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EXTENSION OF MANDATE

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A BRIEF REPORT OF THE VISIT OF
THE UN DELEGATION FROM UNAMIR RWANDA
TO DAR-ES-SALAAM FROM 04 JAN TO 07 JAN 95

1. A UN delegation headed by the SRSG , Ambassador Shaharyar Khan visited Dar-es-salaam to meet various dignitaries of the Government of Tanzania to resolve the issue of the voluntary repatriation of Rwandese refugees from Tanzania. The delegation consisted of the following members:

- a. Brig Gen H Anyidoho - DFC.
- b. Mr Gilles Briere - Chief Logistics Advisor.
- c. Mr S Dao - OIC Humanitarian Cell/Special Assistant to the SRSG.
- d. Maj TM Pitre - Operations Officer.
- e. Mr Stene Bronee - UNHCR Representative.

2. The delegation met the following dignitaries during the visit:

- a. H.E. The President of Tanzania - Mr Ali Mwinyi.
- b. Minister of Foreign Affairs - Mr AO Kinana.
- c. Chief of Defence Forces - Gen RP Mboma.
- d. Inspector General of Police - Mr Harun G Mahundi.

3. During the visit, the modalities of the early and voluntary repatriation of Rwandese refugees from Tanzania were discussed and a number of important decisions arrived at, which are given in the text of this report.

4. In all the meetings, the SRSG Ambassador Shahryar Khan brought out the following points:

- a. There were basically two practical options to resolve the problem of refugees, namely:

- (1) Option 1. A large UN force is gathered to bring order and control in the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania, by separating the political elements from the rest of the refugees.

- (2) Option 2. The governments of Zaire and Tanzania themselves bring order to the camps with the UN giving the requisite financial and logistic support.

- b. Since members states are unwilling to contribute troops, the UN Security Council has only Option 2 to implement.

- c. Rwanda too has to create conditions to welcome and accommodate the refugees and ensure their security.
 - d. Process of reconciliation must start and stability and tranquillity must prevail in Rwanda.
5. The Ambassador also highlighted that the purpose of the visit was to find out what back up support was required from the UN by the Tanzanian government which would assist them in carrying out the task successfully.

MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MR AO KINANA

6. The following issues were discussed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

- a. Concept of Ops. The DFC requested the Minister to give the concept of ops, threat assessment in the camps and the logistics back up required from the UN by the government of Tanzania to carry out the task.
- b. Deployment of Foreign Troops. The Minister stated the TPDF troops backed by UN logistic support could accomplish the mission but no foreign troops would be allowed to be deployed in Tanzania.
- c. Hostile Reaction towards Refugees. The Minister informed that inspite of Tanzania's vast experience in refugee handling, the local population in Ngara and Karagwe districts are extremely hostile towards the refugees due to the following reasons:
 - (1) Refugees indulging in plundering , looting, murders and killing wild life.
 - (2) UN agencies assist only the refugees and not the locals whose resources have been devoured.
 - (3) All the militia who came in could not be disarmed and they now intimidating and killing the locals.
- d. Safety Zones. The concept of safety zones was discussed in detail. These would be established in Rwanda under agies of UNAMIR opposite Goma, Bukavu and Ngara with safe corridors leading to them from the borders. These zones would be well away from the borders and once the refugees enter these zones they would become IDPs whose resettlement then would be done under Op Retour. The Rwandese government have accepted the concept only on the condition that they have access to the zones to make arrests and counter the false propaganda against them.
- e. Repatriation of Refugees. It was emphasised that the repatriation of refugees must be voluntary and not forced. It was further discussed that the pace of repatriation must be such that it does not crack the fragile situation in Rwanda as the government is still inexperienced in the field of reconciliation.

f. Nairobi Summit. The Minister informed that the Nairobi Summit to be held on 07 Jan 95 was for the regional leaders to understand the political nature of the problem. He further informed that since military training was being conducted in the camps by FRGF, it was a major threat as it could result in a possible military confrontation between Rwanda and Tanzania.

MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF GEN RP MBOMA.

7. During the meeting with the Tanzanian CDF, the following staff officers were also present:

- a. Brig Gen CK Gimouge - Principal Staff Officer.
- b. Col MS Mtezo - Acting Chief of Operations.
- c. Col DA Mwawunyange - Director for Foreign Liaison.
- d. Col Gama - Director of Transport.

8. The following issues were discussed between the two delegations:

a. Composition of Force. The CDF informed that the policemen deployed in the camps are an inadequate force, as the militants in the camps are not afraid of them and thus they will be unable to break up the leadership. He felt that troops must be coopted in the operation and the following three tasks would then be carried out:

- (1) Reinforce border patrols to stop infiltration of refugees.
- (2) Assist in breaking up the camp leadership.
- (3) Escorting refugee convoys going back up to the border.

b. UN Liaison Team. It was decided that there was a definite requirement of a UN Liaison Team in Ngara district to act as a link between the Tanzanian government, UNAMIR and the UNHCR. This team would consist of 10-20 UN personnel.

c. Strength of TPDF. It was decided that the proposed strength of the TPDF would be two bns amounting to approximately 1500 pers. These bns were well trained in peace-keeping operations. While one bn would be employed in the area of the camps, the other bn would be required to patrol the borders.

d. Duration of Op. It was discussed that as multiple number of agencies are involved in the proposed op, it was difficult to realistically assess the duration of the op. However, given the condition that the leadership in the camps is broken, it was decided that the op may last for a period amounting to anything up to six months.

e. Force Structure. It was decided that a Tanzanian Force commander must be appointed and the proposed force structure including the logistics set up given at the earliest. The composition of the UN liaison teams will be suggested after the force structure is known.

MEETING WITH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICEMR HARUN G MAHUNDI.

9. The following issues were discussed in the meeting with the Inspector General of Police:

a. Joint Operations by TPDF and Police. The IG Police felt that situation in the camps was not all that alarming to warrant the use of the TPDF. He however said that there was a need to increase the number of policemen from the present strength of 310 to 500 as the camps are widely dispersed. He further informed that the composition of force included general duties policemen, detectives and para mil forces and was a viable force to contain the refugee camps. In case, violence breaks out, only then would the presence of TPDF would be required.

b. International Tribunal. The SRSG informed that the setting up of the International Tribunal at Arusha would start in end Jan 95. He further informed that the operation to start the voluntary repatriation of refugees should start in Feb 95.

SECRETARIAL NOTES.

10. The IG Police brought out the following points after the departure of the SRSG:

a. Strength of Police Required. The total strength of police personnel required was 1000 ie 500 each Ngara and Karagwe districts.

b. Joint Operations with TPDF. The IG mentioned the role of the army and that of the police must be clearly defined before undertaking joint ops. He further informed that in peace time, the army has no power of arrest unless an emergency is declared in that particular area as also the fact the responsibility to patrol the borders in peace is that of the police.

c. Crossing point over Kagera River in Karagwe District. It was brought out that there was no crossing place available over Kagera River which is 30-40 metres wide in Karagwe district and neither is there any road available on the Rwandese side. Thus there are three options for movement of refugees into Rwanda:

(1) All refugees move down into Ngara district and cross over from the Rusomo bridge.


(2) A bridge is constructed and a road is so made so as to connect to an existing lateral in Rwanda. This would require extensive recce and preparation time.

(3) Refugees in Karagwe district are brought into Rwanda through Uganda but the roads in this are in a very bad condition which would make the movement by vehicles impossible.



UNHCR

KAGERA REGION



BRIEFING NOTES - OPERATIONS

FORCE HQ - UNAMIR

INTRODUCTION

1. UNAMIR has gone through a great transformation since Oct 93 and this has led to a remarkable modification in the deployment and the operations of the Force.

AIM

2. The aim of this brief is to give a background history of RWANDA and UNAMIR since its inception in Oct 93.

SCOPE

3. The brief will cover the following:
- a. GENERAL INFORMATION.
 - b. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT.
 - c. FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT.
 - d. UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER 06 APRIL 94.
 - e. NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
 - f. IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR.
 - g. CURRENT SIT.
 - i. KIBEHO INCIDENT.
 - ii. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.
 - h. MANDATE OF UNAMIR II.
 - j. ACTIVITIES AND CONTRIBUTION OF INDIAN CONTINGENT.
 - i. 1/3 GR.
 - ii. FORCE ENGR COY.
 - III. FORCE SIG COY.
 - IV. MILOBS.
 - V. STAFF OFFRS.

GENERAL INFORMATION

4. Geographical Location. Rwanda is located in East Central Africa, having a relatively small area of 26,304 km. The country is bounded on the North by UGANDA, to the East by Tanzania, to the South by Burundi and Zaire to the West. Land locked country.

5. Terrain. The terrain is rugged with steep hills and ridges. The North is dominated by a powerful chain of volcanoes known as the VIRUNGA. The highest volcanic peak is the KARISIMBI (Approx 4500 meters). The average temp ranges from 19 degrees to 27 degrees centigrade and the peak rainy season is May-Jun when the average rainfall is 90 to 100 mm.

6. Vegetation. This varies from tropical rain forest in the West to savanna grassland in the East.

7. Ethnic Division. The population is made up of three ethnic groups: HUTU 85%, TUTSI 14% and TWA 1% The population before the war was estimated to be in the range of 8 million, of which approx 2.5 million people are presently in the refugee camps in Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire as per following details:

a. Burundi 23,000 refugees located in refugee camps in Magara, Ruvumu, Kibezi, Ntamba, Mugano, Majuri and Rukuramijab.

b. Zaire Approx 1.4 million refugees loc in Zaire:

i. Goma 800,000 refugees in Muguna, Kibumba, Kahindo and Katale.

ii. Bukavu 600,000 refugees in Bukavu and Uvira regions.

c. Tanzania Approx 600,000 refugees loc in Tanzania:

i. Karagwe Dist 450,000 refugees in Murongo, Kagenyi, Chabilisa and Omukiriro.

ii. Ngara Dist 150,000 refugees in Burigi, Musuhura, Benaco, Lumasi and Lukole.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

8. ZAIRE, RWANDA and BURUNDI have identical colonial past in that they were all under Belgian domination.

9. RWANDA and BURUNDI were both originally inhabited by the TWA

tribe. Then came the HUTUs from the North, hundred of years ago followed by the Tutsis during the 18th century. Under colonial rule the Tutsis were exclusively given western education which made them dominant over the rest of the local population even though they did not form the majority. The Tutsi domination created problems in both countries. In Burundi the minority Tutsi tribe still controls the military, Civil Service and the economy of the country.

