

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 95

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FROM MILOBS SECTOR 4C CYANGUGU//

TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G2//
MILOB HQ KIGALI//OPS//

SUBJ: INFORMATION REPORT AS AT 151800 HRS DEC 94

1. DURING PATROLS TO THE RWESERO SUB-PREFECTURE ON 13-14 DEC, BUGARAMA AREA 15 DEC 94, A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO HAS BEEN GATHERED ON RPA POLICY, THIER PERCEIVED THREAT, IDENTITY OF LOCAL COMMAND STRUCTURE, DETENTION CENTER LOCATIONS, ETC.
2. INFO ON RECENT INCIDENTS WAS MADE AVAILABLE, BUT LIKE MOST INFO, IT IS CIRCULATED IN A VAGUE CIRCLE BETWEEN COMMUNE OFFICIALS, LOCALS, RPA, MILOBS AND THE OCCASIONAL NGO. SOMETIMES TWO APPARENT INCIDENTS ARE ACTUALLY THE SAME, DATES ARE CONFUSED, AND THE SOURCE OF SOME INFO IS FOUND TO OFTEN ORIGINATE FROM THE RPA TO THE OFFICIALS OF THE PREFECTURE. LACK OF VEH AND LANGUAGE BARRIERS OF COURSE COMPOUND THE SPEED AND ACCURACY OF THE INFO. PARTICULAR INCIDENTS ARE GENERALIZED IN DAILY SITREPS AND WHENEVER PRACTICAL, ARE DETAILED IN SEPARATE REPORTS. THIS REPORT WILL THEREFORE ONLY CONCENTRATE ON ITEMS LEARNED DURING THE VARIOIUS CONTACTS MADE 13 TO 15 DEC.
3. ON 13 DEC THE PREFET OF CYANGUGU HELD A SPECIAL MEETING WITH CIVIL AND RPA OFFICIALS AT THE SUB-PREFECTURE OFFICE IN RWESERO. A MAIN TOPIC OF HIS FIRST VISIT TO THIS AREA AS PREFET WAS TO SYMPATHISE WITH THE LOCAL SECURITY SIT AND MAKE SOME PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION ON ITS IMPROVEMENT. THIS INCLUDED HAVING LOCALS ACCOMPANY RPA PATROLS, WHICH RECV A VERY MIXED REACTION. THE PREFET IS ACTIVE IN IDENTIFYING INCIDENTS, OFFERING A THUS FAR OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT, PROPOSALS, AND ASSISTANCE TO MILOBS AND UN HIGH COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UNHCHR). THIS IS NOT ALWAYS TO THE APPEASEMENT OF THE RPA. AFTER THE MEETING AT RWESERO, THE RPA HAD AN IMPROMPTU CLOSED DOOR MEETING WITH THE PREFET, WHERE IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE RPA PUT FORWARD THEIR REQ FOR RESTRAINT ON THE INIATIVE AND IDEAS OF THE PREFET. THE PREFET IS CONFIRMED TO HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT AS LONG AS HE IS PREFET, HE INTENDS TO DO THE JOB IN THE MOST COMPETENT AND UNBIASED WAY POSSIBLE.
4. LOCALS IN THE COMMUNES OF KAMEMBE, GAFUNZO, KAGANO AND KIRAMBO ARE NERVOUS AND MANY SLEEP IN THE FIELDS DURING DARKNESS. STRANGELY, THE INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED CHRONOLOGICALLY FROM WEST TO EAST AND PRIMARILY ALONG THE NORTHERN (LAKESHORE) AREAS OF THESE COMMUNES. THIS DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH ANY KNOWN MOVT/ROTATION OF RPA, HOWEVER IT IS NOT CONFIRMED. THE ONLY CFM ROTATION IS OF THE PLATOONS IN TOWN OF CYANGUGU ITSELF WHICH OCCUR APPROX EVERY 14 DAYS. IF DEEMED VALID, AND NOT A COINCEDENCE, IT MAY BE A FACTOR IN LENDING CREDIBILITY TO SOME RPA ACCOUNTS OF ORGANZED INSURGENT ACTIVITY, PERHAPS MOVING IN AN EASTWARD DIRECTION. IT COULD BE NOTED HERE THAT ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS SOME COUNCIL LEADERS HAVE

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BEEN WITNESSES OR VICTIMS IN SOME CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE KAGANO AREA. AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF INFO TO BE YET DETERMINED IS SOME BASIC PERS DATA ON THE LDRS AND HOW AND BY WHOM WERE THEY APPOINTED. THIS MAY ASSIST IN DETERMINING MOTIVE, AND THEREFORE A SUSPECTED GP.

5. IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THE RPA IN CYANGUGU ARE DEPLOYED IN WHAT IS BEST IDENT AS TWO COY GPS. THE NAMES/NUMBERS OF THE GPS AND THEIR INHERENT PARTS ARE NOT CFM. THE EASTERN GP IS COMMANDED BY MAJ GEORGE KALINDI AND SEEMS TO RELY PRIMARILY ON LT ELIPHAZ MIHIGO AS HIS SECONDARY. COMMUNES UNDER KALINDI'S CONTROL ARE KAGANO, KIRAMBO AND GATARE, WITH HIS HQ/RESIDENCE LOC IN KIRAMBO (GR 035 432). ACCESSIBILITY IS LTD AND DIFFICULT, AND IS LOC ON A HILL WITH EXCELLENT OBSN OF THE BAY AND THE MAIN ROAD TO KIBUYE. LT MIHIGO IS POSITIONED IN THE KAGANO COMMUNE, AND IS NORMALLY NEAR TO THE COMMUNE OFFICE. THE WESTERN GP HAS THE REMAINING COMMUNES, BUT IS CONCENTRATED MOSTLY ALONG THE LAKE AND NOT TOO FAR INLAND ALONG THE RUZIZI RIVER. IT IS COMMANDED BY MAJ WILSON KAZUNGA (DEPL FROM BUTARE); HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN MOSTLY ON A LENGTHY TASK IN THE GISENYI AREA. MAJ PAUL IS IN CHARGE OF BOTH GPS, AND TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE OF MAJ KAZUNGA'S GP. ALTHOUGH THE GENDARME IS SEPARATE, IT IS BELIEVED TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO MAJ PAUL, AND IS NOW COMMANDED BY A CAPT RUSIGIRA. THE PECKING ORDER IS MAJ PAUL, MAJ KAZUNGA SECOND, AND MAJ KALINDI THIRD. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT MAJ PAUL MAY BE THE SECOND IN COMMAND OF LCOL IBINGIRA'S BRIGADE. DURING AN UNPLANNED MEETING WITH AN RPA COMD, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE VEH RADIO WAS TUNED TO A SEPARATE FREQ THAN THE HAND HELD PORTABLE, AND THAT THE VEH FREQ EMITTED A BRIEF CONVERSATION IN FRENCH, BEFORE BEING QUICKLY SHUT OFF.

6. WHEN REPORTS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY ARE HEARD, THE TERM RGF, NOT INTERAHAMWE, IS MORE AND MORE THE COMMON CHOICE TO BE USED. RPA COMDS ADMIT THAT TO THEM, BOTH ARE NOW CONSIDERED THE SAME AND THE TERMS ARE ACTUALLY INTERCHANGABLE. THEY CLAIM THAT INSURGENT ACTIVITIES HAVE INCREASED SINCE THE IDP CAMPS HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND SINCE RUMOURS WERE REPORTED OF RGF RAID PLANS BEFORE THE NEW YEAR INTO CYANGUGU AREA. RPA HAVE CLAIMED TO HAVE CAPTURED SOME OF THESE SUSPECTS, AND ALLEGE THAT BEFORE AND DURING THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE HPZ, UNIFORMS AND WPNS WERE CACHED, USUALLY WITH RELATIVES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH COMMUNE HAS A DETENTION CENTRE. IN THE CASE OF THE EASTERN COY GP, ANYONE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE INVOLVEMENT IS TAKEN DIRECTLY TO DETENTION AREA IN KIRAMBO, AND KIRAMBO ONLY. THE RPA REITERATE THAT FIVE OF THEIR SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN FOUND KILLED ALONG THE RUZIZI AND LAKE KIVU AREA SINCE OCT. THEY REPORT THAT IN TWO CASES, TWO RPA SOLDIERS WERE TAKEN TO ZAIRE AND HELD, OF WHICH ONE WAS LATER FOUND DEAD FROM MACHETE WOUNDS IN THE RIVER. GATARE BURGERMEISTER REPORTS KNOWLEDGE OF AN AMBUSH ATTEMPT ON HIM THAT WAS TO OCCUR BETWEEN KIRAMBO AND GATARE, AND WAS EVIDENTLY UNCOVERED SOMEHOW BY RPA. THIS INFO WAS PRESENTED TO THE BURGERMEISTER BY THE RPA PRIOR TO A PLANNED MTG BETWEEN HIM AND MILOBS TO DISCUSS LOC SECUR SIT AND HAS NOT BEEN CHECKED AGAINST ANY OTHER SOURCE.

