

UNRRA (EUROPEAN REGION).

Regd. No.

WR 36
Vol I

Date of Paper

FROM WHOM

Date Registered

SUBJECT

1-RECORD

Proposal for repatriation
GENERAL

NOTE. This file must always be passed on VIA the REGISTRY.

Wt P768/276 5m 8/45 H J R & L Gp 51

Referred to

Date

Referred to

Date

Referred to

Date

Miss *Swigson*
Registry

10/10
16/10

NOTE.—Do not retain this File unnecessarily.

(27628) Wt P.470/22 5,000 7/44 A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.745

NO MINUTES should be written on this jacket.

RELEVANT OR PREVIOUS PAPERS, CROSS REFERENCES, ETC.

File No.

SUBJECT.

PRECEDENTS TO BE NOTED

Noted in Registry

Papers transferred from DP 10/7
" " DP 10/17
" " DP 20

Copy

Copy on DP36

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
6, Sharia Bar El-Shifa, Garden City,
Cairo.

Refs.

CALO 218(DP583.22c)

Ours D.583.22c

31 August 1945.

The Administrative Council,
U.N.R.R.A.,
European Regional Office,
11 Portland Place,
London W1,
ENGLAND

ATTENTION: Chief of Bureau of Services

Dear Sir:

Enclosed herewith for your information is copy
of report on the move of the Dodecanese refugees from the
Lebanon, Syria, to the port of Haifa in Palestine for
berkation and repatriation.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) T.T. Waddington

Brigadier T.T. Waddington
Chief of Middle East Office.

cc: As mentioned above.

Reports Branch: 9.10.45.
M. Delier
Dr. Coigny
Mr. Berger *PN*
Mr. Adair
MA 3/1

29 August 1945

TO: Director,
Repatriation Division, M.E.O.

FROM: B.P. Rowland

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Greeks from Souk El Gharb in the Lebanon.

A journey to Jerusalem on the 8th August 1945 was the first step in the repatriation of the 1007 Greek refugees from Souk El Gharb in the Lebanon. Here came the first link up with UNRRA Jerusalem, and here the necessary introductions were made with Capt. Schumacher of Movements Levant in whose hands rested the initial responsibilities for this move. Very good relationships had already been established by Harry Keiles and nothing but the most unreserved assistance was encountered.

On the following day a further journey to Haifa completed the necessary arrangements with Capt. Schumacher's brother, Capt. Schumacher, who fills the post of ESO and RTO Haifa, and with Capt. Weston of Movements, Haifa. At this stage news of the intended move had not come through to them, but it was explained. Mutual sympathy was exchanged.

On Sunday, August 12th, Miss Elizabeth Brown and Mr. B.P. Rowland left Haifa for Beyrouth by car. The journey passed without incident, and at 10 o'clock that night the two UNRRA representatives arrived at the Officer's Club Beyrouth, where dinner had just been cleared away.

The following morning at 0800 hrs started the journey to Souk El Gharb in the Lebanon, a village some six miles beyond Alep and some twenty six miles from Beyrouth. Here the UNRRA representatives were met as bearers of great tidings by the two Greek military officers supervising the general life and supply lines of the refugees. There had been no previous news passed through of the coming move, beyond a trip of Miss Brown's some two months previous. In the small house serving as an office and looking down the Lebanon hills to the Mediterranean, the morning was spent in collating all available information on the condition, number, whereabouts of the refugees; on the accuracy of their registration, the question of their DP cards, the state of their health, the question of medical examination, and the other manifold points arising from the tidings borne by the UNRRA representatives. Of the 1007 Greek refugees 33 were Dodecanese and instructions from HQ Cairo had already been received that these should be transferred to Nuseirat. This move was immediately discussed, it being deemed wise to affect it before the departure of the others when there would be left no provision.

It was agreed with the two Greek officers in charge, Capt. Karriakis and Lt. Alkalai, to clear Souk El Gharb entirely of refugees, and it soon became apparent that there were a number of sick and aged, and women near their confinement period who would either not be able to travel or for whom special transport arrangements would have to be made. This was clearly expressed to the Greek Doctor whose name was never understood, and he was asked to provide a list of all such people. The Greek officers were forewarned of the difficulties with which they would have to contend, and were given such information as would not over excite them. Early in the proceedings the question of baggage. That all but tooth-brushes should go in advance was stressed above most issues. Although assurances were given readily and with confidence, it was to transpire that the instructions might well have been taken in reverse. This was not easy. At the end of that morning a round was made by car of the Souk El Gharb area and to the farthest point of refugee habitation. Most of the houses lay long distances off the road up narrow almost unnegotiable tracks, and a certain amount of trust had to be put in the Greek military, if somewhat misplaced. In their defence it must be said that their own task was not an easy one.

That evening and the following day much work had to be done in approaching the many officials who would have a say in some detail of the move. It is mentioned that 9th Army HQ Alep, source of medical services, lay twenty miles

/fr

from Beyrouth, that transport HQ at 84 Sub Area lay twenty miles from Aley, that HQ Movements North Levant was situated in the Port, and that 37 Ambulance Unit lay some way off the main road from all these, expresses leniently the time which had to be taken up when personal visits were considered expedient, and in the efforts to synchronise arrangements.

Major Findlay had already been in touch with Medical Branch, 9th Army, regarding the transference of 17 TB and 8 mental cases for embarkation at Haifa. In confirming this with Col. Wishart at 9th Army further assistance had to be requested for 7 sick cases (4 TBs and 3 others) who numbered among the 33 Dodecanese to be sent to Nuseirat. Col. Wishart was remarkably unpretentious and helpful, and although he had to be absent the entire following day he personally called first thing upon Major Hill of the 37 Ambulance unit to avoid misunderstandings. Later it was arranged with Major Hill that two ambulances would convey these 7 people from the Lebanon to Nuseirat on Wednesday 15th.

Capt. Ruthven of Movements, Beyrouth Port, was approached the day after arrival in Beyrouth, and the help he proceeded to give throughout every stage of the move cannot be exaggerated, nor the time and patience he contributed to the problems as they arose. Through him arrangements were made for the 26 Dodecanese to proceed by rail to Nuseirat, also on Wednesday 15th. These people were entrained at 0700 hrs on that day and finally numbered 23 and not 26. Unfortunately no escort could be found for them, and accordingly Mr. Stapleton, acting for earlier embarkations at Haifa, was asked to meet these refugees at Haifa where a change of trains was necessary. Nuseirat were informed and the refugees duly met at Gaza. Unfortunately the 4 TBs sent by ambulance were drawn from among the 17 in sanatoriums in the Lebanon for whom Major Findlay had made initial repatriation arrangements. Consequently these four had to be re-entrained for Haifa when the time came. This mistake was reasonable inasmuch as instructions had been received to send all 33 Dodecanese to Nuseirat, and it was not known at the time that the four were taken from among the 17.

With Saturday, August 18th, in mind as the sailing date, further arrangements went ahead. Time was short and two VJ days intervening which emptied all army offices came as a hindrance.

Advance baggage was scheduled for loading at Beyrouth HBT station on Thursday 16th of August, to arrive Haifa the following day. Transport arrangements were made comparatively smoothly with the transport officer 84 Sub Area, Capt. but VJ day produced ten 3 tonners instead of twenty.

Interrupting the baggage arrangements came the question of paint, which rapidly became a major problem. An entire morning was spent in efforts to this for the marking of baggage. Only the final military source to which we were advised to apply was able to help. They produced green, black and yellow. Red ultimately had to be obtained from the local market at very high cost. The delay left only one afternoon for the marking of the baggage, but the task was commendably achieved by the refugees.

From 0700 hrs on Thursday 16th loading commenced and carried on right through the day, and when by ten o'clock that night baggage was still coming round the mountain, the RFO, Lt. Dyer (who suffered his misfortunes with fortitude) called a halt and said that the train would have to pull out. Further wagons would be provided the next day.

The loading problem had its difficulties. The trucks had to come over twenty miles and return, the drivers were East African soldiers resentful before the mirage of demobilisation and at one period a strike was staged. It is not known how many trucks went off duty of their own accord, but toward the end of day there seemed fewer.

Of the 1007 refugees 35 had obtained work in Beyrouth where also the These were told to bring their baggage of their own accord. This arrival trucks, carts, wagons and push carts, and the town of Beyrouth must have the least. This tremendous amount of baggage was suffered and dispatched whence, as yet, no complaints are known have been received. All loading baggage was finished by 1100 hrs on the

As for all this the incidents of life carried on, and a small boy was run over by a reversing truck at Souk El Gharb on Thursday 16th. Taken to St. Georges Hospital in Beyrouth he had unfortunately to lose his limb. His mother, father and further family of four wished then to stay with him. This problem very fortunately was assisted by the postponement of the sailing date to the 21st, which gave time for the boy to recover sufficiently to be moved. However, the doctor's decision remained a last minute one, and through the understanding of Major Hill an ambulance was obtained to run the boy and his mother to Haifa on the day of embarkation.

Returning to the move, entrainment was arranged and commenced at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, August 20th. Two days previously Mr. and Mrs Smith had arrived from Nuseirat on urgent request for escort duties. Unfortunately, it was not possible to use their services during those two days, and although they may have been disappointed in this, the assistance they gave both on entrainment and at the port was not impaired. The entrainment was a slow and tiring task, started in the heat of the day because of difficulty in availability of transport, and continuing until past ten at night. 21 trucks were obtained but the journeys were long, over fifty miles there and back. Train stock consisted of 39 box cars to hold 26 persons each. That these were straw strew was appreciated by all refugees with the exception of a lady who enjoyed asthma. It is not known whether she had an attack.

Difficulty was encountered when the Greek Doctor, who had at best been unreliable, reported some ten cases up the mountain who would have to come down by ambulance. When this was at last managed the RFO would rightly take no one on the train who so much as resembled a stretcher case. This problem took some time to solve, and ultimately those cases deserving were sent to Haifa by ambulance the following day, again through the goodwill of the ambulance unit.

Meanwhile information had come through that certain Greeks from the town intended to jump the train and accordingly two Army security men were obtained who had control of the gate in this respect, and at about ten o'clock the Greek Doctor, possibly in order to redeem himself, discovered among the straws a woman eight months pregnant. He accused her of not being a refugee at all and called for assistance, presenting his find to those concerned. Although she proved to have DP cards it seemed almost certain that she had been registered as a refugee by the Greek Consulate; there was no time but to leave it at that. However, she remained expecting, and when requested to step from the train refused to do so, and when mildly threatened with consequences maintained a silence which, in the darkness at that time of night, concealed her whereabouts among the many other refugees in the box car. One of the security men who spoke Greek was not able to stir her, either by cajolery or clauses from the Penal Code, she was informed that force would be resorted to. A few minutes later six British soldiers were complicating Anglo-Greek relationships, and battling their way out of the box car with this good lady. Showing tremendous force and spirit she screamed and kicked her way into a major problem, endeavouring to throw herself on the line between the platform and the train. She was eventually taken to the RFO's office. There Mrs. Smith solved the remains of the situation by suggesting she go to Nuseirat. Nuseirat were telephoned and arrangements made. The Greek lady kissed the hands of Mrs. Smith, and that night she slept with the RFO as her host, a bed being arranged in the office. She proceeded to Nuseirat the following day.

Finally the train pulled out at 10.45 p.m. and Beyrouth was again still. Haifa East Station, some two miles from the port was reached at approximately 0800 hrs the following day. There were stops of several hours en route.

The train from Nuseirat came in for the first embarkation and it was not before 1100 hrs that embarkation of the Souk El Gharb refugees commenced. This took six hours, with many reasons for it taking so long. The Souk El Gharb refugees had been living in houses and although they had been primed and arranged in groups it was not possible to collect them in these groups, and had any attempt been made to arrange them before entrainment they could not have been got away on train schedules. It was necessary therefore for these people to form their correct groups on the quayside and this job could not be hurried in the space available. Further, the refugees carried too much baggage and

- 4 -

USO stopped the embarkation at one juncture to point this out and confer. In addition to this both the gangway and the sally port were used for embarking and after some time groups who were to use the sally port refused to go aboard, feeling that they were being led into the keel. This difficulty lasted so long that the embarkation came to a complete standstill, with the refugees sitting on their baggage, and interpreters running back and forth from the authorities to their people. When finally they were persuaded to continue coming aboard, some refugees, particularly mothers and their babies, still remained adamant, and while father went through the sally port mother took the children and went up the gangway. Through this, groups became divided, and it was some problem uniting them again.

Inevitably, however, the task was completed, and although the problem was within the ship, the quay was empty. Long after this work continued on the nominal rolls and DP2 cards. So passed the Souk El Gharb Greeks.

From this move it is felt that two outstanding recommendations arise, the first of which would dissolve most of the smaller problems which were met with:

1. Shortage of time, and the unpreparedness of the refugees in the discipline necessary for a move.

It is earnestly put forward that where possible even months before a move is to take place the people, particularly those outside the camps, are acquainted with:

- a) The method of compiling group rolls and the forming of groups, that they may be arranged in groups long beforehand and know the groups to which they belong, even rehearsing aspects of the move if necessary.
- b) The regulations regarding baggage, that each person is permitted to carry only 100 lbs of baggage and send in advance only 195 lbs, and that they will have to incur the consequences where these rulings are ignored.
- c) The means by which they are likely to travel, and the reasons where such means may appear on first hearing as inferior, which forewarning may tend to lessen strikes on dock sides.
- d) All such aspects of a move as may help to achieve orderly results when the time arrives.

2. Baggage.

On this move regarding baggage we were in error, and it is clear a strong enough line was not taken. It is felt that on future occasions action should be taken to the point of confiscation (with the individual refugee's option on what he cares to leave behind) if similar feebleness prevails in efforts to comply, and that the refugees should be fully acquainted with this possibility.

Miss Elizabeth Brown,
Mr. B.P. Rowland.

REPORT ON REPATRIATION OF GREEKS FROM SOUK EL GHARB

IN THE LEBANON

Distribution:

Washington

E.R.O.

Brigadier T.T.Waddington

Miss S. Gifford

Col. R.R. Livingstone

Mr. Emerson Holcomb

Major L. Findlay

Miss Marion Wilson.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DP. 36

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: MISS GIBBONS

FROM U.N.R.R.A. (WARSAW) TO U.N.R.R.A. (LONDON).

No. 57

Dated : 28th August 1945.
Received : 30th August 1945.

Repeated Washington 62.

At interview with Wladslai Wolski Vice Minister Administration in Charge Repatriation 27th August, complete plan repatriation all Polish displaced persons discussed. Plan which is well under way covers first movement from East almost half completed, remainder in hand, second internal movement practically finished, third movement practically finished, third movement from West about one quarter completed, remaining 1,500,000 mostly British and American Zones, with negotiations being carried on primarily through liaison office in Berlin working direct Military authorities expect start movement shortly commencing 10,000 increasing to 18,000 each day with no obstacle, except acute shortage trucks fore seen to prevent completion by 31st December. Repatriation displaced persons Middle East still in preliminary states and not expected consummate for sometime though envisaged * by plan. Repatriation from elsewhere being handled as cleared through diplomatic channels. Seven liaison teams being set up very shortly strategic ports Germany to handle ground any special cases involved. Specifically stated no requirement foreseen for UNRRA Personnel in Poland for this program. Greatest emphasis laid on requirements for trucks, fuel, clothing, footwear, medical supplies; that order with demands being submitted through appropriate ministries. Other Nationals in Poland ^{not} numerous and repatriation being handled through Diplomatic channels with Governments concerned.

* This word is repeated ENVISAGED.

LJ

DP36. Vol I

DP36.
Copies DP 48 - Vol II Orig
" DP36/1
" DP36/18.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Miss Gibbons

USFET MAIN.....TO.....U.N.R.R.A. LONDON

Unnumbered.

D: 28th August, 1945

Info. WAROF pass to MWT 'R: 29th August, 1945
London

----- 112 ----- 143
Usfet rear pass to Usfet Mission to France Brit Mission to
France. Control Commission (BB. EL.) U.S. Groups Control
Commission. Signed Eisenhower. Ciphers 19947 restricted. Reference
UNRRA London signals UK 42099 dated 17th August and UK 50152 dated
25th only to Usfet for CDPX offering Swedish shipping for repatriation
of DP within Baltic and North Sea Areas.

200 Danes, Norwegians and Swedes concentrated in Paris await
repatriation. Please ascertain if one of these small vessels is
suitable for routing to a French port to lift above persons. Scofor
could fill the space outward with French awaiting repatriation. We
propose that balance of 4 ships could usefully move 1,000 Czechs in
Sweden to a German port for onward repatriation and continue by
moving Polish and other DP's from Norway of whom 2,700 Poles. Agreed
Frankfurt.

JHMH/RLW

OUT FILE

DESPATCHED BY
REGISTER

27/8/45

D.P 36

Des. No 381

23rd August, 1945.

Dear Mrs. Dalton,

Thank you for your letter dated August 11th in which you asked for information about UNHRA's role concerning non-repatriables.

The development of this problem was held up because certain Governments (Yugoslav) objected to our dealing with it basing their objections on an interpretation of the Resolution number 57 (Montreal). Their interpretation was, that UNHRA cannot deal in ex-enemy territory with any displaced person without the consent of the Government of their country of origin. The problem was brought before the Third Session of the Council of UNHRA a few days ago and was discussed.

I enclose a copy of "Journal" No. 12 in which you will find Minutes of the Session in question and the text of the final decision in this matter. This paper will give you the information you need about UNHRA's future policy in this field. The decision which, as you see, was taken only three days ago constitutes a turning point for our activity in this matter as it gives us the authority we needed to deal with people who are unable or unwilling to go back to their own country.

I would like to add that our policy is not to treat these people as definitely "non-repatriables" or "stateless" (unless they are stateless in the legal sense, i.e. unless they possess Hansen passports). We will treat them as people who for the moment have not made up their minds i.e. who are potential repatriables. This policy of not committing them at once to become non-repatriables will increase in our opinion, the numbers of displaced persons who after a certain time will be willing to go back to their country of origin.

As concerns the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, nothing new has happened, but I think that after the decision taken by the Council, our relations will be reviewed and strengthened. The only decision taken by us in the last months was to adopt the period of six months as the "reasonable time" mentioned in paragraph 10 of the report of Sub-Committee 4 Committee IV, Atlantic City, during which time we have to care for people who cannot be repatriated until the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees is prepared to remove them to new places of settlement. However, this problem may be re-considered also in the new period we are now entering. You may be interested to know that in a few days the Technical Commission of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees will discuss the problem of the adoption of an identity and travel document for refugees coming within the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

I hope that you are well and that you like your work in the Training Base.

Yours sincerely,

W. LANGRISH

Mrs. Ruth Dalton,
M.T.B.,
Granville,
France.

1. Enclosure

OUT FILE

DP/36

Dec. No 81

TO: Mr. Rhatigan, Deputy Director General Relief Services.

FROM: Colonel Charley

I attach copy of a cable received here, but I presume that you already know of this situation and have taken appropriate action.

20th August, 1945

Cc. Finance Div.

COPY -

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Miss Gibbons

FROM USFET REAR.....TO.....ERO

No.EX-78061

DATED

10th August 1945

RECEIVED

13th August 1945

It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that displaced persons are being returned to native country without final payment of account

It is directed that all displaced personnel be paid in full for services rendered prior to return to native country.

GDC

Registry

No. DP 30 TJ4

OUT FILE

Draft.

UNRRA PARIS

Telegram.

~~ENJOY~~

NO

EN CLAIR

Miss Gibbons
10.8.45.

Mary L. Gibbons
11/8/45

11 AUG 1945

*Divisional
Gibbons*

Despatched

M.

UNRRA BONDON

TO UNRRA PARIS

Re our cables 157 of 20.6.45., 189 of 13.7.45
and 221 of 26.7.45..

Information asked for urgently requested.

(drafted A. Dellerneux)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

PP 36

UNRRA Mobilisation & Training Base.
Jullouville. Manche.

INDEXED

Mr. Curran
17. 8. 45.

Dear Dr Langrod.

As I hear that you are still looking after the Stateless, I write to ask if you could send us all available ^{up-to-date} information about the whole subject, including reports of the Inter. Governmental Com. & any other organisations. This information is badly needed for Training purposes, & we should be very grateful for any help which you can give.

I had the pleasure of seeing M. Delisieux the other day & hearing news of you & other old friends in the E.R.O.

Yours sincerely
Ruth Dalton

ACTION COPY

INDEXED

DP

36

FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Miss Gibbons.

FROM USEET REARTO.....ERO.

No. EX-78061

DATED

10th August: 1945

RECEIVED

13th August 1945

It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that displaced persons are being returned to native country without final payment of account.

It is directed that all displaced personnel be paid in full for services rendered prior to return to native country.

CDC

Copy sent to Frank Juch. Mr Rhodiger

ACTION COPY

INDEXED

SAVINGRAM

DP 36
C 36/39/1
"DP 36/6"

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: MISS GIBBONS

U.N.R.R.A. CAIRO TO U.N.R.R.A. LONDON

No. 15

Dated: 8 August 1945

Repeated CASERTA 226 (Via A.L.S.)

Rec'd: 13 September 1945

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

Refer London cable 273 to Cairo, 102 to Caserta of 31st May and 302 to Cairo of 13th June.

Following cable received 7th August from Floud MEO Representative in Teheran.

"Czechoslovak Minister KADLEC has instructions from his Government to arrange evacuation of all Czechs in Iran through Russia with if possible UNRRA assistance. 400 concerned of whom 260 eligible for UNRRA assistance. No SUDETEN problem here.

2. It is probably that USSR will co-operate and all could travel via Baku in one convoy in mid-September, taking 15 days.

3. Czechoslovak Minister officially asks for UNRRA assistance, with payment of transport costs, provision of food and medical supplies for journey and pressed on Iranian Government to simplify exit formalities. It appears that other assistance such as pre-repatriation assembly camp, provisions of flight teams etc., unnecessary as refugees are highly organised and have doctors available etc.

4. I have informed Kadlec subject to your confirmation UNRRA can assist as requested for 260 only.

5. Suggest MEO send competent official (Czech speaker unnecessary) in next 3 weeks to work with Czechs on supply details, including obtaining journey rations from U.S. and U.K. stocks in Iran and to square up details of financial assistance. This official should be administrative type not welfare type. Perhaps might be same who may later be necessary here on procurement of army surpluses. GALUSINSKI obviously unsuitable owing to his nationality.

6. Though flight teams unnecessary obviously important that progress of convoy through Russia should be fully observed and reported. In view of Russian susceptibilities the best solution is request Czechoslovak Minister to nominate competent refugee to check details of journey and report fully to UNRRA Prague Mission on arrival. Such report important for later use with Poles.

7. I am seeing UNR representative tomorrow stressing that if financial assistance forthcoming UNRRA must insist that all refugees are allowed through in block without prospects of USSR accepting some and rejecting others, and UNRRA must be satisfied with conditions of journey for payment made.

811. If assuming that if assistance is agreed to, then transport costs through Russia will be debited against Russian contribution and transport costs in Iran against Iranian contributions. Please telegraph financial status of Czechoslovak Government. Is it in receipt of free supplies?

9. Please telegraph immediately whether you approve of my line."

In view your 302 must we wait request of Czech Government to ERO and your approval before accepting responsibility for giving assistance requested by Minister. Or do we act upon request of individual Ministers to individual countries. This latter would mean either that one Minister's request would be sufficient for whole area of our responsibility or that we would assist refugees in one limited geographic area and not in another, for example we would assist Czech refugees in Iran but not in Palestine.

It is our opinion that we cannot assume responsibility for repatriation unless we are able to exercise that responsibility throughout the journey otherwise financial and other commitments are apt to be made which we cannot recognize but also cannot justify. This would mean in this case either a UNRRA representative accompany the refugees to Czechoslovakia that we repatriate to the Russian border only. We are exploring possibilities of alternative routes via Middle East.

Your decisions and recommendations on all points raised are urgently required as we are cabling Teheran to postpone further action until we have heard from you.


DMS/VC

DP 36.

INDEXED

To: Miss Gibbons
From: A. Delierneux
7th August 1945.

I attach herewith a list of D.Ps.
from the North-West of Europe still to be repatriated
from Norway and Denmark, and of Polish and Russian
D.Ps. in the countries of North-West Europe.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. Delierneux', written in a cursive style.

A. Delierneux.

	Belgian	Dutch	French	Luxemb.	Swiss	Polish
(4.7) <u>NORWAY</u>	542	1449	1100	50-(30.6)		11.059
(12.7) <u>DENMARK</u>	52	48	321	43	119	4000

	<u>POLISH</u>	<u>RUSSIAN</u>
BELGIUM	4329 (included 1950 immigrant labourers)	823
FRANCE	10,000	17,500
HOLLAND	54	700
LUXEMBOURG	39	25
SWITZERLAND	7,600 (PWs included)	9,650 (PWs included)

Sent for action to M. Delorme
ref: to Dr. Gigny
Col. Charley

DP 36

FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

CEC

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Miss Gibbons.

FROM U.N.R.R.A. (STOCKHOLM) TO U.N.R.R.A. (LONDON).

No. 28.

DATED

30th July 1945

RECEIVED

31st July 1945

Your No. 34.

Received and confusion seems to explain instructions received in your No. 32. Refer to "Brief for D.P. Mission to Sweden" dated 21st April item 12 on Swedish shipping for Displaced Persons which constituted my basic instructions. I have tried to state in my No. 24 and No. 25 that since Luebeck to Sweden traffic is over there are up to 5 Swedish ships available to UNRRA for use in "Repatriating Displaced Persons within the Baltic and North Sea areas E.G. from German Baltic ports to Holland and Belgium and from these countries including movements from France through these countries to Poland and the USSR" or probably elsewhere. Ships could be available until agreement was reached on whether Sweden would take more Displaced Persons. This cable merely intended to clarify my 24 and 25 and your No. 34. I will not discuss use of 5 ships or increase in quota over 10,000 in keeping with instructions in your No. 32. For your information Norway has arranged for Ronskar to pick up 250 Norwegians at Luebeck on Thursday and to transport them to Oslo.

CDC

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry DP.
No.

DP 36 t34

Draft.

UNRRA PARIS

Telegram.

~~ENJOY~~

NO

221

EN CLAIR

Miss Gibbons.
24.7.45.

Mary L. Gibbons

25/7/45

Divisional. +

A. Delierneux

Dr. Calin Delore

OUT FILE

Despatched

UNRRA LONDON TO UNRRA PARIS

Re our cable 157 of 20th June and 189 of
13th July Information asked for urgently
requested.

(A. Delierneux)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. DP 36

R 1100 20/7

564 Athens to Washington
475 London (repeated to)

Despatched *1230/20/7* M.

Draft.

UNRRA LONDON TO UNRRA ATHENS

Please send us copy of AFHQ FX 12997 to which
your 564 to Washington refers.

UNRRA ATHENS

Telegram.

(drafted by A. Delierneux)

~~ENJOY~~ *Cew*

OUT-FILE

NO: *416*

20/7

EN CLAIR

Mary L. Gibbons

Miss Gibbons
19.7.45.

Delierneux
adain

VW

WR 36

DP 4/4
Copy for DP 36

20th July, 1945.

To: The Head of Luxembourg Mission
From: Miss M.L. Gibbons
Copy: M. Delierneux

I enclose a copy of Dr. Langrod's report on the negotiations which he conducted, in conjunction with SHAEF, with the French Government, regarding the temporary settlement of displaced persons not immediately repatriable.

You will gather from this document the position of UNRRA in these and similar negotiations.

(a) We are careful to avoid any implication that the displaced persons thus temporarily settled have become permanently non-repatriable. Every precaution has been taken to ensure that if they make up their minds and elect to return to their country, everything will be done to facilitate such return.

