

UNAMTE

MISCELLANEOUS

1 FEB -12 JUNE 1994

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL

ELFWD JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 166

FILE 5

ACC 1398/0283

File

UN RESTRICTED

TO : FC
FROM : CMO
DATE : 12 JUN 94

SUBJECT : VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION - MILOBS

1. The under listed MILOBS of Uruguay have applied for voluntary repatriation.
 - a. UNID 581 Capt Julio Micak
 - b. UNID 642 Capt Cesar Berterpeche Elgue
2. Attached please find individual request.
3. Recommended for your approval.

*These officers are currently
in Newcom*

Strace
I D TIKOCA
Col
CMO

*FC
I think any of the officers not willing
to stay in the mission should be
allowed to go home. if we keep them
they will be of no help.*

UN RESTRICTED

② CEO

1. As discussed today, 10/7/94, the

ensure that necessary UN RESTRICTED clearance by the French authorities is granted before we despatch the team.

3000.12(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MILOB RECCE TEAM PROCEEDING TO HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE IN THE SOUTH-WESTERN CORNER OF RWANDA

GENERAL

1. With the scaling down of hostilities in the South West of Rwanda and the RPF accepting the general line of the area presently occupied by the French troops, it has become necessary to despatch a team to the area to conduct an initial recce of the area prior to the deployment of MILOBs/Formed troops in anticipation of a take over from the French when their mandate expires.

AIM

2. The aim of this instruction is to outline and assign responsibilities for the smooth conduct of the recce mission by the team.

TASKS

3. MILOB GP HQ

- a. Detail a team of 5 MILOBs for the recce.
- b. Maj Raccine is appointed the team leader.
- c. Arrange clearance and movement of team leader from KAGITUMBA to KIGALI on his return journey on 14 July 1994.

4. CTO. Release 2 x 4 Runner vehicles to the team for their use for the period.

5. OPS BRANCH. Request you seek the necessary clearance from the RPF and the French Command in GOMA through the LOs in GOMA for the movement into the zone. Also arrange the airlift of the team leader by helicopter from GOMA to KAGITUMBA on 14 July 1994. Inform UNOMUR HQ about the movement of the Recce Team.

6. COMMS. Provide communication facilities (immersat phone) for use by the recce team. Team will ensure that they are in constant communication with Force HQ directly or with the liaison

(b) Your instr does not cover security of the recce party. I discussed with FC that French must provide security right from the recce as the situation at there is quite volatile.

(c) Issue attention and ensure you co-ord thoroughly with the French.

10/7 MDFC

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH
10 July 1994

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team in GOMA.

7. RECCE TEAM. The specific tasks of the recce team are as follows:

- a. Establish a patrol base in BUKAVU.
- b. Conduct liaison with the French local commander on the following:
 - (1) Update on the general situation.
 - (2) Deployment of French troops in area.
 - (3) Any RGF troop deployment in the area.
 - (4) Activities of both French and RGF troops in the area.
 - (5) Displaced persons camps and number of occupants in the area.
 - (6) Provision of security for the team while in the area.
- c. Recce possible areas of deployment of MILOB teams.
- d. Conduct recce of possible patrolling activities in the area.
- e. Make an assessment of the logistic requirements to maintain the team.
- f. Liaise with the civilian local authorities.
- g. Make contact with any NGOs operating in the area.
- h. Make an assessment of the Humanitarian situation and the needs/requirements in the sector.
- i. Arrange airlift of team leader with French from BUKAVU to GOMA on the 14 July 1994.

ACCOMMODATION/FEEDING

8. Team to carry adequate accommodation kit for a long stay. Feeding arrangements should also be made by the team.

POL

9. Vehicles must have enough fuel for the journey. Spare jerricans of fuel must also be carried. While in BUKAVU, local arrangement should be made with the French for refuelling until

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the log requirements are finalized.

REPORTS

10. Team will send SITREPs twice a day (0600 and 1800 hrs) either directly or through the Liaison Team in GOMA to Force HQ.

TIMINGS

11. Team departs KIGALI - 110800 July 1994.

12. Team leader returns to KIGALI - 14 July 1994.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
for Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ

Internal:

Action:

CAO' Office

CTO

CCO

C Log O

Maj Raccine (Team Leader) - 3 Copies.

Info:

SRSG

FC

DPC

C Plans

UNOMUR HQ - By Fax.

LIAISON TEAM (GOMA) - By Fax.

PPC - 2907

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

FROM : MILOB GP HQ
TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION

FILE : 6470.0
DATE : 27 JUN 94

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER AND
CHIEF OF STAFF OF RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES HELD AT HOTEL
DIPLOMAT - KIGALI ON 15 JUN 94

PRESENT:

Maj Gen	BIZIMUNGU AUGUSTIN	-	COS RGF
Col	RENZAHO THAREISSE	-	Prefect of KIGALI
Col	I D TIKOCA	-	CMO UNAMIR
Lt Col	MOIGNY P V	-	UNMO, Translator
Lt Col	MUSTAFIZUR R	-	UNMO
Lt Col	RWARAKABITE PAUL	-	Operations Officer, Gendarmerie HQ
Maj	CYIZA AUGUSTIN	-	Staff Officer to COS RGF
Mr	NYILINKWAYA CLAVER	-	Brurgmestre Kigali
Maj	AVOUKOU E		UNMO
Lt Col	GBORGLAH B K	-	UNMO, Secretary
Capt	MOHAMMED A SADIQ	-	UNMO, Joint Secretary

Seen
Hij
02/7
DSC

ITEM 1: PRE-CONFERENCE DIALOGUE

ACTION

1. The COS RGF arrived at 1525 hrs, several minutes before the Operations Officer Gendarmerie who also preceeded the Prefect of Kigali and the two others. While waiting for the others, the CMO proceeded to introduce himself and the UNMOs to the COS. A significant dialogue then ensued. A fairly accurate recording is as follows:

2. COS: Is the MILOBs GP still operating?

CMO: Yes. It is the organisation which has been carrying the transfer of civilians from the RPF side to the RGF side and vice versa. It is also providing Liaison Officers between UNAMIR and you as well as RPF.

COS: I hope you would not take Lt Col Moigny and his Liaison Team away from me. They should not sleep outside my territory for even one night.

CMO: Not at all. As a matter of fact, we are intending to move the MILOB HQ and re-locate it in your territory if you have no objection.

COS: That is a very welcome news. I have no objection at all. In fact I was beginning to think I am loosing touch with many observers.

CMO: Very many thanks for the compliments. It is necessary also that the population understand that we as UNMOs do not carry weapons. We therefore need a guarantee of our security to be provided by your security forces and the population at large.

COS: Well understood, but I am a bit sensitive about this request. It would be better if the Prefect of Kigali were here to respond directly to it. He is in charge of the local population.

3. Apparently worried about the lateness of the others, and that time was running out, the CMO remarked that it seemed that the Acting Force Commander was due to meet the COS at 1630 hrs. The COS answered in the affirmative. The dialogue continued as follows:

COS: I am informed that Mr Benard KOUCHNER is also coming here next tomorrow. The last time he was here, he had a lot of bad words to say about us.

There was no comment from CMO.

COS: Where is the FC now ?

CMO: Nairobi.

COS: The local news media has been accusing him of partiality.

CMO: We have heard of that too.

4. At this stage the Operations Officer representing the COS Gendarmerie arrived and the UNMOs were introduced to him. The dialogue continued.

CMO: I have known Col Bugesora Paul since the Arusha peace talks.

COS: Are you sure the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT can be applied now ?

CMO: Well, it is up to both forces, though some of its provisions seem to have been broken already.

CMO: There was some heavy firing from the RPF side this morning. Where was it targeted at ?

5. At this stage Col Renzaho Thareisse, the Prefect of Kigali arrived. The time was 1540 hrs. The formal meeting began.

ITEM 2: CMO'S OPENING REMARKS AND STATEMENT OF AGENDA

6. Thanks. The CMO thanked the General and his colleagues for taking time off their busy schedules to honour his request for a meeting. He observed that in UN operations, VIPs of their status are normally met by high level UN Commands and their Staff. He was therefore most appreciative that they had accepted to meet the CMO and his officers.

