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CROATIA

8 JAN - 19 FEB 1993

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JUNE 2017

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# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

010/12

To: Ambassador H. Okun  
Ambassador G. Ahrens

From: John Wilson

Date: 19 February 1993

Subject: Security Council Resolution 802

1. There is no provision in Security Council resolution 802 preventing Serb armed elements reoccupying areas vacated by the Croatian Army. Should an impasse result from present discussions on the matter, you could agree to the area being reoccupied by the Serbs. However, we should then be careful committing UNPROFOR to anything more than they were doing before 22 January. Use of Maslenica bridge, the airport and the dam would then have to be "guaranteed" by the Serb authorities.

2. An alternative could be that certain areas, certainly occupied UNPA, could be reoccupied by Serbs and other, restricted areas, handed over to UN control. If you wish a combination of through routes and a Blue Zone concept these restricted areas would need to be identified in discussions with the parties, particularly, the Croatsians.

3. With the benefit of hindsight, one of the elements for implementation of 802 should be guaranteed use of Maslenica, Zemunik and Peruca with free access by Croatian authorities to get them working again.

4. Whatever arrangement is devised, if UNPROFOR is required to assume an element of control, there can be no dual presence in an area.

Croat from this morning 010/12

18 February 1993

Elements for a ceasefire agreement between the Croatian Government and the serb local authorities in implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993) / 762.

1. The armed forces of Republic of Croatia shall return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993.

2. UNPROFOR, including UNCIVPOL, shall take control of each of the above-mentioned areas as soon as it is vacated pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated. (1)

3. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatian forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR, all heavy weapons seized from UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas shall be returned to the supervision of UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR is implementing Annex III, 5,15,19, and Resolution. 743. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out all additional functions consequent on paragraphs 1-5.

4A. In all such areas referred to above that are included in the Pink Zone, UNPROFOR will implement Security Council Resolution 762. To stop the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of which shall correspond to the ethnic composition of the areas concerned in accordance with the 1991 census.

4B. In all such areas referred to above that are included within UNPA south, UNPROFOR is to implement Annex III, (Vance Plan) and Resolution 743, immediately to start the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of the areas concerned in accordance with the 1991 census.



CZN-192  
CZG-143

**MOST IMMEDIATE**  
UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

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010/12

010/1

**RESTRICTED**

'93 FEB -6 18:16

Page 1 of 4

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-171

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GENERAL BOBETKO ON 5 FEBRUARY 1993

DISTRIBUTION:

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MW

JW

1. At his request, I had a meeting with General Bobetko on 5 February 1993. He was accompanied by Maj Gen Faldi and Brig Gen Cisper. I had Gaudreau and Campose with me.

2. At the outset, Bobetko stated that the aim of requesting for the meeting was to put forward some proposals to make "the work of UNPROFOR more efficient towards implementing the Vance Plan" and added that "there should be an agreement between the Croatian Army and UNPROFOR to facilitate UNPROFOR's task of implementing and enforcing the Vance Plan". He said that such an agreement was essential as they were perturbed about certain recent events, including the incident where UNPROFOR troops had withdrawn from some of their locations in Sector South in such a manner that these positions were later occupied by the Serbs. He cited the case of the Mali Alan position where, according to him, the French troops from that position disregarded CA advice and withdrew Northwards towards Sveti Rok instead of withdrawing Southwards, thus resulting in the Serbs occupying the position with one company.



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3. He added that as the CA had achieved its aim during the recent offensive, it did not want to advance any further and that though this point had been clearly stated publicly and a truce called for, the Serb TDF continued to disregard this call and continued to attack with infantry, tanks and artillery, thus forcing the CA to retaliate. This, according to him, reinforced his point that there was a need for a joint agreement for cooperation between UNPROFOR and the CA, and he wanted to know my views on such a proposal.

4. I responded that though I agreed that we needed to reach some agreement towards resolving the present situation, I did not see how any agreement could work in the circumstances unless the Serbs were also consulted about it. I reminded him that in all my earlier meetings with President Tudjman, Minister Susak and Bobetko himself, I had always maintained that it was not advisable to undertake any unilateral action, as the situation would get out of control. I added that their unilateral action had resulted in the Serbs mobilising in all the UNPAs, removing their heavy weaponry from storage areas and being fully deployed along the confrontation line, and that such a deployment could only lead to further escalation of the situation. I reiterated that the need of the hour was for us to regain control over the situation in such a way as to prevent further deterioration in Sector South and avoid spreading of the conflict to the other sectors. I informed them of the Serb stance that they would neither withdraw from the confrontation line nor return heavy weaponry to storage areas unless the CA implemented SCR 802. Hence, they must recognise that, while we were ready to discuss any proposals which could address the current problem, the Serbs would have to be a party to the discussions, if the problem had to be resolved.

5. On their complaint about the method of withdrawal of the French troops at Mali Alan, our view was that the French CO had acted in an impartial manner, in the interests of the safety and



- 3 -

security of his troops, after studying the ground situation at that time.

6. Bobetko responded to my stance by making the following points "(a) UNPROFOR troops cannot withdraw in any manner they want without consulting the CA, (b) UNPROFOR should have defended the storage areas more strongly, (c) we must now insist that the Serbs return the heavy weaponry immediately to the storage areas, (d) we must not accept the Serb contention that the CA has attacked into their areas, as all these areas were parts of Croatia, (e) Croatia cannot discuss anything with the "minority Serbs" at a "state" level, in the same manner as they could with independent states like Slovenia or Southern Bosnia Hercegovina, and (f) we must understand that the political and operational aim of the Maslenica offensive was to secure the Bridge area so that communications can be restored, as it was vital to their economic interests."

7. I responded to his points by reiterating that UNPROFOR did not have the personnel or equipment to fight battles against either side, and that in any case the weapon storage areas had been under joint control in keeping with the Vance Plan. Hence, just as we were also not able to prevent the incursion of the CA into areas which we were mandated to control, we were not in a position to prevent the removal of heavy weaponry from the storage areas. As for the return of the heavy weaponry to the storage areas, this aspect was covered under SCR 802, but as earlier stated, the Serb position was that they would implement their part of SCR 802 only after implementation of the "withdrawal" provision of the SCR by the CA. I emphasised that there was little we could do to help if both sides were to take such inflexible positions.

8. At the end, Bobetko expressed concern that the present deployment of the Serbs in Sector North constituted a threat to the areas of Sisak as well as to the Zagreb - Rijeka highway. He felt



that there was a requirement of joint mechanisms at all levels, involving UNPROFOR and CA, so that commanders both at the "field" and the "force" levels can meet regularly for exchange of information and carrying out joint planning. This, he said, would "result in better cooperation and prepare us for enforcing the Vance Plan, once the authorisation is received." He said that he was going to issue orders for better cooperation of his forces with UNPROFOR.

9. I thanked him for issuing the necessary orders for improving cooperation between UNPROFOR and the CA and informed him that I too would be instructing my units to undertake similar measures from our side. On the mandate, I reminded him that it was for the Security Council to decide whether the mandate had to be renewed, and if so, in what form.

10. It was obvious from the tone and content of the whole meeting, as reported above, that Bobetko was trying throughout to get some sort of commitment with the aim of formalising a joint CA - UNPROFOR effort against the Serbs, which would cover aspects like exchange of military information as well as cooperation in operational activities. He also conveyed an impression of being convinced that the new mandate for UNPROFOR when adopted, would be based on agreements only between the UN and the Croatian Government, without any Serb participation, and would include "enforcement" provisions. His stance also conveyed their growing concern of threat of offensive actions by the Serb TDF, especially in Sector North. On our part, I made it very clear to him that our actions would continue to be guided by SCR 802 and that it was not for us to speculate on the provisions of the new mandate. On the aspect of agreements, I emphasised that any negotiations would have to include Serb participation.

Endall



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CZG=135

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

233/93  
P16

010/12

CODE RESTRICTED

Page 1 of 6

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 1993

*Blawie*  
H-gu

NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2- **152**

93 FEB -4 10:31

UNDE PROFOR. Unit  
Pafers for Nations

SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST

Reference your MSC-170 of 3 February 1993.

UNPROFOR 2-151 of 3 February is re-faxed herewith, alongwith attachments.

DISTRIBUTION:



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB MOST IMMEDIATE  
 INFO: VANCE, GENEVA  
 FROM: GOULDING, NEW YORK *thamipharoo*  
 DATE: 3 FEBRUARY 1993  
 NUMBER: MSC-170  
 SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST

*not received in Gva*

Your UNPROFOR-Z-151 on the above subject has been received here without annexes. Please retransmit asap.

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
 Palais des Nations

93 FEB -4 -5 :15

1993-02-04 03:12



1. Croatian PermRep, Mario Nobilo, called on Tharoor today to hand over the attached "non-paper", which is also being circulated to "friendly Governments" on the Security Council. As you will note, it restates the well-known Croatian position on the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, but in a more constructive manner than hitherto and without speaking of "conditions" for renewal.
2. Tharoor has already reacted to the veiled threat in the penultimate paragraph on page 2, from which Nobilo then appeared to back away considerably. There is, of course, no question of the host Government being given such a right of veto, though it might be advisable for you to meet with Milas and attempt to smooth over the concerns that had led the Government to make this point in such a document.
3. The Croatians appear to see the "non-paper" (whose status, incidentally, Nobilo was prepared to upgrade if necessary) as a basis for further discussion with the Secretariat in the lead-up to the decision by the Security Council on the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate.



CYZ-060 CNZ-085 P2/6

**NON-PAPER**Framework for prolonging the UNPROFOR mandate

The Croatian Government is ready to prolong the UNPROFOR mandate for the period of an additional six months (up to August 20, 1993), but its final decision is directly linked with the necessary substantive changes in the approach and operational framework of the UNPROFOR mandate. During the past 12 months the UNPROFOR operation on the territory of the Republic of Croatia failed to achieve most of its goals, particularly those concerning voluntarily return of the refugees and displaced persons back to their homes in the UNPA's, complete disarmament of the Serbian "militia", placing all their heavy weapons under the efficient UN control, and taking full control over the border-crossings on the international border between the Republic of Croatia and FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Therefore the new UNPROFOR mandate must be based on the principles of an active peace-making operation (with authorization for the use of force when necessary), instead of a passive peace-keeping concept that lacks concrete enforcement measures. The UNPROFOR operation must be aimed at creating the basic conditions for promoting the post-war confidence building process, based on minority and human rights protection, respect for the civil state and its laws, and gradual restoration of the governmental authority of the Republic of Croatia on all its territory.

To fulfill the UNPROFOR mandate in accordance with all the relevant Security Council resolutions, the major goals must be:

A) promoting and creating necessary provisions for normal living conditions in the UNPA's, thus abandoning the '*status-quo*' that is endorsing existing Serbian occupation of the Croatian territory.

B) The new UNPROFOR mandate must be backed up with a Security Council resolution that will authorize more decisive measures, including enforcement in fulfilling all the existing (as well as new) resolutions concerning the UNPA's,

C) All the future UNPROFOR steps must be put in the framework of a precise time-table approach, with concrete mechanisms for their full implementation.

Croatia suggests that, in the near future, UN forces on the territory of the Republic of Croatia be assisted by NATO naval and air forces, whose major task should be providing air-coverage and essential logistic support. NATO should also provide limited ground forces that could be partly situated in close vicinity of the UNPA's (naval base at Croatian island of Vis), and partly inside the UNPA's as an additional force supporting the UNPROFOR troops. That will supply UNPROFOR with the strong military capability and determinant authority for imposing decisive measures in achieving successful implementation of the Vance plan. NATO's role is of utmost



CYZ-060

CNZ-085

P3/6

- 2 -

importance in achieving full disarmament of the paramilitary forces in the UNPA's, and in tightening the UN control over the border crossings. The presence and role of the NATO forces should be endorsed by the Security Council, based upon the Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter and CSCE principles.

The results of the Conference on former Yugoslavia must serve as the essential framework for fulfilling the future UNPROFOR mandate. At the same time, UNPROFOR must act upon the premise that its operation is taking place on the territory of a sovereign UN member state. Croatia is ready to provide all the help required for the full protection of human and minority rights on its entire territory, including measures for strengthening local autonomy in the areas with a Serbian majority and implementation of the Amnesty Act that was passed by the Croatian Parliament in 1992. In this regard Croatia is ready to welcome independent international monitoring of the human and minority rights situation inside its borders, but at the same time Croatia must insist on full respect for its Constitution and judicial system.

The Croatian Government is emphasizing the importance of fulfilling three essential elements on which any prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate must be based:

**I - Agreement on the UNPROFOR mandate should be signed only by UN and the Republic of Croatia. Security Council must emphasize the fact that this peace-keeping operation is not on the "territory of former Yugoslavia", but in the internationally recognized and sovereign state of Croatia.**

**II - Effective disarming of all the paramilitary units and "militia" inside the UNPA's, and putting their heavy weapons under firm UN control.**

**III - Voluntarily and unconditional return of the refugees, detainees and displaced persons.**

**IV - Gradual reintegration of the "Pink Zones" and UNPA's into the political, social, economical, fiscal, transportation and judicial system of the Republic of Croatia.**

These strategic factors must be followed with two basic principles:

\* The Government of the Republic of Croatia must be given the right to be consulted about the structure of UNPROFOR personnel, refusing to prolong the mandate for those whose work was judged as ineffective or biased., whose health conditions is reason for the serious concern, or whose behavior was incompatible with the moral and legal standards they were entrusted with.

\* All statements or commitments in UNPA's made under duress, particularly those relating to the relinquishment of rights to land and property, have to be declared as null and void, especially in the light of the process of returning the refugees to their homes.



- 3 -

Croatia is proposing (under the premisses that the above-mentioned elements are guaranteed) that the new UNPROFOR mandate will be targeted according to the following precise goals:

## **FIRST STAGE (March - May 1993)**

### **1. Restoring full authority of the Croatian government in the "Pink Zones".**

- Croatian army will not stay in those areas, but there will be enough Croatian police forces to secure the peace and respect for the law. UNPROFOR and EC observers should monitor the process of restoring Croatia's authority in these areas.

### **2. Return of the refugees and displaced persons in the "Pink Zones" and UNPA West.**

- Precise timetable for the "Operation Return", backed up with a Security Council resolution endorsing enforcement of the measures to provide safe return of all the persons who voluntarily want to do so.

### **3. Opening the major roads (Karlovac-Plitvice-Obrovac-Sibenik; Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Zupanja; Plitvice-Gracac-Knin-Split; Vinkovci-Ilok; Vinkovci-Vukovar; Osijek-Erdut; Osijek-Bilje-Bell Manastir-Knezevo), and the railway system (Zagreb-Knin-Split).**

- UNPROFOR will provide the security measures for the parts of roads (railway) inside the UNPA's. In the case of any serious obstruction of the traffic, NATO forces will have the authorization to intervene.

### **4. Full implementation of the SC Resolution 769 (1992).**

- UNPROFOR must take tight control of the international border crossings between the Republic of Croatia and FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), and between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that are inside the UNPA's borders. This operation can be partly accomplished in cooperation with UNPROFOR forces on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### **5. Establishing an international war-crimes court.**

- All war criminals must be punished, no matter which side they had belonged to. It is an essential measure in the post-war confidence building process and in preventing uncontrolled revenge by the victims, as well as the starting point in strengthening the stability of the region.



CYZ-060 CNZ-085 P5/6

- 4 -

**6. Clearing all the remaining mine-fields inside UNPA's.**

**7. Establishing special shopping centers** (food, gasoline, clothes) in towns across the UNPA's (Ilok, Vukovar, Dalj, Beli Manastir, Petrinja, Glina, Slunj, Gracac, Knin, Obrovac, Donji Lapac, Udbina, Korenica, Plitvice)

- All persons living in UNPA's will be able to buy all the goods available, under the condition that they are using official currency of the Republic of Croatia.

**8. Establishing TV Channel aimed at promoting post-war confidence building measures**

- This program will be financed and run with the help of UN, European Community and USA. It will contain a daily news segment about the UNPROFOR operation, contact panel programs, educational program and entertainment section.

**SECOND STAGE (June - August 1993)****1. Gradual return of the refugees in all UNPA's that lived there before the war.**

- A precise time-table is necessary. In every town or village that is designated for return, a UN police station must be open for the transitional period. UNPROFOR (with help of NATO forces) should have full authorization by the Security Council to use force in protecting the returnees and, in the case of some serious incident, NATO forces must be ready to intervene.