(b) The second point of importance is that UNRRA acts only as an agent of the authorities in Germany - SHAEF in the case of the French negotiations, and, in future ones, the authority which will take the place of SHAEF. In the case of displaced persons to be temporarily settled in Luxembourg, therefore, I do not think it is for you to approach ex officio the Luxembourg Government. The right line would be for you to act as a go-between and lend your good offices on the same lines as in the French negotiations. I need not draw your attention to the advantage, from a purely diplomatic point of view, of this method of approach.

To Head of Luxembourg Mission
% Brit. Embassy
Brussels.
1. Enclosure.

D.P.
Registry
No. 36 (4)

R. 530 14/7
D 11 58/16/7

Despatched

M.

Draft.

UNRRA LONDON TO UNRRA WASHINGTON

We received the following cable from SHAEF Main dated 6th July 1945:

Telegram.

UNRRA WASHINGTON

2100
NO. 3000
17/7

EN CLAIR

Miss Gibbons
13.7.45.

Mary L. Gibbons
14/7/45

14 JUL 1945

W. J. Gibbons
M. Gibbons
adair

"Meetings with AFHQ have taken place recently and programmes for the evacuation of Italian And Greek Displaced Persons scheduled and the whole matter is in hand now.

"For information: All Greek movements dependent on availability of shipping from Italian ports and camp facilities in AFHQ area.

"SHAEF policy, as set forth in SHAEF Administrative memo 39 (revised), on treatment of Italian Displaced Persons in Germany has been modified as follows:

- Where administratively feasible segregation by nationalities to be applied to Italian D.Ps.
- In Assembly Centres for Italian D.Ps. and Italian labour units, maximum of self-government to be permitted, leaders to be found among D.Ps. themselves.
- Regarding care in Assembly Centres Italian D.Ps. will receive same care as United Nations D.Ps.
- Italians will be repatriated from Germany before other enemy Displaced Persons but second in priority to United Nations Displaced Persons."

These centres are in addition to request above, you have informed your addressed in terms of SHAEF action."

Cobb dropped by
Belieuer

Registry

No. 36 (3)

R. 530 14/7
D 1130 14/7
Despatched

M.

Draft.

UNRRA LONDON TO UNRRA ROME

We have received following information from
SHAFF Main 6th July 1945:

"SHAFF policy, as set forth in SHAFF Administrative memo 39 (revised), on treatment of Italian Displaced Persons in Germany has been modified as follows:

a) Where administratively feasible segregation by nationalities to be applied to Italian D.Ps.

b) In Assembly Centres for Italian D.Ps. and Italian labour units, maximum of self-government to be permitted, leaders to be found among D.Ps themselves.

c) Regarding care in Assembly Centres, Italian D.Ps will receive same care as United Nations D.Ps.

d) Italians will be repatriated from Germany before other enemy Displaced Persons but second in priority to United Nations Displaced Persons."

Telegram.

UNRRA Rome

Encl. No. 236

En Clair 14/7

Miss Gibbons
13.7.45.

Mary L. Gibbons
14/7/45

14 JUL 1945

Personal
Adair
Mr. Gibbons
Sir G. Reid
Sir Johnston
Delicieux
Drafted by Delicieux

Registry
No. DP 36 (2)

S-95549

R 1530 14/7

Despatched D 1100/16/7 M.

Draft.

UNRRA BERNE FROM UNRRA LONDON

We received the following cable from SHAEF Main dated 6th July 1945:

Telegram.

UNRRA BERNE
TYLER 40 PROGRAM

FROM

NO. 32

EN CLAIR 14/7

Miss Gibbons
13.7.45

"Meetings with AFHQ have taken place recently and programmes for the evacuation of Italian and Greek Displaced Persons scheduled and the whole matter is in hand now.

"For your information: All Greek movements dependent on availability of shipping from Italian ports and camp facilities in AFHQ area.

"SHAEF policy, as set forth in SHAEF Administration memo 39 (revised), on treatment of Italian Displaced Persons in Germany has been modified as follows:

- Where administratively feasible segregation by nationalities to be applied to Italian D.Ps.
- In Assembly Centres, for Italian D.Ps. and Italian labour units, maximum of self-government to be permitted, leaders to be found among D.Ps. themselves.
- Regarding care in Assembly Centres Italian D.Ps. will receive same care as United Nations D.Ps.
- Italians will be repatriated from Germany before other enemy Displaced Persons but second in priority to United Nations Displaced Persons.

"In addition to request 4 above, you have informed me that the following is the result of your action."

Cable Drafted by
Delemon

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THE MARGIN.

OUT FILE

Mary L. Gibbons
14/7/45
D. W. Gibbons
Delemon
M. Gibbons
14 JUL 1945
adain

M. Delierneux

(inf. Langrod)
Charley
Hathaway

ACTION COPY

INDEXED

DP36

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

INFORMATION ONLY

U.N.R.R.A. ATHENS. TO. U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON

No. 564

Reptd. London 475

D: 11th July, 1945

R: 13th July, 1945

rec'd 23/7

no trace
in cables section

AFHQ FX 12997 refers.

Subject is Greek deportees. Greek Government and ourselves strongly oppose acceptance Greek deportees charge US Justice Department. Many thousands officially displaced persons being returned immediately. Deportees not this category and should be matter of negotiation between US and Greek Governments but not be confused with official repatriation displaced persons.

MP

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. DP 36

R 1900 12/7

Despatched 1150

M.

13/7

Draft.

TO UNRRA PARIS FROM UNRRA LONDON

Re our cable 157 of 20.6.45.

Please send urgently information asked for.

Telegram.

189 13/7
via C & W
enclain

Miss Gibbons
12.7.45.

Init:

Dr. Cahen Debré

Mary L. Gibbons
12/7/45

[Signature]
+ Cahen Debré

12 JUL 1945

UNRRA MISSION PRAGUE

FROM UNRRA LONDON

UNRRA PRAGUE

From information received on the 4th July 1945 from UNRRA Rome, there are at present 142 Czechs assisted by UNRRA in Italy.

These Czechs are living outside the camps. Registration is carried out. Plans for repatriation will occur in a few days.

NY NO.

BY CLAIR

Miss Gibbons,
A.D.D.G.,
10.7.45.

Action: M. Selterneux

Ref: DR. Langrod ✓

Mr. Scott

Mr. Mathiasen Jm.

Col. Charley ✓

Miss Zimmerman

Dr. Giphys ✓

ACTION COPY

36
DR 10/11

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Divisional Distribution

Action: Miss Gibbons

From SHAEF MAIN SIGNED SCAEF ... to UK BASE FOR UNRRA

No: S-95549

D: 6th July, 1945

R: 7th July, 1945.

Rec'd 9/7/45

Reference UK 43969, dated 4th July.

DPB8

① Your addressee in Berne cannot be identified. Please clarify with contents of Berne No. 64 cable.

SHAEF co-ordinating movement of Displaced Persons and liberated Allied prisoners of war but suggestions from your Headquarters on the subject would always be acceptable.

Meetings with AFHQ have taken place recently and programmes for the evacuation of Italian and Greek Displaced Persons scheduled and the whole matter is in hand now.

For information: All Greek movements dependent on availability of shipping from Italian ports and camp facilities in AFHQ area.

SHAEF policy, as set forth in SHAEF Administrative memo 39 (revised), on treatment of Italian Displaced Persons in Germany has been modified as follows:

- (a) Where administratively feasible segregation by nationalities to be applied to Italian D.Ps. -
- (b) In Assembly Centres for Italian D.Ps and Italian labour units, maximum of self-government to be permitted, leaders to be found among D.Ps themselves.
- (c) Regarding care in Assembly Centres, Italian D.Ps will receive same care as United Nations D.Ps.
- (d) Italians will be repatriated from Germany before other enemy Displaced Persons but second in priority to United Nations Displaced Persons.

② Please confirm that, in addition to request 1 above, you have informed your addressee in Berne of SHAEF action.

Action taken
[Signature]

10/7/45

This is for action by H. Delierneux

INDEXED

ACTION COPY

D.P. 36
EN CLAIR

FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION.

ACTION: Miss Gibbons.

Dr. Topping.

U.N.R.R.A. ROME.....TO... U.N.R.R.A. LONDON.

No. 304.

DATED: 4th July, 1945.

R.C'D 5th July, 1945.

DP36:-----

6/7/45

Re your 159 impossible give figures for all Italy now in view large numbers all nationalities arriving North Italy and moving through A.M.G. and A.C. camps. Most are going to transit camps for repatriation by A.C. also included are large numbers dissident Yugoslavs and Poles both civilian and ex-military.

2. Our camp population of 3300, includes 555 British, Tripolitanians 285, Albanians 141, Austrians 71, Turks 86, Poles 68, Ethiopians 58, Germans 1429, Yugoslavs unwilling return Yugoslavia and paid for by A.C. 438 Italians expelled from Greece and in our camps for temporary care only remainder represent 12 nationalities. As of 1 June we assisting 2433 outside camps. This includes 901 stateless, 762 Poles, 477 Greeks, 142 Czechs, 67 Austrians, remainder represent 22 nationalities. This program being extended throughout Italy and by 1st August, number may trebble.

3. Member DP staff Associated A.C. repatriation officer to insure earliest movement. Nationals under our care constant contact national representatives maintained registration carried out conformity A.C. plans repatriation of Czechs occurring next week, others planned soonest such as Greeks special problem in Italy consists of Yugoslavs, Poles unwilling return their country and apparently stateless who may need resettlement or long term care.

C.C. to whom to

action has been taken

action has been taken

10/7/45

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

DP. 36

Draft.

SHAFF MISSION TO
DENMARK

Telegram.

~~ENCL~~ USAS

NO. 1+

JUL 1945
EN CLAIR

Mary L. Gibson

Miss M. Gibbons,
A.D.D.G.
3.7.45.

*Delivered
M. Gibbons*

TO SHAFF MISSION TO DENMARK
FOR UNRRA

(FROM UNRRA LONDON)

Re unnumbered cable of 15th June send full information
on repatriate in question.

UNRRA.

Despatched

M.

✓ 1600/5/7

Reference.....

DP36


To Miss Gibbons,
From A. Delierneux,
2nd July 1945.

The cable from SHAEF Mission Denmark to UNRRA London is unintelligible.

Cable reads: "Swedish Government requires full information of repatriate in question"

In spite of all my efforts no ~~such~~ documentation can be found referring to such a question. Dr. Coigny can throw no light on the question either.

The only action that could be taken, if you think it necessary, would be to send a cable to Denmark asking for the necessary information.


A. Delierneux.

*Cable sent
3.7.45 - Juc*

*P.K.
mks*

DP36.

101

TO: Dr. Topping ✓
 FROM: Maj. Gen. K. J. Martin.

*See
 Delivered*
 The SHAEF Mission Denmark cable, unnumbered, of 15th June is quite incomprehensible as the Swedish Government is fully acquainted with the repatriation question. Andreassen has visited Sweden. This is a matter for the D.P. Division and not for Regional Sections.

*29/6/45
 Sent to
 Mr
 Rhatigan
 Jure.*
 SHAEF Mission Copenhagen Cable No. 1625 of 23rd June 1945, the first two sentences contain a satisfactory comment from Dr. Norborg for Mr. Rhatigan's information. The last sentence I am dealing with.

K. J. Martin
 (Maj. Gen. K. J. Martin)
 26th June, 1945.

Miss Gibbons ✓
 at

Registry
No.

DP 26

Despatched

M.

Draft.

UNRRA BRUSSELS

ENJOY *usa*

Telegram.

NO.

49

EN CLAIR

20 JUN 1945

Miss Gibbons
19.6.45.

1. Report number and breakdown by nationality or country of all refugees in Belgium who will ultimately be repatriated to Italy, Greece or Yugoslavia.
2. What repatriation movements have been planned and when do you expect them to take place?
3. Are they now assembled in centres, camps or as a rule billeted out?

Cabin Debr.

Divisional + Cabin Debr.
Adair
S. H. Parker
Topping

INDEXED

Mary L. Gibbons

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RIP

Registry
No.

DP 36

CLERICAL

Despatched

M.

Jul 20
1640 JRL

Draft.

UNRRA PARIS

Enjoy
Telegram.

No. 154

EN CLAIR

1. Report number and breakdown by nationality or country of all refugees in France who will ultimately be repatriated to Italy, Greece or Yugoslavia.
2. What repatriation movements have been planned and when do you expect them to take place?
3. Are they now assembled in centres, camps, or as a rule billeted out?

20 JUN 1945

Topping
Divisional + Scott
Packer
~~Cable Detach~~
Adair

Bahn Debre

Mary L. Gibbons

Miss Gibbons
19.6.45.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

DP

S P 36

INDEXED

DE 36

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

YUGOSLAV MISSION, BELGRADETO.....U.N.R.R..ATHENS

NO. B/5

Dated: 16th June, 1945

Rec'd: 19th June, 1945

Repeated London B/57

Under auspices of Yugoslav committee on repatriation 130 Greek nationals left Belgrade 14th June for Greece by rail. Expected arrive Greece border via Pitolj within 3 days.

DW111111

Registry
No.

D.P.36

Despatched

M.

Draft.

TO UNRRA ROME

FROM UNRRA LONDON

To: UNRRA ROME 15
CASERTA, 152
BELGRADE, 139
TIRANA, 13
ATHENS, 231
CAIRO. 326

CASERTA, BELGRADE,
TIRANA, ATHENS,
CAIRO.

Telegram

Please send us soonest following detailed information:

a) Number of D.Ps in your country with breakdown by nationality, country of destination and mention number of D.Ps. needing special care such as children, pregnant women, diseased etc.

b) What repatriation movements have been planned and on what date you expect them to take place.

-ENJOY-

U.S.A.S.

EN CLAIR

R.H. Parker.
14.6.45.

INDEXED

Mary L. Gibbons

Drummond
Scott
Parker
Adair
Topping

25.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

ACTION COPY
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

INDEXED

DR36
13 7/11
E

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: DR. TOPPING

SHAEF MISSION DENMARK.....TO.....U.N.R.R.A. LONDON

NO. -

Dated: 15th June, 1945

Rec'd: 18th June, 1945

Andreason with Shaef Lubeck. Swedish Government requires full
information on repatriate in question. Suggest you confirm with Swedish
Legation, London.

DW1132

DP36

DIVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Mr. Adair

U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON.....TO.....U.N.R.R.A. LONDON

No. 1745.

D: 11th June, 1945.

R: 12th June, 1945.

Headquarters on request state Department has authorized payment \$75 per head for repatriation 500 Greek Refugees Naples to Piraeus June 14th upon clearance Keeny and Cochran. Authorization communicated through State Department to its representatives Italy owing shortness of notice. Keeny, Cochran notified.

Don't Mr. Parker

622

Reference DP36

To: Mr. T.T. Scott,
From: François Morin,
7th June 1945.

INDEXED

With reference to the attached cable, 2nd paragraph, we have already cabled Alspach to send us a complete account of the number of D.Ps. in Switzerland now, with breakdown by nationality or countries of destination.

Personally, I should favour the idea of UNRRA helping the whole lot of transient refugees in Switzerland with maximum utilisation of the Don Suisse fund.

As to the development of an over-all programme of repatriation of refugees to Mediterranean countries, it seems to me that it can only be done when we have a fairly accurate idea of the number and distribution of nationals of the Mediterranean countries, especially those in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France.

With what information we have now, it also seems to me that the best scheme would probably be to send them through Italy where UNRRA is in a position to do efficient work and is not too far from other Mediterranean countries.

We cannot hope to deal with the problem as easily in Yugoslavia.

Once we know what the position is as far as these D.Ps. are concerned we can start looking into the question of their repatriation via Italy.

I see, for the moment, no possible positive answer to Washington on that point. Would you let me know what sort of action you want me to take.

W. Morin

François Morin.

Richard. I don't know if this has been discussed between Mr. Scott, or what was decided.

We cannot develop the overall programme in the Mediterranean, or in Switzerland till we know the breakdown. That.

We have covered Alspach about. I have not seen any similar demand raised against Cairo, (perhaps Athens) or Rome. I hesitate to do so without knowing whether D.P. can limit the policy of an overall programme.

Miss Gibbons: We recently sent telegram R.P. 23.6 (at the Belvedere)

Where these are nationals, it will
require adjustment with the
parent-govts. Where they
are non-repatriable it will
require adjustment with I.G.C.

I do not know, unfortunately,
what stage our negotiations
with I.G.C. have reached.

Can you enlighten me please?

R.H.S.

8.6.

DP 36 - Copy of DP 10/18. OUTGOING TELEGRAM

(EN CLAIR)

U.N.R.R.A. (DIVISIONAL).

FROM U.N.R.R.A. (LONDON) TO U.N.R.R.A. (CASERTA) AND

U.N.R.R.A. (CAIRO). U.N.R.R.A. (ROME). U.N.R.R.A. (RUVO)

U.N.R.R.A. (BELGRADE). U.N.R.R.A. (BARI).

Nos. 102. 273.123.35.89.117.

31st. May. 1945.

This refers to Caserta 168 regarding procedure for handling movement of displaced persons. Following is procedure for handling questions of responsibility for and movement of United Nations displaced persons within territory covered by your Mission:-

1. Any question of UNRRA'S responsibility and authority to help groups of United Nations Nationals will be referred to ERO with full details of numbers and nationality of groups concerned and information as to any approaches which have been made locally to Consular or other Authorities of Nationals concerned.
2. Any plans for movement of displaced persons to countries outside Mediterranean Area will be cleared through Caserta in principle with ERO who will take up the question as appropriate with the receiving authority. Movements inside Mediterranean Area will be cleared with Caserta.
3. Arrangements for movement will be made with the Caserta Office which will be responsible for co-ordinating all movement within and out of the Mediterranean Theatre.

GVI

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

AC18/11 copy for DP36 ✓

[CYPHER]

UNRRA (RESTRICTED)

FROM UNRRA (LONDON) TO UNRRA (WASHINGTON)

No. 1204 ENJOY
26th May, 1945

D: 9.30 p.m. 28th May, 1945

W W W

1. Clarification of UNRRA's relationships with Polish authorities in relation to displaced persons operations is essential.

2. As regards recruitment, candidates are being put forward both by Polish Government in London and Representatives of the Provisional Government in Poland. Since personnel will not be dealing with any specific groups, recruits from both sides are being accepted.

3. A further problem will have to be decided if we take over responsibility for displaced persons before settlement of the broader Polish question. At present SHAEF uses "London" Polish Liaison Officers in determining nationality and issuing papers. In so far as we are not directed by SHAEF or by the Control Commission, we shall have to decide whether we continue to work with existing "London" Polish Liaison Officers or make arrangements to have representatives from the Warsaw Government.

OTP

622

DP36

Copy 674
" DP35

DP

ACTION COPY

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Mr. Scott

Mr. Parker

INDEXED

U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON.....TO.....U.N.R.R.A. LONDON

NO. 1451

Dated: 25th May, 1945

Rec'd: 26th May, 1945

*Dralt into
2nd call sent
1st by me
today for
Athens
and
Rome
EHS
SLA*

Re Athens 226, repeated to London 111, we suggest you consider following in replying to Athens and Rome:

" 1. resolution 47 and 60 now only authority for assistance to Displaced Italians in Greece, and limit assistance to intruded Italians being removed at request of Greek Government and persecuted Italians described in resolution 60. Italian Government request for UNRRA assistance to other Italians displaced outside Italy scheduled for consideration by Central Committee 28th May. Will report action taken.

We see no objection to UNRRA aid to transient Greek refugees in Switzerland, but question advisability distinctive arrangements by one national group. Would prefer treating transient refugee problem Switzerland as entire problem with maximum utilization Don Suisse Funds. Suggest you consider desirability immediate development overall programme repatriation refugees to Mediterranean Countries. In view of emergency situation described in paragraph 2 of Athens 226, you authorized to make interim arrangements, including use of funds as needed."

ACTION COPYGENERAL DISTRIBUTION:ACTIONS: Mr. Scott
Mr. Parker.FROM U.N.R.R.A. (WASHINGTON) TO U.N.R.R.A. (LONDON).

No. 1397.

DATED 23rd May 1945

RECEIVED 25th May 1945

Are we taking any special steps to help people released from Concentration Camps, such as Buchenwald and Dachau, whose plight appears to be particularly bad?

CDC 381.

DE

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

SECRET: U.N. R.R.A. TIG

U.N.R.R.A. ROME.....TO.....U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON

NO. 361

Dated: 23rd May, 1945

Rec'd: 24th May, 1945

Repeated London 157

INDEXED

Re Feller's telephone call Yugoslav assistance.

1. Yugoslav representative maintaining position described our cables and documents.
2. AFHQ raising question camp care dissident Yugoslavs in North Italy, unless you instruct to contrary we shall refuse aid this group pending council action.
3. Some dissident Yugoslavs still in Southern Italian camps and, for sake uniformity of policy, should be expelled, but we willing keep them since they arrived camps long before this question arose; wire confirmation.
4. Re political discrimination, Yugoslav military mission stopped assistance to about 95% of Yugoslavs remaining in Italy last November, and requests no one assist them. Many considered badly in need and appeal to us constantly.
5. Even if you empowered us assist this group pending council decision, we would not agree unless strong assurance favourable council action, since necessity stop relief after brief period aid would be disastrous.
6. This question clearly involves exact interpretation of phrase "in collaboration with the Governments concerned" in first paragraph resolution number 57.

DW 673

E.R.O. - INFORMATION DIVISION - RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS UNITDATE: 10.5.45EXTRACT FROM: B.B.C. Monitoring Digest,
Swedish Home Service in Danish, 8.5.45 (Message by Minister
Prof. Mogens Fog to Danish Refugees in Sweden)TOPIC: DENMARK - DISPLACED PERSONS
Priority Order of Return of Displaced Persons

There are 17,000 to 18,000 Danes in Sweden, and the 3,000 recently evacuated from German camps in Denmark and Germany - a lot of people to have arriving at one time when so many tasks have to be done. Firstly, the policeman are wanted at home. Then those evacuated from German camps, who have reached Sweden during the past few months and weeks, are to have priority, whether they are well or wounded. Then all other refugees can be taken home.

Refugees must obey a definite plan, arranged by the Refugee office, and advice regarding the journey home. It is difficult for the Refugee Office to contact Danes in Sweden who have removed. Danes must report their present address to the Refugee Office and keep their places in the queue for going home, and not return "illegally" as they came. Directions given in the pamphlet received must be followed.

Copies have been sent to:

Dr. Norborg
Mrs. Hynak
Miss Spalding
Miss Cooper

Enquiries concerning this item
to Museum 6898, ext. 304

E. R. O.
INFORMATION DIVISION

UNRRA
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS UNIT

DP 10/7

Date:

5.4.45

Ref. No.:

EXTRACT FROM:

B.B.C. Monitoring Digest
Swedish Home Service 2.5.45

TOPIC:

SWEDEN - REFUGEES

- 1) Preparations for Repatriation of Danes
- 2) Two ships arrive at Traellevborg with Freed Prisoners of War.

- 1) The Danish Refugee Office hopes to be able to repatriate between 17,000 and 18,000 Danish refugees who are in Sweden, within two weeks, provided that Denmark escapes actual warfare, and that developments there are normal. Wechselmann, Chief of the Refugee Office, states that repatriation will be carried out at the expense of the Danish State. Negotiations with the Swedish authorities have been practically completed.

The journey will be made in special trains or in reserved coaches on the ordinary ones. The ports of exit are likely to be Malmö and Helsingborg. Danish refugees will shortly receive their papers from the Refugee Office. They will have to be prepared to leave immediately, but should not rush away now. Mr. Wechselmann emphasises that all the refugees should wait until the authorities in Denmark inform their Legation in Stockholm that they can come. It cannot yet be said when this will be.

- 2) The Lille Mathiessen and Magdalena, both chartered by the International Red Cross, this morning reached Traellevborg with 800 prisoners-of-war set free from German prisoner-of-war camps. They were mainly French, Polish and Dutch, and included about 300 women.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DP

36

U.N.R.R.A. (GENERAL)

ACTION: MR. SCOTT

U.N.R.R.A. SHAEF MAIN SIGNED SCAEF.....TO.....

SHAEF REAR FOR G-5 FOR DISPLACED PERSONS BRANCH FOR U.N.R.R.A..

NO. S-86487

Dated: 29th April, 1945

Rec'd: 30th April, 1945

Message 28th April, RR-17499.

Have kept Berne and Rome fully informed of movement. The present situation is such that further movement cannot take place until nominal roll has been screened by French authorities. This is at present being carried out. However, move before Middle May is not anticipated.

DW 217

INDEXED

D.P.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION:

FOR INFORMATION ONLY:

U.N.R.R.A. BERNE.....to.....EUROPEAN REGIONAL OFFICE:

NO:41

DATED : 23rd APRIL, 1945:

(CYTHER)

RECEIVED : 25th APRIL, 1945:
Enjoy

Repeated Paris (for Carter) as NO:1/Per Foreign Office. NO:768:
Repeated to Washington as Savings NO:78.

-----oOo-----

April 20th Federal authorities requested French Embassy, American and British Legations to seek their Governments' views on the desirability of instructing the Swiss Minister to suggest to the German Government release of the prisoners and displaced persons in Southern Germany and Vorarlberg, allowing them to reach the Swiss frontier for repatriation. In view of the large numbers screening on entering Switzerland, not possible Switzerland would be able to keep them for any length of time. Only solution would be to organise the best possible transit without distinction of nationality, across Switzerland to France. Switzerland would hospitalise to the extent of her means the disabled and sick. Switzerland would ask the French authorities assurance that none of these fugitives would be put back into Switzerland.

De Haller further informs me for your confidential information that the Swiss Minister has been informed that Switzerland is prepared

(a) to admit Allied and neutral wounded and sick up to total of 1,500 subject to 3 days notice

(b) to admit French, Belgians, Dutch, British and Americans up to maximum of 3,000 daily. Instructions to the Swiss Minister add that question of admitting fugitives of other nationalities is subject to negotiations now pending. Organisation of transportation to the German/Swiss border would eventually fall to I.R.C. same applying to Bulgarian and Roumanian diplomats if the Reich takes the initiative of requesting Switzerland to receive these diplomats and the Federal Council acquiesces.

You will observe that the statement in the foregoing paragraph is unilateral with no conditions attached.

H.M.S./293:

TO:

Miss Schofield
~~Land~~ for
for ACTION

Mr. Scott

Please circulate to
central [unclear]
[unclear]

Mr. [unclear]


.....Branch Registry

Date.....

CASERTA

DP 36

ALLIED COMMISSION FOR AUSTRIA
(British Element)



ACA/ADV/18

23rd April 1945.

INDEXED

Dear Mr Scott,

1. The British Element of the Allied Commission for Austria desires to make use of the services of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in connection with planning for the care and repatriation of displaced persons in the British zone in Austria.

2. If any agreement which may previously have been concluded between Allied Force Headquarters and UNRRA should not seem to UNRRA or to the British Element satisfactorily to cover the Commission period in Austria, a new agreement can be worked out between UNRRA and the British Element when the Allied Commission takes over responsibility for the administration of Austria.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "J. H. ...".

Brigadier,
Deputy Commissioner (Military)

T. T. Scott Esq.,
Director, Displaced Persons Division,
European Regional Office,
United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation Administration.

Copy to: G-5, AFHQ.
U.S.G.C.C. (Brig.Gen. Flory).
Major Cair, Displaced Persons Division, Allied
Commission for Austria (British Element), Rome.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DP 36
Vol I

DP

INDEXED

U.N.R.R.A. (RESTRICTED)

U.N.R.R.A. CASERTA TO U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON.

NO. 107

Dated: 21st April, 1945

Rec'd: Per Caserta, 133, 23rd April, 1945

Repeated to Cairo as No. 60.

