

UNAMIR

UN AGENCIES AND NGOS

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Summary Report of the mission to assess the cost of repatriation and removal of
Rwandan refugees currently in Northern and Southern Kivu

All relative details are attached.

The original text is in French.

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Report from the Joint
UNITED NATIONS // ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT mission
to assess the costs of repatriation
and removal of Rwandan refugees.

I. INTRODUCTION

Given the joint statement signed July 26, 1994 in Grand Baie on Mauritius by President MOBUTU of Zaire and President BIZIMUNGU of Rwanda;

Given the joint statement from the Zairian-Rwandan ministerial meeting held September 1, 1994 in Goma at which the UNHCR was represented;

Given the Zairian government's request to the United Nations to help resolve the security problems caused by the presence of refugees, armed factions, and Rwandan political leaders in Northern and Southern Kivu;

Given the Zairian government's commitment to moving the Rwandan political leaders and armed factions away from the border areas where the refugees are located and to deploying United Nations Forces to ensure the safety of the Zairian host population, the refugees, United Nations personnel, and NGO workers stationed in these areas.

Given the discussions organized, at the government's request, by the Special Representative for the Secretary General, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, September 12 to 14 between the President of the Republic on one side and the Government of Zaire and the mission sent by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the other;

Given that all the logistics of the joint Zairian government and United Nations mission to assess the costs of the repatriation and removal of Rwandan refugees are to be borne by the UN;

Given the urgent need to implement these accords, wishes and recommendations;

From September 29 to October 11, a joint mission visited the regions of Northern and Southern Kivu, Shaba, Maniema, Haut Zaire, and the Equator in the hope of gathering information from local authorities, agencies within the United Nations and humanitarian organizations, civilian refugees, dignitaries of the former government and military personnel of the RAF, which would allow the mission to fulfill the task assigned to it by the Government of Zaire and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

And consequently to visit the sites which might be used to shelter the different categories of refugees mentioned above.

II. MISSION RAPPORT

II.1 STAGES OF THE INVESTIGATION

A. State of mind of the population

✓ Generally all the populations visited are well disposed towards the welcome and shelter of the Rwandan refugees in their regions with the exception of Kongolo where some hostility could be read on banners as well as on the faces of the residents who came to the airport. However once the Head of the delegation explained the objective of the mission, representatives from the political parties and the populations showed their approval stating that they had been misinformed as to the motivations that lay behind the transfer of the refugees in their zone.

B. Considerations on the repatriation and movement of the refugees

All refugees - civilian, military, and dignitaries from the former Rwandan government - are opposed to moving away from the border and would prefer to return to their country.

The following conditions were particularly underlined:

- ? 1° That the international community abandon its partiality and become fair and impartial.
- ? 2° That the conditions which take into account the history of Rwanda and the democratic principles of security be satisfied in order to guarantee the return of the refugees.
- ✓ 3° That the restitution of the landed property, movable and immovable property be guaranteed to refugees upon their return to Rwanda.
assured?
- NO 4° That the population be made to feel that it is represented in the government, in the National Assembly, in the army, in short at all levels of society and that the distribution of power be established through a cooperative effort supervised by the United Nations before the elections.
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These are issues between Zaire & Rwanda. The UN cannot negotiate and commit on behalf of Rwanda.

Military personnel also need assistance from the international community as they are not assisted by Non-Governmental Organizations, nor by United Nations Agencies present there.

According to existing legal doctrine, Rwandan soldiers on Zairian territory are considered prisoners of war, and as such are come under the responsibility of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Local authorities in the Northern and Southern Kivu area would like refugees either to return home as promptly as possible or to be removed to areas outside Northern and Southern Kivu to alleviate serious problems arising from overcrowding. Population density increased from 287 to 400 inhabitants per sq km along the coast of Lake Kivu with severe repercussions for the environment, the economy, the social and health conditions of people as a result of overcrowding. The harvest, school year and next elections are also jeopardized in these two areas.

In the other areas visited, local authorities are ready to take in and shelter Rwandan refugees provided the Government of Zaire and the International Community negotiate with the Kigali Government to secure the return of Rwandan refugees, which is the only satisfactory solution.

II.2 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT PHASE

II.2 REPATRIATION

a. Who is willing to return home

All categories of refugees are in favor of returning home under the aforementioned conditions.

b. Camps sites in relation to borders

The closest camps are ± 15 Km away from the border and those furthest away are over 60 Km from the border.

c. Supervision, escort and transport

Will be the responsibility of the United Nations.

II.2.2 REMOVAL

a. Identification of groups to be removed

All refugee groups are hostile to removal; this operation will require coercion for military personnel and politicians.

b. Identification of camps and residences of groups to be removed

The former training centers of Kongolo in Shaba, of Lokandu in Maniema; of Buta in Haut-Zaire and of Irebu in the Equator were chosen by the government of Zaire to shelter the military personnel of the RAF whilst the towns of Mbandaka, Matadi, Boma and Bandundu will shelter the dignitaries of the former Government of Rwanda.

For the site in Haut-Zaire, the regional authorities put forward Barisi, Ganga and Yeme because of the lack of suitable infrastructure.

c. Location of the camps and residences in relation to the shelter sites and towns

The nearest site is situated over 300 Km from the residence camps whilst the furthest is located over 1200 Km away from the residence camps. All shelter sites were chosen outside Northern and Southern Kivu.

d. Supervision, escort and transport

The terms of reference appointed the United Nations to carry out the removal, supervision and transport of refugees Forces. However, until these Forces are deployed, the United Nations System was requested to provide logistical support to the Zairian Armed Forces to maintain security in the camps and facilitate the efficient deployment of United Nations Forces.

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II.2.3 SHELTER SITES

a. Kongolo

* Geographic Data

Kongolo is located north of Shaba, 380 km from Bukavu and 480 km from Goma. The Kongolo area covers some 13,408 sq km and has a population of 300,000, representing 23 persons per sq km.

Kongolo has 60,000 inhabitants and an airport with a 1900 meter runway capable of handling planes weighing a maximum of 14 tons.

* Housing and Living Conditions

The Kongolo camp contains 120 structures used as housing, offices, kitchens, mess halls, bathrooms, schools and storage depots. The masonry-work is sound though most of the buildings are without doors or windows and many have partial or no roofing. The toilets are blocked due to the lack of water. Both electricity and water need to be restored. There is also a water well in the camp. The entire camp is in dire need of thorough cleaning.

* Equipment

No equipment is available in the camp which is entirely dependent on state-run water and electricity plants which are not operating due to a lack of fuel and adequate tools. The camp can house 3,000 persons in the buildings once the roof is repaired and the doors and windows replaced.

* Socio-Economic Activities

The Kongolo area is essentially agricultural. Peanuts, sweet potatoes, corn and palm oil are produced in large quantities. There is also a subsistence fishing industry. Kongolo can be reached by air or by road from Goma and Bukavu. The 711 km stretch of road between Kongolo and Bukavu is in poor condition and may require 7 days of travel. The improved runway at Kongolo can now handle C-130s.

* State of Mind

At the airport, the population at the airport displayed banners hostile to the arrival of Rwandan refugees. The population representatives expressed their opposition to this project. However once the head of the delegation explained that there was a need for solidarity with the ravaged areas of Northern and Southern Kivu and underlined the advantages that Kongolo might draw from the presence of refugees, the speakers admitted that they had been ill-informed and were not opposed to the arrival of former RAF soldiers in Kongolo.

b. Lokandu

* Geographic Data

The former training site for the Zairian armed forces, the Lokandu camp is located in the Maniema region 60 km north of Kindu. The city of Kindu is on the road to Lokandu situated 320 km from Bukavu and 380 km from Goma. Kindu has a national airport equipped to handle heavy cargo planes.

* Housing and Living Conditions

The Lokandu camp contains one hundred buildings in fair condition used primarily for housing. The masonry and roofing is sound, but nearly all the doors and windows are missing. The camp lacks toilets and suffers from shortages in water and electricity. A clean-up and general brush clearing will make the site more inhabitable.

* Equipment

A small abandoned hydroelectric plant provides electricity to professional housing, while the rest of the camp draws its electricity from two outdated electric generators. A wood workshop operates in the camp but lacks any hardware. Between 3,000 and 4,000 persons may be housed in the camp's structures.

* Socio-Economic Activities

Lokandu is located in an agricultural region where rice and corn are produced. There is also a small-scale peach production and hunting is widespread.

* State of Mind

No hostilities have been shown with regard to the arrival of former Rwandan military personnel in Lokandu.

c. Buta

* Geographic Data

Buta is located in the Haut-Zaire region, in the sub-region of BAS UELE which covers an area of 148,000 sq km. and includes a population of 769,276 persons. Since the Buta camp is very small (holds one company), the local authorities proposed three possible alternative sites to the Buta camps:

- Barisi is an abandoned Catholic mission located 110 Km from Buta. The building can house 250 persons. It is also possible to do some fishing.

- Ganga is an abandoned hospital located 180 km from Buta. The hospital has 450 beds and annex buildings may be used as housing. Both Ganga and Barisi share the same problems of access due to the great distances from Buta.
- Yeme: No housing infrastructure. This site is 15 km from Buta and should be considered as a last resort.

* Socio-Economic Activities

The Bas-Uele sub-region is agricultural; groundnut, maize, banana and manioc are grown there; industrial crops include coffee, cotton and palm oil. A cottage industry in diamonds and gold also operates in the area. The removal of products is difficult since the roads are faulty and rail transport problematic. For instance the trip from Buta to Ganga requires 4 days.

* Psycho-Social State of Mind

The population of Buta accepts wholeheartedly the arrival of Rwandese refugees on its soil; this was conveyed by the Sub-regional Commissioner and by the welcome of the population.

d. Irebu

* Geographic Data

Irebu camp is situated in the Equator region, 70 Km south of Mbandaka. The only access to it is by river; the camp used to have a path, now overgrown with vegetation and termite hills

* Housing and Living Conditions

The Irebu camp, a training center for the Navy, has some 150 buildings in reasonable condition, mainly used for housing. Masonry and roofing are in good condition, and a little cleaning would make the whole place inhabitable. It will be necessary to replace doors and windows, as well as mosquito screens. The camp is large and can easily put up 3,000 people in its buildings.

* Equipment

The center has a operational medical center, but no equipment or medicines. There is a generator in working order, but the lack of fuel has made its use impossible. Many wells are available although in need of repair.

* Socio-Economic Activities

Located in the equatorial zone by the river, Irebu is an agricultural, fishing and

hunting site. All evacuation and access is by water.

* State of Mind

The regional and urban authorities have declared that no obstacle has emerged to the arrival of former Rwandan soldiers in Irebu.

II.2.4. SETTLEMENT SITES

a. Mbandaka

* Geographic Data

The city of Mbandaka is the administrative center of the Equator region and is located 700 km north east of Kinshasa. Mbandaka - a city of 450,000 - may be reached by air or by water.

* Housing and Living Conditions

Mbandaka has no electricity and a weak economy. The Afrique Hotel has a 69-room capacity and many houses are unoccupied which, like the Afrique Hotel, require some restoration. While not continuous, running water is available at very specific hours of the day.

* Equipment

Mbandaka has all the equipment that one might find in a city, but the operation of these machines is subject to availability of the fuel needed to run the electric generators.

* Socio-Economic Activities

Mbandaka has a brewery, a national airport with lighted beacons and a river port. The population's livelihood is dependent on its agricultural production as well as fishing and hunting.

* Psycho-Social State

No observed signs of hostility.

b. Towns of Matadi and Bandundu

These towns offer, in theory, all the requirements for welcoming exiled Rwandan dignitaries. They were not visited due to time constraints.

NB: On the Kongolo, Lokandu and Irebu sites, the housing capacity could be

significantly increased through the use of temporary structures (sheeting); there are no constraints in terms of space available.

The following people took part in this mission:

I. For the UN

1. Brigadier General H. ANYIDHO : Deputy Force Commander UNAMIR
2. Mr Stanislaus NKWAIN : Deputy Resident Representative of the UNDP in Kinshasa
3. Mr A.B. Sidique DAO : Responsible for Humanitarian Assistance/UNAMIR
4. Mr Jiddo VAN DRUNEN : Head of the Special Unit for Burundi and Rwanda of the UNHCR/Geneva
5. Mr Collins ASARE : Manager of the Main UNHCR/Addis Abeba Program
6. Lt Colonel P. DESNOYERS : Head of logistics UNAMIR
7. Mr Gilles BRIERE : Logistics assistant UNAMIR
8. Major Phil LANCASTER : UNAMIR

II. For the Government of Zaire

1. Mr MUTURI wa BASHARA : Representative of the Prime Minister
2. Colonel Magistrate MBIDI NIKENI : Main Adviser at the National Defence Ministry
3. Colonel Dr. KABANDA KURHENG : Commander of the Medical Corps/ZAF
4. Mr YENYI OLUNGU Victor : Attorney General of the Republic and representative of the Ministry of Justice
5. Mr Damien IPAKA : Deputy Cabinet Director and Representative of the Ministry of the Interior
6. Mr RUMASHANA BAJOJE-NGWETE : Deputy Cabinet Director and Representative of the EPSP Ministry
7. Lt Colonel KAYUMBI : Logistics Corps ZAF

8. Lt Colonel Doctor LEPELE : Commander of the Medical Corps 10th
Military District Bukavu
9. Captain KABAMBA : ZAF ENGINEERS Corps
10. Mr MUTOKE MUPOMPA : Social Affairs Ministry Adviser and
Representative
11. Mr KABWIKA MBAYO Florent: Pharmaceutical Adviser and Representative of
the Ministry of Public Health and Family

KINSHASA, 15 October 1994

Le présent rapport est une synthèse de la mission chargée d'évaluer le coût du rapatriement et d'éloignement des réfugiés Rwandais implantés dans les régions du Nord et Sud Kivu.

Tous les détails y relatifs sont joints en annexe.

L'original du texte est en version française avec traduction en anglais.

**RAPPORT DE LA MISSION CONJOINTE
GOUVERNEMENT DU ZAIRE // NATIONS UNIES
SUR L'EVALUATION DU COUT DE RAPATRIEMENT
ET D'ELOIGNEMENT DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS**

I. INTRODUCTION

Considérant le communiqué conjoint signé à Grand Baie à l'Île Maurice, le 26 juillet 1994 entre le Président Mobutu du Zaïre et le Président Bizimungu du Rwanda;

Considérant le communiqué conjoint de la réunion ministérielle Zaïro-Rwandaise tenue le 1er septembre 1994 à Goma à laquelle le HCR a été représenté.

Considérant la demande du Gouvernement du Zaïre, aux Nations Unies d'aider à résoudre les problèmes de sécurité posés par la présence des réfugiés, d'éléments armés et des leaders politiques rwandais dans les régions du Nord et du Sud Kivu;

Considérant l'engagement du Gouvernement du Zaïre d'éloigner les éléments armés et les leaders politiques rwandais des zones frontalières où se trouvent les réfugiés, et d'y déployer les forces des Nations Unies en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la population Zaïroise hôte, des réfugiés, des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies et des travailleurs des ONGs en poste dans ces zones;

Considérant les discussions entre d'une part, le Président de la République et d'autre part le Gouvernement du Zaïre et la mission envoyée par le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies conduite par son Représentant spécial, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, du 12 au 14 septembre 1994 sur la requête du Gouvernement;

Considérant que toute la logistique de la mission conjointe Gouvernement du Zaïre / Nations Unies, chargée d'évaluer le coût de rapatriement et d'éloignement des réfugiés Rwandais est à charge de l'ONU ;

Considérant la nécessité pressante de concrétiser ces accords; vœux et recommandations :

Une mission conjointe s'est rendue du 29 septembre au 11 octobre 1994 dans les régions du Nord et du Sud Kivu, du Shaba, du Maniema, du Haut-Zaïre et de l'Équateur en vue de recueillir d'abord des informations auprès des autorités locales, des Agences du Système des Nations Unies et des Organisations Humanitaires, des réfugiés civils, des Dignitaires de l'ex-Gouvernement et des militaires des FAR, susceptibles de permettre à la mission d'accomplir la tâche lui assignée par le Gouvernement du Zaïre et le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU.

Ensuite visiter les sites pouvant servir de lieux d'hébergement des différentes catégories des réfugiés ci-dessus visées.

II. RAPPORT DE MISSION

II.1 ETAPES D'INVESTIGATIONS

A. Etat d'esprit de la population

De façon générale toutes les populations visitées sont favorables à l'accueil et à l'hébergement des réfugiés Rwandais dans leurs régions sauf à Kongolo, où une hostilité se lisait tant sur les calicots portés que sur les visages des habitants venus à l'aéroport. Cependant, après les explications du Chef de la Délégation sur l'objet de la mission, les représentants des partis politiques et de la population ont exprimé leur approbation soutenant avoir été mal informés sur les motivations ayant entraîné la décision du transfert des réfugiés dans leur zone.

B. Considérations sur le rapatriement et l'éloignement des réfugiés

Tous les réfugiés tant civils, militaires que les Dignitaires de l'Ex-Gouvernement Rwandais sont hostiles à l'éloignement et préfèrent le retour dans leur pays.

Les conditions ci après ont été particulièrement soulignées :

- 1° Que la Communauté Internationale se départisse de la partisanerie et devienne juste et impartiale
- 2° Que les conditions qui tiennent compte de l'histoire du Rwanda et des principes démocratiques de sécurité, soient satisfaisantes pour garantir le retour des réfugiés.
- 3° Que la récupération par les réfugiés rentrés au Rwanda, de leurs propriétés foncières de leurs mobiliers et immobiliers soit garantie.
- 4° Que la population se sente représentée dans le Gouvernement, à l'Assemblée Nationale, dans l'armée, bref à tous les niveaux de la vie nationale et que le partage du pouvoir se fasse par voie de concertation sous la responsabilité de l'ONU avant les élections.
- 5° Que les négociations se fassent sur base des accords d'Arusha signés le 4/08/1993 en y associant une quatrième composante à savoir les représentants des réfugiés étant entendu que les trois autres composantes sont représentées par l'ONU, les Gouvernements du Zaïre et de Kigali.

Ils ont en outre proposé qu'une zone tampon de sécurité soit créée au Rwanda pour les réfugiés qui pourraient y séjourner avant leur réinstallations et que cette zone soit placée exclusivement sous la surveillance des Forces des Nations Unies.

Concernant la catégorie des militaires, elle a insisté sur le fait que la Communauté Internationale puisse l'assister étant donné que jusqu'à ce jour elle ne bénéficie d'aucun soutien des Organisations Non Gouvernementales et des Agences du Système des Nations Unies en place.

Suivant la doctrine juridique en vigueur les militaires Rwandais au Zaïre, sont assimilés aux prisonniers de guerre et partant devraient être pris en charge par le Comité International de la Croix Rouge (CICR).

Quant aux autorités locales des régions du Nord et du Sud Kivu, elles souhaitent la rentrée rapide des réfugiés au Rwanda ou l'éloignement de ces derniers dans les régions autres que le Nord et le Sud Kivu étant donné les conséquences graves enregistrées sur le plan démographique. En effet, la densité est passée de 287 hab. au Km² à 400 hab. au Km² sur les régions côtières du lac Kivu. La promiscuité est telle que les conséquences graves ont été enregistrées sur le plan écologique, économique, social et sanitaire. La saison culturale, la rentrée scolaire et les prochaines élections sont également compromises dans ces deux régions.

Dans les autres régions visitées, les autorités locales sont favorables à l'accueil et à l'hébergement des réfugiés Rwandais tout en demandant au Gouvernement du Zaïre et à la Communauté Internationale de négocier avec le Gouvernement de Kigali, pour le retour des réfugiés au Rwanda, seule solution idéale.

II.2 PHASE DE L'EVALUATION TECHNIQUE

II.2.1. RAPATRIEMENT

a. Identification des volontaires au retour

Toutes les catégories des réfugiés sont favorables au retour aux conditions évoquées ci-haut.

b. Situation des camps par rapport aux frontières

Les camps les plus proches sont situés à +/- 15 Km de la frontière tandis que les plus éloignés sont à plus de 60 Km de la frontière.

c. Encadrement, escorte et transport

Ils seront assurés par les Forces des Nations Unies.

II.2.2. ELOIGNEMENT

a. Identification des groupes à éloigner

Tous les groupes des réfugiés sont hostiles à l'éloignement; C'est par contrainte que cette opération pourra s'effectuer en ce qui concerne les militaires et les hommes politiques.

b. Identification des camps et lieux de résidence des groupes à éloigner

Les anciens centres d'instruction de Kongolo au Shaba, de Lokandu au Maniema; de Buta au Haut-Zaïre et de Irebu à l'Equateur ont été choisis par le Gouvernement du Zaïre pour héberger les militaires des FAR tandis que les villes de Mbandaka, Matadi, Boma et Bandundu serviront à l'hébergement des Dignitaires de l'Ex-Gouvernement Rwandais.

Concernant le site du Haut-Zaïre, les autorités régionales ont proposé Barisi, Ganga et Yeme au lieu de Buta par manque d'infrastructure convenable.

c. Situation camps et lieux de résidence par rapport aux sites d'hébergement et villes d'accueils

Le site le plus proche est situé à plus de 300 Km des camps de résidence tandis que le plus éloigné est situé à plus de 1200 Km des camps de résidence. Ce qui est vrai c'est que tous les sites d'hébergement ont été choisis en dehors des régions du Nord et du Sud-Kivu.

d. Encadrement, escorte et transport

S'agissant de l'éloignement, de l'encadrement et du transport des réfugiés, les termes de référence ont désigné les Forces des Nations Unies pour leur réalisation. Cependant, en attendant le déploiement de ces Forces, il a été demandé au Système des Nations Unies, d'apporter un appui logistique aux Forces Armées Zaïroises aux fins d'assurer la sécurité dans les camps et le bon déroulement du déploiement des Forces des Nations Unies.

II.2.3. SITES D'HÉBERGEMENT

a. Site de Kongolo

*** Données géographiques**

Kongolo est situé dans le Nord du Shaba, à 380 Km de Bukavu et à 480 Km de Goma. La zone de Kongolo a une superficie de 13.408 Km², pour une population de 300.000 habitants, soit 23 hab/Km².

La cité de Kongolo compte 60.000 hab, et dispose d'un aéroport doté d'une piste de 1900 m de long, capable d'accueillir des avions de maximum 14 tonnes

* Etat des lieux (infrastructures d'accueil)

Le camp de Kongolo compte 120 blocs à usage de logement, bureaux, cuisines, réfectoire, sanitaire, école et dépôts. La maçonnerie est en bon état ; la plupart des bâtiments sont dépourvus de portes et fenêtres, et un grand nombre sont complètement ou partiellement dépourvus de toitures. Les sanitaires sont bouchés par manque d'eau; les installations électriques et d'adduction d'eau doivent être réhabilitées ; un puits d'eau existe dans le camp, à aménager. Le site doit faire l'objet d'un nettoyage et d'un entretien approfondi.

* Equipements

Aucun équipement n'est disponible au camp ; il est totalement dépendant des sociétés d'état distributrices d'eau et d'électricité, qui ne fonctionnent pas par manque de carburant et d'outils en bon état. Le camp peut abriter 3000 personnes dans les bâtiments, moyennant la réfection de toitures et le placement des portes et fenêtres.

* Activités socio-économiques

La zone de Kongolo est essentiellement agricole ; on y cultive des arachides, des patates douces, du maïs, et de l'huile de palme y est produit en grande quantité. On y pratique également la pêche artisanale. Kongolo peut être atteint, au départ de Goma et Bukavu par route et par air. La route en mauvais état entre Kongolo et Bukavu est longue de 711 Km et peut être parcourue en 7 jours. L'aéroport de Kongolo, amélioré, peut recevoir le C 130.

* Etat psycho-social

A l'aéroport, la population exhibait des calicots hostiles à l'arrivée de réfugiés rwandais. Les représentants de la population ont exprimé leur désapprobation vis-à-vis de ce projet. Cependant, après que le chef de la délégation ait expliqué qu'il y avait un devoir de solidarité avec les régions sinistrées du Nord et du Sud Kivu, et ait montré les avantages que la cité de Kongolo pourrait retirer de la présence des réfugiés, les intervenants ont reconnu avoir été mal informés, et ont déclaré ne pas être opposés à l'arrivée des anciens militaires des FAR à Kongolo.

b. Site de Lokandu

* Données géographiques

Ancien centre d'instruction des Forces Armées Zaïroises, le Camp de Lokandu est situé dans la région de Maniema, à 60 Km au nord de Kindu. La ville de Kindu est la voie d'accès obligée à Lokandu, et est située à 320 Km de Bukavu et 380 Km de Goma. La ville de Kindu dispose d'un aéroport national, capable d'accueillir des gros porteurs.

* Etat des lieux (infrastructures d'accueil)

Le camp de Lokandu compte une centaine de bâtiments en état plus ou moins bon, à usage principalement de logement. Le maçonnerie est en bon état, de même que les toitures ; seules les portes et fenêtres manquent presque partout. Le camp est dépourvu de sanitaires, et connaît des problèmes pour l'alimentation en eau et en électricité. Des travaux de nettoyage et débroussaillage permettront déjà de lui donner un aspect habitable.

* Equipements

Une micro-centrale hydroélectrique désaffectée alimentait les maisons des cadres en électricité ; le reste du camp était alimenté à partir de deux groupes électrogènes, aujourd'hui déclassés. Un atelier bois fonctionne dans le camp, mais est dépourvu de matériel. Il est possible de loger 3.000 à 4.000 personnes dans les bâtiments.