7. Aims. The CMO outlined the aims of the meeting as follows.

a. To introduce himself and his command and staff in order to lay the foundations for closer working relationships.

b. To inform on the MILOBS redeployment plan.

c. To explain the expanded MILOBS mission.

d. To explain UNMO's methods of operation.

ITEM 3: REDEPLOYMENT PLANACTION

8. **Phase 1.** The CMO informed the meeting that phase 1 of the Security Council Resolution on the current Rwandan crises, which is redeployment of UNAMIR, was just beginning. He said, in this phase UNMOs roles will be those of liaison between both parties and assistance in humanitarian relief efforts in KIGALI, GITARAMA, KIBUNGO, BUTARE and BYUMBA prefectures. He gave the planned deployment of UNMOs as follows:

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------|---|----|
| a. | KIGALI Prefecture | - | 68 |
| b. | BYUMBA | - | 62 |
| c. | BUTARE | - | 16 |
| d. | GITARAMA | - | 16 |

9. **Phase 2.** The CMO added that when the new armed units arrive, more UNMOs will deploy with them in RUHENGERI, GISENYI and CYANGUGU areas. This would constitute Phase 2.

ITEM 4: MISSION

10. **Force Expanded Mandate.** The CMO said, in the expanded mandate of UNAMIR, a lot of emphasis will be placed on humanitarian tasks.

11. **UNMO Mission.** He continued that, the COS and his deputy, having worked in the past with NMOG, would be familiar with the roles of UNMOs. In the expanded mandate of the Force, UNMOs will be visiting Displaced Persons Camps to collect necessary data for the use of all Humanitarian Organisations. Other UNMO tasks will include liaison between the Government, RPF, UN, and Humanitarian Organisations, as well as general observation of matters of relevance to the enhancement of the peace process.

ITEM 5: UNMO's SECURITY, CHARACTERISTICS

12. **Unarmed Neutral Negotiators.** The CMO re-emphasised that though in military uniforms, UNMOs carry no weapons whatsoever. He also emphasised that UNAMIR is a mixed peacekeeping organisation with the major components being armed troops; but, that UNMOs are not integral to the armed units. They are completely independent of them and are as well a neutral entity. UNMOs do not depend on the armed units for security. Instead, he said, UNMOs depend on the local authorities and population on both sides for their security. He therefore asked for assurances of this security.

He explained that the reason for this characteristic of UNMOs is that, whenever there is a confrontation between the armed units of UN and the local forces, authorities or population (which is possible) it is UNMOs who intervene and negotiate for peaceful resolution.

13. Travelling Unescorted. Continuing, the CMO informed the VIPs that UNMOs usually travel in pairs or very small groups and are never escorted by the armed troops of the peacekeeping force. They endeavour to be friendly to all and rely on the good faith of the local population as guarantee for their security where ever they go. He requested with all sincerity that the Rwandese population be educated on these facts and be asked to cooperate with UNMOs to carry out their mandate with ease, especially with regard to deployment and freedom of movement.

ITEM 6: RE-LOCATION OF MILOB HQ

14 Finally, the CMO expressed the wish to move MILOB HQ from HOTEL AMAHORO to HOTEL MILLE COLLINES, if it so pleased the COS.

15. The CMO thanked the VIPs once again for finding time to give him audience.

ITEM 7: COS'S RESPONSE

16 Thanks. The COS RGF thanked the CMO for his briefing and proceeded to raise some concerns and accusations.

a. Differentiation UNMOs/Armed Troops. He wanted to know how one could differentiate between the UNMOs and the Armed troops

b. Timings For Re-deployment. He wanted to know when the re-deployment will take place.

c. Fears of the Local Population. The COS said he understood the need for security guarantees from the population. But, he said, the local population have some fears about neutrality of UNAMIR, which adversely affect their confidence in the force. He gave examples:

(1) Kirambo Killings. The people were sure that those killings were done by RPF. But in its findings, UNAMIR said that it was not sure who was responsible.

(2) Belgian Assistance to RPF. According to the COS, the Belgian Battalion of UNAMIR assisted the RPF to gain some strategic positions before the war began, and also assisted them with war-like materials.

d. The COS said he could go on giving more examples but he had better stopped and consider them as matters of the past, in the hope that UNAMIR would operate more fairly in its new mission.

e. New Mission Document. The COS expressed the need for UNAMIR to spell out its new mission in writing to the Ministry of Defence with a copy to the Ministry of Interior. He said the document should also spell out the external differentiating features between the UNMOs and the Armed Units. He said if this become known to the population, UNMOs would have no cause to worry about their security. He re-emphasised the need to know when the UNMOs will deploy, so that the population would be informed in time.

CMO

f. Re-location of MILOBs HQ. The COS also said he had no objection to the re-location of MILOBs HQ in his territory. On the contrary, he said, he was rather happy about that prospect and was looking forward to it. He ended there.

SLOGO

ITEM 8: PREFECT'S RESPONSE.

17. Mutual Confidence. The PREFECT of KIGALI said he supported the concerns and questions raised by the COS. He said it was necessary the views of the Rwandese population be made known to UNAMIR. He said there has been a lack of confidence due to past events. For example, he said, the Belgian troops showed no respect to the population and used to harass them from outside, right into their houses. He said it was not necessary to recount all such incidents, but suffice it to add, he said, that in the past the Belgian troops used to carry RPF personnel on UN vehicles.

18. The Prefect said the local population were now doubting whether these displays of partiality would not be repeated in the future. In conclusion, he emphasised that in order to regain the confidence of the population, UNAMIR must demonstrate transparent neutrality.

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ACTION

ITEM 9: RESPONSE OF GENDARMERIE REPRESENTATIVE

19. Cease-fire. To wind up their presentation, the representative of the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff Lt Col Rwarakabite added that the only good gift UNAMIR could give the Rwandese population was to bring the war to an end.

ITEM 10: CMO'S CLOSING REMARKS

20. It was now 1627 hrs and the DFC UNAMIR had just arrived for his appointment with the COS RGF. So the latter allowed the CMO three minutes to wind up.

21. External Distinguishing Features. The CMO announced that:

a. All UNMO vehicles will carry bold stickers marked "UNMO" on the front and rear wind screens henceforth.

b. On the arrival of new supplies in the near future, all UNMO vehicles will fly the blue UN flag. A few were already flying them, he noted.

22. Timings for Deployment. The CMO promised to furnish the authorities with the re-deployment date as soon as the decision is made.

23. Mission Statement. The CMO said he will endeavour to furnish them with explanatory notes on MILOBs new missions.

24. Other Concerns. He also said he would convey all their expressed fears and concerns to his superiors.

25. UNMO Contributing Countries. The CMO finally named the sixteen countries which are contributing officers to UNAMIR's MILOBs organisation.

26. Thanks. The CMO thanked the COS and his team once again and the meeting came to an end at 1630 hrs.



B K GBORGLAH
LT COL
SECRETARY

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Distribution:

Action: CMO
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Info: FC
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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE HUMANITAIRE POUR RWANDA

UNAMIR - KIGALI

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

MILOB GP HQ

TO : PHQ

Date: 12 Jun 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE SHOOTING INCIDENCE AT NYAMIRAMBO ON 8 JUN 94

1. On 8 June 1994 at 1230hrs, a MILOB team was tasked to escort Officials of Pharmaciennes Sans Frontieres and one journalist to one of the suburbs of KIGALI. The first place the team visited was a Church at NYAMIRAMBO. From there they went to a school where there were a lot of women and children refugees. The team reported that at the school, a group of about 18 armed militia men suddenly arrived, blocked the way and started shouting "No UNAMIR here, no white people, no assistance for these people (father and Tutsis). Later, all UNAMIR personnel came out of the school to talk with the militia. Suddenly, three armed men broke windows, entered the school and opened fire inside while some of them outside were shooting into the air.

2. During the shoot-out, the journalist got wounded and was evacuated to the Red Cross Hospital. On their return from the hospital, the militia blocked the way. The team sought the assistance of RGF troops who escorted them back to UNAMIR HQ.