10. In 1959 the Tutsi domination of the majority Hutu in RWANDA was rejected through a rebellion which resulted in the overthrow of the ruling Tutsis. The rebellion led to the fleeing of over 160,000 Tutsis into neighbouring countries while an estimated 20,000 were killed. In 1961 a UN supervised referendum in the country brought victory to the Hutu led party known as the "Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARME HUTU). The power base in Rwanda therefore shifted to the Hutu majority from 1961.

11. The situation in Rwanda though tense was stable until Oct 1990 when an estimated force of about 10,000 men largely made up of exiled Tutsis crossed into North Eastern Rwanda from Uganda. The initial attack was repulsed by the RGF with the help of Zairian and French troops. The force which was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Force turned guerrilla with most of its attacks on Rwanda coming from the North and North West. The attacks continued with the RPF gaining territory until March 1993 when a cease fire agreement was signed between the Government and the rebels.

12. UNOMUR Following this new cease fire, the Security Council authorised UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION FOR UGANDA AND RWANDA (UNOMUR) to be deployed on the Uganda side of the border with a mandate to verify that no military assistance was provided across the border to Rwanda. In Jun 94, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary General's recommendations that UNOMUR mandate be terminated within 3 months. Accordingly, UNOMUR closed down on 20 Sep 94.

13. Under the truce signed in March 93, the RPF gave up about half the territory it controlled to give way for the creation of a 19 KM wide demilitarized Zone. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and RGF under the aegis of the OAU signed the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT which called upon the UN to put in place an International neutral force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 5 Oct 93. At Arusha the warring factions agreed on the following:

- a. Install a Broad Base Transitional Government.
- b. Set up transitional institutions
- c. Deploy a neutral international force

sectors within the UNAMIR AOR.

CURRENT SITUATION

29. FORCIBLE CLOSURE OF IDP CAMPS.

a. Genocide Week. From 07 Apr to 14 Apr 95, Rwanda observed the genocide week in which national mourning was carried out in remembrance of the victims of the genocide. Anti UNAMIR rallies and reburial ceremonies were held throughout the country.

b. Closure of smaller camps. From 13 Apr 95 onwards, the Rwandese Govt commenced the forcible closure of the smaller IDP camps which resulted in mass scale migration to Kibeho, Ndago and Munini DP camps in sector 4A.

c. 18 Apr 95. At 0300 hrs on 18 Apr 95, RPA cordoned off the complete complex of Kibeho, Ndago and Munini DP camps with a view to forcibly close them. RPA fired in the air to collect the IDPs in certain selected places. 11 IDPs were killed in the resultant stampede.

d. 19 Apr 95. On 19 Apr 95, Kamana camp was closed. The DFC visited the camp to assess the sit on ground.

e. 20 Apr 95. At about 1400 hrs, an IDP tried to snatch a wpn from an RPA soldier. RPA opened fire killing 20 IDPs and injuring another 60. FC visits the camp to assess the sit on ground.

f. 21 Apr 95. Ndago DP camp is cordoned off. SRSG visits Butare to appeal to the Rwandese Govt to allow supply of food and water to the IDPs.

g. 22 Apr 95. 1030 hrs, Zambatt tps are fired upon by unknown persons. Between 1155 hrs and 1250 hrs, IDPs attempt to break the cordon. RPA open fire resulting in cas. Again at 1710 hrs, IDPs try to break the cordon. RPA open fire with automatics, HMGs, RPGs, mors and grens on the IDPs and the firing goes on till 1915 hrs. 2000 IDPs were killed and another 650 injured.

h. 23 Apr 95. An estimated 2000 IDPs occupied the MSF building compound and refused to vacate the camp. RPA cordoned off the complex and placed anti tank wpns in a bid to demolish the building alongwith the inmates. The sit was defused after protracted negotiations between the RPA and UNAMIR.

h. Follow up. The Kibeho incident invited world wide criticism. UNAMIR provided invaluable assistance in treating the cas, transporting the IDPs to home communes, providing security in ORCs, OWSSs and home communes, provision of humanitarian aid and other such tasks that greatly assisted in bringing the sit to normalcy at the earliest. There were confirmed reports of the RPA exhuming bodies in Kibeho and taking them away to unknown places in a bid to hide the actual no of casualties that occurred.

j. 09 May 95. On 09 May 95, the last 546 IDPs were screened, registered and transported to their home communes using UNAMIR and IOM transport. Kibeho camp ceased to exist as of date.

30. International Commission of Inquiry An International Commission of Inquiry has been convened by the Rwandese Govt on 01 May 95 to investigate the Kibeho incident and to pinpoint the blame. The Commission started its work on 03 May 95. The members of the Commission are:

- a. Belgium.
- b. Canada.
- c. France.
- d. Germany.
- e. Netherlands.
- f. OAU.
- g. UK.
- h. UN.
- j. USA.

MANDATE OF UNAMIR II AND PREVAILING POL SCENARIO

31. The current mandate of UNAMIR expires on 09 Jun 95.

MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS

BASIS FOR WORKING

Sub Sect

1. Each Sub Sect will require the materials/ stores/ equipment as given in succeeding paragraphs:-

2. Communications. The following communication equipment would be required for each Sub Sect:-

- (a) 1 x V- SAT (with 1 x tele and 1 x fax channels) with accessories and batteries.
- (b) 1 x INMARSAT-C (for traffic clearance/reserve).
- (c) 2 x MOTOROLA base station along with accessories and batteries.
- (d) 7 x MOTOROLA hand held sets(for Cdr,Ops Offr,Log/Pers Offr,Hum Offr,Duty Offr(3)) with spare batteries and charger.
- (e) 3 x MOTOROLA (VHF) mobile radio set(vehicle mounted) for Cdr, Ops Offr,Log/Pers Offr.
- (f) 1 x Repeater station.
- (g) 6 x Tele (for Cdr, Ops Offr, Log/Pers Offr,Ops/Duty Room,Sig Det,Cdr residence).
- (h) 3 x Charging sets.
- (i) 6 x Secondary batteries.
- (j) 4 km Cable.

3. Transport.

- (a) 4 x TOYOTA forerunners(Cdr,Ops Offr,Hum Offr,Duty Offr).
- (b) 1 x Pick up (Log/Pers Offr).

4. Office Equipment. Besides hiring suitable office accommodation following major office equipment would be required:-

- (a) 5 x Desk Top Computers(Cdr, Ops Offr,Log/Pers Offr,Hum Offr,Signal Detachment).
- (b) 3 x Xerox machines(Ops Offr,Log/Pers Offr,Signal Detachment).
- (c) 7 x Desks.
- (d) 14 x Chairs.
- (e) 7 x Cupboards.
- (f) Adequate maps.
- (g) Adequate stationary.

Teams.

5. The following are required for each Team:-

(a) Communications.

- (i) 2 x MOTOROLA hand held sets with spare battery and charger.
- (ii) 1 x MOTOROLA mobile station(vehicle mounted).

- (b) Transport. 1 x TOYOTA forerunner/Land Cruiser.

Other Equipment/Stores.

6. For each Sub Sect following would be required:

- (a) 1 x Sat dish.
- (b) 1 x TV.
- (c) 1 x VCR.
- (d) 2 x Generators.

Net Requirement of Material/ Store/ Equipment.

7. Working on above basis the net requirement would be as given in succeeding paragraphs.

8. Communications.

- (a) 6 x V-SAT(with 1x tele and 1x fax channels each).
- (b) 6 x INMARSAT-C.
- (c) 12 x MOTIROLA base stations along with accessories and batteries.
- (d) 92 x MOTOROLA hand held sets with spare battery and charger each.
- (e) 43 x MOTOROLA (VHF) mobile radio sets (vehicle mounted).
- (f) 6 x Repeater stations.
- (g) 36 xTele.
- (h) 18 x Charging sets.
- (i) 36 x Secondary batteries.
- (j) 24 x km of cable.

9. Transport.

- (a) 49 x TOYOTA forerunners/Landcruisers.
- (b) 6 x Pick ups.

10. Office.

- (a) 30x Desk Top Computers.
- (b) 18x Xerox machines.
- (c) 42 x Desks.
- (d) 84 x Chairs.
- (e) 42 x Cupboards.
- (f) Adequate maps.
- (g) Adequate stationary.

11. Other Equipment/Stores.

- (a) 6 x Sat dish.
- (b) 6 x TVs.
- (c) 6 xVCRs.
- (d) 12 x Generators.

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HQ MILOB3 GROUP

SITUATION IN RWANDA

AN ASSESSMENT

22/3
Ops for

General

1. Six months after the termination of the Rwandese Civil War, the general situation which appeared calm for some time, is once again becoming tenuous. This is a natural phenomenon as both the present and past former governments are gearing themselves towards wrestling the initiative for the expected tussle which is likely in the future. To expect the situation to stagnate at the levels of calm achieved in Oct-Dec 94 would be an incorrect appreciation of the ^{political and} social dynamics which are evolving and manifesting themselves.

Situation

OBSERVATIONS

2. The current situation, which has many imponderables, is best described with a few pertinent observations which are covered in succeeding paragraphs.

DIVISION
IN RANKS
OF GOVT

3. The present government is at a difficult cross road in its process of decision making on the future course it wishes to adopt towards reconciliation. This is primarily because of a schism within its ranks and the perceptible emergence of a hardliner camp which appears to desire greatly hardening of attitude towards the majority population and more stringent measures to bring the perpetrators of the genocide to book. It appears that almost all political and military actions of the officials at various levels are a manifestation of this basic observation.

2

DIFFERENT
PERCEPTIONS
ON
OP RETOUR

4. OP RETOUR, like any other operation has had an impact which could not have been anticipated. While it has succeeded in bringing home people in fairly large numbers in the early months there has been a tapering effect in the last few weeks. Both UNAMIR and the government want people to return home at the earliest but the perception on the actions at the home community and now appear to be widely different. While UNAMIR advocates a course of reconciliation through creation of conditions to boost the confidence of the returnees, the government has chosen to follow a course of selective repression through a system of arrests akin to preventive detention. The government appears wary of the UNAMIR approach with the feeling that this could project wrong signals which may soon be read as a stone towards "reconciliation without a price."

EFFECT OF
ABSENCE
OF JUDICIAL
SYSTEM

5. In the absence of a judicial system, the arrests appear to be arbitrary and the government's holding facilities have been flooded beyond capacity. The number of arrestees continues to multiply as no system exists for weeding out the innocent from the guilty, which thus invites human rights criticism.

CLANDESTINE
PRISONS

6. With the pressure brought to bear on the government by UNAMIR through its regular advice to create a judicial system, the government has chosen to resort to resort to clandestine prisons to hold the excessive number of arrestees. This has enabled it to carry on executing its campaign of arrests with impunity.

