga fait l'impossible pour maintenir l'ordre. Monsieur Smith a alors demandé le retrait des Forces Katangaises des positions qu'elles occupent actuellement. Le Ministre Kimba a posé plusieurs conditions:

- 1) Restitution des armes illégalement confisquées à nos gendarmes à la plaine de la Luano
- 2) Garantie formelle et écrite de l'Organisation Internationale de faire cesser les patrouilles dans la ville d'Elisabethville
- 3) Interdiction du survol du territoire katangais par des hélicoptères et avions militaires de l'ONUC
- 4) Garantie formelle et totale de la sécurité de nos gendarmes, policiers et personnel civil katangais à la Luano.

Le premier point de ces conditions devait être exécuté immédiatement. Les armes ont en effet été remises cet après-midi aux forces katangaises. Les autres conditions seront mises à l'étude par le représentant de l'ONU.

L'entretien a pris fin à 17 heures. Unquote

Second communiqué quote Le Gouvernement du Katanga a reçu ce jour un ultimatum des Nations Unies sommant le Gouvernement du Katanga de faire évacuer immédiatement les points stratégiques de la ville occupée par les forces katangaises et ce, au plus tard cette nuit, faute de quoi l'ONU se verrait forcée de mettre immédiatement en application les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

Il semble bien, vu les événements de ces derniers jours, que les katangais soient considérés par les membres de l'ONU comme des mercenaires.

Le Gouvernement du Katanga regrette cet ultimatum avec la plus grande vigueur.

Le Gouvernement du Katanga considère que seule la négociation peut résoudre les problèmes. Il est prêt à négocier, mais à la force, il répondra par la force.

Le Gouvernement du Katanga et les Forces Armées katangeaises ont remis aujourd'hui après-midi au Consul d'Italie un membre italien de l'ONU qui avait été fait prisonnier par la gendarmerie.

Le prisonnier a déclaré avoir été bien traité.

Le Gouvernement du Katanga lance un appel au calme à la population. Il lui demande de n'obéir qu'aux ordres du Gouvernement et d'attendre les directives qui lui seraient données. Le Gouvernement du Katanga a confiance dans l'esprit civil et de discipline de ses populations.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères signed E. KIMBA. Unquote.

65/jg

OUTGOING CODE

OK / R...
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE *Linner*
Date : 4 December 1961
N° : L-231 - 232

SECRET

Following from Khiary:

"1. Le prochain rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre la Belgique et le Congo posera de nombreux problèmes qui auront une répercussion certaine sur les activités de l'ONUC.

Il est souhaitable, voire nécessaire, d'étudier dès maintenant les origines et les conséquences possibles de ces répercussions.

2. Cette reprise entraînera certainement le relancement du programme d'aide préconisée lors de la Table-Ronde économique - aide qui en toute hypothèse serait très considérable.

3. Les Congolais en général et les politiciens en particulier pensent, et c'est dans ce but qu'ils l'ont décidé, que la reprise des relations diplomatiques permettra dans une assez large mesure la stabilisation de la situation politique et aidera à rapprocher la fin de la crise congolaise. Cette croyance fort enracinée dans les esprits influencera le comportement des responsables congolais vis à vis des Belges et de l'ONUC.

4. Les Belges connaissent bien la mentalité congolaise, parlant la langue du pays, useront de toute leur influence personnelle et autres possibilités pour contrecarrer l'ONUC. Le Gouvernement Belge n'a aucune autorité sur l'orientation ou l'objectivité de l'action de ses ressortissants au Congo.

5. La Belgique a souvent annoncé par la voie de ses représentants officiels qu'il n'était pas dans son intention de faire transiter son assistance au Congo par l'intermédiaire de l'ONUC.

Cette assistance sera sûrement importante, directe, ne subissant aucun des inconvénients

SECRE

formels de l'assistance des Nations Unies.