B K GEORGLAH
Lt Col
A/SOO

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Name is endorsed now.

①
DFC

②

COO

which name are
you referring to?

[Signature]
13/6

[Signature]
13/6
DFC

UNAMIR
94 JUN 12 09 26



UNAMIR

CRN-207

P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI *J. Didi*
DATE: 12 JUN 1994
NUMBER: MIR-1155
SUBJECT: UNOMUR DRAFT SECOND PROGRESS

ONLY COMMENT CONCERNS TIMING OF PHASE OUT OF UNOMUR OPERATIONS DISCUSSED AT PARA 14, PAGE 6 OF SUBJECT DOCUMENT. THOUGH WE AGREE WITH A SLOW PHASING OUT WE ARE A LITTLE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH FIXED DATE OF 21 SEPTEMBER AS THE ACTUAL DATE SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE TIMING OF A CEASEFIRE. THERE WILL BE A NEED TO KEEP THE FORCE IN PLACE UNTIL AFTER A CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND TO PHASE IT OUT AFTERWARDS. TO THIS END, SOME FLEXIBILITY OF END DATE MAY BE REQUIRED.

BEST REGARDS.

*report
UNomur*

94 JUN 12 09 39

UNAMIR

(FC)

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CNR-31T PL/7

UNATIONS
INS

1994 JUN 11 A 10:51

UNAMIR

194 JUN 11 15 221

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: UNOMUR DRAFT SECOND PROGRESS
DATE 11 June 1994

1926

Attached copy of the subject report as submitted last night to the Secretary General. Should you have any comments, additions or corrections to make, please fax them to this office no later than Monday, 13 June, 9:00 am New York time.

Best regards.

①
FC
My only comment is not pg 6 w/ a close-down on 24 Sept 94 is indicated as opposed to 15 Oct 1994
Barril discussed with me.
12/6
DFC

317 2

DRAFT 10/6/94 (19:10)

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL
S/1994/xxx
xx June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR) for a period of six months from 22 December 1993 through 21 June 1994. This report covers the period since my last report to the Security Council on UNOMUR of 15 December 1993 (S/26878).

2. UNOMUR was established with the adoption of resolution 846 (1993) by the Security Council on 22 June 1993. The mission was mandated to deploy on the Ugandan side of the border with Rwanda in order to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda, focusing primarily in that regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material that could be of military use.

II. DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES

3. As of 3 June 1994, UNOMUR consisted of 81 military observers from the following countries: Bangladesh (20), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Hungary (4), Netherlands (10), Senegal (10), Slovakia (5) and Zimbabwe (10). In addition, the mission included 11 international civilian and 7 locally-recruited staff performing a

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variety of substantive and administrative support tasks.

4. The drastic change in the overall situation in Rwanda, sparked by the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a suspicious plane crash in Kigali on 6 April, and resulting in the resumption of hostilities in that country, affected not only the operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but also UNOMUR's monitoring operations on Uganda's border with Rwanda. Prior to the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda, UNOMUR had restricted its monitoring activities in Uganda along the area of the border with Rwanda, which was controlled by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). As pointed out in my report of 15 December (S/26878), UNOMUR's deployment and operational activities mainly covered two major and three secondary crossing sites stretching from Sabinio volcano in the west to Lubirizi in the east on the Ugandan side of the border (see attached map).

5. Following the resumption of the civil war in Rwanda, the RPF was able to gain control of the entire border with Uganda. It therefore became evident that in order for UNOMUR to fulfil its mandate, the mission would be required to extend its observation and monitoring activities along the whole border, up to Mirama Hills on the eastern part of the Ugandan side of the border, a distance of some 170 km from Sabinio Volcano to the West. Moreover, it was not possible for UNOMUR to investigate in a credible manner the increasing number of allegations being received that troops and support equipment were crossing the Ugandan border into Rwanda without monitoring the entire border. While UNOMUR's movements to the areas in the northeast and west beyond the mission's original area of operation were not restricted, attempts were made to restrict UNOMUR patrols eastward in the Mirama Hills area. After discussions between the UNOMUR Acting Chief Military Observer and the Ugandan military authorities in Kampala on 2 May, UNOMUR received clearance to

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monitor this area both by ground and air patrols. Accordingly, with effect from 14 May 1994, UNOMUR has been able to monitor the entire border between Uganda and Rwanda.

6. UNOMUR carries out its tasks essentially through patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observations as well as on-site investigations of suspected cross-border traffic. Since the resumption of the fighting in Rwanda, UNOMUR's surveillance activities have been especially vigorous and have enabled it to investigate to allegations of arms flows into Rwanda through its border with Uganda.

7. The recent extension of UNOMUR's monitoring activities to the whole border has necessitated the readjustment of tasks and the reassignment of military observers in the operational area. Consequently, the headquarters staff at Kabale has been reduced from 14 to 9 currently to permit the creation of additional monitoring teams, with the remaining headquarters personnel also participating, as appropriate, in patrolling and other monitoring assignments. To help meet the increased operational requirements, UNOMUR currently maintains seven observation posts and checkpoints manned on a 24 hour basis, as opposed to two previously.

8. In carrying out its monitoring mandate, UNOMUR is currently performing a number of specific tasks, including, inter alia:

(a) fixed 24 hour manned observation through the two main crossing sites at Katuna and Cyanika and the secondary crossing points at Bigaga, Lubirizi, Kafunzo, Kashekye and Mirama Hills;

(b) random day and night mobile patrols to cover routes or tracks which require surveillance;

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(c) random day and night foot patrols covering areas which also require surveillance but are inaccessible by mobile/vehicle patrols;

(d) random aerial day patrols involving the airlift by helicopters of military observers into areas of high elevation for a clearer view and observation of routes leading to the border; and,

(e) random aerial day surveillance by helicopter of the border areas and routes. Such surveillance is often conducted by mission commanders and staff to monitor movements along the border and routes leading to the border.

9. The arrival in the mission area of three helicopters in early April has strengthened UNOMUR's overall operational capacity. However, ground features and weather conditions do not permit safe operations of civilian contracted helicopters at night. Therefore, the helicopters are currently used primarily for daytime aerial surveillance, patrolling and reconnaissance. They are also used for emergency medical evacuation purposes, and for rapid deployment of military observers to selected, remote and difficult-to-reach observation posts to monitor suspected crossing sites by day or night.

10. I am glad to report that, in general, UNOMUR's activities in pursuance of its mandate have been effective. In my last report to the Council (S/26878), I noted that any clandestine cross-border traffic had decreased appreciably and that, at that time, movement was restricted and only along well-used routes across the border. I furthermore reported that there was no evidence of any significant traffic in armaments. Despite the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda, the situation of cross border traffic from Uganda into Rwanda does not appear to have changed during the reporting period, and no movement of armaments or armed personnel

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have been detected by UNOMUR.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

11. As indicated in my report on the financing of UNAMIR (A/48/837), the administrative costs related to the military observers and civilian personnel of UNOMUR, with effect from 22 December 1993, are included in the cost estimates for the maintenance of UNAMIR. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/248 of 5 April 1994, inter alia, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed \$9,082,600 gross per month for the period from 5 April to 31 October 1994, for the maintenance of both operations. Should the Council decide to continue the mandate of UNOMUR as recommended in paragraph 14 below, the resources required for its maintenance would be obtained from the level authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 48/248.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is now nearly a year since the Security Council decided to establish UNOMUR and almost ten months since the mission was fully deployed in its operational area. UNOMUR was intended to create an atmosphere conducive to a negotiated settlement of the Rwandese conflict and to underscore the importance that the international community attaches to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. This observer mission has continued to be a factor of stability in the area and has been particularly critical in recent months, as UNAMIR has sought to defuse tensions resulting from the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda.

13. As a result of the dramatically changed situation in Rwanda, both the priorities and requirements of the international community have evolved. It should be recalled, in this connection, that the Security Council, by its resolution 918

(1994) of 17 May, decided to expand the strength of UNAMIR to 5,500 all ranks to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of persons at risk in Rwanda and to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations. Under resolution 918 (1994), the Council, acting under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, also decided to place an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and related material to Rwanda. In addition, the Council established a Committee to liaise with Member States on the action taken by them to implement the embargo.