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OBSERVATIONS
ON PATTERN
OF ARRESTS

7. The systematic arrest campaign has created a fear psychosis amongst the majority population which appears to be an aim of the security ~~the~~ arm of the new government. The arrests campaign has different levels of intensity as described below:-

- (a) The arrests are visibly more marked in the communes adjoining Kigali City. This appears to stem from a possible appreciation by the government that former government elements are attempting to infiltrate into the belt of swampland around the city to establish bases to execute hit and run operations against the city. The intensity of arrests in the communes bordering Kigali appears to be targeted against the creation of such bases. The operations ~~are~~ of the RPA are mainly by night since it is believed that these elements ~~return~~ ^{retire} to the precincts of the built up areas within the bordering communes.
- (b) Arrests in remaining areas are less deliberate and are mainly based upon accusations by the minority community. In many ^{instances} ~~cases~~ these are purely cases of personal vendetta.
- (c) A disturbing aspect which appears more marked in recent weeks is the number of cases of individual soldiers of the RPA seeking personal revenge in their home communes.
- (d) The intensity of arrests is also a level higher in those communes where the present government efforts have ^{experienced} ~~had~~ personal tragedies during the war.
- (e) The home communes of OP RETOUR have also witnessed a higher level of arrests.

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EFFECTS 8. The campaign of arrests all over Rwanda has had
OF ARREST the following effects:-

CAMPAIN
ON SECURITY
SITUATION

- (a) Dilution in confidence of OF RETOUR returnees.
A few families from communes adjoining the camps have returned to Kibeho and Ndogo camps.
- (b) Drop in confidence of potential returnees in IDP camps.
- (c) Fear psychosis amongst Hutus in most communes in sectors 2, 4B and 3. The male population in some communes appears to have reduced due to a flight of this segment.
- (d) Initial signals of possible mass movement of majority population in some sectors of a few communes, particularly around Kigali.
- (e) clandestine movement of Hutu population into Burundi. Approximately 8500 have moved ^{through the} open border illegally in the first 11 weeks of 1995.

SITUATION 9. The security situation in the areas bordering Zaïre
IN AREAS remains tense with forays by former militia elements
BOROBANG into Rwandese territory. The following aspects are
ZAIRE pertinent:-

- (a) In Sector 5 a small percentage of refugees have returned but confidence is being shattered by successful killings of some returnees by the former militia.
- (b) Criminal and banditry activities are rampant in Sector 4C with former militia elements from the Ijwi Island complex making successful raids into Rwandese territory.
- (c) With the RPA spread thin on the grounds in these areas and an existent majority Hutu population the abilities of the Rwandan Government to counter former militia activities in these

areas is limited. It chooses to react by cracking down on the population to force it to desert from providing support to these elements.

(d) With greater success it is likely that the former militia elements will seek to carry their forays deeper into Rwanda.

POLITICAL
MILITARY
Aims

10. The aim of the ^{former} militia elements appears to be centred upon three areas — The Rwanda-Zaire border belt, the IDP camps in Sector 4A and the communes bordering Kigali in the Sectors 2 and 3. With creation of instability in these three areas it possibly hopes to keep the RPA actively preoccupied and tied down, thus preventing it from concentrating its efforts at ^{an} ultimate point of decision. A low intensity campaign of this nature can hope to keep alive the aspirations of the majority population in preparation for the ultimate conventional battle.

IMPROVING
FOR
THE
Rwanda
Govt

11. In this scheme of things it is essential that the former government prevents any efforts towards reconciliation by the present government, keeps the refugee population tied down to Zaire, ensures that the IDP camps remain in existence to provide the bases for the militia elements and finally create conditions of instability all over Rwanda.

12. ~~The~~ If his appreciation of the former government's aims, aspirations and modus operandi ^{is accurate} ~~is accurate~~ it appears that the current government's reactions thus far, are partially correct but in greater part wrong. The campaign ~~against~~ ^{against} government's opinion about thinning out or closing the IDP camps appears to be a step in the right direction. ~~but~~ ^{However,} its campaign

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of arrests aimed at ~~more~~ suspected perpetrators of genocide is neither assisting in the creation of a climate for successful return of IDPs nor ~~allowing~~ ^{allowing} the direction towards reconciliation. It is also winning it no international support. On the other hand, it is only creating greater schisms in an already ^{divided} society and encouraging even the moderate minority community to adopt a hardline stance towards the majority. This approach is likely to ~~approach~~ prove counterproductive.

13. The government should :-

- (a) Adopt population control measures with a more measured scale of activities against the majority.
- (b) Encourage reconciliation.
- (c) Adopt a transparent and fair judicial system to try the hordes of arrestees.
- (d) Increase the confidence of IDPs in the camps to allow them to return peacefully to their home communes.
- (e) Rein in and discipline the lower ranks of the RPA to create a more encouraging environment in the home communes.
- (f) Prepare itself militarily to counter the activities of the former militia in the Zaire-Rwanda border belt.
- (g) Consider creation of a security belt around Kigali city to prevent creation of bases by the former militia.
- (h) Work towards winning international support by working hand in hand with UNAMIR and UNL agencies.

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UN HQ ORDERLY RM

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To : MILOBS GP HQ, KIGALI (Maj KKN Thacker)

From: SECTOR CDR, SECTOR 3, GIANAMA

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN RWANDA FOR
INCLUSION IN BRIEFING FOR FC

DATE: 26 MAR 95

1. Reference our conversation on the subject.
2. Assessment of 6 pages is forwarded.
3. Best regards.


(SA Hosnan)

Col

Sector Cdr

IMPORTANT TASKS PERFORMED BY MILOBS

General

1. MILOBS are the eyes and ears of SRSG/FORCE CDR/CMO/DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, highly mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war torn countries. They are performing very important tasks in UNAMIR(RWANDA). Hence it is felt that even in the revised mandate, the strength of MILOBS should not be reduced/ be only marginally reduced. Some of the important tasks performed by the MILOBS are given in succeeding paras.

Patrolling.

2. Patrolling is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:-

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation.
- (b) To obtain information about terrain and topography.
- (c) To assess the general situation in a given area.
- (d) To show the presence of UN.
- (e) To interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to UNAMIR operations/tasks.

Visits to Communes.

3. Visit various Communes in the area of responsibility to enquire about the following and take necessary actions/ info concerned agencies for necessary actions:-

- (a) Meet Commune Bourgemestre and enquire about Commune problems.
- (b) Population. Population details , ethnic groups and their intersay relationship.
- (c) Assess living conditions of local population.
- (d) Food. Check availability of food and water in the Commune. Distribution of food if any and what agency?
- (e) Orphans. Their number, condition and problems.
- (f) Education. State of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems if any.
- (g) Prisons. Check conditions of prison and detention centres . Check condition of prisoners, human right violations and the judicial system available.
- (h) Agriculture. Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- (i) Health. Check prevalent diseases hospitals/health centres, availability of doctors/nurses and supply position of medicines.
- (j) Security. Assess the security situation, cases of banditry arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (k) RPA. Deployment , strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population.

(l) Administrative Setup. The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.

(m) Returnees. Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security/harassment if any, housing, food and attitude of locals and RPA.

Escort Duties.

4. MILOBs provide unarmed escorts to :-

- (a) VIPs and other visiting persons.
- (b) NGOs.
- (c) For the IDPs, while moving back to their home communes, the MILOBs are tasked for following:-
 - (i) Monitoring of target Communes.
 - (ii) Liaise and coordinate between Open Relief Centres (ORC), local authorities and IDPs.
 - (iii) Escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) to ORC/ home communes in conjunction with RPA and UN troops.
 - (iv) Provide liaison between RPA and Un troops.

Humanitarian Situation.

5. MILOBs are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Hum Offr who works in close coordination with local Humanitarian, Human Rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:-

- (a) Close contact with the Prefect and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
- (b) To work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees.
- (c) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
- (d) Works in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in Commune cachots and prisons.

Advantages of MILOBs

6. MILOBs have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all offr with good experience, sound military background and possess analytical mind. Some of the striking advantages of Military Observers (officers) are:-

- (a) Even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision.
- (b) Because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation.

(c) It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem in Rwanda).

(d) Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilisation of meager UN resources. MILOBs can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs.

(e) It has been experienced that often representatives of HR and other NGOs insists on MILOBs accompanying them.

(f) Where numbers are playing predominant role (as the Rwandese Govt is insisting on certain numbers of total strength of UNAMIR all inclusive), retention of maximum number of MILOBs may be more useful to UNAMIR.


Recommendations.

7. In view of foregoing , it is strongly felt that one of the following options could be adopted:-


(a) Option One. The strength of MILOBs to remain at the existing level. This option would be most beneficial to the organisation due to reasons given above.(Existing Organisation is given at Appx A attached).

(b) Option Two. The strength of MILOBs be marginally reduced from present 320 to 288 (a reduction of 10 %).Suggested Organisation of MILOB group with such strength is given at Appx B attached.


ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



SUGGESTED ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

mi ho B

To: List D
CISS

From: G3 PLANS

Info: COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

Date: 7 Jun 95

Subject: DEPLOYMENT PLANNING DATA SHEETS

SLOGO
info Branches here
File: 5000.48(Plans)
8/6

1. UNHQ New York has recently requested update information to the deployment planning data sheets (DPDS) detailing UN owned and contingent owned equipment for contingents currently deployed in Rwanda. Therefore, a brief on these requirements will be given to contingent logistic/movement officers, sector FSAs, PCIU, ISS and generator unit representatives at 1330 hrs on Wed 14 Jun 95 in the UNAMIR HQ conference room.

2. The brief will cover the requirements and procedures involved in rotation/withdrawal of troops and cover the following points:

- a. Baggage allowance for individual/units on rotation/withdrawal.
- b. Preparation of staff tables/deployment planning data sheets ,
- c. Responsibility of FSAs and unit Log Officers;
- d. Movement from sector location to concentration area,
- e. Movement from concentration area to home country location.
- f. Requirement for container support, and
- g. Movement of sensitive/dangerous cargo.

3 All addressees are requested to advise availability and details of members attending the brief to MCC (attention Jan McMillan, Ext 11100, Fax 11100) by 1600 hrs on Mon 16 Jun 95

see

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.26 (Plans)

To: List A, B & D
CAO

From: G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

Info: DFC
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
RPA LO

Date: 13 Jun 95

Subject: **PROPOSED UNAMIR FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE REVISED MANDATE**

Reference:

A. UNHQ New York Code Cable 1937 dated 9 June 1995

1. With effect 9 Jun 95 UNAMIR has received a new mandate (Reference A) which has shifted the focus from a peace-keeping to a role of assisting in the normalisation and stabilisation of Rwanda. On this basis, the tasks that UNAMIR will undertake can be divided into:

- a. tasks specifically required to sustain a United Nations peace-keeping presence in Rwanda, mainly in Kigali; and
- b. tasks aimed at assisting the government of Rwanda in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction and in the promotion of a climate conducive to the stability and to the return of refugees.