6. Elle épousera plusieurs formes. a) Assistance en personnel, médecins, ingénieurs, techniciens, administrateurs, pour la plupart anciens coloniaux encore en chômage en Belgique. b) Bourses dans toutes les branches de l'activité et dont les Congolais sont fort friands. c) Financière par le versement d'importantes sommes revenant en réalité pour différentes raisons, de droit, au Gouvernement congolais. d) Reprise des exploitations industrielles, agricoles et autres actuellement arrêtées.

6. Cette relance de choc produira un effet tel sur les esprits du peuple qu'il sera obligé, dans sa simplicité, de considérer les Belges comme des sauveurs. Si ces derniers par un effort politique réaliste forcent leurs compatriotes au Katanga et réussissent à les convaincre de pousser Tshombé à négocier, ils auront réellement accompli le miracle et gagné la partie considérée perdue au Congo.

7. Toutefois le Gouvernement congolais n'a pas intérêt à ce que la Belgique joue un rôle exclusif, voire même déterminant, dans les affaires économiques du pays, autrement il risquerait de se trouver en présence d'une série d'arrangements comme l'accord Sabena/Air Congo qui ne serviraient pas ses intérêts économiques. Il serait indispensable que dans les secteurs sensibles le Gouvernement puisse continuer à s'appuyer sur des opinions objectives. La porte ouverte à l'assistance bilatérale pose le problème de l'isolement du Congo des conflits de guerre froide et rendra vain l'un des buts principaux de l'action de l'ONU au Congo.

8. L'ONUC ne doit pas s'alarmer pour autant de cela ni considérer le retour des Belges comme une catastrophe présageant la fin ou l'échec de notre assistance au Congo. Mais un minimum de précaution est à prendre immédiatement car le facteur temps a son importance.

9. L'ONUC doit non seulement accepter et voir du bon côté le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques et le retour des Belges au Congo, mais elle doit faciliter cela et servir souvent de Conseiller aux uns et aux autres pour que ce retour se fasse dans l'ordre et

SECRE

pour le bien de tous.

L-232

10. Elle doit déterminer avec les Congolais les secteurs où l'assistance belge peut se faire sans concurrencer l'assistance des Nations Unies ni porter atteinte à l'indépendance du Congo et à sa souveraineté. Elle doit décourager et empêcher les Belges de réoccuper l'administration publique où leur présence sera mal interprétée par les Congolais et où leur action peut avoir une influence politique néfaste sur la libre détermination du Gouvernement de la République. Elle doit maintenir la formation des cadres congolais dans une atmosphère d'indépendance qui garantit la qualité des hommes de demain.

11. Les Belges peuvent reprendre leur activité dans le secteur privé où ils permettront tout de suite une relance économique et une résorption rapide du chômage. Dans ce secteur les Nations Unies doivent donner aux Congolais la possibilité de se garantir contre une spoliation de leur richesse au profit de l'étranger.

12. Nos moyens d'action et de pression sont assez importants pour nous permettre de jouer pareil rôle. a) La qualité apolitique de notre assistance. b) La confiance dont nous jouissons auprès des hommes qui détiennent le pouvoir. c) Les services déjà rendus et que nous pouvons rendre aux moments difficiles. d) La présence des troupes des Nations Unies seule garantie pour la sécurité publique. e) L'impopularité inhérente à la qualité d'anciens colonisateurs des Belges sont autant de facteurs qui ont leur poids dans une conversation de persuasion.

13. Sur un plan pratique l'ONUC doit 1) placer aux postes névralgiques des hommes indépendants et de valeur pour permettre à l'administration et au Gouvernement congolais d'échapper à toute tentative de corruption ou d'orientation anti-intérêt national. (Ceci est déjà réalisé dans certains secteurs et est en voie de réalisation dans d'autres. Cela nécessite également une révision de notre action actuelle qui doit être réduite en quantité mais renforcée en qualité, d'où une grande liberté d'action pour nos représentants locaux 2) hâter l'intégration du personnel ONUC dans l'administration congolaise pour mettre fin

SECRET

à la critique qui nous est souvent adressée de maintenir une administration parallèle à celle du Gouvernement. 3) permettre le recrutement de certains fonctionnaires belges dans nos effectifs au Congo pour désarmer leurs critiques contre l'ONUC.