* Activités socio-économiques

Lokandu est situé dans une région agricole, où se cultivent le riz et le maïs. On y pratique aussi la pêche artisanale, et la chasse y est généralisée.

* Etat psycho-social

Aucune hostilité n'a été manifestée vis-à-vis de l'arrivée d'anciens militaires rwandais à Lokandu.

c. Site de Buta

* Données géographiques

Buta est situé dans la région du Haut-Zaïre, dans la sous-région du BAS UELE qui couvre une superficie de 148.000 Km², pour une population de 769.276 habitants. Le camp de Buta étant très petit (Capacité d'une compagnie), l'autorité locale a proposé trois sites possibles, en remplacement du camp de Buta.

- Site de Barisi : c'est une mission catholique abandonnée, située à 110 Km de Buta ; les bâtiments permettent de loger 250 personnes. Il est possible d'y pratiquer la pêche.
- Site de Ganga : c'est un hôpital abandonné, situé à 180 Km de Buta ; la capacité de l'hôpital est de 450 lits, et des bâtiments annexes peuvent être récupérés comme logement. Les mêmes problèmes d'accès qu'à Barisi se posent pour le site de Ganga.
- Site de Yeme : dépourvu d'infrastructure d'accueil, ce site situé à 15 Km de Buta est à considérer en dernier ressort.

* Activités socio-économiques

La sous-région du Bas-Uele est agricole ; on y cultive l'arachide, le maïs, la banane et le manioc ; comme cultures industrielles, le café, le coton et le palmier à huile. On y pratique aussi une exploitation artisanale de diamant et d'or. L'évacuation des produits est difficile, car les routes sont défectueuses et le chemin de fer problématique. Il faut, par exemple, 4 jours pour atteindre Ganga au départ de Buta.

* Etat psycho-social

La population de Buta accepte sans conditions l'arrivée de réfugiés rwandais sur son sol ; cela a été exprimé par le Commissaire sous-régional et par l'accueil de la population.

d. Site d'Irebu

* Données géographiques

Le camp d'Irebu est situé dans la région de l'Equateur, à 70 Km au Sud de Mbandaka. On n'y accède que par voie fluviale ; le camp disposait d'une piste, aujourd'hui envahie par la végétation et les termitières.

* Etat des lieux (infrastructures d'accueil)

Le camp d'Irebu, centre d'instruction pour la Force Navale, compte près de 150 bâtiments en bon état, à usage principalement de logement. La maçonnerie et les toitures sont en bon état, et il suffirait d'un nettoyage pour rendre l'ensemble habitable. Par ailleurs, il est nécessaire de replacer les portes et les fenêtres, ainsi que les toiles moustiquaires. Le camp est vaste, et peut facilement abriter 3.000 personnes dans les bâtiments.

* Equipements

Le Centre dispose d'un centre médical fonctionnel, mais totalement dépourvu de matériel et de médicaments. Un groupe électrogène y est installé, et est en état de marche ; cependant, le manque de carburant ne permet pas de le mettre en marche. De nombreux puits sont disponibles, qu'il faut aménager.

* Activités socio-économiques

Situé dans la zone équatoriale, au bord du fleuve, Irebu est un site d'agriculture, de pêche et de chasse. L'évacuation et l'accès ont lieu par voie fluviale.

* Etat psycho-social

Les autorités régionale et urbaine ont déclaré qu'aucun obstacle n'était enregistré pour l'installation à Irebu des anciens militaires rwandais.

II.2.4. VILLES D'ACCUEIL

a. Ville de Mbandaka

* Données géographiques

La ville de Mbandaka est le chef-lieu de la région de l'Equateur, et est située à 700 Km au Nord Est de Kinshasa. On y accède par voies aérienne et fluviale. Elle est peuplée de 450.000 habitants.

* Etat des lieux (infrastructure d'accueil)

La ville de Mbandaka souffre du manque d'énergie électrique et de la faiblesse des activités économiques. L'Afrique Hôtel offre une capacité d'accueil de 69 chambres; il y a également beaucoup de maisons inhabitées, qui nécessitent comme l'Afrique Hôtel des travaux de réfection. L'alimentation en eau n'est pas continue, mais s'effectue à des heures bien précises.

* Equipements

La ville de Mbandaka présente tous les équipements que l'on peut trouver dans une ville, mais le fonctionnement est tributaire de la disponibilité du carburant pour faire fonctionner les groupes électrogènes.

* Activités socio-économiques

La ville de Mbandaka possède une brasserie, et dispose d'un aéroport national balisé et d'un port fluvial. La population vit de l'agriculture, de la pêche et de la chasse.

* Etat psycho-social

Aucun signe d'hostilité n'a été observé.

b. Ville de Matadi et Bandundu

Ces villes offrent théoriquement toutes les disponibilités pour l'accueil des dignitaires rwandais en exil. Elles n'ont pas été visitées, faute de temps.

Nota bene : Sur les sites de Kongolo, Lokandu et Irebu, la capacité d'accueil peut être largement augmentée en utilisant des structures provisoires (sheeting) ; il n'y a pas de contraintes au point de vue de l'espace disponible.

Ont pris part à cette mission, les personnalités dont les noms suivent :

I. Pour l'ONU

1. Le Général H. ANYIDHOHO : Commandant Ajoint MINUAR
2. Mr. Stanislaus NKWAIN : Représentant Résident Adjoint du PNUD à Kinshasa
3. Mr. A.B. Sidique DAO : Chargé de l'Assistance Humanitaire/MINUAR
4. Mr. Jiddo VAN DRUNEN : Chef de l'Unité Spéciale pour le Burundi et le Rwanda HCR/Genève
5. Mr. Collins ASARE : Chargé du Programme Principal HCR/Addis-Abeba
6. Le LtColonel Pierre DESNOYERS : Chef logistique MINUAR
7. Mr. Gilles BRIERE : Assistant logistique MINUAR
8. Le Major PHIL LANCASTER : MINUAR

II. Pour le Gouvernement du Zaïre

1. Mr. MUTIRI wa BASHARA : Chargé de mission du Premier Ministre
2. Le Colonel Magistrat MBIDI NIKENI : Conseiller Principal au Ministère de la défense Nationale
3. Le Colonel Médecin KABANDA KURHENGHA : Commandant du Corps Médical/FAZ
4. Mr. YENYI OLUNGU Victor : Avocat Général de la République et représentant du Ministère de la Justice
5. Mr. Damien IPAKA : Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint et Représentant du Ministère de l'Intérieur
6. Mr. RUMASHANA BAJOJE-NGWETE : Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint et Représentant du Ministère de l'EPSP
7. Le LtColonel KAYUMBI : Corps logistique FAZ
8. Le LtColonel Médecin LEPELE : Commandant Corps Médical 10ème circonscription Militaire Bukavu.

9. Le Capitaine KABAMBA :

Corps du GENIE FAZ

10. Mr. MUTOKE MUPOMPA :

Conseiller aux Affaires Sociales et
Représentant de ce Ministère

11. Mr. KABWIKA MBAYO Florent :

Conseiller Pharmaceutique et Représentant du
Ministère de la Santé Publique et Famille.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 15 octobre 1994

RESOLVING THE REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS CRISIS

OPERATION RONDAVAL

A. THE PROBLEM

International tension
Rwanda's infrastructure
Aid Fade
Rising Tension
B B G N U initiatives (R P A Force)

B. THE IMPERATIVE

To get the people home
How to do it ?
When to do it ?

NOTE : Because the problem is so vast, a lot of people will have to work.

C. PREREQUISITES

1. The means to govern
2. Security
3. Land distribution
4. Information Strategy

1. THE MEANS TO GOVERN:

- (i) Funding: RENP-Catalyst
Use this plan to generate interest.
(ii) Advice: From independent experts.

2. SECURITY

The R P A has a Military approach. Regimental approach intimidate the people. .

- a) - approach of R P A
- b) - cooperative operations with UNAMIR-supervise R P A with training.
- c) - Sequencing (so many troop battalion to arrive)
*Confidence building for home coming
*Enhance security in camps.
- d) - Security Plan
Phase 1 : DP's
Phase 2 : Refugees
Sausage-Squeeze Effect.

3. LAND DISTRIBUTIONS

- a) - Problem- who owns the land ?
- b) - Is there enough land ? Perhaps in respect of killings/genocide and mass exodus
- c) - How to distribute it ? Structured !
 - (i) The Land Commission(no corruption,structured)
 - (- Germany-has experience in Land Distribution during Reunification)
 - The European Community and the United States can use appropriate technology to facilitate the work of the Land Commission. State-of-the-Art computers and Satellites available.

4. INFORMATION STRATEGY

- Oral society
- Media
- Coordination
 - (i) Leaflet/Radio/PA (coordinated information with the Government
 - (ii) Coordination with the Broad Based Government of National Unity.
 - (iii) Confidence building

TIMING

- Balance
- Duration
 - Phase 1 - Displaced persons - 6 months
 - Phase II - Refugees (Planting/harvesting
 - 9 months
 - (Planting/Harvesting
 - (12-15 months)

- Weather
- Start Date - Maximum security

4. PHASES

- Planning phase - end 1st March
- 1st March - 31st August Internally Displaced persons phase
- 1st September - 31st May - Refugee phase
- After 31st May -consolidation phase

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- Government- S R S G - UNAMIR FC
- Task force
- * Permanent large busy organisation all the agencies will be represented. The coordination is by UNREO/UNAMIR
- Role of UNAMIR
- Chain of command

CONCLUSION

- Imperative
- Timing
- Focus - Inside and outside through the media -to generate energy
- Cooperation
- Success

We should visualize success and realize it.

SECTOR FOUR

PROPOSED PLAN FOR RETURN OF DISPLACED TO PLACE OF ORIGIN

		TIME
A:	IDENTIFICATION OF PLACE OF ORIGIN (THROUGH UNHCR REGISTRATION)	UNHCR/ICRC
B:	CONSULTATIONS WITH PREFECTS PROVIDING THEM WITH PLANS AND SEEKING THEIR CO-OPERATION	UNAMIR/UNHCR HUMAN RIGHTS
C:	MILOBS TO CONDUCT SURVEY OF PLACES OF ORIGIN TO ASCERTAIN SAFETY, WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN INVASIONS OF PROPERTY ETC.	UNAMIR
D:	CONSULTATIONS WITH RPA REGARDING MODALITIES FOR CLEARANCES AND STREAMLINING OF CHECK POINTS. THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE SCREENING AND CONVOYS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH SAFE CONDUCTS TO MINIMIZE THE ELEMENT OF APPARENT HARASSMENT INHERENT IN FREQUENT SCREENINGS AND SEARCHES OF CONVOYS	UNAMIR/HUMAN RIGHTS/UNHCR/UNREO
E:	INFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN CAMPS TO PREPARE DISPLACED PERSONS OF OPERATION	"
F:	PREPOSITIONING OF SEEDS, IMPLEMENTS AND OTHER FOOD ITEMS. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME SURVIVAL KIT PACKAGES ON ARRIVAL	UNREO/UNAMIR/UNHCR <u>MEDIA</u> <u>ALERT</u>
G:	DEPARTURE OF CONVOYS TO PLACE OF ORIGIN	UNHCR/UNAMIR/ICRC?/HU MAN RIGHTS/IOM
H:	MILOBS AND UNAMIR FORMED TROOPS UN HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS ON THE ALERT AND AWAITING ARRIVAL	UNAMIR
I:	ARRIVAL AND WELCOMING BY PREFECTS	ALL

CC: DANT.

UNICEF RWANDA EMERGENCY OPERATION
KIGALI, RWANDA

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FOR PERIOD ENDING 2 OCTOBER 1994

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FROM: Nigel Fisher
Representative

I. OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AND AROUND RWANDA

Security Situation in Rwanda

On 26 September a letter was issued to all U.N. agencies in Rwanda from the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General clarifying the allegations that forces of the Rwandan Government may have been responsible in recent weeks for massacres of members of the Hutu community in Rwanda. The letter indicated that the allegations had been taken up with the Rwandan Government on 20 September by Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Mr. Shaharyar Khan, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Rwanda. On 23 September the Rwandan Government directed an investigation by a team of four Government ministers, representatives of UNAMIR and UNHCR and a U.N. Human Rights Monitor. A thorough investigation is expected to be carried out by the Commission of Experts established by Security Council resolution 935.

Security Situation in Goma, Zaire

All expatriate staff have now been evacuated from the Katale camp in Goma due to increased tension. Over the weekend it was found that the militia had in their possession a list of eight expatriate NGO personnel against whom, it is believed, they were planning some form of retaliation. Four NGOs were forced to evacuate the camp by way of Uganda as they were unable to depart through the camp towards Goma. Meetings were held on 1-2 October with UNHCR, UNICEF, the Zairian Government (including a representative from the Prime Minister's Office), the provincial government and camp leaders in an attempt to obtain assurances for the security of agency personnel. As of midday on 2 October, UNHCR was still dissatisfied with the assurances provided and expatriate personnel remain out of the camp. In addition, tensions in Goma between the ex-Rwandan government military forces and the militia and the Zairian police and military remain high. During an incident on 1 October involving ex-Rwandan Government military and Zairian military, two ex-Rwandan government soldiers were killed. In light of these developments, which serve to underline the fragile nature of the security situation in the camps, UNICEF programme activities in Katale have been temporarily postponed pending resolution of the problem.

Security Situation in Ngara, Tanzania


On 2 October, UNICEF reported that three days of violent incidents threatened the security of refugees and aid workers in Ngara camps. One refugee has been killed and two persons are missing. The first serious incident in Ngara occurred Thursday, 29 September, when Tanzanian police entered the Benaco camp and arrested an ex-Government official who had not given back the Rwandan Government the car he was using. The police station (opposite the UNICEF/UNHCR compound) was soon surrounded by a large crowd of refugees who were eventually dispersed by police using teargas and firing bullets in the air. At the same time, tens of thousands of refugees descended on the UNICEF/UNHCR compound. An

incident was averted when news was announced of the official's release from the police. Also on Thursday, in the Benaco camp, a vehicle with three persons on board was attacked and turned over. The driver escaped but the two passengers were reported missing. The dead body of a refugee was found on Friday, 30 September, near a Red Cross Distribution Centre located near the area where the Tanzanian police fired bullets to disperse the refugee crowd. The police report all bullets that they fired were accounted for. In a separate incident, MSF-Holland staff members narrowly escaped a chasing crowd of refugees who mistakenly thought they had given a lift to a Tanzanian policeman. UNICEF staff report that refugees have been putting up roadblocks in an effort to control routes to the Rwandan border.

It is clear that in all refugee locations additional security precautions will be required to assure the safety of staff working in the camps.

Refugee Movement/Displaced Persons

BRITCON, the British contingent of UNAMIR, estimates the population of displaced persons in Rwanda as of 26 September to be 1,967,760, with some 900,000 located in Sector 4 in the southwestern region of the country. These estimates are in the process of being confirmed by other UN agencies, especially UNHCR, and the NGOs.



BRITCOM has also provided estimates of the displaced persons/refugee population in countries outside of Rwanda to be as follows: Goma, Zaire (800,000), Bukavu, Zaire (320,000) and Uvira, Zaire (190,000); 15,000 in Uganda (UNHCR estimates there are between 60,000-70,000 refugees who fled country prior to latest conflict); Ngara, Tanzania (300,000), Karagwe, Tanzania (98,400); and Burundi (179,500). It should be underlined that these figures are, in some case, substantially different than those provided by UNHCR. The

current figures should only be used for comparison, since UNHCR is responsible for the official refugee count.

The returnee movement for internally displaced persons in the southwest, known as "Operation Homeward" and coordinated by UNAMIR, resumed Thursday, 29 September with the movement of 110 returnees from Gikongoro. The next convoy is scheduled to leave on Monday, 3 October. Under the original plan, UNAMIR was to use up to 100 trucks to return up to 4,000 people per day. As noted previously, due to a perceived lack of security, very few displaced persons have volunteered to be moved.

UNAMIR reported on 30 September that approximately 1,800 people have crossed into Burundi from Gitarama and Butare in the last few days. On 28 September, UNAMIR also reported a significant refugee outflow from displaced persons camps in southwest Rwanda into Burundi: 3,000 from Rurumba, 700 from Rwamiko and 1,000 from Kibeho.

UNAMIR also reported on 28 September that the rate of repatriation from Goma has notably decreased.

Government Administration

At the UNREO agency/NGO meeting on Tuesday, 27 September, a representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation announced that the Government would begin to charge handling charges and custom duties on goods coming into the country. All goods designated for humanitarian assistance will be exempt from government tax but will be subject to a handling fee of 1% percent of the value of the goods. All other goods not designated for humanitarian assistance will be taxed at 4% of the total value of the import. Out of this, 3% will be allocated to the Government and 1% to the private company who is assisting the Government to cover all handling and storage charges.

The Government is also in the process of drafting new legislation requiring the accreditation of NGOs working in Rwanda. The accreditation process will most likely involve three phases: the first phase would require all NGOs working in the country to register with the Ministry of Rehabilitation; the second phase would require them to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prove *bona fide* NGO status in the home country; and the third phase would require them to register with the functional Ministry dealing with their area of operation. As part of the accreditation process, the Ministry of Rehabilitation has requested that all NGOs submit activity reports for July, August and September and every month thereafter.

As a consequence of these two recent developments, there has been some concern on the part of NGOs about the newly enforced systems and the possibility of increased control by the central government on their movements and activities. However, it must be understood that the Government must re-establish basic administrative policies and procedures; the current systems do not appear to be excessive or overly controlling.

National Salaries

This past week the Rwandan Government began to pay salaries to some of its health and education workers, covering a two month period. Payment of salaries has been a critical issue, so this is an important step on the part of the Government towards returning the country to a state of normalcy.

Rehabilitation

UNDP has been asked by the Rwandan Prime Minister to assist the Government in preparing a Round Table Conference for rehabilitation and construction. The Government plans to hold the conference in December, possibly in New York. The conference will provide the Government with an opportunity to present to the donor community its rehabilitation and reconstruction programme and seek their support in funding and implementation. UNICEF will ensure that issues pertaining to children and women are appropriately reflected in the conference preparations.

*UNDP
Vehicle
ministry*
UNDP has provided five vehicles for the central ministries with which it collaborates -- Finance, Planning, Office of the Prime Minister, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and the Interior. This action demonstrates that other UN agencies are complementing UNICEF's planned support for other central ministries with whom it cooperates.

Rwandan Public Holiday

On Saturday, 1 October, the first public holiday of the new Rwandan Government was held and marked by military parades and a large public rally in the Nyamirambo Stadium in Kigale. The tone of the rally was very positive and victorious, celebrating the first major victory of the RPF four years ago. Speeches made by the President, Vice President and Deputy Prime Ministry, while underlining the importance of national unity, also emphasized the need for the swift identification, trial and eventual punishment of those involved in the genocide. On behalf of the Government, the Vice President also thanked the international community for its assistance to Rwanda. He pointed out, however, that a few NGOs had begun to work in Rwanda with questionable political agendas. He indicated that such activity was not welcome in the country.

Food Supply

WFP has reported that although donor response to the Rwanda Regional Crisis is encouraging, with confirmed pledges as of 19 September totalling 247,533 metric tons valued at US \$141.1 million, there is still a shortfall which must be covered if WFP is to carry out its mandate effectively. Priority food resource needs for the region for the month of October are 16,055 tons of cereals, pulses, corn soya blend, salt, dried skimmed milk and sugar. About 21,255

tons of commodities, mainly cereals, are needed for November and 38,885 tons of food aid will be required for December.

In a food coordination meeting held on Wednesday, 28 September, WPF indicated that it wished to offer various food assistance programmes which would include a Food-for-Work programme for school teachers, a programme to establish nutrition centres and a primary school feeding programme. WFP has requested the support of other U.N. agencies and NGOs to undertake these activities.

Fuel

As of 31 September, UNAMIR will stop providing petroleum, oil and lubricants to all NGOs since fuel is now commercially available in major centres of the country.

II. PROGRESS OF UNICEF OPERATIONS

General

Phys. & Rehab. Ministry
"Line of Credit" to Key Ministries. Through an exchange of letters, UNICEF has now given formal notification that it will provide a "line of credit" to seven ministries with which it closely works for basic physical rehabilitation. These ministries are the following: Health; Primary and Secondary Education; Higher Education; Public Works, Energy and Water; Family and Women's Affairs; Social Affairs; and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.

World Bank Grant. Formal approval has now been received in the form of a signed grant between UNICEF and the World Bank for the \$10.5 million contribution to the UNICEF Rwanda Emergency Operation. The grant will support programmes for health, nutrition and water supply as presented in the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. A meeting with World Bank staff currently in Kigali is planned for 3 October to discuss administrative procedures. NYHQ is requested to expedite issuance of the PBA to ensure rapid expenditure.

Radio Rwanda
Radio Rwanda. UNICEF REO awaits feedback from the Supply Division in Copenhagen on the urgently-required equipment to rehabilitate the broadcasting capabilities of Radio Rwanda. Meetings have been held with GTZ locally to coordinate support for this vital communications infrastructure. Discussions are also continuing with expatriate Rwandans in Ethiopia and Belgium to gain access to the prerecorded radio materials in Kinyarwanda that the group is broadcasting out of Ethiopia.

Demining
Demining. Discussions have continued on potential support for the demining of health centers and schools. UNICEF has now reached an agreement with the Ethiopian Government on an initial assessment mission to determine the nature and scope of the assistance required. A small assessment team from Ethiopia is expected in the next two weeks. It is worth nothing

that the Government of Rwanda has thus far done commendable work in ensuring the demining of health and education facilities to allow for the opening of schools and the provision of basic health services. This action will reduce the additional support required from UNICEF and other sources.

Health Sector

Health Information and Sectoral Assessment. The mortality/morbidity data collection has been jointly organized throughout the country by one of our staff and Ministry of Health officials. Data collection will take place twice a month in the different regions, beginning the week of 3 October. A focal point has been identified in each region (eg., the Regional Medical Officer whenever feasible). Given the shortage of vehicles, data collection will be done in collaboration with other UNICEF programme sectors. In addition, Phase 2 of the Health Facility Assessment is on track. Twenty-six teams of two persons have been sent into the field, together with two teams of supervisors. Assessment of health facilities in the region assigned to UNICEF will commence 3 October.

Health Facilities Rehabilitation. Following extensive repairs by UNICEF, the Central Medical Store (OPHAR) will begin to receive drugs from different donors as well as from consignees. Following discussions with the Director, it has been agreed that NGOs will now be directed to OPHAR to fulfill their requests for drugs or other medical equipment. The EPI programme is expanding smoothly throughout the country and UNICEF has finally received the critical components of the cold chain equipment (eg., fridges, cold boxes, vaccines carriers, syringes, etc.). The consultant for Health Policy and Management is preparing a basic document for the Health Policy and Management Workshop which is scheduled to take place at the end of October. A questionnaire is being drafted and will be distributed to the Regional Medical Officers in order to begin identifying the major health problems in each region.

Distribution of Medical Supplies. A table summarizing the medical supplies distributed with UNICEF assistance will be available in the next SitRep.

Nutrition Sector

During the week of 26 September, several meetings were held with the technical staff of the Nutrition Service of the Ministry of Health. A special meeting was held with the Director General of the Ministry of Health and the Director of Health Programmes to begin to coordinate priorities and planning government capacity-building in the area of nutrition. Visits were made to five unaccompanied children's centres in the Kigali region to understand the food and nutrition needs of the centres. During each visit, some special foods for children from the UNICEF stock, as well as some related supplies, were distributed. A visit was made

to the hospital of Rutongo and one of its branch dispensaries to observe their work with malnourished children and their supplementary feeding programmes, which have received technical and supply support from UNICEF. Discussions were held with USAID-Kigali to follow up on the pledge made in early August of a donation of special children's foods by the U.S. Government. A coordination meeting was held with the Ministry of Rehabilitation on food aid to unaccompanied children's centres, as well as a meeting with an MSF nutritionist on the possible coordination of nutritional surveillance activities. Follow-up continued on the orders for hoes and bean seeds and a plan formulated for their distribution.

Successes: The priorities of the Ministry of Health in nutrition appear to accord very closely with those identified by UNICEF. Details of a budget and plan for reinforcing the Ministry's work in nutrition are still being worked out. UNICEF is now acquiring a better understanding of the needs of the operational NGOs for feeding programmes in health facilities and children's centres.

Constraints: More coordination is needed among all players on the ground working in nutrition. UNICEF will restart the weekly nutrition meetings that were previously organized by UNDP and will continue to work on the planning of a national workshop for coordinating nutrition activities. The section continues to be somewhat hampered by lack of access to vehicles at a time when it is important to have more contact with activities in the field.

Education Sector

During the week beginning 26 September 1994, schools in the following prefectures opened: Kigali (city and rural) on 26 September, Gikongoro on 27 September, Cyangugu on 28 September and Kibuye on 29 September.

On 1 October, the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education and the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture, plus one senior official from each Ministry, left to attend the International Bureau of Education (IBE) Conference of Ministers of Education, Geneva, 3-9 October.