Your Service 12.
Herewith our 107 to Washington.
Following cables received from Washington:

(a) "79. Some prospect getting 160 Sephardic Jews from Bergenbelsen Germany. Alternative proposals to ship to Philippeville or Nuseirat. Do Pierce and Altpach agree our opinion? It is preferable they be sent to Nuseirat and if so can their acceptance there be arranged?

(b) "86. Berne reports 26 February, 1500 Yugoslavs in process of repatriation to Yugoslavia from Switzerland and now in Marseilles awaiting shipment. They may need financial or other assistance in arranging transportation. Clearance and approval proposed repatriation and desire for assistance of Yugoslav Authorities. Consult AFHQ and suggest co-operation. Support authorised by UNRRA Resolutions single.

2. Necessary action is being taken here with AFHQ these cables and others received, since you were here. Emphasise the necessity for action once recommendation with which you agree in principle reference handling of Displaced Persons this theatre. Continuance on present basis quite impossible.

3. It is especially desirable we straighten out earliest, channels of communication and establish points of responsibility as between Washington, E.R.O., SHAEF, UNRRA CASERTA, AFHQ., recognizing new conditions since liquidation of Balkan Mission.

4. General Spofford and official thinking here strongly support my views.

5. Cochran desires assistance preferably some strong person with experience UNRRA SHAEF Area. Recognise this cannot be resolved immediately but meantime will you take action here re para. 3 above, or would you wish me to refer to Washington?

6. Postscript 1500 Yugoslavs referred in para.1(b) above found to be ex-prisoners of war. Whole question in hand here with AFHQ.

DW 109

Telephone: ABBEY 6593-4-6467-8.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES.

Our Ref.:

Your Ref.:



11b, REGENT STREET,
LONDON, S.W.1.

April 19th 1945.

Dear Mr. Scott,

I am very sorry that I missed seeing you today. I hope that at some future date when I visit London again I shall be more fortunate.

I enclose some material which I was asked to transmit to you from the Secours Dentaire International in Geneva.

I also have one or two questions on behalf of Mr. Olgiati. He asked me to enquire as to UNRRA's future plans for the repatriation of displaced persons. If these plans are being prepared, at what stage are they at present? How are the working teams formed? And what conditions are to be fulfilled by members of these teams?

He also wished to know whether it is now possible to engage Swiss individuals or teams. When Mr. Olgiati was here last he saw Mr. Hoehler, who said that UNRRA might reconsider the engagement of Swiss people for operational work.

Mr. Olgiati would be very grateful if you would kindly give him an answer to these various questions. Address: Don Suisse, Berne.

Yours sincerely,

K. Murr.

T.T.Scott Esq.,

UNRRA,

170 A, Great Portland Street,
W.1.

Orig. on AC 28/14
copies extracts on H, WE, S, DP.

copy extract for DP 36
hwAdair
Min Bond.

EXTRACT FROM Minutes of Directors' Meeting, Yugoslav Mission, held on Sunday, March 25th, at 3 p.m.

INDEXED

IV. STATEMENT BY COMMANDER JACKSON

Commander Jackson added the following points:-

(i) The Yugoslav Government had accepted the nomination of Mr. Sergeevitch as Chief of Mission.

(ii) It was becoming increasingly clear that the aim of an UNRRA Mission was to work with the Government in every way. Most of the European governments were consolidating their own positions and were keen to do the job of reconstruction themselves. Confidence would be established by the quality of the service provided by UNRRA, and advice should not only be given but freely accepted.

(iii) The development of the provision of services by the Mission was still an open matter, but it was clear:-

- (a) that there was a big health job to do
- (b) that on welfare matters the Government had its own plans and after finding out what they were, there might be many places where UNRRA could help
- (c) that on displaced persons problems Tito himself had emphasised the importance of getting back the refugees from Egypt, particularly the children. The problem of Italians in Yugoslavia, which was already worrying the Yugoslav authorities, should have to be raised as an issue of policy at the next meeting of the UNRRA Council.

(iv) Provision of Supplies. The following points were important:-

- (a) UNRRA must not be in a position of providing too little too late. Quite apart from anything else this would result in the danger of grave inflation in the present financial situation in Yugoslavia
- (b) the phasing of supplies was a matter of great importance
- (c) Dr. Biceric's Foreign Trade Unit should be made full use of as a focal coordinating point
- (d) the mission should not forget the importance of interlocking the UNRRA supply line into the normal channels of trade
- (e) the need for transportation was nearly unlimited even to bring the up to the pre-war standard
- (f) there would be no difficulty in obtaining an understanding with the Yugoslav authorities, provided the mission delivered the goods and built up its provision of services on a small scale, in close cooperation with the Yugoslav authorities.

(v) The question of providing some Russian and other non-Anglo-American personnel for the mission would be taken up at an early date.

D.P.

36 Vol I

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION:

FOR INFORMATION ONLY:

U.N.R.R.A. CASERTA.....to.....U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON:

No. 150

DATED

19th March, 1945.

RECEIVED

20th March, 1945.

Repeated to London as 62.

-----ooo-----

From Hendrickson as No. 80.

1. We have had general discussions here about our policy in relation to displaced persons.
2. We will discuss this with you in London and Washington, but in the meantime you may like to know that our preliminary views are as follows (a) until the policy of the military authorities for handling displaced persons in Europe is more definite, U.N.R.R.A. should undertake no, repeat no, financial responsibilities associated with this work, except for commitments such as maintenance services, personnel etc., which has been agreed previously, and about which specific agreements exist (b) it seems reasonable to assume that U.N.R.R.A. at a later date will be called upon to take greater responsibilities for the movement of displaced persons, in respect of financial liability we believe that local currency will be available for expenses in countries which (1) receive U.N.R.R.A. supplies (2) make available partial contribution in local currency, U.N.R.R.A. liability in relation to land transport should not be great, foresee the possibility of substantial expenditure in connection with sea transport, and we shall review this problem in London and Washington.
3. As mentioned above, we feel that we should not undertake any new commitments in relation to displaced persons, until the plans of the military become more definitive, after consultations/.

consultations with SHAEF and AFHQ we should be able to estimate U.N.R.R.A.'s continuing responsibilities, meanwhile displaced persons are being repatriated from Mideast camps, the initiative and responsibility for arranging the movement has been assumed by the military, we are proceeding on the assumption that financial liability for movement will remain with the military authorities.

C.5162.

U/c Rome Jan 20th 1945
T. A. 1005

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB-COMMISSION

DPR/1/ADM

RECEIVED

SUBJECT: Repatriation.

16 MAR 1945

UNRRA (REGY.)

1. OBJECT.

The object of having one organisation in each country in Mediterranean Theatre of Operations to be responsible for dealing with all incoming and outgoing Displaced Persons (excluding Allied and Enemy Prisoners of War^o), is to avoid confusion as to which of many agencies might handle certain categories of refugees.

2. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM.

Estimates of the numbers of Displaced Persons vary considerably. The following approximate figures which concern the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations are shown to indicate the magnitude and diversity of the problem. (Figures quoted are those shown in G-5 Section A.F.H.Q. Report 383.7 dated 25 October, 1944.

- (a) Displaced Persons who require to be returned from outside their Country to their Country within the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

These are largely Italians, Yugoslavs and Greeks to whose numbers the following is a rough guide:-

(over)

o) D.P.R.S.C. Estimate

ooo ITALIANS (Largely in Germany, Hungary and Poland)	380,000
" (France)	200,000
o YUGOSLAVS (Largely in Germany, Czech- oslovakia & Austria)	350,000
oo GREEKS (Largely in Bulgaria and Germany)	180,000
	<hr/> 1,120,000

o Exclusive of Yugoslavs in Middle East Camps and
in Italy.

oo Exclusive of Greeks in Middle East Camps.

ooo Does not include former Italian Divisions still in
Yugoslavia.

(b) Displaced Persons who require to be returned from various
places within the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations
to their own Countries outside the Mediterranean Theatre
of Operations.

(1) In Austria.

Russians	290,000
Poles	200,000
French	225,000
Belgians	25,000
Czechslovakians	75,000

815,000

(2) In Italy.

Germans	25,000
Czechs and Poles	5,000
o Other Nationalities	7,000

37,000

o D.P.R.S.C. Estimate.

2. (b) Contd.

(3) In Yugoslavia.

Germans	1,400
There are also Austr. & Germans in annexed Slovenia	
	50,000
There are Bulgars & Macedonians in South Serbia	
	80,000
There are resettled Magyars in BACHA.	
	17,000

161,000

(4) In Greece.

Poles	59,500
Bulgars	150,000
Germans	23,000
Mixed Nationalities to go to Asia Minor, Middle East and A- frica	
	88,500

271,000

3. RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT IN LIBERATED AREAS.

This has been defined as follows:-

(1) They will normally have full responsibility for Displaced Persons and Refugees and for their own Nationals returned to their countries by the Allied Military Authorities.

(2) They should make available specialist personnel to issue repatriation visas and help as necessary in controlling their displaced nationals.

(3) They should issue "stand fast" instructions and

instruct the frontier guards to direct into Assembly Centres or Processing Centres persons attempting self-repatriation. They will as far as possible ensure that a uniform theatre policy is carried out for dealing with displaced persons, including registration and reciprocal acceptance of registration and medical clearance records. There should be an agreement to accept and interchange with other national authorities, liaison officers to assist in the supervision and control of displaced persons of their own, nationality, and who will be empowered to issue repatriation visas. There must be agreement to admit to their territory all their former nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries without discrimination on account of race, religion or political beliefs.

(4) The repatriation and resettlement of displaced persons and refugees is a matter which concerns directly Governments at present responsible for such individuals and more so the Governments of the nationals concerned. Most of these functions which will eventually be their concern should in the first case be handled by one single Allied Military Organisation, as initially these Governments will be in no position to assume responsibility.

4. CONCLUSION.

The varied categories of returning displaced persons, forced labour, disbanded military forces, etc., creates many groups which concern many organisations. It is considered imperative that one organisation in each country be responsible in the first instance for the reception and transfer of all displaced persons and refugees. This central organisation can then, after processing the displaced persons and refugees, hand them over to the appropriate agencies.

5. PROPOSAL.

That one organisation in each country in the Mediterranean Theatre be responsible for dealing with all incoming and outgoing displaced persons of all nationalities (excluding Allied and Enemy Prisoners of War), acting as the receiving and despatching organisation for such Nationals.

Disposal can then be handled by any number of agencies through this central organisation after the initial reception and grouping of nationals has been accomplished.

Displaced Persons and Repatriation organisations already established for Mediterranean countries are the appropriate organisations to deal with this work until individual Governments can assume responsibility. In Italy the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission is the appropriate organisation.

C.B.FINDLAY,
Colonel,
Director.

4 January, 1945.

la/

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D.P. 36

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION:

FOR INFORMATION ONLY:

U.N.R.R.A. ROME.....to.....U.N.R.R.A. WASHINGTON.

No.168

DATED

13th March, 1945.

(EN CLAIR)

RECEIVED

15th March, 1945.

Repeated to E.R.O. as No.49.

-----000-----

∅ Your 160 coincides our position. According information from Blickenstaff, Madrid, of refugees accepted for admission to North Africa, about 160 would accept evacuation immediately. Nationalities of origin are German 26, Polish 26, Spanish 22, Balkan nationalities 28, French 13, Turkish 10, Russian 8, Portuguese 5, other 22. Of these, 100 have lost nationality and are stateless. 87 entered Spain before and 73 after September 1939. Former apparently ineligible U.N.R.R.A. resolutions, hence basis request to I.G.C. Upon receipt approval I.G.C. payment, will take steps for movement to Philippeville.

∅ Not received in E.R.O.

C.5049.

I give you below statistics of Norwegian Displaced Persons and Refugees in Norway as at January 30th, 1945:

Prisoners of War in Norway:

Russians (including Russian civilians)	60,000	x)
Yugoslavs	1,700	
Poles	1,000	
Total	62,700	

Displaced Persons in Norway:

Danes (most important group)	}	9,000
Frenchman		
Dutch		
Belgians		
Poles		
German civilians		20,000
Total		29,000

Internally " Displaced " Norwegians:

Evacuees from Finnmark & Northern Troms	35,000
Forced labour employed at some distance from their home	110,000
Political prisoners (including those imprisoned in their home district)	8,000
Total	153,000

Norwegians Displaced Abroad:

In Sweden	38,000
In U.K., U.S.A., Canada and the at sea	32,000
In Germany (prisoners)	8,000
Elsewhere	1,000
Total	79,000

The figures above relate to the latest information of the Norwegian Intelligence Service. They must, of course, only be considered as an estimate.

The number of displaced persons in Sweden increases weekly by an average of 500 people.

7th March 1945.

Lugubha Sniggen

* This figure seemed rather low
correction 74/10 - 46. 21.

REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS

DP10/17

N O R W A Y .

Preliminary draft proposed by
Dr. Alf Sewerlin

Not to be circulated

- I. Repatriation of Norwegian Subjects now in Germany/
Poland
II. Repatriation of Foreigners now in Norway.

I. Repatriation of Norwegian Subjects Now in Germany/Poland.

1. Number of Norwegian displaced people in these countries.

A.	(Norwegian refugees.	20.000	in Sweden
B.	Norwegian Prisoners of War.	2.000	in Germany
C.	Norwegian Civil Prisoners.	4.000	in Germany
D.	Norwegian Jewish deportees.	1.000	in Poland
		27.000	

- A. THE NORWEGIAN REFUGEES NOW IN SWEDEN will be repatriated by the Norwegian Authorities in Sweden, in collaboration with the Swedish Government.

The Norwegian refugees in Sweden are throughout organized by the Norwegian Authorities there, supported and taken care of by them.

The Repatriation of these refugees will probably not call for Interallied personnel or material help.

- B. THE NORWEGIAN PRISONERS OF WAR now in Germany total at present about 2.000 men. Most of these are officers, deported from Norway during the occupation. They are all kept in regular military camps. We assume that the repatriation of these men will be undertaken by Interallied Military Authorities. Control, contact and identification of these prisoners will not cause any problems. Their names ranks number and present residences in German Offlags and Stalags are known.

- C. NORWEGIAN CIVIL PRISONERS. about 4.000 at present in Germany are of two categories:

1. Internees in concentration camps, without any judicial proceeding or any sentence given.
2. Prisoners in German jails, sentenced by German court martial for patriotic activities; treated as criminals, certainly without being criminals.

Contact, Identification, Control

We have no report that any number of the Norwegian internees have been released from concentration camps or prisons for war-work in Germany. It is therefore believed that the number of dispersed Norwegians in Germany is very small, and particular measures to support them, seems at present not to be necessary.

The Norwegian displaced people in Germany are supposed to be found in the camps or prisons where they now are staying.

Name and address of the camps and prisons are known for the greater part of the prisoners.

We assume that the Norwegian prisoners will keep together in self-organised groups during the liberation and immediately afterwards.

We therefore suppose that the contact, identification and control of the Norwegian prisoners in Germany will be an easy task for the repatriation authorities.

Food.

It is assumed that the International organization will at the earliest possible moment have reports of the food-situation in the camps.

It is further assumed that food supplies will be available in the sufficient quantities to prevent any hunger or deterioration of the already very poor nutritional standard in the camps or prisons.

Distribution and preparation of meals should not be difficult for the prisoners in camps or in jail. They are already engaged in the distribution, cooking and serving of meals in the camps. The necessary equipment is there now, and may be there at the moment of liberation.

Medical Care and Control.

Norwegian doctors are interned in Sachsenhausen, Oranienburg and in other camps. They have in most cases been permitted to practise as doctors within their camps, and have been supplied with medical instruments and medicine from Norway.

These doctors will be able to give most valuable information about the epidemiological situation in the camps and the health conditions of the prisoners.

They will also be able to partake in the medical control and examination before the return to Norway, in case such examinations are found necessary.

Norwegian doctors now in Sweden can at a very early stage come to Germany and under the direction of allied repatriation authorities give the medical attention to Norwegians and other nationalities.

Transport.

The Norwegian Authorities, and the Norwegian people will demand that the Norwegian prisoners in Germany will be taken back to Norway as soon as it is physically possible.

As heavy demands are assumed to be made for railway transport from many military and civil purposes, we assume that we will not use railway transport more than strictly necessary.

From the different concentration camps and prisons, the 4.000 civilian prisoners are supposed at the earliest possible moment to be transported by railway, and without intermediate stops to:

1. Hamburg
2. Warnemünde.

The railway journey will for the larger groups be:

2500 men: from Granienburgh to Warnemünde
500 men: are already in Hamburg
200 men: from Schleswig to Hamburg.

In Hamburg and Warnemünde.

Ships contracted by the Norwegian Government (either Norwegian ships now in Sweden, or Norwegian ships now in ocean use, or Swedish or Danish ships contracted by the Norwegian Government) are planned to be present in these two ports at the earliest possible moment.

It may be necessary to let the ships wait in these ports for some days, until the greatest possible number of the Norwegian displaced people have arrived at these ports. During these days it is assumed that the people can be sheltered on board, and be given their food, medicine, clothes, medical treatment and examination, etc., on board.

It is assumed that these ships can be equipped with food and medicine, can have Norwegian doctors who can take care of the sick and undertake the "frontier-examination" before the prisoners are landed in Norwegian ports.

Arrival at Norwegian Ports.

If conditions in Norway do not deteriorate very much from what they now are, it is assumed that the Norwegian Authorities will be able to procure the food, housing, etc. necessary for their maintenance, to arrange the social and medical service needed, and re-establish their homes and social security.

D. THE NORWEGIAN JEWS, DEPORTED TO POLAND.

About 1.000 Norwegian Jews have been deported from Norway during the war.

The names and personal particulars of the deportees are available.

Since these people left Norway, - no information has been received about their fate.

They have certainly been taken to Poland. But their exact destination, their present address, or conditions are not known.

Contact. Identification. Control.

Must be undertaken according to the general principles adopted by the International Repatriation Authority.

Food, Medical care and medical control.

Must be undertaken according to the principles adopted by the International Repatriation Authorities.

Repatriation.

Most of the Jews deported from Norway were Norwegian Nationals. Their repatriation is a matter of course.

Some of the deported Jews were not Norwegian Nationals, but had come, during the last years before the war, to Norway as refugees from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and other countries.

The Norwegian Authorities are willing to let them return to Norway, from where they were deported; and their settlement in Norway or return to the country they originally belonged to, will be settled during their stay in Norway.

Transport.

Must be undertaken according to the general principles adopted by the International Repatriation Authority.

Re-settlement in Norway for all Norwegian Displaced Populations.

If the conditions in Norway at the liberation of the country are not much deteriorated, compared with the present conditions under the occupation, it is assumed that the repatriated population will be able to find maintenance, social and economical support in Norway.

There will be a certain shortage of a large number of commodities that have to be imported, - but hitherto the number of people that have to be repatriated has not got such size that their number would affect the condition of the total population.

Note:

As the name and personal particulars of most of the Norwegian displaced people are known, - would it be of any help in the preparation of the Repatriation, that Identification and Registration forms were adopted as soon as possible by the International Repatriation Authority, - printed, and given to representatives of the allied nations and filled out by us with the information available.

COPY ONLY

UNRRA
G.5. SHAEF (MAIN)

14th February, 1945.

To : T. T. Scott Esq., UNRRA, Displaced Persons Section

From : A. M. Newbold.

Re : Repatriation - Organised Movement

RAIL The planning which was done by us in London seems in the main to fall into line with the programme here. In fact, maps are now in preparation, based on our work of routing and mileage for rail traffic ex Germany to the three Western United Nations in Europe.

It is anticipated trains would take between 800-1,000 displaced persons and would be composed of any rolling stock available - either passenger coaches or box waggons. Every effort will be made, however, to provide passenger coaches for children, their mothers, expectant mothers and aged and crippled displaced persons. The trains will run in charge of a military detachment and 1 doctor, 2 nurses or more and 2 welfare workers. Use will be made of displaced persons as Chief Train Leader and Assistant Train leaders, the latter being placed in charge of each vehicle. Their various duties will be explained to them in advance.

Normally, the repatriation trains will incorporate:

- 1 Supply Van for rations to be distributed en route:
- 1 ~~Baggage~~ van for displaced persons surplus belongings.
- 1 Kitchen car if available:
- Passenger coaches for Personnel, and for female and infant displaced persons.
- Passenger coaches or box waggons for ordinary displaced persons.

SEA SHAEF - as UNRRA - is extremely anxious to obtain shipping for repatriation purposes and every effort will be made to attain this end.

ROAD Road convoys are by no means eliminated and, if not used for complete repatriation journeys, would, when available, be utilised for collecting displaced persons ~~and~~ feeding railheads.

Considerable planning is now being done in regard to organisation of repatriation on foot of duly controlled parties of nationals of Western United National Countries. The present planning envisages the provision of staging camps along the secondary highways where it will be possible to rest, feed and provide first-aid treatment. It is suggested hot meals be supplied at the beginning and end of each day's organised trek and a packed meal for consumption en route.

CANALS/RIVERS No definite arrangements have been made but enquiries as to possibilities have been instituted.

AIR Enquiries have been instituted and possibilities for certain categories of displaced persons are not entirely eliminated.

No information re U.S.S.R. intentions concerning repatriation by various means of transport, is available.

A.M.Newbold

Mr. T. T. Scott
for your information
W. H. Langford

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-2-

Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) spoke about his experience with displaced persons in Spain. He concluded his speech with two points:

1. That UNRRA is either unable or unwilling to realise the magnitude of the problem of displaced persons, and
2. That there is a most urgent need for a common policy among all the United Nations with regard to displaced persons.

Kline Regre

8th February, 1945.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF LORDS

OFFICIAL REPORT
(UNREVISED)

Vol. 134. No. 21

Wednesday, 7th February, 1945

CONTENTS

Motions—Neutrals and Axis War Criminals.
Relief and Repatriation Problems.
Question—The Lords' Debates.
Representation of the People Bill—Third Reading.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Bill—
Third Reading.



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HOUSE OF LORDS

Wednesday, 7th February, 1945.

The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Prayers.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

Geoffrey Francis, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

PONTYPOOL GAS AND WATER BILL. [H.L.]

Read 2^a, and committed.

TEACHERS (SUPERANNUATION) BILL.

Brought from the Commons; and read 1^a, and to be printed.

NEUTRALS AND AXIS WAR CRIMINALS.

2.12 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART had given Notice that he would move to resolve, That "the rights of neutrality" do not extend to the granting of asylum to Axis war criminals. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I do not propose to-day to endeavour to elicit any inconvenient information; I am here rather to register a widely-held point of view, and I hope that its timely expression may avoid some subsequent and possibly dangerous misunderstandings. Some time ago His Majesty's Government sought from the Government of Eire an assurance that they would not give asylum to Axis war criminals. From the reply I have extracted certain salient passages to serve as a peg on which to hang an intimation which I think is the more necessary in that the flight of the guilty is already beginning. The Government of Eire in their reply say that in their view the right to grant asylum is not in question. Not only is that right very much in ques-

tion, but I hope to show to-day that it does not really exist. Millions of people in this country, and in many other countries too, will vehemently deny that in a radically altered world—and it is on those words particularly that I wish to lay emphasis—any neutral countries have the right to grant asylum to Axis criminals beyond the pale. We have experienced the greatest convulsion in human history. Rivers of blood have flowed beyond the ken of the backwater of the neutrals, and in these circumstances it must surely be for the belligerents and not for neutrals to decide who is qualified for asylum and who for retribution.

The Government of Eire go on to say that they can give no assurance which would preclude them from exercising this right in the name of charity, or some other noun. I have high regard for abstract nouns; they are part of the indispensable equipment of humanity; but in this case we are not concerned with abstractions, we are concerned with preventing a third world war, which is very far from being an abstraction. Then the Government of Eire go on, I think, to give the whole case away. They refer also to the absence of any comprehensive international agreement which covers this matter. I do not think I need comment on the admission; it speaks for itself. And this matter of neutral rights has, in effect, really been a chameleon. It has continually changed. Professor Brierly, in his new book on the outlook for International Law, has written that all the ideas that we now associate with neutrality are modern and he goes on to add a warning that neutral countries cannot expect to have things the way that they see them. Now that, in both these world wars, has been a very frequent phenomenon and if one were to take the Eire note on its face value it will apparently be what the Government of Eire would expect to continue. I am afraid that we shall have to disappoint these expectations.

Grotius, in a well-known passage—and I am sure your Lordships will agree that most famous sayings are platitudinous—says that neutrals ought to do nothing to strengthen the side which has an unjust cause in a war or to impede one that is waging a just war. But over and over again in these two world wars neutrals have taken action which has strengthened

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the side which is waging an unjust war; and that is something that we really should not overlook. They may have felt not only impelled but compelled to do so; and within reason I understand that attitude. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will remember better than I do that in the last century there was a general and rather vague impression that neutrals were, somehow, more virtuous than belligerents. I do not think that even the Victorians pushed that theory so far as to suggest that neutrals were more virtuous than victims, and yet some of our modern non-belligerents have pushed it that far. (Very frequently in the course of this war they have vaunted the virtue of their dispassion, particularly when they thought that there was a prospect of sitting at the Peace Conference). Then the first world war came and destroyed that theory of virtue. Those of the younger generation—and I was one of them—who had just a little knowledge of International Law were somewhat disconcerted to find that neutrals, well-knowing the difference between good and evil, well appreciating the distinction between the "just" and the "unjust" causes of Grotius, continued in effect to "sit pretty" and to profit from both sides. That, speaking with all moderation, I find both comprehensible and reprehensible.

But they really pushed it rather far, for they afforded cover and camouflage to enemy companies and organizations, they aided our enemies to avoid the blockade and the Black List, and such a system of cheating grew up that for the first time in history we were obliged, in a world whose complexities have infinitely grown since the last great conflagration, to set up everywhere large counter-organizations to counteract that cheating. Now that left a certain amount of irritation so that when the last war was over and the League was founded and the Covenant drafted, and we were all given to understand that there would be no more neutrals, we were all, I think, inclined to say, "and high time too." And I have no doubt that if that promise had been fulfilled we should have had a better world. But the promise was not fulfilled. The chameleon took on a different colour and semblance, indeed the ink was hardly dry on the Treaty before some of the members of the new club, by sheer force of bad habit, were again

back at the old game and were in fact assisting the aggressor of the past, the aggressor of the future, to evade the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

At that time, too, the Kaiser took refuge with the Dutch, who refused to disgorge him, and the eyes of the world were upon us to see whether we should stand firm. We did not stand firm, as your Lordships are well aware. But the reason for the concession on our part, as I well know, because I saw that from the inside, was far less any real consideration for the theories of neutrality than the fact that we were war-weary, rather spineless, and we wished to wash our hands. We said—I often heard it said at the time—"Well, perhaps it is just as well, because it would really have been rather embarrassing to try him." Then there came the second world war and the chameleon took another turn, took another step along the road, if I may quote Grotius again, towards strengthening the side with the unjust cause. To quote the words of the Prime Minister, Eire rendered substantial disservice to the Allied cause; or, if you prefer the dispassion of an international jurist here it is:

"In the present war the Allies have respected the neutrality of Eire although it has been wholly favourable to their enemies."

And he goes on with a second censure:

"It could not be tolerated that any State which had agreed to enter the system, even with limited obligations, should supply, or allow its nationals to supply, an aggressor with the kind of assistance that neutral Swiss factories have been affording to the aggressor in this war."

From what I have seen in the Press it would appear that the United States Government have arrived at somewhat the same conclusion.