2. In response to the new mandate, a concept for future operation in Rwanda was developed by this HQ and passed to UNHQ New York. UNHQ was requested to determine the troop contributing nations as soon as possible to allow the commencement of planning for the downsizing of UNAMIR formed troops and the rotation of personnel and equipment back to contributing nations. Extracts from the UNAMIR concept of operation are produced below for your information.

Force Commander's Concept of Operations

3. The revised mandate will require UNAMIR to reduce its formed troop strength to 1,800 personnel by 9 Oct 95 passing through a strength of 2,330 by 9 Sep 95, or sooner. The force level of 2,330 will be used as a bench mark rather than an intermediate stage in order to avoid disruption

and turbulence in redeployments. The Milobs and Civpol strengths will remain at their current authorised levels of 320 and 120 respectively. Helicopter support should remain at the current establishment of five aircraft provided by Canadian Helicopters International.

4. To achieve the new mandate Rwanda will be divided into five sectors (Enclosure 1) and UNAMIR will be structured with a reduced Force HQ, a battalion group and support services (medical, military police, logistics, engineer, signals) located in Kigali to conduct tasks to sustain peace-keeping operations. A movement control unit of fifteen military personnel will be required for a period of three to four months to supplement the Movement Coordination Centre to assist with the downsizing of UNAMIR as directed by the new mandate. These personnel must be fluent in English, be trained in all aspects of field movement (road, rail, sea, air & freight operations) and be capable of being deployed independently in small teams both within the theatre and to the sea points of departure.

5. Four independent company groups (commanded by LTCOL) will be located in Kibungo, Nyundo (near Gisenyi), Gisakura and Gikongoro to provide a focal point for the provision of humanitarian aid, assist UNHCRFOR representatives, facilitate the return and reintegration of refugees into their home communes and provide limited assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics and medical care.

Proposed Force Structures

6. The revised mandate has been approved with a total force strength of 1800 formed troops, 320 Milobs and 120 Civpol. Therefore, the following force structure is proposed:


- a. Force HQ (35 pers)
- b. One battalion of four infantry companies in Kigali (800 pers)
- c. One engineer squadron (125 pers)
- d. One medical company (100 pers)
- e. One signal company (75 pers)
- f. One Logistic Group (85 pers)
- g. Four independent company groups (each of 135 pers)
- h. One military police platoon (30 pers)
- i. One movement control unit (15 pers)
- j. Milobs (320)
- k. Civpol (120)

A proposed organisational chart for the force structure is attached as Enclosure 2.

Enclosures:


1. Sector deployment Map
2. Proposed UNAMIR Organisation Chart

UNAMIR ORGANISATION CHART



SECTOR DEPLOYMENT MAP

Enclosure 2 To
G3 Plans SCOO-26 (Plans)
Dated 13 JUN 95
TANZANIA





UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : SECTORS 1,2,3A,3B,4A,4B,4C,5 AND 6 DATE : JUNE 95
FROM : MILOB GP HQ
SUBJECT : REDEPLOYMENT/REORGANISATION MILOBS.

1. Please be informed that in view of the new mandate significant changes in deployment and organization of UNAMIR will take place. While there will be no change in the strength of MILOBs, the UNAMIR troops will be reduced to a considerable strength. Due to this reduction of troops, MILOBs have to fill the gap and will take over some tasks which have been assigned to troops so far. However, the main task of MILOBs will remain same as of now with special emphasis to humanitarian assistance, monitoring of the reconciliation progress and the security situation. It is further considered that every Prefecture might become an independent sector itself.

2. You are therefore requested to give your views on the planned reorganization and redeployment and to forward the possible future organization of your sector. The organization should include necessary strength, concept of operation and the requirements of various items like communication systems, office equipment, computers and vehicles, etc.

3. You are requested to send your reply by 15 June 95 positively.

4. Your cooperation in this matter is highly appreciated.

5. Best regards.


AHSANULLAH
LTCOL
SOO

FAX DONE
TO ALL SECTORS

Prepared our proposal.
Lt Col Opong is going to discuss.
A/Sec - 8/28/4

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.26 (Plans)

To: FC
DFC
COS
DCOS SP
FMO
DCMO
CHAO

From: DCOS OPS

Date: 27 Apr 95

For discussion today.
Let DCMC know we
very early at 0800 to look
at the my 4000 proposal.
21/4
DFC/...

Subject: POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR A REVISED MANDATE

Please find attached a brief on the possible force structure for a revised mandate. I would appreciate your comments/suggestion by COB 29 Apr 95.

BRIEF ON POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE

TO

FULFIL A REVISED MANDATE

- *The force structure identified below should only be implemented if the Rwandan Government agrees to adhere unconditionally to all aspects of the SOMA.*

Proposed Tasks and Troop Requirements - Current Mandate

- Deploy into Sectors as Required (to provide aura of security)
 - 143 communes. One section to visit four communes each day, therefore, 36 section are required. This equates four companies (3 x section per platoon x three platoons per company x four companies per battalion) Two companies would be required for relief and as a reserve. Therefore, two battalions of 800 troops per battalion would suffice and at the same time allow a certain amount of flexibility to react to unforeseen situations.
 - Total: 1600 Troops → How would they be equipped? 1600 troops in 16000 km²?
- Protect Displaced Persons and Refugees
 - Although the return of refugee is a possibility it should not be a force determinant. If the refugees at some time in the future decide to return to Rwanda, which is highly unlikely at this time, an increase to the force structure will be required.
- as in the past had more troops.
- Provide Armed Escorts to Human Rights Personnel and Representatives from the International Tribunal, including Full Time Protection to the Prosecutors Office
 - 143 x Human Rights Field Officers will each require on the average two troops for protection (286).
 - Protection of the HQ will require a platoon (35 troops). → Inadequate - A company of 100 troops which FC is not allowed to do - need guards?
 - Protection of the 35 x Tribunals representatives will each require on the average two troops (70).
 - Total: 391 Troops
- Assist Operations of Relief Agencies and NGOs
 - No specific troops to tasks; by product of presence and protection troops.
 - Assist in the distribution of aid to communes (integral unit transport, no additional resources required). } A provision must be made.
 - HQ (five Milobs) plus HAC/MILOB teams (three Milobs per team) in each Prefecture (35 Milobs).
 - Total: 35 Milobs
 - Milobs teams of three will cater for CTO and leave. No?

- Monitor Borders

- Due to the terrain, a combination of boat (three boats x six Milobs in each) and helicopter (3 helo x 4 Milobs in each) patrols will be required (30 Milobs).
- Monitoring 15 x border crossings will require a team of three Milobs at each (45 Milobs).
- HQ/Coord for these elements (10 Milobs)
- Total: 85 Milobs
- *If vehicle or foot patrolling of the border is envisaged it would require a significant increase to the force structure (Milobs and formed troops)*

- Monitor/Observe the Flow of Refugees and Conditions in Communes

- See Monitor Border (previous)
- 143 communes. One team to visit four communes each day, therefore, require 36 teams of three Milobs (108 Milobs).
- One MILOB/HRFO Ready Reaction team (three Milobs per team) for each of the ten Prefecture (30 Milobs).
- HQ/Coord (9 Milobs)
- Total: 147 Milobs

- Train Commune Police and more Gendarmes (to civilianise police)

- CIVPOL activity. Commissioner to evaluate requirement of current 125 authorised strength.

- Build up Civil Service/Public Servants

- Political staff to evaluate this requirement.

- Assist in the Establishment of Justice System (judges, lawyers)

- Engineer elements could assist in vertical construction in prison renovation and construction (See below).

Additional Tasks and Troop Requirements - Peace Building Mandate

- Repair and Improvement of Infrastructure

- If military involvement is desired, repair of town/commune water supply, construction of roads and bridges and repair of building (schools, government buildings etc) could only be carried out by army engineer elements. It is estimated that a Construction Regt, with heavy plant, would be required. This would be both expensive and likely very difficult to obtain from contributing countries. Furthermore, this is likely best achieved through the international aid community, donor countries and the world bank. However, if this task were incorporated into the force structure it would entail a increase of approximately 500 troops to the force structure.

Support Functions to the Force

- **Medical Support**

- The support provided by a medical Support Force would include a level one, two and three treatment facility, trained aero medical evacuation (AME) and road evacuation crews, and preventative medicine advice through environmental health teams. This will also include a Force Medical Officer and staff.
- Total: 200 Troops

- **Engineer Support**

- Provision of EOD, limited road and site preparation and limited vertical construction would require a engineer squadron.
- Total: 200 Troops

- **Signals Support**

- The terrain and the dispersion and location of formed troops will require signal detachments in all prefectures/sectors.
- Total: 125 Troops

- **Logistic Support**

- Continuation of the Integrated Logistics System will be required.
- Total: 85 Troops

- **Self Protection Forces**


- Protection Kigali infrastructure, such as UNAMIR HQ, UN facilities and contractors, and the provision of a RRF and escorts (for resupply and VIPs) will require a battalion (800 troops).
- Total: 800 Troops

Required Force Structure

- **Total Units Required**

- Three battalions (800 pers each battalion)
- One engineer squadron (200 pers)
- One signal company (125 pers)
- One medical company (200 pers)
- One Logistic Group (85 pers)

Total Military Personnel Required

•	Troops	3,401
•	Milobs	
•	Total Force	<u>3,668</u>

Brief prepared by: LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3 Plans
Cleared by: COL J. Arp, DCOS OPS
27 Apr 95



DISCUSSION PAPER ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE MANDATE

A. Current mandate

1. Under its resolution 965 of 30 November 1994, the Security Council decided that UNAMIR's mandate should be extended to 9 June 1995 and that it would continue to perform the following tasks:

- a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
- c) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Resolution 965 also expanded UNAMIR's mandate to include the following tasks:

- d) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;
- e) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

B. Status of implementation of UNAMIR's current mandate and implications for its future role

2. An estimated 2 million Rwandese refugees remain in neighbouring countries and the IDP camps inside Rwanda continue to shelter around 200,000 displaced persons. The rate of IDP return and refugee repatriation has been reduced to a trickle, especially because the security situation in the country has continued to deteriorate.

Should the situation change and the return home accelerate, there would be a reduced need for the protection of IDPs, a function performed by our formed troops at present. Conversely, should the process of repatriation of refugees increase, formed troops would be needed to escort returning refugees from border areas to their home communes.