**2. Opening all the local roads and railways in the UNPA's, connecting them in all transportation aspects with the rest of the Republic of Croatia.****3. Restoring all telecommunications lines with UNPA's and the rest of the Republic of Croatia.****4. Taking all necessary measures for regulating and integrating the schooling system, social care, health care and pension system in the UNPA's with the rest of the Republic of Croatia.****5. Elections for the seats in the Croatian Parliament in all UNPA's and the local self-government (općine-kotari)**

- That will enable equal participation of those regions in the political life of the Republic of Croatia. In accordance with this, a visit into the UNPA's by high Croatian Government officials will be arranged, with the goal of opening political talks about the special status of regions with a Serbian majority inside the Republic of Croatia.

- 5 -

6. **Creating special ethnically mixed police forces in UNPA's**, following the pre-war data from the 1991 Census, that will serve as a major guardian for the civil state law and peace.

7. **Establishing a long-term international human-rights watch commission**

- This commission will keep close surveillance on the situation in the UNPA's, and will promptly address any complaints in regards to the human rights questions and in implementation of the Croatian and international laws and norms.

8. **Issuing Croatian ID cards, passports and other documents** - in accordance with existing procedure - for the persons living inside the UNPA's.

9. Following the basic framework of the Resolution 769, UN forces will gradually begin to transfer the control of the Croatian international border (now in the UNPA's) to the authorities of the Republic of Croatia

(New York, February 03, 1993)



OUTGOING  
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CZN-172

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

-3 93 FEB 17 1617  
MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

CZN-173 p2/6  
MOST IMMEDIATE 010/12

DATE: 3 February 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-151

SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST

1. You would recall that on 30 January 1993 I had written to Susak advising him of our concerns about reports of Croatian Army movements and possible build-up for actions in Sector West; in that letter I had also advised him that we had issued instructions to our units in that Sector to take effective action to prevent any attempts at use of force in the UNPA there. Subsequently, on 1 February 1993, I had again advised him by telephone of further reports I had received. Our UNPROFOR-2-140 of that date refers.

2. We have today received some reports from Commander, Sector West, of Croatian Army activities (copy of his cable attached), which though not definitively establishing preparations for offensive action, give cause for some concern. A copy of a letter I have received today from General Novakovic of the Serb TDF is also attached. You may wish to call in the Croatian PermRep and apprise him that you have been made aware of such developments and cautioning him against any actions in contravention of SCR-802; such actions will be resisted.

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AT HIS  
REQUEST

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ZAGREB



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TVA 1034	TOT	SW HQ 755	Sg: 10	Date: 0302
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Page 1 of 2

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/~~IMMEDIATE~~/MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CPVPTO/EYES ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO: T 0302	DATE: 03 FEB 92 1030
TO: HQ UNPROFOR - EAGREB	FROM: HQ Sector West
FAX NO:	FAX:
ATTN: COS	FILE REF NO : DRAFTER : B.C. Taylor, Maj TITLE : Ops O RELEASING OFF: [Signature] SIGNATURE : [Signature]
INFO : FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: COMD ASSESSMENT	

MESSAGE

Ref: COS FAX, MOST IMMEDIATE, 021425A JAN 93

1. Although there is no concrete evidence of a build up of CA Military Forces next to the UNPA there is a definite increase in military traffic. Most of it are buses with uniformed soldiers and a larger than usual number of military trucks. Most of the activity is in and around N. Gradiska (Approx 8K East of UNPA). The number of uniformed soldiers on the streets in N. Gradiska has increased markedly as well. Some have been observed marching in coy size groups and some have been observed boarding trains.

2. The largest concentration of CA forces near the UNPA is in a training camp at STRMAC area Grid XL8724 (2-3K East from UNPA). SAs and mortars have been observed in that area in the past. Lately some administrative vehicles have been seen on the road between STRMAC & N. Gradiska in both directions, but no evidence of a change in this area. A backhoe with military personnel was seen digging what could be Artillery emplacements in the area of Grid XL8310 (about 3K from East of the UNPA within 200 to 300 meters South of the highway). Fresh trenches have also been observed west of Novska on the south side of the highway area Grid XL5023 about 8K from the UNPA.

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- DFC



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3. There are a number of "rumours" from Croatian civilians in the UNPA that some sort of Croatian military activity will take place in the UNPA between 15 - 21 Feb. Dates have been quoted from different sources at different times but all have been consistently within this time frame. Some military aged persons living in the area have been warned for mobilization and some people have reportedly made plans to move their families out of the area.

4. Day and night patrols are being conducted by the UNMOs and close liaison is being maintained with SCMM to monitor any evidence of military movements near the UNPA but despite the activity mentioned above there is no specific significant military deployments which can be seen as directly associated with the UNPA.

*(Signature)*  
B Ben

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C2N-173

ps/c

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA  
SERBIAN ARMY HQ  
NO. 01 - Int. 79  
Knin, 03.02.1993

PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK ON THE SECTOR WEST,  
PROTEST is to be delivered:

UNPROFOR HQ - ZAGREB (Lt Gen S. NAMBIAR)

SECTOR WEST HQ

THE RSK STATE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR, KNIN

Dear Sirs,

We've already informed you, on several occasions, that CA had concentrated strong forces on the RSK borders, that is, in the UNPA of the Sector West. We have a reliable information that 6-7 CA brigades are committed for an attack on the RSK territory in the Sector West, which was temporarily postponed.

The following units are prepared and concentrated: 2nd guard brigade of CA, 7th guard brigade of CA, 105th brigade of CA, CA 121st brigade, CA 125th brigade and CA 127th brigade.

Such a concentration of forces can not lead to peace, for sure.

Dear Sirs,

You know at what extent we obeyed your requirements and at what extent we relied on you. That makes your responsibility bigger. We do not harbor illusions nor have confidence in Croatian Authorities and CA. They are just waiting for an opportunity to commence attack on that Sector. We are sure that it will happen soon.

We request you to inform the SC and the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali himself, about this.

We expect your personal intervention, too, as well as taking of the concrete measures.

Best Regards,

COMMANDER

Brig Gen Mile Novakovic

03/02/93 AS

A4 -> A4

11-866



CZNAI PGK

2300

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3/3

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO GEN 803

FROM: UNMLO, HAJ, HOUSE 42

03 9,10 A FEB 93

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA  
GLAVNI STAB SRPSKE VOJSKE  
Broj 01-int. 79  
Knin, 03. 02. 1993. godine

Priprema napada na sektoru  
"Zapad", protest nastavlja. -

KOMANDI UNPROFOR-a ZAGREB (na ličnost gen.-ppuk. Satiše Nembijara)

KOMANDI SEKTORA "ZAPAD"

DRŽAVNOM KOMITETU RSK ZA SARADNJU SA UNPROFOR-om KNIN

Poštovana gospodo!

Već smo vas obavestili u nekoliko informacija da je HV skoncentrisala velike snage na granicama Republike SK, odnosno u zoni pod zaštitom UN-sektora "Zapad". Pouzdano znamo da je za napad na teritoriju RSK, sektor "Zapad" koji je bio privremeno odložen, angažovano 6-7 brigada HV.

Pripremljene su i skoncentrisane sledeće jedinice: 2. gardijska brigada HV, 7. gardijske brigada HV, 105. brigada HV, 121. brigada HV, 125. brigada HV i 127. brigada HV.

Ovakva koncentracija snaga sigurno ne vodi miru.


Poštovano gospodo!

Vi znate u kojoj smo meri na ovom prostoru ispoštovali vaše zahteve i u kojoj meri smo se oslonili na vas. Vaša je odgovornost tim veća. Mi ne gajimo iluzije i poverenje u hrvatsku vlast i hrvatsku vojsku. Oni samo čekaju pogodnu priliku da otpočnu sa napadom i na ovom sektoru. Ubedjeni smo da će to isto brzo doći.

Molimo vas da o ovome obavestite i Savet bezbednosti i lično sekretara UN gospodina Butrosa Galija.

Očekujemo i vaše lično angažovanje i preduzimanje konkretnih mera.

S poštovanjem.





C2N-162  
C2A-129

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR  
Palais des Nations  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE 20:06

P.12  
220/53  
010/12

90 FEB 19 10:06

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEWYORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 1 FEBRUARY 1993

*Handwritten signature*  
*W. J.*

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-141

SUBJECT : LETTER FROM GENERAL BOBETKO

SELF-EXPLANATORY LETTER OF TODAY'S DATE FROM GENERAL BOBETKO IS  
FAXED HERewith FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

ENDALL

DISTRIBUTION:	
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REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE  
GLAVNI STOŽER HV

CROATIAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Class: 804-01/93-03/02

No: 512-06-01-93-5

Zagreb, 1 February 1993

C2A-162  
C2G-129

P2/2

Lt.Gen. Satish Nambiar  
FORCE COMMANDER  
UNPROFOR

Dear Mr. General,

Artillery actions on the whole of the territory held by the Croatian forces at the present, commenced today at 07.00 hrs. An infantry attack, combined with armoured forces, strength of two companies, reinforced with an armoured platoon, started at 10.00 hrs, in the direction of Kašić. Also, a smaller column, strength of one company, directed its activities in the direction of Sukošan. Helicopter transporting activities were registered. Great material damage was caused at 07.25 hrs, in the village Debeljak, near Sukošan, in an explosion caused by a railroad car full of explosives, which the aggressor have sent down the tracks, with intentions for it to be activated in Zadar.

We ask for an intervention, because we shall not open the fire, regardless of artillery attacks, unless they start with actions against the Republic of Croatia's Armed Forces

I ask you, Mr. General, for your intervention in order to calm down the situation, because this is all about the reinforcements of Šešelj's and Arkan's Chetniks, who came from Belgrade and are active along the entire frontline.

I'll avail of the opportunity to inform you that I have issued necessary instructions to prevent movement restrictions of your observers. You have to understand that, for the sake of their own personal safety, they will be escorted by our liaison officers.

I would appreciate if you would send me the informations at your disposal that could help me, and of which you feel that I have no knowledge about.

Sincerely yours,

General Janko Bobetko  
Chief of Staff

0711-161  
CZA-128

MOST IMMEDIATE

P12 219/93

COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

010/12

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

-1 93 FEB 15 13 36 Z

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

93 FEB -1 15:52

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

DATE: 1 February 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-140

*Handwritten signature*  
H. G. M.

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SECTOR WEST

1. I called Susak at 1500 hours today to recall the contents of my attached letter of 30 January 1993 and to inform him of my concern at unconfirmed reports of abnormal Croatian Army moves in the areas adjoining Sector West. I cautioned him against any confrontation by his forces against UNPROFOR troops.

2. He gave me another of his solemn assurances that Croatian forces were not intending to take any actions in Sector West.

3. He informed me that Bobetko was sending me a letter apprising me of Serb counter-attacks in the Zadar area today; I have yet to receive that communication.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

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UNPROFOR

CZN-161  
CZA-128

2/2

CZN-196  
CZA-123

30 January 1993

Dear Mr. Susak,

I have to inform you that we have been receiving reports from various quarters indicating a rise in the level of tension in and around Sector West.

As you will appreciate, this gives me much concern. I should like you to take note that orders have been issued to the Sector Commander to take all appropriate additional measures to defend the confrontation line, in the context of the mandates conferred upon UNPROFOR by the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,  
*Satish*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

Mr. Gojko Susak  
Minister of Defence  
Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb

OUT GOING

CODE RESTRICTED

CZN-160  
C2G-127

UNOG TELECOM. UNIT  
Palais des Nations

OUTGOING CABLE

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

'93 FEB -1 14:50 INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 1 February 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-139

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SECTOR SOUTH -  
UPDATE AS OF 1300 HOURS ON 1 FEBRUARY 1993

1. Further to our sitrep of today's date, situation update in Sector South, as of 1300 hours today, is as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. Peruca Area. Situation is reported as quiet.

3. Zemunik-Maslenica Area. Kenbat reported that Serb TDF fired artillery from the Biljane area at approximately 0805 hours. They also reported that two armed helicopters, which had landed earlier at Benkovac at 0730 hours, took off in the north west direction at 0850 hours. One of them landed back at Benkovac at 0910 hours with one rocket fired. UNMO liaison team in Zadar was informed by CA liaison officer this morning that Serb TDF tanks were firing from Skabrnje and Biljane towards Zadar. He also alleged that the TDF had fired a Luna (surface to surface) missile towards Debeljak 3177. This information has not been confirmed by our sources.

4. Kakma Area. Exchange of artillery fire commenced in the general area at 0735 hours. Endall.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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LV	DB
	JW



CZN - 159  
CZG - 126

216/93  
010/12

UNOG IMMEDIATE  
UNOG - UN Comm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
UNIT  
UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR ZAGREB

OUTGOING CRYPTO

MOST IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING

93 FEB -1 14:50

Page 1 of 1

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 1 FEBRUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 138

SUBJECT: REUR MSC-151: PERUCA

*Handwritten signature*  
+ J

DISTRIBUTION:	
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1. No such approaches have been made here.
2. Action undertaken in respect of the dam is that we have UNMOs patrolling the vicinity.
3. There were exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides on 31 January and tension remains high, although we have no reports of firing around the dam itself. The Serbs have consolidated their defensive positions from which, Sector South reports, they can dominate Peruca and adjacent areas by fire and observation. No definitive report can be made at this time in respect of the dam. However, television reports that the British visited it yesterday with their ambassador and experts.
4. Both sides want us to put troops onto the dam; the Croats unconditionally (subject to our protecting their workers), the Serbs in the context of the implementation of operative para. 1 of SCR 802.
5. In accordance with your instructions, I have not asked Rob, who is also concerned over the safety of his troops, to send them back to the dam. In view of Croatian non-compliance with SCR 802 and deceitful statements to us, and potential military action, I would not propose, subject to revised instructions, to expose any UN personnel to the present situation. If 802 is not enforced by Secco, we will most probably have further military action. Knin is now saying that they must know if Secco will act within 48 hours; else they will take their own decisions.

Endall

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CZV-156

CZG-123

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UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

TO: Palais des Nations, GENEVA  
TO: Palais des Nations, NEW YORK

1993 FEB 09 24

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

'93 FEB -1 9:43

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

IMMEDIATE

DATE: 1 February 1993

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR-Z-135

SUBJECT:

SITUATION IN SECTOR WEST

A copy of my letter to Susak on the subject is attached for information.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SR/BR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JW





UNPROFOR

2/2

CZM-156  
CZG-123

30 January 1993

Dear Mr. Susak,

I have to inform you that we have been receiving reports from various quarters indicating a rise in the level of tension in and around Sector West.

As you will appreciate, this gives me much concern. I should like you to take note that orders have been issued to the Sector Commander to take all appropriate additional measures to defend the confrontation line, in the context of the mandates conferred upon UNPROFOR by the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,  
*Satish Nambiar*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

Mr. Gojko Susak  
Minister of Defence  
Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb

CNZ075

CYZ055

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓

FROM: GOULDING, NEW YORK *the hiphouse*

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: MSC 151

SUBJECT: Continued Fighting: United States démarche

1993 JAN 31 A 11 04

93 JAN 31 16:59

Palais des Nations

UNOG (Geneva) UNH

1. United States Permanent Mission called Tharoor Saturday evening to inform him that US Ambassadors/Chargés in Belgrade and Zagreb had been instructed to seek urgent appointments with Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman to express concern about the consequences of the continued fighting, particularly in relation to the risks posed to the Peruca Dam. The United States envoys will urge both parties to withdraw their troops from the area of the Dam and to assist UNPROFOR in demining it. Tharoor took note but recalled that UNPROFOR was not yet in a position to make any commitments regarding the Dam, except in the context of the implementation of resolution 802.

2. Please let us know whether you have received similar approaches at your end, and what action you have undertaken (or propose to undertake) in relation to the Dam itself.

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# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
FROM : VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
DATE : 29 JANUARY 1993  
SUBJECT : ALLEGED SERB ACTIVITY IN SECTOR EAST

*Joseph B. S. Jr.*  
UNPROFOR LO.

The enclosed record of a telephone conversation is forwarded to confirm the telecon Wilson/Campose of 291800 A January 1993.

Mr. Vance:

I asked the Croatian Ambassador what was the message he wanted to convey from the President's office in Zagreb. He gave me the following:

1. The Croatians believe the Serbs may be preparing for an attack in the Osijek area as they have seen tanks on the move. The Croatians themselves have no action in this area.
2. He says there has been a meeting in Borovo Selo between Serbian commanders and a General named Loginov, who is ex-UNPROFOR and is now an adviser to the Serbian Army.
3. The Croatians (Sarinic) have proposed to General Nambiar that UNPROFOR re-take control of Peruca, but the General has refused. This offer is still active on the Croatian side.
4. The Zadar area is now calm and the Croatians have ceased action.