But of course these censures do not apply only to these cases—and I say this without any rancour or recrimination: the past is the past but we have got to have regard to the past if we are to form and found a sane future—these censures apply to all the neutrals. Our very Allies, Turkey and Portugal, supplied our enemies with vital war material. The Swedes did the same and even allowed the passage of German troops. For that matter, the Turks also allowed the passage of German warships. Spain not only afforded support, moral and material, to our enemies, but actually

sent troops to fight our Allies. The Governments of Eire and Argentina must certainly bear some responsibility for the loss of life among our merchant seamen by the fact of having maintained, in the name of neutrality, the spy nests disguised as Axis Legations. Never has such a medley of dereliction been collected in one threadbare doctrine. The neutrals, with their own hands, have very largely destroyed the ancient edifice, and if we are going to rebuild it nearer to our hearts' desire, that building must certainly not contain any room or even an attic which would shelter Axis war criminals. We can never again run the risk or court the certainty of a third world conflagration by letting the guilty live, intrigue and prepare in the safe refuge of countries that have not shared our sufferings, and in the light of this hard reality the claim of the Government of Eire, or any other neutral, that the right is not in dispute, or that it can be exercised in the name of charity or any other noun, simply disappears, in my submission. The interests of mankind still have a priority over any changing paper theories.

It is perfectly true that many of the neutrals have given assurances in this respect, but in assessing the value of those assurances we have to remember that a good part of the loot is already there. Apart from personal loot, a whole network of device and entanglement has been built up to conceal industrial theft, and on the purely personal side there has also been dereliction. I personally have the names of certain, as I think, very sinister Germans who have been getting out lately with false passports, and I happen to know not only the names on those passports but the identity of the creatures that they conceal. I suggest to your Lordships that that fact alone shows that we are in effect at the cross-roads. If we are going to admit any neutral right in this particular sphere, these men and others like them will use neutral countries as cover and bases for organizing sabotage, political assassination and subversive activities, not only in Germany but elsewhere, and they will also use those countries as bases for the organization of a new German war potential.

On that point I would like your lordships, if you will, to listen to the very uncomfortable words of so high an authority as Mr. Sumner Welles. He writes:

"The majority of the agents of the German General Staff are being trained to appear as men of large commercial or financial interests who will be able to dispose of considerable amounts of capital derived from the reserve which the German General Staff has already, during the past years, deposited under one guise or another in neutral countries."

Now, we shall be wanting not only the German General Staff but the agents of the German General Staff. These are the men who have prepared two world wars; they are the worst of the war criminals, and if we are not prepared to be stern and explicit at this stage we shall find them, as I have already indicated, quoting the concrete cases, slipping through our fingers. There is another, perhaps even more urgent, illustration. I happen also to know the names of a good few of the worst of the Gestapo butchers and torturers in Norway. That country is being, I believe, denuded to bolster up the failing Fatherland, and when that process of denudation has gone a little further it is most highly improbable that those creatures will go back to the Fatherland. They also have their false papers ready, and unless we make our position very clear they will be slipping across the border into Sweden and will be lost to us. That surely we are not prepared to contemplate, and that is why I said earlier on that we are in fact, at the cross-roads.

Now I would like to quote, as a further reason for some doubt in assessing the value of these assurances, an extract from one of the many reports of a Sub-Committee of the United States Senate, which runs as follows:

"The Germans have made careful preparation to continue and rebuild their industrial domination as a preparation for another war. When the German guns are silenced in Europe, the principal German industrial combines plan renewed activity from bases in the Argentine. There are plain indications that the Nazis have planned to use Argentina as an industrial base of operations in the Western Hemisphere."

The Senate Sub-Committee's report continues:

"Members of the Thyssen family are now established in the Argentine. German interests have been placed at the heart of the country's economy. In all a dozen Thyssen representatives have been acting as technical advisers to the Government of Argentina."

That is all an extract from the report of a Sub-Committee of the United States Senate. And I ask myself—I do not ask the Government because I want to give

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the reply myself—what value, what confidence can be reposed in the promises of countries already riddled with German penetration, in some cases enjoying a near-Nazi régime and in others having already broken their word? And I give my answer. I think it is this: that we ourselves must be prepared to reinforce those assurances or, where we have not received assurances, to reinforce our requirements, by suasion if possible and by more direct measures if necessary.

In contemplating those measures, I submit to this House that we need not feel ourselves to be handicapped by any of the old conceptions—although to-day I am speaking on one issue and one issue only—by old conceptions which have been very largely, as I have shown to you to-day I hope, self-slain. At the Moscow Conference the three great Allies pledged themselves to pursue the war criminals to the uttermost ends of the earth. Those were the words used, and I submit to you that if words have any meaning, and we are not to be mocked again, those words mean acquiescence in the Motion I have brought before this House to-day, and I think an explicit declaration in that sense may save a lot of trouble later on. In our contemplations and actions we must be guided by one clear fact. It is this. The Germans are not only cannon fodder, they are war material when deliberately exported, and exports of German war material must be as strictly controlled as imports of German key war materials like copper and nickel. On that latter phase I think we are all agreed. I submit we should also be agreed on the former.

If your Lordships will be so good as to cast your minds back over what has actually happened during our lifetime, I think you will see that these points emerge very clearly. Firstly, as admitted by the Government of Eire, these neutral rights repose on no fixed foundation; secondly, that in the course of this century those rights have been distorted beyond recognition; thirdly; that this distortion is due—and I want to lay special emphasis on this point because to my mind it is the explanation of the whole business—to the fact that Germany has been allowed to start both these world conflagrations with an overwhelming initial preponderance of force; fourthly, that, has, in consequence, driven the neutrals, or some of

them at least, to consider that their interests—not their rights, their interests—entitled them to strengthen the side of the unjust cause, to strengthen the aggressor until he became clearly the loser; fifthly, this rather sorry tale points in my mind to the necessity of a redefinition of neutral rights.

I am only speaking about one of them, one that has been claimed to-day, but I think it highly probable that at the peace settlement that redefinition will have to take place, although I personally have not yet abandoned the hope that we may at least enter the promised land where there will be no more neutrals. In any case I am sure that this time at least sufficient measures will be taken to make it impossible for the aggressor ever again to start with that initial preponderance of force and in those circumstances it may be that less need or emphasis will be laid on neutral rights as a whole. In the last war M. Clemenceau said war was too serious a thing to leave to soldiers—to my mind a highly contentious proposition. But I think that most of us will be agreed that one of the most vital things that belong unto our peace is too serious to be left to neutrals. We are on the eve, I hope, of a new world. We are already on the threshold and those who think as I do wish to cross that threshold untrammelled by any obsolete fiction. I beg to move:

Moved to resolve, That “the rights of neutrality” do not extend to the granting of asylum to Axis war criminals.—[Lord Vansittart.]

2.34 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, I wish I could say that I think the Motion of my noble friend is, as he thought in his first sentence, well-timed, but I do not think so, and I must briefly put the matter before the House and ask your Lordships to consider one or two reflections which find no place in my noble friend's speech. He began by saying that there was no right of asylum and that nobody was qualified for asylum, and so far every sensible and well-instructed man will agree with him. The circumstance that a fugitive, whatever his past record, tries to enter a country other than his own gives that individual no right whatever to be admitted. The right does not attach to the fugitive at all and I am not aware of any competent person

Who suggests that it does. So we may get rid of any idea of that sort. But a wholly different question arises in the case of a sovereign State—and I suppose the neutrals are sovereign States; Switzerland, for instance, is a sovereign State—when the matter that is raised is whether the sovereign State can be compelled to surrender any portion of its sovereignty. Hitherto at any rate it has been part of the sovereignty of a sovereign State that it might receive, and it might refuse to give up, a foreign fugitive. In times past that claim has been made by this country, when it has chosen to receive men whose record we thought was a record of courage and of true patriotism, in spite of all the knocking at our gates by other Powers to compel us to surrender those who had come here.

I must say that I am surprised that my noble friend with his long and close acquaintance with these matters and his lifelong connexion and training, should really come forward and move, as though by a Motion of this House you could somehow alter International Law, that rights of neutrality did not extend to the granting of asylum to Axis war criminals. I hope my noble friend will forgive me for saying that I think he has adopted the very worst means of securing the object which we all have at heart. I cannot imagine a worse way of persuading Irishmen that they have no right to admit a crime-stained fugitive than by shouting at them that the British House of Parliament, or one House of Parliament, has resolved that they have no right. I cannot imagine a situation which is less likely to produce the result desired. What in practice happens is this. Nobody knows much better than my noble friend, but I must remind the House of it. I claim that what the Government have done in this matter is perfectly right and we have every reason to think it will be effective. Twice over we have had debates in this House already—elaborate debates—on the subject. Twice over the attitude of this country has been explained. We have not proceeded by the method of informing neutrals that they have not got any rights. That is what Hitler did. He told a lot of neighbours they had no rights and he proceeded to act accordingly. We have not told these neutrals they have got no rights. What we have told them is this. We have said, to give asylum or refuge

to these crime-stained scoundrels would not only be utterly opposed to our notions as to how we all may make our contribution towards building up a better world, but it would be a course of action utterly opposed to the whole purpose of those who have had to fight to establish liberty, your liberty and ours, that having preserved your liberty you should take so deplorable a course. That has been done not only by this country. It has been done in the United States by messages from President Roosevelt. It is not by a method of writing down a resolution which denies one of the matters which has hitherto been one of the attributes of national sovereignty, that you will build up a sense of reason and wise policy in neutral countries; it is not by that method that the results will be secured which we all whole-heartedly intend by every means legitimately in our power to achieve.

Let me remind your Lordships a little more in detail of what has been done, because it is not a new subject to the Government at all. First of all, in the summer of 1943 as the result of developments which were then very rapidly producing their effect in Italy, the Allies undertook communications to the neutral States on this subject. We were specially concerned—I think everybody was concerned—lest Mussolini and others who shared guilt with him might attempt to take refuge in some neutral country. We did not put our appeal on some assertion of legal right, which would at once have raised a controversy between all the international authorities in the world, and which I must say, from such small knowledge as I have on the subject, might very likely have turned out to be a not very good argument. What we did was to publish this statement to all the neutrals involved. I am reading the actual words:

"In view of developments in Italy and the possibility that Mussolini and other prominent Fascists and persons guilty of war crimes may attempt to take refuge in neutral territory, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to call upon all neutral countries to refuse asylum to any such persons and to declare that they will regard any shelter, assistance or protection given to such persons as a violation of the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and which they are determined to carry into effect by every means in their power."

It would ill-become me to bandy words with the noble Lord as to the preferable methods of diplomacy, but I must say

[The Lord Chancellor.]

I should have thought that that method of presenting the plain situation to the neutrals was a good deal to be preferred to the Resolution which he has put upon the Paper. The United States, at the same time, made parallel representations. The authority of the United States goes with that document addressed to neutrals. The Soviet Government also addressed such neutral countries as were proper, those with which they had relations. I do appeal to the good sense of your Lordships' House that that is the proper way in which to present this most urgent demand to neutrals, and that it is not the proper way first of all to write down something as though it was the law of nations which is not the law of nations at all, and secondly, to deal with neutrals as though they were not sovereign States.

That was what happened in 1943 more particularly, as I have said, in reference to events then going on in Italy. But further communications between the Allies and further reflection made it necessary to consider whether a wider communication ought not to be made, not in reference to Italy but of a much more general character and indeed more largely referring to Germany and, I suppose, to Japan. In the summer of 1944—I think the actual occasion was in connexion with events then happening in France—the United States Government took the first step in this matter, a step in which we immediately concurred. The United States Government deemed it advisable to make further representations at Berne, at Madrid—my noble friend Viscount Templewood will remember when he received the intimation—at Lisbon, at Stockholm and other places. President Roosevelt made, first of all in Washington, a public statement of the firmest character on this very subject. That statement having been made in Washington, the American Government proceeded to transmit it to the neutral Governments at the places I have mentioned.

The substance of it was this. The President declared that it was difficult to believe that asylum or protection to any such persons would be given by any neutral countries, and that the United States Government would consider the harbouring of any of the Axis leaders or their henchmen by a neutral Government as contrary to those principles for which

the peoples of the United Nations were waging war. We proceeded gladly to adopt and countersign that declaration. It lies in the Foreign Office of every neutral in the world and I apprehend that it is not likely to be overlooked. The results were by no means discouraging. The declaration did not call for any answer—it was not in the form of a communication which invited a reply, any more than was our declaration of the previous year—but none the less neutrals lost no time in assuring us of their own intentions. One of the neutrals, I think, pointed out that this trenchanted very nearly upon their rights of sovereignty, but your Lordships will appreciate that it does not do so because it is not denying to them their sovereignty; it is saying what we and the Allies, who had fought and suffered in this war, expect of them as good members of the human society. It was in that spirit that the neutrals replied.

I will give one or two examples. Portugal, in a note handed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon by the Secretary-General of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said:

"The Portuguese Government has no hesitation in affirming that it will not, by granting asylum in its territory, permit war criminals to escape the decision of the national, or international, tribunals competent to try them."

Spain, my noble friend Viscount Templewood will remember, communicated with us, and His Majesty's Ambassador received an assurance that it was not the intention of the Spanish Government to provide asylum for war criminals in Spain. Then Sweden. At a meeting of the Riksdag, the Legislature, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs said:

"It must not be concluded from our generous policy towards refugees that Sweden is also open or will offer asylum to persons who have defied the conscience of the civilized world."

Next the Argentine. In a memorandum of the Secretary of State, which was handed in by the Argentine Ambassador, it was stated:

"Firstly, in no event will persons accused of war crimes be allowed into Argentine territory. Secondly, neither will they be allowed to create capital deposits or acquire property of any kind."

That communication is not novel to the House. In a speech on this subject which I made some time ago I quoted it as an

example of what might be done by our method of treatment. Then there is the case of Switzerland. Switzerland is entitled to regard itself as a sovereign State, and I do not think that we shall ultimately promote the unity and happiness of mankind if we claim that it is only we who have been fighting who are entitled to decide these matters. In a written reply, dated November 11, to a councillor in the Swiss Federal Council, the Government said:

"It is clear, in particular, that asylum could not be granted to persons . . . who have committed acts contrary to the laws of war and whose past conduct reveals them as possessing notions irreconcilable with the basic traditions of law and humanity."

My noble friend, very naturally, in a great part of his speech, dealt with the case of Eire. It is an unhappy case. Eire received the same communication, and they first asserted that as they understood it the right to grant asylum is not in question. But they went on to say that it had been "the uniform practice of the Eire Government to deny admission to all aliens whose presence would be at variance with the policy of neutrality, or detrimental to the interests of the Irish people." In these circumstances the Dominions Office thought it was right to send a reply to the Eire Government which your Lordships may be interested to hear read. This phrase "detrimental to the interests of the Irish people" was a striking phrase, and therefore the United Kingdom Government replied by saying that, for their part, they would wish to make it clear to the Eire Government that it would certainly, in the words used by the Eire Government, "be detrimental to the interests of the Irish people" were war criminals to be harboured in Eire. That seems to me a very proper retort to the communication which we received. This is a question which is not to be decided in heat or passion at all. The question is whether the methods which are thus followed by the British Government in this matter are all wrong, half-hearted, namby-pamby and milk and water, and whether in place of them your Lordships should adopt unilaterally this bold Resolution which I should think would cause all the International Law books in the world to be rewritten, and therefore give some comfort to some people, but which, in my humble opinion, would be a most unwise way in which to proceed. You do

not get the result you want always by announcing that you are the person with the big stick, and that you are going to have your way whether it is right or not. And you certainly do not get it by passing resolutions, pious or otherwise, which, in themselves, have no result at all. I am convinced—and I hope that I have convinced your Lordships by what I have said—that the proper and wise way to behave is not to deny that neutrals have rights—though it would be a most extreme and fantastic exercise of them if they treated these criminal emigrants as an acceptable addition to their population. That is not the way to do it.

Surely according to the best dictates of diplomacy—that great science which my noble friend Lord Vansittart has for so many years practised and expounded—the right thing is to say to these neutrals, as we have in fact said: "You people are standing by while we have bled and suffered and fought and endured tortures, in order to rescue liberty for the world. You will enjoy the fruits of these efforts although you have never bled or suffered. If you feel that you are a member of this new community which we hope will result in producing a better world, well then, behave as such, behave as a member of the club, for be sure that if you do not you will be acting in a manner contrary to the whole objects which we have had in view in fighting this war. You will get no good out of it; nothing but trouble and, it may be, disaster." That is the language which should be used in these communications to the neutrals, and I appeal to your Lordships, exercising, as we always do in this House, perfectly free and unfettered judgment, to say whether that course, taken by His Majesty's Government, is not really wise and politic.

I regret very much if I seem to be critical of so old and valued a friend as the noble Lord, but he will see that he puts me, and puts us all, in rather a difficulty. What is to happen to this Motion now on the Paper? Should it be carried? I think it inconceivable that we should carry a Motion which contradicts the whole method of President Roosevelt and of all our Allies. It raises, to say the least, a most dubious proposition of International Law, and it provokes these very neutrals into asserting that, small as they are, unimportant as they are, they, too, have their rights

[The Lord Chancellor.] of sovereignty. It seems to me that that would be a very unhappy result of this afternoon's excursion. Are we to reject the Motion? For my part, I am most unwilling to go and register a clean negative that may almost seem to be encouraging them to do the very thing which no man in this House, for one single moment, wishes them to do. There really is, if my noble friend will forgive me for saying so, only one course which can be wisely taken here, and that is that he should ask leave of the House to withdraw the Motion. We are grateful always for the illumination he brings and for the brilliant speeches he contributes to our debates. But this thing is a mistake, and I hope very much that—if only as a matter of responding to a personal appeal—my noble friend will think it right, whatever his immediate feelings may be, to withdraw the Motion.

3 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, it is difficult indeed for me and the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack to argue this question at any length, because we start from diametrically opposed standpoints. He has argued the matter mainly from the legal and theoretical point of view; I have confined myself strictly to the practical point of view. I think that the argument need not be prolonged. He says, if I understand him rightly, that we are going into the new world with the old conceptions and (as I consider them) the old handicaps. Unless I misunderstood him, he seemed to think that I was attacking neutral rights as a whole, whereas I confined myself very explicitly to denying this particular one in, as I said, a radically altered world.

This is a point on which millions of people feel very deeply indeed. We do not feel that words alone will suffice. The noble and learned Viscount talked about the reprimand which would be administered to any member of the new "club" if he misbehaved. I think that I showed in my speech that some members of what was the new club after the last war did not behave too well. I omitted to mention that some of them did not even pay their subscriptions. I do not think that we can pin all our hopes to that. This is a vitally serious matter. I should like to point out that I showed in my speech that abuses are already taking place. I do not know what action the Government contemplate

to meet those abuses, and I carefully refrained from asking that; but I emphasize again that they are taking place. I would venture to ask—though I expect no answer—what the Allied Governments meant by saying that they would pursue the war criminals to the uttermost ends of the earth, if the interpretation which we have heard to-day is the right one. Does that mean that they will sit at home and send a few notes and expect the goods to be delivered? I maintain that if we once admit this particular right in this radically altered world it will be abused; and signs of abuse have already been manifest.

The noble and learned Viscount suggested that I should withdraw my Resolution. I have in this House, I think, withdrawn almost every Motion that I have ever brought forward, but in this case I do not see my way to do so. This is a subject on which too many of us feel too deeply for me to do that. In order to meet the convenience of the Government—and this is as far as I can possibly go in this vital matter—I am prepared to leave my Resolution on the Paper. I shall not withdraw it. I am prepared to leave it where it stands to-day, and, if I get any further evidence of abuse, I shall come to this House again and take up the matter where I left it and divide the House. To-day I shall refrain from doing that.

3.4 p.m.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, I think that the course which the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, suggests will not be congenial to the general body of the House, nor do I quite understand how such a course can be taken. He could move that this debate be now adjourned, and, if the House agreed to that, the subject could be discussed on another day; but that the debate should come to an end without any decision of any kind in any direction, and that the matter should be left in the air, is, I think, not possible according to the rules of this House. The noble and learned Lord Chancellor appears to have given conclusive reasons for the inadvisability of passing this Resolution, and reasons also why it would be very inconvenient to allow it to be voted against and negatived. In these circumstances I would appeal to the noble Lord not to press his Resolution now, or to endeavour to deal with it in the manner which he suggests. If he does so, I think

It is probable that the House would prefer to pass a Motion for the previous question, which I believe is in accordance with the rules of this House, although a course which has been very seldom used of recent years. Perhaps the noble Lord, on reconsideration, will not put the House to the inconvenience and disability of being compelled to adopt that course.

LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, in answer to the noble Viscount, I should like to say that I am ready to adopt any course convenient to the House short of withdrawing my Resolution. If it will suit the House better for the debate to be adjourned, I am prepared to agree to that course.

NOBLE LORDS: No, no.

LORD VANSITTART: If the House prefers to negative the Resolution, that must be done.

3.6 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT CRANBOURNE) (*Lord Cecil*): My Lords, I hardly think it would be in accordance with the wish of the House that this debate should be merely adjourned. There are only two good reasons for adjourning a debate: either that time does not permit it to be finished, or that the House requires more information to enable it to be finished. Neither of these reasons is present in our discussion to-day. I deeply regret the action of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, whom I have always regarded with very great respect as an experienced diplomat, but I do not think that on this occasion he has shown the same experience of our Parliamentary system. The whole Resolution is ill-framed. He asks your Lordships unilaterally, without consultation with our Allies, without consideration of the effect on neutrals, on the Motion of a private Member to pass a Resolution the result of which would be fundamentally to alter the ordinary course of International Law. I really do not think that the noble Lord can expect the House to take action of that kind. If he insists on pressing his Resolution to a Division it will have to go to a Division, and I hope that your Lordships will show in no uncertain manner what you feel about this procedure.

LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, if there is no middle course between this

Resolution going to a Division and my withdrawing it, I shall feel myself compelled to ask leave to withdraw it. I leave myself in the hands of the House on that point.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

RELIEF AND REPATRIATION PROBLEMS.

3.8 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF READING rose to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the position of displaced and Stateless persons on the Continent of Europe; and to move for Papers. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, this is not a subject into which one can introduce any particular degree of glamour or exhilaration. It is a vast, complex, sombre and intractable problem, and, although it may not be the direct concern of this country, at the same time it affects so many Continental countries that no real stability can be restored to Europe until it has been at least substantially solved. I confess to some astonishment at the apparent failure of the Press and public, and I am inclined to add of Parliament itself, to appreciate either the immensity or the immediacy of this topic. The displaced persons referred to in this Motion are, of course, those who for different reasons or under different degrees of compulsion have been uprooted by the Germans from their homes and deported to other regions of their own countries, or to other German-occupied countries, or to the interior of the Reich itself.

The great majority of these people have been used as an almost bottomless reservoir of slave labour, dedicated to the maintenance of the German war machine, either as members of the gigantic Todt organization, a vast labour service which has almost the proportions of an army itself, or as workers in the fields, factories, mines and forests, producing materials of war. And side by side with that tremendous productivity there has been taking shape Hitler's New Order. The German leaves nothing to chance, and little to choice. His policy has been so to parcel out industry and agriculture that no country shall under either of those heads be self-sufficient but that all shall be inter-dependent upon

[The Marquess of Reading.] each other, and at the same time subservient to the Reich itself. The implementing of that policy has, of course, required the wide distribution of labour, and these slaves, as they substantially are, have been herded like cattle from place to place, as circumstances required and as labour shortage in any particular area or any particular industry prevailed.

At the same time, when the lay-out of industry was being devised, or the attentions of the Royal Air Force became too pressing, and it was decided to shift a factory from, say, Northern France to the once relative security of Czechoslovakia, it has been the practice that when that factory moved it should move accompanied by its entire directing staff and workers—taken up lock, stock and barrel, and deposited in its new home. Repeat that process a few hundred times, add to those slave workers civilian prisoners, persons in concentration camps, hostages, war fugitives, and the countless thousands who have been evicted from their homes in border lands, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Alsace, in order to make way for Nazi lords of creation to be installed as Wardens of the Marches of the Reich, and you have a very presentable imitation of the reign of chaos.

It is surely no extravagant conjecture that the German leaders, while planning the economic vassalage of Europe in the event of their victory, should sometimes have calculated that in the event of their defeat they would, by the use of these methods, leave behind them such a legacy of turmoil and travail for their conquerors as to frustrate for a long period of time their efforts to restore tranquillity to the liberated lands. According to an official estimate by the Allied Governments these conditions of organized deliberate upheaval affect something between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 persons in Germany and German-occupied countries of Europe; and those 20,000,000 to 30,000,000 have to be identified, collected, sorted, fed, clothed and ultimately transported back to their homes—or what is left of them—for it is only too likely that in many cases there will be nothing and nobody to welcome and cherish them on their arrival, that they will have to depend upon such relief as can be afforded them in food, shelter

and clothing until the gradual and painful process of their rehabilitation can begin.

It is clearly the first essential that the return to their countries of these people shall not proceed according to their own devices and impulses, but that it shall be systematically controlled along carefully prepared lines; otherwise, the roads of Europe will be strewn with millions of desperate, exhausted, sick and starving people, and the hideous anarchy of the end of the Thirty Years' War will be re-enacted on an incomparably greater scale before our own eyes. But the mere mechanics of the undertaking are prodigious. It has been estimated that to transport home no more than the 1,800,000 Frenchmen believed to be still captive in Germany, would require no fewer than twenty-four trains a day for a period of ninety days, or some 2,160 trains in all. And they, after all, are only one-fifteenth part of the total, and concentrated in one country, have to be moved to a neighbouring country; the rest, scattered over the face of Europe, requiring to be conveyed at a moment when railway lines are torn up, railway bridges destroyed, railway stations obliterated, and locomotives and rolling stock at a fantastic premium. The disease demands urgent remedy, for these people will be pining to get back to their own homes, and the process of their physical, moral and economic rehabilitation cannot begin until they are back in their own surroundings.

Moreover, impatient and resentful of delay, they may well prove a disturbing element in the country through which they are passing, to which, after all, they represent no more than additional mouths to be fed at a time of acute dearth. Incidentally, if there is to be delay it is greatly to be hoped that every effort will be made to find them on the spot some work of however transient a character, in order that they may be kept employed in the interval, and not left with twenty-four hours out of the twenty-four in which to brood and fret over their fate. That, I believe, to be of immense importance. There is the further consideration that the countries of Europe will be anxious to re-establish their own economic life, and for that purpose will reassemble at the earliest moment their scattered nationals in order that they may make the fullest use of such resources as remain to them.

There is the problem in outline, one of infinite ramifications, humanitarian,

social, economic and administrative; and so far not a great deal has been heard of steps taken and measures devised to solve the difficulties. Presumably, as in the case of relief, the first approach to the problem will come from the military authorities, whose task it will be to initiate action at least for the assembling and accommodating of these people, pending further developments. In the next stage—always assuming that it receives the necessary formal invitation—U.N.R.R.A. is supposed to come upon the scene. The only authority in actual possession and control of quantities of transport, supplies, medical stores; the only authority in actual control of manpower for the building of huts; the only authority in control of movement personnel, traffic control and police, is the military authorities; and if this problem is going to be effectually and speedily solved, I hope, for one, that, always provided that it shall not delay the demobilization of the Army, the putting into operation of such plans as there may be for the repatriation of these people will be left for the longest possible time in the hands of the Army, if these persons are to have any hope of being got back to their destinations.

In the recent debate on the war situation, the noble Viscount the Leader of the House assured us that it was not lack of administrative personnel that was hampering U.N.R.R.A.'s activities but lack of transport. If transport was insufficient even for the needs of relief, how are these unfortunate people to be got home? And if man-power was adequate for the distribution of relief, is the noble Viscount equally in a position to assure us that the man-power at U.N.R.R.A.'s disposal is sufficient to cope both with the problem of relief and with the problem of repatriation as well? For U.N.R.R.A., after all, once it has been invited, is charged with a three-fold problem: first, the provision of relief in the countries where the people are found; secondly, the task of transporting them home; and thirdly, the task of maintaining them in conditions of relief when they have arrived at their destination.