Although its present mandate extends UNAMIR's protection role to "civilians at risk in Rwanda", this term is vague and imprecise, as such a category of persons could, in a conflict situation such as that obtaining in Rwanda, be stretched to embrace a large number of people. Thus, this part of UNAMIR's mandate should be modified to require UNAMIR's assistance in more clearly defined cases.

3. As long as the need for distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations remains, UNAMIR military forces would continue to be needed for the provision of security and support.

4. The Security Council has called upon the Government of Rwanda to play an even greater role to repatriate refugees, to promote national reconciliation and to reinvigorate the political process, including the creation of an appropriate mechanism for sustaining dialogue between the Government, the refugee community and the United Nations. The Security Council mission which visited Rwanda on 12 and 13 February 1995 concluded that national reconciliation was a continuous process over the long term and that it was the primary responsibility of the Rwandese themselves.

Observing that progress in this domain so far was limited, the mission urged the Government to continue to play a leading role, in particular to widen the political process to include all segments of Rwandese society. As reconciliation is generally deemed indispensable for lasting peace and progress, this aspect of the mission's work is likely to remain vital. At the same time, it would appear that progress in this domain is unlikely for several years especially as reconciliation involves the population as a whole. It is more likely, in the near term, to work towards a political settlement based, for instance, on the generally accepted power-sharing formula provided for under Arusha. UNAMIR could therefore continue to exercise its good offices in this regard, as appropriate, including serving as an intermediary or mediator. In this connection UNAMIR, working in close cooperation with relevant United Nations agencies, could assist in the area of preventive peace-building by helping to restore and strengthen civil society and good governance, through such means as support for institutional reforms involving the reestablishment of the country's judicial and police systems. A broad programme of civic education could also be launched to sensitize the population on the need for tolerance and respect for the rule of law and the rights of all citizens.

5. Due to the volatile security situation, UNAMIR is likely to continue to escort UN personnel throughout the country, including human rights monitors and staff of the Prosecutor's office conducting investigations throughout Rwanda for the International Tribunal. This task could be performed either by formed troops or by military observers, the exact numbers to be determined as soon as the full complement of human rights monitors is deployed and the size of the Prosecutor's staff in Rwanda is known.

Furthermore, protection of UNAMIR and other United Nations staff and property in the country, especially in the event of an emergency, would remain UNAMIR's responsibility for which formed troops would continue to be needed. This task could conceivably be performed by a UNAMIR rapid reaction force, the size and configuration of which would need to be determined, taking into account, *inter alia*, the total number and location in Rwanda of the personnel and property involved.

6. UNAMIR's assistance in the training of a national police force would continue to be required to meet the country's internal security needs. Therefore, CIVPOL's recently increased authorised force of 120 observers is seen as the minimum if UNAMIR is to be able to fulfil its mandated task to help train and establish a new, integrated national police force.

7. The Security Council, by its resolution 965, also requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible steps that could be taken by the United Nations to promote the establishment of an effective mine clearance programme for Rwanda. The Security Council mission which visited Rwanda in February 1995 recommended, on its part, that an integrated inter-agency demining programme be established as soon as possible in Kigali and expressed the hope that the international community would contribute generously to it. The Security Council may wish to entrust the coordination of such an inter-agency demining operation to UNAMIR in the context of its future mandate.

C. Regional developments and implications for UNAMIR's future role

8. Conditions in neighbouring countries could also have a bearing on the nature, extent, size and duration of UNAMIR's role in Rwanda. Should conditions worsen dramatically in Burundi, this would have immediate humanitarian and possibly security implications for Rwanda. Extremist groups from both countries could intermingle with genuine refugees to destabilise further the situation in both countries. Furthermore, the growing reports of military training for Rwandese refugees in the neighbouring countries, in particular Zaire and Tanzania, strengthen the case for regional developments to be taken into account in any strategy to stabilise the situation in Rwanda. Although the Government of Rwanda could take counter-measures by closing its borders, this could have serious adverse consequences in terms of negative international publicity, and it would also be detrimental to Rwanda's interests since, being land-locked, it is highly dependent upon its neighbours, especially Tanzania, as well as Zaire, for the provision of goods and services.

The Security Council has supported the convening of an international conference to address a range of political and other issues aimed at identifying long-term solutions to ensure peace, security and sustainable development in the subregion.

UNAMIR could also be assigned a role in this regional framework, specifically through border patrolling or observation and monitoring. Although such a measure could serve as a useful deterrent by helping to avert armed infiltration, it is unlikely to succeed in the absence of large infusions of United Nations military personnel, equipment and other resources. Not only are the borders, especially those with Zaire, long, sinuous and otherwise difficult to monitor, previous United Nations experience with UNOMUR on the Rwanda-Uganda border has demonstrated the difficulties inherent in such operations. Moreover, any such operation would need the express approval of all the countries concerned (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire), and there is no guarantee that this may be forthcoming.

Another aspect to be considered is whether the extension to UNAMIR of a border role could be seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of Rwanda. Since Rwanda is still considered to be a conflict area, the performance of this role, especially patrolling, could be viewed as interventionist support on the side of the present Government in this civil conflict. A distinction should be made between the functions performed by a peace-keeping force in a border patrolling capacity, and those undertaken in a border observation and monitoring role. Border patrolling is a more visible, interventionist presence necessitating a heavy deployment of military personnel and equipment, since it effectively involves protecting the

borders of a country -- a task normally performed by national forces or by United Nations forces acting under Chapter 7 powers. It would also expose our forces to greater risk of attack by infiltrators. On the other hand, border observation and monitoring would be more discreet and flexible, and thus more feasible and practicable, as it would not project our forces on the frontlines of a civil conflict. Furthermore, this role allows more flexibility in the use of our resources with the possibility of greater reliance on the use of equipment than manpower, thus entailing fewer risks to our forces.


D. Conclusions

9. On the basis of the above and bearing in mind that the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda, which include the return and resettlement of Rwandese who fled their homes and the attainment of peace and national reconciliation, remain to be fully realised, the Security Council may wish to assign UNAMIR the following tasks as part of its future mandate:

- a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, returning refugees and "civilians at risk" (to be reformulated) in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
- c) Exercise its good offices to help promote peace and to achieve a political settlement within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
- d) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;
- e) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;
- f) Coordinate the implementation of an integrated inter-agency demining programme;
- g) Conduct border observation and monitoring along Rwanda's international borders.

10. The specialized units of the United Nations should be consulted to determine the resources (personnel and equipment) that would be required to perform the above mandate.

- 11. Reconstruction of basic infrastructure? / I shall explain
- 12. community service?


Sammy Kum Buu
Political Adviser
21 April 1995

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN REFUGEE CAMPS

SITUATION

1. Unconfirmed, and unconstested, rumours have been spread about military activities, including the storage of military weapons, and related training in UNHCR supported refugee camps. With broad popular appeal these 'sensational' revelations can, and indeed will, lead to a loss of credibility of UNHCR unless they are countered, better still, preceded by a positive, pro-active program of public information which tells things as they are. These rumours, which are fundamentally incorrect, could well lead to a negative impact upon donors decisions on the amount of support to offer.

AIM

2. The aim of this short paper will be to articulate the facts of the matter and make recommendations for action to counter this situation.

FACTS

3. UNHCR will not extend protection or provide support to those refugees who engage in military activities while outside of their home country. Most NGO's work within similar guidelines. Indeed refugees have to refrain from all military activity or they will lose the entitlement to humanitarian assistance. The presence of the ex-military and ex-militia in the refugee camps is nevertheless clear, though there is no evidence of military activity in the camps. In fact the presence of NGO's, UN aid workers and the recent addition of the Zairian Contingent for Security in the Camps (CZSC) and the Civilian Security and Liaison Group (CSLG) ensures a good measure of surveillance over camp activities. When one adds the physical nature of the camps, the extremely crowded conditions, the chance for anything but small group, static activity is minimal.

4. The other facts which indicate that military training is not going on in the camps is that it is not necessary. The soldiers and militia were basically trained as members of the national army, until fleeing in the summer of 1994. Command is probably exercised from the 'ETAT MAJOR' of the ex-FAR, which is established in the vicinity of MUGUNGA refugee camp, and is staffed by senior ex-military officers, headed by General BISIMUNGA. This is a non-refugee camp with which UNHCR has no relationships, but evidently works, as the name implies, as a headquarters. The best way to train is to conduct operations and, when the proximity of the refugee camps to the RWANDAN boarder is considered, and reports from zairian forces are reviewed, it is obvious that nightly operations are conducted from KIBUMBA and perhaps other camps. The individuals evidently leave the camp under cover of darkness and smoke, retrieve weapons previously cached in the forest, in some case in RWANDA, the boarder is crossed, and military operations are conducted. On the evening of 13 April 1995, the leopard battalion of the zairian forces

arrested eight men in the boarder area near KIBUMBA camp. They had in their possession, one anti-tank mine, three anti pers mines, three high exposure grenades and some bullets. La Garde Civile alleges that the individuals were refugees from the MUGUNGA camp. This incident is being studied in detail.

5. This problem of possible military activities in refugee camps has been discussed with the CZSC. The comander, Colonel NDONA MOTEKE MBONBO, states that the Government of Zaire denies that there are military activities in the refugee camps. The Vice-Prime Minister for Defence visited the area on 10 - 12 April 1995, and discussed the issue with Governors, local military and civilian authorities and UNHCR representatives. It was stated that the Zairian Government is committed to the international laws and conventions pertaining to the refugee status, and it will not extend freedom of movement to those refugees who admit to being military.

6. There are weapons in the in the camps. The daily firings heard, and killings reported, attest to this fact. Notwithstanding, it is considered that these are weapons smuggled in by individuals and are fundamentally used as a means of intimidation and banditry. This fact might be better understood, using Camp MUGUNGA as an example, when its geographical layout is considered, 3000 meters by 1000 meters with a population of 170,000 people. In fact there is no space for any military training outside of individual, low level, class room type instruction.

SUMMARY - COMMENT

7. No hard evidence can be found to verify rumours of 'weapon caches' and "military training" in UNHCR refugee camps.

8. Significant increased suveillance and patrolling in the camps has taken place over the past month with the arrival of the CZSC and CSLG.

9. 'L'Etat Major' of the ex-FAR operates quite apart from UNHCR camps, but in close proximity to them.

10. Operations are being conducted out of Zaire into Rwanda by individuals who live in Refugee Camps. This, given the size and nature of the camps is difficult to pin down and impossible to stop.

11. The public position of the Government of Zaire echoed by the CZSC, is that it will not tolerate military activity in refugee camps. No statement has been made on other camps such as 'l'Etat Major' ex-FAR.