UNESCO consultant, Mr. Moctar Fall, continued his survey of school buildings/facilities, looking at the prefectures of Kibuye and Gisenyi. The results of this survey, which is being conducted in coordination with UNDP, will be presented as they become available. -

Inauguration of the second phase of TEP preparation has taken place with the sending of a team to Byumba for the purposes of supervision, follow-up and data collection. The team has collected for Byumba the best information currently available on the schooling situation in Rwanda. Some of their findings are as follows:

- In the 17 communes of Byumba, there are 123,085 primary school pupils and 1,942 teachers, resulting in a pupil teacher ratio of 63.4:1;
- 70.6 percent of the pupils are enrolled in grades 1-3, precisely those grades which the TEP targets;
- The majority of the teachers are underqualified or unqualified, but TEP training is going ahead and can be expected to be particularly important for these teachers. It is important to note that the teachers are not being paid; some report that they have not been paid for the past two years;
- In some schools, many teachers and pupils have come from outside Rwanda, especially from Uganda;
- Many schools have little or no school furniture; the great majority of schools have no textbooks, exercise books, pencils, etc.;
- A few schools completed the 1993-94 school year (eg., in Muvumba), with limited disruption; this is unlikely to be replicated in other prefectures, however;
- A typical pattern of school organization is as follows: Grades 1-3 have two shifts, a morning shift from 8:30-12:00 and an afternoon shift from 1:30-4:30; pupils in Grades 4-5 attend all day;
- The language of instruction is Kinyarwanda; French lessons are offered in Grades 4-6, but some older children have more competence in English than in French;
- The transportation of TEP kits from prefectures to communes and schools requires UNICEF/UNESCO's active assistance as we cannot rely on NGO presence or Ministry of Education authorities.

A preliminary inventory of the stock of textbooks held at the store of the Printing Press shows that current holdings are inadequate for most subjects and most grades; only for Kinyarwanda, Grades 4-6, is there a reasonable volume of stock.

While the Director of the Printing Press in Kigali has given assurances as to its capacity to meet orders for textbooks, the UNICEF/UNESCO education team is investigating the comparative costs and production capacities of other printers.

A meeting was held at the Bureau Pédagogique on 29 September with a group of curriculum specialists; work will begin shortly on reviewing and, if necessary, revising textbooks and teacher-guides for Grades 1-6 subjects in anticipation of the commencement of textbook production in a few weeks time.

A UNESCO consultant, Marc Sommers, has arrived to conduct a study of the educational needs and aspirations of young persons, especially of post-primary school age.

Water and Sanitation Sector

The weekly Water and Sanitation coordination meeting was held on 26 September. Discussions focused on the following issues: garbage collection of Kigali city by AFRICARE; UNICEF/Austrian Relief Programme (ARP) efforts to rehabilitate the Ngarama gravity flow pipeline system; UNICEF's willingness to support any organizations in the assessment, survey and rehabilitation of the Burgesera/Karenge water treatment plant; and a request to ICRC to supply enough chemicals to the Gitarama water treatment plant.

Specific activities last week include the following:

- Signed a letter of understanding with Portable Water Supply System (PWSS) to supply water in the Kibeho camp in the southwest for a period of three months; this project will supply 1.56 million liters of drinking water per day for 130,000 displaced persons in the camp;
- Issued 2,000 liters of diesel for generator, 50 bags of aluminum sulphate and five drums (45 kg) of chlorine to Rwamagana water treatment plant for two weeks of operation;
- Held a coordination meeting with ICRC, UNAMIR, Prefecture, Electrogaz and UNREO in Gikongoro regarding the rehabilitation of the water plant by mid-October 1994, plant management, personnel training and payment and fuel supply;
- Distributed 194 m3 of water to unaccompanied children's centres, orphanages, hospitals and public clusters in Kigali city, Nyamata, Butare and Gikongoro by 11 water tankers;
- Received 60 OXFAM water tanks (10 and 45 m3) at Kigali by air for distribution to Gikongoro, Bukavu and Goma;
- Continued to make progress on the repair of the MINITRAPE/UNICEF central warehouse, which is now 30 percent completed;
- Australian troops repaired the Relima water treatment plant and restarted the system which has not been functioning for the past three days;
- All CCFs and SCFs for the section have been raised to cover Goma, Bukavu and Rwanda up to December 1994.

WATER AND SANITATION						
ACTIVITIES	Achievements For Week Ending 1 October		Cumulative Achievements Since July 1994		Overall Outcome	
	Quantity	Beneficiaries	Quantity	Beneficiaries	Quantity	Beneficiaries
Rehabilitation of Kigali City Water Treatment Plant	80%	190,000	85%	200,000	100%	300,000
Rehabilitation of Prefecture Water Treatment Plants	1	20,000	10	500,000	12	770,000
Protection of Springs	---	---	4	1,000	1,000	20,000
Repair of Gravity Flow Pipeline System	1	5,000	10	60,000	30	150,000
Latrine Construction	25	1,250	300	15,000	10,000	500,000
Training of Water Plant Technicians	---	---	20	40,000	150	1 million

Constraints:

- Lack of local technical manpower;
- Lack of vehicles to distribute materials;
- Lack of vehicles to transport Government counterparts;
- Slow local procurement process; and
- Inadequate supplies.

WATER AND SANITATION				
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES	Availability from January 1992		Availability from Since July 1992	
	Quantity	Beneficiaries	Quantity	Beneficiaries
Water Tankers	4	20,000	5	25,000
Water Trailer Tractors	6	15,000	6	15,000
Water Treatment Plants	---	---	1	10,000
Water Bladders	30	30,000	50	50,000
OXFAM Tanks	60	None as yet	60	None as yet
Generators	16	200,000	16	200,000
Water Pumps	6	100,000	6	100,000
Pipes	100 km	---	150 km	50,000
Water Treatment Chemicals	5 tons	---	15 tons	40,000

III. INTERNAL UNICEF MATTERS

Personnel

UNICEF REO has submitted to NYHQ a draft proposal for the organizational structure of the Rwanda office. Additional justification for this structure will be submitted this week to allow DOP and EMOPS to review the proposed structure for submission to the BPRC. REO would like to underline the very high level of support received to date for recruitment and placement of personnel. It is hoped that the submission of a more detailed office structure will facilitate DOP's work in finding staff to fill posts for the longer-term.

Urgent assistance from DOP is requested for the recruitment of replacement Emergency Coordinators for Goma and Bukavu. In both locations it is essential for the credibility that there be an overlap with the current coordinators.

will leave in two weeks time and Juan Carlos Espinola in Bukavu at the end of the month. Additionally, it is important that for these two key posts the personnel identified be experienced UNICEF programme staff who are fluent in French. We believe that Michel Sidibe from Swaziland was identified for a loan to REO Goma. Given his previous experience and language skills, he is a superb choice for the post and, if possible, should be made available immediately for a three month period.

Finance

Thanks to the assistance provided by UNICEF New York and Baghdad, computerized accounting and financial monitoring systems have now improved substantially. For future emergencies, it should be emphasized that the presence of experienced, highly-qualified operations personnel conversant with all components of GSFSS at the start of emergency operations is vital to avoid the need to recreate standard financial and supply control mechanisms after the fact. The technical assistance provided during the last month from DFM has also been very much appreciated as it has been instrumental in sorting out a number of problems with finance and operations.

Cash flow for the various locations of UNICEF operations continues to be somewhat problematic. However, systems are now in place which should decrease gaps and increase accountability.

Administration

With the assistance of OAM in New York, negotiations have been finalized with the Director General of SORAS for rental of the office premises. An initial five-month rental period (August - December 1994) has been agreed to allow OAM to examine the proposed rental agreement. Based on OAM approval, a 12-month lease would be signed effective January 1995.

Staff housing continues to be problematic since most staff are still housed in the Hotel Mille Collines. The hotel has regularly increased its daily rates as more services become available. Nazin Achkan has now begun to assist with negotiations for additional housing.

Nigel Fisher officially closed the Nairobi liaison office for the REO effective 1 October. A skeleton staff will be maintained to assure a liaison function and ESARO will cover all remaining support requirements.

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ADDENDUM TO SITUATION REPORT NO. 48

Unaccompanied Children Sector

Following is a summary of activities for the week ending 1 October:

- UNICEF finalized negotiations with Save the Children Fund UK on the joint Tracing, Registration and Reunification Programme and the agreement is expected to be signed this week.
- The Ministry of Rehabilitation and the Ministry of Social Affairs met to discuss the implementation of their first joint project which will focus on the assessment of unaccompanied children's centres in Rwanda, with technical, logistical and financial support from UNICEF.
- A "desk-top" review of all available data on unaccompanied children's centres indicates that there is now a total of 14,407 unaccompanied children in centres within Rwanda -- which is 151 fewer children than a month ago.
- UNICEF and Save the Children Fund UK have reached an agreement to start activities promoting the Convention on the Rights of the Child in collaboration with a local NGO known as Haguruka. Four projects are expected to be completed within the next three months:
 - (1) official recognition of the Kinyarwanda version of the Convention on the Rights of the Child;
 - (2) a teacher-friendly version of the Rights of the Child to be used in classrooms;
 - (3) a children's version of the Rights of the Child to be used in unaccompanied children's centres; and
 - (4) 10 radio messages on the Rights of the Child intended for adults and children using traditional Rwandan tales and folklore.
- Over the past week, several NGOs have offered to open unaccompanied children's centres in Rwanda, including the Spanish Red Cross, Premiere Urgence and APY, a Spanish NGO.
- The first reunification problem has been reported which involves a child refusing to live with uncles. UNICEF, the Belgian Red Cross and Ministry of Rehabilitation are in the process of establishing guidelines for addressing these types of situations.

GENOCIDE IN RWANDA APRIL-MAY 1994

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The death of president Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda in a suspicious plane crash on April 6, 1994 was the pretext for Hutu extremists from the late president's entourage to launch a campaign of genocide against the Tutsi, a minority who make up about fifteen percent of the population of Rwanda. The extremists also killed Hutu who had shown that they were willing to cooperate with Tutsi in forming a more democratic government. Six weeks later, the killing continues. At least 200,000 and perhaps as many as 500,000 unarmed and unresisting civilians have been slain. The international community has failed to take any effective action to stop the slaughter.

SYSTEMATIC SLAUGHTER

The massacres were planned for months in advance. The Presidential Guard and other elements of the Rwandan army taught members of the political party militias, the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi*, how to kill most efficiently. The *Interahamwe*, "Those Who Attack Together," are part of the *Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (MRND), the party of the late president; the *Impuzamugambi*, "Those With a Single Purpose," are attached to the *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR), an extremist Hutu party in alliance with the MRND. Created in 1992, the militias received intensified military training in late 1993 and early 1994, as groups of 300 men at a time were sent for three weeks to a military camp in the northeastern region of Mutara. In their attacks on civilians, the militia are often accompanied by a small number of soldiers or national policemen, but the militia have killed far more people than have uniformed members of the armed forces.

The Rwandan authorities distributed firearms to militia members and other Habyarimana supporters as early as 1992, and gave out many more in late 1993 and early 1994. The bishop of the important Catholic diocese of Nyundo criticized this distribution of weapons in a pastoral letter at the end of December 1993. The militia who returned from training programs in early 1994 brought firearms, including grenades, back with them.

A private radio station owned by members of Habyarimana's inner circle, the *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*, last autumn began a campaign of hate-filled propaganda against the Tutsi generally and members of the opposition to the Habyarimana regime, both Tutsi and Hutu. At the end of 1993, the broadcasts became more virulent and began targeting individuals who were named as "enemies" or "traitors" who "deserved to die." Among those so labeled were Lando Ndasingwa, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who was one of the first killed once the massacres began (along with his mother, his wife and his children), and Monique Mujawamariya, a human rights activist, who narrowly escaped with her life. Throughout these weeks of slaughter, the Radio des Mille Collines has incited listeners to genocide, encouraging them to "fill the half-empty graves."

Among the owners and directors of the Radio des Mille Collines are:

- Alphonse Ntirivamunda, son-in-law of Juvénal Habyarimana;
- Félicien Kabuga, a wealthy businessman whose son is married to a daughter of Habyarimana;
- Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, head of the CDR;
- Tarcisse Renzaho, the prefect (governor) of Kigali city; and
- André Ntarugera, Minister of Postal Services and Communications.

For some time, this radio station was run by Ferdinand Nahimana, who had been in charge of the national radio when it was used to promote the killing of Tutsi in an earlier massacre.

The state-owned Radio Rwanda has also played a negative role in the violence, broadcasting contradictory messages, sometimes appealing for calm, but just as often encouraging continued massacres. As recently as May 19, it was ordering listeners to extirpate the rebels to the last man and eliminate anyone suspected of opposing the regime. It may have adopted a harsher tone in order to replace the Radio des Mille Collines, whose broadcast range was limited to Kigali following repeated attacks on its transmitter by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a largely Tutsi rebel movement.

THE WORST, BUT NOT THE FIRST MASSACRE

The current slaughter differs in scale but not otherwise from earlier massacres in Rwanda in October 1990, January-February 1991, March 1992 and December 1992-February 1993. The earlier killings, like those this year, were organized by officials of the Habyarimana government or of his political party, the MRND, and the closely allied CDR. Like those this year, the killings targeted Tutsi and those Hutu labeled as opponents of the Habyarimana regime. These attacks by the government on its own unarmed citizens cost about 2,000 lives and were condemned by both local and international human rights organizations.¹

THE SLAUGHTER BEGINS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CRASH

Within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard had set up roadblocks around the capital of Kigali and had begun liquidating key members of the moderate opposition. Among the early victims were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda. Others were human rights activists, including Charles Shamukiga, Fidele Kanyabugoyi, Ignace Ruhatana, Patrick Gahizi, Father Chrysologue Mahame, S.J., and Abbé Augustin Ntagara.

The Presidential Guard was joined by the party militias, and within a week these forces had killed an estimated 20,000 people in Kigali and its immediate environs. The international community responded by evacuating foreign nationals, the first step in its withdrawal from the crisis. Perhaps encouraged by this retreat, the leaders of the genocide extended its scope outside the capital to the east and the southwest. Beginning on April 15, when most foreigners had departed, authorities distributed large quantities of firearms, including automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols, to militia and other supporters of Habyarimana.

Many people were killed in their homes, but others were slain in hospitals and churches, places usually recognized as sanctuaries. Among the worst such incidents were the following:

- Kibungo - 2800 people gathered in a church center were slaughtered in a four-hour period by the Interahamwe using grenades, machine guns, machetes and R4 rockets. Approximately forty people survived.
- Cyahinda - 6000 Tutsi who had taken refuge in a church were attacked by militia who left only about 200 to live.
- Kibeho - 4000 people killed in a church.
- Mibirizi parish - 2000 slain.
- Shangi parish - 4000 killed.
- Rukara parish - 500 slaughtered in the church.
- Kigali and Butare - hundreds of patients and staff were killed in hospitals.
- Butare orphanage - twenty-one children, selected solely because they were Tutsi, were slain as well as thirteen Rwandan Red Cross volunteers who tried to protect them.
- Gikongoro - eighty-eight pupils were slaughtered at their school.

Thousands of survivors in Kigali sought safety in the Amahoro stadium, the Hotel des Milles Collines, the Sainte Famille Church and other locations. The Rwandan army has bombarded these sites from time to time, killing

¹ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Arming Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War: Human Rights Since the October 1990 Invasion* (February, 1992); *The International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990, Final Report* (March 1993); Africa Watch, *Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda* (June, 1993).

sixty at Amahoro stadium on April 19, and eighteen others at the Sainte Famille Church on May 1. All of these hostages are surviving under inhumane conditions, often with no food or water for days at a time. Troops of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) guard those at the stadium and the hotel and try to visit the other sites occasionally.

THE WAR RESUMES

Shortly after the massacres of civilians had begun, the war between the Rwandan army and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) resumed, ending a cease-fire in effect since August 1993. Since early April, two kinds of violence -- the slaughter of the defenseless by government party militias or the Presidential Guard, and the battle between the two armies -- have gone on simultaneously, sometimes in the same area, as in Kigali, but often in widely separated regions. The south and west, where some of the worst massacres have taken place, are remote from the actual war zones.

The RPF is composed largely of Tutsi who fled a 1959-63 revolution that ended their aristocratic control over Rwanda (previously backed by the colonial Belgian government) and installed the current Hutu-dominated regime. After thirty years in exile, a force composed from among these refugees and their children invaded Rwanda in October 1990, first seeking to win the right to return home and later hoping to overturn the Habyarimana government. In addition to resisting the RPF militarily, Habyarimana immediately launched a campaign against the Tutsi within the country, accusing them of being "accomplices" of the RPF. Serious human rights violations were committed against Tutsis uninvolved in the rebel movement, including the massacres described above.

The civil war between the government and the RPF was ended by a peace agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on August 4, 1993 (the Arusha Accords), which provided for a transitional government composed of Habyarimana's MRND, the internal opposition parties, and the RPF. The United Nations provided a peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) to monitor the execution of the agreement and facilitate the integration of the two armies. Under the terms of the agreement, the RPF was permitted to station a battalion in Kigali under U.N. protection. Because of a series of delays, most of them caused by Habyarimana and his supporters, the transitional government had not yet been installed at the time of the plane crash.

When the civilian massacres began, the UNAMIR troops failed to respond. The RPF decided to resume the war, both to rescue its troops in Kigali, who clearly could not expect any effective protection from the U.N., and to try to stop the massacres.

THE SELF-PROCLAIMED GOVERNMENT

Shortly after the crash and the beginning of the massacres, a group of politicians close to Habyarimana proclaimed themselves the new government. Backed by extremist military, the self-proclaimed regime also won at least tacit acceptance from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Rwanda. The "ministers" of the new government purported to represent a number of political parties and thus to continue the mandate of the previous coalition government, but in fact all emerged from the same ideological position whatever their party labels.

EXTENDING THE MASSACRES

During the first two weeks of slaughter elsewhere in Rwanda, the *préfet* (prefect or governor) of the important southern *préfecture* of Butare succeeded in keeping his region generally calm. The prefect, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, was a Tutsi and a member of the political opposition. His wife, Josephine, was a human rights

activist. Butare, where Tutsi and Hutu had lived closely together for centuries, was generally hostile to Habyarimana and his anti-Tutsi ideology. As the site of the original campus of the National University, several research institutes, and the showplace new National Museum, it was the intellectual capital of Rwanda.

On April 19, the "President" of the rump government, Theodore Sindikubwabo, removed the prefect of Butare and replaced him with a hardline military man from the north of Rwanda. At the same time, he gave a speech on the radio calling for the killing of "accomplices" in Butare. That evening units of the Presidential Guard flew into Butare airport. The massacres began almost immediately. One eyewitness recounted that on the night of the arrival of the Guard, they dug pits in the ground and filled them with burning tires. He saw people thrown live into the pits, including his sixty-year-old mother-in-law. By noon the next day, the sound of gunfire had become continuous as Tutsi and Hutu allied with them were executed in an arboretum adjacent to the National University, in an area behind the National Museum, and on the banks of a nearby stream. The killings continued day and night for the next three days.

NETTOYAGE - CLEANING UP THOSE WHO ARE LEFT

In late April, leaders of the militia called upon their members to finish the "cleaning up" (*nettoyage*) of Tutsi and members of the Hutu opposition who had escaped death up to that point. An attack on those sheltered at the Hotel des Milles Collines in Kigali was narrowly averted, apparently by French intervention, but an effort to rescue sixty-two of the hostages failed on May 3. U.N. troops, in possession of a guarantee of safe conduct from the commander-in-chief of the army, sought to escort the hostages to safety, but the convoy was set upon by militia directed to make the attack by the Radio des Milles Collines. Nine of the hostages were seriously wounded and all had to return to the hotel.

On April 29, military and militia killed more than 300 of 5,000 hostages who had been held since April 15 at a stadium in Cyangugu in southwestern Rwanda. Several days earlier the clergy of Bukavu diocese in neighboring Zaire had alerted the world to the suffering of these hostages who had been confined for two weeks without food and with a single water tap and no sanitary facilities. On May 11, militia and military began transferring the hostages to a former refugee camp some thirteen kilometers from the town of Cyangugu, where they could torture or kill them without drawing attention. The buses transporting the hostages were often stopped en route and some persons removed to be slaughtered and left by the side of the road. The bus making the trip on Wednesday, May 11, was halted and all men between the ages of forty and eighty were removed and killed.

Militia and military continue to make nightly visits to stadiums, church compounds and other locations where people at risk have taken refuge. They remove groups of people to be executed. Anyone who is educated or has shown capacity for leadership is targeted for elimination.

On May 16, the "Minister of Defense," Augustin Bizimana, asserted that the massacres had stopped--except for "isolated killings by extremist elements." That same day foreign journalists were still witnessing groups being removed for execution from a Tutsi refugee camp at the large church center of Kabgayi in central Rwanda, some fifteen miles from where Bizimana made his statement. Also on May 16, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that the self-proclaimed Rwandan government had refused to accept the neutrality of its hospital at Kabgayi and would not guarantee its security. On that day and the two days immediately after, massacres increased in the southern prefecture of Butare. Militia manning the road blockades in that area also behaved more aggressively to passers-by. These changes resulted from the arrival of militia from the north who had been brought in because the region was "*pas suffisamment nettoyé*," that is, "not cleaned up enough." They were to kill the Tutsi and Hutu opposition members who had been previously protected by local officials or who had otherwise managed to escape massacre.

By mid-May, the militia had been able to create a dense network of road blocks throughout the zones controlled by the rump government. In some cases, the barriers were separated by no more than a few hundred yards, making escape virtually impossible for those targeted for elimination.

CENTRAL DIRECTION

The dispatch of additional militia to the south indicates that there is still central control of the massacres. In addition, Matthieu Ndirumpatse, President of the MRND, apparently expects the militia to heed his orders when he addresses them over the radio. He did so on May 19, directing them to allow hostages trapped at the Hotel des Milles Collines and elsewhere in Kigali to leave for safe havens. At the time of this writing, negotiations were proceeding about the release of those hostages.

Although much of the violence is still controlled by authorities of the hardline parties, the rump government or the Rwandan army, random killing, especially in the course of banditry and pillage, is growing as well. As food becomes more difficult to obtain, violence linked to the struggle for survival will increase.

Discipline among Rwandan army troops, lax for some time, has crumbled further in the last month, resulting in multiple abuses against civilians. In the region of Bugesera, for example, soldiers looted at will during the week of May 16, apparently in violation of orders from their commanding officer. Their attacks caused the local population, virtually all Hutu, to flee in panic towards Burundi.

RESISTANCE TO THE MASSACRES

Reliable accounts describe the heroism of some Rwandan authorities, both civilian and military, who have sought to prevent or halt the slaughter in their regions. In some regions, local government officials, known as burgomasters (*bourgmestres*), have done their best to protect the targeted populations and to guarantee security within their communes. Unfortunately, in some cases, they have eventually been forced to yield and permit the massacres. Military officers who have tried to maintain order or to aid the threatened to escape have later suffered reprisals for their human conduct.

Human Rights Watch/Africa will not publish the names of these courageous defenders of human rights for fear of putting them in danger but will acknowledge them for their bravery and decency at a future date.

THOSE WHO CAN HALT THE VIOLENCE

All those who claim to exercise authority within Rwanda are legally and morally obligated to halt the genocide and other human rights abuses. They include the following persons.

Party Officials:

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, head of the CDR
Matthieu Ndirumpatse, President of the MRND

Those who claim positions in the self-proclaimed government:

Theodore Sindikubwabo, "President"
Jean Kambanda, "Prime Minister"
Augustin Bizimana, "Minister of Defense"
Justin Mugenzi, "Minister of Commerce"
Eleazar Niyitegeka, "Minister of Information"

Military Officers:

General Bizimungu
Colonel Bagosora
Colonel Nkundiye
Colonel Mpiranya
Colonel Mpiranya
Captain Simbikangwa

ABUSES BY THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

The self-proclaimed government has accused the RPF of having killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, both last year and in recent weeks, but it has been unable to provide any details of time, place or circumstance where the alleged massacres have taken place. After extensive investigation among reliable sources, both Rwandan and foreign, representing clergy, staff of nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, Human Rights Watch/Africa has concluded that there is at present no credible evidence that the RPF has engaged in any widespread slaughter of civilian populations, although there are reports of less systematic abuses.

Refugees who fled to Tanzania at the end of April have frequently talked of RPF abuses, but the accounts are too vague to be credible. No one among the enormous number of people at Ngara camp, for example, appears to have first-hand knowledge of such alleged abuses. In the quarter of a million mostly Hutu refugees at the camp, medical authorities report that they treated only four wounds, all of them slight. This contrasts with the reports of numerous and serious wounds among the Tutsi refugees who have fled to Burundi or who have escaped to northern Rwanda. The massive flight of Hutu to Ngara drew widespread attention because it was the largest number of people ever to flee a country in such a short period of time. But these refugees fled in panic about reports that the RPF was approaching their region, not because they had been attacked or seen others attacked by the incoming troops. They had been frightened by propaganda broadcast on the radio about supposed RPF atrocities. Many refugees had taken the time, nonetheless, to gather food and even farm animals before their departure.

On May 18, a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that RPF troops had fired on Rwandans seeking to flee across the river that marks the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. He added that UNHCR representatives had gathered credible accounts from persons who had been abused or seen others abused by the RPF. The RPF immediately denied the allegations and invited UNHCR officials to inspect the zone under their control. Human Rights Watch/Africa has requested the details of these reports from the UNHCR, but at the time of writing had not yet received the information.

Church sources indicate that two Catholic priests were killed by the RPF at Nyinawimana, but information on the date and circumstances of these killings is not yet available.