Wilma



## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

M O S T I M M E D I A T E

Page 1 of 3

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
 INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
 FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
 DATE: 29 JANUARY 1993  
 NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 122  
 SUBJECT: PERUCA DAM

*Handwritten signature*  
*Mr. Gm*

29 93 JAN 20 55Z

1. You will by now know the sad story of Peruca. While the indications are, that Serb-placed explosives have caused what may prove an irreparable breach in the dam, we have not arrived at any final conclusions. The conduct of both sides in the area during the past 48 hours has been entirely mendacious and grossly irresponsible, culminating in yesterday's fierce artillery battle around the dam, and the damage it underwent.

2. The Consultants' report of September 1992, para. 3.2.3, deals with "Explosives". It's second sub-paragraph states as follows: -

"Given a sufficiently deep breach the emerging water would wash away the clay, progressively enlarging and deepening the opening until the reservoir was effectively emptied. This process would take some period of time, possibly ranging from a few hours to a few days. Given a peace-time solution with ample earth-moving plant available it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrest this process."

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UNDP Telecomm. Unit  
 Palais des Nations  
 29 JAN 29 21:29

Sad to say, this appears to be what is happening. A journalist who was at the site today told us tonight that the Croats felt they could no longer save the dam, but might be able to prevent a flood-wall tearing down to the sea.

3. I have debated at length with my colleagues over our appropriate course of action. We are still rather shocked - despite our time here - by the brazenness of lying, at all levels of government. It gravely affects the basis for cooperation, and I am unwilling, even in these grave circumstances, again to place at risk the lives of our troops in what may prove to be Peruca's last hours on the basis of any Croatian government assurance. I have accordingly sent the attached letter tonight to Susak.

4. You will, of course, recall, that item 1 (a) for last week's aborted high-level meeting at Maslenica was Maslenica; item 1 (b) was Peruca. The agenda, mercifully, was short. Perhaps - and it is a big perhaps - the destruction caused by this absurd adventure can still also be limited. They were warned; again and again.

Endall





UNPROFOR

CZN-144 P 3/3

29 January 1993

*Dear Mr Susak,*

1. In the exercise of our good offices, we have been discussing the situation in the Peruca dam area with you and the Knin authorities today without, it would seem, any agreement being reached.
2. In the circumstances which have now arisen, I suggest the following course of action: -
  - a. I shall arrange to deploy United Nations observers to the area of the dam as soon as possible;
  - b. an immediate ceasefire should be implemented;
  - c. all your forces in the area should return to the positions at which they were emplaced prior to 22 January 1993, in compliance with Security Council Resolution 802.
3. Experience during the past few days has made it difficult at this time to accept assurances on any of these matters without some reservation. Accordingly, I feel unable in the exercise of my responsibility as Force Commander, to risk the lives of UNPROFOR troops at this site, unless and until your Government has accepted and implemented the provisions of Resolution 802.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,**Satish*Lt Gen Satish Nambiar  
Force CommanderMr. Gojko Susak  
Minister of Defence  
Republic of Croatia

Fax no. 432-415

UNOG Telecommunications Unit  
Palais des Nations

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

93 TO: AN 29 1900 BUILDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 20K-20617

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 29 January 1993

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR-Z-119

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GENERAL NOVAKOVIC

MOST IMMEDIATE

Subject letter, dated 29 January 1993, is forwarded for information.

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CEN-141  
CEN-111  
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HQ SECTOR SOUTH KNIN

TEL: 8711301443

29.Jan:93 12:22 No.017 P.

T 2329 2/3

RSK

HQ RSK Serbian Army

No 01-60

Knin 29.01.93

DISRESPECT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ABOUT PERUCA DAM

UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb (Gen Nambiar)

Sector South HQ

RSK State Committee for Cooperation with UNPROFOR

(RSK Government Bureau in Belgrade)

Even beside our ultimate attempt to take part in security of the dam with our own forces to prevent the dam being damaged and destroy by Croatian Army. On your request we withdrew our Milicija forces yesterday which were in the night 27/28 January engaged in the obstruction of Croatian special units action which as you already know were firing also on UNPROFOR forces.

Withdrawal of our forces from Peruca dam is in accordance with our principle attitude that its status has to be arranged also according to UN Security Council resolutions. However, immediately after withdrawal of our forces, according to your request, Croatian armed forces with incursion of special diversion group and with the action of one brigade in direction Sinj - Vrlika occupied the dam and now keeping it under their control.

We are free, dear gentlemen to draw your attention on your obligation on this situation to, according UN Security Council resolutions, request also the Croatian side to immediately leave Peruca dam and to cede its security to the UNPROFOR forces.

For serious consequences which may appear in further disrespect of UN Security Council resolution, Serbian side will not be responsible of.

Commander  
Major General  
Mile Novakovic



REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA  
 GLAVNI ŠTAB SRPSKE VOJSKE ROK  
 Broj 01-60  
 Knin, 29. 01. 1993. godine

MOST IMMEDIATE  
 TO: GEN ROK T 2329 3  
 FROM: UNPROFOR, EAST ARTER  
 VRLO HITNO

Nepoštovanje Rezolucije  
 Savjeta bezbednosti UN  
 o HE "Peruća"

KOMANDI UNPROFOR-a ZAGREB (na ličnost gen-dpk Nambiaru)  
 KOMANDI SEKTORA "JUG"  
 DRŽAVNI KOMITET ROK ZA SAGLEDANJE SA UNPROFOR-om  
 (Birou Vlade ROK u Beogradu)


I pored naše prvobitne namere da sarađujemo sa snagama učesnicima u obezbeđenju HE Peruća radi sprovođenja njenog odlučivanja i ršenja od strane hrvatske vojske na naše insistiranje u toku jučerašnjeg dana povukli smo milicijske snage koje su tokom noći 27/28. januara bile angažovane u sprovođenju akcija ustaško-hrvatskih specijalnih jedinica koje su kao što vam je poznato, dejstvovala i po snagama UNPROFOR-a.

Povlačenje naših snaga sa HE Peruća u skladu je i s našim principijelnim stavom da se njen status mora urediti i u skladu sa rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti UN.

Medjutim, odmah nakon povlačenja naših snaga, izvršenog u skladu sa vašim zahtevom, hrvatske oružane snage upadom specijalne diverzantske grupe i dejstvom jedne brigade sa pravca Sinj - Vrlika, pojele su branu i sada je drže pod kontrolom.

Slobodni smo, poštovana gospodo da skrenemo pažnju na vašu obaveznu da u nastaloj situaciji u skladu sa rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti UN sada nalazite i hrvatskoj strani da odmah napusti HE "Peruća" i njeno obezbeđenje prepusti snagama UNPROFOR-a.

Za ozbiljne posledice koje bi mogle proisticati u slučaju daljeg nepoštovanja rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti UN Srpska strana ne može snositi odgovornost.





UNOG, Telecom. Unit  
Paris des Nations

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UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

TO UN 29 1993 BOLDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → OK. 20/7/17 29 93 UN 18 52

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

DATE: 29 January 1993

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR Z 118

SUBJECT:

PERUCA DAM - 29 JANUARY 1993  
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AS AT 1700 HOURS

Subject report, prepared by Sector Engineer, Sector South,  
is faxed herewith for your information.

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TWO 11805

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

VBDNR 235.3		UNPROFOR SECTOR SOUTH	
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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE  
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OUTGOING FAX NO.: 834/OPS		DATE/TIME: 291445A JAN 93	
TO: HQ UNPROFOR		FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH	
FAX NO.:		FAX:	
ATTN: DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER COS FE		FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : MAJ DOBBIE TITLE : SEC ENG RELEASING OFF. : SOO SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>	
INFO : D.C.M. FAX NO.:			
SUBJECT: PERUCA DAM TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AS OF 291700AJAN			

MESSAGE

DAMAGE TO PERUCA DAM AS REPORTED BY UNMO AND ECMM ON SITE AT 1130 HRS AND AS OBSERVED ON SKYNEWS IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. 3 MAJOR EXPLOSIONS ON CREST GATE OVERBRIDGE MAIN GALLERY AND CAUSEWAY/ROADWAY ON WEST END OF THE DAM. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ARTY FIRE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH SYMPATHETIC DETONATION CAUSED THE DAMAGE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE DAM BY THE USE OF DEMOLITION CHARGES.

2. WATER IS FLOWING THROUGH A BREACH IN THE MAIN STRUCTURE OF THE DAM AND THE POWER HOUSE IS PARTIALLY SUBMERGED. WATER LEVEL IN PERUCA RESERVOIR HAS DROPPED BY A MAX OF APPROXIMATELY 1M. CROATIAN CIVIL ENGINEERS ARE CURRENTLY USING HEAVY EARTHMOVING EQUIPMENT TO STOP WATER FLOW. APPROXIMATELY 200 WORKERS ARE ASSISTING IN WORKS PROTECTED BY CA.

3. CROATIAN ENGINEER ASSESSMENT IS THAT THEY HAVE THE DAMAGE UNDER CONTROL AND AS A RESULT CIVILIAN POPULATION DOWNSTREAM OF DAM HAS BEEN WARNED FOR EVACUATION. BUT HAS NOT BEEN EVACUATED YET.

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DFC  
COS  
CAO  
CMO



C 21- 140  
C 26- 110

(9/3)

4. CREST GATE OR FLAP GATE OVERBRIDGE STRUCTURE AND PART OF THE MACHINERY HOUSE HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY THE USE OF CUTTING AND CRATERING DEMOLITION CHARGES. THE CAUSEWAY NEAR THE BANK OF THE RESERVOIR ON THE WEST SIDE HAS BEEN CRATERED USING DEMOLITION CHARGES. THE CRATER IS JUST ABOVE THE WATER LEVEL AND IS NOT CONTRIBUTING TO UNCONTROLLED OUTFLOW OF WATER.

5. APPARENT BREACH IN THE CLAY CORE AT THE MIDWAY POINT BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST SIDES OF THE DAM HAS CAUSED A DISPLACEMENT OF THE ROAD SURFACE OF APPROX 1 - 2 METRES. THIS DISPLACEMENT AND THE FACT THAT WATER PURCOLATING ON THE DOWN STREAM SIDE OF THE DAM CONTAINS CLAY PARTICLES CONFIRMS THE RUPTURE OF THE CLAY CORE.

6. BASED ON A WATER LEVEL OF 356.20 28 JAN AND THE FACT THAT THE WATER IS FLOWING OVER THE CREST GATE WHICH CEASES TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUTFLOW AT RESERVOIR LEVEL 355.25 THE MAX DROP IN WATER LEVEL POSSIBLE CAUSED BY RUPTURE IS 0.95 METRES WHICH IS A MAX OUTFLOW OF 18.4 MILLION CUBIC METRES. THE CONTRIBUTION OF OUTFLOW BY THE CREST GATE BASED ON A 12 HR PERIOD IS APPROX 0.60 MILLION CUBIC METRES. THEREFORE THE RUPTURE COULD BE PASSING AS A MAX 411 CUBIC METRES OF WATER PER SECOND. SHOULD THE WATER LEVEL IN THE RESERVOIR BE 355.75 METRES THE WATER PASSING THROUGH THE RUPTURE COULD BE AS HIGH AS 208 CUBIC METRES PER SECOND. FROM TELEVISION PICTURES IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE WATER LEVEL BUT IT APPEARED TO BE JUST ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE FULLY OPENED CREST GATE. THE ABOVE CALCULATIONS ARE PROVIDED TO GIVE A RANGE OF POSSIBLE UNCONTROLLED OUTFLOW THROUGH THE RUPTURE. IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THIS OUTFLOW WILL CAUSE FURTHER EROSION OF THE CLAY CORE THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO A COMPLETE BREACH OF THE MAIN DAM STRUCTURE.

7. ESB INTL IN THEIR SAFETY REPORT TO UNPROFOR STATED IN PARAGRAPH 3.2.3 THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO ARREST THE PROCESS OF THE EROSION OF THE CLAY CORE. POSSIBLE OUTFLOW AS CALCULATED IN PARA 6 ABOVE EMPHASIZES THE DIFFICULTY. MR MACAN CHIEF ENGINEER RESPONSIBLE FOR PERUCA DAM DAMAGE CONTROL WILL BE ASSESSING PROGRESS OF REPAIRS LATER THIS EVENING. UNMOs WILL ATTEMPT TO GET INFO AND WILL PASS TO SEC ENGR AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. THIS INFO WILL BE PASSED TO HQ UNPF IF AND WHEN RECEIVED.

010/12  
198/93

1993-01-30 03:08

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓  
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 29 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-144  
SUBJECT: Peruca Dam

*[Handwritten signature]*  
3 JAN 30 1993  
P 10:00

1. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has advised us that they have a Swiss team of civil engineers which could be made available on short notice in the event that an independent assessment of the damage to the Peruca Dam is considered useful. The team recently provided its expertise on the Mojkovac Dam situation in Northern Montenegro.

2. DHA, in cooperation with UNHCR, is also preparing contingency plans in case an evacuation of the area below the Peruca Dam is required.

3. At this stage, this is for your information only, in case the situation evolves. Our overall guidance remains as our MSC-140.

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Pavé des Nations  
JAN 30 - 5:49

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THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT  
Zagreb, Opatička 8  
tel. 38 41 445 661, fax. 38 41 433 988

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## Statement from the Office of the President

Friday, 29 January, 1993.

Yesterday morning Serbian paramilitary forces, together with a group of Vojislav Šešelj's četniks from Serbia, committed aggression against the Peruća hydroelectric dam near Sinj. At approximately 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 28, members of the Kenyan UNPROFOR battalion were expelled by the aggressor, who succeeded in occupying the dam site. Local authorities sent to hold talks with the aggressor were held hostage and one delegate was brutally murdered. The aggressors assault on the dam has caused a considerable amount of damage; the destruction of machinery at the hydrocenter, the demolition of the access bridge and the setting off of explosions in a number of places.

Croatian defence forces decisively responded and secured control of the dam and surrounding territory. UNPROFOR officials were immediately called to return to their original positions and resume control of the dam, which has hitherto not been fulfilled.

Croatian authorities as early as last night sent a group of experts to assess the current condition of the dam. Their report focused on the imminent real danger that through the build up of water - and damage caused to the dam - further damage and even the complete destruction of the dam could occur. The experts on the spot are putting an enormous amount of effort into preventing this disaster from occurring and have requested that the United Nations send their own experts. Serbian extremists have been warned to desist their assaults so as to enable workers, with the aid of relevant equipment, to repair the damage.

A precise program has been established in the event of a disaster, which includes the evacuation of residents in vulnerable areas. For this reason, people have been requested not to respond to provocations and not to succumb to panic, but to follow strict instructions from relevant authorities who have the situation under control. The Croatian Prime Minister, Mr. Hrvoje Šarinić has personally arrived on the site.



THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Zagreb, Opatička 8

tel. 38 41 445 661, fax. 38 41 433 988

Ivan Milas

Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Croatian Government

*telephone statement - Friday, 29 January, 1992, at 9:30 a.m.*

## **From the Peruča dam - Eyewitness account of the most barbarian action in the history of mankind.**

The Peruča dam has been mined in several places, threatened to erode with tragic consequences. At this moment experts at the dam site are carefully monitoring the changes and confirm that there is no immediate danger of a monumental catastrophe. Urgent emergency measures are being taken. The residents of Cetina, as far as Omiš, have been instructed of procedures and are prepared to evacuate accordingly. We wish to avoid both the loss of human life and damage to the economic activity in the area, which can be disastrous for Croatia. We have urgently called for world experts in large dams from international organizations to immediately come to Peruča, and we have sent reports to the United Nations and informed the international news agencies, requesting urgent international action. In light of the imminent threat of great damage, which Croatia cannot afford, we request the United Nations and international public to prepare urgent assistance of every kind.

*In the name of the Crisis Headquarters:*

Ivan Putanec, General Director of Croatian Electro-power Industry.



29/01/93 16:30 2227/31272  
January 28, 1993



PRESS RELEASE

## **CROATIAN MILITARY AND POLICE ACTIONS IN THE ZADAR REGION**

The recent limited action of the police and military forces of the Republic of Croatia in the region of Zadar was aimed at securing the building site of the Maslenica bridge which forms a vital transportation link between central Croatia and the coastal region in the south of the Croatian republic. The bridge and parts of the highway which cross it were occupied by the Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitary forces in 1991, effectively cutting off the coastal region of Croatia with the Croatian heartland. Therefore, the Croatian action was necessary in order to economically, logistically and socially reintegrate the coastal region of Croatia with the rest of the Republic, as well as to facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assistance to this region and also to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose sole link to Croatia is the above-mentioned highway. It should be noted that the coastal region of Croatia contains a population of 700,000 along with an added 200,000 refugees who had fled the Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The city of Zadar had been particularly cut off from the rest of Croatia making it difficult not only for its return to normal economic activity, but also in providing assistance to tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons who had streamed into the city as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing which was carried out in the areas to the immediate north and east of the city. The Serbian atrocities perpetrated against unarmed elderly Croatian men and women in the towns of Skabrnje and Nadin in the proximity of Zadar, and which were documented in a recent Helsinki Watch report, are still remembered for their exceptional brutality and cold-bloodedness. The actions of the Croatian police and military mentioned above were predominantly carried out in the so-called "pink zone" in the district of Zadar.