14. Prendre contact immédiatement avec le Gouvernement Belge pour faciliter l'application du plan esquissé ci-dessus et obtenir son adhésion à notre façon de voir.

15. Nous proposerions également que des conversations soient engagées sans délai avec le Gouvernement congolais pour faire ressortir l'importance d'encadrer toute aide venue de l'extérieur dans un mécanisme coordonné au sein du Gouvernement où nous aurions une équipe des Nations Unies prête à fournir tous conseils au Premier Ministre. M. Adoula a déjà accepté que cette équipe soit créée sous la direction du Professeur Badre pour lui donner directement les avis objectifs en liaison étroite avec le Conseil Monétaire et les autres organes intéressés.

Nous proposerions que des conversations soient engagées avec la Délégation des Etats-Unis à New York, ainsi qu'avec d'autres délégations, pour qu'elles exercent une pression diplomatique sur la Belgique dans le but de lui faire accepter l'encadrement de son programme d'assistance économique et technique sur le plan multilatéral.

16. Continuer notre assistance au Gouvernement congolais dans le cadre des résolutions et recommandations des instances supérieures des Nations Unies, de manière à asseoir son autorité, étendre son influence, renforcer ses moyens pour le rendre invulnérable à toute tentative d'influence étrangère."

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN ONLY, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L- 230

OK/Rou

SECRET

I received following personal and top secret from Ivan Smith and Urquhart
(ELLEO 248): Quote
We think it only fair in view of tragic events today in which one Swedish soldier was
killed and 8 Swedish 2 Norwegian and one Argentinian are held by Katangese to say the
following. Brigadier Raja has on numerous occasions in the past weeks personally briefed
units in Eville on necessity of not going about unescorted in dangerous areas. George
and eye also briefed sector B to this effect only 2 days ago. In agreement with and on
orders from Brigadier Raja we brought all civilians into Headquarters perimeter protesting
loudly. You will note that no Indian personnel have been arrested by Katangese. Those
missing have definitely not kept to instructions and we did not even know where the
11 people now arrested were at the time of their arrest. They were certainly not in UN
military areas or on duty. The tragedy today in tunnel was different since they were on
duty but did not take an escort. Unquote.

OP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

04
ep
/

PRIORITY

To : SEC GEN ~~ONLY~~, New York

From : LINNER, Léo *Linner*

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L- 229

SECRET

1. Following from Smith & Raja (ELLEO 244): Quote

If this situation continues in which inflammatory elements are clearly at work suggest New York urgently request UK Govt to close Rhodesian frontier including rail movement and important road and also exercise serious control on aircraft flying to Katanga. Unquote.

2. During a visit he paid me this morning British Ambassador was acquainted with above. He had no comments to make.

cc: Acting Force Commander

JP/jg

OK/ *Ramond*

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SEC GEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo *Linner*

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L- 228

SECRET

Further L-219 following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 249): Quote

Kimba telephoned 23458 rattled because he had information that we had concentrated 9 DC4s and 9 Curtis aircraft at Léo to fly via Luluabourg Kamina to Eville. Asked confirmation or denial. Eye told first wish to register strongest possible protest at fact he was continuing to hold 11 ONU personnel second repeat our strongest condemnation of actions which resulted in murder of a Swede and the wounding of others and now within the last few minutes eye have been informed that Swedish Doctor and 2 medical orderlies between 1830 and 1900 had gone to the tunnel to assist their wounded comrades were now missing. Said he would be responsible to world for flagrant breach cease fire and of normal behaviour. Eye repeated most urgent protest and asked arrangements release all personnel immediately through Consul. He said this was impossible and charged we still hold residue of gendarmes from airport incident. Told him extensive enquiries proved every gendarme that came into our hands had been returned and any missing can only have fled bush and we could not be responsible for his deserters. He returned to question of aircraft asking confirmation or denial. Eye told eye had no specific information but possible that aircraft were connected with rotation of troops of which he well aware. He then angrily said "Eye give you warning if any of these aircraft fly over Katanga soil they will be shot down" Eye told him this was a very grave statement. Eye would immediately report to New York and that any such action would