In other cases, church sources report that refugees at a camp in Uganda relate that the RPF killed civilians at Rwantanga, seven kilometers from the Ugandan border, and at Nyambwesongezi, in Byumba prefecture. A witness from Rwantanga, a woman who arrived badly beaten, recounted that RPF soldiers had beaten her twelve year-old daughter to death with their rifle butts. Another witness reported that his wife and children had been killed by the RPF when the soldiers attacked people whom they had summoned to a meeting.

A newspaper account published in Uganda in late April related that RPF soldiers had tied up a person accused of being a local leader of the Interahamwe militia and had delivered him to an angry crowd who had kicked him to death. The story was accompanied by a photograph of the apparent victim. Other reliable sources have told Human Rights Watch/Africa that they have seen RPF soldiers execute civilians who appear to have been militia leaders.

Human Rights Watch/Africa has brought these reports to the attention of the RPF and has asked for investigation of the incidents and punishment for any soldiers found guilty of killings or other abuses of civilians.

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE DISPLACED

Approximately two million Rwandans have fled their homes in the face of the massacres and the war. Within the country, Tutsi survivors are clustered in a variety of locations, some voluntarily, others held hostage by military or militia units. In addition to those frequently mentioned at sites in Kigali, there are those at the stadium at Cyangugu and in several places in Butare. In central Rwanda, there are approximately 50,000 displaced persons, largely Tutsi at Kabgayi, mostly Hutu at nearby Gitarama. In addition there are certainly other groups who remain unknown to outside observers. More than 200,000 people have sought refuge within the zone controlled by the RPF in northern and eastern Rwanda.

When the slaughter began, there were about 200,000 Burundian refugees located in camps in southern Rwanda, who had fled violence in Burundi in October 1993. Many of them have returned to Burundi or fled to Tanzania, but as many as 80,000 may still be left in Rwanda.

Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to surrounding countries, the great majority of them to Tanzania. Approximately one quarter of a million Rwandans are grouped at Ngara, Tanzania, the largest refugee camp in the world. Approximately 8,500 Rwandans have sought safety in Zaire; between 5,500 and 10,000 in Uganda, and between 16,000 and 47,000 in Burundi.

The misery of those seeking refuge in surrounding countries has been well publicized, and a variety of organizations are seeking to meet their enormous needs. Information on the suffering of those within Rwanda is very limited, but those reports available indicate that conditions are desperate for many of the displaced. Often they go without food or water for days at a time. Medical care is simply nonexistent for the great majority of these refugees, many of whom have died as the result of untreated wounds or disease.

The battle for control of Kigali between the army and the RPF has made it difficult, often impossible, to deliver the supplies and services needed to keep these refugees alive. In many other cases, militia and authorities of the self-proclaimed government have hindered or prevented assistance to the displaced. In the most notorious instances of such conduct, militia and military have attacked hospitals in Kigali and Butare and killed both staff and patients. International agencies such as *Médecins sans frontières* and the ICRC have lost large numbers of local staff.

RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

After nearly seven weeks of slaughter and hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the international community has still made no effective response to the genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda.

Human Rights Watch, the *Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme* (based in Paris), Amnesty International, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (based in Montreal, Canada), Oxfam UK and other international nongovernmental organizations have condemned the slaughter as genocide. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Pope have also called the slaughter genocidal. Major heads of state, however, have refused to call the horror by name even as they condemned the massacres. Governments are reluctant to talk of genocide by name because to do so would obligate them to act under the terms of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The convention requires its signatories to "prevent and punish" genocide--defined as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group--as a crime against humanity. A large number of states are party to the

Genocide Convention, including all the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Rwanda itself. As yet, few states--none of them major Security Council powers--have stated that they are willing to live up to their obligations under the convention. The Security Council debated for eight hours on April 29, before finally adopting a declaration early on April 30 that used the legal terminology of the Genocide Convention but still rejected the use of the term itself.

The United Nations

Under the terms of the Arusha Accords, the United Nations was asked to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). This force, which just before the crisis numbered 2,500 troops, was to monitor the cease-fire, contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, and engage in other activities associated with the establishment of a transitional government in which members of Habyarimana's government would share power with members of the internal opposition and representatives of the RPF.

Among the duties of UNAMIR was the enforcement of a prohibition against the importation of arms and ammunition into Rwanda. On the night of January 26, UNAMIR learned of the unauthorized secret landing and unloading of a plane load of arms at Kigali airport. The U.N. force intervened and placed the arms under joint U.N.-Rwandan government supervision to prevent their distribution to the Rwandan army. During February, UNAMIR also prevented the delivery of three more plane loads of arms and ammunition for the Rwandan government. The U.N. authorities therefore knew that the Rwandan government was attempting to obtain fresh supplies for its troops, presumably in preparation for further war.

In February 1994, the assassination of two leading political figures was followed by a week of killings and other violence in Kigali. Interpreting its mandate narrowly, UNAMIR made no effective response to the violence, although it certainly heightened insecurity in the capital city. As tensions grew throughout February and March, U.N. personnel and the diplomatic community generally were well aware of extremely worrying developments indicating that hardliners in the government intended to overturn the Arusha Accords. They were frequently warned by responsible local persons, including human rights activists and political leaders, that preparations were underway for a campaign to wipe out those who opposed the Habyarimana regime. They knew of the hate-filled radio broadcasts, the training of militia and the distribution of arms. Whether unable to imagine the scale of impending horror or limited by mandate or the traditions of diplomatic practice, they took no effective action to prevent the disaster.

With the onset of the killing after the plane crash in which President Habyarimana died, UNAMIR again failed to act decisively. Apparently both the terms of the mandate and the lack of appropriate equipment for the troops hampered an effective response. Had there been prompt and firm action by UNAMIR to suppress the first violence, the situation would certainly have developed differently.

When Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana fled for her life to a U.N. compound, UNAMIR dispatched ten soldiers, part of the Belgian contingent, to rescue her. They encountered a hostile and armed crowd and three were disabled. The others requested instructions from headquarters and, according to a press account, were told to put down their arms and attempt to negotiate with the crowd. They were slaughtered. The Belgian government then withdrew its troops, who were the best equipped of those available to the UNAMIR force. Subsequently Bangladeshi troops also left, some of them in panic before orders were given for their withdrawal.

On April 21, the Security Council met to decide the fate of the UNAMIR force. Rather than admit that genocide was taking place, as was clearly apparent by that date, and accept the responsibility of preventing it, the Security Council voted to withdraw the majority of the remaining troops and to leave behind a skeleton force of 270 soldiers. The United States, initially in favor of removing the U.N. presence completely, led this move to retain only a token UNAMIR presence.

Proponents of the reduction of UNAMIR argued the necessity of removing the troops from a threatening situation which they were ill-equipped to handle. But with the exception of the ten Belgian soldiers killed while attempting to defend the Prime Minister, surely one of the most important targets of the extremists, no additional U.N. soldier had been killed in the weeks of subsequent violence. (One was later killed in a mortar attack in Kigali). There was no evidence that U.N. troops had been targeted by either of the hostile parties after the first day of the massacres.

In the first weeks of violence, the Security Council apparently received inaccurate reports on the situation, particularly those based on information from the Secretary-General's Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. Characterized by *The Washington Post* on May 8 as "blurred, sanitized summaries...depicting mutual and chaotic killings," these reports failed to convey the systematic and organized nature of the genocide which had at the time already been established by accounts in the press.

In the face of the mounting disaster--and particularly following widely publicized accounts of the massive outflow of refugees on April 29--the United States and other actors decided that more troops must be sent back to Rwanda with an expanded mandate. Within the Security Council, delegates from the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Spain and Argentina played the leading role in shaming other member nations into this decision. After lengthy debate on May 16, the Council authorized a force of 5,500 troops with an enlarged mandate to protect displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk (UNAMIR II). Unlike the mandate for the first U.N. force, that for UNAMIR II permits troops to use force if necessary to carry out their mission. However, last minute hesitations by the United States resulted in orders to deploy in the first instance only a small force of several hundred troops and about 150 unarmed observers. Deployment of the rest of the force depends upon progress towards a new cease-fire between the RPF and the government, the availability of resources, and further review and action by the Security Council.

General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian military commander of UNAMIR, has played a constructive role, particularly in maintaining communication with both sides of the civil war. He is currently negotiating with both parties to obtain neutrality for Kigali airport. Were the U.N. assured control of the airport, the work of UNAMIR II would be greatly facilitated. Fighting over the control of the airport has often made it impossible for relief flights to land there.

The government of Rwanda, as it existed before April 6, held a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Its representative has continued to serve the self-proclaimed regime that took power after the death of Habyarimana and has been permitted to retain the seat on the Council. He has even been permitted to speak at length in debate and to vote on resolutions concerning Rwanda, although customarily representatives do not play an active role in considerations of conflicts that affect their own states. Jerome Bicomumpaka, the so-called foreign minister of the rump government, was recently allowed to address the Security Council. Accompanied by CDR head Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, he was in New York as part of the self-proclaimed government's efforts to justify the unjustifiable and to win international acceptance for their genocidal regime. In these statements, the self-proclaimed government has stated that it would favor the return of U.N. troops to Rwanda to enforce a cease-fire between the RPF and the Rwandan army, with the armies to return to the positions they held before the resumption of the civil war.

The RPF initially favored U.N. intervention in Rwanda, but at the end of April reversed its position to issue a hardline statement opposing the sending of more U.N. soldiers. It subsequently softened its position somewhat to say that it would not oppose a force sent for humanitarian purposes; it remains opposed to any force that would attempt to interpose itself between the two armies.

In response to urging by the United States and others, the new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso (who took office on April 5, the day before the crisis began), undertook a mission

to Rwanda and Burundi in mid-May, five weeks after the massacres had begun. In a statement on his return, he condemned the widespread violence, but did not label the systematic killing of Tutsi as genocide.

At the request of Canada, an emergency meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has been convened for May 24. It will be only the third time that this body has met in such a special session, the preceding meetings having been called to deal with the Bosnian crisis. The session will probably call for the sending of a special rapporteur to investigate the situation in Rwanda.

The Diplomatic Community in Kigali

Representatives of most nations in Kigali offered temporary protection to Rwandan staff members and others who sought asylum at their homes or embassies. On April 13, Amnesty International reported, however, that some unidentified embassies had apparently turned away Rwandans seeking protection. Diplomats mobilized primarily to evacuate citizens of their own countries and most refused to assist Rwandans, even long-time employees of their own staffs, in leaving the country. Belgium and France were apparently the only nations to aid some Rwandans in escaping, although French press reports indicated that several Rwandan employees at the French embassy had been abandoned and later killed by government forces. France provided aircraft to permit evacuation of Madame Agathe Habyarimana, members of the Habyarimana family and others close to the regime. Some were transported to Paris and several hundred others were taken to Zaïre.²

The United States

Like the United Nations and most of the international community, United States officials have shown considerable confusion and slowness in dealing with the UNAMIR II initiative, apparently because it is the first to be considered since the declaration of a new administration policy on peacekeeping missions.

President Bill Clinton made an unusual direct radio appeal to Rwanda on April 30, calling for an end to the violence; it was one minute in length and spoke only in vague terms about the need for Rwandan leaders "to recognize their common bonds of humanity." A more useful public statement was made by the President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, on April 22. He called upon Rwandan military leaders by name to "do everything in their power to end the violence immediately." The Lake statement, which did not actually condemn the leaders named, nonetheless represented an important departure from routine diplomacy because it supported the principle of individual accountability for human rights abuses and named those able to end the massacres.

Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck adopted the same approach in a statement issued on May 8, after a visit to countries surrounding Rwanda. He advocated a United Nations-directed inquiry to establish individual responsibility for the massacres.

Other important State Department officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell, have made frequent public statements over the Voice of America condemning the killings.

The United States has thus far resisted pressure to pledge that it will not assist any regime that emerges from the genocidal slaughter. It did, however, deny the request for visas made by representatives of the self-proclaimed government who wished to make their case in Washington. Because of the special international status of U.N. territory, the United States could not prevent those representatives from going to New York to lobby at the U.N.

Members of Congress have expressed grave concern over the massacres and have pressured the administration for further action. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing on the

² Alain Frillet & Sylvie Coma, "Paris, terre d'asile de luxe pour dignitaires hutus," *Libération*, May 18, 1994.

situation on May 4. Senators Paul Simon and James Jeffords, the ranking members of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Kweisi Mfume and Donald M. Payne of the Congressional Black Caucus have all written to President Clinton to ask for more effective United States action.

In terms of real action, the United States government has continued diplomatic efforts aimed primarily at a cease-fire in the civil war between the RPF and the government rather than at halting the massacres. It has also contributed some \$28 million in assistance to refugees and has stated that it plans to approve an additional \$28 million for similar efforts. The U.S. has also indicated that it is willing to pay approximately one third of the costs of the new UNAMIR II force and provide logistical support in sending the troops to Rwanda.

France

France has supported the Habyarimana regime for many years, even sending French troops to assist in the army's actions against the RPF, in October 1990 and again in February 1993. In *Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War* published in January 1994, Human Rights Watch documented French participation in arming and training the Rwandan army. Along with Egypt, France has received representatives of the self-proclaimed government, thus helping accord them respectability in the international community. The delegates received in Paris included Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, the head of the CDR party which is most responsible for the current genocide.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, head of the CDR party; Matthieu Ndirumpatse, president of the MRND party; those who claim authority under the self-proclaimed government, including Theodore Sindikubwabo, Jean Kambanda, Augustin Bizimana, Eleazar Niyitegeka and Justin Mugenzi; and military officers Bizimungu, Bagosora, Nkundiye, Mpiranya, and Simbikangwa must halt the genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda immediately.
- Authorities of the RPF, including its president, Alexis Kanyarengwe, and its military commander, Paul Kagame, must order members of their forces to halt all summary executions or other killings of Rwandan civilians. Any who are found to have committed such abuses must be disciplined as appropriate and held in custody pending trial. Where the forces of the RPF succeed in overcoming government forces, they must arrest all those accused of involvement in genocide and other crimes against humanity and ensure that they are held in humane conditions to await trial as soon as circumstances allow.
- The international community must clearly and forcefully condemn genocide in Rwanda calling the horror by its rightful name. The Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, as well as the individual governments of the international community--including the United States--must recognize that the organized nature as well as the scale of the massacres proves that the authors intended to eliminate in whole or in part the Tutsi as a group within Rwanda; that is, that their actions fulfil the definition of the Genocide Convention.
- The international community must also condemn the systematic slaughter of thousands of Hutu who opposed the Habyarimana regime, as a violation of international humanitarian law and a crime against humanity.
- The member states of the United Nations must do everything possible to assist a speedy and complete deployment of UNAMIR II forces. Members must respond promptly to requests for additional troops. The United States must devote the necessary resources to ensure that any organizational or logistical problems are resolved immediately.

- The international community must insist upon accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights should name those persons who have the power to halt the slaughter and should demand that they do so immediately.
- The international community must take steps to ensure that no form of impunity be offered to those responsible for genocide and other crimes against humanity. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights should mandate a representative to attend negotiations between all parties to the Rwandan conflict who must insist that impunity not be granted as part of a peace settlement. No participant in the negotiations should be permitted to trade cooperation with international efforts to resolve the crisis, by arranging a cease-fire or in making peace, for protection, for himself or any other person accused of genocide or crimes against humanity.
- The international community must ensure that those accused of genocide and crimes against humanity are brought to justice in trials that conform in all respects with accepted international practice, including guarantees of the rights of the accused. If such trials are to be held in Rwandan courts, the collaboration of international magistrates and prosecutors should be required, through the creation of an exceptional jurisdiction if necessary.
- Governments, human rights organizations, and individuals should use all possible channels to take legal action to bring those guilty of genocide and other crimes to justice. Human Rights Watch/Africa has assisted one victim--who is the sister of several of the dead, including the late Minister Lando Ndasungwa--in bringing a civil suit in the U.S. courts against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza for genocide and other crimes against humanity. Officials and individuals elsewhere should initiate similar proceedings against the chief authors of these horrors. The criminals should be made aware that there will be no place in the world where they can escape judicial action.
- The United Nations Commission on Human Rights should delegate and adequately fund a special rapporteur to report promptly on the Rwanda crisis. It should insist that members of the UNAMIR force be charged with a mandate to report all human rights violations to the Commission through its delegated representative. It should also provide for a group of human rights monitors in Rwanda to supplement reports provided by UNAMIR personnel.

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Human Rights Watch/Africa (formerly Africa Watch)

Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories of the Helsinki accords. Kenneth Roth is the executive director; Cynthia Brown is the program director; Holly J. Burkhalter is the advocacy director; Gara LaMarche is the associate director; Juan E. Méndez is general counsel; and Susan Osnos is the communications director. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the executive committee and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair. Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa. Abdullahi An-Na'im is the executive director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington representative; Karen Sorensen, Bronwen Manby, Alex Vines and Berhane Woldegabriel are research associates; Kimberly Mazyck and Urmi Shah are associates; Alison Des Forges is a consultant. William Carmichael is the chair of the advisory committee and Alice Brown is the vice chair.

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(8/94)

The brilliant circle of poets in Boston (1955-1960) from Robert Frost to Robert Lowell, Richard Wilbur, W.S. Merwin, Anne Sexton

central Africa, bringing the
rise of another year of life to peo-
ple farmers in the region. However,
the masses of Rwandan refugees in
eastern Zaire already ravaged by civil
war, genocide, and cholera, the onset
of the monsoons, a new nightmare
come true.

As storms that will last on and off
through next May gather, refugee fam-
ilies huddle inside the tiny grass, bam-
boo, and mud shelters that clog the
landscape around the border town of

has formed the country's new govern-
ment, there are farmers and soldiers
and hardly any else; few if any
shopkeepers, barbers, no street
vendors, no offices. There are no po-
lice, no courts, judges, no law. The
capital of Kigali has less than half
its 350,000 pre-war population.

What is remarkable about this
emptiness is that for Rwandans land is
everything. In a overpopulated coun-
try with a subsistence economy, fear of

to Jacques, before the president died
in a suspicious plane crash on April 6,
1994, "the Interahamwe was only the
MRND youth wing. We were just
young people, not militias. Originally
we were not together for fighting but
for thinking."

It was, however, a very short step
from "thinking" to genocide, and in
fact the militias were killing people
earlier than Jacques claims they did.
After a series of failed cease-fires

Hutus needed little convincing to
groups whose ultimate aim was to
Tutsi. Survivors of attacks in se-
villages in the southwest of Rwanda
often spoke of the Hutus being
into villages to do the killings, but
the local groups did not have the s-
uch for the job.

The UN's criticisms came just
months after the Habyarimana
crumpled and the RPF formally en-

your leaders into a state of panic, a
death at the hands of the Tutsi rebels
of the RPF. Convinced by years of
anti-RPF broadcasts portraying the
RPF as a bestial Tutsi army bent on
nothing less than the complete subju-
gation of Hutus, the people were too
terrified to test the RPF's promises of
reconciliation.

And then there is the guilt of those
in the Hutu militia who killed at least
half a million innocent men, women,
and children—and the guilt of those

and by 2 million, by the RPF,
which had invaded with a small
refugee army of Tutsis from neighbor-
ing Uganda a few months before.

While Habyarimana and his cronies
found demands for political change
obnoxious, the RPF threat was deadly
serious. Most of the rebels were the
children of Tutsis who had fled the
country during the Hutu uprising,
which started in 1959 and had by 1965
overthrown the Tutsi aristocracy and
replaced it with a succession of Hutu
regimes. The declared aim of the RPF
was to bring down the Habyarimana
government and repatriate all the tens
of thousands of Rwandan refugees,
people who had been dispossessed of
their land and wanted it back.

It was during the 1991 rebellion by
the RPF that plans were first made
to form pro-government militias of
young Hutu men. After the rebels had
launched an attack on the northern
Rwandan town of Byumba, Augustin
Bizimana, the governor of the region
(who would later serve as the defense
minister during the April 1994 slaugh-
ter of the Tutsis), proposed that a
"home guard" be formed in border
areas. Since it was necessary to weed
out infiltrators, he proposed that at
least one person from every ten house-
holds be mobilized, so that strangers
as well as collaborators could be iden-
tified at once. The plan was never put
into action, but it was not discarded ei-
ther. It was merely transformed.

A year earlier, in January 1990,
President Habyarimana had formed
a youth wing of his own party, the
Mouvement Republicain National
pour le Développement (MRND). The
idea was to create a base of support
among the young at a time when the
middle class and many civil servants
had begun to show sympathies for the
moderate opposition led by the Parti
Socialiste-Démocratique (PSD), the
Parti Libéral (PL), the Parti Socialiste
Rwandais (PSR), and the Mouvement
Démocratique Républicain (MDR).
The youth wing of the MRND was
set up as a group that would be
fiercely loyal to the president. Haby-
rimana called it Interahamwe, a
taken from a patriotic song. The
said: "Rise up Rwanda, you
ported by Interahamwe, the
join together in common."
April 1994, the name was poly-
translated as "those who are
together."

Jacques is twenty-seven and a
civil servant from the capital. He
is soft-spoken and neat. He
does not seem the sort of person capable
murder, but by his own admission
has personally killed at least
people and was a member of a unit
in a Kigali suburb that tortured
murdered dozens more, including



Rwanda refugee camp, Tanzania. Photograph by Gillian Farrow

Goma. The hovels that lack plastic
sheeting—a valuable and thus highly
stealable commodity—are frequently
damaged by the wind and rain. This is
the least of the refugees' worries.
Human waste does not get absorbed
into the black volcanic bedrock of
Goma and the rains turn the camps
into stinking swamps. The stench is
unbearable and aid workers fear new
epidemics of dysentery as well as
pneumonia and malaria.

Meanwhile, several kilometers and
a few rolling hills away in Rwanda, the
rains, which would normally mark the
new planting season, go unheeded.
Fields full of sorghum, maize, cassava,
and sweet potatoes rot in wet soil. For
weeks the crops waved in the breeze
waiting to be picked or cut down, but
there was no one to harvest them. It is
already too late even to prepare for
next year.

In a country the size of Wales where
a shortage of land has been at the core
of the Hutu-Tutsi struggle, parts of the
Rwandan countryside are entirely
empty. It is possible to drive through
vast stretches of Rwanda without see-

losing your share of land—is
fear of death. Nevertheless, at in-
dane have chosen exile and death over
land. Ignoring the new, mainly Tutsi
refugees, almost exclusively Hutus, re-
main in the camps, which were until re-
cently stacked with the bloated dead
bodies of cholera victims.

According to the best estimates of
the overwhelming relief agencies in
Goma, at least 100,000 people have
died from disease since they first
crossed into Zaire at the head of an
RPF advance in early July. Those who
survive fight over food and clean
drinking water. Scores of people have
been killed or maimed. Zairean troops
and demobilized Rwandan Hutu sol-
diers shake down the wretched for
what little they find.

To understand what it is that keeps
them living and dying in these condi-
tions while their land sits idle, it is nec-
essary to understand what led them to
leave Rwanda in the first place. In
many talks with refugees in Zaire,
it became clear that most of

who sat back and watched. "After
what happened to the Tutsis, we ran
because we did not think the RPF
would ever be able to forgive us," a
refugee whispered to me.

Many outside observers, especially
in the early days of the slaughter, have
tended to dismiss what has happened
in Rwanda as African mayhem-as-
usual. They saw the Hutu-Tutsi con-
flict as little more than a savage tribal
frank show. While the violence was
certainly savage, it was not normal and
it was not exclusively tribal. The
killings were neither random nor
spontaneous. Nor were most of the
victims killed as a result of the coun-
try's civil war. The slaughter of civil-
ians took place simultaneously with
the war—sometimes in the same re-
gions as the combat between the gov-
ernment and the RPF armies—but it
was completely separate from the war.

The truth is that between 500,000
and one million people, mostly Tutsis,
were hacked to death, burned alive, or
shot by their friends and neighbors
throughout the country as part of a
systematic, organized, and brutal

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have made it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to distinguish between most
Hutu and Tutsi by their physical
appearance. (By law and custom,
ethnic identity is passed through
the father.) If it were not for the na-
tional ethnic identification cards
which all Rwandans were obliged to
carry, the militias would in many cases
have had a difficult time knowing
whom to kill.

These identification cards, like the
hardening of the Hutu-Tutsi social
structure, were a legacy of Belgian
colonial rule. Much of the current
problems can be traced back to the ar-
rival of colonialism and the creation of
the "Hamitic theory," a discredited
racial explanation for the physical and
cultural differences in black Africa. Its
origins lie in the refusal of European
explorers and colonizers to believe
that the Bantu peoples of Central
Africa could have developed rela-
tively sophisticated kingdoms such as
existed in precolonial Rwanda. So the
Europeans explained these "anoma-
lies" by inventing a race of "African
Aryans," the Hamites, who suppos-
edly migrated from northeastern
Africa, bringing civilization to the
"savages" further south.

Today the theory is universally dis-
missed by experts, but in the heyday of
colonialism it was used to reward or
withhold privileges from local peoples.
When the Belgians arrived, they fa-
vored the Tutsis—taller and, to Bel-
gian eyes, more European in appear-
ance—while the Hutus became a
second-class majority. Consigned to a
life of peasant farming, most Hutus
were denied education and barred
from administrative jobs. As indepen-
dence approached, however, the Bel-
gians shifted their allegiances to the
Hutus, whose uprising between 1959
and 1963 resulted in the massacre of
100,000 Tutsis, while 200,000 more
were forced to flee, most of them to
Uganda. Their unsuccessful attempts
to negotiate their return home com-
bined with their persecution under a
succession of Ugandan governments
ultimately led to the creation of the
RPF.