The "pink zones" are regions of Croatia which had been occupied by the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitaries during their aggression against Croatia in 1991. The "pink zones" had a pre-war population of 78,045, of which Croats formed the majority (see attached map). These territories should have been returned to the authority of the Government of Croatia as soon as UNPROFOR assumed responsibility within UNPA Sectors South and North and the Croatian Government had issued an Amnesty Act (S/RES/762, op. para. 5; S/24188, para. 16). Although



29/01/93 18:58 2227/31272 PAGE 04  
both of these provisions had been met long ago by the Croatian authorities, these territories were never returned to the administrative system of the Government of Croatia due to the intransigence, lack of cooperation and stalling tactics of illegal Serbian paramilitary forces in this region. These militant Serbian formations, which should have been disbanded by UNPROFOR according to the Vance peace plan, continued to perpetrate acts of terrorism and ethnic cleansing against the remaining Croatian population.

The "pink zone" in the district of Zadar (which has the same name as its largest city) consisted of an area of 135 square kilometers and contained a pre-war population of 11,535 of which the vast majority (8,822 or 76.5%) were Croats (see attached table). In the case of Zadar, the restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zone" will mean that thousands of refugees who had fled this region from fear of Serbian ethnic cleansing can return to their homes.

The Croatian Government had recently informed the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia about its intention to establish control over this territory in the "pink zone" located in the district of Zadar. The return of this territory to the authority of the Croatian Government was agreed to in the Vance plan and was a major factor in Croatia's acceptance of this plan. The restoration of this territory to Croatian authority was envisaged by the reports of the Secretary-General concerning Security Council resolution 762 (1992). In paragraph 3 of his report (S/24188) he emphasized that "the Croatian authorities are correct in their interpretation of the plan approved by the Security Council, which does not provide for any change in the UNPA boundaries" and "therefore they were under no obligation to agree to an adjustment of the agreed boundaries in those sectors in order to circumvent the problem".



010/12



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE

Zagreb, January 29th, 1993.

UNPROFOR HEADQUARTERS  
Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

Dear General,

- 1.) I am informed that today at 11.00 a.m. the Chetniks will attack the Peruca dam and our forces that are defending the accesses to Peruca.
- 2.) About the fact that yesterday they mined the bridge and damaged the dam we already informed You, as well as Mr. Vance.
- 3.) Now I beg You and I warn You to take action for the stopping of the aggression on the Peruca dam. At Peruca there are more than 200 workers and civilians whose lives are in danger.
- 4.) Your forces still didn't take their positions on Peruca. I beg You to give the necessary orders to Your units.

Please give us information about the development of the situation and about the actions taken, so that we can make further decisions.

Yours sincerely,

General Janko Bobetko



CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE  
CROATIAN ARMY

YZF 333 -01

010/12  
187/93

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

3858

93 JA 28 15 48Z '93 JAN 28 17:47

DATE: 28 January 1993

TO: UNPROFOR ZAGREB INFO: VANCE, GENEVA	FROM: MARRACK GOULDING DPKO UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK
FAX NO:	FAX NO: (212) 963-9222
ATTN: GENERAL NAMBIAR	

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 2

Regret text of Presidential Statement attached to our MSC 135 was the penultimate version. Attached please find revised text as adopted.

\* COPY ATTACHED  
FOR REF. *mm.*

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~~Draft~~ Presidential Statement on Croatia

The Security Council is deeply concerned to learn from the Secretary-General that the offensive by the Croatian armed forces continues unabated in flagrant violation of resolution 802 (1993) of 23 January 1993, at a crucial time in the peace process.

The Council demands that military action by all parties and others concerned cease immediately. It further demands that all parties and others concerned comply fully and immediately with all the provisions of resolution 802 (1993) and with other relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Council once again demands that all parties and others concerned respect fully the safety of United Nations personnel and guarantee their freedom of movement. The Council reiterates that it will hold the political and military leaders involved in the conflict responsible and accountable for the safety of the United Nations peace-keeping personnel in the area.

The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter, in particular with a view to considering what further steps might be necessary to ensure that resolution 802 (1993) and other relevant Security Council resolutions are fully implemented.

MSG-135

CNZ 067 CYZ 048 P5/5

### Draft presidential Statement on Croatia

The Security Council is deeply concerned to learn from the Secretary-General that the offensive by the Croatian armed forces continues unabated in flagrant violation of resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, at a crucial time in the peace process.

AMENDED. [ The Council demands that the Croatian authorities cease immediately their military action. ] It further demands that all parties and others concerned comply fully and immediately with all the provisions of resolution 802 (1993) and with other relevant Security Council resolutions.

AMENDED. [ The Council once again demands that all parties and others concerned respect fully the safety of United Nations personnel. ] The Council reiterates that it will hold the political and military leaders involved in the conflict responsible and accountable for the safety of the United Nations peace-keeping personnel in the area.

The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter, in particular with a view to considering what further steps might be necessary to ensure that resolution 802 (1993) and other relevant Security Council resolutions are fully implemented.



010/12



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd St., Suite 3108  
New York, New York 10017

Tel. (212) 986-1585  
Fax (212) 986-2011

New York, 28 January 1993

**H.E. Yoshio Hatano**  
**President of the Security Council**  
**UNITED NATIONS**  
**New York**

DISTRIBUTION:	
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Your Excellency,

The Republic of Croatia accepts the message of the Presidential statement [document S/23110] issued at the meeting of the Security Council on 27 January 1993. All the advances of Croatian Army have ceased. However, the Serbian side - paramilitary units and "militia" - continues its offensive, which Croatia regards as continuation of the aggression on its territory. In spite of that, Croatia will continue to take all necessary steps in implementing its obligations under the Resolution 802 (1993). In the light of this recent events, Croatian Army is now forced to act defensively, and the Republic of Croatia cannot be responsible for prolonged hostilities.

The illegal and extremist leadership in Knin, aided by the Serbian authorities in Belgrade, wish to keep the front-line active - thus exerting additional pressure on the Republic of Croatia in Security Council, in an attempt to undermine the peace talks in Geneva. There have been various independent reports that thousands of well-armed men - so-called "volunteers" - are coming from Serbia to "help their Serbian brothers in the Republic of Krajina", in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 769 (1992). We have reason to believe that this has been orchestrated and organized by the regime in Belgrade.


Serbian offensive now poses a serious threat to the security of UN personnel in the region. Consequently, Serbian paramilitary units have regained the control of the Peruca dam, and are now threatening to destroy it; they are keeping members of the Kenyan battalion of UNPROFOR as hostages on the site of the dam; as reported by the Secretary General, they are holding 21 UN personnel hostage in Benkovac. Croatia is providing UNPROFOR with all the necessary help to ensure its safety.

These events are contrary to Croatian goals - establishing peace in the region, normalization of the living conditions of civilian population, and rebuilding and reconstruction of infrastructure. The crucial and strategic aims of the limited Croatian action are the facilitation of road communication through Adriatic highways, and the voluntary return of refugees in the "pink zone" adjacent to the UNPA Sector South.

We kindly ask the Security Council to further encourage the UN forces on the ground to help mediate a local cease-fire, so that a comprehensive negotiations on the political settlement can be continued, in accordance with the Vance Plan. Croatia urges the Security Council to use its authority in order to enable the implementation of the resolutions 762 (1992), 769 (1992), 779 (1992), 802 (1993), and all other relevant resolutions. We reiterate our firm belief that a lasting peace and stability in the region cannot be achieved without enforcing the three pillars of the Vance Plan: disarming and dismantling all the paramilitary units in the UNPA's, restitution of the heavy weapons to the custody of UNPROFOR, and the immediate voluntary return of all the refugees and displaced persons.

I kindly ask for your assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of Croatia to the United Nations





CNZ 070 CYZ 051 P1/1

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

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**CODED CABLE**

'93 JAN 29 -3 :39

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓  
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 28 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-140  
SUBJECT: Peruca Dam

1993 JAN 28 P 9:34

UNATIONS

*fx* *[Signature]*

Thank you for your most illuminating UNPROFOR Z-112.  
We fully support the line taken in your letter of 28 January to  
Defence Minister Susak. UNPROFOR should only consider resumption  
of authority in the dam area as part of the arrangements for the  
full and unconditional implementation of Security Council  
resolution 802.

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CZ6-106

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO-CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

20 JAN 1993 0

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
93 JAN 28 20:25  
Page of 5

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → ok 2110  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG  
FROM : NAMBIAR. ZAGREB *Plant. l. or Gen*  
DATE : 28 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 112  
SUBJECT: Situation in Peruca Dam Area

1. After 24 hours of disingenuousness which, even by local standards, has been startling, I have just received a letter on Peruca from Defence Minister Susak - copy attached. I have sent him an interim reply, also attached. The message also came from Bobetko/Letica in Zadar to Peterson, who is currently informing Spanovic on the matter. I am awaiting news from her, and clarifications from Rob as to the situation on the ground. So far as we are currently informed, while everyone has left the actual dam itself, they are all milling around in the general vicinity. The Croats have advanced right up to the periphery, and the Serbs have apparently withdrawn some kilometres, but are bringing up armour in support of their infantry. The prior sequence of events has been as follows:

2. At 1500 hours today our reports indicated that a fierce battle was raging in the area of Peruca dam with intense artillery and rocket fire being exchanged by both sides. Allegations and counter-allegations against each other were being presented to us, but what seemed to be happening on the ground was that the CA was attacking the Dam area and the Serbs were fiercely resisting.

3. Separate UNMO teams were sent out from Sinj to the headquarters of the CA Brigade, and the Serb TDF at Knin and Vrlika, respectively, to try to get a clearer picture of events. The team which visited CA 126 Brigade headquarters at Sinj, at 1600 hours, was told by the CA LO that the CA had captured both sides of the Dam and that they had forced the Serbs to withdraw. He added that they were occupying the area around Dervans 8651, but that the area of the dam itself was not occupied any more by either the Serbs or the CA. He mentioned that they had captured two Belgrade journalists in the Peruca area.

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4. The team which visited the Serb TDF headquarters were told that the CA had captured the Dam area and that the Serbs had withdrawn to Maljkovo. They later visited Maljkovo and saw some soldiers there, in a state of disarray, and they noticed five buses with soldiers which were moving rearwards towards Vrlika. On their way back, between Maljkovo and Vrlika, they met General Lukic, TDF commander, who confirmed that the Dam was under CA control. He added that there were no Serbs left in the Dam area and that it was likely that the CA would destroy the dam in such a manner as to put the blame on the Serbs. On the way back from Vrlika to Knin, the team observed six T-72 tanks and four SA-6 mobile anti-aircraft missile launchers heading towards the Vrlika direction.

5. At 1835 hours, Defence Minister Susak telephoned me to say that the Peruca dam area was under the control of the CA. Earlier, when I had contacted him to protest the CA shelling of the Peruca dam, Susak, like Bobetko the night before, had given a categorical assurance that the information given by the TDF about CA shelling was wrong and that they were not attacking in the area. (Last night, we had again noted Bobetko's histrionic capability, this time solo, for over an hour; evidently sent by Tudjman and Susak to perform for us.) This evening, Susak told me that the CA was holding the area to the sides of the dam but were not occupying the dam itself. He offered to hand over the dam to Kenbat control immediately.

6. Susak's kind offer to return the dam to UNPROFOR control (while still occupying the dominating area around it) has several layers of meaning. For my part, I am at present disinclined to risk our troops' lives on top of it. We would be vastly convenient scapegoats if the place were blown up deliberately, or as a result of shelling. Each has already publicly played the card:- "the other side is going to blow it up and ensure that we are blamed".

7. Peterson has now reported that Spanovic's reaction to this gift horse was also circumspect. They were always, he said, in favour of ceasefires, but there were one or two small clarifications. The Croatian offer made no mention of 802:- when were they ready to withdraw to their previous positions, instead of making continuous advances?

8. He also warned her that they believed that the Croats had not the least intention of abiding by 802. They were, he said, untruthfully stating, tonight, that the Serbs were shelling Zadar again: he had just checked (1830 hours) and no shell had been fired on Zadar. He wanted to warn us, with the utmost seriousness, that he expected the main Croat attack to take place tonight or tomorrow, and that there would be considerable escalation.

C2N-134  
C26-106

9. They have evidently decided to try to re-insure themselves with UNPROFOR. They want to make peace with the French battalion today, and on local television to instruct the population on correct behaviour towards UNPROFOR and, especially, the French. They say they are relying on the Security Council to get the Croats out, and Spanovic came up with the idea, tonight, of him doing a joint press conference with UNPROFOR in Knin. Peterson said we would think about it.

10. Guidance on accepting Peruca, once again, would be appreciated.

11. CIVPOL Commissioner Johansen has today brought back to Knin 11 of the 21 police detained in Benkovac. The remaining 10 will come tomorrow. The deal - which suits us, too - is that a new group of 10 will return to run the Benkovac police station. They will have freedom of movement and the right to withdraw if the security situation requires.

Endall.





UNPROFOR

CZN-134  
CZG-106

28 January 1993

My dear Mr Susak,

1. Thank you for your letter of date which I have just received.

2. I have asked my colleagues in Sector South to ascertain and apprise me of the status of the situation in the Peruca Dam area. On receipt of details from them, I shall, in consultation with New York, determine the appropriate course of action in the context of Security Council Resolution 802.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

FAX NUMBER: 432-415

Mr. Gojko Susak  
Minister of Defence  
Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb





190/93  
010/12

C 2N-1032  
C 2G-104  
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Palais des Nations  
'93 JAN 28 19:12

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
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ZAGREB

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE 28 23 00 18 05 Z

I M M E D I A T E

Page 1 of 1

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *204 1940*  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG  
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB *Blank*  
DATE : 28 JANUARY 1993 *19 Jan*  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- *110*  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GERMAN AMBASSADOR

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*CC SA. 2 AR brief*

German ambassador Weisel is a regular caller and he came today to see DCM for an hour of informal exchange. He made a number of points:- that he had been having "a very stormy" session with Tudjman, who had evidently miscalculated on the Maslenica action. First, he had thought that his army could do it quickly; second, he evidently believed he had received a green light from various persons including Mitterand, the two co-Chairmen, and Cosic (Weisel stated that Tudjman was insistent on this under questioning, the latter telling him that, in diplomatic circles, one did not have precise undertakings but, instead, more muted - but equally unambiguous - signals. I should also say that senior members of the western press say that they have also been briefed to this effect. Weisel volunteered that the Germans had told Croatia that their condemnation of its resort to force was not only token. However, he went on to speak of mandate renewal, and said he thought that there would now be a case for sanctions not being removed against Belgrade until political agreements regarding the sectors had been concluded. (We took the opportunity to respond that we thought that only by a judicious mixture of carrot and stick could anyone hope to get either element in Croatia to behave with necessary moderation.) He spoke (with feeling) about recent Croatian mendacity, saying that nobody should believe a word they said. In this context, it emerged that this morning Susak, before the assembled diplomatic community called in for briefing, had told them that UNPROFOR had arranged an 0600 ceasefire today, and that it was holding. We had to tell him that there was not a word of truth in this statement, either.

I shall be briefing the local diplomats tomorrow afternoon, in the first of a proposed regular series of meetings with them.

Endall

010/12



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE

*Zagreb, January 28 th, 1993.*

UNPROFOR HEADQUARTERS  
Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

*My dear general,*

- 1.) Thank You for everything that You and Your associates are doing for trying to establish cease-fire in and near the Peruca dam.*
- 2.) I and general Bobetko have been in touch with all our commanders in the area and according to our informations nobody's forces are at Peruca dam at present.*
- 3.) I want to assure You that the Croatian army will cease the operation and guarantee from our side security of the UN-troups if they are willing to go back to Peruca dam and take full control of it.*
- 4.) If You could inform us about Your decision on this proposal it would be greatly appreciated.*

*With warm regards,*

*Yours sincerely,*

DEFENSE MINISTER



*Gojko Šušak*



C 2N-130  
C 2G-103

010/12 186/93

(1/4)

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE ZAGREB

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 28 93 JA 15 47Z  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB MOST IMMEDIATE  
DATE: 28 January 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-108  
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN PERUGA - LETTER FROM IVAN MILAS

Attached letter from Mr. Ivan Milas, and my response thereto, is forward for information.