of course be opposed by UN. Eye repeated my request for release of all people being held immediately. He told "give me my 20 people and we shall see about your 11". Repeated that we do not have his 20 people. He told "if that is your official position my position is that eye do not have your 11". For another 10 minutes he panted irrelevantly. Unquote.

cc: Acting Force Commander

JP/jg

OK/Romano

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Linner

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L-227

SECRET

Gizenga has been actually seen in his residence at Stan yesterday by
one of our Ethiopian officers.

cc: A/Force Commander

JP/jg

[Signature]

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

OK
Baron

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Linier

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L-226

SECRET

I now have confirmation that information given out in para 1 L-208 was erroneous and that Tshombé left Brazzaville yesterday morning for Paris via Air France.

[Signature]
JP/jg

OUTGOING CLEAR

ROUTINE

LEOPOLOVILLE
4 December 61

1961 DEC -4 AM 11:37
O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS NEWYORK

L-225

SECGEN from LINNER



Para 2 our L-190 should be amended. After quote et les soldats katangais
doivent trouver cela normal et ne pas s'en inquiéter Unquote Please add :
Quote En fait il s'agit d'une feinte indignation et par un plan dorénavant mis
en place comma Unquote.



JP/jg

OUTGOING CLEAR

1961 DEC -4 AM 11:37

ROUTINE

O.N.U.C.

LEOPOLDVILLE
4 December 1961

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

L- 224 For BUNCHE, STAVROPOULOS from LINNER

Linner

REference your 7803. Kanakaratne plans to leave Leopoldville 15 th evening and spend a few days in Geneva arriving New York 21st. Wattles has agreed to remain for few days after Marcella's arrival which we hope will be expedited. I have no objection to these arrangements.

NK/mr

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

Mr. Ahmed.

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Rover

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, New York
From : LINNER, YACOB, Leopoldville
Date : 4 décembre 1961
No. : L- 223

SECRET

Reur 8467. By evening 30 Nov it was realized here that persistent radio reports and press reports for previous 48 hours of new fighting in Kapanga area and Kongolo area would have to be investigated by us to the best of our ability.

ANC HQ was contacted and they confirmed skirmishes and patrol activity in Kapanga area but could not say anything about Kongolo. In fact on evening of 30 Nov the Prime Minister's office rang to ask if we ~~knew~~ knew anything about ANC moves into North Katanga and if there was fighting at Kongolo. We admitted we had no information.)

Since neither the Central Government, ONUC HQ, nor ANC HQ knew anything about this important development, i.e. possible seizure of Kongolo in North Katanga by Stanleyville ANC an air recce was ordered for 1 Dec in an effort to ascertain at least was there fighting in the area. This plan to use air recce was reported in our ONUC 6971 of 30 Nov.

These reports about Kongolo had all the elements of truth since for many weeks previously the ANC have been moving down from Stan through Kundu and ultimately assembling at Kasongo for just such an attack.

Even today 4 Dec radio reports continue about the fall of Kongolo although there have been no reports from our garrisons at Kabalo, Nyunzu or Niemba of retreating Katanga gendarmerie. Further, this morning ANC HQ rang up this HQ for any information on this.

KOB/cc

The situation at the moment is that we have not succeeded in clarifying the matter since we have not received any result of the air recce owing to the accident.