RECOMMENDATION

12. That UNHCR make a reasonably detailed statement on the nature of, and the situation in the camps as to cached arms and military training.

13. That consideration be given to the requirement for a professional, full time public information officer who's responsibility would be to create a pro-active public information program in Zaire, on behalf of UNHCR.

RÉP DU ZAIRE

LUBARIKA

KAMANYOLA

LUVUNGI

KANGANIRO

NOUVELLE REPARTITION DES CAMPS

(29/12/94)

PHYSICAL SITE PLANNER SECTION

UVIRA/ZAIRE

(LEMERA)

LUBERIZI

RWENENA

KIBOGOY

KAJEMBO

SANGE

RUNINGO

KILIBA

KAGUNGA

UVIRA

LEGENDE

----- LIMITE D ETAT

===== ROUTE

✈ CAMPS

■ VILLAGES

⚡ POSTE DE SANTE

✈ AEROPORT

⚡ HOPITAL

h: 1/250000

2 - REFUGEE CAMP SITES
KATANGA DISTRICT (19/01/1991)

ID	CAMP	HA	EST. NO. REFUGES	POPULATION
1	CHIRASCA	15	77	11,301
2	NYALAYOGO	10	12	9,574
3	KALIRE	8	65	6,581
4	MURHALA/IDJWI	12	18	6,512
5	KASHUSHA	60	26	28,449
6	ADT-KITU	3	36	7,991
7	NYANGELI	20	25	18,877
8	MURHALA/KATANA	6	34	3,185
9	HONGO	16	12	19,303
10	CHABARABE	22	28	27,794
11	KATANA	40	77	26,419
12	NYANGELI		34	819
13	NYANGELI I	5	25	8,473
14	NYANGELI-ADT	60	25	19,241
15	ADT	2	6	2,256
16	NYANGELI	1,5	11	1,214
17	CHABARABE	2	6	1,830
18	NYANGELI	1	20	1,087
19	NYANGELI	7	30	1,000
20	NYANGELI Int.			5,358
21	ADT Int.			11,010
22	NYANGELI Int.		16	6,168
23	NYANGELI	3		797
24	NYANGELI	2	70	206
25	NYANGELI	0,5	20	40
26	NYANGELI	0,5	11	411
27	TOTAL	352,5	-	307,931

total number of refugees in camps
excluding integrated = 239,910

average number of refugees per Ha is 681


CHIMANGA * ZAIRIAN CAMP SECURITY CONTINGENT (ZCSC)

NYANGELI


KEY


UNARMED MILITARY
CAMP

REFUGEE CAMP SITES AND
STATISTICAL MAP



Map No. 1.1





Principales Concentrations des Réfugiés ●

To: FC

Info: DFC/CMO
COS
DCOS/OPS
DCMO

From: MILOBS HQ SO2 (G2 EP)

Date: 06 May 1995

Subject: SITUATION ESTIMATE - LONG TERM VISION

I. INTRODUCTION:

Situation in Rwanda will be more tense in the weeks to come with many indicators pointing out to a very presumable deterioration, more harassment, more violence and more harsh measures by the Rwandan government/RPA against the civilian population. The government is not satisfied with the present mandate of UNAMIR. The ongoing propaganda campaign against UNAMIR plus harassment and criminal activities against UNAMIR personnel and property, evidently carried out with the knowledge the authorities if not tacitly condoned by them, point out to the final target which might be a reduction or even a withdrawal of the mission from Rwanda. This is however contingent on clarification of policies by the Rwanda leadership and results of frictions among the moderates and the extremists among that leadership. In view of the above a number of possible actions may be expected.

II. POSSIBLE ACTIONS:

A. By the government of Rwanda:

1. The government will embark on the road of terror to control the population. The predominant factor in the government's policy towards the civilian population will be imposition of the reign of terror, fear and intimidation. More developments like the 22 - 23 Apr 95 Kibeho camp manslaughter may be expected in the foreseeable future. Ambushes at the borders, particularly at the Burundi border, will be set up to prevent escapees from leaving the country.

2. Further evacuations of IDPs camps should be expected with the final goal being to have all of them closed as genuine or potential sanctuaries for Hutu militias and FRGF infiltrating into the interior. The random use of force and fire arms against civilians should be considered as a matter of course.

3. Networks of informers reporting on everything in their vicinity will expand and people will be encouraged to spy more effectively on each other. The government and local authorities will exploit the readiness of many people to get their neighbors incarcerated and conduct ~~secret~~ operations.

4. More arrests and harassment of the local population will be approved of and effected, particularly in the areas with a high degree of interahamwe and FRGF activity. In the general zeal to find and arrest anyone suspected of genocide more people will be detained and liquidated without trial. "Demonstrations of people's justice" in form of verdicts announced at public gatherings against criminals and political opponents should be expected.

5. Congestion in prisons and detention centers will continue and there is a strong possibility that it might be intentional as due to a lack of the qualified judicial personnel not many trials of those accused of or suspected to have committed genocide last year could be expected soon. There may exist a possibility to solve the problem of incarcerated interahamwe members (genuine or imagined ones) in another way: by physically eliminating them through tough conditions in prisons and detention centers.

6. Anti-UNAMIR campaign will continue, however on a variable scale. Even if that campaign abates for some time and local newspapers and radio stations publish news and comments favorable to the UN operation, it does not mean that the public mood could not be steered on the anti-UNAMIR course by local authorities. The campaign may easily resume as a part of the psychological and political pressure against UNAMIR.

7. The combination of psychological and physical elements in Rwanda government's hostile actions against UNAMIR will rather tend to increase over the next weeks attributing to more pressure and tension and even serving as an excuse to demand the mission's reduction or withdrawal.

8. There is a strong supposition that the Rwandan authorities are fully aware of and provide a cover-up for perpetrators of all kinds of crimes against UNAMIR, NGOs and cooperating agencies/companies, their personnel and their property. "Ordinary criminals" or interahamwe elements will be preferably blamed for that sort of criminal activities.

9. The government is extremely arrogant, self-confident and not ready to perceive any danger of their country being completely ignored by the international community if the mission fails. That attitude seems to be gaining more and more ground at all echelons of power in Rwanda.

B By the RPA:

1. As political atmosphere deteriorates the RPA will increasingly impose its will and orders onto civilian authorities and will

virtually subdue the administrative structures. Civilian authorities will have less and less control over armed elements in the country.

2. Extremists in the RPA high command will gain the upper edge which means a hard time to be given to any opposition, including their own ranks. Purges and reshuffles are therefore very likely, both at the central and the grassroot level.

3. RPA will actively fulfill all orders to the effect of intimidating the population and preventing the people from expressing any dissatisfaction with the existing government. In case the RPA high command considers those orders not to be sufficient for attaining that goal, own measures - including summon executions - will be easily sanctioned.

4. Local RPA commanders will be empowered to upgrade security levels at their respective areas at will if they consider that measure to be effective against any threat on the part of RGF, interahamwe and/or any other opposition force.

5. Cases of intimidation against soft targets (the civilian UN personnel, UNVs, UN agencies, military observers, civilian police, international organizations, NGOs etc.) will tend to increase with RPA soldiers participating in criminal activities with or without the knowledge of their superiors. More burglaries, thefts, armed robberies, provocations and even physical violence should be expected at locations where UN and NGOs presence is heavy and their activity may become a sort of annoyance for RPA (Kigali, Gisenyi, Kibuye, Cyangugu, Butare). RPA may/will be involved in such incidents. The situation may be compounded by the fact that some NGOs are or may be implicated in anti-government activities in Rwanda: the RPA tends to perceive some NGOs to be tacit allies of the old regime still assisting it inside and outside the country.

6. Clandestine actions against UNAMIR formed units should be also considered as presumable, resulting from various reasons (revange, misunderstanding, pilferage, ill will). Sector 1 and sector 4B could be targeted first as problems have cropped up there in the relations between UNAMIR troops and the locals in the past.

C. By FRGF and the former Rwandan government:

1. The anniversary of their defeat in the last year Rwandan civil war (04 July - Kigali taken over by RPA, mid-July - transitional government left Gitarama and settled down in exile in Zaire) as well as the upcoming dry season will provide an opportunity to launch operations against RPA and civilian targets within the Rwandan territory. Guerilla-type operations should be expected on a mounting scale (e.c. mines being planted at public places, assassinations of administrative leaders, banditry, ambushes, even violence against the UNAMIR personnel in retaliation for the mission's alleged "inaction" and a "hand-over of power" to the RPA last year).

2. The upcoming period of the next 4 to 5 weeks may see an intensification of FRGF and the former government's activities in the military and political areas. Mistreatment of IDPs and other civilian Hutu population by the RPA will provide an excellent excuse for the erstwhile government elements to step up their military activities, beef up their ranks, expand their sanctuaries in the Rwandan interior, increase the number of infiltrations, expand their network of informers and conduct all sorts of harassment against the civilian population.

3. An intensified propaganda campaign will be carried out against the present government and the RPA in a bid to win more support among the predominantly Hutu population. One of the very presumable elements of that campaign will be a call for "national disobedience" towards the RPF dominated government in Kigali and/or even a call to arms when situation is reckoned as ripe for armed resistance (insurrection).

IV. COUNTERMEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS;

As far as any countermeasures and precautions are considered one question has to be addressed first: a. will the UNAMIR mandate continue in its present shape ? or b. will it be modified ? or c. will it be cancelled ? A clear-cut attitude has to be expressed by the Rwandan government at the earliest possible date. Given those three options following measures might be taken:

A. In case the mandate is extended or modified:

1. Effective measures have to be adopted in order to provide maximum protection for UNAMIR personnel and property. Preferably, UN troops' presence should be established at all UNAMIR compounds, both civilian and military ones. As more and more targets will be exposed to criminal activity a point has to be brought to the locals that thefts, robberies, unauthorized searches and confiscation of property, abuses of the UN personnel, raids into UN and NGOs personnel's accommodations would not go unpunished and will be stoutly repelled.

a. Specific measures should include e.c.:

- positioning armed UN military sentries at all UN civilian offices, hotels accommodating the UN personnel, parkings, both in Kigali and in the field, as well as at all MilObs and CivPol offices. Maintaining additional personnel or increasing the number of personnel in those offices for the night shift is not advisable as a waste of human resources.

- all facilities identified as vulnerable targets should be located within military compounds with round-the-clock sentries and operational communications equipment (if the option mentioned in the previous paragraph turns out not to be feasible).

- communications equipment should be therefore more properly allocated (e.c. no motorolas for civilian personnel performing merely office duties but more communications means to be allocated to the personnel in the field).