Since their own rise to dominance,
Hutu political leaders themselves have
adopted the Hamitic theory but with a
new twist. In the revised version, the
Hutu are said to be the original inha-
bitants of Rwanda while the Tutsis are
seen as despicable foreign invaders.
This is the central theme of the hate
propaganda that the Hutu extremists
circulate in the camps in Zaire. It was
even endorsed by some of the coun-
try's most prominent academics.

Dr. Leon Mugesira, for example,
was a senior adviser to President Habyarimana and one of the most impor-
tant ideologues of the MRND party.
Now he is a refugee in Zaire, where
he is under investigation for war
crimes. In November 1992 he deliv-
ered a speech that was widely inter-
preted as a call to the Hutus to commit
acts of genocide against the Tutsis. A
transcript of the speech, authenticated
by a human rights commission which
visited Rwanda last year, shows that
he urged Hutus to rise up and "decim-
ate" sympathizers of the RPF.

"The fatal error we made in 1959
was that we let them leave," he said.
"We cannot live in peace if we do
not unearth the battle axe," he added.

"Be warned that he whose life
save will not save yours."

In clear reference to the Hi-
theory, he exhorted the popular
return their terrible master
Ethiopia. They should take, he
short cut by way of the Nyabo
River. Two years later, many
sands of bodies changed river
streams and floated toward
Victoria.

The killing, however, was not
limited to ethnic Tutsis. The militia
slaughtered Hutus who did not
support the ruling party. While these
people were killed because they were
poorly trained to the Hutu,
another ideological aim was also
carried out: to destroy the more
elite group whose demand
human rights and democracy
direct threat to the extremists.

By autumn of 1993, hate-filled
broadcasts by the most vicious
of the country's three main radio
stations, Radio Mille Collines, own
members of Habyarimana's in-
side, were circulating two propa-
ganda messages, one against the Tu-
general, the other against the op-
position. As time went on
broadcasts became more viru-
lently specific. Politicians were sing-
led out by name as enemies or traitors
"deserving to die."

The political situation in
was extremely tense by Apr.
President Habyarimana had been
laying for months the final
the Arusha Accords, much to
tation of the Western and Afri-
cans who were concerned to
major cooperation in Rwa-
ndia. Habyarimana was drag-
ged to the table by African lea-
ders had convened a meeting at
Salam. Reports from the
that Habyarimana, despite
tions of his hard-line critics,
grudgingly agreed to fully
the accords and surrender
broad-based transitional go-
vernment. Whatever Habyarimana
may never be known, on
April 6, on his way home
meeting, his plane mysteri-
ously exploded.

The government im-
posed the RPF of down-
while the RPF claimed it
of the hard-liners in the
interior. Habyarimana
the pretext the extremist
dent's courage used to
slaughter. Within an hour
crash that killed Haby-
presidential guard, the
loyal to Habyarimana,
blocks around the cap-
tured members of
opposition, most of
Among the first to die
Uwilingiyimana, who
prime minister and a
RPF leader.

Rwanda also had over
five human rights
Africa with at least
organizations working
government and RPF
April 6, most of those
members of those
served in just a few
sands of the more
citizens of Rwanda
the presidential guard.

the streets of Kigali with lists of those they wanted dead: journalists, human rights lawyers, civil servants, teachers, businessmen, and clergymen. A curfew was imposed under the pretense of controlling the violence, but in reality it was done to help the presidential guard hunt down their victims in their houses.

The presidential guard was soon joined by the youth militias and within a week, according to Human Rights Watch, these forces had killed an estimated 20,000 people in Kigali and the surrounding region. It was during this time that the massacres spread to other parts of the country. There were places such as Butare, a university town with a tradition of tolerance, where local administrators refused to cooperate with the genocide. Not to be thwarted, the extremists replaced these brave men and women with hard liners who when necessary busied in soldiers and militia from outside to liquidate local communities.

It was also during this time that militia units that had not been armed were summoned to local barracks for brief training and to receive weapons and supplies. Jacques was among them.

"Three days after the president was killed, the military began to organize the Interahamwe, so that they could keep up the roadblocks. And the young people from each neighborhood went to get training to learn to fight and kill," Jacques said.

How did you kill?

"In our neighborhood we killed with guns, but in other areas they killed with pangas [machetes], clubs, and sometimes guns." Each time Jacques and his friends saw someone they thought was "collaborating" with RPF members, "the word would be passed to the roadblocks and if these people were stopped or found they would be enticed and killed along with their family."

You killed entire families?

"Yes, they were RPF members."

Women and children too?

"Yes, everybody was killed because if one escaped he could join the RPF and come back and attack us. In some cases children were spared and were taken to the Red Cross. But if their father or brother was an RPF member or supporter then the whole family was killed. Even the children."

Do you feel sorry that you killed Tutsis?

He emitted a small "humph" like a laugh stuck in his throat.

"No. I can't say that I feel sorry."

It is hard to comprehend the sheer audacity of what the Interahamwe tried to do. Using fragmentation grenades, machetes, truncheons, and wooden boards with nails sticking out of them, Rwandan extremists matched the efficiency of the Nazis' industrialized method of genocide. In just ten weeks, Rwanda's militia and army, along with many Hutu civilians killed at least 500,000 people. Throughout

and the army and militia pushed many people who would normally have dreamed of killing. Teachers killed students. Husbands killed wives. Even Rwandan churches were bloodied by the violence, both figuratively and literally. When the slaughter began, many people sought refuge in their local churches. However, the sanctity of God's house was not respected by those bent on killing. The largest of the massacres took place in church buildings or church compounds. Unfortunately, it was not just the buildings that were corrupted. According to a fact-finding mission of the World Council of Churches (WCC) which visited Rwanda in August, both Protestant and Catholic church hierarchies have been discredited by

calling themselves too much with the former Hutu regime and its inbred politics. A report drafted by Samuel Isaac, a WCC official, said "In every conversation we had with the government and church people alike, the point was brought home to us that the church itself stands tainted, not only by passive indifference, but by errors of commission as well."


The reasons why Hutus joined the Interahamwe in the killing spree are varied. Often the members of Interahamwe directly threatened people with death if they themselves did not kill; but in most cases the killing frenzy had so carried people away that such pressures were hardly necessary. Some people killed because they had personal scores to settle. Others joined the butchery out of greed.

Radio broadcasts promised the killer they could have the hand of those they killed. Radio RTLM, another extremist station, told listeners: "Those who mount the roadblocks will be rewarded. Those who do the work will not be forgotten. Those who do nothing will get nothing in return."

In conversations with hundreds of Hutu refugees in the camps over a period of weeks, I found hardly any who recognized the enormity of the crime that was committed in Rwanda. A but a very few Hutus deny any guilt for the mass slaughter, and almost everyone you meet in the camps does not see their ordeal as self-inflicted but as the fault of the Tutsis. "We are dying

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GRAHAM GREENE



Why did Nixon leak this memo?

here because of the Tutsis and the cockroaches of the RPF who want to rule over us," one woman told me. She was absolutely convinced that it was right to kill Tutsis.

The Hutus of the camps quote a proverb: "A nation will happen in Rwanda." You would do well to ask what we are going to do about it. These things

of the Tutsi kingdom. Naramba has always been determined against the accusation. He has been fighting for a return to a genuine democracy and an anti-feudal fight. He remains unable to con-

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never that their own survival depended on killing.

Part of the government's success was that its propaganda managed to convince the Hutu population that there was no difference between Tutsis generally and the RPF—a claim still made by former government leaders, among them Eliezer Niyitegeka, the information minister in the so-called interim government that took power after Habyarimana died. Currently living in exile in Bukavu in Zaire with other members of the former government, he continues to consider himself a minister of Rwanda and to insist that in a war with the RPF the Tutsis were fair game.

"It has been proved that RPF had to recruit members from Tutsi families," the minister said when we met on the veranda of a lakeside resort hotel in Zaire. "We have documents written which proved that most of the Tutsis were part of the RPF. And if we were fighting against RPF and there was proof that Tutsis were also members of RPF then people had to fight them also. This is what happened after the crash of the president's plane."

"No single individual or group is responsible for what happened. Personally I blame nobody," he added, laughing heartily.

That Rwanda might somehow become a peaceful country seems increasingly impossible. The mistrust between Hutus and Tutsis is greater than ever. The genocide has only confirmed the gulf between those who were selected for murder and those who did the killing. The RPF leaders have said that they want to bring to justice only those who organized the killings. Everyone else is welcome to come home. But fear of the RPF both real and imagined keeps them away.

In an attempt to reassure the Hutus of its honorable intentions, the RPF has named a Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, as the new president of the country and also appointed a Hutu prime minister, Faustin Twagiramungu. The Hutus see them as little more than RPF puppets. Few doubt that the real power behind the government is the Tutsi vice-president and defense minister, Major General Paul Kagame. General Kagame was the military strategist behind the RPF's victory.

The Hutu often refer to the RPF as *inkwanyi*, intrepid fighters, the name given to the warriors during the days

will readily surrender their do of the government: any time the estimate of the number is accurate, then the Tutsis have reduced from about 15 per cent Rwanda's pre-war population to somewhere between 10 and 15 percent. But sooner or later it will return, either through a situation or by force of arms. A tiny do return they will bring them their demands for der rule, which will probably return of their same leaders to power government succeeds in putting the Hutu responsible for murder on trial it may well the accused will have strong support from the remaining Hutu population which, according to estimates, includes over three people still inside the country and two million outside it.

In the meantime, the militias active in parts of Rwanda, as the Zaire camps. Sybella V press office for the UN Emergency Office (UNREG) only that every day relief must treat patients with fresh wounds in the northwest Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, near border. Militia bandits in the west, where the former Front zone was located, are refugees from returning both the region's forests. In the camps, militiamen and 20,000 soldiers are thwarting the efforts agencies to convince the refugees it is safe to return to Rwanda. are being killed every day for ing about going back to Rwanda.

In Kinyinya camp, near Ruvuvu, a soft-spoken until recently was a teacher at a training camp in Rwanda, said he could not RPF. "They are not honest. he had no illusions about opened in his country. The said, were not earned out by militia. Everyone joined women and children. Point crowds of men and women around him he said. "No, I feel guilty now. They would be successful, they would get rid of all the failed. Now the bad scene. They are seeds of they are in these little children. This is a very long story going to continue."

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REPUBLIC OF GHANA

AKOSOMBO AGREEMENT

This Agreement, which supplements and amends the Cotonou Agreement, is made and entered into on this 12th day of September AD 1994 by and between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) represented by and through its leader Charles G. Taylor (hereinafter referred to as THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, (ULIMO) represented by and through its leader Lt. Gen. Alhaji G.V. Kromah, (hereinafter referred to as THE PARTY OF THE SECOND PART), and the Armed Forces of Liberia represented by and through its Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. J. Hezekiah Bowen (hereinafter referred to as THE PARTY OF THE THIRD PART), hereby:

WITNESSETH:

PREAMBLE

NPFL, ULIMO and AFL reaffirm their acceptance of the Cotonou Agreement as the framework for peace in Liberia. However, having realized the slow pace in the full implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, resulting from the failure of disarmament and the inability of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG) to achieve the objective of its mandate within a six-month period as set forth under Section B Article 14 (2) of the said Cotonou Agreement: and

Having noted with grave concern the protracted human suffering and the undue hardships to which the people of Liberia (inside and outside the country) have been overly subjected as a result of the senseless Liberian civil crisis: and

Having realised the urgent need to bring this ugly civil crisis to an immediate and lasting end:

Do hereby agree to the following:



PART 1

MILITARY ISSUES

DECLARATION

SECTION A

ARTICLE 1

Count 1 is amended to read as follows:

The parties to this agreement hereby agree and declare a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities effective as of the signing of this amendment.

SECTION B

ARTICLE 3

SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING AUTHORITY

Count 1 is amended to read: That the LNTG, ECOMOG and UNOMIL in collaboration shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement.

The parties hereby expressly recognize the neutrality and authority of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in respect of the foregoing.

Accordingly, the LNTG shall ensure that ECOMOG and UNOMIL shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia.

SECTION C:

ARTICLE 4

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Count 4 is amended to read: The LNTG, in collaboration with ECOMOG and UNOMIL, shall ensure that all points of entry including sea ports, airfields and roads shall be monitored and supervised.

Count 5 is amended to read: The warring parties shall undertake to disengage and move to designated assembly points within the time frame in the schedule to be attached to this document.

Count 6 That the LNTG shall enter into a Status of Forces Agreement with ECOWAS within 30 days from the signing of this Agreement.

Count 7 That the existing Status of Mission Agreement already executed with United Nations(UNOMIL) is herein incorporated by reference and is applicable.

SECTION D

ARTICLE 5

ACTS OF VIOLATION

Count 2 is amended to read: The following acts shall constitute violations of the Agreement:

Sub-Section (b): Any change or improvement of existing positions aimed at acquiring territory.

Sub-Section (c): Any deliberate discharge (whether with conventional or unconventional weapons) against the position of any warring party by another, or firing at any individual or property or any seizure or abduction of individuals and properties.

Sub-Section (f): While the right to communication shall not be abridged, any proven use of communication devices, facilities or propaganda designed to incite or having the effect of inciting hostilities between any of the warring parties.

Sub-Section (h): Obstruction of the implementation of any of the provisions of the Agreement by any party and/or individual.

[Handwritten initials: B, AK, and MS]

Sub-Section (i): Harassments, intimidations, or attacks upon any official of the LNTG, relief organizations, ECOMOG, UNOMIL, Ceasefire Violations Committee as well as individuals.

Sub-Section (j): Obstruction of the activities of the LNTG, ECOMOG, UNOMIL and the Ceasefire Violation Committee.

Sub-Section (k): The facilitation or creation of new or splinter armed groups. To this end, any individual or group of individuals suspected of creating or assisting to create any new armed or splinter group or facilitating existing splinter group(s) (directly or indirectly) shall:

1. Not be recognized under the Cotonou Agreement
2. Shall be disarmed and disbanded by ECOMOG in collaboration with LNTG verified by UNOMIL.
3. Thereafter be prosecuted under the laws of Liberia.

SECTION E

ARTICLE 6:

DISARMAMENT

The introductory paragraph is hereby amended to read: the ultimate objective of disarmament under the Cotonou Agreement being primarily to create a conducive security environment for absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections in the country, NPFL, ULIMO and AFL, hereby agree to disarm to ECOMOG

with the cooperation of the LNTG and monitored and verified by UNOMIL in accordance with the schedule to be attached to this Agreement. The parties further mandate the LNTG to begin the formation of appropriate national security structures to facilitate the disarmament process. Accordingly appropriate measures shall be undertaken to enable the AFL to assume its character as a national army. Until such measures are completed the AFL like all other parties and warring groups shall be completely disarmed in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. In order to ensure a secure environment for the proper functioning of the unified government in Monrovia the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall ensure that no group or individuals bear arms in the perimeter of the Capital. However, the personnel security of the leaders of the warring parties shall be reflected in the Status of Forces Agreement.

Count 4 is amended to read: Each of the warring parties shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG which would be inventoried by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL. Upon proper inventory, such weapons and warlike materials, shall be taken by ECOMOG to the designated armouries, monitored and verified by UNOMIL and LNTG.

Count 5 is amended to read: All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall also

report and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after elections.



Count 7 is amended to read: For the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, ECOMOG shall conduct any search to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by UNOMIL and LNTG.

SECTION F:

ARTICLE 7

ENCAMPMENT

Count 1 is amended to read: The parties agree and fully commit themselves to the encampment of their combatants, and maintenance of command and control in encampment centres, established by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and LNTG in collaboration with the parties. The encampment centres shall, in addition to disarmament and demobilization, serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants.



SECTION G:

ARTICLE 8

PEACE ENFORCEMENT POWERS

The following amendments are hereby made to wit:

1. That in the event any party, new armed group or splinter group and/or individuals refuse to desist from acts in violation of the Agreement, the LNTG, in collaboration with ECOMOG shall have the power to use the necessary force available to compel compliance.

2. All violations of the ceasefire shall be reported to UNOMIL who shall, on immediate receipt of the information or violation, commence an investigation and make findings thereof. In the event the violation can be cured by the party, UNOMIL shall pursue such a course. However, should such a course not be possible, UNOMIL shall submit their findings to the Ceasefire Violations Committee. The Violation Committee shall invite the violating party/(ies) for the purpose of having such party/(ies) take corrective measures to cure violations within such time frame as may be stipulated by the Committee. Should the violating party not take the required corrective measures, and the use of peace enforcement powers are recommended

against the violator - the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall thereupon take the necessary action.

SECTION H

ARTICLE 9

DEMOBILIZATION

Count 2 is amended to read: Further, the parties hereby call upon the LNTG, UN, OAU, ECOWAS and other international organizations and countries, to design a programme which recognizes the peculiarities of the parties and finance the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and reintegration of all former combatants to normal social and community life.

Count 3 is amended to read: It is agreed that the LNTG, in collaboration with the parties shall immediately commence a community information or educational programme, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of ceasefire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization. Such programme shall include other social institutions.

Count 4 Internal security arrangements including police, customs and immigration will be put in place immediately. Planning for restructuring and training of the AFL will be


the responsibility of the LNTG, with the assistance of ECOWAS, United Nations and friendly Governments.

SECTION K

ARTICLE 12

SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION

This article is amended to read: The attached schedule of implementation to be attached to this Agreement, including disarmament, encampment and demobilization of combatants, preparation of a Status of Forces Agreement, restructuring of AFL and dissolution of the parties drawn up by ECOMOG and UNOMIL in collaboration with the Parties, shall be given to each of the Parties prior to implementation. The Parties undertake that they will create no obstacles to the full implementation of any of the foregoing activities.



PART II

POLITICAL ISSUES

SECTION A

Section B Article 14 (7) is hereby amended to read thus:

EXECUTIVE

(i) The Parties further agree that during the transitional period leading up to inauguration of an elected government, the executive powers of the Republic shall be vested in a five member Council of State which is hereby established. Each of the Parties (AFL, NPFL and ULIMO) shall appoint one member to the Council and the remaining two, representing unarmed Liberians, shall be chosen from among prominent Liberians, one appointed by the Liberian National Conference recently convened in Monrovia and the other, by NPFL and ULIMO. The designation of Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen shall be determined through a process of elections to be carried out within 7 days of the signing of this Agreement. The new Council of State will be inducted under the auspices of the Chairman of ECOWAS or his representative within 14 days of the signing of this Agreement.

(ii) The Council of State shall conduct and be responsible for the day to day operations of government. All decisions shall be made on the basis of a simple majority.

(iii) The Council shall also devise and implement appropriate rules of procedure in respect of its operations, to be signed by all members on the occasion of their induction into office.

(iv) The parties hereby agree that the allocation of Ministries, Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies as agreed by the Parties in Cotonou, Benin on November 3-5, 1993 shall be maintained, taking into account existing factions in respect of existing vacancies.. All boards of Public Corporations shall be constituted in accordance with the Acts creating said Corporations.

(v) In the case where the executive post is allocated to one party, the two deputy posts shall be allocated to the two other parties. In the case where there are more than two deputy posts in a given Ministry, Public Corporation or Autonomous Agency, the Council of State, shall appoint qualified Liberian citizens to occupy the third and or remaining deputy posts.

(vi) The Council of State shall also exercise its executive prerogative powers to appoint qualified citizens in all other subordinate presidential appointed posts in government as may be provided by law in consultation with the parties.

(vii) Each of the parties shall have the right to review the status of its appointees in the LNTG through the Council of State and any change in appointment by the Council of State, should follow as closely as possible the constitutional procedures. Once appointments have been made to the Council of State changes can only be effected for cause and then consistent with existing laws.

LEGISLATURE

SECTION B

ARTICLE 14

Count (9) is amended to read:


(i) That the parties agree that the Transitional Legislative Assembly shall be a unicameral body composed of 48 members. The TLA is expanded by 13 eminent citizens selected through the Ministry of Internal Affairs from each of the 13 counties, and appointed by the Council of State.

(ii) The parties further agree that the TLA shall give consideration to providing appropriate benefits for the heads of warring parties.

Article 16 (1) is hereby amended to read:

(2) Is hereby amended to read: That the transitional government shall have a life span of approximately 16 months commencing from the date of installation of the five member Council of State.

(3) Is hereby amended to read: That General and Presidential Elections shall take place on October 10, 1995, and the newly elected Government shall be installed on the first Monday of 1996.



SECTION H


ARTICLE 20

The Parties agree that all provisions of the Cotonou Agreement not amended here are herein incorporated by reference and the same are hereby applicable and remain in full force and effect except for the below listed provisions:

- (1) Part 1, Section A Art. 2,
- (2) Part 1, Section B Art. 3, Count 3
- (3) Section D Art. 5 (d)
- (4) Part II Section A Art. 13,
- (5) Part 2, Section B Art. 14, 4, 6, 7 i, ii, iii, iv,

DONE AT AKOSOMBO, REPUBLIC OF GHANA

THIS 12 DAY OF SEPTEMBER 1994




CHARLES G. TAYLOR

LEADER

NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA

(NPFL)




LT. GEN. ALHAJI G.V. KROMAH

NATIONAL CHAIRMAN

UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF

LIBERIA FOR DEMOCRACY (ULIMO)




LT. GEN. J. HEZEKIAH BOWEN


CHIEF OF STAFF

ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL)

WITNESSED BY



for HIS EXCELLENCY FLT. LT. J.J. RAWLINGS
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA AND
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF ECOWAS



AMBASSADOR TREVOR GORDON-SOMERS
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL IN LIBERIA

Kigali 18th Sept 94
2:30 PM.

Dear Mr DAO,

I was coming to check whether
it is possible to have cars for
supervision of the assessment
about rehabilitation. I have
tried elsewhere unsuccessfully.

Now I am going for another
assessment to Kibuye, Gashyamba, Giko-
nyoro etc and tomorrow Mr Bya-
kuri Jean-Marie Vianney will
come here and see you.

Thank you

Lazarus Ndutaro
[Signature]
Ministry of Rehabilitation
and Social Integration

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

A:

SRSG / Exec Dir

FROM:

DE:

CSS.

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

I regret, but we do not have the resources to help here. If SCF wish to purchase equipment, we can consider putting them on our frequencies.

ACCS
18/10

QUL
17/10

Shaharyar M. KHAN
*Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Rwanda*

B. P. 749
Kigali, Rwanda
Tel: (1 212) 963 3093
Fax: (1 212) 963 3090

24 October 1994


Dear Mr Rifkin,

Thank you for your letter of 7 October 1994, requesting UNAMIR's assistance in supplying The Save the Children Fund, SCF (UK), with ten (10) VHF radios (Motorola Radius GP300) for the effective utilization of your skilled staff in SCF (UK)'s child tracing/family reunification programme in Rwanda.

I have referred your request to the Communications Unit at UNAMIR who reported that they do not have the resources to help out with the radios at this point in time. However, should SCF (UK) wish to purchase the radio equipment, I shall be pleased to put UNAMIR's communications network at your disposal. In effect, your radios will be programmed here to enable SCF (UK) to benefit from the good VHF communications net which has been installed at UNAMIR.

Let me take this opportunity to assure you of our cooperation as I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Yours sincerely,



Shaharyar M. Khan

Mr Steve Rifkin
Field Director
Save the Children SCF (UK)
Kigali



Save the Children

Rwanda Programme - Kigali
Satellite Telephone: 873 - 683240 / 682467 / 682472

Contact Address
P.O. Box 1124
Kampala UGANDA
Tel: 258815 / 244796
FAX: 230096

7 October

Ambassador Khan

Special Representative of the Secretary General of the
United Nations to Rwanda

Your Excellency

Following the discussions of this week in which you intimated the possibility to assist The Save the Children Fund, SCF (UK), in its work we would appreciate your backing in expediting current matters regarding communications.

SCF (UK) is engaged in a number of projects in collaboration with U.N. agencies; of particular import is the child tracing/family reunification programme. The effective utilisation of the skilled staff in this programme is hampered by our inability to exploit the good VHF communications net which has been established here.

This, along with the need to tie into the U.N. umbrella for security issues, leads us to ask for assistance in supplying SCF with 10 VHF radios (Motorola Radius GP300) to allow these links to be fostered. SCF would be grateful for the provision of such radios which will only enhance our collaboration and cooperation with our humanitarian partners.

Any assistance in helping SCF will be gratefully received and employed to the benefit of the overall programme goals.