Here again, as in the case of relief which we discussed not long ago, there is this strange situation: that U.N.R.R.A., although it is not a private charitable organization but a great inter-governmental agency, cannot come into a coun-

try unless it has been invited so to do by the Government concerned. At the Montreal Conference, held in September last, the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A., in his speech to the delegates, said this:

"Progress has been made towards the definition of the functions which the administration"—

that is U.N.R.R.A.'s administration—

"is to perform in handling the displaced persons found in each liberated country."

"Progress has been made towards the definition"—it does not somehow give a ring of great expeditiousness. He goes on to say that preliminary to such individual agreements a multilateral agreement between the United Nations has been devised and he adds that it is to be hoped that this agreement can soon be signed by the Governments concerned. It would be interesting to hear from the noble Viscount the Leader of the House how many countries in the interval since September have entered into definitive agreements of the sort referred to with the administration of U.N.R.R.A., and also how many signatures have been obtained of Governments to the multilateral agreement to which apparently the Director-General attached so much importance. It is fundamental to the solution of this grim and baffling problem that agreement should be properly and widely arrived at. One cannot avoid a suspicion that the matter is still hanging fire.

On the aspect of repatriation, two other queries arise. How is nationality to be decided? There will be amongst these persons large numbers possessing no documents at all. Others will be in possession of false documents, in which there has been an enormous trade in Europe under the German occupation. I understand the present project to be that each country concerned shall be called upon to admit a repatriation officer from each other country concerned, in order to examine the credentials of those claiming to be its nationals. I cannot feel any particular affection for the idea of that corps of itinerant inquisitors, who are apparently to be charged with the power of rejecting a man's claim to nationality because they dislike his face or his necktie or his accent, and condemning him thereby to permanent exile. Surely there should be some appeal against such rough injustice, or, better still, the original investigation should not be carried out by

[The Marquess of Reading.] one individual but by a tribunal of three, one drawn from the country in which the man is found, one from the country of which he claims to be a national, and the third from a neutral country to preside. Only in that way can the individual hope for adequate protection.

The other question concerns those people who are of settled residence in a country but at the same time not of its actual nationality, although they may have lived there for many years and carried on their business there. To what country are those people to be repatriated—to the country of which they are settled residents or to the country of their former nationality? And if to the country of their settled residence, if those countries agree to take them back, if there is an agreement of that kind, what for this purpose constitutes "settled residence" as distinct from "temporary sojourn"?

I have not yet exhausted all the bodies who are concerned in these various operations. There is still another which comes in, although no doubt on a more limited scale. I assume for this purpose that the principle is accepted that there shall be no repatriation of any individual against his will. If that principle be agreed, then there remains a residue of non-repatriables, responsibility for whom I understand to be vested in the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees. It is the task of that Committee to provide for the ultimate destination of these persons, and from my own experience of similar problems in the years before the war it is no light or enviable task. The relation between U.N.R.R.A. and the Inter-Governmental Committee I understand to be this: that it is U.N.R.R.A.'s task to look after these persons for what is called a reasonable time and then hand them over to the Inter-Governmental Committee when the final arrangements are made. What, for a purpose of that kind, is a reasonable time, and who is to decide in a particular case whether or not a reasonable time has elapsed? If U.N.R.R.A. contends that it has performed its function for a reasonable time, and that contention is upheld, and at the same time the Inter-Governmental Committee is not yet ready to take over, whose is the responsibility for these unfortunates during the interregnum? Considering all these various bodies involved

one is driven to the conclusion that too many cooks with too ill-defined spheres of influence have been engaged to spoil this particular broth, and while they are discussing between themselves which recipe to follow or responsibility for the preparation of the separate ingredients, the broth itself will probably have taken the initiative and incontinently boiled over.

As regards Stateless persons, those who upon racial, religious or political grounds have been deprived of their former citizenship by Germany or her satellites, I have only two questions to ask. So far as is known have those persons been given any effective papers of identification in place of those which have been removed from them? The second question is this: Is it the intention to extend to them the benefits of the Nansen scheme or some similar scheme so that they shall not live the rest of their lives as hunted wraiths without any recognized existence in the world? Again, at Montreal the Minister of State who represented Great Britain committed himself to an admission which is both startlingly frank and frankly startling. What he said was this:

"Apart from the question of supplies, there are one or two other practical matters which I think the Council ought to come to some decision upon before we leave Montreal. First of all there is the question of displaced persons. I think in general we have not realized until quite lately how extremely important that question is. In fact, if U.N.R.R.A. is able to organize the repatriation of those millions of unfortunate beings . . . U.N.R.R.A. with that alone will have done a job which justified its existence. As I say, there are practical decisions which have to be taken by this Council meeting if U.N.R.R.A. is going to be able to do that job, and I hope when those questions come up for decision we shall be able to act rightly and with decisive permanence."

A NOBLE LORD: Who said that?

THE MARQUESS OF READING: Mr. Law, Minister of State. So far as I can ascertain the decisive permanence for which the Minister of State was hoping took the form of the passing of one additional resolution which extended the sphere of U.N.R.R.A.'s operations to include enemy and ex-enemy countries—no doubt a right decision, but one which very gravely added to the already burdensome weight upon U.N.R.R.A.'s shoulders, and at the same time emphasized the necessity for definite and detailed plans in preference to nebulous benevolence. Resolu-

tions may be of such stuff as schemes are made of, but they do not put clothes on men's backs or food into their mouths or a roof over their heads or warmth into their bones or provide transport to carry them home. When the U.N.R.R.A. conference took place this war had been going on for five years and it had long been abundantly and increasingly apparent what the problem was, what the immense scale and complexity of it was and how necessary it was that plans should be made for its solution.

I have put this Motion down in the hope of eliciting from the Government how far even now other member Governments of U.N.R.R.A. have awakened to the urgency of this problem; how far plans really exist in any concrete form for dealing with the situation; and how far they are expected to take seriously their support of U.N.R.R.A. when for a period of six months the vital post of Deputy Director-General of U.N.R.R.A., rendered vacant by the resignation of Sir Arthur Salter, has never been filled? A problem of this size cannot be tackled by last-moment inspirations or piecemeal palliatives. I believe and I hope that your Lordships in general and His Majesty's Government in particular will share the belief that unless plans to meet this situation have been carefully preconceived, ready to be put into operation swiftly and effectually when the moment comes, the seeds of peace in Europe will have been planted in sterile and infected soil. I beg to move.

3.38 p.m.

LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am sure I speak for the whole of your Lordships in saying that we are grateful to the noble Marquess for drawing attention to a question of such tremendous importance and indeed urgency. I only hope his words will be passed on by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House to his colleagues in the Government who are more directly responsible for this state of affairs. It is of course not only a British responsibility or even a British Empire responsibility. This is a matter affecting the whole of the United Nations and above all of course the three principal Powers. The noble Marquess referred to the Nansen scheme after the last war. I share with him a great admiration for the late Dr. Nansen, with

whom I had a long friendship. I suppose no man did more for suffering humanity in those years immediately after the last war than that great Norwegian. The noble Marquess referred to the question of people who have lost documents of identity and so on. The failure in this respect that followed the last war was due to the fact that the States concerned did not recognize the Nansen scheme and the Governments concerned did not play the game in regard to it.

The noble Marquess has dealt with a matter which will become urgent in the near future. A great deal of the problem cannot be tackled until the fighting of the major battles has ceased on the Continent of Europe, but I hope that when that moment comes there will be a complete change of attitude towards this question. I can best describe perhaps what I am hoping will happen by relating to your Lordships a conversation I had with a survivor from the troop ship "Arandora Star," which was torpedoed in mid-Atlantic when carrying German and Italian prisoners of war to Canada. Before the ship was torpedoed there were on board Italian prisoners and German prisoners who had looked on each other with hostility, and the Italians were divided into Fascists and Anti-Fascists. There were also on board British guards and British seamen. Five minutes after that ship had sunk and when the survivors were struggling in the water all distinction of nationality was lost; they were all helping each other to survive, to live. I hope that when the main battles end in Europe a similar spirit will actuate all the nations concerned. This frightful problem will have to be dealt with drastically and urgently. With all respect to the noble Marquess I hope it will not be dealt with by such people as Mr. Ernest Brown.

I propose to deal only with a section of this very large problem and to refer in a few words to the position of the refugees, mostly Jewish, in the Balkans and in other countries. Those countries have been liberated either by the Russians or our own Armies or by partisans, and the problem is immediately before us. The noble Marquess said that some 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 people were concerned. The majority of them will not have countries to go back to. The trouble is that the majority of the refugees in the Balkans come from Hungary and

[Lord Strabolgi.]

Germany and cannot go back. I imagine that very few of the Jews surviving from Hitler's persecution have any wish to go back to Germany. Many of them are survivors of the original Jewish communities in the satellite countries; for example, Rumania and Bulgaria. It would be very difficult for them to be absorbed in those countries where they are now refugees.

According to my information at least 80 per cent. of them are willing and anxious to go to Palestine and arrangements have been made in Palestine to house them and find employment for them. Accordingly, the difficulties occasioned by problems of work and houses and the slowness of the military do not arise. About 700,000 are affected and that number will increase. Employment is waiting for them and houses are waiting for them. When they get to Palestine a number of them, the fit young men, will be eligible and, I am sure, willing to join His Majesty's Forces. We shall need manpower in Europe for some considerable time and of course there is the Eastern war to be taken into account as well. If these people reach Palestine the younger men at any rate can be recruited for Jewish brigades. In the neutral States and the States outside our sphere of influence—I apologize to the noble Viscount for the term because I know he will deny we have spheres of influence—we might have difficulty in recruiting these men for the Forces, but when once they get to Palestine there will be no difficulty. There are 10,000 in Greece, 25,000 in Italy, 310,000 in Rumania and Transylvania, 450,000 in Bulgaria, 180,000 in France, and 22,000 in Belgium. Some of those I have referred to are of course indigenous.

The Vichy Government, under stimulus from the Nazis, deprived the Jews wherever they could, of their property, their possessions and their employment, and rendered them almost outlaws. Their places have been taken by French shopkeepers, business men, professional men and so on. The Vichy Government has been displaced but there is difficulty in persuading these little non-Jewish business men, who have taken over businesses and property, to restore them to their original owners. The result is that you have a large Jewish community there, suffering just as much from economic distress as any of those referred to by the noble Marquess. Of refugees in the accepted

sense of the word there are 13,000 in Sweden and 26,000 in Switzerland. This problem is not as big as it might have been. There were, in the parts of Europe which came under Axis domination, about 6,000,000 Jews. There are only about 1,000,000 left. One of Hitler's war aims has been nearly achieved. It is unnecessary for me to dwell on the cruelty with which this extermination has been carried out of 5,000,000 people. The whole world is aware of the enormity of the crime.

But how about the surviving million? Most of them are impoverished, homeless, workless, with little prospect of resettlement in the territories where they used to live or in the new territories where they are refugees. Are we going to allow the complete achievement of Hitler's war aim by leaving this million to their fate? Of course we shall not. The British public would not permit it. The trouble is that in the onrush of great events, with the great panorama of history passing before our eyes, these people are forgotten. The newspapers are reduced in size and the B.B.C., as we know, is completely under the Government; so these facts are overlooked, and these people are forgotten. In due course, as the noble Marquess said, U.N.R.R.A. will get to work and provide clothing and food to relieve immediate necessities, or it will be done, as it ought to have been done, by the military authorities. But these people will still remain outlaws without an economic niche in the countries where they found refuge. On the other hand, if we allow them to go to Palestine—and the barriers against it are purely artificial—they can be established at once, and the task of U.N.R.R.A. and of the military authorities will be relieved to that extent.

In Rumania alone there are 50,000 candidates for emigration to Palestine and there are 30,000 in Bulgaria. These people are destitute, helpless and homeless. Their only hope is to go to Palestine. They cannot be reabsorbed in the Balkan countries. The present quota of visas to Palestine is 1,500 a month and that is now exhausted. There was an original quota under what was known as the White Paper—the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, will remember that because he was a member of the Cabinet—of 75,000 emigrants to be allowed into Palestine. Those

75,000 permits have now been used up. May I ask the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House—I gave him notice of this, not very long, but some hours—what is proposed to be done now? The 75,000 permits under the White Paper issued by Viscount Templewood and his friends, have been used up, and conditions now are entirely different. I think that number would never have been agreed to if it had been known what was going to happen, but the 75,000 has been used up. What is going to happen now?

I am not discussing—for this is not the occasion for it—future policy in regard to Palestine. That is a matter affecting the United Nations. This particular matter of these helpless people is extremely urgent and we must have an immediate policy. This is an administrative matter; it is a matter which would be raised in Committee of Supply in another place. Many obstacles, apart from this very meagre ration of permits of admission to Palestine, have been put in the way of the rescue of fugitives from Nazi oppression. During the last year or two we have had from spokesmen of the Government particularly from the Foreign Secretary who spoke at times with tears in his voice, heart-rending accounts of what has been going on, and assurances that we would do anything that lay in our power to save these people from Nazi concentration camps and gas chambers. But, in actual practice, many obstacles have been put in the way of their reaching sanctuary. For example, in July, 1943, it was decided that the Jews who escaped from Nazi oppression and who succeeded in reaching Turkey—they managed to get through underground channels from the Balkans—should be granted visas for Palestine. But the Turkish Government was not informed of this until June, 1944; that is to say eleven months later. So eleven months was lost, and I do not know how many people have perished in the interval.

Particularly would I ask the noble Viscount if there is any relaxation proposed in the near future for the orphaned Jewish children. I am sorry to see that the Bench of Bishops has been somewhat depleted since the House first met as I had hoped for strong support from the Church on this particular matter. The Churches in France and Switzerland, of all denominations, have done wonderfu

work in caring for these Jewish children. I am sure that humanity can be grateful for all time to the religious houses of France for the great and splendid efforts they have made in this cause. There are 15,000 of these children in France, 2,500 in Belgium, 1,000 in Switzerland and large numbers in liberated Poland and other countries. There is an exceptional number of orphaned Jewish children for a special reason. At one time the Nazis in France did not send orphaned Jewish children to the Polish concentration camps and gas chambers, and many hundreds of Jewish mothers committed suicide in order to save their children. What is going to be done about this? There are arrangements made for them to be received, to be taken care of, brought up, educated and made into useful citizens in Palestine. Is the door to remain closed? If so, how is that justified?

As I said, the conditions in which Lord Templewood and his colleague drew up a temporary policy for Palestine have been completely altered by the events of the last five years. There was not this problem, or any problem of this kind, then. I hope that Lord Templewood when he speaks will support my plea. I hope that I can rely upon his advocacy here, in this most important matter. I fully support, and my noble friends have asked me to say that they do also, Lord Reading's main thesis, but on this particular question I would make a special appeal to the Government to see that these Stateless, homeless Jews who are now living in distress and poverty, particularly in the Balkans, and who will perish if something is not done for them, are allowed to go to the only country where they have a legal right to settle under the Mandate, and that is Palestine. I only hope that my poor arguments will have some result in helping some of these poor people, and I trust that the much more eloquent plea made by the noble Marquess for a change of policy may have its effect.

3.56 p.m.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, I am emboldened to make a few observations upon the Resolution, which has been so eloquently moved by the noble Marquess, as the result of certain definite experiences which I have had over a number of years, and particularly in the last four and a half years in Spain. I cannot help remembering that, at the end of the last

[Viscount Templewood.]

war, I had the privilege of helping the League of Nations with the settlement of 30,000 refugees in Eastern Europe. Incidentally, my memory of those months does not confirm the criticism made by Lord Strabolgi of the so-called Nansen passport. My experiences may have been exceptional, but I did, at that time, find the Nansen passports invaluable for the refugees with whom I was dealing.

LORD STRABOLGI: If my noble friend had had to travel on one of those passports himself he would have found things very different.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: I can only state what my own memory is. Perhaps my noble friend the Earl of Perth, when he speaks, with either confirm or criticize what I have said. Subsequently, when I was at the Home Office I had to deal with the difficult problem of the migration of Jewish refugees from Germany. There, again, I cannot help regretting the fact that I was not successful in the attempt that I made to settle in this country a great many more Jewish professional men—and particularly Jewish doctors—whose services, I believe, would have been invaluable to the Allied effort at the present time. Then I come to my experiences in Spain. Dealing with refugees and escaped prisoners of war was one of my principal duties. During the time I was at Madrid about 60,000 escaped prisoners of war and refugees crossed the Pyrenees and passed into Spain. It was my responsibility and the responsibility of my Mission to facilitate their passage, and to prevent their being thrown back into the hands of the Gestapo for expulsion once again back into German-occupied territory. I am glad to say that my staff succeeded with this difficult task.

We passed through Spain many thousands of Allied prisoners of war, and we also passed varied crowds of every type of refugee—men, women and children of all nationalities, Christians and Jews, and including curious groups such, for instance, as the Jews from Salonika, who have been settled there since the sixteenth century, still talking the Spanish language and maintaining Spanish habits, and also numbers of Stateless persons for whom we had to provide guarantees and passports. As I say, I am glad to think that with possibly only one exception none of

these refugees was allowed to drift back into German hands. It was a hard battle. The Germans were claiming to have them returned. I should like to pay a tribute to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Jordana, now unfortunately dead, with whom I was dealing, and who throughout those difficult months and years maintained a firm front against the German demands.

This cross-section of escaped prisoners and refugees of all sorts left upon my mind a vivid impression of the complexity and the magnitude of the problem with which Europe is faced. The noble Marquess spoke of 30,000,000 displaced men and women. I believe that figure is below the mark. This is one of the greatest problems which has ever faced Europe—these 30,000,000 men and women torn from their homes, as the noble Marquess said, with their homes probably destroyed, themselves physically weak and often physically mutilated by the treatment to which they have been subjected, having lived for months and years terribly abnormal, inhuman lives, without hope, without even the hope of the prisoner who looks forward to the end of his sentence. They have lived the lives of slaves and of beasts of burden. It is not necessary to elaborate this terrible picture; the noble Marquess has said enough to show how immense is the problem which now confronts us.

When I come to the methods with which we are attempting to deal with it, I cannot help reaching the conclusion that they are totally inadequate. I make no criticism of the personnel who are engaged upon this work; for all I know they may be excellent, but what they are doing is upon a scale altogether inadequate for the magnitude of the problem. There is U.N.R.R.A., from what I can judge (and I speak without inside knowledge), either unable or unwilling to realize the urgency and the magnitude of these problems. There is also what is called the Inter-Departmental Government Committee, a Committee which I helped to set up when I was Home Secretary, an excellent Committee for the purposes of seven or eight years ago, with a personnel against whom I make no criticism, but without adequate directive from the top and without adequate means at its disposal.

I venture to impress upon the noble Viscount who is to reply that what is

needed is that the three great Allied Leaders should take cognizance of the urgency of this question, that they should announce a common policy, and that they should give a directive to the organizations concerned. As things are at present, I am doubtful whether any such directive has been given. Have the Allies a common policy? Have they a common policy upon the question already raised by the noble Marquess and by the noble Lord who preceded me, as to the categories of refugees that they are prepared to admit or whose admission they intend to refuse? I could give you a list of questions of that kind, but I shall not weary the House with them. What is urgently needed is a united Allied policy, stating clearly the obligations that the great Allies are ready to undertake and placing at the disposal of the various organizations sufficient material means for that policy to be carried out.

It may be that my own experiences in Spain were exceptional and not fully representative of all that has been happening. I can only say that time after time in Spain I felt the need of quick decisions and speedy action. I will give noble Lords two examples taken from my own experience. I was confronted with the arrival of these thousands of refugees. The Spanish Government were naturally somewhat hesitant as to whether they could receive them, and they wanted to know who was going to maintain them. They also wanted to know how long they were going to remain in Spain. From my own point of view it was necessary for me to attempt to sift the refugees into various categories. For instance, it was urgently necessary for us to do our utmost to sift out the German agents who were introduced into Spain under the guise of refugees, and of these German agents there were many. I had no staff at my disposal adequate for the separation of these thousands of men and women into the appropriate categories. On that account, I pressed the Government here that a camp should be set up in North Africa, which was then already in our occupation, where the sifting could be effectively done. I was convinced that if such a camp were once set up I could pass these men and women quickly through Spain and the necessary sifting could be done in North Africa with the staff which was at the disposal of the Allies. Everybody agreed to my pro-

posal; indeed, I think they thought it was a very good one; yet month after month—I think I am right in saying year after year—passed and that camp was not set up.

I can give another instance, an instance that bears upon the question just raised by Lord Strabolgi, the instance of the Jewish refugees who were to go to Palestine. A number of these Jewish refugees came through Spain. The usual associations sent out their representatives to investigate their cases, and in course of time a category was created of persons to whom permits were given to go to Palestine. So far as I know, there was no difference of opinion about these permits; the various authorities were all agreed. Yet for month after month we could never co-ordinate the arrival of these Jews at the ports, the arrival of ships at the ports to take them to Palestine, and the permits for their actual admission into Palestine. Here again, I make no criticism against any individuals: I quote the instance to show how necessary it is in all these matters, great and small, to have a directive at the top, and to have a directive that insists constantly upon the extreme urgency of these problems.

I have said this much on the material side, of the problem—the transport, the feeding, the re-settlement of these tragic people; but in my view the material side of the problem, immense as it is, is less complicated than the moral one. As I said just now, these men and women have, for year after year, been living in absolutely inhuman conditions. It does not need a psychologist to say what reactions this tragic period may have had upon them. There were many instances within my own knowledge. Many of these men and women were in an abnormal state, and I considered that it would take months and perhaps years of care and trouble before once again they could become normal citizens. Let me give your Lordships a single instance, the instance of a prisoner of war who escaped into Spain. He was a very gallant officer, with a magnificent military record, covered with every decoration for gallantry. He escaped, he passed through terrible adventures, he endured an incredible physical strain. He was of invaluable help to the other British prisoners of war who were with him. He arrived on the frontier, and the night

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of his arrival he wrote a letter to his wife saying that his whole life had been a failure, that he had committed the unforgivable sin of betraying his companions who had accompanied him out of Germany into Spain, and he was going to end his life. He killed himself that night. There was not a word of truth in any of those suspicions with which he had convinced himself: he was suffering from an illusion. There was a man of strong physical resistance, who had the courage to make his escape across Europe—the kind of man who of all others, one would have hoped, could have resisted such an illusion. If that can happen to such a man we can imagine the individual illusions and the mass illusions from which thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of these men and women on the Continent of Europe are suffering to-day, and will suffer, it may be for months and years to come.

LORD STRABOLGI: And the children, too.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: And the children, too. On that account I do press the Government not to ignore this side of the problem. And, side by side with an organization fitted to act quickly and upon a broad front, there should also be an organization (shall I call it of welfare?) for these sufferers, an organization that may have to be kept in being for months and years to come. I am sure, from the experiences that I have had from day to day in Spain, that unless we concentrate upon this side of the problem these millions of men and women, after this inhuman abnormal period, to put it at its lowest, will be a continual source of unrest to the future of Europe.

In conclusion, I look back to the years between the two wars and to the attempts that we made, some of us it may be unsuccessfully, to resettle the Continent. Looking back with the dispassionate eye almost of a historian, I come to the conclusion that the fundamental mistake that we made in those years was to think of our problem in political and territorial terms. We did not realize that Europe had been passing through one of the great upheavals in its history, an upheaval that left behind every kind of moral problem. I venture to say to this House, let us not repeat that mistake; let us realize that, great as may be the problem of

the material relief of these men, women and children, their moral welfare is perhaps more important. I hope I have said enough to show my deep sympathy with the objective of the noble Marquess. I hope I have said enough to show that I make these observations in no spirit of carping criticism. I realize the immense difficulties of the problem, but I feel that here we are dealing with one of the central problems of the future, and that it is essential, if we are going to confront it with any success, that the organization of the United Nations should be upon a much greater scale than it is at present, and should take into account the extreme urgency and difficulty of the questions with which we are faced.

4.20 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I find it extremely difficult to follow the noble Viscount, who has just made a speech, based on experience, which has aroused, I think, not only your Lordships' sincere sympathy but even emotion. I do want, however, very briefly to support the plea so eloquently put forward by the noble Marquess when moving the Motion which is on the Order Paper. Now the Motion divides certain persons on the Continent of Europe into two categories—displaced persons and Stateless persons. Both those categories have one thing in common: they will both require food, relief and clothes. But the first category, the displaced persons, do have one enormous advantage: they have a country to which to look forward, their home, while the Stateless persons have nothing. It is therefore the latter problem which, to my mind, is the most critical, and it is the one with which I should like very shortly to deal.

Of course, the numbers are quite different. It is clear that the displaced persons are far more numerous than the Stateless persons. Nevertheless, if we judge from what happened after the last war, the problem of Stateless persons can become very acute. It became very acute then because these persons were numerous and no provision of any kind had been made for the position in which they found themselves. Naturally, owing to this lack of provision, they had no passports, they were unable to travel and were in a state of great trouble and unhappiness. The matter was taken up, as the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, has reminded us, by Dr. Nansen, and by his untiring

efforts for a long time he did succeed in securing the issue to these Stateless persons of what were known as Nansen passports. And here I venture to differ from the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi: those passports really were very effective in the end because they were recognized by the vast majority of the countries who were members of the League of Nations—at that time I think there were something like fifty. It is perfectly true it was not very easy to travel with them. Why? Because the passport official is a most suspicious being. These passports were new and he took a long time examining them; he probably had the people out of the trains and put them through a grilling. Still, the passports were recognized and ultimately were of the greatest value to these poor people. By those passports they were entitled to travel and also to have the protection of the Nansen organization. Up to this point, however, there was great misery, and in my view it is very important that steps should be taken now to avoid the recurrence of a situation of that kind. We cannot obviously to-day estimate the numbers of those people who will become Stateless after the war, but they are not likely anyhow to be less than they were after the war of 1918.

Now one thing is quite certain: it cannot do any harm and I believe it will be of very great benefit if proper arrangements were now made to cope with this problem. It is in the years immediately after the cessation of hostilities that the problem becomes so difficult. After many years these people tend to settle down; sometimes they become naturalized in the different countries, the scope of the difficulty is less, and really automatically the problem solves itself. What you do want, however, is to allow these people to travel freely, so that they can ultimately find a country of their own where they and their family can settle. For that purpose passports are essential and the passports should be recognized. I therefore trust that the Governments—and I quite agree with what the previous speaker has said, that it is not only His Majesty's Government but the Governments of the United Nations—will give this problem of Stateless persons immediate consideration. I do not mind a bit whether the task is undertaken by U.N.R.R.A. or by the Inter-Governmental Refugees Committee—that is not the point. The point is that there shall be a central organization which

is dealing with it and which shall take the responsibility and have the authority to execute its decisions. Personally I think that as the mantle of Dr. Nansen has fallen on the High Commissioner for Refugees, he would be the proper person for the task, but I should not think of pressing that view, because the real question, as I say, is that there shall be a responsible body which shall act at once.

LORD STRABOLGI: You want a tiger.

THE EARL OF PERTH: Well, a wise tiger and a tactful tiger if you can get one, so much the better. I do hope, therefore, if I may say this final word, that His Majesty's Government will take the initiative, if necessary, in urging that this problem shall be put before the Council of the United Nations, and that their representative on whatever body they think fit will take a leading part in endeavouring to get the matter settled and to put a finish to this human misery.