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93 JAN 28 16:20



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ZAGREB

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C2N-130  
C2G-103PERUCA DAM*My Dear Mr Milas,*

1. Thank you for your letter No. 5030107-92-145 dated 28 January 1993.
2. According to the latest reports I have, there is a fairly intense battle going on in the Peruca Dam area with heavy shelling by the Croatian Forces, as well as by the Serbs. The question therefore of reintroducing any UNPROFOR troops, who were withdrawn from the dam site this morning, due to the shelling they were being subjected to, does not arise.
3. It is up to the Croatian Army to cease operations in the area if a disaster is to be averted.

*With warm regards,  
Yours sincerely,**Mr. V. N.*Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

FAX NO: 38 41 443 735

Mr. Ivan Milas  
Vice Prime Minister of the government  
of the Republic of Croatia and  
President of the Government's Commission  
for UNPROFOR  
Zagreb





CEN-130  
C26-103

(3/4)

**GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
Government's Commission for UNPROFOR**

CI. 800-01/92-01/05  
No. 5030107-92-145

Zagreb, January 28, 1993

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

**Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar**

**Chief of Mission  
Force Commander  
UNPROFOR**

Dear general,

We have learned that the Serbian paramilitary formations penetrated into the area of Peruća Dam, which was under UNPROFOR control, expelled therefrom the members of KENBAT and destroyed the bridge which was the constructive part of the dam system. Apart from the fact that the status of the area was violated and that the coercive act against UNPROFOR was committed, this deed also jeopardized the stability of the dam, which could cause both incalculable ecological and human catastrophe in the whole region under the dam.

We demand the measures to be taken in order to bring the dam under UNPROFOR control and to undertake other measures in order to prevent the threatening disaster.

With respect,

**Vice-president of the Government of the Republic of Croatia  
President of the Government's Commission for UNPROFOR**

**Ivan Milas**



CZN-130  
CZG-103

FAX-117-865

4/4

28 93 JAN 13 402

**VLADA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE**  
**Državna komisija za UNPROFOR**

Kl. 800-01/92-01/05  
No. 5030107-92-145

Zagreb, 28. siječanj, 1993.

**VRLO HITNO !**

**Lt. Gen. Sotish Namblar**

**Šef Misije**  
**Zapovjednik snaga**  
**UNPROFOR**

**Štovani Lt. Gen. Namblar**

Doznali smo da su srpske paravojske formacije ušle na područje brane Peruća, koja je pod kontrolom UNPROFOR-a, protjerale s tog područja Kenijski bataljun i srušile most koji je sastavni dio sustava brane. Osim što je time povrijeđen status tog područja i izvršen nasilni akt protiv UNPROFOR-a, ugrožena je stabilnost brane, što može dovesti do nesagledive ekološke i ljudske katastrofe na cijelom području lapod brane.

Tražimo da poduzmete sve mjere da vratite branu pod kontrolu UNPROFOR-a i da poduzmete druge mjere radi sprečavanja prijetnje katastrofe.

**Uz puno štovanje,**

**Potpredsjednik Vlade Republike Hrvatske**  
**Predsjednik Državne komisije za UNPROFOR**

*Ivan Milas*  
**Ivan Milas**

FL COS  
DFL CAO  
DCM CMO  
REG  
FILE



UNOG, Telecom. Unit  
Paris, France

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UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

184/93

010/12

TO: JAN 28 1993, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

28 93 JAN 15 24Z

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

DATE: 28 January 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-106


SUBJECT: SITUATION IN PERUCA - LETTERS FROM SPANOVIC

Attached cable from Sector South which includes letters 50 and 51 from Colonel Spanovic, and my response thereto, are forwarded for information.

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CZM 128  
CZG 101

(2/8)

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE/TIME: 281225A JAN 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR	FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH COMD
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN: FC DFC DCM	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : maj. WALUGU TITLE : DSOO RELEASING OFF.: SIGNATURE : 
INFO : FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN PERUCA - LETTER FROM SPANOVIC	

MESSAGE

1. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND THE SUBJECT LETTER FROM MR. SPANOVIC APPEALING FOR UNPROFOR INTERVENTION TO REFRAIN CA ACTION ON THE DAM TO AVOID ECOLOGICAL DISASTERS IN THE AREA.
2. REQUEST YOUR PROMPT ACTION TO CALM THE TENSION. SAME THREAT OF POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION IS RECEIVED FROM CA SIDE. YOUR PRESSURE AT ZAGREB LEVEL WOULD APPRECIATED.
3. REGARDS.

FC  
DFC



CZN-128  
C26-101

(3/8)

HO SECTOR SOUTH KNIN

TEL: 8711301443

28.Jan.93 12:10 No.029 P.09

2/6

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA  
DEFENSE MINISTRY  
No.01-50  
Knin,28.01.1993

VERY URGENT

Demand for intervention through the UNPROFOR HQs  
to halt the operations

TO: -General S.Nambiar  
-UNPROFOR HQ - ZAGREB  
-Brig gen Arap Rob  
-SECTOR SOUTH HQ

Dear General,

We are appealing for immediate intervention with CA to halt infantry and  
artillery attack which is being carried out on the Perucac Dam, at this very  
moment, on Jan 28th at 09:45 hrs, and which commenced last night at 18:00 hrs.  
Therefore, we will be forced to take certain radical measures by ourselves in  
the mentioned area.

Find attached a detailed information!

DEFENSE MINISTER  
Col S.SPANOVIC

CZ4-128  
CZ6-101

(4/8)

3/6

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

DEFENSE MINISTRY

No. 01-51

Knin, 28.01.1993

Warning about the intentions of ustashes on the Peruca Dam area  
is to delivered to -

UNPROFOR HQ - ZAGREB

SECTOR SOUTH HQ

THE RSK GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN BELGRADE (for information)

On Jan 27th 1993 at 18:00 hrs CA launched a general attack on the Peruca power station. An attack is supported by heavy artillery and being carried out on several routes. Especially heavy operations are on the mountain of Svilaja, where the enemy flanked our positions.

At the same time, there was an attempted infiltration of a group of 40 ustashe-Croatian soldiers, aimed at beating of the UNPROFOR units on the Peruca Dam and committing a sabotage on the Peruca power station by activating of planted explosive.

In order to help the UNPROFOR units, as well as to prevent such a terroristic act with possible serious losses, ecological consequences, we sent out a part of our forces to foil a sabotage plan of the mentioned group.

Several members of the ustashe forces were killed, most of them wounded and one commander captured.

We should mention that the aggressor had carried out preliminary preparations. Apart from mobilization and concentration of forces, evacuation of the population downstream the dam, had been carried out.

It is obvious that the Croatian Authorities are even ready to sacrifice the Peruca Dam, only to justify aggression against the RSK territory and turn the public against Serbs, due to a possible disaster which might ensue after the Dam destruction.

THE SECTOR SOUTH HQ HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF all these preparations timely.



CZN-128  
C26-101

C5/8

HQ SECTOR SOUTH KNIN

TEL: 8711301443

28.Jan.93 12:10 No.029 F.11

24/1

During the operations, three UNPROFOR check points were under the aggressor's artillery fire: The Peruca power station, observation post in Zrnac and observation post in the village of Potravlje, the hamlet of Prolici.

We request you to take immediate measures, by the UNPROFOR through the UN Security Council and to condemn such an act of the ustashe-Croatian side.

Due to the great importance of the Peruca power station, in term of preventing disaster, our forces will keep on defending the Peruca power station.

Sincerely Yours,  
Col Stojan Spanovic

28/01/93 AS

*AS*

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA  
MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE  
Broj 01-30  
Knin 28. 01. 1993. godine

VRLO HITNO

Zahtav za intervenciju  
preko komande UNPROFOR-a  
za prestanak dejstava, -

- General - pppuk Stiš Nambijaru
- Komanda UNPROFOR-a (Zagreb)
- Brigadnom generalu Arapu Robu
- Komandi sektora JUG

Poštovani gospodine generala

Molimo da hitno intervenišete da hrvatska strana prestane sa agresijom  
pješadijskim i artiljerijskim napadom koji je u toku na brani Peruća sada  
28. januara u 09,45 časova, a isti je otpočeo od sinoć od 18,00 časova.

Bićemo prinudjeni da na tom pravcu sami preduzmemo radikalne mjere.

Sledi detaljnije obaveštenje.

MINISTAR ODBRANE  
pukovnik  
Stjepan Štengović





REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA  
MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE  
Broj 01-51  
Knin 28. 01. 1993. godine

CZN - 128  
CZG - 101

6/8  
7/8

Upozorenje o namjerama  
ustaša prema brani HE  
Peruća, dostavlja. -

KOMANDI UNPROFOR-a ZAGREB  
KOMANDI SEKTORA "JUG"  
BIRU VLADE RSK U BEOGRADU (na znanje)

U 18,00 časova 27. januara 1993. godine ustaško-hrvatske snage otpočele su se opštim napadom prema brani HE Peruća. Napad je podržen snažnom artiljerijom, a izvodi se iz više pravaca. Posebno su jaka dejstva sa planina Svilaže u bok našim snagama.

Istovremeno su na HE Peruća pokušali ubaciti OTG jačine oko 40 ustaško-hrvatskih vojnika koji su imali namjeru da razbiju snage UNPROFOR-a i izvrše diverziju na HE Peruća aktiviranjem postavljenog eksploziva.

U cilju pomoći snagama UNPROFOR-a kao i sprečavanju ovakvog terorističkog akta sa mogućim teškim ljudskim, materijalnim i ekološkim posljedicama angažovali smo dio snaga i osujetili plan OTG.

Likvidirano je nekoliko pripadnika ustaških snaga, više ih je ranjeno, a jedan od komandira je zarobljen.

Napominjemo da je agresor izvršio prethodne pripreme. Porad mobilizacije i grupisanja snaga iselio je stanovništvo izvođno od brane.

Očito je da su hrvatske vlasti spremne i žrtvovati branu Peruća samo da bi opravdali izvršenu agresiju na teritoriju Republike Srpske Krajine i okrenuli javno mišljenje protiv srpskog naroda zbog moguće katastrofe nastale rušenjem brane.

O svim ovim pripremama pravovremeno je izvođena komanda sektora "JUG".

Agresor je u toku izvođenja b/d svojim artiljerijom djelovao po tri punkta UNPROFOR-a, i to: HE Peruća, snimatrčka stanica na objektu zrač i osmatrčki punkt u s. Potrevlje, zaseok Proleci.

Molimo da se preduzmu hitne mjere od strane snaga UNPROFOR-a, kao i preko Saveza bezbednosti UN na osudi ovakvih postupaka ustaško-hrvatske strane,

Zbog posebnog značaja objekta HE Peruća, posebno se očekuje sprečavanje katastrofe, našim snagama uporno ćemo braniti HE Peruća.

u poštovanju

MINISTAR ODBRANE  
Pukovnik Stojan Šćepović





UNPROFOR

9/8

28 January 1993

CZH-128  
CZG-10.1PERUCA DAM*My dear Colonel Spanovic,*

1. Please refer to your letters no. 01-50 and 01-51 of date.
2. I have raised the matter with the Croatian Government who have informed me that their forces are not undertaking operations at the Peruca Dam. They however allege that your artillery is firing towards Sinj and their forces are responding to that fire.
3. I would ask you not to undertake any precipitate measures at the Dam which may cause disaster. The fact that your Armed Forces have forcibly taken over control of the Dam from UNPROFOR troops has been conveyed to New York.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

Colonel Stojan Spanovic  
Knin



UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

'93 JAN 28 14:01

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

MOST IMMEDIATE

DATE: 28 January 1993

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR-Z-105

SUBJECT: SECTOR SOUTH - SITUATION UPDATE AS AT 1300 HOURS

1. Further to our sitrep of today's date, the latest information received from Sector South is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. Peruca area. The process of occupation and reinforcement of the Peruca area by the Serb TDF continued during the night. Shelling of the area by the CA commenced at 0930 hours today. The Serbs are reported to have retaliated with shelling by artillery and mortars. The Kanbat troops in the area were evacuated to Civljane by 1000 hours. It was reported by the Serb TDF to their UNMO LO at approximately 1030 hours that an access ramp of the Dam has been blown up due to the CA shelling. A threat has also been conveyed by the TDF that if the shelling does not cease immediately, they would blow up the dam. As of 1200 hours, it has been agreed that an UNMO team, under TDF escort, will move to the Dam area to monitor the situation more closely. At 1300 hours, I spoke to Defence Minister Susak and conveyed our concern. His version is that Radio Knin had broadcast that the CA elements are in the Dam area and hence Admiral Letica is in Sinj himself. He has apparently informed President Tudjman that the report is wrong; however, he says the Serbs have fired MBRL towards Sinj and the CA has responded.

3. Evacuation of French troops at Goleš. Action to evacuate the French troops at Goleš, under TDF escort, commenced this morning. However, they have not been able to move out the French personnel in their APC. As of 1200 hours, it has been accepted

CZG-100

CZN-72+

2/2

by the CO of the French battalion to incapacitate the APC and machine gun and evacuate his troops in TDF cars. The operation is underway at the moment.

4. Maslenica-Zemunik area. Sporadic shelling of Biljane, Miranje, Kasic and Islam Groki were reported during the night. It is reported that the Serbs appear to be consolidating their positions along line Zemunik Airport - Goleš - Drace - North of Smilcic - Narandzici (southeast of Novigrad). Shelling is also reported in the Velebit Mountain area.

5. Drnis area. No new reports have been received.

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CZN-125  
CZB 098

1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE 20 56Z

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - ~~OK~~ 221515 ~~6.5~~

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 27 January 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR. 2-103

SUBJECT: LETTER HANDED OVER BY BOBETKO  
REGARDING SITUATION AT PERUCA DAM

*Blambil*  
*4 gm*

93 JAN 27 22:34

UNICE TELECOMM. UNIT  
Palo Alto, CA 94304-1100

**CODED CABLE**

1. In response to my attached note faxed to Defence Minister Susak, General Bobetko visited me at 2015 hours. He informed me that the only official information conveyed to Sector South was in a letter from Commander Lukovic at Zadar; he insisted I should send this to you for information.
2. He also categorically denied that the Croatian Army had shelled the Peruca Dam area and stated that 126 CA Bde has been demobilized.

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CEN-125  
CZG-098

2/4

27/01 '93 20:04 041 170 199

UNPROFOR ZAGREB \*\*\* CRO EMMIGRAT MIN

001

UNPROFOR



FORPRONU

FORCE COMMANDER

271825

Dear Mr Susak,

Attached report I have  
just received from the Sector  
Commander South is forwarded as  
discussed on the telephone.

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature

st Gen

27/01 '93 20:04 041 170 199

UNPROFOR ZAGREB \*\*\* CRO EMMIGRAT MIN

002

SITUATION

UPDATE

SECTOR SOUTH



SITUATION UPDATE SECTOR SOUTH

3/4

FROM SECTOR COMD SOUTH

1. UNMO KNIN HAS RECEIVED INFO FM CA SIDE ADVISING THAT UNPROFOR WITHDRAW FROM PERUCA DAM DUE TO AN EXPECTED ATTACK (TIME 1735). ACCORDING TO CA 126 RDE, EVALUATION IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH EASTERN BANK.
2. CURRENT SITUATION:

CA SHELLING PERUCA DAM AND SOUTH OF DRNIS. (TIME 1745)

NB DUE TO DANGER OF MOVING TROOPS AT NIGHT, SECTOR COMD HAS ORDERED TROOPS (UN) AT PERUCA TO REMAIN IN THEIR SHELTERS.

CZN-125  
CZG-098

TO

MA TO FC

MA TO CUS

(02)

432415

DD 1750A

4/4

CEN-125  
CZG-098

27/01 '93 19:20 338 41 450524 URED GSRY UN MO-KABINET 200  
FROM : URUPH ZH KURU. SH UNPT ZHDHK PHONE NO. : SH 57 312559 Jan. 27 1993 6:21PM P01



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

OFFICE FOR UN AND EC  
DEPARTMENT FOR SECTOR SOUTH  
Z A D A R

27th January 1993

TO: UNPROFOR  
SECTOR SOUTH HQ  
K N T N

On the date of 27<sup>th</sup> January 1993 the irregulars in the area of Vrlika and Potravlje grouped strong forces and took the Alebića Kula GR 8848. That area is under UNPROFOR 86H5561 and nothing had been done to prevent the Irregulars.  
If UNPROFOR is not able to bring Irregulars back to their previous positions, we shall be obliged to take our technical means, which are under UNPROFOR control, and take our positions in order to oppose the Irregulars.  
At 16.30 hours UNPROFOR left their positions on Alebića Kula and village Prolići.