Yours sincerely

Steve Rifkin
Steve Rifkin
Field Director SCF(UK)

A company registered in London No. 178159 and limited by guarantee. Telegrams & Cables: Savitana London SES. Telex No. 892809 SCFLONG
Patron: Her Majesty The Queen. President: Her Royal Highness The Princess Anne. Mrs. Mark Philips GCVO
Chairman: Mr. G.S.G. Witherington. Hon. Treasurer: Mr. Brandt, FCA Director General: Mr. J.A. Cumber, CMG MBE, TD

① We should help - reports to SCF
Cannell
② CCO
pl advise
19/10

③ one/100
pl advise
19/10



PROGRAMME - ANNAN/BARIL VISIT TO RWANDA 19-21.9.94

Names of Visitors: Mr. Kofi Annan, Under Secretary General for Peace Keeping Operations

Major General Baril, Military Advisor

Mr. Lamin Sise

Date of Visit: 19 - 21 September 1994

Responsible Office: OSRSG

Escort Office: Major Lancaster

SERIAL	TIME	ACTIVITY	REMARKS
<u>Mon. 19 Sept.</u>			
1.	0945	Arrival Kigali Airport - proceed to Residence	Met by SRSG, FC, ED, DFC and CAO
2.	1030	Quarter Guard at UNAMIR HQ	CanCon to provide
3.	1045	UNAMIR Briefing	DCOS OPS to arrange, CC to provide coffee
4.	1145	Meeting with Mr. Robert Gersony, UNHCR	HAO to coordinate
5.	1230	Meeting with Mr. Clarence, Human Rights	HAO to coordinate
6.	1300	Working lunch	SRSG/FC/ED/DFC/CAO with support staff plus Heads of Agencies and NGOs - HAO and Protocol to coordinate
	14.30	Meeting with Mr. Kanyenzi to coordinate	

7.	1505	Meeting with Foreign Minister	OSRSG to coordinate
8.	1600	Meeting with Prime Minister	OSRSG to coordinate
9.	1700	Tour of the City	Vehicle group plus security. Include Parliament building.
10.	1730	Meeting UNREO, UN Agencies and NGOs	HAO to coordinate
11.	1900	Dinner	To be hosted by SRSG
<u>Tues. 20 Sept</u>			
1.	0830	Departure for Mereru by Helicopter	SRSG, FC, ED, CMO, DCMO AND Escort Officer to accompany. Comd Gisenyi Milob Sector to provide escort, transport
2.	0900	Arrive Mereru, Visit 2FD	
3.	0940	Fly to Gisenyi, Visit Milob Sector HQ	Milob Sector to provide transport and Briefing.
4.	1030	Travel by road to Goma. Tour Goma camps, meet Ambassador Dillon.	Milob to provide escort and arrange border crossing, protocol officer to organize visa, UNREO Rep. will coordinate meeting with Ambassador Dillon.
5.	1130	Lunch with Milobs	Milobs to organize self funded luncheon.
6.	1230	Departure by Helicopter for Kabale	
7.	1415	Arrival Kabale - Attend UNOMUR Closing Ceremony	UNOMUR to provide TPT to closing ceremonies.
8.	1630	Depart Kabale by Helicopter	
9.	1800	Meeting with civilian staff preceded by Administration briefing.	CAO to coordinate
10.	1900	Dinner hosted by FC at residence	Guest lists to be issued.

<u>Wed. 21 Sept.</u>			
1.	0800	Departure by Helicopter for Cyangugu	SRSG, FC, ED, DFC and escort officer to accompany.
2.	0900	Arrive at Cyangugu Visit Ethiobat	Comd Ethiobat to coordinate visit and briefing.
3.	1000	Departure by helicopter for visit to Camp 102	23 PFA, 9SQN RE to arrange.
4.	1100	Fly to Gikongoro, Visit Ghanbat	CO Ghanbat requested to provide lunch.
5.	1300	Return to Kigali by helicopter	
6.	1330	Meet with Vice President and Minister of Defence	OSRSG to coordinate
7.	1400	Depart Rwanda	

Distribution

External: Milob GP HQ, Ghanbat, Ethiobat, Frafbat, Tunbatt, Malawi Coy. Nig Coy, 9 Parachute SQN Re, Force Engr Coy, Force Sig SQN, Force FD Hospital.

Internal: SRSG, FC, ED, DFC, CAO, CP, SPA, DCOS, OPS, HAC, G3 Plans, G4, FMO, G1, Mission Spokesman, Military Spokesman, Ausmed, Britcon, Cancon, Airops, Camp Comd, MA to FC, MA to DFC, A/MA, ADC, Security.

HAO
22 September 1994

SURVEY MISSION OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO KIGALI

23 SEPTEMBER 1994

Chief of the Delegation

H.E M. Tokuichirou Tamasawa, Minister of Defense

Members

Mr. Naoki Murata	Director General of Defense Policy Bureau,
Mr. Tsuneo Isojima	Director of Plans and Operations Department, Ground Staff Office
Mr. Shouji Takegouchi	Director of Plans and Operations Department, Air Staff Office
Mr. Mitsuo Tanaka	Director of press, Public Relations Division
Mr. Morio Itou	Secretary to Minister of Defense
Mr. Nobuki Kawamura	Staff Official of Defense Policy Division
Mr. Horoshi Sawahata	Lieutenant Colonel, Foreign Liaison Office
Mr. Masao Mlura	Security Police

Objectives of the Mission :

- ◆ To investigate the situation of the relief activities for rwanda Refugees
- ◆ To inspect the activities of the Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel dispatch to Mozambique

This mission that will visit the Republic of Kenya, Uganda, Zaire will arrive in Kigali on September 23, 1994.

The mission will meet the rwandan government Authorities, the OIC/UNAMIR Major General Tousignant, Force Commander and the Executive Director of the Office of the SRSG, Dr Abdul Kabia.

11A-0



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/24/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et Chef de Mission sera absent du Rwanda du 21 au 29 septembre 1994. Pendant son absence, le Général Major Guy C. Tousignant, Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR, assurera l'intérim de la Mission.

La MINUAR remercie une fois de plus le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise pour sa coopération et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 22 septembre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

HAO
22 September 1994

SWEDISH DELEGATION VISIT TO KIGALI

23 - 25 SEPTEMBER 1994

Chief of the Delegation

H.E Mr. Lars-Goran Engfeldt, Ambassador of Sweden

Members

Mr. Carl Olov Cederblad	Ambassador Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm
Ms Helena Bjuremalm	Head of Section Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm
Mr. David Friberg	SIDA, Stockholm
Mr. Bengt Herring	First Secretary Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi

Objectives of the Mission :

- ◆ To visit Kigali in order to study relief operations in Goma-Zaire and Rwanda including Swedish contributions.
- ◆ The delegation will visit UNAMIR Headquarters Friday 23, September 1994 in the afternoon and will pay a visit to the rwandan Government Authorities Saturday 24, 1994.

7.

RWANDA REGIONAL RELIEF TRANSPORT COORDINATION

- 1 In a meeting between the High Commissioner for refugees Ms Sadako Ogata, the WFP Executive Director Ms Catherine Bertini, the UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Ms Karin Sham Poo, the UNDP Assistant Administrator Ms Merlin Johnson-Sirleaf and the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Peter Hansen, an agreement was reached on the allocation of responsibilities between the UN Agencies for the Rwanda regional emergency. As per this agreement, the responsibilities entrusted to WFP are:

- Sal
Krislan 15.8
- Food and Rations
 - Land Transportation
 - Storage
 - Food for Work

- 2 During her mission to Rwanda earlier this month, the WFP Executive Director discussed with SRSG Khan, Gen Schroeder, Ambassador Ramson, and other relevant partners the implementation requirements for the transport coordination mechanisms.

- 3 The coordination effort aims at achieving an optimal utilization of all relief truck fleets operating in the region belonging to or controlled by all UN Agencies, NGOs and others involved in the relief operation. In this context, "trucks" include all trucks of every type, size and capacity, but exclude passenger buses, light passenger vehicles, water tankers and other similar special purpose vehicles.

- 4 The coordination of the Rwanda regional transportation comprises the relief traffic within, into and through Rwanda. It includes relief traffic to the Rwanda refugee camps in all neighbouring countries.

- 5 The broad scope of the activities to be undertaken in respect of the transport coordination requires a gathering of knowledge of the trucking capacities, positioning and deployment so as to harmonize their utilization in accordance with the needs as they arise. They include but are not limited to the following:

- To determine the actual trucking capacity in the region and specifically:
 - (i) To ensure finalization of the mobilization of dedicated WFP fleets that will operate in the area;
 - (ii) To gather information regarding the fleets being mobilized by other UN Agencies and NGOs;

- (iii) To collect information regarding the commercial fleets in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda that can be made available for transportation of relief commodities, both food and non-food items;
 - (iv) To establish a data base of the static trucking capacity available over the routes indicated above.
 - To determine the actual lake transport means, namely:
 - (i) To evaluate and recommend measures to be undertaken to increase the capacity of the barge operation from Kigoma to Bujumbura and Uvira, which involves the loading capacity at Kigoma and the off-loading at Bujumbura;
 - (ii) To assess the capacity for the barge operation from Gisenyi/Goma to Bukavu.
 - To assess the infrastructure conditions of the road network along the routes and particularly inside Rwanda and recommend improvements/repairs where required.
- 6 The transport coordination activities will be undertaken by a unit to be established under the WFP Country Office in Kigali and premises have already been allocated for that purpose.
- 7 The exact modalities of coordination that will ensure adequate cooperation among all parties involved need to be urgently defined. They will comprise the following:
- (i) Information and reporting requirements;
 - (ii) Establishment of channels of communications, e.g. the appointment of liaison officers by the partners;
 - (iii) Coordination of food and non-food shipments. Of particular importance is the establishment of a link with FACIC - Food Aid Coordination and Information Centre - in Nairobi in regard to the food aid pipeline.
 - (iv) Decision making process for the allocation of transport.
- 8 The comprehensive financial requirements for the setting in motion and the staffing of the unit have yet to be finalized. However the USG has been approached to provide the required funding, technical support equipment and professional staff.

August 14, 1994



UNAMIR MINUAR

OFFICE OF THE DFC
UNAMIR FORCE HQ
KIGALI

1000.7(DFC)/A/1

15th September, 1994

See Distribution

A VISIT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO RWANDA AND
A TEAM OF THE STAFF TO ZAIRE MON-TUE 12-13 SEP 94

INTRODUCTION

1. The SRSG led a team of six officers of his own staff to Zaire from Mon-Wed 12-13 September 1994. The purpose of the visit was to meet the Zairian authorities and foreign diplomats to discuss with them issues related to the various categories of Rwandese nationals that have taken refuge in Goma/Bukavu since the end of the civil war in Rwanda in July 1994. Upon arrival in Kinshasha - Zaire, the SRSG held a brief meeting with his delegation and outlined the various categories of Rwandese in Zaire as follows. Top politicians of the former Government, the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards, then the common Rwandese who are harmless. He then continued to discuss the strategic approach to the discussions. The pivot points would be to stress to the Zairian authorities what they stand to gain both politically and economically by encouraging the Rwandese to go back home.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to bring out the salient points of the discussions that took place with the view to finding the best approach to finally evacuating the refugees from Zaire back to their own country.

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUGEES

3. During the SRSG's initial briefing it became clear that the problems associated with the separation and eventual evacuation of the refugees are as follows:

- a. Identification of the various groups.
- b. Their new locations within Zaire.
- c. Cost of repatriating the harmless elements.
- d. The procedure for disarming those that possess weapons.
- e. Psychological operations prior to or in conjunction with other measures to facilitate easy evacuation

IDENTIFICATION

4. This should not pose too much problem. The politicians are known and can easily be sorted out from the lot. They still enjoy the respect of their citizens in the camps with them so taking them away should not pose a problem if only the rest are assured of the fact that they are going to a safe place.

5. The military men in uniform should also be easy to identify. The only problem here is the Presidential Guards wearing the same uniforms and so are some of the notorious Interahamwe. Aside from the uniform, the militias and the Presidential Guards are still in position to intimidate the Regular Forces and the ordinary Rwandese. What can be done however is for the regular soldiers under a capable leadership should defy the Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards. Under a capable, a neutral force preferably UN operating under Chapter VII, it should not be too difficult to separate them provided the RGF itself is willing to do so. The ordinary Rwandese can then be given the option of selecting to go back home or stay in Zaire.

NEW LOCATIONS IN ZAIRE

6. The new camp for about 20,000 former RGF soldiers is to be located in Ituri. This place is located in the North-Eastern part of Zaire about 100-150 km from Goma. It appears the Zairian authorities are willing to get the ex-soldiers into the new camps but they are not in position financially or security-wise to undertake the task. There must be an outside help.

COST OF REPATRIATION

7. UN must find donors and agencies that will be willing to assist in this. This was later discussed at length with the officials of USA and Belgium.

THE PROCEDURE FOR DISARMING

8. This is perhaps the most delicate part of the whole operation. It will be necessary to find out what level of propaganda had gone out to get these soldiers back to Rwanda or fight the Government in Kigali. Is there a foreign power encouraging or training them for a show down on the RPA? Do they have leaders that will lead them on a counter-offensive? If investigation reveals that they are weak and frail and that even with foreign encouragement they do not seem prepared to go back for a fight, disarming them will be relatively easy. If, however, they have a use for the weapons in the immediate future then how will they give them up?

9. Zaire, we are told, cannot help in disarming the RGF or in any form of security duties. The Zairian troops in the camps constitute enough insecurity already. The only obvious choice is a neutral force operating under chapter VII. A credible force from countries accepted to Zaire given the right mandate to

execute their task within a short period of time. The existing camps as well as the new ones to be created must all be protected by UN Forces.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

10. Already there have been some contacts between the Rwandese and Zairian authorities. If they are all committed to what came out of those meetings then intensified efforts in the following ways will help.

- a. Radio broadcast directed to the camps.
- b. Direct contact between the politicians in Kigali and the Refugees. Zairian politicians could accompany their Rwandese counter-parts on such trips.
- c. Bringing back from Rwanda some of opinion leaders that used to live in the camps and had gone back and currently living in Rwanda.
- d. With concurrence of the Zairian government, distribute leaflets in the camps re-assuring them of sincerity of the government in Kigali.
- e. Perhaps the most important of all is the demonstration of faith by the government in Kigali. They must show beyond any reasonable doubts that they are committed to reconciliation and truly want to build a harmonized nation.

VISIT TO US EMBASSY

11. We met the Chargé d'Affaires of the US Embassy at 1200 hours local time. In a short discussion with him, the following points were emphasized.

- a. Zairians are sincere in the re-locating the refugees and their eventual repatriation but are not in position to do it. The Zairian Army itself is plagued with indiscipline and the Govt has no money to undertake the task.
- b. An area (Ituri) has already been earmarked as the camp site for RGP.
- c. It is obvious that when the military elements of the refugees are moved away from the border with Rwanda, confidence between the two countries can be restored.
- d. United States troops will not participate in such an exercise but the US Government will be prepared to provide money and logistics support.

MEETING WITH BELGIAN CHARGE d'AFFAIRES

12. At 1300 hours on the 12th of September, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires met the delegation in the Hotel Inter-Continental and he emphasized the following points to us.

- a. The Prime Minister of Zaire is sincere about supporting the repatriation of the refugees but he does not have the means to do so.
- b. Our delegation must try to see President Mobutu and get his approval of whatever plans we have. He has the final say. The fact that the President intends building a Mausoleum for the late President Habyarimana in Gbadolite underscores the relationship that existed between the two and therefore one wonders whether or not President Mobutu would want to see the mainly Hutu soldiers go back home.
- c. Belgian Government will offer assistance but will not contribute troops.
- d. The European Union is favourably disposed to assisting.

VISIT TO ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES

13. On Tuesday 13th September 1994, the SRSG's delegation visited three statesmen in Kinshasa. The Prime Minister, Ministers of Interior and Defence. In all cases it was clear that the Zairian authorities are sincere about the evacuation of the Rwandese refugees but they do not have the means of doing so. In all three places they made it clear that Rwandese must not be coerced into any movement against their wish especially to Rwanda. They however wish no more refugees into Zaire but will instead help in encouraging those that wish to go back to Rwanda. The Minister of Defence stated that the presence of the refugees has affected their reputation and a lot of money is being spent on them daily. Even within the country the citizens especially opposition politicians and some members of the Armed Forces are vehemently opposed to the role Zairian government is playing in the whole affair. The Minister of Defence went on to say that the Rwandese refugees themselves are not behaving well in the camps. It is, therefore, in the interest of the government of Zaire to send them back home. He re-iterated that if they had the means, they would have evacuated them long ago. He further stated that the Zairian Army has disarmed some of the military men in the camps but others still possess weapons. The total figure of the RGF refugees was given by the PM to be 16,000 but Minister of Defence stated 90,000 including their families.

A JOINT WORKING GROUP - UNAMIR/ZAIRE

14. At the end of the discussions it was agreed that a joint working group made up of UNAMIR/UNHCR/ZAIRE should carry-out a reconnaissance and come out with a detailed report on how the whole refugee situation must be handled. This view is to be

conveyed to the UN Secretary General immediately for approval to be given for the reconnaissance to be carried out. The terms of reference for such a group could be as follows.

- a. Over-all strength of the refugees.
- b. Security.
- c. The various groups ie. the top Politicians, RGF, the Interahamwe and Presidential Guards; the ordinary Rwandese. How to identify them.
- d. Cost
- e. Where are they to be sent to - the camps.
- g. Intelligence on the people and the camps.
- h. Duration of the operation - Timings.
- i. Assessment of troops to task.
- j. Cost element.

THE COST OF THE RECONNAISSANCE

15. This issue was to be taken up with UN New York to enable speedy execution of the task.

MEETING PLACE

16. The Minister of Defence strongly suggested that the first meeting place of the working group should be in Kinshasha then to the existing and proposed camp sites.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU

WED 14 SEP 94.

17. The SRSG's delegation visited President Mobutu in Gbadolite on Wednesday 14 Sep 94. As in the previous meetings, the SRSG after fraternal greetings outlined the purpose of our visit. He had hardly gone half-way when the President assumed the discussions. There was no doubt that the case of the Rwandese refugees was very dear to his heart. He, however, remained vague on the question of moving the RGF Solders to different camps. He instead chose to dwell at length on the fact that the government in Kigali has the onus on itself to prove beyond reasonable doubts that it is safe for the Rwandese to return home. In addition, he indicated that there is a long standing treaty between East/Central African States that refugees from neighbouring states should be located 150 kilometers from the borders and that such refugees should be treated humanely. We would have preferred a more positive answer from the President. All the same, it was good having face to face meeting with him after which he referred us to his Director of Cabinet Mr Kugulunda to discuss the details with him. I did not benefit

from the translation of those details which were done mainly between Mr Kugulunda, the SRSG and Mr Michael Mussali of the UNHCR.

CONCLUSION

18. Despite a few hitches here and there, our mission was quite successful. Zairian authorities demonstrated during the discussions that they would want the refugees problem sorted out as quickly as possible. One thing that came out clearly is that they can not undertake the task by themselves. They need the assistance of United Nations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. Whilst we await the setting up of the joint working group/reconnaissance Team, and its subsequent detailed report, I recommend the following course of action.

- a. The psychological operations referred to in paragraph eight (8) should be vigorously pursued. Among those points is the need to stress the utmost need of the Rwandese government in Kigali to show absolute faith in their professed reconciliation.
- b. A known ally of President Mobutu should prevail on him to come out clearly with his personal views on the situation so that he does not pursue clandestine operations to thwart the efforts of any UN Force that will be put in place.
- c. The OAU should be brought into the picture now.
- d. The UN should be quick in responding to whatever the SRSG will come up with.
- e. The Reconnaissance Team from UNAMIR should be made up of both Civilian and Military experts.



HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

Distribution:

SRSG
FORCE COMMANDER
EX DIRECTOR

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BURUNDI

Background

There is growing concern with the evolving situation in Burundi. This concern is heightened by the instability of the situation in the southwestern humanitarian zone. UNREO is progressively staffing all of its positions, and in the process evolving into a structured organisation rather than a group of "key" individuals. This institutionalisation of the structure has meant that UNREO will progressively no longer be as dependent on individuals for its effective operations. In the process of its professionalisation UNREO has developed a core staff who have gained significant understanding of the Rwandan situation, and who would be invaluable to any regional effort.

The following is a proposal emanating from the field for addressing a possible deterioration of the situation in Burundi. The plan wishes to offer DHA with the option of fielding an effective presence in Burundi in collaboration with the military and political wings of a possible UN response.

It is essential that DHA have the capability of intervening immediately upon, if not before, the actual deployment of a humanitarian operation. The UNREO structure is an immediate field resource for DHA in its attempt to gain its rightful place in the elaboration and implementation of humano-military operations.

Proposal

A number of actions can be taken in conjunction with ongoing UNREO operations in anticipation of a possible rapid deterioration of the situation in Burundi. Were events to rapidly change, DHA New York could request UNREO to immediately field a humanitarian structure. This structure would give time to headquarters to identify personnel specifically tasked with running the Burundi operation. If DHA dispatched immediately a senior member of its rapid response cell to Kigali (all english speaking and with a current understanding of the Rwanda operations), the current Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator in Kigali (a french speaker) could be temporarily detached to set up the structure in Burundi.

The UNREO proposal addresses the preparatory, crisis and response phases of an emergency operation in Burundi.

Preparatory Phase

Maintain a permanent UNREO presence in Bujumbura to monitor the situation. To date Jacques Bandelier has been the UNREO designated individual in Burundi and also the field coordinator for the UNREO southwest operation. With the arrival of additional staff and a possible easing of tensions in the old humanitarian zone, Jacques will be able to increase the time he allocates to the Burundi component of the operation.

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Preparatory actions will include:

- reinforcement of the Bujumbura base (one additional staff)
- setting up communications equipment (Swedish Team)
- identification of current UNREO staff to be mobilised in case of immediate deployment in Burundi, identification of additional equipment
- establishment of the Butare base ("base arriere" for a possible Burundi operation), and identification of other peripheral sites (Uvira, Kigoma, Kibondo, Ngara)
- identification of regional field coordination centres within Burundi (Ngozi, Kibondo, Gitega, Rutana)
- establishment of communications with the Burundi relief community
- defining and identifying support structures such as Swedish Relief Team

Crisis Phase

To the extent possible UNREO Bujumbura staff would remain in Bujumbura to monitor the evolving situation. A team would be dispatched to Uvira (less than one hour distance from Bujumbura) to set up a monitoring and logistical support base. The Butare field office would be staffed by one additional communication officer to ensure twenty-four hour radio communication with Bujumbura.

Preparatory actions will include

- assessment of possible evacuation routes
- agreement with Burundi Security Coordinator on UNREO coordination efforts during a crisis

Response Phase

The current preparations would allow DHA to immediately field a number of humanitarian coordination teams. Conditions permitting? DHA would also maintain a field presence in Bujumbura during the crisis phase.

The ultimate objective of this plan is to enable DHA to mobilise a significant structure to participate in a UN response to a Burundi Crisis.

23 AUGUST 1994

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UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
PLAN OF ACTION
FOR THE RETURN OF DISPLACED AND REFUGEES TO THEIR HOME AREAS

I. Overall Situation

More than two and a half million people are presently located outside of their home areas as a result of the events of the last five months. Nearly two million of these have sought refuge outside of the country and some half a million to eight hundred thousand people are displaced within Rwanda, predominantly in the southwest of the country.

The refugees living outside Rwanda are located in:

Zaire

-	Goma	850 000
-	Bukavu	320 000
-	Uvira	190 000

Burundi	200 000
---------	---------

Tanzania

-	Ngara	300 000
-	Karagwe	98 000

Spontaneous return of refugees from these areas into Rwanda has been hampered by:

- prevailing insecurity in the Bugesera and Kibungo prefectures (bordering Burundi and Tanzania)
- information on conditions in Rwanda disseminated in the camps by the ex Government
- intimidation in the camps against returnee candidates by militia elements

The vast majority of the refugees were "called" into exile, rather than pushed out of Rwanda. It is generally recognised that the recent movement of large numbers of people into Zaire was as much a result of RGF instructions to withdraw broadcasted over Radio Milles Collines as it was a result of an RPF advance. The present "anchoring" of refugees in the camps is further reinforced by the leadership structures which have emerged. These are for the most part formed from the extremist components of the old government.

The displaced "caseload" is of a different nature. People are located in the old southwest humanitarian zone. These displaced fled the advance of the RPF by passing the northwest prefectures (considered to be the heartland of the Hutu extremists) and converged in the southwest area occupied by moderate Hutu populations. The reduced level of radicalisation of

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this group and the distances they covered over the last months would explain why the displaced located in the old French protection zone did not flee into Zaire when French forces withdrew. Consequently this group could be considered to be more amenable to returning to their home areas. Over the last few days small numbers of displaced have started to return. Large scale return, however, is constrained by the questions and concerns over the RPF treatment of returnees.

II. Proposed Strategy

Given the above analysis, the suggested approach is to focus returnee support operations on the southwest displaced populations. The refugee populations would be addressed following the successful reintegration of the displaced. Attention should be placed on providing assistance in areas to which the displaced will return and in which the humanitarian community is presently least visible.

The international humanitarian community should be encouraged to consider working in the prefectures Gitarama, Kibungo, Bugesera and Butare. Coverage of these areas by international NGO/UN Agency staff would contribute to increasing the:

- absorptive capacity of the areas to which the people return
- level of confidence returnees may have in returning

The overall approach should be based on trying to attract people back to their home areas, rather than pushing them out of their present locations. Additionally, community based efforts should be encouraged rather than returnee targeted assistance. This would also contribute to easing possible tension between returnee populations and those who had remained behind.