4.28 p.m.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I think no one who listened to the moving and eloquent speech with which the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, introduced this debate, can have any doubt of the single-minded purpose which inspired him in putting down his Motion, or of his passionate desire to find some practical solution to what I would fully agree is one of the most tragic problems of these very tragic times. I think the debate has fully maintained the high level which the noble Marquess himself set. We must all welcome very warmly this debate, for two reasons. First of all, it calls attention to a vast problem which is too often overshadowed by immediate political or military developments but which will need to be handled, quite obviously, after those developments have passed over Europe; and secondly, it gives us an opportunity, I think, of explaining and putting into their right focus some aspects both of the problem itself and of the manner in which it is being tackled.

The Motion, as the noble Earl, Lord Perth, said in his speech, deals with two categories, displaced persons and Stateless persons; but he would be, I am sure, the first to agree that those two categories cannot, in fact, be divided into watertight compartments. Numbers of displaced persons are, of course, Stateless,

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and the vast proportion of Stateless persons have, in fact, been displaced by the war. The two categories dovetail into each other. The problem, as I see it, might perhaps be stated in this way. As a result of the war there are millions of Europeans (for the purpose of the Motion as I understand it we are dealing with Europe only) who have been forcibly deported from their countries or homes or who have fled to avoid a worse fate. The total figure has been mentioned in the debate this afternoon of 20,000,000 or 30,000,000. I do not know if that is a correct figure, but I think we can take it for certain that the total runs into many millions. Very large numbers of these unhappy people are still in enemy hands. Considerable numbers have been found in what is now liberated territory, and others have succeeded in reaching, or have been helped to reach, territory never occupied by the enemy at all. The ultimate problem as regards all these displaced persons—and it is only with them I am at present dealing—is this: Can they be repatriated to their countries of origin or returned to their homes? If they cannot, what is to be their future? Are they to stay where they are or are they to go elsewhere?

The features of the problem are well known to your Lordships, but before I go any further I might make two general observations. First of all, I would like to say a word about the Jews, which occupied the main part of the speech delivered to your Lordships by Lord Strabolgi this afternoon—a speech, if he will allow me to say so, rather more sweeping in its assertions than accurate. The noble Lord asked certain questions and I am very glad to give him the answers, so far as I am in a position to do so. He stated as a fact, or at least so I understood him, that the quotas for Palestine were now completely exhausted; and he built the whole of a very powerful argument upon that fact. But in fact the quotas are not exhausted. I am very glad to be able to relieve his mind on that point. This is the position. In September last the Jewish Agency asked His Majesty's Government that 10,300 places should be made available for migration to Palestine. That request, as the noble Lord knows, was granted in full, but a necessary limit was placed of 1,500 immigrants a month. This was done for purely practical reasons—the housing

situation in Palestine and the possibility of serious difficulties in the economic sphere if the immigrants came in too rapidly. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said to-day that there was no housing shortage in Palestine. I really think he must have been misinformed. In fact, there is a perfectly appalling housing shortage in Palestine.

LORD STRABOLGI: I did not say that. I am sure the noble Viscount does not want to misrepresent me. I said that arrangements have been made to accommodate these people by putting them in camps and that sort of thing for the time being.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The noble Lord said, as I understood, that there was no housing problem.

LORD STRABOLGI: No difficulty about accommodating these people.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: There is in fact an extremely severe housing shortage, and in addition the economic position of Palestine does not allow at present of a very rapid accumulation of immigrants. No doubt, they can be brought in gradually but there must be a limitation in the number that can be absorbed at any one time. As a result of the decision which was reached last October and the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Jewish Agency, there are numbers of immigrants who are at present going in there at the present time. I quite agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, that the situation which will arise after next May is one that clearly requires the most careful consideration, which is being given to it. But I am not, I am afraid, as your Lordships will understand, in a position to make any announcement about that to-day. I recognize, as Lord Strabolgi does, that there are very large numbers of Jews from Rumania and Bulgaria in addition to other categories to which he referred this afternoon, who want to go to Palestine. But of course the question as to which particular Jews go to Palestine and where they are to come from is a matter not for His Majesty's Government but for the Jewish Agency itself, to whom the power of selection, as the House knows, has been entrusted. No doubt they will choose those Jews whom they think would be of greatest benefit to Palestine or whose danger in Europe is the most acute.

I seemed to detect at one moment in the noble Lord's speech an attempt to extend the discussion into a debate on the future policy of His Majesty's Government towards Palestine. I hope he will forgive me, if that was not his intention. In any case, I think it is clear that this is not the proper time for that. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the problem which we are discussing to-day, the refugee problem, is not solely or even mainly concerned with the Jews. It is a much more general problem than that. Naturally, no one would deny that the miseries of this war and of the years leading up to it have borne more hardly upon people of the Jewish race than upon others, but it would be wrong to think we can deal with Jews as a quite distinct body of persons from their fellow citizens who have been deported or displaced. It would be untrue and it would also, I think, be wrong.

Secondly, my Lords, I was very glad to hear what Lord Reading said this afternoon as to the necessity for international control of the movement of displaced persons, whether in the direction of repatriation or in the way of resettlement. I am quite certain he is right that the international method on this question is the only really effective method. The problem and the numbers involved are so great that they must be handled in an orderly manner and, where at all possible, in groups, or we shall merely get chaos. It follows logically that this is a matter to be handled internationally and on a comprehensive basis rather than by a series of *ad hoc* measures or agreements. It may be argued that the problem is pressing and that international machinery is in its nature too slow and ponderous. I think that was rather the view of Lord Reading himself this afternoon; but against that the complications which are likely to follow attempts to deal with the matter unilaterally or even bilaterally—except in rare cases where the problem is clearly defined and of limited scope—are obvious. The situation to which the noble Marquess has called attention is therefore that there are at present in liberated territories very large numbers of displaced persons—I will deal with the Stateless problem later—and the noble Marquess asked what is being done or what is going to be done for these unhappy people. He enumerated the following agencies as being intimately

concerned. First, the military authorities; then U.N.R.R.A.; and thirdly the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, in the case of non-repatriables. He also I think drew attention to the question of agreements which have been or may be concluded between the Governments concerned.

I would like, if I may, to answer him briefly on all these points. As your Lordships are aware, the military authorities are of course under present arrangements in complete control in forward operational zones and in the so-called military period before territory is handed back to the civil government. I dealt with that in the debate on the war situation last week. This, as I said last week, may be of longer or shorter duration according to the particular circumstances of the country concerned. It is open to the military authorities to employ U.N.R.R.A. to handle under their control displaced persons, provided that the Governments concerned agree to U.N.R.R.A. being employed to handle their nationals as well as displaced persons who have become Stateless. I got the impression from the noble Marquess's speech that he rather resented U.N.R.R.A. being dependent upon an invitation from the country concerned, but surely it would be impossible to impose an international organization of this kind upon any country. If a country is ready to receive it, the organization should be available; but I do not think it would be possible to impose an international organization upon a sovereign State.

THE MARQUESS OF READING: My point on that was that U.N.R.R.A. is itself the result of an agreement between a number of Governments, and one would expect that the Governments in agreeing to create U.N.R.R.A. would automatically be giving their consent to U.N.R.R.A. going in to function in the respective countries.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I quite agree. One might have expected it, but it has not worked out that way. In North-Western Europe, both in enemy territory and in forward operational zones in Allied territory, U.N.R.R.A. will thus be employed under the terms of an agreement signed by Governor Lehman and General Eisenhower on November 25 last. Once the United Nations' territory

[Viscount Cranborne.] has been liberated by the Allied Forces and has been handed back to the civil Government—that is the second stage—it rests under the terms of the U.N.R.R.A. Charter, with the Government concerned whether or not to invite U.N.R.R.A. in to handle the problem of displaced persons found within that territory. It is the Governments themselves who are primarily responsible. It is only if they invite U.N.R.R.A. that U.N.R.R.A. can come and assist. I am not altogether clear what the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, meant when he referred to “definitive agreements between Governments and U.N.R.R.A.” There are, so far as I know, no agreements dealing specifically with displaced persons. Possibly what he had in mind was that the French, Belgian, Luxemburg, Dutch, Norwegian, Czechoslovak, Polish and Greek Governments had expressed a wish to receive U.N.R.R.A. liaison missions. I do not know if it was those that he meant.

THE MARQUESS OF READING: I hesitate to interrupt again but the noble Viscount asks me what I was referring to. I was referring to a speech by the Director-General himself at Montreal where he said progress had been made towards a definition of the functions which the administration of U.N.R.R.A. had to perform in regard to displaced persons found in liberated countries, although no definitive agreements had as yet been reached. I took that to mean that it was expected agreements would be reached.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Agreements have not been reached, as far as I know. The missions to which I have referred would, of course, cover, among other things, displaced persons. There are already U.N.R.R.A. missions of this kind at Paris and Luxemburg and no doubt there will be others added at a later date.

The noble Marquess also asked about the Multilateral Agreement concerning the care and repatriation of displaced persons. The scope of this agreement briefly is that each contracting party, while retaining full control over displaced persons within its own territory, agrees to take certain steps designed to secure orderly repatriation and to admit missions from other United Nations, for the purpose of identifying and assisting their nationals, and from U.N.R.R.A., for the purpose of carrying out similar tasks in respect of displaced

persons with whom U.N.R.R.A. is authorized to deal. The noble Marquess seemed to have the impression that this agreement has entirely hung fire. Perhaps he did not intend that.

THE MARQUESS OF READING: I asked whether anybody had signed.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I will give him the facts. The agreement negotiated under U.N.R.R.A.'s auspices, has been accepted by Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Holland, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, and it is to be signed in London on behalf of those Governments on February 20. The noble Marquess also asked about individual agreement between Governments—not between Governments and U.N.R.R.A. but bilateral agreements between Governments—to deal with the repatriation of each other's displaced nationals found in the other's territory. There are at present five such bilateral agreements, one between France and Czechoslovakia, one between France and Luxemburg, one between France and Belgium, one between France and Holland and one between Belgium and Holland. These are a matter primarily for the Governments immediately concerned, but perhaps I may make one general observation. I would not suggest for one moment that bilateral agreements of this kind are intended to conflict or indeed do conflict with the Multilateral Agreement of which I have spoken. But the fact must be faced that to the extent that they clearly prefer direct two-way handling of the problem to a more comprehensive handling under U.N.R.R.A. auspices, they do weaken the intention underlying the Multilateral Agreement. It is, I think, at least arguable that what is gained by a direct and relatively rapid handling of a matter which two Governments can deal with on their own, is outweighed by the fact that attempts to deal with what is fundamentally an international problem on an international basis, are thereby weakened.

Let me now come back to the problem of the ultimate “repatriability” of displaced persons, since it is to this end that all U.N.R.R.A.'s activities with regard to the displaced persons must primarily be directed. It is, I think, generally recognized that when groups of displaced persons turn up in the course of military operations or afterwards, it will not be immediately possible to establish

What proportion of them will be repatriable. That is a practical point, as your Lordships will recognize. Repatriation depends on a number of factors. It depends, for instance, upon whether the Government of the country of which they are nationals, or where they had their place of settled residence, is prepared to receive them back. If not, of course U.N.R.R.A. has no power to compel them to go back. Again, conditions in the country of origin, the countries from which they originally came, may be so disturbed that it would be dangerous, or for other reasons impossible, for them to return. No doubt displaced persons will be encouraged or expected to return home as this becomes practicable and in a suitable order of priority, or unless there are very strong reasons to operate against this. During the intervening period, they will remain an U.N.R.R.A. responsibility and, as the Minister of State explained in another place on October 11, U.N.R.R.A. has already agreed at Atlantic City to assist in their maintenance for "a reasonable period even after it has been proved that they are not repatriable, until they can be moved to resettlement elsewhere."

The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, raised this point of "reasonable period" this afternoon. He asked what is a reasonable period and who is to determine it. He will remember that, at Atlantic City, the closest consultation was enjoined between U.N.R.R.A. and the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees within whose field the problem of resettlement is opposed to repatriation lies. The two bodies are, in fact, in the closest touch on this and other points, and I can assure the noble Marquess they will do all that is possible to see that satisfactory arrangements are made on this question. Perhaps it may also be convenient if I deal here with the point made by the noble Marquess with regard to the future of persons "of settled residence" before the war though not possessing the actual nationality of the country of residence. A very good case in point is that of Poles living in France, of whom there are a considerable number. This also was considered at the Atlantic City meeting of the U.N.R.R.A.'s Council and is dealt with in a provision of the Multilateral Agreement to which I have already referred. Under this provision the signatories of the agreement.

"while they can give no absolute or general guarantee to readmit all such persons into their territory, undertake to meet any requests they may receive for their readmission in a spirit of wide humanity."

Thus the principle to which the noble Marquess attaches importance is accepted. I think he asked what period would qualify for readmission to their own countries?

THE MARQUESS OF READING: What constitutes settled residence?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: There is no specific period. I have made inquiries and I understand that it is recognized that it must be for individual countries to decide for themselves what decision they may reach on this matter. I do not think it would be possible—I am only expressing a personal view—for any international body to compel nations to take back people who are not their nationals. One might ask them to take back their own nationals, but these are people who have never acquired the nationality of the country in which they have lived. It is impossible for any international body to compel nations to take them back. Nations will have to make whatever arrangements they think right with regard to this particular category. Until these people are repatriated they will presumably have to remain the responsibility of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees.

And now I would say a word about those people who, in the jargon which has grown up round this subject, are known as "non-repatriables." It is a terrible expression, but your Lordships will know what it means. It is clear from what I have said to-day that, in the best of circumstances, the number of non-repatriable displaced persons will be very considerable, running perhaps into hundreds of thousands. To them will doubtless have to be added a large proportion of those persons who, even before the war, had been obliged to leave their homes for reasons of race, religion, or political belief. Among these are to be found the bulk of those persons who have become Stateless—that category to which the noble Earl, Lord Perth, referred in his speech. In the last resort, non-repatriability ultimately implies resettlement, either in the country of temporary refuge or elsewhere, and the bulk of non-repatriable people (including those whom Allied

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Governments will be unwilling to allow to return to their countries on the ground of their war-time activities), will thus come within the field of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees.

That body, of which Lord Perth, I think, had very long experience at one time, and whose work in connection with refugees, allied to that of the League High Commissioner for Refugees, dates back to a considerable time before the war, has now considerably expanded its work under the wide authority given it as the result of the Bermuda Conference of 1943. It has already a representative in Paris, and the Belgian Government have, in principle, accepted the appointment of a representative in Brussels. It has also one in Italy attached to the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee of the Allied Control Commission, and one in the Middle East. The Inter-Governmental Committee has been very active in several directions. Besides keeping a close eye on the well-being of the large numbers of refugees who already came within its mandate before the war, it has been concerned with relief and rescue measure in connection with those still in enemy hands, and in investigating on the spot, in liberated countries, the situation with regard to persons of former German and Austrian nationality—at present Stateless—who are now found there, and of other groups who, if they cannot be repatriated or returned to their homes or absorbed where they are, will eventually need to be resettled. It is worth mentioning that the United Kingdom and United States Governments are jointly responsible for the financial implications of the Committee's operations, and that all its operational schemes are submitted to them for approval. I have already explained what is intended to be the eventual delimitation of work, in connection with displaced persons, as between U.N.R.R.A. and the Inter-Governmental Committee as recognized at Atlantic City.

There remain a few miscellaneous questions which have been raised in the debate, and which seem to me to require some answer. I think it was the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who asked whether U.N.R.R.A. has a sufficient staff to cope both with relief and repatriation, and whether the military authorities ought not to be left in charge as long as pos-

sible. The answer to the first of these two questions is that U.N.R.R.A. has, so far, been able to meet all such requests for personnel as have been made to it. If U.N.R.R.A. has not been more widely used, the first reason is the one which I gave a week ago; namely transport difficulties. A further reason is that some Allied Governments have preferred, and felt able, to handle the problem themselves. Under the S.H.A.E.F.-U.N.R.R.A. Agreement, to which I have referred, S.H.A.E.F. have asked U.N.R.R.A. to provide a large number of personnel to deal with Allied displaced persons in Germany, and U.N.R.R.A. has, for some time, been busy recruiting and training persons so far as man-power difficulties allow. But it is not, of course, easy, as your Lordships will realize, in existing circumstances, to find very large numbers of suitable men for this type of work, which requires special qualities of tact and judgment. I sometimes hear people talk as though it was only necessary to go out into the street to pick up a few men fitted to work for U.N.R.R.A. As a matter of fact, these are extremely difficult posts to occupy, and they call for great experience of a rather specialized kind.

This staff will, for the present—indeed for a long time to come, I should think—work with the military authorities who will continue to be responsible for supplies and transport. In fact, I would suggest that the question is not whether the military authorities or U.N.R.R.A. should handle the problem: the problem can only be dealt with effectively by the two authorities in combination. The experience gained by U.N.R.R.A., while working with the military, should enable U.N.R.R.A. later on to relieve the military of the burden, and the sooner this can be done, as I am sure your Lordships will agree, the better. In liberated territories, of course, where the civil Government is in control, and U.N.R.R.A. has not been invited in, the responsibility remains with the Government of the country concerned, and must do. This, I think, answers the point which the noble Marquess Lord Reading raised about the need for provision for housing and feeding for repatriates on arrival at their destination. Where Governments do not invite U.N.R.R.A. into their territories to operate, the responsibility must remain upon them. But where U.N.R.R.A. has

been asked to assist, it is, of course, clear that this would be one of their main functions.

I believe that both the noble Marquess and the Earl of Perth asked me a specific question about Stateless persons—namely, whether they have any sufficient documents, and, if not, will the Nansen system be applied? That is a question which it is extremely difficult for me to answer at the present moment with complete finality, and I hope that your Lordships will excuse me if I do not do so. But, broadly speaking, while some Stateless persons may not have sufficient documents, those who have enjoyed previous arrangements—for instance, those in the United Kingdom or other countries where international rules and standards of conduct apply—are provided with adequate documents. But this is clearly a serious problem, and I am glad to be able to tell the House that the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees are at the present time engaged in convening a committee of Government experts to study this particular problem of Stateless persons not covered by previous arrangements in regard to their documentation—who constitute the core of our problem.

In conclusion—and I am afraid I have kept the House for a very long time—I would say this. The whole problem of displaced persons, using the term in the widest possible sense, is on a scale which has never been seen before. It has arisen not only out of the war itself but from events in Germany and elsewhere leading up to the war, and even—as those of us who worked at Geneva know very well—from the aftermath of the last great war, and the revolutions and upheavals which resulted from it. It is no new problem. It is necessary to set in clear relief the two conceivable ways of tackling it. One is by grasping at immediate aspects which seem capable of settlement, but which in that event are bound to be dealt with as it were *ad hoc* and without overmuch regard to similar problems elsewhere. The other method is to deal with the problem as a whole, internationally, and methodically work out systems of priority and machinery. It is easy to understand the desire of the advocates of the first course (and they are quite numerous) to press on, and to sympathize with their impatience with the international approach, with all the

machinery involved, as being unnecessarily cumbrous and slow-moving; but to those (if there are any) in your Lordships' House who feel like this I would say a word of caution. There is a real danger that if they had their way we should get the worst of both worlds; we should have and waver between the two courses and lose the advantages of each.

I should like to be bold enough to express a personal view. I cannot pretend to be an expert on this most difficult and technical question, but I do know something of the background, because I spent many weeks working on various aspects of the refugee problem at Geneva in the years before the war. Frankly, I do not believe that this is one of those problems which can possibly be tackled on an *ad hoc* basis; it is far too big and the numbers involved are far too formidable. I will freely admit that the results achieved in the past by international action have not always been all that we might have hoped. I think that on the whole they have been disappointing, and I am afraid that has to a considerable extent been due to the fact that not all those nations who paid lip service to the principle of international action were in practice willing to give it a fair trial. Of course, unless nations are really prepared to live up to their professions, no scheme of any kind will succeed.

In my view, however, we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged by possible lack of complete success in the past. It would be, I think, very surprising if we had achieved success at the first effort. International action in this sphere, as, I am afraid, in many others, is a plant of very slow growth. Of course, as the noble Earl, Lord Perth, and the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said to-day, this is an urgent problem. His Majesty's Government recognize that as much as anyone in this House; but I do not think that any implied charge of dilatoriness—and this is the only part of Lord Reading's speech which could give any ground for complaint—is justified. On the contrary, there is an immense amount of devoted work going on at the present time. But it is no use raising false hopes that there is an easy way out of this problem; there really is not.

The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, asked why we did not have a common policy between the three main Allies.

[Viscount Cranborne.]

There is a common policy, agreed at Atlantic City, with regard to repatriation. There are not yet detailed plans with regard to resettlement. First of all, we do not know how many people will have to be resettled, and we do not know what will be the areas, by the time that this war comes to an end, which will be suitable for their resettlement. There will be countries of temporary refuge and countries of permanent refuge. In my view, the countries of temporary refuge will have to keep a large number of these refugees permanently; I do not believe that you can go on moving them about the world. But that is a matter to be thrashed out, and in the meantime these people will have to be looked after as best they can be by the International Committee.

We must recognize one hard fact. We cannot expect a rapid or complete solution of this problem. It would be futile to do so. I have seen myself far too much to have exaggerated hopes. However we tackle the refugee problem, it is going to be with us for many years to come. It is one of the evil legacies of the great world upheaval which has been going on since 1914. This is only one aspect of the formidable task of restoring order out of the present chaos which is likely to occupy the whole of our lives and most of the lives of our children. Everywhere—at Dumbarton Oaks, at Hot Springs, at Bretton Woods—we are tackling it on an international basis; and on that basis alone, I firmly believe, have we any chance of achieving success.

LORD STRABOLGI: May I have an answer to the question relating to Jewish orphan children, of which I gave notice?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I do not think that I can say more to the noble Lord than I have already said. I did make it clear to him that there was a certain number of certificates allowing people to come into Palestine, and those certificates are allocated by the Jewish Agency.

5.5 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, sometimes in listening to a Minister replying to a debate I reflect that whilst the War Office has a General Staff other Ministries appear to have a Generalization Staff; but to-day that reproach cannot be addressed to the noble Viscount. of

whose sympathy with any problem of human suffering we are all fully aware. He has answered the debate to-day with the courtesy and diligence which he always shows in answering a large number of specific questions flung at him. I am most grateful to him for the care which he has taken in his reply, and with the leave of the House I desire to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORDS DEBATES.

5.6 p.m.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name.

[The question was as follows:]

To ask His Majesty's Government, whether they will arrange that in future the debates in the House of Lords on matters of public interest shall have fair representation in the bulletins of the B.B.C.]

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I have been asked to reply for the Government to the noble Viscount's question. The responsibility for the broadcast reports of the proceedings of Parliament rests with the B.B.C. and not with His Majesty's Government, but I understand that my right honourable friend the Minister of Information not long ago called the attention of the Governors to the desire expressed by some Members of Parliament that there should be fuller Parliamentary reports.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, arising out of that answer, does that mean fuller reports of the House of Lords as well as of the House of Commons? The House of Lords is never mentioned in these Parliamentary reports at all. Last week there were two very important debates in your Lordships' House, one on the question of the dissemination of Empire information and the other on the regulation of advertisements, both subjects of great importance to people in this country, and there was absolutely no reference to them at all. I should like to ask the noble Earl, therefore, whether that general statement with regard to Parliamentary reports does cover the House of Lords as well as the House of Commons.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I think that the noble Viscount can take it that the expression "Parliamentary Reports" covers proceedings in both Houses of Parliament.

LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, arising out of this question, is the Leader of the House aware that for some weeks the B.B.C. news broadcasts have contained no mention of the House of Lords at all, or even of his own admirable speeches?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer for the B.B.C., which is an independent-minded body. We may not agree with their assessment of the importance of your Lordships' House, but we cannot do anything about it.

LORD STRABOLGI: While there are still two Chambers in this Parliament, why should one be ignored? Is my noble friend aware that the Government have a great deal of influence with the B.B.C., as we saw from the brief debates in another place?

LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I should like to ask the Leader of the House whether it has been pointed out to the Governors of the B.B.C. that there must be an interaction between Parliamentary proceedings and public opinion, and that public opinion cannot be informed in the absence of information, and that therefore the B.B.C., as an organ of publicity, in not reporting these debates is depriving the public of the possibility of forming its opinion upon matters of the first importance?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I have not the slightest doubt that the Governors of the B.B.C. will take notice of what has been said in your Lordships' House.

LORD STRABOLGI: Is my noble friend aware that the very important shipping debate initiated by my noble friend behind me (Lord Winster), when for the first time for two years we had a statement on Government shipping policy, was not referred to at all in the B.B.C. report of Parliament, though that was the only way in which sailors at sea could know about a matter affecting their own profession?

VISCOUNT ELIBANK: May I ask my noble friend, in view of the expressions of opinion that we have heard to-day in this House, whether he will bring such influence as he can to bear upon the Minister of Information or the B.B.C., or upon both, in order to remedy a situation which is creating a good deal of feeling among many noble Lords in this House?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I will certainly be very glad to report what has been said to-day to the Minister of Information, but, as I say, it is really a matter for the B.B.C., and I have no influence with the board of the B.B.C. whatever.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL.

Read 3^a (according to Order), and passed.

LAW REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE) BILL. [H.L.]

Read 3^a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD. [H.L.]

WALLASEY CORPORATION. [H.L.]
Committed (yesterday).

BUCKS WATER BOARD. [H.L.]

NORTH DEVON WATER BOARD. [H.L.]

PLYMPTON ST. MARY RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL. [H.L.]

REIGATE CORPORATION. [H.L.]

SOUTH SHIELDS CORPORATION. [H.L.]

METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD. [H.L.]

Committed (yesterday): The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

House adjourned at twelve minutes after five o'clock.

Telephone: 1

LA. GHAM 3090

DP 36
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION,
EUROPEAN REGIONAL OFFICE,

11, PORTLAND PLACE,

LONDON, W.1

Reference

Your Ref. 1 enclosure

16th December, 1944.

Dear Miss Livingstone,

Thank you for your letter of 9th November, 1944.

According to the Resolution 1, to para. 5c of the Report of the Committee IV, Sub-Committee 4, of the First Session of the Council of UNRRA, and to the Resolution 46 of the Second Session of the Council, UNRRA cannot function in a United Nations territory "without the concurrence and co-operation of the Governments concerned." (Para. 8 Committee IV, Sub-Committee 4.)

Since there is no request to UNRRA from the Soviet Government in this matter, UNRRA is unfortunately unable to render any assistance to the United Nations nationals displaced in the Soviet territories.

Please find enclosed copies of relevant resolutions.

Yours sincerely,

Miss L.M. Livingstone,
Hon. Secretary,
Deportees Welfare Committee,
21, Bloomsbury Street,
W.C. 1.

1 enclosure

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RESOLUTIONS ON POLICY OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

PART I

GENERAL POLICIES

Resolution No. 1

A Resolution Relating to the Scope of the Activities of the
Administration

(Reception No. 299)

RESOLVED

That the following shall be the broad policies of the Administration with respect to the scope of its activities:

1. Areas in Which the Administration Will Operate

The exact geographical areas in which the Administration will operate and the kind of operations it will undertake in each case must be determined by the Director General (in the light of policies laid down from time to time by the Council) only after consultation with, and with the consent of, the government or authority (military or civil) which exercises administrative authority in the area. The Administration's activities in seeking to achieve the objectives referred to in the preamble of the Agreement setting it up will be governed as follows:

1. In the case of a liberated area in which a government or recognized national authority does not yet exercise administrative authority, the Administration will operate from such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the military command and the Administration, and subject to such control as the military command may find necessary. The administration shall, so far as circumstances permit, seek the advice of the government or recognized national authority concerned.
2. In the case of a liberated area in which a government or recognized national authority exercises administrative authority, the Administration will operate only after consultation with, and with the consent of, the government or recognized national authority concerned regarding the form of activities to be undertaken by the Administration within the whole or part of such area.
3. If it appears necessary for the Administration to operate in an

enemy or ex-enemy area in carrying out the purposes of the Agreement, it will do so only from such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the military command, the established control authority or duly recognized administration of the area on the one hand and the Administration on the other, and subject to such control as the military command or the established control authority may find necessary; provided that the Council approve the scale and nature of the operations it is proposed to undertake and the standard of provision, and that all expenses connected with such possible operations in an enemy or ex-enemy area should be carried by the enemy or ex-enemy country concerned. The Director General will consult with the military command or established control authorities having control of enemy or ex-enemy areas with a view to securing information as to any surpluses of supplies from time to time available in such enemy or ex-enemy areas from which relief and rehabilitation import requirements of liberated areas might be met.