7. THE RPA ADMIT TO ALMOST ALL INCIDENTS OF SHOOTING PEOPLE IN

BOATS ON LAKE KIVU IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS. THEY ARE VERY VOCAL OF THE SECURITY THREAT THE WATERWAYS IMPOSE AND HAVE BEEN ISSUING STERN WARNINGS THAT ABSOLUTELY NO MOV'T ON THE LAKE WILL BE TOLERATED. THERE HAD EARLIER BEEN A CURFEW FROM 1800 HRS UNTIL DAYBREAK, BUT THAT IS NOW CANCELLED. THE RPA ACKNOWLEDGE THAT FOR THOSE PERS WISHING TO EXILE THEMSELVES OUT OF RWANDA, THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO DO SO AS LONG AS IT IS BY LEGAL BORDER CROSSING MEANS.

8. INCIDENTS IN THE NORTH AND NORTH EAST OF 4C HAVE VARIED FROM BANDITRY (ONLY ONE KNOWN CASE INVOLVING RAPE OF ONE WOMAN) TO MURDERS OF SEVERAL PEOPLE IN A SINGLE INCIDENT. FOR BANDITRY CASES SUSPECTED AS RPA, IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF THESE CASES DECREASE NOW THAT THE RPA HAVE BEEN PAID IN THIS AREA. MAJ KALINDI AND THE RPA LO HAVE STATED THAT THE PROCESS TO PAY (PERHAPS ALL IN RWANDA) SOLDIERS TOOK APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK TO COMPLETE. NO DETAILS OF PAYMENT METHOD AND COORD IS AVAL, OR OF PAY SCALE AMOUNTS.

9. SOUTH WESTERN SECTOR OF 4C HAVE SEEN INCIDENTS PRIMARILY ALONG THE RUZIZI RIVER AND EXCHANGES OF SMALL ARMS FIRE BETWEEN ZAIRE SOLDIERS AND RPA IN THE AREA OF RUZIZI ONE AND THREE ONLY. RPA TROOP CONCENTRATION IS MOSTLY IN KAMEMBE TOWN AREA, GISHOMA AREA AND BUGARAMA CITY AREA. AS IS THE CASE IN THE EAST AREA OF 4C, EACH COMMUNE HAS A DETENTION HOLDING AREA, WITH A SPECIFIC COMMUNE DETENTION FACILITY DESIGNATED FOR GENOCIDE CASES. THE TWO DESIGNATED FACILITIES KNOWN IN 4C ARE LOCATED AT KIRAMBO AND MUSHAKA (GR 8308). A VISIT ACCOMPANYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM TO THE MUSHAKA CELLS WAS GRANTED, WHERE 25 PRISONNERS WERE HELD. ONLY TWO OF THESE WERE HELD FOR NON-GENOCIDE ACCUSATIONS. A TOTAL OF 19 PERSONS HAD BEEN HELD HERE FOR OVER 15 DAYS TIME, THEREFORE THERE IS NO URGENCY IN TPT THESE PRISONNERS TO CYANGUGU OR BUTARE, ETC.

10. AN OPPORTUNITY WAS NEGOTIATED TO INSPECT A PLATOON SIZE RPA ENCAMPMENT LOCATED AT NYENJI (GR 7907). IT WAS WELL ORGANIZED AND CONTAINED FIGHTING TRENCHES BEHIND EACH SHELTER HUT AND A MIN OF ONE COMD BUNKER. ALTHOUGH NO WPN OTHER THAN SMALL ARMS WERE OBSERVED, NOR AMMO PACKAGING, ETC, SEVERAL PITS WITH NO PARTICULAR ORIENTATION WERE SEEN AROUND THE EDGE OF THE BIVOUAC. AFTER SPEAKING WITH MANY LOCALS IN THE AREA, IT WAS FOUND THAT OVERALL, THE PEOPLE ARE CONTENT WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE RPA AND THE ONLY PROBLEMS THEY ARE EXPERIENCING ARE LOCAL ISSUES AS NORMAL. THEIR BIGGEST COMPLAINT IS OF NEED FOR AN ACTIVE SECTOR LEADER TO GOVERN SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS. THERE ARE NO MASS GRAVES IN THIS AREA DUE LARGELY TO THE PROXIMITY OF THE RUZIZI RIVER TO NYENJI AREA. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST THREE WOMEN ARRESTED RECENTLY IN THIS SECTOR BY RPA FOR HARBOURING WEAPONS (FIREARMS AND POSSIBLY GRENADES) AND WERE TAKEN INITIALLY TO THE BIVOUAC FOR HOLDING. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT NOW THERE, NOR AT THE NEAREST CELLS LOCATED AT MUSHAKA.