As far as the last part of your cable is concerned it was not thought any more "military" for ~~an~~ a charter aircraft to transport a military information officer on reconnaissance than to airlift troops stores etc over the Congo, sometimes in delicate circumstances.

cc. A/Force Commander.

SECRET

OUTGOING CODE

o v d.
PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 4 December 1961
No. : L- 222

Reference your 8443. Following is text of reply by Jerkovic from Albertville:

" Complaints of Belgian Permanent Representative absolutely not correct. Wednesday 22 and Thursday 23 not one ONUC aircraft left Albertville for Usumbura according information Chief Movement Control Albertville Major Jacobs. Concerning aircraft Air Congo we have written declaration of their representative Mr. D'Hondt that not one of their aircraft left Albertville on mention dates to Usumbura. Concerning Sobelair we have written declaration of their representative CFL Company that not one ticket was issued on mentioned dates, as a result there was no aircraft. In any case Belgian Permanent Representative should inform us the number of registrations of incriminating aircraft which ~~were~~ according to him affected this transport. In any case that is pure fantasy that these persons were forced to leave Albertville by us and against their will. We have never practised this and this never would be done. Exception only mercenaries and political advisors, operation terminated September. Other people from Albertville can leave freely when they want and where they want, they are not prohibited by us. We strictly respect instructions from Leopoldville requesting permission to transport whomsoever it may be by one of our aircraft."

NK/mr

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

OUTGOING CODE

OV. en?
ROUTINE

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 4 December 1961
No. : L- 221

Huini
SECRET

Further to my L-24.

1. List of 279 foreign personnel presumed to be still at large in Katanga and, in our view, falling within para A-2 of Secco resolution of 21 February being pouched to-morrow. The detailed information relating to most of them has been gathered from examination of documents of Katangese authorities which fell into our hands.
2. Copies of these lists being also forwarded to Ivan Smith and Raja for their information.

NK/mr

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

[Handwritten signature]

OK
ffranky

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : SECGEN, New York
FROM : LINNER, Léopoldville
DATE : 4 December 61
No : L- 220

Kimba

Following from Ivan Smith : Quote . The situation is now that eye have verbally on several occasions at a meeting early in the afternoon told Kimba and Munongo that eye was under instruction to tell him that all Kat. armed troops must be ordered back to their camps within reasonable period of time today . As soon as we had news of the latest outrage resulting in death and injury to swedish soldiers eye repeated that his armed troops must withdraw immediately and if this did not happen the Kat. authorities alone must be held responsible for the consequences of any action we may be forced to take within the terms of Security Council mandate. Eye immediately conveyed to the US and through him to British Consul the nature of my talk with Kimba and they agreed to get to Kimba as quickly as possible to reinforce the request we made. US Consul on behalf of himself and British Consul Dunnett has just returned from conversation with Kimba emphasizing arguments previously put by us. Kimba told him that there was no intention of Gendarmerie roving about or attacking UN posts. He would withdraw them from key positions in town such as tunnel as soon as he was sure UN would not attack . Hoffaker assured him that such a thing was the very opposite of our intentions and offered his good offices to resolve present tension. Unquote .

[Signature]

JP/sl .

cc : A/ Force Commander

OUTGOING CODE CABLE


HK
P. Mauley

PRIORITY

TO : SECGEN, New York
FROM : LINNER, Léopoldville
DATE : 4 December 61
No : L- 219

Kimba

Following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 250) : Quote. In telephone conversation with Kimba near midnight he asked for confirmation or denial about concentration of aircraft at Leo bound for Elisabethville. Details of total conversation follow in slower cable but am immediately reporting. He then angrily said Quote. Eye give you warning, if any of these aircraft fly over Katanga soil, they will be shot down Unquote. I told him this was a very grave statement. Eye would immediately report to New York and that any such action would of course be opposed by UN. Unquote.


JP/sl

cc : A/ Force Commander .