14. Under these circumstances, there appears to be little rationale for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. At the same time, however, the issue of arms flows is one of the major areas of concern in the ceasefire talks, which are being held under the auspices of UNAMIR. As UNOMUR's activities allow UNAMIR to address, at least to some degree, the issue of outside interference in the Rwandese civil war, I believe that UNOMUR should continue its monitoring activities until an effective ceasefire has been established. I therefore recommend that UNOMUR's mandate be renewed for a period of three months. During this period, the number of military observers would be reduced by phases, adjusting to operational requirements. UNOMUR would be closed down by 21 September. I would report the completion of this process to the Security Council.

15. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of Uganda for the co-operation and assistance it has extended to UNOMUR. I also wish to pay tribute to both the military and civilian personnel of UNOMUR for the professionalism and dedication with which they have carried out their tasks under very difficult conditions.

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

: SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM : MILOB GP HQ
(PERS BR)

DATE : 9 JUN 94

SUBJECT : POSTINGS - MILOB

1. CMO is pleased to appoint Lt Col Gborglah, Operations Officer RPF Sector, Mulindi as acting Senior Operations Officer, Milob Gp HQ wef date.
2. He will handover his former duties to his sucessor and take over his present appointment in the absence of Lt Col S Iliya who is to proceed on official liaison mission to Nairobi.
3. Regards.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION:
FHQ PERS SECTION

INFO:
FC
DFC
FHQ HUM SECTION
MILOB GP HQ, Ops Br
MILOB GP HQ, Log Br

*Seen
4/7/94
09/6
JFC*

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

: SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM : MILOB GP HQ
(PERS BR)

DATE : 9 JUN 94

SUBJECT : POSTINGS - MILOB

1. CMO is pleased to appoint Lt Col Gborglah, Operations Officer RPF Sector, Mulindi as acting Senior Operations Officer, Milob Gp HQ wef date.

2. He will handover his former duties to his sucessor and take over his present appointment in the absence of Lt Col S Iliya who is to proceed on official liaison mission to Nairobi.

3. Regards.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION:
FHQ PERS SECTION

INFO:
FC
DFC
FHQ HUM SECTION
MILOB GP HQ, Ops Br
MILOB GP HQ, Log Br

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TO : FC
FROM : CMO
DATE : 9 JUN 94


SUBJECT : VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION - MILOBS

1. The under listed MILOBS of Uruguay have applied for voluntary repatriation.
 - a. UNID 532 Maj Adison Linares
 - b. UNID 533 Capt Igancio Elgue
 - c. UNID 576 Capt Luis Pereira
2. Attached please find individual request.
3. Recommended for your approval.

CAO/CMO

I approve of this repatriation.
Initiate the necessary steps to get
them to their home country.

09/6
DFC/LOS


I D TIKOCA
Col
CMO

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAH

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ

FROM : MILOB GP HQ
(CRATER ANALYSIS TEAM)

Date: 5 Jun 94

SUBJECT: CRATER ANALYSIS REPORT- SHELLING OF KIGALI
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 05 JUNE 1994

GENERAL

1. At about 0900hrs a total of 3 shells landed on the tarmac and behind the Control Tower when a UN aircraft landed. The airport had been prone to similar threat for the past 5 days. The Crater Analysis Team was tasked to verify the source of the firing.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The Team was to confirm, among other things, the following:
- The type of projectile used.
 - The direction from which it was fired.
 - The type of weapon used.
 - Possible location of the hostile weapon.

METHOD OF VERIFICATION

3. The Team identified 2 craters out of the lot and conducted analysis on both craters and fragments as follows:

a. Crater 1

(1) Impacted on tarmac 5 metres to the runway (GR 152828).

(2) Bearing to hostile - 4760 mils magnetic.

Mag Variation - 245 mils East.

Grid Bearing to gun - 5005 mils Grid.

(3) Line of fire from gun to point of impact = 5005-3200
= 1805 mils

(4) Angle of Descent = 1600 mils

(5) Range was around 6.5 km.

(6) Projectile used = 106mm PD.

(7) Weapon used = 106mm Canon.

(8) Exhibit - fragment measured using template and fuse head.

(9) Possible location of hostile weapon - KIMIHURURA Presidential Guard Compound.

b. Crater 2

- (1) Point of impact was behind Control Tower (GR 145830)
- (2) Bearing to hostile = 4800 mils (Magnetic).
- MV of 245 mils East = 5045 mils Grid.
- (3) Line of fire = 5045 - 3200.
= 1845 mils Grid.
- (4) Angle of Descent = 1580 mils.
- (5) Range is around 6.4 km.
- (6) Loc of gun = KIMIHURURA area.
(Presidential Guard Compound).
- (7) Projectile used = 106 mm.
- (8) Weapon used = 106 mm Canon.
- (9) Exhibit - Fragment measured using template and fuse head.

FINDINGS AND OPINIONS

3. The outline facts stated under the various craters analyzed refers.

4. In summary, the team is of the following opinions:

a. The airport was shelled from the direction of Camp KIMIHURURA - Presidential Guard Compound and/or Central KIGALI.


b. The hostile weapon could be located at Camp KIMIHURURA, the angle of descent refers to the range around 6.5 km and above.

c. The airport was shelled deliberately upon the arrival of the aircraft, the accuracy, rate and interval of fire, refers.

d. The RGF are responsible for the shelling. They could be suspicious of the fact that, RPF, now controlling the area receive resupplies through the port. Their earlier allegation that 4 aircrafts landed at the airport, is a point to note.

CONCLUSION

5. In conclusion, the airport was deliberately shelled by the RGF from Camp KIMIHURURA - Presidential Guard Compound, following the arrival of the UN Aircraft.


MOHAMMED SADIQUE
Capt
Crater Analyst

1/6



United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

MKF300

OUTGOING FAX NO: 814
29 MAY 1994

TO: MGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI	FROM: COL ABRAB ACTING CMO UNOMUR, KABALE
FAX NO: 07-84285	FAX NO: 250 485-23810
SUBJECT: ILLEGAL DETENTION OF UNMQS	

REFERENCE:

A. OUR DAILY SITREP (FAX NO. 801) DATED 27 MAY 1994.

1. IN INVITING ATTENTION TO REFERENCE A, A LETTER OF PROTEST TO NRA IS ENCLOSED HEREWITH. ALTHOUGH THE NRA CLO HAS PERSONALLY REGRETTED FOR THE INCIDENT AND ASSURED OF ALL COOPERATION, YET, THIS IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR KIND INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ACTION AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE PLEASE.

2. BEST REGARDS.

① DR KABIA

I need your advice on this.

JG

31/5

DFC

②

MIA

This is finished with

JG

03/6

DFC

3
FC

I requested for an
advice from Dr Kabia.
Pse send his comments
at ②

JG

31/5

DFC

⑤
FE

I don't quite understand
the question word but
you have my name
I will tell you what I
thought in my mind.
JG

②
DFC

The letter of
protest is a copy of
for the moment since
Uganda has consented
opposed the investigation
of UNOMUR into the case
if at you haven't together
and submit the case papers.
Then, you submit the
then submit a memorial
31/5

814 2/6



United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

- UN RESTRICTED -

CMO/001/94

HQ UNOMUR
P.O. BOX 186
Kabale
Uganda
28 May 1994

TO: Colonel Peter Korum
Commander 2nd Division
NRA
Kibuye

INFO: Maj. Robert Zaky
Chief Liaison Officer
NRA, Kabale

ILLEGAL DETENTION OF UNOMUR BY NRA TROOPS

1. This is to bring to your kind notice that two of our United Nations Military Observer (UNMOs) while patrolling in area Busagana-Kabingi (HQ 8057. Also refer to sketch attached) at 280130 May 1994 were detained illegally at the NRA check point (CP) for over 3 hours. They were on a patrol coming from Kibuye and entering through the truck leading to the south (refer to sketch). The patrol was accompanied by one NRA soldier too. When asked by the UNMO's about the reasons, the NRA on duty at CP reported that they have instructions from the NRA Battalion Commander at Kibuye to detain the UNMOs. UNOMUR Office at Kibuye made numerous attempts (till 2345 hours) to contact the Battalion Commander NRA who was not available. The NRA soldier on duty also mentioned that the Battalion Commander will not be available until next morning and he has no authority to leave them.