Nothing in the above should be taken as preventing the Administration from carrying on activities in other areas in order to perform the tasks laid upon it in the Agreement, provided that the government or authority (military or civil) exercising administrative authority in the area concerned agrees.

COMMITTEE IV - SUBCOMMITTEE 4

5. Bearing these various considerations in mind, and subject to what is said in paragraph 8 regarding the concurrence of the Governments concerned, the Subcommittee has reached the conclusion

(c) that UNRRA should also assist in the repatriation of those nationals of the United Nations in other countries who are exiles as a result of the war, and whose return to their homes in liberated territory is regarded as a matter of urgency:

8. As regards "agreement with the appropriate governments", the Subcommittee understands that the governments concerned may include the government or governing authority (other than an enemy or ex-enemy government of governing authority) of the country in which the persons to be repatriated are temporarily resident, of any country through which they may have to pass, of the country in which they were formerly residents, and of the country of which they are nationals. The Subcommittee assumes that UNRRA in the course of seeking to reach agreement with these various governments will keep the other governments concerned fully informed of the progress of the negotiations. The Subcommittee, recognizing that UNRRA cannot render assistance to any of the categories of persons referred to above without the concurrence and cooperation of the governments concerned, which it will be the duty of UNRRA to secure, expresses the hope that all the governments concerned will deal with any requests which they may receive from UNRRA in this connection in a spirit of wide humanity even if the request refers to persons who are not their nationals. The Subcommittee's further recommendations on this point and on the question of cooperation with the military authorities are contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 17, 20 and 23 below.

To: Mr. Scott
Dr. Langrod
From: A.M. Newbold

Reference

DISPLACED PERSONS ORGANISED MOVEMENT

Please find enclosed, copy of Memorandum of Meeting held at Norfolk House, on 8th December. I give my remarks below and have notified various amendments to A.C.C.

DOCUMENTARY DATA

1. Copy of minutes enclosed (Meeting with SHAEF, July, 1944)
2. Col (Charley) said he had made a mistake about "another" Meeting. It was some one as in (1) above
3. SHAEF "Eclipse" Memo No. 14, marked "Secret" - "Top Level" was to be supplied to me but the A.C.C. now say they are not authorised to pass on copy. I have seen the document which is not of great interest to my Section.
4. Extract enclosed re. traffic priorities.
5. Marginal note to be added "an over-all speed of 30 Klm. p.h."

BAGGAGE

In regard to Allied Liaison Officers being responsible for assisting in the disposal and custodianship of all D.P. property, it was stated at the Meeting that this was a proposal from the French Government. Administrative Memorandum No. 39, however, covers the point and makes all Allied Liaison Officers responsible (Page 9 j. 6.)

MEDICAL SERVICE ON TRAINS

The quota of one Ambulance Train per million D.Ps. should be mentioned as a suggestion. The point has not yet been submitted to National Governments.

In regard to disinfection of rolling stock at end of journeys, I stated washing out with solution of lysol and spraying with solution of hypochloride would be necessary.

UNRRA MOVEMENTS OFFICERS

The text has been modified to read:

"... UNRRA will probably have Movement Officers, etc."

A.M. Newbold

13th December, 1944.

At Meeting today with Control Commission, the above amendments were duly noted.

It was decided not to proceed with any further meetings with Col. Buchanan (Movements) until further news was obtained from SHAEF re planning after my arrival there

A.M. Newbold.

20/12/44

ORGANIZED MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Minutes of Meeting at Norfolk House

on

6th December 1944

Present: Col. F.D.G. BUCHANAN, Chairman Movement and Tn. Sub-Branch, OC(IE).
 Lt. Col. I.W. CHARLEY, Displaced Persons Branch, OC(IE).
 Lt. Col. B.W.J. NEVELET, Movement and Tn. Sub-Branch, OC(IE).
 Mr. A. W. NEWBOLD, U.N.R.R.A.
 Major G.J. CHANTREY, Displaced Persons Branch, OC(IE).

GENERAL POSITION

Col. BUCHANAN stated that SHANF Movement and Transportation Branch were preparing a general appreciation and plan in conjunction with UNRRA representatives. Any planning done by The Commission/Council would be only for the post-SHANF period. Lt. Col. CHARLEY said that in accordance with SHANF Memo. 104, SHANF would submit to the Commission/Council any plans for repatriation that were being made, and Commission/Council would then consider them with a view to the long term policy. He agreed to investigate the position at SHANF during his approaching visit, and report position. Col. BUCHANAN said that by the time the Commission takes over SHANF will already be at grips with the problem - and we shall simply continue where they leave off. Mr. NEWBOLD thought little rail transport would be available during the early period and Lt. Col. NEVELET was of the opinion that a high percentage of DEs would take to the roads.

AIR TRANSPORT

Lt. Col. CHARLEY stated that he had instituted an enquiry as to the possibility of Air Transport for special categories among the DEs. The French and other National authorities were very short of trained and reliable bureaucrats of whom there were many among the DEs, and it might be a means of getting key men home quickly. Col. BUCHANAN thought Air Transport was a possibility though not at all probable.

DOCUMENTARY DATA

Col. BUCHANAN listed all the existing relative documents of which he was aware, as follows:-

1. Minutes of a meeting held at SHANF in July - presided over by Major-General RAPIER. He would let Mr. NEWBOLD have copies of these minutes.
2. Lt. Col. CHARLEY said he had also attended another meeting at SHANF about the same time and would endeavour to procure copies of the minutes.
3. Lt. Col. CHARLEY agreed to let Col. BUCHANAN have a copy of SHANF Eclipse Memo. No. 14.
4. Col. BUCHANAN said he would provide an extract from the latest US draft directive No. 7 "Control of Inland Transport" suggesting certain general movement priorities.
5. SHANF Admin. Memo. No. 39 was in possession of all present.

TRAIN LOADING CAPACITY

Mr. NEWBOLD stated that he envisaged an average train of passenger stock carrying 850 DEs and running at 30 kilometres per hour. Stops for hot meals would be at 8 hour intervals. These would be in sidings or marshalling yards outside main stations.

Col. BUCHANAN said that SHANF was apparently calculating on an average train

/load.....

load of 800 DPs (converts or passenger stock).

If converts were used, it was agreed that there would have to be a halt every 4 hours, for sanitary reasons.

BAGGAGE

Lt. Col. CHARLEY stated that it was advisable to let DPs take as much baggage with them as the available transport would permit.

Col. BUCHANAN suggested that baggage accompanying DPs should be limited to what the individual could personally carry. Lt. Col. AMTHURST pointed out that the more baggage taken on the train the less people could travel. Mr. NEWBOLD stated that while extra baggage could be forwarded at a later date to Reception Centres a lot of it would probably get lost before it reached its owners. Lt. Col. CHARLEY said that Allied Liaison Officers were responsible for assisting in the disposal and custodianship of all DP property, which included luggage that could not be taken with them. Mr. NEWBOLD said that the Polish Government would encourage their DPs to take everything possible with them in order to assist in the rehabilitation of that country.

RECEPTION CENTRES

Mr. NEWBOLD stated that UNRRA have come to a tentative agreement with all the National authorities except the Russians on the question of the location of Reception Centres. Except in the case of Poland all these Reception Centres were near the frontiers. The Polish locations would present serious difficulties.

MEDICAL SERVICE ON TRAINS.

Mr. NEWBOLD asked Col. BUCHANAN whether it was preferable to run complete Ambulance trains or attach Ambulance coaches to ordinary repatriation trains. Col. BUCHANAN thought the former alternative preferable. Mr. NEWBOLD said that if Ambulance trains were used they would need one per million DPs. UNRRA were providing medical personnel and facilities at all principal halts, and certain National authorities would be prepared to provide additional Medical staff.

It was agreed that all rolling stock used by DPs would have to be disinfected at the end of each journey. Special cleaning squads would have to be used for this purpose. This rolling stock (if converts were used) might have to be used to carry food on the return journey.

CONTROL OF ROLLING STOCK

Col. BUCHANAN stated that no agreement had yet been reached for controlling rolling stock outside Germany. This would probably ultimately be a responsibility of E.I.F.O. but it had not yet been decided whether this body was to function in an executive or purely advisory capacity. It was possible that DPs would have to change trains at certain frontiers.

ROAD TRANSPORT

Lt. Col. CHARLEY thought that there might be considerable amounts of German ex-military M.T. available for repatriation purposes. Lt. Col. AMTHURST stated that much of this had been looted from the occupied countries and they would doubtless lay claim to it. Lt. Col. CHARLEY suggested that such claims might be met once the DPs of the country concerned had been repatriated. Col. BUCHANAN agreed to institute inquiries on this subject.

SHARING OF UNRRA RESPONSIBILITY.

Mr. NEWBOLD stated that UNRRA was interested in the DP problem in the whole of Germany, not merely in the British Zone, though no agreement had yet been arrived at with the Russians. UNRRA was already sending a mission to Poland.

PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED AS REGARDS U.S. GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL.

As regards the U.S. Group Control Council, Col. BUCHANAN thought that the best procedure was for discussions to be carried out between the Control Commission and UNRRA first of all, and then for these discussions to continue with US Group

/Control.....

Control Council. Mr. NEWBOLD stated that UNRRA had not yet opened discussions with US Group Council.

U.N.R.R.A. MOVEMENT OFFICERS.

Lt. Col. ASHLEY asked about the respective functions of the Movement Officers and Transport Officers appointed by U.N.R.R.A. Mr. NEWBOLD said that U.N.R.R.A. would have Movement Officers at Corps/District and Convoy Officers at lower levels. Col. BUCHANAN asked if these Officers could be called "UNRRA Movement Officers" and "UNRRA Convoy Officers" to avoid confusion. Mr. NEWBOLD agreed.

It was agreed that the date of the next meeting should be left to Lt. Col. ASHLEY to fix after he returns from SHARF.

E. E. Cranham

MAJOR,

DISPLACED PERSONS BRANCH.

CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY. (D.E.).

12 Dec 44.

XXXXXXXXXXXX
MUSEum 6898 Ext: 107

AMV/RK

LFD/MOV & TN/1824

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
170a, Great Portland Street,

13th December, 1944.

Dear Colonel Buchanan,

I am obliged for your letter of the 9th instant and for the
enclosures which accompanied same.

Yours sincerely,

Ann Newbold

Colonel Buchanan,
Control Commission for Germany,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square,
S.W. 1.

SECRET

WHITEHALL 4477 Ext. 257

LED/MOV & TN/1824

Land Forces Division,
Control Commission for Germany,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square,
LONDON, S.W.1.

9th December, 1944.

Dear *Newbold,*

I enclose copies of the following papers as arranged at meeting in this HQ on 8th December:-

- (i) Minutes of Meeting on the Movement Problem of Displaced Persons in North West Europe, held 1500 hrs 18 Jul 44.
- (ii) Present ideas (still in draft) of possible movement priorities, showing where the movement of displaced persons may come (Appendix 'A' to this letter).

Yours

Sincerely

P. S. A. A. A.

- Newbold, Esq.,
UNNRA,
Room 314,
170A, Great Portland St.,
LONDON.

Copy to: Lt.Col. Charley, Displaced Persons Branch
(less Minutes referred to above).

Appendix 'A' to LFD/MOV & TN/1824
dated 9 Dec 44

Possible Priorities of Movement

Priorities will be established for the movement of passengers and freight. Following order to be taken as a general guide:-

- (a) Allied Military occupation requirements.
- (b) Movement of PW and internees of any of the United Nations and associated states.
- (c) Requirements for civil relief of Allied and liberated countries.
- (d) Movement of displaced persons.
- (e) Disposition of German armed forces.
- (f) Minimum requirements for German economy.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-4 Division - Mov & Tn Branch

21 July 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Meeting on the Movement Problem of Displaced Persons in North West EUROPE. G-4 Conference Room, D-10, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, at 1500 hours, 18 July 1944.

PRESENT:

Major General C. S. NAPIER	DACOS, G-4 Div, Mov & Tn Br., SUPREME HEAD- QUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (IN THE CHAIR)	
Major General A. W. GULLION	Displaced Persons Br,	SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
Brig E. H. LYSAGHT-GRIFFIN	G-5	ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY
Col A. H. MOFFITT, JR.	"	FORCE
Lt-Col J. S. WATSON		
Maj L. W. CRAMER		
Brig B. M. CLARKE	Economics Branch,	"
Lt-Col A. L. ALLPRESS	G-5	
Maj G. H. GRAHAM		
Brig L. FIELD	Supply, G-5	"
Lt-Col M. R. L. ROBINSON	Mov & Tn Branch	"
Capt MILTON GORDON	G-4	
Lt-Col G. A. EDEN	Log Plans Branch	"
	G-4	
Maj E. W. CAMP	Post Hostilities Planning, G-3	"
Lt-Col C. Z. CASE	Office Chief of Transportation	EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY
Col P. D. G. BUCHANAN	Control Commission Military Section (Mov & Tn)	
Sir HUBERT YOUNG		UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
Dr. W. L. LANGROD		
Professor HONDELINK		TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE INLAND TRANSPORT
Mr. D. F. ALLEN	Ministry of War Transport, Liaison	SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

GENERAL AND PLANNING POLICY

1. After brief introductory remarks during which he drew attention to the SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE PAPER, "Refugees and Displaced Persons", 4 June, as the present brief for military planning, the Chairman proceeded to the Agenda first raising the question as to the latest position of UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION vis-a-vis the military, in relation to the Displaced Persons problem.

2. Major General GULLION replied to the effect that permission had been given by SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE for two UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION officials (Sir HUBERT YOUNG and Mr. ROBERT SCHLEE) to be stationed with G-5 plus ten experts of BRITISH and US nationality attached to various G-5 country units to assist in planning at that level. He added that Displaced Persons representatives would be attached at all appropriate military levels and also brought out that no authority exists at present for the employment of UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION beyond the planning stages. It had not yet been decided how soon after the surrender period UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION would step in but that as long as the Military Period existed in GERMANY, UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION would serve as ancillary to the Army. Sir HUBERT YOUNG confirmed that this was his understanding of the position as it stood today and said that he understood that it was possible that at some stage the Army might ask UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION to take over even during the period of military control; hence the desirability of planning together. All the Allied Powers concerned except UNITED STATES OF SOVIET RUSSIA had indicated that UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION will be required to assist in the Displaced Persons problem.

3. The Chairman said that when the Army feels that it can withdraw from the Displaced Persons picture, the DPX will be relieved by an international body.

4. Major General GULLION said that it was not contemplated that UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION should be responsible for arranging transportation. Either the Army or whoever takes over control of transportation from the Army would assume this responsibility.

CONTROL OF MOVEMENT AND PRIORITIES.

5. The Chairman asked who was to tell the Army the movement requirements, i.e. numbers to move priorities and routes ("from where to where"). Major General GULLION replied that studies and plans including the question of priorities had been made. National authorities have expressed a strong desire to be consulted as to national priorities, i.e. types of repatriates to receive first attention. It is hoped, however, that there will be no undue political pressure for precipitate movement. The question of priorities of movement between countries would have to be decided on an international basis at the highest level.

6. The Chairman referred to para 53 a(1) of the SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE paper of 4 June (AG 383.7-1GE-AGM) where military commanders are charged with the initiation of demands for transportation. He said that while agreeing the need for decentralization so far as possible, it would be necessary to view the problem as a whole and he expressed the opinion that the more delicate the transportation situation became, the greater the need for centralization of control.

SPEED OF REPATRIATION.

7. The Chairman's next question was how quickly after surrender could the problem of Displaced Persons repatriation be expected to develop. Major General GULLION said that it depended on the location of the Allied armies at the time of surrender but that allowing for registration of Displaced Persons and visas the period would vary from one month to four. This estimate contemplates the deferring of Displaced Persons to Prisoners of War. He expressed grave doubts as to the efficacy of any standfast orders. Dr. LANGROD said that in his opinion there was no possibility of even eighty per cent standfast being accomplished but he envisaged the use of flying squads of varied nationals whose duty would be primarily to direct the Displaced Persons into assembly centers for orderly repatriation. He added that UNITED NATIONS RELIEF & REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION had made a detailed study of the problem and that the latest views on the emergency machinery required were contained in a paper which had been communicated to the Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 and a copy of which he gave to the Chairman. Of 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 Displaced Persons in GERMANY, 2,500,000 are expected to trek. The Chairman asked whether G-5 Planning allowed for "seepage" to which Major General GULLION replied that the plans already made would not break down if such seepage should, in fact, occur. The Chairman commented that in his judgment some "seepage"

might be a good thing in that it would relieve the pressure and permit the more restless elements who might be expected otherwise to cause trouble, to return to their homes.

SUPPLY

8. Brigadier FIELD suggested that supply problems will become very complicated under the conditions envisaged by Dr. LANGROD and in order to carry out the function of supply properly it will be necessary to know where the Displaced Persons were located and the numbers involved. The first movement requirement would, assuming collapse, be long distance supply but every effort would be made to use local resources as soon as possible. In reply to Lt-Col ALLPRESS, Brigadier FIELD said that supplies would initially have to come from stockpiles in the UNITED KINGDOM until such time as the resources of North West EUROPE could be distributed to the best advantage.

MOVEMENT CONTROL IN GERMANY

9. The Chairman outlined the form of movement control envisaged by the Army within GERMANY, i.e. US/BRITISH officers to be "fastened on" to military and civil transportation authorities. He considered that it would not be before the second month after surrender at the earliest that a movement control organization on a tripartite basis could be effective. He thought it important that all GERMAN transportation agencies should receive all movement demands through a single movement control organization but felt that it was important that those concerned with the Displaced Person problem should not have academic ideas as to the degree of movement control which was possible. He also considered it desirable that a comprehensive high-level plan should be evolved for the deliberate repatriation which will take place after the military phase.

EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION

10. The Chairman asked Professor HONDELINK whether in view of the proposed set up of EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION in the near future the work of the TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE INLAND TRANSPORT during the past year coincided with the views that had been expressed during the meeting concerning the probable reorganization of the European Transport System. Professor HONDELINK replied that the TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE INLAND TRANSPORT had worked very closely on the lines that had been discussed and he foresaw no difficulty in fulfilling the role that was likely to be required. In answer to a further question from the Chairman, he replied that the TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE INLAND TRANSPORT had made a detailed study of the Displaced Persons problem.

MOVEMENT BY SEA

11. Lt-Col WATSON asked whether in the event of extremely bad internal conditions necessitating assembly of Displaced Persons in coastal areas shipping would be available for their movement and supply by sea. The Chairman replied that freight vessels would probably be available for supply but that personnel shipping was much more difficult as the whole question was tied up with the large scale problem of possible movement to the FAR EAST. Apropos the use of captured enemy shipping for movement of Displaced Persons, Mr. ALIEN mentioned that the question of using such captured shipping for the FAR EAST was under consideration.

MOVEMENT BY RAIL

12. It was agreed that covered goods wagons should be used if necessary for the transportation of Displaced Persons especially in the case of short hauls on the basis of thirty persons in each "8 horse/40 men" wagon. It was considered undesirable to segregate sexes; it was better to keep families together.

CONCLUSIONS

13. The Chairman emphasised the importance of close cooperation between G-4 and G-5 in which Major General GULLION fully concurred. He asked who would be the officer with whom his staff should consult in Mov and Tn. The Chairman replied, Lieutenant Colonel ROBINSON.

14. The Chairman then asked the meeting if there was general agreement

/on the points

on the points which had been discussed at the meeting and there was general assent.

(Sgd) MILTON GORDON, Secretary,
Captain, GSC,
G-4 Division, Mov & Tn Branch,
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

To Dr Langrod

From A.M. Newbold.

DISPLACED PERSONS - ORGANISED MOVEMENT

I had an interview to-day with Mr Fisher, Deputy Director, Transportation, Control Commission Council (British).

This is an extremely large and important Department of the Foreign Office and occupies the whole of Norfolk House, St James' Square.

They will control all German Administrations in the British Zone and will appoint, either as civilians or Military - in latter case with rank of Brigadier - Directors of Transportation.

Railways
Roads
Ports
Water Ways

with Deputies at lower levels.

The Control Commission Council would represent the German Railways in the British Zone in any international transport arrangement coming under D.I.T.O. if the latter materialises.

The Group Control Council (U.S.A.) will function in the same manner as the British Organisation.

The agreement of U.S.S.R. has also been obtained in regard to similar representation at Headquarter level - Berlin.

The three bodies will control all movements in Germany and will receive applications for transport at various levels according to the importance of the movements which will be merged into a complete transport programme covering passenger and freight traffic.

It was stated that the Military Transportation Service will take complete charge of all movements from the time that the Displaced Persons leave the Assembly Centres.

I am attempting to obtain a copy of Administrative Memorandum No. 39 issued by S.H.A.E.F. (Paris). This document may be forthcoming to-morrow.

The Control Commission Council appear to have little knowledge of U.N.R.R.A. after the Military period.

The next Meeting will be held at Norfolk House at 2-30 p.m. Monday 4th December with Mr Fisher, Colonel Buchanan (Movements) and Lt. Col. Charley (Transportation).

Control Council postponed
to postpone Mtg - to hold
on Monday or Tuesday AM.
Agreed 10.30 am Tuesday 5/21/44.

AMN

M² A.M.N. Newbould

Repatriation

~~Welfare~~ Sec

D.P. Division

Your note attached -

A/- Para marked A/- is what
you are going out to join
at SITAEF.

B/- Para marked B/- is already
in hand, but such officers
are not easy to obtain just
now.

Erhygyn Giliw
Brigadier
D.P. Division

12/12/44.

N.
[Signature]

437
Deliberate Decision

To: Mr. Scott
Dr. Langford
From: A.M.N. Newbold

Reference.....

Inter-Allied Control Commission (British Element). Organised
Movement

I had a meeting yesterday with the above and it is pleasing to know our planning coincides on general lines with the ideas of the I.C.C.

The gave me the impression of being very eager to collaborate closely with us.

Colonel Buchanan stated he had just seen Lieut.-Colonel Robinson, SHAEF Movements, who had informed him SHAEF had ~~just~~ started a D.P. Movement Planning Programme with a delegation of UNRRA.

A | Have you any knowledge of this, please? Nothing is known in this Section.

Lieut.-Colonel Charley is proceeding to SHAEF today and has promised to probe the matter and to have another meeting with me immediately he returns. He has tentatively proposed Friday next for the meeting.

You will be interested to know I.C.C. has borrowed a fair amount of our planning data of which they are having copies made. The original documents will be returned after use.

B | Colonel Buchanan made special request that any Movement Officers appointed by the Administration shall be designated in future as UNRRA Movement Officers to avoid confusion with Movement Officers of other organisations.

A.M. Newbold

9th December, 1944.

To: Dr Langford
From: Am Newbold

Enclosed memo from M: Scott
together with my report of
developments re contact with
SHAFF organisation (London)
for Organised Movement of
D.P.

Am Newbold

28/xi/44

Friday 24/XI/44 SHAEF called

Saturday: 25/XI/44 SHAEF 'thanked' to say we
could make contact with:
(British) Control Commission Council
• subsequently with
(American) Control Council
(London)

Monday 27/XI/44 SHAEF 'thanked' re 15 page
document

"Administrative Memorandum
No 39" dated 18/XI/44.

2 pages on UNRRA Transport
activities.

Sir Herbert Young. SULZBERGER.

Control Commission to study
above document before our
meeting.

SHAEF(London) obtaining authority
SHAEF(Ruin) for copy to be
sent me.

1

Friday 24/xi/44. Lt. Col Allpress, SHAEF (Rear) called, having heard from M. of W.T. of our activities in regard to D.P. Organized Transport. Said there was an Organisation in London dealing with question. promised to 'phone SHAEF (Paris) for authority for me to submit my planning and collaborate closely with London Organisation.

Saturday 25/xi/44 SHAEF (Rear) 'phoned to say authority granted by SHAEF (Paris). We should hear from:

Control Commission Council (British)
re appointment and, after preliminary discussion, should have further talks with:

Group Control Council (U.S.A.)

Monday 27/xi/44. SHAEF (Rear) 'phoned had received 15 page document "Administrative Memorandum N°39" dated 18/xi/44 issued by SHAEF (Paris) in which mention was made of UNRRA, adding that the Control Commission Council (British) would receive copy of document which they should study before contacting me for appointment. UNRRA is not on Distribution list. He was 'phoning SHAEF (Paris) for authority to hand me copy.

Tuesday 28/xi/44 M: SULZBERGEN introduced Major Snell of Group Control Council (U.S.A.) who words with U.S. Colonel Brisbane.

Col. Brisbane had received copy of Administration
Memorandum No 39 which contains only
generalities concerning U.N.R.R.A. Major Snell
would await invitation from Control Commission
Council (British) to attend joint meeting.

M^r SULZBERGEN had no definite information
as SHAEF plans concerning Organised Transport
of Displaced Persons.

Meeting with Control Commission Council (British)
has been arranged for 2.30pm. tomorrow 29/XI/44

Am. Newbold (314)

28/XI/44

DP/IN/N 170a Great Portland St

25th November, 1944.

Dear Sir,

I have recently been in communication with Lt. Col. Allpress, who has been good enough to suggest that we should meet in order to discuss problems concerning the eventual repatriation of United Nations' Displaced Persons from Germany.

I shall be glad if you will kindly say when I can call upon you and perhaps you will telephone me at your early convenience (Museum 6893 Ext. 107).

I would suggest, if convenient, any time on Wednesday next.

Yours faithfully,

AMN.

A. M. NEWBOLD.

H. Fisher, Esq.,
Deputy Director Transportation
Norfolk House,
St. James Square,
S. W.

To : D. Langrod

(314)

25/xi/44.

Re my memo yesterday.

Lt. Col. Allpress 'phoned he had
communicated this morning with
SHAEF (Paris).

Col. Allpress requests I make
appointment with British Organisation
for preliminary talk - to be followed
by joint meeting with American
Organisation (London).

Have asked for appointment
re per enclosure.

For Newbold

To: Dr. Langford (for information of M. Scott, if necessary)
From: Ann Newbold

Displaced Persons. Organised Movement

Lt. Col. ALLPRESS (SHAEF) London 'phoned 23/xi/44 stating he had been informed by M. Ogilvie Webb, M.O. W.T. that I was concerned for U.N.R.R.A. with question as above.

Today he called here by appointment, in company with M. Webb.

He stated that he considered my planning should be carried out in conjunction with the British Organisation (not SHAEF) and eventually the American counterpart, in London, both of which were aware of SHAEF's plans.

He did not say U.N.R.R.A. planning was not on right lines, but did not give particulars of SHAEF's plans.

He is telephoning to SHAEF tomorrow (G.S.) to obtain authority for me to make contact - and collaborate - with the 2 London Organisations above mentioned: the British Section is under control of M. INGLIS, Dist. General Manager LNER. (Scottish Section); the American under Col. BRISBINE.

He gave special warning not to mention in writing the names of the two Organisations in London.