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

OK
Franky

To : SECGEN, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Linner

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L- 218

1. Following from Ivan Smith evening of 3 December (ELLEO 239): Quote
-- One Swedish soldier killed and 2 injured including a Captain at Tunnel. On receipt news telephoned Kimba 18.20 local saying 1. Must immediately inform Secgen and Swedish Government. 2. Eye warned him at earlier meeting that continued presence Katangese armed forces Elisabethville could lead to incidents and conflict. Eye told him that we required their withdrawal within reasonable period. 3. Eye pointed out that in this incident proved my apprehensions well founded. 4. Eye asked him to give an order for the immediate return of his Army troops to the camp and let me know within half an hour that such an order had been given. His reply was that he knew that such ~~xxxxxx~~ road blocks existed and yet the Swedish soldiers in their Volkswagen hazarded the trip through the tunnel. When requested the Swedes did not stop and the guard fired at their wheels. He then claimed that the driver lost control of the car and that the man died as the result of the motor accident. We repeated in the interest of law and order and to prevent any further deterioration or incident we must ask him once again to withdraw immediately the armed Katangese personnel or Katangese authorities must bear responsibility for the consequences. Kimba said you can tell your Burmese that he should know better, having just emerged from a Colonial State, than to give ultimatums to a country of petits negres. Kimba said he was here to negotiate but would receive ultimatums. Eye repeated my request for immediate withdrawal of troops and the conversation ended. Will cable when Swedes reach hospital my information is death and injury gun fire but await confirmation. Unquote.

2. Further information obtained in subsequent message (ELLED 242): Quote
ONUC Italian hospital reports one dead and two wounded Swedish soldiers were brought
in a Civilian Red Cross vehicle after gun fire at tunnel reported earlier. The dead
man referred to had two bullets in the abdomen, the wounded Captain has fracture arm
from bullet wound, the third injured has one bullet wound in the abdomen and one in
the leg. It is true that the car crashed into a tree after the driver had been
killed. The gendarmes kept on shooting after the car crashed and the Captain believes
that he may have been shot after the crash. All men were due for rotation today.
Unquote.

3. / Following from Press Officer, Swedish Battalion in Eville: Quote
Killed soldier is Private 3412 B. Hallstroem. Injured are Captain 3311 G. Carlstrand
and Sgt. 1040 O. Rudstroem. They were attacked from behind by Katanga gendarmerie on
Saio Avenue. Car was on its way to Swedish Camp from Ghurka HQ where Capt. Carlstrand
was serving as Liaison Officer and Hallstroem as his driver. Unquote.

cc: Acting Force Commander

JP/jg



OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN ONLY, New York

From : LINNER, Léo

Date : 4 Dec 61

Nº : L- 217

Further L- 216 following from Ivan Smith (ELLEO 240): Quote

In connection with any action we may be forced to take it should be remembered that 10 of our personnel are held by the Katangese authorities and in the event of serious military action their chances of survival would be non existent. Unquote.

cc: Acting Force Commander

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

*OK
JP/sl*

IMMEDIATE

TO : SECGEN ~~only~~ . New York
FROM : LINNER , Léopoldville *Lin*
Date : 4 December 61
No : L- 216

1) Ivan Smith, on afternoon of 3 December reports : (Elleo 243) Quote.
All on military and civil side very calm and showing commendable restraint under intolerable provocation. All recognise our role at this moment is to deal effectively on local basis with each situation as it arises. As Raja points out military action over and above containment and control — requires from New York decision at highest level together with reinforcements including armour and air. Situation here is capable of disintegrating quickly if ministers fail to exercise control over hysterical gendarmerie who have been inflamed by Tshombe and other ministerial propaganda assuring them that UN is their enemy. They believe it and are terrified we are about to attack them. We will continue to do our best to avoid letting this develop into full military situation. Unquote .

2) Please note our telex conversation has already been reported to him .

JP/sl

cc A/ Force Commander