2. The A/UNMO brought this matter to the notice of Maj Zaky, NRA, CLO who immediately intervened and the UNMOs were released from the CP at 270030 May 94.

- UN RESTRICTED -

- 1 -

814 3/6

UN RESTRICTED

3. Although Maj. Laky was called at this HQ by A/CMDR who regretted for the incident, yet, I would like to draw your kind attention to following:

- a. The patrol was escorted by one NRA member who also informed the NRA soldier at the CP that they (patrol) were coming from Kisoro side and not from Buhigwe.
- b. The area and route followed by the patrol is usually monitored by UNOMUR and was agreed upon during a meeting held between the Army Commander, NRA and A/CMDR during last March 1994.
- c. In inviting attention to Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article VI of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (copy/extracts enclosed), UNMOs enjoys immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage. In this regard attention is also invited to relevant clause of the status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) signed between UN and Ugandan Government.
- d. Such detention of UNOMUR members with no valid reason was an insult to UN and a clear violation of the privileges contained in para (3 c.) mentioned above.
- e. UNOMUR considers such action by the local Battalion Commander, a deliberate attempt to harass our UNMOs.
- f. Should there be any observation/complain against our UNMOs, it could always be referred to this HQ for necessary actions specifying name, time, place and incident.

4. In the light of foregoing and as instructed by my higher authorities may I humbly request you to please look into the whole matter and do the needful.

5. Best regards.

Enclosures: 2 pages



Chief Military Observer


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814 4/6
Page 6/6

ANNEX 'B'

----- Pitel Route
* Place of incident
* (NAR Check Point)

KI



814 5/6

XVII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF UNOMIL PERSONNEL

78. Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article VI of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (concerning experts on mission, which applies to UNMOs) reads as follows:

* Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. Representations of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their function in connection with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose."

* Article VIExperts on Mission for the United Nations

"Section 22". Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V) performing mission for the United Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise for their functions during the period of their missions including the time spent on journeys in connection with their missions. In particular they shall be accorded:

- a. Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage;
- b. In respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations;
- c. Inviolability for all papers and documents;
- d. For the purpose of their communication with the United Nations, the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags;

- e. The same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments on temporary official missions;
- f. The same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal baggage as are accorded diplomatic envoys.

Section 21. Privileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any case where, in his opinion, the immunity could impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the interest of the United Nations.

file 4/6

NYK PLS RELAY TKS

CUN 07



UNAMIR

18 MAY - 1 17 181

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

VIA NYK CNR 183

PAGE 1/2

CODE CABLE

OUTGOING FAX NO. 654
01 MAY 1994

@
D/C
cos
Localland
D
RC
2/5

TO: MAJ GEN R. DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI <i>MISC 585</i>	FROM: COL ASHAR ACTING CMO UNOMUR KABALE <i>[Signature]</i>
FAX NO: (07) 84266	FAX NO: 256 486-23816
SUBJECT: UNOMUR INFOJUM/19 PERIOD 25 APR TO 01 MAY 94	

1. THE SITUATION IN UNOMUR AREA IS STILL CALM.
2. NRA IS STILL IN A PERIOD OF MILITARY TRAINING. AT KISORO AREA, TROOPS FROM THE 25TH NRA BN WERE DEPLOYED AROUND THE BORDER AREA, MAINLY AROUND CYANIKA, WHERE THEY MADE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, DEPLOYED ADA GUNS AND ALSO A MBRL (TOWED); THE LOCATION OF THIS LAST WEAPON, NEAR BP#4 (SQ6951), RAISED A LOT OF EYE BROWS AS RPF HAS IT IN ITS MILITARY INVENTORY, AND AREA WEST WAS THEREFORE TASKED TO KEEP A 24 HOURS SURVEILLANCE OVER THAT WEAPON.
3. THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM AND TO RWANDA HAS INCREASED THIS LAST WEEK WITH CROSSINGS IN AND OUT IN A DAILY BASIS. THE ICRC HAS STARTED TO SUPPLY THE NEW REFUGEE CAMP IN KISORO, AND ALSO CHECKING THE NEEDS FOR THE NEW REFUGEE CAMP NEAR

CUN 07

654 PAGE 2/2

KAFUNZO (SQ4687). MR ERIC, FROM ICRC ALSO INFORMED THAT CONVOYS FROM RED CROSS SHALL START TO PASS THROUGH CYANIKA (AREA WEST) IN RELIEF MISSIONS TO RWANDA VERY SOON.

4. DURING THIS WEEK, MIO CONDUCTED AN INFORMATION RECCE WHICH HAS CONFIRMED, ON THE SPOT, THAT THE BRIDGE AT THE CROSSINGPOINT OF MERAMA HILLS/KAKITUMBA (SQ5183) IS OPENED AGAIN AND NOW UNDER RPF CONTROL. OUR MOBILE PATROLS SENT LATER TO THERE WERE HOWEVER STOPPED BY THE NRA FIVE KM BEFORE THE BRIDGE AND NOT ALLOWED TO GO FURTHER; THE FIRST PATROL, ON THE 25TH, SAW A WHITE TRUCK, UPJ394, THAT USES TO CROSS AT KATUNA FOR RPF SUPPLY. COMING EMPTY FROM RWANDA (KAKITUMBA). THE A/CMO MADE A FORMAL PROTEST TO THE SENIOR LIAISON OFFICER AND REMINDED HIM OF OUR RIGHT OF MOVEMENT TO THAT AREA AS IT IS LOCATED ON THE UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER. A/CMO ALSO COMPLAINED THAT THIS ATTITUDE IS SUSPICIOUS AND COULD MAKE ANYONE THINKS THAT NRA IS SUPPORTING THE RPF THERE. UNTIL THIS SUNDAY, THE CLEARANCE WAS NOT GIVEN YET AND OUR PATROLS ARE STILL STOPPED. THE A/CMO IS GOING TO RAISE THIS ISSUE DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY COMMANDER ON THIS MONDAY, 02ND MAY, IN KAMPALA.

5. REGARDS,

MILOBs

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : A/FC

Date : Mar 94

FROM : DCMO, MILOB GP HQ

Ref : A/FC's Note
dated 24 Mar 94

SUBJECT : EXPLANATION - ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE INFORMATION

1. The memorandum No. 1000.04 (A/ MA) dated 18 Mar 94 was received by MILOB GP HQ on 24 Mar 94 morning under the cover of Acting CAO,s memorandum dated 23 Mar 94. However CMPO, MILOB GP HQ was called in person by CMPO, FHQ on 19 Mar 94 afternoon and took him to Finance Section of CAO,s office where the requirements of relevant reports and returns were given by Finance Section to CMPO, MILOB GP HQ.

2. It may be mentioned here that since the commencement of Leave/CTO of the MILOBs, each leave/CTO application was processed through CCPO of CAO,s office for his verification, endorsement and records. Once a Leave/CTO application is verified by CCPO and returned to MILOB GP HQ, only then the same is put up to CMO for his approval and signature. As such all the records relating Leave/CTO of MILOBs are readily available in CCPO,s office. MILOB GP HQ is under command to FHQ and all the routine reports and returns are duly submitted to FHQ. Finance Section of CAO,s office should have collected its required information regarding Leave/CTO of MILOBs from CCPO. It is most unfortunate that the accusation made in this regard against MILOB GP HQ is totally baseless. Because neither any report as such was asked officially by them, nor any report was submitted by MILOB GP HQ.

3. The report as asked by Finance Section on 19 Mar 94 were manifold and timestaking. The same could not be submitted on 21 Mar 94 as they requested for, due to inconveniences caused by constant current failures and disorder of the single generator at MILOB GP HQ. However same is regretted.