CHIEF OF DEPT

Commander

Ivica Luković



00:02 22-10-8661

2/2

"they, and UNPROFOR, are now our only hope". He also mentioned the Croatian Deputy FM's attitude during the meeting with Tudjman:- "We have shown that if UNPROFOR can't do the job, we will do it ourselves"; referring to this attitude with incredulity.

3. DCM had conveyed our perplexity over the Croatian action, saying that we just could not see, in practical terms, what they hoped to achieve, because the Maslenica project could not be achieved unilaterally. We said we understood Croatian exasperation, but that, only through effective talks between Zagreb and Knin could the underlying problem, which had made UNPROFOR's work so difficult, namely, intra-Croatian relations between Croats and Serbs, begin to be dealt with, however slowly and painfully. We recalled that the Vance Plan made it explicitly clear that such problems would also be dealt with in the context of an international conference, but that, of course, the recent horror of BH had tended to overshadow the inherent explosiveness of the Krajina situation. He said that he fully agreed.

4. In general, Churkin expressed his satisfaction with the visit and with the various analyses he and we had made of the situation. DCM was accompanied by Shannon Boyd and Mohamed Abdul-Aziz.

Endall

CEN-123  
CEG-096



C2N-121

C2G-095

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

'93 JAN 27 14:40 UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

27 93 JAN 14 15:15

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

Page 1 of 3

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 27 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 99

SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM CROATIAN GOVERNMENT27 93 JAN 14 15:15  
362

1. The attached letter was hand-delivered this morning. It was preceded by an oral communication by a CA-MLO to Thornberry. Both have been sent most immediately to the FC, DFC and Sector South Commander in Knin. FC conveyed the oral communication to Spanovic in Knin who, instead of replying to the allegation, emphasised that the Croats had been attacking continuously since yesterday.

2. We have no information at this time to confirm or deny these allegations. We have, however, heard from Sector South that shelling from the CA side towards Benkovac and Biljani began at 0725 this morning. It is reported that the TDF responded with fire from two attack helicopters each of which flew five sorties. I should add, however, that our communications within the Sector have been seriously affected by the hostilities and by resultant Serb action.

3. There are conflicting reports about French soldiers caught near Drace and Goles - as to whether or not they are still there. FC is now flying to Gracac to visit French battalion HQ. Kenyan APCs moving towards Drace and Goles to make in situ enquiry and conduct any necessary action.

4. We have raised with Knin authorities the situation of approx. 21 UNCIVPOL currently held at the Benkovac Hotel, on the top floor, by the TDF. CIVPOL believes they are being retained as a "shield", as the TDF occupies the rest of the building. The centre of Benkovac is not at present under attack. The police were yesterday provided with resupplies including medicine. We are issuing a

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FC

press statement on this matter. Ostensibly, they are being held for "their own security". They are well treated. They are from a number of countries.

5. FC has just (1420 LT) spoken with Thornberry. At the meeting with Spanovic the latter stated that they wanted a ceasefire and withdrawal which would be complete and unconditional. After that, discussions could begin. Peterson added that their position was sombre: they wanted a ceasefire but were now ready to return to war.

Endall





REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE  
ZAGREB

CROATIAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Class: 018-04/93-01/

No.: 3101-93-43

Zagreb, 27 January 1993

LT. GEN. SATISH NAMBIA  
FORCE COMMANDER  
UNPROFOR

Dear Mr General,

According to our reports, at 09.46 hrs. the aggressor commenced a heavy combined tank-infantry attack with artillery support, from Smilčić towards Kašić.

As you know, the Croatian Army halted all combat actions yesterday, in accordance with the agreement that you have initiated. The aggressor did not comply with the agreement, but had continued with armed provocations. And so, at 23.56 hrs, they attacked Prkos with 10 FRL missiles from Biljani Donji, at 00.05 hrs. a repeated attack with 5 missiles, and at 09.07 hrs. 5 120 mm mortar grenades on Zemunik Donji from Zemunik Gornji.

During the night, the aggressor undertook two infantry attacks from Velika Bobija on Mala Bobija, and from Bobija on the road to Sv. Roko (on Velebit).

The CA formations refrained from returning, despite the material damage the aggressor had caused with these attacks.

I demand that you immediately undertake necessary actions and halt the latest attack, because otherwise we shall be forced to return.

Please. intervene urgently and send me a reply.

Yours sincerely,

GENERAL JANKO ROBEKTO  
CHIEF OF STAFF

DCM  
COS

1993-01-27 14:47

14:47

PAGE = 01

WMOOCELECOM UNO GVA TELECOM

6034674

1993-01-27 15

CZAN-119

CZG-093

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

26 93 JAN 21 55Z

MOST IMMEDIATE**CODED CABLE**

Page 1 of 7

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 26 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-097

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH TUDJMAN:  
CONSEQUENT NEED FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION:	
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HO	93 JAN 26 22:46
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1. Tudjman, who had Seks, Susak, Minister of Interior Jarnjak, Bobetko and four others, civilian and military, with him, stated that the operation was now over. All police and military action was concluded. Today, there had been "just a few Serb attacks to which they had merely responded". He had issued orders. I said I had heard that before, several times. He emphasised that the present line was the final one, not Letica's proposed objective. Once the Serbs' arms had been restored to storage and their paramilitary had been disbanded and demobilized, they would withdraw their military, leaving the police behind. They had no plans for the Drnis or Peruca areas though they had been provoked by Serb shelling there. It would be up to UNPROFOR, now, to negotiate the implementation of this agreement. In answer to our direct question, he stated that Croatia intended to retain all the territory it had gained by its military advance.

2. He expressed condolences on yesterday's French casualties. However, it was not possible that this could have been done by Croatian forces. He asked us to have a full enquiry. They had been in touch with the French unit before the attack so that it would have been impossible for the Croats to have hit the French. He had been in touch with President Mitterand who had said, we were told, that he had no intention of accusing Croatia in respect of this incident.

3. At this point, I drew his attention to a report just received through BHC from the French helicopter unit based in Split, giving details of firing by AAA on the 3 French helicopters which had conducted the medevac after the Karin Plaza tragedy. On this, we



..... have now written to the Croats (copy attached) and a press  
..... statement has now been issued (copy also attached). Bobetko denied the possibility of this coming from the Croatian Army: he had, he said, been watching the radar screens all the time. Susak said it might have been an agent provocateur masquerading as CA: they had had such an experience. They agreed to conduct an immediate enquiry.

4. I also mentioned the case of two Russian CIVPOL, returning from leave, who had been beaten up and stripped of their IDs, etc., by Croatian soldiers in Zadar. Bobetko said this was impossible.

5. Tudjman said they would now prepare to start work on Maslenica bridge, as all (naming them) were in agreement on the matter. He said that they looked forward eagerly also to a similar outcome on such matters as Peruca, the highway, etc. He said that would assist with UNPROFOR's mandate renewal. We did not say anything.

6. As I shall be seeing the Serbs tomorrow in Knin, and Tudjman's interesting interpretation of 802 will certainly be known to them (Hina), and as they are in an excitable and emotional condition, I should like to have written instructions as to whether the Croatian interpretation is correct. Should it be impossible to have such authoritative Council view by the morning, I shall say that I am awaiting the Secretary-General's instructions on the matter. Were I to authenticate Tudjman's view tomorrow, I cannot really predict the outcome. They might go into orbit; alternatively, ballistic.

..... 7. I also attach copy of a just-received cable from Zadar, which gives more detail on the Croatian form of compliance with SCR 802.

Endall



UNPROFOR

26 January 1993

Dear Mr. Milas,

Firing on UNPROFOR Medevac Helicopters

I regret to bring to your attention the following incident which we cannot but view as of utmost seriousness. It is particularly disturbing in view of the painstaking efforts UNPROFOR puts in advising the Croatian authorities of all of its flights.

During a night medical evacuation operation yesterday, 25 January 1993, at 1825 hours, while three (3) UN helicopters were flying over the sea at 3 minutes' interval, 10 kilometres off the coast, south of PAKOSTANE (43°55' - 15°31'E) (GRID WJ 4061) from SPLIT to ZADAR, they were fired upon. The firing consisted of three bursts of gunfire, four rounds each - Total: twelve rounds, presumably 40 mm anti-aircraft gun. None of the helicopters was hit, no UN crew were injured.

The flight was announced as agreed with the Croatian authorities and duly authorized.

Given range and location, only the Croatian Armed Forces could possibly open fire on those UN helicopters.

Under the Agreement for Facilitation of Aerial Movement for UNPROFOR (FAIRMOV) which was concluded with the Government of Croatia, UNPROFOR was given guarantees for secure and complete freedom of movement of its aircraft and helicopters.

This incident is very similar to the one dated from 28 September 1992, which was swiftly and professionally handled by the Croatian Authorities.

We would appreciate receiving, on an urgent basis, the conclusions of an enquiry about this incident.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Cedric Thornberry".

Cedric Thornberry  
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Ivan Milas  
Vice-President of the Government of  
the Republic of Croatia and  
President, Government's Commission  
for UNPROFOR, Zagreb





## UNPROFOR

## PRESS RELEASE


26 January 1993

UNPROFOR FRENCH MEDEVAC HELICOPTER UNDER FIRE IN CROATIA

Three unarmed French UNPROFOR helicopters were fired upon during a night medical evacuation on 25 January 1993. The helicopters were airborne in connexion with fatal and other casualties incurred yesterday by the French battalion at Karin Plaza which was under Croatian army attack. The attack occurred 10 kilometres off the Croatian coast south of Pakostane as the aircraft were flying from Split to Zadar at three minute intervals. The firing consisted of twelve rounds, presumably from 40 mm anti-aircraft weapons. None of the helicopters was hit; none of the UNPROFOR crew were injured.

The flights were announced, as agreed, to the Croatian authorities and were duly authorized by them. UNPROFOR has agreements with the Croatian Government which guarantees secure and complete freedom of movement of its aircraft and helicopters.

Yesterday's incident marked the fourth time a United Nations helicopter has come under fire over Croatian territory since the first violation occurred in September 1992.

  
Shannon Boyd,

Acting Chief, Press & Information,  
UNPROFOR, HQ, Zagreb  
Telephone: 180053

NL BURUM LES 492041280- ECMM X 26-JAN-1993 16:48:13 126882

MASLENICA ATTACK -- MESSAGE #9 FROM ZADAR

XXX DO NOT HOLD THIS MESSAGE. PASS IMMEDIATELY TO CIVIL AFFAIRS AND INFORM  
SECTOR COMMANDER. THANK YOU. XXX

BEGIN MESSAGE #9.

TO: JEANNIE PETERSON, CAC KNIN

--PARAGRAPH F FOR OPERATIONS ONLY --

FROM: ED JOSEPH, CAO (ZADAR)  
LCL ALAIN PERIGNON, COS

DATE: 26 JAN 93, 1430

SUBJECT: JOSEPH/PERIGNON MEETING WITH LETICA/LUKOVIC (1200) ON

- REACTION TO FRENCH TRAGEDY
- CURRENT CA FIGHTING POSTURE
- REACTION TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 802
- PERUCA DAM DEVELOPMENTS
- EARLY REPORT FROM UNMO/ECMM TRIP WITH CA ESCORT
- SITUATION IN GOLES-DRACE (PARAGRAPH F)

HIGHLIGHTS:

LETICA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HIS FORCES ARE SHORT OF THE LINE, INDICATES  
WHERE AND HOW SHORT OF THE LINE.

CA CURRENT FIGHTING POSTURE CHARACTERIZED AS SELF-DEFENSE. LETICA  
SAYS IF TUDJMAN ORDERED A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING CEASING REARGUARD CLEANING  
OPERATIONS, CA WOULD RESPECT IT.

LETICA ISSUES CONDOLENCES FOR FRENCH TRAGEDY (WITHOUT ADDRESSING  
QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY), SAYS INVESTIGATION WILL ESTABLISH FACTS.

A. REACTION TO FRENCH TRAGEDY

LETICA BEGAN BY EXPRESSING CONDOLENCES IN THE NAME OF THE CROATIAN  
ARMED FORCES FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE THAT OCCURRED YESTERDAY. HE SAID CA SIDE  
WAS SORRY IT HAPPENED AND INTENDS TO COLLECT ALL RELEVANT FACTS.

UNPROFOR POINTED OUT THAT UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION INDICATED 1 FRENCH  
SOLDIER ARRIVED IN KNIN WITH SHRAPNEL IN HIS FLAK JACKET APPARENTLY FROM A  
122MM GUN. LETICA WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THIS BUT REPEATED INTENTION TO  
ESTABLISH FACTS. HE SAID REPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED TO UNPROFOR EITHER THROUGH  
ZAGREB OR ZADAR BUT WOULD NOT SAY WHEN.

ON GENERAL BOBETKO'S STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT UNPROFOR KNEW ABOUT  
THE ATTACK AND SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE WAY, LETICA ACKNOWLEDGED THE  
STATEMENT AND SAID IT REFERRED ONLY TO THE INITIAL WARNING ALLEGEDLY  
PROVIDED ON 22 JANUARY BEFORE THE ATTACK. HE COULD NOT SAY WHO OR HOW  
UNPROFOR WAS NOTIFIED, IN PARTICULAR WHETHER SECTOR SOUTH WAS TO HAVE BEEN  
NOTIFIED.



6/7

ON UNPROFOR'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT THE DEATHS OF THE FRENCH SOLDIERS WERE QUOTE PROBABLY DUE TO CROATIAN FIRE UNQUOTE, LETICA SAID HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE STATEMENT.

ON EVACUATION OF REMAINING FRENCH TROOPS, CA SIDE INDICATED FULL INTENTION TO COOPERATE TO ACHIEVE THIS, INCLUDING BY APPROVING A QUOTE LOCAL CEASE-FIRE UNQUOTE.

B. ON CURRENT FIGHTIN POSTURE

UNPROFOR INFORMED LETICA THAT KNIN HAS SAID NO FOR THE TIME BEING TO THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL. UNPROFOR WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO MEET WITH KNIN AUTHORITIES.

LETICA BROUGHT UP THAT CA SIDE HAD (ON EVENING OF 23 JAN) BEEN GLAD TO HEAR THAT KNIN HAD ACCEPTED NEGOTIATIONS IN PRINCIPLE. HE SAID HIS SIDE HAD ONLY BEEN WAITING TO HEAR ON THE AGENDA, PLACE AND TIME. HE SAID CA SIDE HAD BEEN READY FOR A CEASE-FIRE QUOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED UNQUOTE.

LETICA CONTINUED THAT AS HE SAID YESTERDAY, THERE ARE POCKETS CONTAINING GROUPS OF (SERB) INDIVIDUALS. HE SAID CA IS QUOTE CLEANING TERRAIN UNQUOTE TO ENSURE SECURITY.

HE THEN SAID THAT CA FORCES ARE STOPPED SHORT OF THE BLUE LINE. (NOTE: AFTER LCL ODAK INDICATED IMPRECISION OVER THE TERM LINE, IT WAS AGREED TO USE THE TERM BLUE LINE FOR THE FULL LINE EXPRESSED AS CA MILITARY OBJECTIVE.) LETICA SAID HIS FORCES ARE NOT MOVING FORWARD FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS.

WHEN ASKED IF CA FORCES INTEND TO MOVE FORWARD FROM PRESENT POSITIONS TO REACH THE BLUE LINE, LETICA SAID NO. CA ACCEPTS THE ORDER OF THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY (TUDJMAN.)

WHEN ASKED WHAT IF TUDJMAN SAYS TO STOP ALL ATTACK, INCLUDING SO-CALLED CLEANING ACTIONS, LETICA CA WOULD STOP. HE REITERATED CA CURRENT POSITION IS TO STOP ON QUOTE ALREADY REACHED POSITIONS UNQUOTE, NOT GO FORWARD.

WHEN ASKED HOW FAR HIS FORCES WERE FROM THE LINE, LETICA AND LUKOVIC SAID CA FORCES ARE ON A CURVE BEHIND THE BLUE LINE. WHEN ASKED FOR A MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM, THEY POINTED ON THE MAP AND SAID WEST OF NADIN THEY ARE 2 TO 3 KILOMETERS FROM THE BLUE LINE, WEST OF NOVIGRAD AREA THEY ARE 5 AND ONE HALF KILOMETERS FROM THE BLUE LINE.