OBSERVATIONS.

11. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY HAS INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS. MUCH OF THIS INCREASE COULD BE DUE TO THE RECENT CLOSURES OF MANY REFUGEE CAMPS IN CYANGUGU AND SECTOR 4A. MANY PEOPLE UPON CLOSURE OF THESE CAMPS

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HAVE EITHER ESCAPED TO ZAIRE, OR HAVE RETURNED TO VARIOUS COMMUNES LOOKING FOR ACCOMODATION AND ITEMS. IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT SOME PERS FROM THESE CAMPS WHO ARE FEARFUL OF PERSECUTION BY THE RPA HAVE COMMITTED SOME OF THESE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AS TRANSIENTS OR BASED FROM VARIOUS COMMUNES. RPA ARE ADAMANT THAT THEY WILL (AND HAVE) PUNISH SOLDIERS WHO HAVE COMMITTED AN OFFENCE. THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF PUNISHMENTS APPARENTLY WITHIN USE BY THE RPA: FOR MINOR OFFENCES OF THEFT, FRAUD, DISOBEDIENCE, ETC, A BEATING OR BEATING FOLLOWED BY EXPULSION FROM THE RPA. FOR OFFENCES OF MURDER, TRAITORISM OR RAPE, EXECUTION WILL BE POSSIBLE. THERE MAY BE INCIDENTS HOWEVER WHERE THE RPA PUBLICLY CLAIM NO WRONGDOING, BUT SECRETLY PUNISH OR DISCIPLINE THEIR TROOPS PRIVATELY TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID WORSENING GEN PUBLIC PERCEPTION.

12. THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENT LIKE ACTIVITY VIA BOAT FROM ZAIRE TO RWANDA AND RESULTING IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN RWANDA IS POSSIBLE. MANY LOCALS ARE ADAMANT OF THE FEASIBILITY OF TAKING EVEN LARGE ITEMS SUCH AS COWS ACROSS TO ZAIRE BY BOAT. RPA ROUTINE PLAN IS TO POSN TROOPS ALONG PREDETERMINED AREAS OF THE SHORE AND FIRE VOLLEYS AT CERTIAN BEARINGS TOWARD ZAIRE. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY ONE GOING TO/FROM RWANDA BASICALLY WAIT FOR THIS ACTIVITY AND THEN CHANNEL A PATH AWAY FROM THE ARCS OF FIRE MARKED BY TRACER. MUCH OF THIS NIGHT MOVEMENT IS LIKELY NOT A MILITARY OR CRIMINAL INSURGENCY PERSAY, BUT POSSIBLY RWANDANS FLEEING TO ZAIRE ON THEIR OWN ACCORD AND REASONS (SOME MAYBE WANTED BY RPA) AND OTHERS ARE ONES RETURNING TO RWANDA TO "STEAL" MANY OF THEIR OWN BELONGINGS PREVIOUSLY LEFT BEHIND AND THEN RETURNING TO ZAIRE.

13. THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERAHAMWE AND EX-RGF ACTIVITY OCCURING IN 4C IS ESTIMATED AS HIGH. WPN AND UNIFORMS COULD HAVE INDEED BEEN EASILY LEFT BEHIND BEFORE AND DURING FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE FORMER HP2. THE PROXIMITY TO BOTH BURUNDI AND ZAIRE BORDERS AND THE PROCEDURE OF CROSSING AREAS OF LAKE KIVU IS LIKELY, IN REALITY, ONLY A MODERATE RISK. THE RPA SIMPLY HAVE TOO MUCH AREA TO COVER, NO REAL NI OBSN EQPT KNOWN, LITTLE TPT AND ARE UNDERMANNED FOR THE TASK. THE RPA MUST BE TAKING THIS AS A MAJOR RISK TO SECTOR SECURITY SINCE IT APPEARS THE BULK OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT IS ALONG THE LAKESHORE AREA IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS THE BORDER AREAS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST. A CONCEPT OF CREATING FURTHER INSTABILITY BY DONNING A PIECE OF UNIFORM AND COMMITTING A CRIME, OR EVEN SIMPLY ENSURING TO BE SEEN IN THIS MILITARY CLOTHING DURING AN ATTEMPTED CRIME, IS PLAUSIBLE AND AND WOULD BE EFFECTIVE.