4. The above is submitted for your kind information and consideration.



GANNA SECK
Lt Col
DCMO

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*This report has been submitted
and the case must be considered
closed.*

*Jg
21/3
etc*

*20/3
DFC/cos*

To: DFC

From: MRS QUIST

Subject: MILOB REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL

MA

Keep until I receive
CMD's latest amts.

MILOB

20/3
DFC/COS


1. Having gone through all the attached proposals, I also tend to support the proposals of the Kigali Sector Comd and the COO. My reasons are as follows.

a. In the DM2 Sector, presently we have a MILOB Coord who is a Lt Col with a Capt assistant and they are solely responsible for the administrative aspect of the MILOB. This has worked very effectively except that the Coord does not see himself as part of the DM2 HQ Staff.

b. Command and Control of the MILOBs is exercised by the Sector Comd and he or the Ops Offr/Duty Offrs task them and they carry out these tasks without any complains. This has enhanced comd and control and has avoided duplication. The teams have also been very closely located to Byubatt Coy HQs for the sake of coordination and this is working effectively.

c. The loc and tasks of the Kigali Sector MILOB teams are a little different hence the number (6) of staff Offrs (MILOBs) with the Sector HQ.

2. In view of the above, I would like to suggest that the present arrangements be ~~endorsed~~ streamlined and endorsed.


15 MAR 94

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Kigali Sector HQ
Kigali
Telephone : 84127

7128.9/Ops

28 January 1994

See Distribution

Subject : MILOBS REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL

Reference :

A. CMO letter No. NIL dated 25 January 1994.

B. UNAMIR Force HQ OPO 1/93 dated 18 November 1993.

1. I have gone through with deep interest the paper on the MILOB reorganization forwarded vide Ref A. The paper attempted to put forward a solution to the existing complicacies in the command, control and communication arrangement of MILOBS of the entire UNAMIR. It is apparent from the study of the paper that the philosophy and concept of operation of Force HQ especially that of KWSA have been lost sight off while analyzing the options (proposals). Therefore, the options need to be reconsidered.

2. I have the following comments/observations on the paper:

a. Kigali Sector Commander is not only the commander of troops, he is also the commander of a territory known as Kigali Weapons Secure Area (KWSA). As the Sector Commander, he is required to establish KWSA in Phase 1 and maintain it throughout Phase 2 and 3. This responsibility envisages controlling, monitoring, detecting and investigating the uses and movements of all weapons and ammunition and personnel of all factions and armed civilians within KWSA. In performance of this responsibility Kigali Sector MILOBS constitute one of the vital components of his Command. Because presently they are deployed in 12 RGF camps 7 Gendarmerie camps and CND RPF compounds to perform above mentioned tasks. If this vital element is taken away from the command of Kigali Sector, the responsibility of KWSA can not naturally remain with Kigali Sector. In that case Sector Commander Kigali takes the responsibility of RUTBAT and KIBAT only not the KWSA. This will entail the overall recasting of concept of operation by the Force HQ. Although proposal 1 provides for tasking to Kigali MILOB Sector by Kigali Sector and the arrangement of CCC conference, this arrangement can't be effective without placing them under command. The problem of complicacies of command and control arrangement will rather worsen.

1
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b. UNAMIR is a Mission and all observers, selected officers drawn from different countries, are expected to have the missionary spirit. But the paper seems to have tended to attach more priority towards welfare of the observers than the operational requirement. ?

c. Observers have been characterised in the paper to be of different orientations. In fact, they possess the same background as that of other officers of UNAMIR. As such there is no justification of putting them in a separate command and control arrangement with disregard to operational requirement. Even if proposal 1 is adopted, MILOB Group HQ will have to be under Force HQ which is manned by officers who are not observers.

3. In the light of the above, if the responsibility of KWSA remains with Force HQ, then proposal 1 can work. But if this responsibility has to remain with Kigali Sector, the MILOB component of this Sector has to remain under command of Kigali Sector also. I believe, taking this vital aspect into consideration, probably, Force HQ through OPO 1/93 has placed them under command of Kigali Sector. The complicity of administrative and logistic command can easily be solved by giving this responsibility also to Kigali Sector. This is not a problem since all administrative and logistic resources are centralized with the Force HQ and CAO's Office. No such facilities exist in MILOB Group HQ. In this context I have a third proposal for your perusal, the diagrammatic layout of which is at Annex A. According to this proposal, organization of Kigali MILOB is also attached as Annex B. The main features of this proposal are as follows :

a. Force HQ has following three operational Sectors:

(1) Kigali Sector with three components viz RUTBAT, KIBAT and Kigali MILOB.

(2) DMZ Sector with two components viz BYUBAT and DMZ MILOB.

? (3) MILOB Sector with three sub sectors viz RPF sub sector, RGF sub sector and UNOMUR sub sector. (and Southern Sector when it becomes operational)

b. Present MILOB GP HQ is converted to a operational MILOB Sector HQ.

c. MILOB Sector takes no responsibility of MILOBs of Kigali and DMZ Sector. These MILOBs are posted direct from Force HQ to respective sectors and remain under command of Sectors for all purposes.

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d. MILOB Sector to be commanded by CMO and will have a staff organization as that of Kigali and DMZ Sector. Its sub sectors may be commanded by Lt Cols and may have small staff organization of 6 UNMOs. *why 6?*

e. Kigali/DMZ Sector MILOB to be commanded by a Lt Col with a small staff organization of 6 UNMOs. *why 6 to the commander?*

f. Kigali/DMZ MILOB commander will plan leave/CTO of all MILOBs within the allotted strength and no MILOB will be shifted from one sector to the other.

4. An analysis of this proposal is as follows :

a. Advantages.

✓ (1) MILOBs remain under command of one HQ only for both operation and administration.

(2) Present Force HQ concept of op remains unchanged.

(3) There remains three operational Sector commanders under the Force Commander with defined area of responsibility; no-body overstepping others areas. As such command, control and communication remain conventional, simple and coherent.

? (4) This arrangement eliminates the possibility of making MILOB Group HQ a superficial one if RGF, RPF and UNOMUR are to be sectors as mentioned in proposal 1.

✓ (5) It eliminates the problem of dual command of operation and administration as mentioned in proposal 2.

(6) It also eliminates complications of CCC with Kigali/DMZ Sector with respective MILOB Sector.

(7) Force HQ need not be bothered with information details coming from many Sectors. Channel of command of Force HQ will be easier.

(8) It allows reduction of a huge present staff organization in the MILOB Group HQ. //

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(9) This arrangement makes MILOB Commanders of Kigali/DMZ Sectors more effective as MILOB welfare can well be looked after by the MILOB Commander, a Lt Col, like Commander RUTBAT & Commander KIBAT. Sector HQ generally plays a supervisory role only.

(10) It will help enhance operational efficiency of Kigali MILOBs. Already Kigali MILOBs have developed operational orientations with Kigali Sector. Any change in their operational status will affect operational efficiency.

b. Disadvantages. This proposal may deprive the observers of Kigali and DMZ Sectors of the expert advice/opinion of CMO who possesses lot of experience on peace keeping missions. This can, however, be compensated by making CMO the advisor to Force Commander on MILOB matters of UNAMIR. Some short briefing/trg course for all observers also may be run by CMO on request by Force Commander/Sector Commander. Therefore, it, virtually, has no disadvantage.

5. With regards.



MARCHAL L.
Colonel BEM
Sector Commander

Annexs :

A. Diagrammatic Layout of MILOB Reorganization.

B. Organization of Kigali MILOB.

Distribution :

External :


Action :

Colonel TIKOCA
CMO
MILOB Group HQ

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ANNEX A TO
HQ KIGALI SEC
No 7/28.9/QPS
DATED 28 Jan 94

DIAGRAMATIC LAYOUT OF MILOB REORGANIZATION




A - 1

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ANNEX B TO
HQ KIGALI SECTOR
No 7/28.9/OPS
DATED 28 JAN 94

ORGANISATION OF KIGALI MILOB



NOTE: As per Ref B, 78 UNMOS were placed undercommand of Kigali Sector but present situation in Kigali warrants additional 32 UNMOS (1xLt Col as Kigali Milob Commander, 6x staff officers. 1x Lo at CND, 2x teams in CND and 2x teams in KWSA less CND.