III. Challenges

In defining an approach/strategy a number of points, if not realities, need to be taken into account and addressed. These include:

1. NGO and UN agency personnel resources are finite. It would be unnaturally optimistic to imagine that a returnee assistance programme could be implemented without affecting ongoing humanitarian efforts. Given the present location of the returnees as well as the nature of needs in the southwest, those NGOs and agencies located in the southwest and specifically the Prefecture of Cyangugu should be encouraged to move to the prefectures identified in section II
2. Though the events of the last months have been devastating to the Rwandan people, infrastructure has been relatively spared. Donors should be encouraged to tailor their emergency funding of a returnee operation to immediate first phase infrastructural recovery actions

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3. In order to ensure the sustainability of the international efforts, the nascent government administration should be given the co-leadership of the returnee programme. Ownership of the operation coupled with the resources to implement the operation would possibly give the confidence and authority to government officials to ensure that internationally acceptable procedures are used in applying justice locally

4. It should be remembered that the RGF for the most part withdrew from Rwanda. A sizeable military and militia force exist in Zaire and Tanzania. Forays into Rwanda are being effected by militia groups operating out of Ngara camp. Security of international humanitarian staff in the Kibungo and Bugesera Prefectures will need to be assured. Additionally, as the urge for refugees to return increases so will militia aggressiveness against international relief workers in the camps of Goma, Bukavu and Ngara

IV. Humanitarian Actions

1. Formation of a Returnee Task Force comprised of interested NGOs, UN Agencies, UNAMIR representatives
2. Joint UN/NGO/UNAMIR assessment missions in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare, Bugesera and Kibungo
3. Establishment of regional returnee coordination centres with representatives of the Ministry of Rehabilitation
4. Information campaign with UNAMIR support targeted on the southwest and subsequently on Goma, Bukavu and Ngara
5. Mandate of UNREO Logistics Coordination Cell changed to cover returnee operation. IOM coopted into the structure

V. Allocation of Responsibilities among UN Agencies

[In a meeting between the UNHCR Ms. Sadako Ogata, the WFP Executive Director Ms. Catherine Bertini, the UNICEF deputy Executive Director Karin Sham Poo, the UNDP Assistant Administrator Ms. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and the DHA Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Peter Hansen, a broad understanding was reached on the allocation of responsibilities between the UN Agencies for the Rwanda Emergency. Individual UN Agencies were identified as sectorial or cross-sectorial reference point for the effective management of the humanitarian intervention.]

Overall Coordination -- UNREO/DHA

1. Coordination of humanitarian relief assistance in Rwanda
2. Elaboration of strategies and contingency plans
3. Field monitoring, situation and needs assessments
4. Interaction with local authorities
5. Liaising with military contingent commanders and UNAMIR Force Commander
6. Security procedures and communications

Sectoral and Cross-sectoral Focal/Reference Points

UNHCR

1. Operational coordination of relief activities outside Rwanda
2. Repatriation planning, establishment of way-stations and (*inter-alia* with IOM) organisation of onward transportation of refugees to home communities
3. Air transportation
4. Shelter materials/basic relief items
5. Protection monitoring (in coordination with the High Commissioner for Human Rights)

UNICEF

1. Water and Sanitation
2. Health and Nutrition
3. Unaccompanied minors and orphans
4. Non-food relief items
5. Education
6. Psycho-social needs

WFP

1. Food and rations
2. Land transportation
3. Storage
4. Food for work

FAO

1. Agriculture
2. Livestock

WHO

1. Health capacity building

UNDP

1. Elaboration of recovery strategy
2. Coordination/financing of recovery activities
3. Institutional strengthening and capacity building

30 AUGUST 1994

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S/1994/879
Français
Page 4

15. Des dispositions seront prises pour le financement de la Commission d'experts. En outre, j'ai l'intention de créer un fonds d'affectation spéciale qui sera alimenté par des contributions volontaires versées par des États, des organisations intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales ainsi que par des personnes physiques et morales, afin d'aider la Commission à exécuter son plan de travail.

16. La Convention du 13 février 1946 sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies¹ s'appliquera à la Commission et à ses membres. Les membres de la Commission auront le statut d'experts en mission au sens de l'article VI de la Convention.

Note

¹ Résolution 22 A (I).

UNAMIR

194 SEP -8 10 45

United Nations
Development Programme

World Development

Office of the Resident Representative
Kampala

FAX MESSAGE

TO: Mr. Khan
Special Representative of
the Secretary-General
Kigali, Rwanda

FAX NO. 212-963-3090
3097

CC: Mr. A. Hein
UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda

FROM: Tedla Teshome
Resident Representative
and
UN Resident Coordinator

REF: PRO/302/RWANDA

MSG. NO. 1964

ACCOUNT:

DATE: 7 September 1994

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Dear Mr. Khan,

It has been reported that on the wake of the RPF's victory in Kigali a large number of Rwandese refugees have crossed to Rwanda with an estimated 600,000 heads of cattle. It is feared that the cattle which appear to be located in Nyagatare, Mutura in Kagera area near the Uganda border are exposed to contagious Bovin phurc-pneumonia (CBPP) and foot and mouth disease (FMD) and in consequence large losses may occur.

Interested groups have approached this office to solicit the assistance of the United Nations to diffuse this explosive situation by arranging rapid vaccination to the affected cattle within Rwanda. In view of the poor conditions on the Rwanda side, it was suggested that the United Nations should solicit the cooperation of the Government of Uganda to make available the required manpower resources and logistic arrangements on full funding basis. Should such request be made to the Government of Uganda, we are confident that positive responses will be received.

It is recommended to launch a one-week operation which will entail about 40 team of five technicians each to operate over 70 zones. The total cost, excluding the cost of vaccines, but including costs of personnel, ice and logistic arrangements, is estimated to be in the range of \$200,000 to 250,000.

We urge your office to consider mobilizing the UN system support and through Rwanda Government to approach Government of Uganda to cooperate in mitigating the emergency situation that could have a disastrous consequence on the cattle population of Rwanda.

Warm regards.

UNREO HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS WORKING OR PLANNING TO WORK IN RWANDA (BY LOCATION)

August 30, 1994

Updated Tuesday and Friday

* DENOTES PLANNED ACTIVITY
 # DENOTES SECTOR BUT NOT REGION PROVIDED.
 * DENOTES MORE INFO AVAILABLE FROM NGO UNIT
 NATIONAL (RWANDAN) NGO

NAME ORG	HEALTH	FOOD	WATER/ SANITATION	AGRICULTURE	LOGISTICS	TRAINING	UNACC. MIN.
ICRC	NATIONWIDE	NATIONWIDE	NATIONWIDE	NATIONWIDE		NATIONWIDE	
IOM					NATIONWIDE		
ACTION NORD-SUD	RUTONGO(KIGALI)						
ADEHAMU I				KIBUYE			
ADPR/PMU INTERLIFE		KIGALI, GIKONGORO, KIBUYE		KIGALI			
ADRA	NDABA(KIG)	*	*				*
ADRI I				GISENYI, KIBUNGO, KIGALI BUTARE, CYANGUGU			
AFRICARE							KIGALI
AFSR FRANCE							
AFVP(FRANCE)				*	*		
AICF(FRANCE)	KIGALI, NKULI (RUH) GIKONGORO	RUHengeri, NKULI (RUH), CYANIKA (GIK), GIKONGORO	GIKONGORO				
AICF-US	BUTARE *		BUTARE *				BUTARE *
AIR SERVE INTL					ENTEBBE, KIGALI, BUKAVU(FLIGHTS)		
AMDA (JAPAN)	NGARAMA(BYU)		NGARAMA(BYU)		NGARAMA(BYU)		
AMERICARES	NEMBA (RUH)	NEMBA (RUH)					
AMREF(KENYA)	BYUMBA						
ARAMET I							
ARF I	NATIONWIDE						
ARDI I				KIGALI, BUTARE, GIKONGORO, KIBUYE, CYANGUGU			
ARF(AUSTRIA)							
ASB-GERMANY	KIGALI-KINYINYA*						
ATLAS LOGISTIQUE					KIGALI, KABALE		
AVSI							NYANZA, GATAGARA
BAMBINI DEL RUANDA	GAHINI*						GAHINI*

August 30, 1994

NAME ORG	HEALTH	FOOD	WATER/ SANITATION	AGRICULTURE	LOGISTICS	TRACING	UNACC. MIN.
HELP(GERMANY)	#	#					
HOSPITAL SANS FRONTIERE	CYANGUGU						
IMC	KIBUNGO TOWN, PREF KIBUNGO.(12 SITES), NYANZA(BUT)*, SAVE(BUT)*						
INADES I							
	#				KIGALI		
JRPR(GERMANY)							KIGALI* ,BUTARE*
LWF					KIGALI, BUTARE, RUHENGRI		
MDM	KIBUYE,KIGALI,GIKONGORO, CYANGUGU,GAHINI, SEYORONGI						
MEMISA/BUFMAR	KIGALI,BYUMBA,KIBUYE, GITARAMA**						
MSF	KIGALI, RUHENGRI, GISENYI, GITARAMA, BUTARE, CYANGUGU, KIBUYE, GIKONGORO**		KIGALI,BUTARE,RUHENGRI GITARAMA,GIKONGORO**				
NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID	#						
ORPHELINS DU RWANDA							#
OXFAM	NYAMATA		RUTARE,BYUMBA,KISARO, MUKONO,KAYONZA MURAMBI,RUHENGRI GISENYI				
PHARMACIENS SANS FRONTIERES	KIGALI,GITARAMA *						
PREMIERE URGENCE		GOMA			GOMA,KIGALI		
PSALM 23-BV							
REFUGEE TRUST(IRELAND)	MUGAMBAZI*,BUGESERA			BUGESERA *			
RFD I							
SAFE HARBOR							#
SAMARITAN'S PURSE	KIGALI RUTARE (BYU)						RUTARE (BYU)

August 30, 1994

NAME ORG	HEALTH	FOOD	WATER/ SANITATION	AGRICULTURE	LOGISTICS	TRACING	UNACC. MIN.
SCF UK	BYUMBA, RUHENGIRI, GIKONGORO	BUKAVU, GIKONGORO				NATIONWIDE	NATIONWIDE
SCF-US							KIGALI *
SDR	MUHIMA (KIG)						
SECOURS POPULAIRE							
SOLIDARITES					GIKOMERO		BUTARE
CHILDREN'S VILLAGES							NGARAMA, KIGALI, GIKONGORO
TRIANGLE							KIGALI *
TROCAIRE	GIKONGORO, CYANIKA, KIREHO	GIKONGORO, CYANIKA, KIREHO					
US COMM FOR REFUGEES							
VOLCANO VET. CTRS MORRIS ANIMALE FOUNDATION							
WLD SOC. FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALES							
WORLD VISION	KIGALI			BYUMBA *	BYUMBA*, GIKONGORO*, KIGALI, KANAZI*, BUKAVU		BYUMBA, KIGALI, KANAZI
WORLD RELIEF(GOMA)	GOMA						GOMA
FEED THE CHILDREN		RUHANGO					RUHANGO

UNREO/DHA
PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE SOUTHWEST

Situation

A possible massive movement of displaced into Zaire from the southwest of Rwanda is becoming an ever increasing reality. It is essential that the international humanitarian community attempt to:

1. mitigate/offset the risk of such a move
2. prepare for the inflow of refugees into the Bukavu area

The following plan of action attempts to address both points.

Objective

UNREO establish coordination structures in collaboration with UNAMIR in each of the three sectors defining the French security zone. These coordination points would attempt to attract international NGOs, disperse them around the sectors, and were the necessity to arise follow the displaced into exile.

Implementation Steps

1. Deploy UNREO staff in Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu (11-13 August)
2. Assess situation draw up NGO distribution matrix (12-14 August)
3. Announce to NGOs UNREO "deployment strategy" (12 August)
4. Coordinate of NGO deployment and of relief assistance
5. Follow displaced into exile

Clearance/Endorsement Process

1. SRSG, UNAMIR Force Commander (11 August)
2. Minister of Rehabilitation (11 August)
3. UN Agencies (12 August)
4. NGOS (12 August)

UNREO Structure

Central Coordination Office

Deputy Coordinator (Kigali)

Information Emery Brusset	Operations Joe Bishop	Logistics Buddy Tillet
(information analysis)	(operations room, with UNAMIR)	(support, asset utilisation)

Field Offices

Bujumbura Coordination - Jacques Bandelier

Gikongoro Sanou/Elisabeth	Kibuye Jacques Bandelier	Cyangugu Sanou/Elisabeth
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PROJECT: MINE CLEARANCE PLAN FOR RWANDA

This report was prepared in collaboration with Capt. Hurlston of the British Contingent, UNAMIR.

Background:

The mine and unexploded munitions situation in Rwanda has become critical in towns and cities since April 1994. Mine clearance is needed on roads, urban and rural areas, and mine awareness training is urgently needed for all people living in Rwanda. Currently, only four Canadian military personnel are disposing of mines and munitions in Rwanda. The British contingent's mandate currently limits their mine clearance activities to those involving military operations.

Currently, King Faycal Hospital reports an average of two civilian casualties per day in Kigali. Most of these cases are a result of children stepping on anti-personnel mines while at play.

A Mine Action Headquarters has been set up in HQ UNAMIR with a mine intelligence cell, and the UN De-mining Expert has drawn up a preliminary plan in which a civilian contractor would train 150 Rwandan mine clearers and 30 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assistants over a period of one year. The mine clearance in Rwanda would then eventually be handed over to the Rwandan Government.

Requirements:

Please refer to Brigadier (Retd) Blagden's Mine Clearance Plan of 17 August 1994.

Cost:

1. \$4.3 million USD total, broken down as follows:
 - a. \$2 million USD for the main and mine dog contracts;
 - b. \$.25 million for manpower;
 - c. \$.02 million for rental;
 - d. \$2.03 million for equipment and running costs.

Time Frame:

During the first year, the plan envisages mine clearance by the contractor, incorporating the training of the 150 Rwandans. Once the contract has been awarded, and the trainers are on the ground, the training of the 150 Rwandans could be completed within one year.

Action To Be Taken:

1. Provide funding and award contract to civilian contractor as soon as possible.
2. Secure the approval and clearance of the Rwandan Government to proceed with the plan.



Kristen Scott
Political Affairs Officer
22 August 1994

PROJECT: RESTORATION OF AIRPORT IN KIGALI

Objective: To restore Kigali Airport to commercial air traffic

Background:

1. On 20 July, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) technicians visited the Kigali airport to do a technical assessment. Mr. Baliddawa, the Regional Representative of ICAO, presented his assessment to the Rwandan Minister of Transport and Telecommunication, Mrs. Imaculee Kayumba.

2. ICAO technicians have since been working to calibrate the navigational instruments and instrument landing systems in order to broaden the scope of aircraft that the airport can accommodate. Lloyd's of London is currently underwriting the insurance, and, without the correctly adjusted instruments, the insurance costs were prohibitive and constraining.

3. ICAO now reports that both the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and the VOR, a navigational aid, are functioning well, both having been checked out by the American FAA.

Requirements:

The urgent requirements now are as follows:

1. The airport must have civilian airtraffic controllers in the control towers.

-Five air traffic controllers would be required.

-Two meteorological officers would be required.

2. The airport must have adequate fire-fighting equipment, trucks and personnel.

Eight fire fighting officers would be required.

The personnel for each of these areas could be recruited from UN Volunteers. These UN Volunteers are paid at a rate of \$2,200 per month.

Cost

1. The cost to finance technical personnel: \$200,000.00

2. The cost to finance fire emergency protective services: \$1.9 million.

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE SOUTHWEST

I. Overall Situation

People have commenced moving towards Zaire from the eastern part of the "French Humanitarian Zone". Daily figures remain fairly low, 5 000 out of Kibuye, 2 800 entering the forest from Gikongoro (both figures for 13/8, slight increases on 14/8). The moves are organised/supported by ex-RGF groups from Zaire:

- in Kibuye militia elements are said, even observed, to be blocking the movement of people east, and inciting people to flee southwest

- in the Gikongoro Prefecture similar intimidations are being put on the local populations. Until recently such efforts were supported by radio transmissions out of northern Burundi

Ex-RGF are also organising transportation from both Prefectures to Cyangugu. Reports indicate that the "intelligentsia" of the areas are being targeted for movement west and southwest.

Even though movements are being observed it is not obvious that the general population wish to move "en masse" as they did from the northwest some weeks ago. Groups are observed starting their move towards Zaire, but stopping along the way (only to be encouraged along by ex-RGF elements). It should be recalled that the southwest population currently in country have already ignored a summons to Zaire by the ex-RGF (mid-July). They are consequently not as tied to the old government as their northwestern counter-parts now suffering in Goma.

Relief assistance is entering the Gikongoro Prefecture in significant quantities. ICRC have distributed 1 000 mts and WFP over 600. The international NGO presence is very visible and assistance is increasing. The situation in Kibuye is not as positive, though the needs are significantly less given the outflow of 30,000 - 50,000 displaced to Giterama two weeks ago.

Consequently, the people are fleeing the eastern portions of the "French Humanitarian Zone" for reasons of fear of the RPF (aka RPA), and not as a result of humanitarian need.

The international community is faced with the challenge of implementing an emergency preparedness plan in Zaire, without provoking a massive movement west.

The projected situation in Bukavu resulting from a massive movement of displaced/refugees is apocalyptic. In comparison to Goma, in Bukavu:

- no international airport exists (Bukavu and Cyangugu airport could only be utilised over a two week period before being permanently out of commission)
- road infrastructure is extremely poor, and will worsen with the coming rains
- possible refugee sites are located further away from the point of entry (at least 20-30 Kms), and would take far longer to prepare than in Goma (two to three weeks in Goma)
- the people will arrive in a far weaker state having walked six days through an almost impenetrable forest with limited scavenging potential
- local authorities are even less enthusiastic than in Goma to host Rwandan guests

The conclusion of a UNREO chaired meeting between military contingent commanders, UN agencies and NGOs was that the cost of effective preparatory measures in Bukavu would be prohibitive.

II. Proposed Strategy

Based on the assumption that arrivals of refugees into Bukavu has to be considered a "failure" of the preventive/preparatory approach, the following phased strategy is proposed:

Phase 1 Containment

- a. Concentrate relief assistance in the Prefectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro, supporting ongoing political efforts
- b. Utilise the forest, a funnelling point, to our advantage (point for for disseminating information)

Phase 2 Positioning

Establish camps in the Cyangugu Prefecture. Massive inflow of humanitarian assistance

Phase 3 Disaster

Free-for-all in Zaire. Encourage people to go to camp structure in Cyangugu Prefecture

The implementation of the phases is obviously dependent on the magnitude of the moves west.

III. Immediate Humanitarian Actions

1. Encourage NGOs to focus on Phase 1 at least until 20 August:
 - increase NGO/UN coverage of Kibuye Prefecture
 - commence Phase 1 operations in Cyangugu in support of "political efforts" (18 August)
2. Monitor success of dialogue sessions between RPA and local authorities, and movements of displaced
3. Review possibility of utilising entry point into the forest as an area where political messages can be transmitted
4. Set up radio transmission for the zone (mobil transmitter)
5. Prioritise inflow of relief supplies in country (medical, water equipment)
6. Prepare plan to assist people crossing the forest (Phase 2)
7. Identify sites in the Gishoma portion of Cyangugu Prefecture, and finalise plan of action for Phase 2 (16 August)
8. Raise awareness over fate of Nyarushishi camp

15 August 1994

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE

I. In preparing Phase 2 a number of assumptions have had to be accepted/understood:

1. a movement into Bukavu will result in certain death for a significant portion of the population. The cost of setting up the necessary infrastructure to address the needs of a large influx of refugees would be prohibitive. An international response to a major influx once it occurs would be of limited effectiveness given the unavailability of land to settle people, the extremely poor road infrastructure to Bukavu and within the area, the absence of an adequate airfield ... Existing constraints are such that, to date UNHCR has been unable to settle the 100,000 refugees entering Bukavu and seeking UNHCR assistance

2. the populations are moving towards Zaire out of fear of the RPA, or more specifically the unknown linked to the RPA advance. The people are not fleeing an advancing army, nor are they necessarily responding wholeheartedly to ex-RGF instructions. People do not seem to be moving because of humanitarian need. Various rapid surveys effected by NGOs would seem to indicate that the people do not really want to move to Zaire

Given these assumptions it is felt that any plan should attempt to capitalise on the peoples hesitancy to move into Zaire and accept the fact that providing assistance into Bukavu is impossible. Consequently, the approach developed focuses on the establishment of camps in the southern portion (around Gishoma) of the Cyangugu Prefecture. This area offers the advantages of being:

- logistically accessible
- capable of absorbing large numbers of people
- the furthest point from an RPF advance, and fairly easily identifiable/defendable as a potential safe zone
- close to the Zairian border at a point capable of receiving a greater caseload of refugees (Ruzizi Plains)

Were a massive movement of people to be confirmed and the situation to become catastrophic, the setting up of camps in this area by the humanitarian actors would offer the international community with a strategy/approach with which to address the situation: safe zones. An influx into Bukavu would offer no opportunity for effective international response.

II. In considering the implications of a massive movement of displaced towards Zaire, the fate of the Tutsi inhabitants of the Nyarushishi camp must be given high priority. Some 12 700 people are under French protection in an area fifteen kilometres east of Cyangugu, along the Cyangugu-Gikongoro road. It is essential that in the transfer of authority from the French to UNAMIR the safety of these people not be neglected. The disappearance of this group would probably irreparably damage relations between the international community and the RPA.

Field Offices

Field Office 1, Cyangugu

Field Coordination Officer:	Jacques Bandelier
Information Officer:	Erik Arnsted
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

Field Office 2, Gikongoro

Field Coordination Officer:	Trevor Feeney
Information Officer:	Jette Isaksen
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

Field Office 3, Butare

Field Coordination Officer:	Benedicte Glaver
Information Officer:	Nils Bjorn Larsen
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

Field Office 4, Gisenyi

Field Coordination Officer:	vacant
Information Officer:	vacant
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

Field Office 5, Byumba

Field Coordination Officer:	vacant
Information Officer:	vacant
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

Field Office 6, Kibuye

Field Coordination Officer:	vacant
Information Officer:	Elisabeth Stanic
Logistics Assistance:	vacant
Communications Operator:	vacant

The Field Coordination Officer is the head of the field office and should be a direct employee of UNREO. 10 of the other field posts are expected to be filled by UNVs based on posts requested by UNV on behalf of UNREO in the consolidated appeals.

Staffing

Management

Humanitarian Coordinator	Arturo Hein
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator	Charles Petrie
Coordination Manager	Mark Froehart? ¹
Secretary x 2	vacant

Information Cell (4+0+1)

Info Collection/Analysis	Info Officer	Emery Brusset
Meetings/NGO Liaison	Info Officer	Anita Menghetti
Media	Press Officer	Sybella Wilkes ²
Reporting	Info Officer	Gerard Leclaire ³
	Secretary	vacant

Operations Cell (3+1)

Operations Planning	Operations Officer	Gromo?
Operations Monitoring	Operations Officer	vacant
Operations Tracking	Ops Systems Officer	Steve Falces
Tracking and display	Operations Assistant	vacant

Logistics Cell (2+1)

Logistics Support	Logistics Officer	Buddy Tillet ⁴
Resource Monitoring	Logistics Officer	Deborah Owens
Airport Liaison	Logistics Assistant	vacant

Administrative Unit (1+1)

Admin. Officer	vacant
Admin. Assistant	vacant

Support Unit (13+2+1)

Chief	SST
Communications Officer (Deputy Chief)	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	vacant
Support staff x 7	SST
Assistants x 2	SST
Secretaries x 1	SST

¹ seconded by OFDA, arriving coming week (22 - 28/8)


² leaving for one week's leave

³ arriving 21/8 replacing David Harshbarger

⁴ in Nairobi

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE

ORGANIZATION



SST Swedish Support Team
F.O Field Office

United Nations
Development Programme

UNAMIR

MKF 542

94 JUN 21 12 45



World Development

FACSIMILE

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE

TO: General DALLAIRE, UNAMIR PC
001 1 212 963 3090
PLEASE CC UNR E O Advance Humanitarian Team, Kigali

UNR E O Kabale
(cc UNOMUR)
0486 238 16

Ms Deborah SAIDY, DHA - Geneva
001 41 22 788 6389

Mr Ahmadou LY, UNDP - NY
(cc Security Coordinator)
00 1 1 212 906 5830

Mr Kaz KURODA, DHA - NY
000 1 212 963 1312

Ms Jocelline BAZILE PINLEY, UNDP Bujumbura
000 257 225 850

Mr Toon WISSERS, UNDP Dar es Salaam
051 46 718

Mr Tedla TESHOME, UNDP Kampala
041 244 801, or c/o WFP 041 250 485

Mr Andrew SOKIRI, UNHCR Geneva
(Please copy to Fernando Del Mundo ext. 8486)
000 41 22 739 8440

Save the Children Fund UK
000 44 71 793 7610

Medecins Sans Frontieres, Nairobi
71 46 40

Medecins du Monde, Nairobi
56 80 14

FROM: Arturo HEIN, UNDP Resident Representative, UN
Humanitarian Coordinator

DATE: 21.06.1994

SUBJECT: SITHED # 30

UN Gigiri fax: 254 2 622 084

H. (EDIR) 11/11/94

ARTURO HEIN, RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN KENYA

UNDP KENYA, P.O. Box 2500, Nairobi Kenya 101 22. Tel: 254 21 250 000, Fax: 254 21 250 000. E-mail: UNDP@KENYA.KE

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA
(UNREO)

c/o UNEP
Conference West, Room 202
P.O. Box 30552
Nairobi, Kenya

Tel.: (254-2) 62-2492
Fax.: (254-2) 62-2084
Nairobi, Kenya

Tuesday 21 JUNE
SITUATION REPORT # 30

UN/NGO Advanced Humanitarian Team in Kigali reported that there was heavy shelling in Nyamirambo yesterday. There was also shelling around the Hotel Mille Collines and Meridien Hotel. Access remains difficult to downtown areas of Kigali for humanitarian teams. Critical needs in Kigali are medical supplies, especially dressings and blood for the ICRC hospital.

CORRECTION (Sitrep 29): Yesterday 240 persons were transported from King Faisal Hospital and from Sainte Famille. About 240 people went to the RGF side and 240 people went to the RPF side.