LETICA AND LUKOVIC DESCRIBED CURRENT BATTLE ACTIVITY AS STOPPED. THEY SAID CA FORCES ARE OBEYING ORDERS AND NOT ADVANCING. WHEN ASKED WHAT IS THE CURRENT QUOTE FIGHTING POSTURE UNQUOTE OF CA FORCES, LUKOVIC SAID THAT THEY ARE NOT MAKING ANY OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION. HE SAID THEY HAVE NO NEW TARGETS. HOWEVER, IF THEY ARE ATTACKED THEY WILL PROTECT THEMSELVES. HE SAID THIS POSTURE COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS SELF-DEFENSE.



C. PERUCA DAM

LETICA/LUKOVIC DENIED ANY CA ACTIVITY IN OR AROUND THE DAM THAT WOULD RAISE TENSIONS.

D. SC RESOLUTION 802

CA SIDE SAID IT WAS AWARE OF RES 802, BUT DID NOT HAVE A COPY IN ENGLISH. (CORRECT COPY OF SAME WAS PROVIDED.) LETICA SAID HE HAD NO REACTION NOW.

E. MOVEMENT/OBSERVATIONS OF UNMO/ECMM

LUKOVIC SAID AN UNMO/ECMM PATROL WITH CA ESCORT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO THE FOLLOWING AREAS -- ZEMUNIK, SMOKOVIC, MURVIC, AND ALONG THE LINE TO MASLENICA.

EARLY REPORTS FROM THOSE JUST NOW RETURNING SHOW CALM SITUATION WITH CA IN TOTAL CONTROL AROUND AIRPORT, ZEMUNIK AREA, SMOKOVIC, AND PALEKA. SOLDIERS WERE RELAXING WITH HELMETS OFF. SEVERAL HOUSES WERE ABLAZE, APPARENTLY FROM DELIBERATE FIRES, NOT WAR DAMAGE. SHEEP AND CATTLE WERE BEING ROUNDED UP IN SMOKOVIC.

IN AREA WEST OF ISLAM LATINSKI, 1 CA T-55 TANK AND 1 APC WERE SPOTTED.

AT MASLENICA BRIDGE (ON WESTERN SIDE), OBSERVERS COULD HEAR EXPLOSIONS AT CLOSE RANGE. CA VAN WITH 4 SNIPERS AND HEAVY-BARRELED SNIPER RIFLES IN ADDITION TO AD-478 WERE TAKING POSITIONS ON WESTERN SIDE. 1 KILOMETER WEST OF BRIDGE SHELLING WAS TAKING PLACE, HITTING WATER AND NEAR MONITORING VEHICLES (NEAR POSEDARJE.) CIVILIANS WERE EVACUATING AREA IN VEHICLES.

F. (OPERATIONS ONLY) SITUATION IN GOLES AND DRACE

THESE TWO POINTS (WHERE UNPROFOR STILL HAS TROOPS) ARE STILL CONTROLLED BY SERBS. SERBS ARE IN CONTACT WITH FRENCH SOLDIERS. THE ATTITUDE OF SERB SOLDIERS IS DESCRIBED AS VERY FRIENDLY, BUT IT IS NOT TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY FRENCH PULLOUT.

PRESENT DECISION OF FRENCH COMPANY COMMANDER IS TO WAIT FOR A CLEAR SIGN FROM THE SERBS THAT THEY CAN LEAVE FREELY TO ZADAR. MORALE IS GOOD AND SUPPLY OK, EXCEPT FOR BATTERIES.

COS IS SORRY TO DISTURB OVER-HEATED SBHQ WITH QUESTIONS, BUT EFFECTIVE LIAISON IN ZADAR, ESPECIALLY ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE, IS DEPENDENT ON TIMELY AND ACCURATE FEEDBACK. COS MUST INSIST THAT ALL EFFORTS BE MADE TO MINIMIZE THE SEVERE DANGER FACING THESE TROOPS. IN PARTICULAR, COS CRITICALLY NEEDS REAL-TIME KNOWLEDGE OF WHETHER CA CEASE-FIRE GUARANTEES ARE BEING RESPECTED IN THE FIELD.

END MESSAGE #9.

IN.471



170/93

010/12

CNZ 064 CYZ 046 P1/1  
JUN 1993  
Pat Jones

OUTGOING CODE CABLE '93 JAN 27 -4 :51

COLEMAN CAELE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓  
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 26 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-131  
SUBJECT: Tudjman's position

for [Signature]

1. Re your UNPROFOR Z-95 and Z-97, Resolution 802, as we read it, is unambiguous in requiring "the withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces" from areas "within or adjacent to the UNPAs". This would include both army as well as armed police.

2. However, if the withdrawal of the Croatian Army is conditional upon the disarming of Serb para-military forces, the debate on this question may be academic. We imagine it will be necessary to initiate talks as soon as practicable between the two sides if either is to be persuaded to comply with the relevant provisions of Resolution 802.

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

26 93 JA 18

26 JAN 93

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → *ok*

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 26 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- **95.**

SUBJECT: TUDJMAN'S POSITION

*Clawhill*  
*at Gen*

CODED CABLE

93 JAN 26 20:37

UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCE  
PATER-400-10000

.....

1. Prior to my meeting tonight at 2015 hours with Tudjman, we have just seen a Hina summary of a Tudjman statement on their position. As, of course, you know, SCR 802 differs in wording from SCR 762, which latter related in part to Miljeveci, and referred to the withdrawal of the Croatian Army. 802 refers to the withdrawal of Croatian "armed forces". The Croats always refused to withdraw their "police" from Miljeveci on the ground that they were not part of the army. They nevertheless deviated from what we ourselves believed was the intent of 762 by holding onto the area gained in that incursion through their police. We were, at the time, told not to object to this apparent deviation because it was not clearly in breach of the Resolution. After much huffing and puffing on our part at the Croats, we subsided. But the Serbs did not; and the continued presence of their police, holding militarily-gained territory, really poisoned the water for the implementation of 762. This looks like repetition of a fairly transparent device, and we shall appreciate instructions should, as we anticipate, Tudjman come out again with the idea. (We shall report after the meeting.) I might add that, this time, the Croats, for the first few days, insisted that their invading force was a police force.

2. I am planning to visit the sector tomorrow, having what I should like to be a brief meeting with the authorities, but basically spending the day - at Knin, Benkovac and Gracac - with the Sector personnel. Gaudreau is back there since this afternoon. Should we get into substantive talks in a day or so, I shall send Thornberry down to try to negotiate. But I think we may be a little way from that.

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## PRESIDENT TUDJMAN ON LATEST U.N. RESOLUTION

ZAGREB, Jan 26 (Hina) - Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman met Tuesday with the Defense and Interior Ministers Gojko Surak and Ivan Jarnjak, Croatian Army Chief-of-Staff Gen. Janko Bobetko, the the Split operative zone Commander Brigadier Anto Gotovina, Gen. Anto Rosa and the Assistant to the Interior Minister Zeljko Tomljenovic.

At the end of the meeting, President Tudjman gave a statement for Hina and Croatian TV in which he said that he had met the senior Croatian officials who were involved in the operations of the police and military formations in the Maslenica area on completion of the job of securing the building of the pontoon bridge firstly, and subsequently a permanent one, as well as securing the road between Maslenica and Zadar.

President Tudjman went on to say that, as it has already been made public, the operation has been completed, that the building of the bridge and the road has been secured, and that the high officials are to return to Zagreb and resume their duties in the Ministries and the Main Headquarters.

"In today's circumstances, following the UN Security Council resolution, the Croatian police and army forces were given the task of securing the areas that were so far under the occupation of the Serbian paramilitary formations," said President Tudjman.

"Our army forces will leave the areas they liberated during the operation in accordance with the disarmament of Serbian paramilitary forces and the return of the heavy weaponry they had seized from the UNPROFUR controlled storages, while the entire area will be secured by the Croatian police forces. All this is aimed at the reestablishment of the civil authorities and the normalization of life in the entire area," concluded Croatian President.

(Hina - The End)

CRN-113  
626-092

CZN-116

CZ9-09, 165/93

010/12

UNOG Intercomms. Unit

Palais des Nations

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
(UNPROFOR)

'93 JAN 26 13:20

1/2

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLEMOST IMMEDIATE

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK -OK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE : 26 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : 94.

SUBJECT : Continuance of Hostilities

*Clambit*  
H. Gun

I attach copy of my letter to President Tudjman for your information.

I understand Mr. Vance is seeking to have my appointment brought forward.

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ENDALL



CZV-116

CZG-091.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

26 January 1993

2/2

Y- 2.11.93

As you know, I had requested earlier this morning the privilege of an immediate meeting with you to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolution 802 (1993), which was adopted by the Security Council last evening, and the text of which I attach for Your Excellency's ease of reference. In the circumstances, I much regret that your schedule does not permit you to receive me until tonight.

May I, therefore, communicate in advance the matters upon which I shall seek to consult with you. The Council has, inter alia, demanded the immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas and withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces from these areas.

It has also strongly condemned those forces' attacks upon UNPROFOR in the conduct of its duty and has demanded their immediate cessation. Other provisions of the Resolution include a call for cooperation with UNPROFOR in resolving all remaining issues connected with implementation of the peace-keeping plan.

I shall also wish to mention the disparity between the positions which you and Minister Susak have, on several occasions since Friday, communicated to the United Nations, and those repeated, also several times, to my representatives by your military commanders in Zadar.

I am especially concerned, because UNPROFOR has confirmed that your forces, despite the Security Council Resolution, have continued this morning to shell various locations, and are persisting in their attempts to move forward. I am also perturbed by reports which I have been receiving today of unusual movements of Croatian troops in the Ornis area.

In view of this situation, I am informing the Secretary-General that the conflict is continuing.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Nambiar*

Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

His Excellency  
Dr. Franjo Tudjman  
President  
Republic of Croatia



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



H>O  
05/93

010/12

Office of the Co-Chairmen

CRYPTOFAX

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
(FOR THAROOR)

25 January 1993

INFO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Page 1 of 3

FAX:

FAX OUT NO:

FROM: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FAX NOS:

(41-22) -917-00-79  
(41-22) -917-00-80

Vance

TELECOM.  
SVA 00173  
CZY 008

In accordance with your request, I am attaching a summary of our discussions with President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak regarding the Croatian offensive in and around Maslenica.



We first learned of the Croatian offensive around noon on Friday, January 22. We attempted to reach General Nambiar but were informed that he had left the office for a meeting with President Tudjman. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on Friday, I reached President Tudjman who said that the Croats had initiated a limited operation to secure the area around Maslenica Bridge. The President stated that the "police" were attempting to secure the area so that construction of a pontoon bridge could begin. I urged him to stop the fighting immediately. He said that he would do so. Later that afternoon, I spoke with General Nambiar who briefed me on the preliminary reports which he had received. General Nambiar stated that he had dispatched General Gaudreau to the area to assess the situation. I then contacted President Milosevic and urged him to help contain the fighting.

Following the plenary session on Saturday, January 23, David and I discussed the offensive with President Tudjman and Defense Minister Susak. The Croats stressed the importance of rebuilding the Maslenica Bridge and expressed their exasperation with what they described as the continued stalling by the Knin authorities. We urged them to contain the fighting immediately and to bring the situation under control. The President and the Defense Minister assured us that they would do so.

At approximately 5:00 p.m., we convened a meeting with Presidents Tudjman, Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic. We emphasized the crucial importance of bringing the situation under control. We urged all sides to do everything in their powers to contain the fighting. All sides agreed to do so. Thereafter, David and I met with President Milosevic and reiterated the need for restraint. The President said that he would do what he could to persuade the Serbs in the Krajina to contain the conflict. The Croatian delegation departed Geneva for Zagreb at approximately 7:30 p.m. on Saturday night.

On Sunday morning, we received reports from UNPROFOR that shelling had resumed early that morning. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, David and I met with President Cosic. During the course of the meeting, President Cosic received a call from General Panic who informed the President of reports that the Croatian Air Force and Croatian Navy were engaged in an attack on Maslenica. General Panic requested that he be given the authority to use JA military forces in the Maslenica area. President Cosic ordered General Panic not to deploy any military forces until the President had the opportunity to discuss the matter fully with the General upon his return to Belgrade. We expressed our appreciation to the President for the restraint that he had shown. The President responded that it was vital that the Security Council take action against Croatia. President Cosic then left for Belgrade.

Following the meeting with President Cosic, I contacted Defense Minister Susak who assured me that he had given explicit orders to stop the fighting. I asked Susak whether Croatian planes or ships had been involved in the offensive. The Defense Minister stated unequivocally that no planes or ships had been employed. I again urged Susak to do everything in his power to stop the fighting immediately.

Early on Sunday afternoon, we received a report from UNPROFOR that the Croatian commander in Zadar, Admiral Letica, had stated to representatives of UNPROFOR that the cease fire agreed to by President Tudjman was only a proposal and was therefore not binding on the Croatian military. I immediately contacted Defense Minister Susak who assured me in the strongest terms that he had issued a clear order to stop the fighting and that his order was binding on all military personnel.

Despite these assurances, we have received a report this morning from UNPROFOR that the Croatians are continuing military operations in and around Maslenica and Zemunik.



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CZG-088

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
DATE: 25 January 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR - Z - 91  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN  
REGARDING FRENCH CASUALTIES

*Alambil*  
*at gun*

25 93 JAN 17 22Z

Please find enclosed, for your information, a copy of my letter of today's date, addressed to President Tudjman.

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UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
93 JAN 25 17:39

*via*  
*CRY 20 FAX*  
93 JAN 25 17:41  
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Palais des Nations

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

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UNPROFOR

**CODED CABLE**

25 January 1993

CEN 113  
CZG-088

*Your Excellency,*

As you are probably aware, a French soldier was seriously wounded at Paljuz, at 1300 hours on 23 January 1993, due to Croatian Army tank fire.

2. I have just been informed that at about 1540 hours today, two French soldiers have been killed and three wounded, at Karin Plaza area due to Croatian Army shelling.

3. I am bringing this to your attention in the context of the fact that we have been repeatedly asking your authorities for over 72 hours now to cease fire in the area. May I request you to instruct the local forces to comply with this requirement.

4. Needless to say, I am informing New York and Geneva of these casualties to UNPROFOR personnel.

*With warm regards,*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Satish*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

His Excellency  
Dr Franjo Tudjman  
President of the Republic  
of Croatia  
Zagreb



159/93  
010/12

CEN-112  
C26-87

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 10

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → 12  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG  
GOULDING, UNTAC, PHNOM-PENH  
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB  
DATE : 25 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-2- 90  
REF. : REUR MSC-123 AND 124

*Handwritten signature*  
H. Gm

93 JAN 25 17:53

UNOG Information Unit  
Patricia M. ...

1. An annex describes the operational situation as it has been reported to us at 1300 hours today as requested in your MSC-124. The present message suggests a course of action which might be considered, in the light of the situation and its implications.
2. The Croats' strategic objective, as stated by their Zadar commanders to our people there, is the line Bobija - Karin - Nadin - Libane - Tinjske. Despite their early successes due to the surprise nature of the attack, they are far short of achieving this. We estimate that the Serbs are organising for defence and counter-attack, and have sufficient hardware to do so with some effect. One of the uncertain elements is the effectiveness of their command and control. A further element of uncertainty relates to whether the front is going to be widened to include other objectives in this or other sectors. We are doing all we can to minimise this possibility. The Croat proposal for a ceasefire at this time, just repeated in Zadar to Gaudreau and Peterson, would have the Serbs vacate territory still under their control. Although we will convey it again in Knin, this is not a serious position.
3. We remain deeply perplexed by the underlying objectives of the Croatian action. Even were they to attain the line described above, it would certainly not provide them the security they would need to effect a unilateral reconstruction of the bridge and reopening of the Dalmatian highway, as all of it would remain under Serb artillery threat.

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4. The consequences of their action are, however, far reaching. From our perspective, they are:-

- (a) the fact that the implementation of the Vance Plan is, probably, just about back to square one;
- (b) with this, the slow process of confidence-building, without which we cannot move forward on a consensual basis, has crashed, and will need major efforts in many quarters for it to be got back on the road;
- (c) the Geneva peace process itself is brought into question, because of the pressures the situation probably imposes on, especially, the Serb leaders:- perhaps above all on Milosevic and Cosic, rather than on Karadzic.

Although these were perfectly obvious to anyone with knowledge of the situation on the ground, we find it hard to believe that the calculations were actually made. Indeed, it seems to us increasingly that such bizarre conduct came as a result of a fit of pique on the part of some rather inexperienced leaders in Zagreb. We had tried, many times in the last months, when they expressed ungovernable impatience, especially on Maslenica, to spell out for them what we saw as the natural and logical consequences of unilateral resort to force; and had tried to make clear to them, in every context, that there are no short-cuts, and that they have to negotiate the resolution of vital problems rather than go back to war.