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① MA
This case is being
checked by CMO. Let
us wait for his
comments.
13/3
DSC/CO

TO: DFC

FROM: COO

Date: 18 Feb 94

Subject: MILOB REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL

1. Having gone through the proposal of MILOB Gp HQ and comments/suggestions of Kigali Sector HQ, I broadly support the proposal of the Kigali Sector HQ and have the following comments to offer:

a. If there is no technical problem in delegating the responsibility to Kigali/DMZ Sector HQ to take care of the administration and logistic of UNMOs (i.e. provisioning of transports, radios, sanctioning of leave etc), the proposal of the Kigali Sector HQ may be considered with few variations.

b. This will enhance better command and control and sense of belonging between UNMOs and Sectors.

c. UNOMUR must remain a separate sector directly under the Force HQ as per UN guidelines on integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR.

d. To differentiate between the two Observer Gps (i.e. MILOB Gp and UNOMUR) MILOB Gp may be renamed as "UNAMIR MILOB Sector".

e. The UNAMIR MILOB Sector will have following sub sectors commanded by Lt Cols:

(1) RPF Sector.

(2) RGF Sector.

(3) Southern Sub Sector.


f. UNAMIR MILOB Sector Comd may however, carry out liaison and coordination with Kigali/DMZ MILOB Sub Sectors through visits. This will enable him to provide guidelines (special to UNMOs) to all UNMOs based on FC's directives with the aim of maintaining uniformity (a role similar to that of an inspector).

2. The suggested arrangement should dispense with current command and control complications, contribute towards cohesiveness and achieving desired a level of operational efficiency.

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3. This is forwarded for considerations as desired please. Correspondence relating to the subject are also returned herewith.



ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer

Enclosure 24 pages

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RUTBAT
ESCORT REPORT

PERIOD COVERING FROM 110600 MAR TO 120600 MAR 94

1. Str and composition of ptl. 1 sec (10 pers).
2. Msn. To escort RPF VIPs within the area of Kigali city.
- a. Sect. Kigali Sect.
- b. Map Ref. D/17
- c. Area Covered. Kigali city.
3. Time of Departure. 1045 hrs.
4. Time of Return. hrs.
5. Route Pat.
6. Terrain. Metal and heringbone.
7. Faction. NTR.
8. Incidents Observed / Reported. NTR.
9. Special Obsn /Other Info. NTR.
10. Results of Contacts. NTR.
11. State of Ptl. NTR.
12. Ptl Chief Name / Unit. Capt Mahbub from Lorry Coy.
13. Seen. _____

Ops Offr _____

1
UN RESTRICTED

7/G/18
OPS-6000
which is lorry Coy

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

TO: DFC

FILE: 001/MILOB


FROM: CMO

DATE: 04 MAR'94

SUBJECT: VEH DISCIPLINE

REFERENCE: VERBAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN DFC AND CMO ON 03 MAR'94

1. Attached please find the instruction on "VEH DISCIPLINE" dated 27 Jan'94, which was circulated to all MILOBS for their strict compliance.
2. The above is forwarded as required.
3. Regards.


I. D. TIKOCA
COLONEL
CMO

in
8-1
96
Adjutant from informant
enclosed personnel
at Col Downing

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

FROM: MILOB GP HQ
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION:
DATE: 27 JAN 94
SUBJECT: VEH DISCIPLINE

REFERENCE: FORCE ROUTINE ORDER No 2, DATED 10 JAN 94

1. It has been observed with concerned that MILOBS are driving vehicles violating the normal traffic/vehicle discipline, i.e over speeding, careless driving etc. This has been substantiated by a number of vehicle accident in the recent time. Para 3 & 4 of the reference above clearly states that the rules, procedures and precautionary measures to be taken while driving the vehs.

2. With the sudden rise of veh accident two board of investigation (BOI) has been formed one each in Force HQ and MILOB GP HQ to investigate all the present and future veh accident so as to find out the causes of accident and give apportioned blame to the concerned persons if it is not attributable to military duties.

3. It may be mentioned here that MILOBs are liable to bear all the expenditure incurred for a particular accident if he is found guilty by the BOI. This may be adjusted in either of the following manner:

- a. With holding/deducting from MSA.
- b. Claim from the country of the concerned officer(if MSA does not cover the expenditure)
- c. Deducting from the contingent money being paid to the concerned officer's country.


4. In view of the above you are requested to bring it to the notice of all MILOBs under your command on the following:

- a. Must check the fitness of the veh before moving out by conducting the daily inspection required before driving the veh.
- b. Must follow the traffic/veh discipline.

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- c. Must never over speed.
 - d. Apply 4-Wheel drive when road is slippery even on sealed road.
 - e. Must follow the instructions in para 3 & 4 of the reference above.
 - f. Should be ready to pay for the expenditure as blamed by the BOI for the accident. The offender will be liable to pay full or part of cost to make good the veh, if found by the BOI that he is responsible.
5. Forwarded for strict compliance.


I. D. TIROKA
Colonel
CMO

Distribution :

Action:

Sect Comd, RGF MILOB Sect ✓
Sect Comd, PPF MILOB Sect
Sect Comd Southern MILOB Sect
Sect MILOB Co-ordinator, Kigali Sect
Sect MILOB Co-ordinator, DMZ Sect

MILOB GP HQ, Ops Br
MILOB GP HQ, Log Br
MILOB GP HQ, Liaison Br
MILOB GP HQ, Pers Br

Info:

DCMO
ADC to CMO

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

TO: FHQ
FROM: CMO
INFO: KIGALI SECTOR HQ
DMZ SECTOR CMD
DATE: 02 MAR 94
SUBJECT: ROUTINE DUTIES OF MILOBS


1. Due to its varied activities and schedule, MILOB is constrained to vary its routine procedures to effectively carry out its tasks. Without recourse to listing the various tasks, we generally operate as specified below:

a. MILOB HQ The Headquarters operates on a daily routine basis. Duty hours commence 0730-1700 hrs with a one hour break (1200-1300 hrs) between. Thereafter, the staff remain on listening watch for any special duty or task that might arise.

b. Duty Room. The duty officers of the operations branch employ both the daily and the shift system. They commence work as mentioned above to review and write reports. They then fall back on the shift system from 1400-0600 hrs. This is necessary in order to have adequate rest. The escort teams operate a daily shift of 24 hours.

c. The Field Units The field units operate is daily shift but could modify this to the multiple shifts in case of manning the observation posts and conducting night and day patrols.

2. In each instance, UNMOS could be called upon to perform any task at any time when required or during emergencies. Therefore must always be on the alert.


I D TIROKA
Colonel
CMO

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MA
Draft outline for me right
to the point that as much
as they are not up to the
number, their shift system allows
24 hour off duty and in certain
cases 48 hours. There is
addition to CTO is unacceptable.
We need the presence of the
observers to be felt.
J. J. 04/3
DFO/COS.

ops 980/ky

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)
MILOB GP HQ

TO: FC

FILE:6004/MILOB

THROUGH: DFC/COS

FROM: CMO

DATE: 02 MAR 94

SUBJECT: RECCE REPORT. RPF TERRITORY

1. Attached please find above.
2. For your info and necessary action.

[Signature]
I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

②
Dalkahie
for information
④
DFC
for action plan.

[Signature]
FC
3/3

③
[Handwritten notes]
Information will
be in report
which will be for
your action plan, etc.

⑤
CPLAN

This is a useful
info for planning purposes.
Take note and include
in your projections.

b. See me.

[Signature]
04/3
DFC/COS

⑥
By MA
Original find to CPLAN
GFL 04/3

TO : CMO
MILOB GP HQ

FROM : SECTOR COMD
RPF MILOB HQ

FILE NO: 7318.0
DATE : 26 FEB 94

SUBJ: RECCE REPORT

1. GENERAL. Team P-502 carried out recce on 21 and 22 Feb 94 spending the night in MUHAMBO.

2. Aim . The aim of the recce was as follows:

- a. To locate refugee areas in our AO.
- b. To locate access rds to our AO.
- c. To locate and reconnoitre Assy Points in our AO.