- in case of armed infiltrations and breaks-in there should be no hesitation to use fire arms against assailants (as the case was in other UN missions, e.g. in Cambodia). Frame-up operations against car and property thieves could be considered. Keeping low profile is only an invitation for criminals to continue and intensify their activities.

- expansion of the Rapid Reaction Force could/should be considered as an urgent task to prevent presumable hostilities toward UNAMIR and its personnel.

2. More attention should be paid to the UNAMIR propaganda effort and those measures could include:

- exploiting UN achievements in Namibia, Mozambique and Cambodia to counteract association of its African operations with failures and errors in Somalia and Liberia.

- UNAMIR should more effectively and intensely emphasize that the mission was not able to prevent an all-out war waged by everybody against everybody in Rwanda last year but, however, it did assist a great number of people (providing e.g. shelters at the Amahoro stadium and Mille Collines Hotel, food, medical care, transportation etc.) at the time of hostilities and after the war.

- propaganda effort by the UNMIR information services should be more offensive, stressing all positive elements (assistance for returnees, medical care, grants for the Rwandan people etc.). Broadcasts to that effect should appear more frequently on the air of radio Rwanda even in the form of pre-paid programs.

- more pressure should be exercised onto the Rwandan government and local authorities to ensure respect for and observation of human rights according to international standards. In case of hardliners taking the upper edge within the government a clear linkage could be shown between any continuation of aid and assistance programs for Rwanda and the respect for universal human rights.

In case the mandate is cancelled:

1. Measures should be taken to provide maximum security for the UN personnel and property. In this respect specifically:

- Most UNAMIR personnel and property should concentrate in Kigali in expectation of prompt evacuation.

- Formed units could abandon their outposts and concentrate in their respective battalion headquarters.

- Sentries at all UN compounds and facilities should be vastly strengthened as the end of a mission usually invites a lot of crime (thefts, pilferage, looting, robberies, burglaries etc.). * Maximum security precautions should be effected immediately.

- Military observers' activities should be reduced to monitoring situation along main roads and in towns.

- Civilian components' activities in the field should be reduced to a minimum or suspended.

- Strenuous propaganda efforts should be made to the effect of ensuring a smooth termination of the mission in cooperation with local authorities. The government and its territorial branches should be discouraged from taking any steps against UNAMIR.

- Rwandan authorities should be made responsible for the security and safety of the mission's personnel by virtue of relevant agreements.

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	GRID	SECTOR	CHECK
BUTARE	GISHAMVU	658056	3A	
	HUYE	683146	3A	
	KIBAYI	842982	3A	
	KIGEMBE	706932	3A	
	MARABA	638216	3A	
	MBAZI	718181	3A	
	MUGANZA	845075	3A	
	MUGUSA	840256	3A	
	MUYAGA	904266	3A	
	MUYIRA	864404	3A	
	NDORA	817126	3A	
	NGOMA	712129	3A	
	NTYAZO	872318	3A	
	NYABISINDU	714385	3A	
	NYAKIZU	572968	3A	
	NYARUHENGARI	756072	3A	
	RUHASHYA	699263	3A	
	RUNYINYA	605121	3A	
	RUSATIRA	747315	3A	
	SHYANDA	772185	3A	
BYUMBA	BUYOGA	014133	1	
	BWISIGE	173272	1	
	CYUMBA	001342	1	
	CYUNGO	941210	1	
	GITI	246027	1	
	GITUZA	3222	1	
	KIBALI	056249	1	
	KINYAMI	149184	1	
	KIVUYE	956317	1	
	KIYOMBE	094402	1	
	MUHURA	2908	1	
	MUKARANGE	083314	1	
	MURAMBI	462013	1	

	MUVUMBA	259471	1	
	NGARAMA	267280	1	
	RUTARE	190088	1	
	TUMBA	939131	1	
CYANGUGU	BURGARAMA	900078	4C	
	CYIMBOGO	771198	4C	
	GAFUNZO	897357	4C	
	GATARE	129454	4C	
	GISHOMA	819109	4C	
	GISUMA	854267	4C	
	KAGANO	985411	4C	
	KAMEMBE	801315	4C	
	KARENTERA	925216	4C	
	KIRAMBO	039443	4C	
	NYAKABUYE	918166	4C	
GIKONGORO	KARAMA	560315	4A	
	KARAMBO	471347	4A	
	KINYAMAKARA	609268	4A	
	KIVU	409050	4A	
	MUBUNGA	521019	4A	
	MUDASOMWA	423224	4A	
	MUKO	384406	4A	
	MUSANGE	524475	4A	
	MUSEBEYA	389331	4A	
	NSHILI	393964	4A	
	NYAMAGABE	537272	4A	
	RUKONDO	551384	4A	
	RWAMIKO	493137	4A	
GISENYI	GASEKE	504044	5	
	GICIYE	505120	5	
	KANAMA	275123	5	
	KARAGO	455170	5	
	KAYOVE	276920	5	
	KIBILIRA	583856	5	

	MUTURA	317235	5	
	NYAMYUMBA	219070	5	
	RAMBA	485938	5	
	RUBAVU	215136	5	
	RWERERE	271229	5	
	SATINSYI	585002	5	
GITARAMA	BULINGA	667790	3B	
	KAYENZI	829894	3B	
	KIGOMA	771504	3B	
	MASANGO	612544	3B	
	MUGINA	935673	3B	
	MUKINGI	714616	3B	
	MURAMA	666490	3B	
	MUSAMBIRA	826739	3B	
	MUSHUBATI	694714	3B	
	NTONGWE	895572	3B	
	NYABIKENKE	724921	3B	
	NYAKABANDA	647963	3B	
	NYAMABUYE	741707	3B	
	RUNDA	985824	3B	
	RUTOBWE	775806	3B	
	TABA	890843	3B	
	TAMBWE	768527	3B	
KIBUNGO	BIRENGA	597593	2	
	KABARONDO	620778	2	
	KAYONZA	577844	2	
	KIGARAMA	618700	2	
	MUGESERA	481644	2	
	MUHAZI	459901	2	
	RUKARA	562014	2	
	RUKIRA	657580	2	
	RUSUMO	749487	2	
	RUTONDE	484846	2	
	SAKE	434543	2	

KIBUYE	BWAKIRA	498616	4B	
	GISHYITA	213620	4B	
	GISOVU	291524	4B	
	GITESI	280714	4B	
	KIVUMU	553731	4B	
	MABANZA	347735	4B	
	MWENDO	453589	4B	
	RUTSIRO	315834	4B	
	RWAMATAMU	152573	4B	
KIGALI	BICUMBI	378764	2	
	BUTAMWA	026765	6	
	GASHORA	268563	2	
	GIKOMERO	169947	6	
	GIKORO	369869	6	
	KANOMBE	198820	6	
	KANZENZE	104631	2	
	MBOGO	965045	6	
	MUGAMBAZI	047028	6	
	MUSASA	831984	6	
	NGENDA	064447	2	
	NYARUGENGE	0885	6	
	RUBUNGO	192850	6	
	RUSHASHI	840094	6	
	RUTONGO	047942	6	
	SHYORONGI	964951	6	
	TARE	887104	6	
RUHengeri	BATARO	818446	5	
	CYABINGO	654254	5	
	CYERU	813352	5	
	GATONDE	626171	5	
	KIDAHO	716478	5	
	KINIGI	541404	5	
	KIYOMBE	601334	5	
	MUKINGO	512303	5	

	NDUSU	622121	5	
	NKULI	468245	5	
	NKUMBA	661394	5	
	NYAKINAMA	595279	5	
	NYAMUGALI	869229	5	
	NYAMUTERA	590203	5	
	NYARUTOVU	748178	5	
	RUHONDO	689301	5	

... MILCB HG.

ASC UNAMIR II - GAZETTEER

EFF: 14 December 1994

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
AKABACURA	594094	3A	X
AKABUGA	499887	4A	X
BIBUNGO	9067	3	X
BIRAMBO	4763	4B/3	X
BISESERO	2660	4B	X
BISOKE	449393	5	X
BITABA	4030	4A	X
BOHORO	4621	4A	X
BUDAHAMGARWA	2962	4B	X
BUGARAMA CITY	9002	4C	X
BUGARAMA	4329	4A	X
BUHANDA	6253	3	X
BUHETA	7915	5	X
BUHORO	4621	4A	X
BUHORO	5710	3	X
BUKAVU	7422	4C/ZAIRE	X
BUKINANYANA	500896	4A	X
BUNYENGA	9142	4C	X
BUNYOMA	5034	3	X
BUSANZE	4591	4A	X
BUSEKANKA	7833	4C	X
BUSHEKERI	9932	4C	X
BUSHENGE	8729	4C	X
BUSORO	9247	3	X
BUSORO	6605	3	X
BUYOGA	'0013'	1	X
BWAKIRA	5061	3	X
BYIMANA	7062	3	X
BYUMBA	825	1	X
CAV	7370	3	X
CHISHOMA	8212	3	X
COKO	5399	4A	X
CYAFURWE	5317	4A	X
CYAHINDA	5596	3	X
CYAMBARA	3419	5	X

Handwritten signature and scribbles.

	TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
	CYANGUGU	7824	4C	X
	CYANIKA	5629	3	X
	CYIMBOGO	7720	4C	X
	CYIMVUZU	8237	3	X
	DUSENYI	5055	4B	X
	GAFUMBA	3377	4B	X
	GAFUNZO	9035	4C	X
	GAHUNGA	5743	4A	X
	GAKEREKO	4031	4A	X
	GAKWISI	8727	4C	X
	GASARENDA	4122	4A	X
	GASASA	5521	4A	X
C	GASENYI	3859	4B	X
	GASETSA	5672	2B	X
	GASHARU	6335	4B	X
	GASHORA	2656	2A	X
	GASHWATI	3842	4B	X
	GASUTA	5052	4B	X
	GATARE	9010	5	X
	GATARE	3535	4A	X
	GATARE	1345	4C	X
	GATOVU	4033	4A	X
	GIHINGA	7908	5	X
	GIHOMBO	1554	4B	X
C	GIHORWE	3425	5	X
	GIKONGORO	5827	4A	X
	GIKUNDAMVURA	9309	4C	X
	GIKUNGU	3535	4B	X
	GISAGARA	8113	3	X
	GISAKURA	9829	4C	X
	GISENYI	1712	5	X
	GISHAMVU	6505	3	X
	GISHOMA	8211	4C	X
	GISHYITA	2062	4B	X
	GISORORO	4816	4A	X
	GISUMA	8426	4C	X