UNAMIR reported that the RGF has sustained heavy casualties and lost ground to the RPF in Kigali and in the south west. The RPF continued to reinforce its troops and bring military supplies to Kigali. The advance of the RPF towards Butare and Kibuye continued. Fighting occurred on the outskirts of Butare and in and around Ruhengeri.

The UN/NGO assessments of the RPF held areas have been postponed after the RPF withdrew support. This is going to seriously affect the consolidated appeal.

Radio Mille Collines, has been broadcasting messages that militias should not attack "innocent people" but should fight against the RPF.

UNAMIR reported that a French soldier was shot dead by Gendarmes in Bujumbura on 17 June when he tried to enter a public building. He was asking for help after a quarrel between nine French military and a group of young men at Hotel Source du Nil in Bujumbura. Another Frenchman was badly injured. On 19 June tension increased in Burundi.

UNICEF reported that 2,563 women and children have been vaccinated between 11-19 June in Kigali. 1412 cartons of WFP biscuits were distributed by the UN/NGO AHT in Kigali. A UNICEF unaccompanied and traumatized child specialist travelled to Bujumbura today. She will begin an assessment of displaced Burundian children.

Following the problems in Ngara, Tanzania, the Tanzanian government has agreed to increase the number of police in Benaco camp to 300. Logistics problems (fueling, vehicles, communication equipment) are an issue. UNREO met with the leaders of Benaco camp. They apologized for

the problems of the last week and promised that international staff would be safe in the camp. It is proposed that Mr Gatele and his commune should be moved to a site 2-300 km from the Rwandan border. MSF (France, Spain and Holland), IRC, AEF, OXFAM and AICF are still not returning to work in the camp.

ICRC delivered 217 tonnes of food to 12,000 persons at Butare and 80 tonnes of food to 17,000 persons at Rwamagana. On 19 June, about 400 citizens of Zaire were evacuated by the RGV to Goma (Zaire) from Kigali.

For information contact:
Wilkes/ Brusset
Information Cell
Tel: 622492

MKF 966

FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

94 JUL 21 10 03

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE

(UNREO)

TO:

Mr Peter HANSEN, DHA New York
000 1212 963 1312
General DALLAIRE, UNAMIR FC
001 1 212 963 3090
UNREO Advance Humanitarian Team, Kigali
000 581 49228 3430
UNREO Kabale
(cc Col. Asram Haque, UNOMUR)
0486 238 16
UNREO Bujumbura
257 214568
UNREO Goma
000 873 175 4535
Ms Deborah SAIDY, DHA - Geneva
001 41 22 788 6389
Mr Ahmadou LY, UNDP - NY
00 1 1 212 906 5830
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71 46 40
Medecins du Monde, Nairobi
56 80 14
Mr J. PEREZ DE VEGA, FAO Rome
000 396 522 54385
Daryl SEXTON, ECHO Bujumbura
257 224612
Mark MULLAN, ECHO Dar es Salaam
051 46724

FROM:

Arturo HEIN, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda

DATE:

July 20, 1994

SUBJECT:

SITREP # 50

UN Giciri fax: 254 2 622 084

FC (EDIR) UNREO

1/7

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
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July 20, 1994
SITUATION REPORT # 30

GENERAL

The RPF has taken Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kibuye and are reported 7 km south-west of Gikongoro. The RPF declared a ceasefire and named a new Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) which was inaugurated in Kigali on July 19. Approximately 1 million people have fled to Goma (Zaire) in the last week, following the RPF advance to Gisenyi. The RPF has closed the border from Gisenyi to Goma and no more Rwandans are now crossing at this border point (although some are still crossing through some footpaths). UNREO Goma reported that the Zairean side of Gisenyi has been devastated by the fighting and the large numbers of people passing through the area. According to UNHCR Bukavu a further 100,000 people have fled to Bukavu and Uvira. Approximately 50,000 Rwandans have crossed into Burundi in the last week.

The Rwandan army crossed the border into Zaire with their arms and equipment and are now staying in the town stadium, having been partially disarming. Radio Mille Collines is broadcasting statements which are hostile to the international community from the south-west of Rwanda (probably linked to perceived disinterest of the international community for the Interim government).

Inside Rwanda the emergency operations will concentrate on the south-western region and the estimated 600,000 displaced, which will have to be accessed from Burundi. A group of NGOs is emerging which plans to focus assistance to the eastern portion of the protected zone, Gikongoro. It is important to incite the displaced to remain that side of the Nyungwe forest, as movement through this natural barrier could reduce the desire for a prompt return to the home areas.

The humanitarian agencies (WFP and MSF in particular) are calling the attention of the international community to the potential disaster facing some 600,000 internally displaced in the Gikongoro region.

The RPF has tightened security in Kigali with the inauguration of the new government. Kigali has remained calm, with an estimated 50,000 people, and the RPF is maintaining its checkpoints. Only one checkpoint now remains on the road from Gatuna to Kigali, however, at the Byumba cross-roads. Lootings of private uninhabited houses in Kigali are still going on. The city market has reopened. UNAMIR reported that 771 displaced persons were transported from Rutare to Kigali on 18 July.

2/1

There are 10,800 persons in Rutare awaiting transportation to Kigali. The number of casualties has reduced dramatically now, as reported by the medical NGOs. There are only 2 displaced camps remaining: King Faisal (150 patients + 2-3,000 displaced persons) and Amohoro Stadium (2-3,000 displaced persons).

Around 7,000 people have returned to Rwanda from Uganda.

RELIEF COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

The 'Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda' was discussed on 19 July at a donor meeting in Nairobi, chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator Mr Hein. Copies of the last draft of the Appeal were circulated, and agencies made a short presentation and answered donor questions. Mr Shaharyar Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General, made a special declaration on the political situation, before boarding the plane to Kigali, where the inauguration of the new government took place today. The meeting had a very positive tone, due to the high degree of donor interest and the intimate coordination of the agencies. The Appeal is to be launched on Friday 22 July by Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, and will be followed by a visit of Mr Peter Hansen, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs to the region.

During the donor meeting in Nairobi WFP explained that it would be changing the focus of its programmes inside Rwanda from emergency deliveries to food for work and food for seeds programmes. The ICRC explained that it is shifting its priorities from war surgery to protection and family tracing. The agreement on the distribution of responsibilities for food with WFP will be reexamined. ICRC will continue distributions until self-sufficiency is attained.

The following schedule of coordination meetings was agreed on in Kigali:
Mondays: water and sanitation
Tuesdays: general meeting
Wednesdays: food distribution
Thursdays: health, nutrition and logistics
Friday: general

The new government authorities have been invited to participate in the meetings. These meetings will be held in the UNDP office meeting room at 17:00.

The UN agencies have moved into the UNDP office prior to establishing new offices, in the case of UNICEF (in the old World Bank office), or its previous ones (WHO and WFP). NGOs have started occupying nearby buildings.

The following donor organisations have also visited Kigali this week: USAID, Austrian Cooperation, and Swiss Disaster Relief.

LOGISTICS AND ACCESS

Kigali

Two UNAMIR flights are scheduled to Kigali per day. UN agencies and NGOs are encouraged to send relief supplies on these flights, which are

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often not used to their full capacity (which could lead UNAMIR to cancel flights).

WFP has received 4 trucks from Kampala, loaded with UNIMIX, maize, spare parts and diesel (50MT).

UNREO Kabale reported that the RPF plans to set up a liaison office in Kigali for NGOs. A growing number of NGOs have expressed interest in moving to Kigali, but many have still not received a blanket clearance from the new government to do so.

South West Rwanda

In the Gikongoro area WFP delivered 65MT of food on 13 July, and a further 140MT on 16 July. CRS plans to send 200MT per week to the area, and ICRC will continue providing 250MT per week. MSF International will be sending a team of 11 expatriates in the area to carry out medical programmes, vaccinations, supplementary feeding and sanitation. Merlin (mobile medical teams), Care (food distribution), and AICF (nutrition and sanitation), are also active. A food coordination meeting took place in Gikongoro on 18 July and sectoral meetings will take place in the next few days.

Zaire

The large numbers of people who have crossed into Zaire in the last week has caused a major humanitarian crisis. Although a certain amount of stockpiling has taken place, it is insufficient for the 1,500,000 Rwandan refugees now in Zaire. UNHCR Goma estimates that at least 20 million litres of water are needed per day in an area where water is scarce. At least 600 metric tonnes of food are needed per day for the 1 million refugees in Goma.

UNHCR estimates that the airlift operation can only provide 10 % of the needs of the refugee population in Goma. There is no ground support equipment for the downloading of planes and everything is downloaded by hand. UNHCR and WFP are currently establishing a food and logistics chain for Goma.

UNHCR Goma has identified three sites for refugees: Katale, 58 km north of Goma, which can support 300,000 people; Kibumba, 28 km north of Goma which already has between 2-300,000 people; Saka, newly identified by the Zairean authorities, which can support 500,000 people.

The US Geological Service has warned that a geological survey of the Lake Kivu area which was done in 1987-88 revealed that there are areas of carbon dioxide concentration (which are a hazard for anyone digging in the area). The possibility of sudden lava flows should also be taken into account.

The agencies have set up close cooperation structures in Goma (ICRC, UNHCR, UNREO, UNICEF, Oxfam, WHO, IOM). Daily coordination meetings have been established. WFP is sending a team of 7 persons to Goma, and IOM has reinforced its 10 person international team.

ODA has donated 100 metric tonnes of cargo and 11 vehicles to the operation in Goma. Two people from OFDA Kinshasa have been relocated to Goma. The USAID Administrator, Brian Attwood, has visited Goma,

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having been drawn away from a visit to Palestine, as well as Ms Borton, director of OFDA. Two ECHO staff members and one from the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau are also in Goma.

WFP is starting a major airlift from Mombasa to Goma to bring in urgently needed food supplies. An aircraft (Ilyushin 76) has been identified to do two rotations per day, provided landing permissions are granted at the congested Goma airport. A total of 6,500 MT of food will be sent. A UNHCR convoy from Bujumbura to Goma (ETA 19 July) is also bringing 18mt of CSB, and 2mt vegetable oil from Burundi food stocks.

ICRC reported that 500MT of food is being sent from Kampala to Goma.

IOM is considering reinforcing its staff in Goma. IOM is transporting people to the camps. They are also trucking fresh water to the camps. A UNHCR Emergency Team is going to Goma today. Concern is sending 7 international staff to Goma who will deal with health, water and logistics.

ASSESSMENTS AND REHABILITATION.

The comprehensive assessment which is due to start from Kigali next week will take a particular look at rehabilitation in the RPF controlled areas, such as the supply of water, which is at present the foremost problem in Kigali. Precise operational objectives will be elaborated as a result of this assessment. There is a possibility that the assessment be delayed due to the reorganisation of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Development. All information on this can be obtained from UNREO in Nairobi or Kigali.

UNICEF has made an agreement with the RPF to provide assistance to rehabilitate the Kigali urban water system. They are also planning to set up a food security system in which non-food items are exchanged for newly harvested crops. This is to encourage the rapid harvesting of crops.

HEALTH

MSF reported that their operations are continuing in Kigali, Byumba and Bugesera. They are beginning operations in south-western Rwanda in Kaduha camp, Rukondo and Cyanika. MSF is continuing operations in Goma. Contingency planning for 400,000 people took place in Goma in the last few months. UNREO wishes to encourage donors to support the NGOs operating ex-Burundi into the south-west of Rwanda to prevent problems and further displacements in that region.

UNICEF reported that 200 complete emergency health kits, 200 cartons of ORS, 400 packs of retinol, 60 rolls of cotton wool, 40 vaccine cold boxes, 100 vaccine carriers, 1,000 ice-packs, 20 field tents and 72 family size tents arrived on 17 July from Copenhagen in Goma. A second plane of tents, cooking sets and syringes is scheduled for 20 July. 40-60 tonnes of emergency supplies which have been prepositioned in Bujumbura will leave later this week. In Kabale a UNICEF coordinated training for psycho-social treatment of traumatized children took place on 17-18 July. Three UNICEF-USAID teams are currently doing assessment missions from Kabale, Bujumbura and Ngara regarding unaccompanied children. Teams will regroup in Nairobi on 21 July.

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A press conference was held by UNICEF experts on unaccompanied and traumatized children on 19 July. The agency said that there are over 100,000 unaccompanied children in Rwanda. Assessment missions have already taken place in Ngara, Kigali and northern Rwanda. An assessment in Cyangugu will begin tomorrow. Five pages of guidelines for responding to traumatised children have been produced by UNICEF. The experts stressed that trauma is an integral part of the emergency, and it is important that it is dealt with from the beginning. In cooperation with UNESCO, UNICEF is re-establishing education opportunities for primary-age children in the refugee camps. Education kits have been prepared. The kits include information for dealing with the psychosocial needs of traumatized children, using an approach which emphasizes interactive and cooperative learning.

UNICEF estimates that 20% of the refugee population in Goma are children. Initial estimates are that 130,000 of these are unaccompanied children, many in a very vulnerable state. Most are in a fair-good nutritional condition, with a few suffering from diarrhoea and sores. 120 unaccompanied children were transported by UNICEF to the Ndosho SOS village outside Goma. Donor support to Ndosho, which is intended to be a temporary measure, is a collaborative effort between UNICEF, ICRC and MSF. There are about 1,500 children in Ndosho and more children are arriving every day.

ICRC reported that the NGO INTERSOS is carrying out tracing of parents of unaccompanied children in Benaco and Mugano camp, Burundi.

WATER AND SANITATION

The Austrian Cooperation is proposing to support an ICRC/ MSF two phase programme to rehabilitate the water system in Kigali, and is considering placing an expert in the city.

WFP reported that there are high mortality rates in the Rusumo commune of Benaco Refugee Camp (Tanzania). Mortality is caused by diarrhoea, dysentery and dehydration. Poor sanitary conditions have been reported with an insufficient numbers of latrines, sources of clean water and refuse disposal.

OTHER

The Minister for Development in the Netherlands, Mr Pronk, has offered the UN community a Hercules to be used for the Rwanda Emergency for the next ten days. This Hercules has arrived in Uganda with medical supplies for MSF Holland in Northern Rwanda. The Canadian Air Force is also considering lending a C130 to the operations in Goma in the coming days. The German Air Force has lent a Boeing 707 to UNHCR for the same operation.

On 18 July the USAID Director, Mr Brian Attwood, said that the USA would give a further 31 million dollars to help Rwandan refugees. The European Union will give 180 million dollars over three months to help Rwandan refugees. European foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels, also pledged another 22.7 million Ecu from the community's emergency budget for humanitarian aid.

6/7

UNREO will add a financial tracking section to this situation report twice a month, and all operational partners are encouraged to report their contributions to DHA Geneva (Ms Hazbun, fax: 41 22 788 6389). This will allow an improved monitoring of the overall flow of resources and of the status of the operations.

7/7

MKF978



UNAMIR

94 JUL 22 09 25

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
(UNREO)

TO:

Mr Peter HANSEN, DHA New York
000 1212 963 1312
General DALLAIRE, UNAMIR FC
001 1 212 963 3090
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UNREO Kabale
(cc Col. Asram Haque, UNOMUR)
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UNREO Goma
000 873 175 4535
Ms Deborah SAIDY, DHA - Geneva
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Mr Ahmadou LY, UNDP - NY
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Mark MULLAN, ECHO Dar es Salaam
051 46724
Arturo HEIN, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda
July 21, 1994
SITREP # 51

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

UN Giciri fax: 254 2 622 084

FE (ECHO) UNREO

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
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July 21, 1994
SITUATION REPORT # 51

In Kigali, displaced persons continued to leave Amahoro Stadium for their homes. It is reported that the displaced settlements in the Byumba Prefecture (north of Kigali) are emptying, as people return home to the north or Kigali respectively. Some of the settlements are now reduced by 50%.

A delegation from the branch office of the International Civil Aviation Organization (UNDP project) has arrived in Kigali to report on the possibility of opening Kigali airport to international flights.

UNREO Goma reported that cholera has broken out amongst the Rwandan refugee population in the area. 111 people were confirmed to have died of cholera yesterday. Dehydration and dysentery appear to be increasingly common.

UNREO Bujumbura reported that a meeting was held in Gikongoro on 19 July:

- AICF will provide food and water to Kibeho camp (100,000 displaced). They will be supported by WFP.
- Kaduha and Musange camps (150,000 displaced) will be maintained by Care, who will distribute WFP supplied food.
- Equilibre is providing logistical support to all agencies working in the area.
- CRS/Caritas is providing 400MT of food per week to 150,000 displaced persons.
- only AICF and Care have identified sites for displaced persons.
- some agencies believe that the number of 900,000 displaced in this area is overestimated. However, the 'pipeline' figure of 560,000 is not sufficient. Storage facilities in Gikongoro are not a problem.
- weekly meetings will take place in Gikongoro.

On the same day UNREO Bujumbura chaired a meeting in Bujumbura:

- agencies were urged to start non-food relief in south-west Rwanda. UNICEF, OXFAM and MSF (B) all plan to do so in the near future.
- 15,000 people returned to Rwanda (French Safe Haven Zone) from Burundi.
- there are high mortality rates in some refugee camps in Burundi.
- Portugal is donating a Hercules plane to Operation Turquoise to be used for humanitarian purposes.

UNREO Bujumbura reported that UNHCR has only seen 30,000 refugees in Kamanyola, Zaire. The number of 400,000 is highly exaggerated.

WFP/UNICEF Bujumbura reported that there are no more than 100,000 people in Bukavu in Zaire. Most have come from Cyangugu. Approximately 800 people are returning to Rwanda from Burundi every day.

The Australian Government is making the following donations for the Rwanda Emergency: US\$550,000 to UNHCR, US\$190,000 to WFP (including communication equipment), US\$260,000 to ICRC, US\$220,000 to UNICEF, US\$74,000 to World Vision and US\$220,000 to Care.

For further information contact:
Brusset/Wilkes,
Information Cell,
Tel: 622492

NOTE

UNHCR Geneva is now responsible for the coordination of the airlift to Goma. Mr Neil Wright is the UNHCR coordinator for the airlift. Requests for flight clearance, slot times and information regarding humanitarian flights for the Burundi/Rwanda emergency should be addressed to the UNHCR Air Operations Cell. The following details should be sent to the UNHCR Air Operations Cell, with copies to the Airlift Coordinator and Special Unit for Burundi and Rwanda:

- aircraft operator/charter company
- flight number
- type of aircraft
- exact flight plan/itinerary, including destination/ intended consigner.
- ground assistance needs
- cargo details
- handling agent, including contact numbers.

Contact:

Neil Wright	Tel: 41 22 739 8658
	Fax: 41 22 739 8670
Air Operations Cell	Tel: 41 22 739 8754
	Fax: 41 22 739 8669

Hkf 2017

UNAMIR
94 JUL 26 13 44

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE

(UNREO)

TO:

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UNREO Kigali
000 581 49228 3430
UNREO Kabale
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Mr J. PEREZ DE VEGA, FAO Rome
000 396 522 54385
Daryl SEXTON, ECHO Bujumbura
257 224612
Mark MULLAN, ECHO Dar es Salaam
066 22507

FROM:

Arturo HEIN, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda

DATE:

July 26, 1994

SUBJECT:

SITREP # 53

UN Gigiri fax: 254 2 622 084

FC UNREO

14

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
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Nairobi, Kenya

July 26, 1994
SITUATION REPORT # 53

Rwanda

Kigali

- Mr Peter Hansen, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, met with government officials in Kigali today. An Inter-Agency mission has taken place to Gisenyi today and yesterday, another one is due to Gikongoro tomorrow, composed of members of Mr Hansen's mission.

- UNREO Kigali reported that a health meeting was held on 23 July with Dr Vincent Biruta, Minister of Health. NGOs will be informed this week as to where they will be able to work. Before the war there was one hospital and 6 dispensaries in Kigali. Only one dispensary has been badly damaged. The Government plans to open the King Faisal Hospital for public use (it was private before). Health meetings will be held every Friday at the UNDP office.

- UNREO Kigali reported that a general meeting was held on 25 July. It was held at the request of the Minister for Social Rehabilitation and Reintegration, Mr Bihozagara. The Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister for Health also attended. It was announced that it is no longer necessary to apply for security clearances or be accompanied by a guide when travelling around Rwanda. A special crisis committee to monitor the situation of the refugees in Zaire and displaced in southern Rwanda is being set up. Controls at the border south of Butare will be loosened.

- UNREO Kigali reported that UNAMIR want to strengthen the capacity of Kigali airport in order to receive humanitarian assistance for the displaced in Rwanda and the refugees in Zaire.

- Staff from Sabena Airline are currently in Kigali to assess the airport capacity. The Director of Hotel des Mille Collines, staff from the Meridien and the Belgian Director of "Magasins Generaux du Rwanda" are also expected in the near future.

✓ - Two public messages were broadcast on Radio Rwanda on 25 July. The first condemned looting and informed the population that they are not allowed to move into houses which are already occupied, unless they own the house. The second was an appeal to civil servants to return to work.

- There are still road checks within Kigali, but they are very relaxed. Ownership of vehicles is checked.

Southern Rwanda

- The security situation is affecting food deliveries to Gikongoro.

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- ICRC reported that there are approximately 300,000 people in the Kibuye area who are receiving no assistance. Some are manifesting a desire to return to the RPF controlled areas.

Gisenyi

- ICRC distributed food to 170,000 beneficiaries north of Kibumba.
- UNICEF will send medical supplies, UNIMIX and high energy biscuits to Gisenyi tomorrow.

Zaire

Goma

- The number of deaths continue to be alarming. MSF reported that up to 80,000 refugees could be afflicted with cholera.
- A water tanker service is being provided by MSF, the French military and UNICEF along the refugee routes as they walk northward to Katale and Rutshuru. OXFAM has been designated the lead agency for water for the time being.
- WFP reported that two mobile storage units have been airlifted to Goma. Three are due to arrive this week.
- ICRC reported that a water supply system has been established at 'Solferino' camp. IFRC has donated equipment to set up a surgical unit at Solferino.

Bukavu

- UNHCR estimates that there are approximately 312,000 Rwandan refugees in Bukavu and 100,000 in Uvira (this is in addition to the 90,000 Burundi refugees). These figures have been agreed upon with WFP as planning figures.
- WFP delivered 30 MT food to Bukavu and 60 MT to Kamanyola from WFP Bujumbura on 19 July.

Tanzania

Ngara

- The registration of Rwandan refugees is now complete. The figures are:

Benaco camp	186,407
Lumasi camp	51,719
TOTAL	238,126

- Under 5 mortality rates for the week of 4-10 July was 5.64 per 10,000. This is increasing - only two weeks ago it was 3.75. Diarrhoea is the main cause of mortalities.
- The main concern in Benaco is the potential spread of dysentery. A UNICEF and MSF France supplementary feeding programme should start this week from 25 distribution points.
- WFP reported that refugees continue to arrive in Ngara and Karagwe at the rate of 1,500 and 2,000 per day respectively.

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Karagwe

- UNHCR plans to open a new site, Cyabilsa II, to accommodate an estimated 2,000 - 3,000 refugees who are crossing into Karagwe district per day. The continued influx of refugees is continuing to strain food, health and water systems.

Burundi

- WFP reported that the influx of 60,000 refugees from Rwanda over the past week from eastern Butare into Ngozi brought the total Rwandan refugee population in Burundi to over 200,000. There are an estimated 5,000 refugees arriving per day in the provinces of Ngozi, Muyinga and Kirundo. Refugees are arriving from territories controlled by the RPF, some of which (Kibungo and Bugesera) were taken months ago. There is mounting tension between military, civilians and refugees in the northern provinces of Burundi. More Rwandans are waiting to cross the border. Two new camps in Ngozi (Caprin, capacity 30,000 and Ruvumu, capacity 15,000) which were identified by UNHCR are already nearly full. New camps in Kirundo and Muyinga provinces are also reaching saturation levels.

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UNIA World Development



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DATE: 20.06.1994

SUBJECT: SITREP # 29

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FC EDU UNRAO

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Monday 20 JUNE
SITUATION REPORT # 29

CORRECTION: It was reported in sitrep 28 that one Uruguayan was killed and one Bangladeshi injured when they hit a land mine north of Kigali. In fact, the RPF fired a rocket propelled grenade at the marked UN vehicle those men were travelling in.

On Saturday 18 June approximately 800 people were evacuated to and from Hotel Mille Collines by UNAMIR. All 69 UN staff members and families were evacuated. Approximately 100 people decided to stay at Mille Collines. Today evacuations are taking place from Ste Famille church to King Faisal Hospital. 100 wounded children and civilians are being evacuated from the ICRC hospital to King Faisal Hospital.

On Sunday 19 June a Red Cross worker was killed and at least three other people were wounded when a mortar hit the ICRC hospital in Kigali. Another mortar hit the compound later, but nobody was injured.

The airport at Kigali remains closed. The RPF have placed rocks on the airstrip in order to stop the French army landing. The RPF has not given security guarantees that they will not fire at the airport.

UNAMIR reported that fighting in the Nyamirambo, Gikondo and Kychuru areas of Kigali is heavy. There is fighting in the general area of Butare as the RPF continues to move south west.

UNREG Kabale reported that MDM is planning to withdraw from Northern Rwanda. The RPF have been negative about the presence of French personnel in the areas they operate in.

A French convoy with 30T of food is stuck in Uganda awaiting RPF clearance to drive to Kigali.

WFP and UNHCR estimates that there are no more than 40,000 Burundi refugees in Rwanda.

The US is sending 50 APCs to Entebbe for UNAMIR.

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