5. This being said, we are sure that not even Tudjman has been as exasperated with the Krajina Serbs as we, ourselves. As you know, we have been trying to negotiate with them, so as to secure their compliance, for the last ten months. Our draft reports to the Secretary-General for the Security Council have been bleak and factual and, in recent months, we have been raising the pressure level by going public on their non-cooperation and misdeeds. But this has been a part of negotiation, and we have at all times stayed in touch with them, seeking to find ways to move forward. It has, however, been quite frustrating to sit, as we have, through hundreds of hours of evasive nonsense. (I should add that the Croats have also been rather astute in throwing major spanners into the works at sensitive moments!)

6. Despite these setbacks, we feel that the Secretary-General and the Council will expect us to think beyond the bleakness of the present situation, and try to project answers to the basic questions which will still be with us when the present hostilities cease. We perfectly understand the unlikelihood that the Council will wish, in such circumstances as have been reported in recent months, to blame only one party. Indeed, blaming one side or the



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CZG-87  
- 3 -

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other is not much good, unless we can use the situation as a means of pressure on both to move forward again.

7. The crucial issue for us on the ground is the UN's reputation for impartiality. In the absence of an enforcement action, and related resources, without the reputation of impartiality we lose whatever moral authority we might still retain; and, perhaps, might as well go home. And driving an army through our mandate, in a unilateral resort to force, must, in our view, be vigorously condemned if we are to retain any credibility in the region. Thus, the ceasefire and return to former positions must, in our opinion here, be one of the foundations of any Secco resolution. One has to bear in mind - if we may say so - the fierce sense of honour which prevails in the region. The Serbs will not be able to absorb this blow emotionally or politically; any more than the Croats can withstand, indefinitely, the non-implementation of the key elements of Mr. Secretary Vance's peace plan of December 1991.

8. Despite the present continuing fighting, we feel that the Council might want, in any deliberation, to seize the fundamental underlying issue which has remained immobilised - so far as we are aware - for nearly a year (though Thornberry was with Carrington when the latter met with the Krajina Serbs in Belgrade in the summer, and Carrington proposed talks). This is, of course, the future relationship between Croatia and its Serb minority. I do not wish to venture into the Co-Chairmen's territory, but we all feel that until Croats and Serbs in Croatia accept that they are going to have to live with, and respect, one another, as majority and minority, there will never be peace here, and anything we do will be "Band-aid". So we should like any resolution to obligate the parties in that direction. There would be loud screeching on the Serb side; but the Croats, too, would have to swallow a great deal of their former rhetoric, and make political accommodations which many of the present Government would resent, and find extremely difficult. I will say no more on this matter because I feel it beyond my direct mandate.

9. The third element which we would like inserted in a Secco resolution would be a reiteration of 743 and relevant succeeding resolutions, and a condemnation - which should not be one-sided - of the lack of seriousness (and the tension this has caused) of the parties so far in carrying them out. In this regard, it might require the parties to meet, under UNPROFOR, at a senior leadership level, to resolve outstanding questions, priority being given to major issues of economic cooperation. The issues might even be listed (chosen with care, to appeal to both sides) in the resolution or an accompanying Secretary-General's report; with the Secretary-General reporting back to the Council by a specified date:- Maslenica, Perucá, other areas of interlocking economic concern. It would be good if the Council were to take a direct interest in the implementation of these basically operational

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CZG. 97  
- 4 -

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matters, because they are very inflammatory. Consideration might also be given, should the Serbs prove of good behaviour (a long shot) to a future requirement for the Croats to lift their economic embargo (which is helping to cripple the sectors without really pushing the Krajina into a better frame of mind, and negotiations).

10. You will appreciate that I am quite tentative about the content of a possible resolution because, inter alia, I am not really informed about a number of matters on which I have touched above. But I fully agree that a balanced resolution, with carrot-and-stick for both sides, and within an overall settlement framework, is what is now required, together with an urgent ceasefire and return to the previous ceasefire line. Without these elements, the future here, for everybody including UNPROFOR, is, probably, far from rosy.

Endall



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C2G-87

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN THE UNPA  
SITUATION AS AT 1300 HOURS ON 25 JANUARY 1993

BUILD-UP

1. Concurrent with attempts by the Croatian Government to put pressure on UNPROFOR to provide protection for the commencement of construction of the bridge at Maslenica, which lies on the Western boundary of UNPA Sector South, the Croatian Army continued the build-up of its forces along the boundaries of the UNPA Sector South and the adjoining "Pink Zones", throughout the month of January 1993. Croatian Government pressure took the form of ultimatums to UNPROFOR in meetings arranged by Defence Minister Susak with the Force Commander and his senior colleagues at Zagreb on 7 January 1993 and at another meeting at Geneva on 10 January 1993 which was attended by, among others, the Co-Chairmen of the ICFFY, President Tudjman, Defence Minister Susak and Lieutenant General Nambar. On both occasions the Croatian Government stand was that in case UNPROFOR could not assure protection for the bridge construction, the Croatian Government would undertake unilateral action on their own. In response, both at the Zagreb and Geneva meetings, it was conveyed to the Croatian authorities that any unilateral action on their part could lead to renewed hostilities in the region and hence, it was essential that the Croatian authorities meet with the Serb authorities at Knin and negotiate some agreement with them before undertaking any action for bridge construction. Thereafter, attempts were made by UNPROFOR representatives to arrange a high-level meeting between representatives of the Croatian Government and the Knin authorities to discuss the issue of Maslenica Bridge as well as other matters of concern to either party. A meeting was agreed to by the Croatian Government at Maslenica on 21 January 1993 but the Knin authorities wanted the meeting to be postponed to 22 January 1993, which, on the other hand, was not acceptable to the Croatian Government. On 21 January 1993, Vice Prime Minister Milas of Croatia conveyed that they were willing to have the meeting on 23 January 1993.

2. While efforts continued to arrange a meeting between the two sides, it was reported by UNPROFOR military observers and troops on the ground that the Croatian Army (CA) was building up its forces along the confrontation line. These included reports on restructuring and relocating its units and formations, training exercises, reinforcement of defensive positions, concentration of newly inducted troops in certain areas, build-up of artillery and tanks, construction of an airfield at Lucici, and intensified patrolling. Some build-up was also reported in areas adjoining the boundaries in Sector East and Sector West, but these were ten to 15 kilometres in depth from these boundaries and not on the boundaries itself. A protest was sent by the Force Commander to General Bobetko, the Croatian Army Chief on 18 January 1993, highlighting the reports he had received and asking that action be taken to honour the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements, but no reply was received (A non-committal reply was later received



C2N-112  
C26-87

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on 23 January 1993, after hostilities broke out).

3. On the Serb side, the Knin authorities brought to the notice of UNPROFOR reports of the CA build-up. These were conveyed to Vice-Premier Milas on 19 January. However, no orders for mobilization were issued on their side. On 20 January 1993, it was reported that the Knin authorities had asked their male population to stay within their homes as a preparation for possible mobilization and had commenced maintenance of equipment in some storage areas. UNPROFOR continued to monitor the situation and report to New York and Geneva on the situation.

#### EVENTS ON 22 JANUARY 1993 AND THEREAFTER

##### Sector South

4. The CA commenced its attack at about 0730 hours on 22 January 1993, when it was reported that Croatian artillery positions at Starigrad had commenced shelling of the Serb position at Rovanjaska. Thereafter, over the next few hours, reports were received of CA attacks on Serb positions at Islam Latinski and Zemunik Airport. Reports were also received of Croatian build-up of forces in the Velebit Mountains. The Force Commander called on President Tudjman at 1330 hours on 22 January 1993 and conveyed his serious concern at the unilateral action by the CA, which he said, would result in destabilizing the situation in the area. He asked that the CA halt its offensive immediately and that the forces be withdrawn to previous positions. In response, President Tudjman stated that the actions of the CA were caused by Serb intransigence on the issue of the Maslenica Bridge and that the aim of his forces was to provide security for the commencement of bridge construction at Maslenica. He asserted that his forces would not attack in other areas if the Serbs did not retaliate and stressed that they would not withdraw from the areas captured around Maslenica. At a meeting of UNPROFOR representatives at Zadar with Admiral Letica, Commander of the Croatian Forces, on 23 January 1993, the Croatian Commander conveyed that the objective of his forces was the line southwards from Zrmanja River - west of Obrovac - Krusevo - UNPA boundary - Smilicic - Skabrnje - Nadin, with the aim of securing the Maslenica Bridge and the highway running through it.

5. The Serbs were taken by surprise by the Croatian offensive on 22 January 1993 and responded to the attack by declaring a "state of war" and ordering the mobilization of all its male population, reportedly between the ages of 18 and 60. UNPROFOR-controlled weapon storage areas were broken into and heavy weaponry, including tanks, artillery, APCs, anti-aircraft guns, and so on, were removed and moved towards the area of the fighting. On the afternoon of 22 January 1993, while moving through the UNPA on the road Sveti Rok - Mali Alan, a convoy of Serb TDF was ambushed by CA, who had infiltrated into this area, resulting in 21 Serb dead and some wounded.



6. Since then, the Croatian offensive has continued notwithstanding assurances given by President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak that instructions had been issued to cease offensive action. In fact, Admiral Latica has conveyed that the Defence Minister's instructions to cease fire cannot be interpreted as executive orders but, in actual fact, was a proposal for the Serbs to accept the aims and objectives of the Croatian offensive. At the time of writing this report, Croatian attacks are continuing in the area of Jasenice, Drace, Smilcic, Biljana and Zemunik. It is our assessment that the CA has committed five to six brigades so far in their main effort in the Maslenica area. The present situation in various parts of Sector South are as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

7. Maslenica Area. Maslenica and Rovanjaska are now under Croatian control. CA has deployed one infantry company and some 81mm mortars each in both these areas. The Serbs are still in control at Jasenice, where reportedly, they now have two infantry companies, supported by an artillery battery. CA troops have reportedly infiltrated in Mali Alan and possibly are holding the saddle area.

8. North of Maslenica Area Serbs have occupied/reinforced positions along the cease-fire line. Serb TDF have reportedly deployed a tank platoon in Podum, artillery battery at Kanjce, a tank company at Rakici, two artillery batteries at Licki Osik, four to five tanks between Licki Ribnik and Sitnik, artillery battery at Uzelci, some heavy mortars at Papuca and an infantry company along with some heavy guns and mortars at Ruka. The situation in the Velebit Mountain area is not clear and Serb artillery continues to shell suspected areas. The CA has reinforced on their side of the cease-fire line, but does not appear to be planning any offensive action in these areas.

9. South of the Maslenica Area. The situation is as follows:-

(a) The CA has captured Islam Latinski on 22 January and Novi Grad on 23 January. The CA has continued to attack Smilcic on 23 and 24 January, but the Serbs appear to be holding on. Some fighting has reportedly recommenced in the area of Smilcic - Biljana at 0800 hours on 25 January, and continues up to this time.

(b) CA has continued its attempts to capture Drace, where a tank battle has continued throughout 24 January and still continues on 25 January. The Serbs are holding on and have reportedly reinforced their positions with a tank platoon, some infantry and some anti-tank guns.

(c) CA has captured Murvica, Smokovic, Musapstan, Crno, Babindub and the southern portion of Zemunik Airport. Serbs continue to hold Goleš and the runway area of Zemunik Airport. Both these areas are under



heavy shelling and attack by the CA.

(d) The Zadar area was shelled by the Serbs for some time on 24 January, but stopped under orders of "Defence Minister" Spanovic. Earlier, the CA had threatened to retaliate by shelling Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac, in case the shelling of Zadar did not cease.

(e) The Kakma area remains quiet, with the Serbs having reinforced their positions along the cease-fire line.

10. Drnis Area. The CA has continued to fire at Zitnic and Kasic from the direction of Pakovo Selo and Mocići, using artillery and tanks. The Serbs have retaliated with artillery fire at 1630 hours on 24 January. The Serb TDF continues to occupy/reinforce positions in this area and two infantry battalion groups are reportedly deployed in the Drnis area and one battalion group at Knin. The Serbs report that four CA brigades are building up for attacks in this area. However, UNPROFOR has no reports so far which substantiate this information.

11. Peruca Area. The Peruca area remains quiet though there is tension and fear on the Serb side. Some CA activity had been reported in Sinj and adjacent areas. The Serb TDF has reinforced this area, reportedly with an infantry battalion and some tanks. In a meeting on 25 January, the Knin authorities stated that they intended to take over the Peruca Dam from UNPROFOR control, as they had reports that the CA was building up two brigades for an attack.

12. Movement of Refugees. Since the commencement of fighting on 22 January, eastward movement of Serb refugees has been reported from the area of hostilities into towns/villages in depth, including Knin. UNPROFOR assisted with the evacuation of approximately 200 civilians from Smokovic on 23 January.

13. Meeting with Knin Authorities on 25 January 1993. The Sector Commander and his senior colleagues attended a meeting with "Defence Minister" Spanovic, "Interior Minister" Martić, TDF Commander Novakovic and Chief of Police, Cusic, at 1000 hours on 25 January 1993. Spanovic expressed disappointment with the fact that UNPROFOR had not provided any assistance to their side and said that the Serbs had "been pushed to the wall". He stated that they intended to take over the Peruca Dam as they had reliable information that two CA brigades were concentrating in the area with the aim of capturing the Dam. He also reported the build-up of four CA brigades for attacks towards Drnis. Spanovic and Martić expressed strong resentment at some actions of the French troops who, in their view, assisted the CA. They said that the French troops were not welcome any more. The Sector Commander has asked them not to do anything that would aggravate



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the situation and assured them that the allegations against the French were untrue.

#### Sector North

14. Mobilization of the TDF in Sector North commenced on 22 January 1993. On the night 22/23 January, almost all weapon storage areas were broken into and most heavy weapons were removed. The TDF has occupied positions along the cease-fire line on 23 and 24 January with infantry, tanks and artillery. Some of these forces have reportedly been moved to Sector South as reinforcements. The Serb TDF/militia have closed the Turanj crossing point and have reportedly placed some restrictions on movement of UNPROFOR personnel in the Vojnic area. These restrictions have been protested by the Sector Commander. No activity has been observed on the Croatian side of the cease-fire line, though the Serb TDF allege that the CA have moved two brigades into the Karlovac area. The UNMOs are patrolling areas on the Croatian side of the cease-fire line and the Sector is monitoring the situation closely.

#### Sector East

15. Mobilization commenced in Sector East on 22 January. All weapon storage areas were broken into and heavy weapons removed. The Serb TDF has occupied positions on the cease-fire line with infantry, tanks and artillery. Some positions in depth have also been occupied. Mine laying by the Serb TDF has been reported in some areas. The bridges at Batina, Erdut and Ilok are closed. Some cease-fire violations have occurred over the past three nights, but these have not been more than usual. At approximately 1140 hours on 24 January, 60 members of the "Arkan Tiger Brigade" forced their way through the UN checkpoint at Batina Bridge. They returned through the bridge after a complaint was made to the TDF commander.

16. Mobilization orders have resulted in a fresh wave of tension and fear among the minorities within the UNPA, some of whom have requested to leave the sector and cross over to the Croatian side. Negotiations have been conducted by UNPROFOR with the authorities on both sides and approximately 75 people are reportedly being allowed to cross over to the Croatian side on 25 January 1993, while some others have been placed under UNPROFOR protection.

17. No build-up of CA has been observed so far along the cease-fire line, though some reinforcements of tanks, APCs and some other weapons were reported approximately 10 to 15 kilometres from the cease-fire line since approximately two weeks ago.

#### Sector West

18. Concurrent with the other sectors, mobilization of the Serb TDF has taken place in Sector West on 22 and 23 January.

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However, though the weapon storages have been opened in a few cases, no weapons have been removed so far due to the local Serb authorities having accepted the assurances of the Sector Commander that presently there is no build-up by the CA and that UNPROFOR takes responsibility to prevent CA attack on to the Serb areas. Notwithstanding the current acceptance of the Sector Commander's assurances by the local Serb authorities, this situation is not likely to continue for long as, reportedly, the local Serb authorities are under increasing pressure from Knin to remove the weapons and occupy positions along the old cease-fire line and any delay on their part is likely to be viewed by the Knin authorities as "disobedience" of their orders.

#### Meeting at Zadar

19. The Deputy Force Commander, Peterson and others have had a meeting with the Croatian Army authorities in Zadar at 1100 hours. Report on the meeting is awaited.