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
GISUNZU	418176	4A	X
GITEGA	5447	3	X
GITESI	2871	4B	X
GITI	2302	1	X
GITISI	7254	3	X
GITOVU	9451	3	X
GITSIMBWE	1052	4B	X
GITUZA	3222	1	X
GOMBANIRO	9298	4C	X
GISOVU	2952	4B	X
HEPFU	8035	4C	X
JOMA	8410	5	X
KABACOCO	5941	4A	X
KABAKONO	6917	3	X
KABGAYI	7267	3	X
KABIGUZI	9146	3	X
KABILIZI	5935	4A	X
KABUHANGA	2931	5	X
KABUREMERA	6111	4A	X
KADUHA	4643	4B	X
KAGABRO	2465	4B	X
KAGANO	9844	4C	X
KAGARAMA	9244	3	X
KAGARAMA	5829	4A	X
KAGENGE	7710	4C	X
KAGIKONGORO	8316	4C	X
KAGUNGA	3859	4B	X
KAMANA	5197	4A	X
KAMEGELI	5122	4A	X
KAMEMBE	7823	4C	X
KAMEMBI	8031	4C	X
KAMURAZO	5048	4A	X
KAMUYUMBO	5233	4A	X
KAMWAMBI	6331	3	X
KANAMA	2812	5	X
KANAZI	963	2A	X

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
KANGAZI	7833	4C	X
KANKONI	9246	4C	X
KANYAMIHETO	5140	5	X
KARAGO	4516	5	X
KARAMA	5631	4A	X
KARAMA	6011	3	X
KARAMBI	6153	3	X
KARAMBO	9122	4C	X
KARAMBO	4734	4A	X
KARANGO	9037	4C	X
KARANJWA	7422	4C	X
KAREBA	4023	5	X
KARENTERA	9221	4C	X
KAROMBE	2887	4B	X
KARONGI	2768	4B	X
KAVUMU	7442	3	X
KAYENZI	3470	4B	X
KAYONZA	5884	1	X
KIBAGA	5054	4B	X
KIBAYA	6461	1	X
KIBAYI	8497	3	X
KIBEHO	5007	4A	X
KIBILIRA	5786	5	X
KIBUMU	5573	4B	X
KIBUNGO	5961	2B	X
KIBUNGO	6115	3	X
KIBUYE	2772	4B	X
KIGALI	6892	6	X
KIGARAMA	682703	2	X
KIGEMBE	7093	3	X
KIGEME	4725	4A	X
KIGOMA	7649	3	X
KILIMBI	1049	4B	X
KINAZI	9156	3	X
KINIGI	5440	5	X
KINTEKO	7313	3	X

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
KIRAMBI	6234	4A	X
KIRAMBO	'0444	4C	X
KIRARO	5131	4A	X
KIRUKU	8207	5	X
KITABI	3520	4A	X
KIVU	4410	4A	X
KIVUMU	5572	3/5	X
KIYUMBA	5729	4A	X
KIZI	6120	3	X
KIZINGA	'0944'	1	X
MABANZA	3473	4B	X
MAGUMIRE	3434	4A	X
MAHURU	7521	4C	X
MAMERESIO	5435	4A	X
MANJALI	480293	5	X
MARA	2068	4B	X
MARABA	6321	4A	X
MARABA	6097	3	X
MARIBA	5806	3	X
MARYOHE	4354	4B	X
MASAKA	9840	BURUNDI	X
MASANGO	6254	3	X
MASHESHA	8913	4C	X
MASIGA	4489	4A	X
MATA	5115	4A	X
MAZA	7335	3	X
MBASA	5411	3	X
MBAZI	7117	3	X
MBOGO	6129	3	X
MBOGO	9604	5	X
MPANDA	5607	3	X
MPUNGE	5207	3	X
MUBASA	4635	4A	X
MUBUGA	5202	4A	X
MUBUGA	2463	4B	X
MUBUGA	5411	3	X

	TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
	MUDASOMWA	4222	4A	X
	MUFUMBESI	3075	4B	X
	MUGAMBAZI	'0403'	1	X
	MUGANO	5621	3	X
	MUGANZA	4305	4A	X
	MUGANZA	8407	3	X
	MUGINA	9267	3	X
	MUGOMBWA	8404	3	X
	MUGUSA	8425	3	X
	MUHANGA	8418	4C	X
	MUHEHWE	8609	4C	X
	MUHIRA	2412	5	X
C	MUHURA	2908	1	X
	MUKAKA	3727	4A	X
	MUKAKA	7522	5	X
	MUKAMIRA	4621	5	X
	MUKAMIRA	4621	5	X
	MUKINGA	9065	3	X
	MUKINGI	7160	3	X
	MUKINGO	4730	5	X
	MUKINGO	7345	3	X
	MUKINGO	7345	3	X
	MUKIRA	3048	4B	X
	MUKO	3840	4A	X
C	MUKOMA	8939	4C	X
	MUKONGORO	5040	4A	X
	MUNANIRA	6105	3	X
	MUNINI	3624	4A	X
	MUNINI	4800	4A	X
	MUNYINYA	9345	3	X
	MURAMA	6749	3	X
	MURAMBI	5129	4A	X
	MURAMBI	4308	4A	X
	MURAMBI	4609	1	X
	MURENDE	6333	4A	X
	MURUNDA	3088	4B	X

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
MURURU	7521	4C	X
MUSABIRA	8273	3	X
MUSAGARA	5251	4B	X
MUSANGATI	3290	4B	X
MUSANGE	5347	4B	X
MUSEBEYA	3933	4A	X
MUSHAKA	8209	4C	X
MUSHUBATI	3278	5	X
MUTENGELI	3240	4A	X
MUTONGO	7420	4C	X
MUTOVU	4103	4A	X
MUTOVU	2929	5	X
MUTURA	3223	5	X
MUVUBA	2646	1	X
MUYAGA	9026	3	X
MUYANGE	5131	4A	X
MUYIRA	8639	3	X
MWENDO	4558	4B	X
MWITO	8534	4C	X
NAGOMA	9371	3	X
NDABA	4272	4B	X
NDAGO	5101	3	X
NDORA	8112	3	X
NGANZO	3632	4A	X
NGARAMA	2629	1	X
NGOMA	7112	3	X
NLARUGINA	4938	5	X
NIRUND	3088	4B	X
NKANDA	4393	4A	X
NKOMERO	6749	3	X
NKOMERO	4339	4A	X
NKOMERO	4334	4A	X
NKUMBA	6639	5	X
NKURUBUYE	4533	4A	X
NKWIRA	3080	4B	X
NSHILI	3996	4A	X

	TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
	NTONGWE	9057	3	X
	NTYAZO	8631	3	X
	NYABAGUMA	9954	3	X
	NYABIHEKE	5337	4A	X
	NYABINAGA	1351	4B	X
	NYABINYEGA	6444	3	X
	NYABINYENGA	6444	3	X
	NYABISAZI	5649	3	X
	NYABISINDU	7138	3	X
	NYABITARE	8424	3	X
	NYAGASOZI	3569	4B	X
	NYAGATARE	8124	4C	X
C	NYAGATOVU	3078	4B	X
	NYAGISOZI	6139	4A	X
	NYAKABUYE	3176	5	X
	NYAKABUYE	9116	4C	X
	NYAKIBANDA	6507/6708	3	X
	NYAKINAME	5925	5	X
	NYAMASHEKE	9841	4C	X
	NYAMATA	1061	2A	X
	NYAMIGINA	4624	4A	X
	NYAMIGINA	4522	4A	X
	NYAMISHABA	2571	4B	X
	NYAMUHUNGA	8726	4C	X
C	NYAMUMBA	9106	5	X
	NYAMUTERA	5819	5	X
	NYANGE	5573	3	X
	NYANTANGA	4924	4A	X
	NYANZA	5529	4A	X
	NYARUCUNDURA	3189	4	
	NYARUCUNDURA	3189	4B	X
	NYARUSHISHI	8422	4C	X
	NYENJI	7907	4C	X
	NYRUTEJA	7093	3	X
	NYUMBA	6405	3	X
	NZAHABA	8606	4C	X

TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
PEPINIERE	8338	3	X
PINDURA	1326	4C	X
RAMBA	5414	4A	X
RARANZIGA	5798	4A	X
REMERA	4292	4A	X
RILIMA	2561	2	
ROAMIKO	4914	4A	X
RUBENGERA	3374	4B	X
RUBONA	6247	3	X
RUBPREZA	1158	4B	X
RUBYIRO	2169	4B	X
RUGABANO	4266	4B	X
RUGOTE	8815	1	X
RUHANGO	7754	3	X
RUHASHYA	7026	3	X
RUKIRE	6658	1	X
RUKOKO	4772	3	X
RUKONDO	5538	4A	X
RUKURA	8114	5	X
RULI	7569	3	X
RUMILI	17197	1	X
RUNGU	2729	5	X
RUNYINYA	6012	3	X
RUNYINYA	4907	4A	X
RUNYOMBYI	4892	4A	X
RURAMBA	4616	4A	X
RUSAMBU	9130	4C	X
RUSANDA	4354	4A	X
RUSATIRA	7431	3	X
RUSAYO	8212	4C	X
RUSEKERA	4234	4A	X
RUSHANSHI	8509	5	X
RUSHISHI	2558	4B	X
RUSHUBI	6141	4A	X
RUSIZI-1	7624	4C	X
RUSIZI-2	7422	4C	X

	TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
	RUSUMO	7594	2B	X
	RUSUSA	1050	2	X
	RUTAGARA	6559	3	X
	RUTARE	1908	1	X
	RUTONGO	0494	1	X
	RUTSIRO	3183	4B	X
	RUTUNTU	5547	4A	X
	RUYENZI	8132	3	X
	RWAMAGANA	4884	2A	X
	RWAMATAMU	1557	4B	X
	RWAMIKO	4813	4A	X
	RWANIRO	6729	3	X
C	RWANKANGO	5450	4B	X
	RWERERE	2722	5	X
	RWESERO	9838	4C	X
	RWISHYWA	3706	4A	X
	RWUMUYA	8736	4C	X
	SAVE	7419	3	X
	SHARA	9111	4C	X
	SHEKE	6303	4A	X
	SHORORO	4695	4A	X
	SHYANDA	7718	3	X
	SHYEMBE	6217	3	X
	SHYEMBE	6271	3	X
C	SHYOMBWE	8011	5	X
	SHYORONGI	9694	5	X
	SIMBI	6322	3	X
	TABA	4540	4A	X
	TAKWE	7574	5	X
	TAMBWE	7653	3	X
	TARE	8715	5	X
	TUMBA	9912	1	X
	TYAZO	442	4C	X
	UWINDAVA	480876	4B	X
	VIRA	1658	4B	X
	VUMBI	5510	3	X

	TOWN	GRID 1	SECTOR	CHECK
VUMWE		4321	4B	X
VUNGA		8561	3	X