3. Route. RWAMAGANA-NGARAMA-MUHAMBO-KARAMA-GATUNA-SHONGA-GASHESHA-KABORGOTA-GISHURO-TABAGWE-NYABITENDERI-MUTUMGISA-RWAMAGANA.

4. REFUGEE AREAS. At KABORGOTA (GR 215573) the team met twice with Mr OSWALD RUDAKEMWA, a priest who is in charge of the refugees and team also met once with Ms CHRISTINE UMUTONI the Director of the cabinet of the Ministry of Rehabilitation for Refugees. Both were pleased to meet UNAMIR personnel and assured close cooperation during the discussion. According to their info and our recce the situation is as follows:

a. The first batch of refugees entered RPF territory on 20 Dec 93 and the rest of them around 24 Dec 93. Both ethnic groups are represented. But both officials couldnot and didnot want to present details about the number of HUTU and TUTSI because they waht to avoid any ethnical seperation. In their expression they are all RWANDESE.

b. The total number of refugees upto now runs upto 7,000. More are still coming in but in smaller numbers. They were and are entering RWANDESE area between SQ 1851 and 2561.

c. The refugees donot live in camps but all over the area operated by the 157 Bn. They live in self made accommodationsn some have resettled their real property and many move around the area with their cowherds.

d. Areas and villages occupied by refugees are:

- (1) SHONGA SQ 1854, 1954, 2054
- (2) GASHESE SQ 2256
- (3) GISHURO SQ 2057, 2058, 1958
- (4) KABORGOTA SQ 2157
- (5) TABAGWE SQ 2258, 2358
- (6) NYABITENDERI SQ 2557
- (7) RUNYINA SQ 2654
- (8) MUTUMGISA SQ 2455
- (9) GATURA SQ 1855
- (10) MUTOJO SQ 2350
- (11) Along the eastern RPF boundary as far as 2 kms west of it.

e. Team 502 also supervised the first incoming of a food convoy organised by WFP and UNHCR. This convoy showed up on 211800b Feb 94, had to stop and unload at KARAMA because the bridge at GR 189512 is not passable for heavy trucks. The food will be distributed with a smaller truck.

f. Team assured Mr RUPKAMWA to continue the supervision of the refugees.

5. Access Roads to AO. Team 502 tried to check the road leading from TABAGWE to NYAGATARE. Both civilians and RPF declared the rd safe upto NYABITENDERI from there upto the east. The rd is supposed to be mined. That's the reason why the WFP and UNHCR had to enter RPF territory via MUHAMBO. Upto now only the access via GASHENYI (GR 248471) is confirmed as safe as a second one.

*we must
again the
bridge as
a priority
task*

*the were we
aware of
this?*

Very good information

6. Assy Points. Team 502 reconnoitred the area of the church in GATUNDA (GR 183449). The church located on a hill is surrounded by about 20 houses (school and workshops), which are able to accommodate approx 800 sldrs. The closer areas to the west, south and east are partially forested and plain and are able to accommodate another 2,000 sldrs.

a. Water Situation. The water pipes around the church are almost destroyed but water can be collected at a bridge close to KARAMA at GR171458.


b. Rds. Access to this location is available from both directions, MUHAMBO and KARAMA.

c. Conclusion. This area is qualified to assemble 2 battalions which are recommended to be the assy point. There should be no problems to use the 20 houses surrounding the church. The other accommodations have to be provided by UN.

well done

7. Misc. Team 502 also went upto the UGANDIAN border at GR 224595. According to RPF statement this CP is also used for resupply and visited by UNOMUR regularly.

[Signature]
M SARR
Maj
Dy Sector Comd



UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)
MILOB GP HQ

TO: DFC

FILE: 6005/MILOB

THROUGH: COO

FROM: CMO

DATE: 24 FEB 94

SUBJECT: RPF COMPLAINT ON USAGE OF UNSAFE ROAD


1. I have forwarded your querrie ref subject above to the DMZ, MILOB co-ord to investigate. I attached herewith the facsimile reply from him for your information.

2. I have informed him that wef immediately movements of his MILOBs must be known to him on their route in and route out and new routes to be taken, has to be cleared first for safety before it is used.

4. MILOB patrol instruction to be adhered to is stipulated in the draft SOP I forwarded to your office.

3. For your necessary action.

5. Regards.


I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

(2) COO

For your information pse.

1/8
01/3
DFC/COO

(1) MA
Reply to MILOB HQ that
I did receive the SOP and
acknowledged. I thank
him for this letter clarifying
the issue.

076

26 1930 Feb 94

E. 94H

To the Air Force
 1000 ft 100 ft

from 1000 ft to 100 ft
 1000 ft 100 ft

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF THE
 (1) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (2) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (3) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (4) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (5) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (6) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (7) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (8) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (9) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY
 (10) THE SURVEY (1000 ft to 100 ft) BY THE SURVEY



UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

TO: FC

FILE:6004/MILOB/2

THROUGH: DFC

FROM: CMO

DATE: 01 FEB 94

SUBJECT: INFORMATION

1. Attached please find information gathered from the discussion between MILOB, MIO and MR MIRONKO Francois XAVIER. President of Mironko EURAFRIC Limited 'Kigali.

2. For your info.

①

FC

The attached information note from CMO is for your attention.

My analysis is that if it is true that this man is a businessman then he is more worried about the future security of his business than anything else. It may however be useful meeting him for.

[Signature]
01-2-94
DFC/COS.

[Handwritten note:]
flood
for
bri

④
DIC

I agree with
mine ③

[Signature]
3/2

[Signature]
I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

②
Dr Kabisa
your comments
pls
[Signature]
3/2

③
FC

contacts with
this individual,
if necessary must
be maintained at
the level of the CMO.
Any higher contacts will
risk the security of
the Com. of Gen. Staff
EA 3/2

UN RESTRICTED

INFO NOTE no-014

01. Feb. 94.

FUTURE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD.

According to a hutu Rwandese businessman, the peace agreement will be implemented but not in its whole integrality. The BBTG and the transitional assembly will be emplaced, but the transition period won't be going on as scheduled in the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The goal of the present blockage is to get a renegotiation on certain parts of the agreement. The RPF are aware that they will not win the elections; but they hope to have themselves installed militarily in the country in order to contest with their weapons the elections.

According to this man, the war cannot be avoided. The President of the Republic, even if he wants to keep high his diplomatic image with the international community, he does not have the right to sacrifice all Hutus. If he does so, he may be killed.

After talking to this man, he wished to meet the F.C. with this declaration:

"I am a businessman, i am known and respected by all. The General is a Great authority. It is not normal from my side, that i do not invite him while he is in my country. I can receive him in my house or in his. We can be useful to each other; even if i am not a politician. I strongly wish to meet him".

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF SRSG

Date 27 Jan 94

No. 401 By 22

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

TO: FC

FILE: 6004/MILOB

THROUGH: COS/DFC

FROM: CMO

SUBJECT: INFORMATION

1. Confidential information given by MILOB Teams are as follows:

a. The RGF force are building up strength immediately outside the 10 km KWSA at specific key points.

b. They are building up arms and ammunition reserve in small incoming consignments like the ones that arrived on Friday 21 Jan 94.

c. The cargo aircraft responsible for the delivery belongs to an MK Air Cargo stationed at GHANA, the crew were from Zimbabwe. The air craft took off from Chatearou airport of France refueled at EGYPT arrived in Kigali Rwanda and equipments unloaded for the RGF are of Belgique made.

2. A patrol of milobs was sent this morning to ascertain para 1a above.

3. For your info and necessary action.

[Signature]
I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

① FC
Sir, You will notice from para 1c that the countries that have been mentioned are the contributing to UNAMIR. I am not aware of any MK Air Cargo stationed in Accra-Ghana but this could be further investigated. I suggest UN RESTRICTED on in-depth investigation is carried out on this issue. Meanwhile our letter to them is yet to be reviewed.

④ MA
PUB this away
for the time being
JH 27/1
DFC

③ DFC
Please stay on this
and
FC
27/1