14. SOME CRIMES AND KILLINGS CAN BE ASSUMED RPA, OTHERS HAVE BEEN ADMITTED BY RPA AND PUNISHMENTS HAVE BEEN ACTIONED. THE KILLING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONS IN A SINGLE INCIDENT, SUCH AS THE 13 KILLED AT KARAMA IN NOV, AND SOME INVOLVING PERSONS ON THE WATER AT NIGHT, ARE AT LEAST SIGNS OF PROBLEMS IN COMD AND CONTROL AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THE RPA HAVE DECREED ABSOLUTELY NO MOV'T TO BE TOLERATED ON THE WATER, THERE ARE PERHAPS MORE PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF IT. IN AT LEAST ONE REPORTED CASE, RPA ALLOWED CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS TO FISH AT NIGHT UNDER DIRECT SUPERVISION, WHICH CONTRADICTS THIER OWN STRICT POLICY. PEOPLE NEEDING TO FISH FOR FOOD AND MONEY HAVE A NEED TO CONTINUE AND ARE AT RISK OF EITHER

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BEING SHOT, ARRESTED, OR THE BOAT CONFISCATED. ANALYSING THE INCIDENTS, THERE IS A TREND OF LESS AND LESS FLEXIBILITY IN THIS POLICY AND INCIDENTS OF WHAT SEEM LIKE EXTREMELY RASH OR CARELESS DECISIONS TO FIRE ON BOATS IN THE WATER. GROUPS OF PEOPLE ARE EXECUTED IN AN EXTRAJUDICIAL MANNER AS SUSPECTED INTERAHAMWE, YET CLOTHING AND AMMO IS SELDOM FOUND OR SEIZED AS EVIDENCE IN THESE CASES. EXPLANATIONS OF JUSTIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS CAN BE INTERESTING.

COMMENT

15. SECTOR 4C IS LESS STABLE THAN ONE MONTH AGO. INSTABILITY OF THE POPULACE CAN LIKELY BE ATTRIBUTED TO POOR DECISIONS AND ACTIONS AT A SECTION OR PLATOON LEVEL BY THE RPA, AND BY SOME INSURGENT ACTIVITY BOTH MILITARY IN NATURE AND BANDITRY BY DISPLACED PERS, EX-RGF AND INTERAHAMWE. THERE IS AN HONEST INTENT OBSERVED BY MANY JR AND SR OFFR OF THE RPA IN 4C TO BE A PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND EFFECTIVE IN GOVERNMENT. THE PREFET OF CYANGUGU IS EXTREMELY PROACTIVE AND VERY CONSCIENTIOUS IN HIS POSN, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY ACTS AS A LEADER. THERE IS A REAL THREAT ASSUMED OF INSURGENTS OPERATING IN SECTOR 4C, PLUS THE RUMOURED THREAT OF SOME KIND OF ACTION BY EX FORCES TO CONDUCT SOME FORM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATION BY THE NEW YEAR. WITH PERHAPS WORSENING COMD AND CONTROL AT A LOCAL LEVEL DEEP IN THE COMMUNES AT NIGHT, THE SITUATION COULD VERY WELL WORSEN SLIGHTLY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

16. IT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH LOC RPA COMD AND HAS BEEN AGREED THAT UNAMIR COULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW SUSPECTED OR SELF-PROCLAIMED RGF AND INTERAHAMWE PRISONERS IF DESIRED. THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE SEIZED, AND CAN BE COORD THROUGH MILOB HQ SECTOR 4C CONTACTS WITH RPA COMDS.

17. UNAMIR ARMED PRESENCE COULD BE INCREASED IN THE NORTH OF SECTOR 4C TO ASSIST IN THE INCREASE IN STABILITY AMONG THE POPULACE IN THE AREA. INCREASED NERVOUS TENSION IN SOLDIERS, INCREASED ACTS OF CRIME BY PROBABLE ANTI-GOVT GROUPS, ALL COMPOUNDED WITH INCREASE IN POPULATION FROM CAMP CLOSURES AND REPATRIATION, COULD VERY MUCH INCREASE SECURITY RISK TO UN AND NGO AGENCIES, THEREFORE BECOMING A POSSIBLE TARGET TO BOTH RPA AND OTHER ARMED INDIVIDUALS. IF THE ASSESSMENT OF EFFICIENCY OF GOVT AND RPA JR AND SR OFFICERS IS ACCURATE, INCREASED UNAMIR PRESENCE WOULD ASSIST IN CONTROL OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY AND ASSIST THE RPA AND GOVT TO TIGHTEN ITS CONTROL OF LOCAL MILITARY ACTIONS. THIS COOPERATION MAY ALSO INCREASE FLEXIBILITY TO CURRENT POLICIES, YET MAINTAIN THE AIM OF THE ASSISTANCE MISSION.