He will 'phone me on Monday the result of his conversation with SHAEF Paris.

Re my recent suggestion to visit SHAEF and M. Scott: reply to make contact first with Liaison Officer SULZBERGER. I had a short conversation with latter yesterday but he was on point of leaving for Country and returns only next week when I will again see him.

24/xi/44

Ann Newbold

To: ~~Mr. Scott~~
From: Dr. Langrod

To: ^

Organised Movement. Displaced Persons

Based on various discussions which we have had with representatives of all United Nations' Governments ~~concerned~~ concerned in regard to the above, a considerable amount of planning has been carried out by us on the following subjects:

Railway Rolling Stock requirements for repatriation trains;
" " " " " ambulance trains;
Formation, capacity and van accommodation for above trains;
Speed and Overall turn-round times;
Routing (illustrations have only been prepared up to the present, and a great deal of work is necessary to complete same);
Scheduled stopping stations en route at fixed intervals;
Reception stations for special repatriation trains in United Nations' Countries.

It will be necessary to submit to a Commission of Experts, for official confirmation, the above matters, but it is not anticipated there will be any fundamental difficulty, the points having, as above-mentioned, been thoroughly discussed with the Government representatives concerned.

The Administration is not aware, however, of the opinion and desires of SHAEF in regard to the organised transport of displaced persons and all our planning has been based up to the present on our own ideas on the subject.

May I suggest that our planning has reached a stage when the whole question should be discussed with SHAEF to ascertain whether UNRRA is on the right lines? Moreover, such confirmation from SHAEF will put the Administration in a much stronger position in regard to the Commission of Experts, and eventually the Standing Technical Sub-Committee on D.Ps.

I recommend, therefore, that you should consider the desirability of an appointment with the competent section of SHAEF being made at an early date for Mr. Newbold and myself, or, in any case, for the former.

[Signature]
17th November, 1944.

313

[Signature] Mr. Langrod

[Signature] Mr. Newbold

Was you first talk to
Euzlanger about this. He has
just come from SHAEF - Paris,
very much something of what
SHAEF think has in mind.
See me again about it after
seeing Euzlanger. P.A.S

Registry
No.

AD P 36 ✓

Dr. P. Z. ...

Despatched

11-30¹⁴ M. 10

Draft.

Your telegram 700, paragraph 1.

Telegram. to
H.M. AMBASSADOR
WASHINGTON

ENJOY NO. 911 ✓

13 October

CODE

*General Distribution
(100 copies please)*

United Nations nationals in enemy and ex-enemy areas (all in thousands) Germany and Austria Belgians 552 Czechoslovaks 745 French 2131 Greeks 17 Yugoslavs 491 Luxembourgais 16 Dutch 308 Norwegians 6 Poles 2450 Soviet at least 1850 total 8566. Add to these Danes 21 Italians 600. In Italy Yugoslavs 58. In Bulgaria Greeks 50 Soviet 1. In Finland Dutch 2 Poles 9 Soviet 8. In Hungary Czechoslovaks 10 Yugoslavs 1 Poles 9. In Rumania Poles 76 Soviet 150. Grand total 8963. All estimates tentative and approximate and no allowance made for exceptional mortality, e.g. in Italy.

Non-United Nations nationals displaced by enemy action for reasons of race religion or activities in favour of the United Nations. Total number extremely uncertain, may be about one half to one million, impossible to estimate allowance to be made for results of extermination policy. Indications from recently liberated countries are that these people have been more successful in going underground than was expected. Only figures available are 145 thousand Spanish Republicans in France and very tentative estimates of Jews deported since September 1939. These are (all in thousands) 125 German 50 Austrian 60 Hungarian and 20 Rumanian Jews.

Paragraph 2 - action taken.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION.

DP36

ACTION Mr. Hoehler

GOVERNOR LEHMAN, WASHINGTON...to...EUROPEAN REGIONAL OFFICE, LONDON.

No.700

DATED 6th October, 1944.

(EN CLAIR)

RECEIVED 10th October, 1944.

1. Urgent you obtain and forward here information on size and location of displaced persons problems raised by resolutions entitled "operations in enemy and ex-enemy areas as respect to displaced persons and epidemic control" and "care and return of certain persons other than United Nations nationality or stateless persons found in liberated territories".

2. Ask SHAEF to request authorization from CCS to deal with new problems raised by former resolution relating care and return friendly enemy nationals in enemy areas military here being informed of resolutions and operational questions involved.

C.551.

2nd October, 1944.

Dear Lady Cheetham,

Major Carter has passed on to me your letter dated September 14th, 1944.

The question of repatriation of enemy and ex-enemy nationals has been considered during the first session of the Council of UNRRA in November 1943, and several provisions have been made in paras. 10 and 11 of the Report of the Committee IV. Sub-Committee 4.

As you are doubtless aware the second session of the Council of UNRRA has just been held in Montreal and the whole question of enemy and ex-enemy nationals reconsidered.

The resolutions reached will be forthcoming in the very near future and we shall then be glad to communicate with you again.

/I should...

The Lady Cheetham, ...
Foreign Office,
(Refugee Dept.)
3, Cleveland Row,
St. James's, S.W.1.

I should like to say that UNRRA is in close co-operation with the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and I believe that the Austrian Emigres you refer to in your letter, whether stateless or not, fall under the competence and care of this Committee.

Yours faithfully,

Dr. W. Langrod,
Head of Repatriation Section.

N.F

WR10/7

17th May, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gundel,

I am most grateful to you for your letter of May 16th, which I have just received this morning, and for the information about displaced Danish persons abroad which you were good enough to include in it.

The information is most useful for the work of the Displaced Persons Division of the UNRRA London Office.

If at any time you obtain any further details, I should appreciate it very much if you would keep me posted.

Again many thanks.

Yours sincerely,

T.T. Scott
Director of Displaced Persons Division.

L. Gundel, Esq.,
The Danish Council,
67, Pont Street, S.W.1.

WR 10/8

THE DANISH COUNCIL

TELEPHONE
KENSINGTON
6656

67, PONT STREET · LONDON · S · W · 1

Nearest Undergrounds: Knightsbridge or Sloane Square.

May 16th, 1944.

Your Ref:

The Director of Displaced Persons Division.

LG/AE.

Dear Mr. Scott,

Your letter of the 12th May only reached me this morning and I am just writing to confirm that the official figure of Danish refugees in Sweden is now given as between 14-15,000.

As regards the number of Danish workers in Germany, revised figures have just been published in the Danish underground paper "Frit Danmark". The paper claims that these figures are based on German documents which it managed to procure. Here they are:-

"By December 31st 1943, altogether 18,087 Danish men and 4,338 Danish women were working in Germany. 8,814 were in Berlin, of whom 2,038 were women - about half the total of women workers employed in Berlin. 5,475 Danish workers were employed in Schleswig-Holstein, 1,299 in Hamburg, 833 in the Weser-Ems district, 775 in Mecklenburg, 565 in Vienna, 504 in Saxony and the remainder in other parts of Germany."

We are now making further enquiries in Sweden about the number of Danish workers who may possibly be in other occupied territories and as soon as I have any news I shall be pleased to write to you again.

In the meantime, I am

Yours sincerely,



L. Gundel
Hon. Secretary
THE DANISH COUNCIL.

T.T. Scott, Esq.,
U.N.R.R.A.
European Regional Office,
11a, Portland Place, W.1.

Mrs. Haines - for information.

gar.
12th May, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gundel,

I am writing, as I promised this morning, to follow up my telephone conversation with you, and to thank you for the offer you made to help this Division with figures concerning the number of Danish citizens who have been displaced from Denmark to other countries as a result of the present war, and figures of foreigners, if any, who have been intruded into Denmark, for similar reasons.

I am most grateful to you for the preliminary figures you gave me over the phone, relating to Danes in Sweden and Danes removed from Denmark to Germany or countries in the occupation of the enemy.

If the further enquiries you are going to make produce any more detailed information, I can assure you that I shall be very glad indeed to have it.

Thanking you very much in anticipation of your further assistance,

L.B. Gundel, Esq.,
Danish Council,
67, Pont Street, S.W.1.

Yours sincerely,

T.T. SCOTT.

ANALYSIS OF REPATRIATION PLANS

Anné 67

Belgium	ARB/DP/51
Czecho-Slovakia	ARB/DP/47-8
France	File No. 97
Poland	ARB/DP/46
Netherlands	File No. 154

I. POLICY1. INTERNATIONALA. International Authority

In enemy countries repatriation operations to be organised and carried out under sole authority of U.N.R.R.A. which will include in its organisation delegates and staff of allied territories concerned - All that bears a material aspect should be inter-allied.

Belgium 2(4)

In the interest of economy of labour, personnel and means, repatriation should be organised on Inter-Allied basis

Czecho-Slovakia 1(2)

U.N.R.R.A. to direct and co-ordinate repatriation operations.....

France 1-2 (II)

Repatriation from enemy controlled territories to be in hands of U.N.R.R.A.

Poland 1.Art.3. I.

Administration of inter-allied repatriation organization must be largely decentralised.

Belgium 2(8)

Contact should be established at the earliest moment between U.N.R.R.A. and the Allied Repatriation Organisations concerned, and the Allied High Command.

Netherlands 1(3)

*To file -
Council -
Nicolas*

B. Categories to be repatriated

The problem of displaced civilians and P.O.W. (Prisoners of War) be treated as one.

France P.G.3 II.

U.N.R.R.A. will carry out repatriation of

- (a) deported civilians and P.O.W.
- (b) Allied forces where requested by Governments concerned.

Belgium 3(ii)

P.O.W. to be repatriated in same manner as other D.P's, "unless the countries concerned decide otherwise".

Poland 5 Art.20.

5. Act. 21. Every allied country to have right to send back to his pre-1938 place of residence any person who, not being a national of country concerned, has crossed its frontiers with temporary identity card or other identity paper issued on inaccurate or false statement.

Poland 4. Art.21.

Only persons recognised as medically fit to undertake the journey will be admitted for repatriation.

Poland 4 : 17.

existing /
Repatriates requiring hospital treatment to be directed to hospitals already or specially formed in places wherefrom repatriates will start homeward journey.

Poland 4 : 19.

C. Speed and Priority

Repatriation measures not to be delayed or hampered by the movement of enemy populations or the demobilization of the German army.

France P.G. 3 II.

Priority of repatriation measures to be applied in proportion to size of national groups.

France P.G.3 II.

Priority of repatriation for French D.P's: those who have been longest away (P.O.W. Alsatians and Lorrainians political deportees, work deportees &c.) Priorities among these groups to be determined by the magnitude of their suffering in exile and the need for those most urgently necessary for the national life

France P.G. 4 E.

D. Repatriation Authority. Personnel

Great difficulty involved by decision of the "Inter-departmental Council" that each country insist that highest possible number of foreign stations be manned by Czechoslovak executive personnel. Improbable that necessary national personnel, particularly medical, can be provided.

Cz-Slov. 20.

Staff of U.N.R.R.A. and its ^{*offshoots*} ~~staff of schools~~ to be proportional (from a national point of view) to constitution of D.P.'s.

France 1-2 (II)

French personnel on Inter-allied missions should consist largely of former P.O.W.

France F.G.4D

E. Finance

U.N.R.R.A. to bear all expenses in enemy countries and Allied Governments all expenses in their own countries (including the expenses of returning other Nationals to their homes). All expenses under both heads to be repaid by enemy countries.

Belgium 9(vi)

All expenses connected with repatriation to be borne by enemy countries (this proviso not to exclude further compensation claims ~~in~~ by repatriated).

Poland 5 Art. 22.

2. NATIONAL

A. Responsibility

So far as is possible "without endangering U.N.R.R.A.'s mission" principle of national sovereignty must be respected, especially in liberated allied territories. Hence U.N.R.R.A. must delegate much of its work to Allied governments.

Belgium 2(2), 2(3)

2. Act. 4. All Allied Governments concerned (e.g. with nationals to be repatriated or from whose territories other Allied nationals are to be repatriated) entitled to set up own national repatriation authorities.

Poland 2 Art. 4.

National Centre

(a) main directing and supervising body in organisation of Repatriation process inside each individual state.

(b) liaison body between central authorities of particular state and Inter-Allied Repatriation Centre and, if necessary, between Regional Centres.

Cz. Slov. 4.

Regional and Local Missions to function under authority of UNRRA with same proportional national representatives as in central body.

France 1 II.

In territories of allied countries repatriation to be organised and directed by national authorities (a) with respect to their own nationals (internal repatriation) acting entirely on their own authority, utilising however, help of international agencies, as far as they consider it necessary, especially in provision of food, clothing, shelter, medical aid and transport. (b) with respect to the citizens of other allied countries by the national authorities in co-operation with the repatriation authorities of the home country of the repatriates on lines set down by international authority or by supplementary international agreement.

Poland 1 Art. 3. II.

The Allied High Command should be asked to accept the principle that Allied Nationals, as far as possible, will be taken care of and eventually be repatriated by their own Nationals.

Netherlands 1(3)

For the purpose of repatriating the Allied population deported to Germany, the Allied Governments concerned will set up organisations which will closely collaborate with the organisation projected by the Council of U.N.R.R.A. They will comply with the rules of the Director General of the UNRRA Administration who, in accordance with Resolution No.10 will have to co-ordinate their plans.

Netherlands 1(1)

The organisation must co-operate with the Army Authorities in preventing non-organised movements of Displaced Persons temporarily residing in enemy territory.

Netherlands 1(3)

II. ORGANISATION

(N.B. The following items apply to controlled repatriation from enemy territories. For uncontrolled movements see Section 7)

1. European Regional Headquarters

(a) Staff drawn from various nations, but owing allegiance to U.N.R.R.A.

(b) A committee of delegates of Allied governments:

(i) to act in ~~advising~~^{advisory} capacity;

(ii) to enjoy full rights to supervise the entire administration;

(iii) ^{Committee members} to assume functions of Inspector General of Sector H.Q.

Belgium 3-4

Inter-Allied commission for Repatriation directs and co-ordinates operations of repatriation. Each interested nation to put staff at disposal of Inter-Allied Commission. Staff of each nation to be proportional to numbers of D.P's.

In addition to Chief and his immediate staff, personnel should include experts in Transport, Health, Feeding, Social Service, Administration, Finance, Labour and Social Insurance, Military Service (Army, Navy, Air Force), Communications Information.

France 1 II.

Chief directing authority, adjoined to H.Q. of Allied Occupation Army or to Allied Civil Service. Individual states to be represented by delegates.

I.A.R.C. will deal with questions of principle concerning repatriation and with security, medical and social measures connected with it.

Before organisation of repatriation^{is} established will ~~provide~~^{provide} and despatch special relief units (social and medical workers, food and medicaments) for labour, internment and other camps threatened with famine in same way as for other threatened regions. H.Q. will set up European Regional Area Centres, Classification Stations and Frontier Crossing Stations, will assign personnel to them and provide material equipment for them. Will give directions for providing means of carrying out repatriation and will control its course.

Headquarters
will set up

Cz. Slov. 4a.

N.B. The Polish plan apparently does not contemplate a European Regional H.Q. but a Central Inter-Allied H.Q. for displaced persons in enemy territory. (See 2).

2. Polish Plan

In enemy controlled territories inter-allied repatriation authority will establish:-

- (a) a Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau whose activities will extend over the whole territory of the enemy country in question;
- (b) Regional Repatriation Centres whose activities will comprise regions defined by the Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau within the enemy country.

Poland 2. Art. 5

Central Inter-Allied Repatriation will be composed of

- (a) Director appointed by Inter-Allied Repatriation authority.
- (b) Council of delegates of all Allied countries interested in repatriation from the enemy country concerned;
- (c) Inter-Allied staff composed mainly from citizens of Allied countries interested in repatriation from enemy country concerned.

Poland 2 Art. 6. I.

The Director and staff of the Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau directs the entire action of the repatriation in the particular territory concerned applying the rules and recommendations of the Inter-Allied repatriation authority, taking into account the wishes and suggestions of the Council of Delegates and giving due attention to suggestions put forward by national delegates.

Poland 2. Art. 6.II.

The Council of Delegates to have right to put before Director of Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau wishes and suggestions decided upon by majority vote of meeting of the Council. Particular delegates can communicate direct with Director of Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau in matters connected exclusively with affairs of their nationals.

Poland 2. Art. 8.

Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau.

Departments:

- (a) Operational
- (b) Technical
- (c) Supply
- (d) Health
- (e) Transport
- (f) Finance

Poland 2. Art. 9.

3. French Scheme of Organisation.

National organisation parallel to that of U.N.R.R.A.

Commissariat aux Prisonniers Deportés et Réfugiés:

- (a) Délégation à Londres
- (b) son Administration Centrale à Alger
- (c) des Délégations en pays ennemis dès la fin des hostilités
- (d) des Missions dans les pays alliés ou neutres de Transit.
- (e) une Mission auprès de la liaison administrative constituée à Londres
- (f) une Mission auprès de la Maison administrative constituée en Afrique du Nord
- (g) une Représentative à la Délégation du Comité Français.

4. Netherlands Scheme of Organisation

An adequate number of Allied Nationals to be attached to the Allied Command charged with the care and the repatriation of Displaced Persons. Their task is to co-operate in organising all preparatory measures affecting repatriation and, in due course, and, as far as possible to take care of and eventually to repatriate their own Nationals in accordance with plans approved by the Allied Command. The personnel required should be placed at the disposal of the Allied Command by the Allied Repatriation Organisations. The number of officers required to be proportional to the estimated total number of Allied Nationals displaced in enemy territory. For Netherlands proposed initially not less than one officer per 10,000 Displaced Persons for each of the functions of repatriation, relief and transport, and one medical officer per 5,000 displaced persons, that is on the basis of 30,000 displaced Netherlands Nationals, excluding those who will return on their own initiative (estimated to number 100,000) -

- 30 Repatriation Officers
- 30 Relief Officers
- 30 Transport Officers
- 60 Medical Officers

These numbers eventually to be increased by 100 per cent in the 3 first categories and 250 per cent in the case of Medical Officers, these officers either to be available in London or be made available after a part of the whole of the Netherlands has been liberated.

The London Representative of the U.N.R.R.A. Committee on Displaced Persons should agree, at the earliest moment, with the military authorities the function of this personnel, as well as the precise nature of the measures of repatriation to be carried out during the purely military period, so far as it is possible to determine this in advance.

The Officers designated above would submit their reports to the Allied High Commands Displaced Persons' Section, which in turn would advise U.N.R.R.A. It is hoped in this way to gain a complete picture of the number of persons to be repatriated, their nationality, the hygienic and sanitary conditions under which they are living and the functioning of the local food supply organisation.

The Officers could be used by the Allied High Command for any other tasks connected with repatriation (in case actual repatriation started during the military period) and would facilitate the transfer of the Repatriation Services to U.N.R.R.A.

As soon as conditions in enemy territory allow, assumed that the Allied High Command, while retaining control, would delegate the actual task of repatriation to U.N.R.R.A., the National Officers thereupon to be re-transferred to their National organisations, who would then supply such further personnel as would be required and which they were able to provide. National organisations to be organised to safeguard the interests of all Allied nationals but each organisation to be free so to organise itself so as to preserve the National character of the organisation, especially in respect of direct contact with its Nationals. Talent and labour available among displaced persons to be utilised to fullest extent, balance of personnel required to be drawn from the Netherlands.

Netherlands 2 - 3

Netherlands Organisation will function in co-operation with Netherlands Repatriation Authorities in Netherlands - responsible to Netherlands Minister of Social Affairs

Netherlands Note 3

Netherlands Organisation working in close collaboration with U.N.R.R.A. will function (a) from London before liberation of National territory (b) from Netherlands and for the most suitable place in enemy territory after liberation.

Netherlands Note 4.

The National Authorities will take care of D.P's. returning unorganised on basis of plans recommended by the Allied representatives on the Comité pour l'Etude de l'Amnistie. These plans also deal with treatment and repatriation of Allied Nationals temporarily resident in Allied countries.

Netherlands Note 5.

ANALYSIS OF REPATRIATION SCHEMES

5 Area Headquarters

N.B. The above title corresponds to U.N.R.R.A. organisation. In the following summary "Regional" means the same as "Area".

BELGIUM

3. II. 2 Sector Headquarters

Each sector-one enemy country at the head of each a Sector Chief assisted by administrative committee of national delegates who would inspect and supervise work of Districts organisation.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA *

4. III. b. Regional Centres

Will direct and co-ordinate work of Classification Stations and will set up Assembly Stations. In direct contact with Frontier Crossing Services. Will direct transfer of repatriates from Classification Sections to Frontier Crossing Stations. Will carry out medical and epidemiological control and will be H.Q. for mobile medical units - and, if necessary, for mobile hospital units.

FRANCE

1. II. Regional Plan

"Sous Commission ou Missions Régionales"

POLAND

3. Art. 10. Regional Repatriation Centres run by Regional Repatriation Commissioners and staff appointed by Director of Central Inter-Allied Repatriation Bureau. Commissioner will co-operate with National repatriation Commissioners.

4. 17. Formation in conjunction with National repatriation authorities of quarantine stations to be administered by health authorities.

* (21. ARB/DE/33). First Draft Report of Advisory Committee received after above plan worked out. Article 21 e.g. "No displaced person should be allowed to proceed to his home unless his identity papers have been stamped or otherwise endorsed by the medical control" fully coincides with original proposition brought forward by Czechoslovak Health Council and then altered by the "Inter-departmental Council" and makes most of contents of plan unnecessary, especially with regard to health problems. Has the effect of greatly simplifying health problems connected with repatriation.)

BELGIUM

50. Districts Headquarters.

Chief of District assisted by administrative committee of delegates of Allied countries principally concerned who will act as Inspectors of repatriation centres and flying squads of the district.

6(a) Repatriation Centres

Each district will have to be provided with several of these. Camps in Germany probably suitable as out-centres. Centres will be principle nucleus of practical repatriation operations.

6(b) Flying Squads (medical, feeding, shelter &c.) to be sent as occasion requires to points

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

2.7. Assembly Stations

(? about 200) in district towns. Will act as local registration authority and public advice bureau for all D.P's regardless of nationality will deal with registration of D.P's give them essential social and medical help, and will, organise, as necessary, communal feeding and billeting. Finally will arrange transport to

3. Classification Stations to be established in important local centres (in military barracks, military and other camps &c. each to receive repatriates from several (10-20) Assembly Stations. Repatriates submitted to medical examination delousing, medical treatment. Hospitalisation for sick, quarantine stations for suspicious cases.

FRANCE

1.II. Local Plan

"Missions Locales"

Will each deal with 10-20,000 D.P's grouped by nationality. Communal services by inter-allied staff; work affecting particular national groups by nationals of that group.

POLAND

3. Art.11.I. Repatriation Station

set up in suitable places within their areas by Inter-Allied Repatriation Commissioners.

3.12. Head of repatriation station to be appointed by Regional Repatriation Commissioner. He and medical, sanitary and administrative personnel of station will be officials of Inter-Allied Repatriation authority.

3.13.I. All allied governments concerned can appoint their own administrative, medical and sanitary personnel. The principle national official at the station to represent interests of D.P's who are nationals of his country.

BELGIUM

where urgent action is needed.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Collaboration of mobile laboratory units, where necessary (sent from Regional Centres). Repatriates listed according to nationality and given registration card with medical record to produce at Frontier Crossing ~~Stations~~ and to home authorities. Existing Nazi camps to be utilised.

3. Frontier Crossing ~~Stations~~ ^{Station} to be set up near main frontier crossings. Will carry out reception and registration of arriving repatriates, epidemiological control according to health records (all above), short medical inspection and further transport into interior of country.

But see

20.C.S. Health Council was not in agreement with Inter-departmental Advisory Committee - that crossing stations should only be transit stations and equipped on the medical side for first aid only - and requested all their representatives to insist that the trains with repatriates should go from Classification Stations directly to the appropriate Reception Stations. During this phase necessary to introduce a special provision for food problems arising during transport. This may involve setting up special kitchen and food supply wagons.

FRANCE

POLAND

4.14. As far as possible repatriates to be grouped nationally.

4.15. I. In Germany number of repatriation stations should be sufficient to accommodate a 4 days transport contingent.

Average stay should not exceed 4 days

4.18. Quarantine Stations to be administered by health authorities.

3(a)

Netherlands Regional Offices, one for every 100,000 Displaced Persons, with following personnel:

		<u>Regional Officers</u>	<u>Recruited from Netherlands</u>	<u>Recruited from Dutch D.P's in Germany</u>	<u>Recruited from local population</u>
<u>Under control of:</u>					
Repatriation Officer	1	10	170	170	-
Central Administration	1	-	3	-	-
Central Registration	1	-	50	40	-
Relief	1	10	180	400	120
Medical Service	1	20*	50 XX	30	200
Transport	1	10	30	10	-
Recreation/Information	1	-	5	-	-
Accountancy	1	-	10	-	-
TOTAL		<u>50</u>	<u>498</u>	<u>650</u>	<u>320</u>

2.9 to be run in line with technical directions laid down by UNRRA Relief and Medical Services and orders of Central Inland Transport Organisation and in co-ordination with other National Organisations.

* To augment according to necessity to 1 doctor per 2,000 Displaced Persons.

~~XX~~ One nurse.

6 Organisation for Controlled Repatriation in Allied liberated Countries

BELGIUM

8. National Repatriation Office
(see Section 5)
7. An U.N.R.R.A. delegation
comprising one delegate from each allied nation with nationals in that country, with a secretariat to co-ordinate relations between delegation and (a) Executive of European Branch of U.N.R.R.A. (b) National Repatriation office, to whom delegation should give all assistance. Delegation to have right to report any shortcomings of National Repatriation office to London.
- 7.IV. National Repatriation Office
will be branch of national government, responsible to that Government, not to U.N.R.R.A. will deal with (a) reception of its own nationals (b) return of other nationals to their own countries (c) liaison with U.N.R.R.A. for the return of its own nationals.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- 11, 20. Reception Stations e.g.
quarantine (on C.S. territory)
- 4.III. Billeting Offices in own country to provide temporary accommodation and feeding for repatriates unable, for various reasons, to return direct to their original homes. Can be billeted either in requisitioned buildings in towns, or in special housing centres (former military camps, barracks, &c.) Medical services similar to those in Classification Stations (see above)

7. Organisation to meet uncontrolled migration from enemy territories

BELGIUM

- 7.(a) Rounding up Centres at crossing points
(equipped as regards sanitary
preventative measures, feeding, lodging,
transport)
- 7.(b) Barriers (e.g. on the Rhine)
10. Reception Stations (quarantine) specially
appointed for purpose. Must be absolutely
isolated from other internal repatriation
centres in order to avoid contact with
~~Regulars~~ (see p. 6) D.P.'s in controlled
repatriation

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

3. Frontier Crossing ^{Stations} ~~Services~~ (See Organisation for ~~"Regulars"~~)

(Controlled Repatria-
tion)

ANALYSIS OF REPATRIATION SCHEMES

FUNCTIONS

BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FRANCE

POLAND

At ALL STAGES : central regional and local :

Transport
Medical & Sanitary services
Feeding
Social services
Administrative services
Finance
Labour office and social insurance
Military, naval and air service
Communications
Information

4. 1. Administrative Committee 4a. Inter-Allied Repatriation Centre.

Advisory organ to the executive central power of the European repatriation branch;

Would enjoy full rights to supervise the entire administration of this branch;

Every national delegate while collaborating in the whole, to take special interest in questions concerned with repatriation of his own nations;

Delegates to assume

Questions of principle concerning repatriation and medical and social care;

Provision and despatch of special relief units (social and medical workers, food and medicaments) for labour and internment and other camps;

Setting up of Regional Centres, classification stations and frontier crossing services.

Assignment of personnel
Provision of material equipment, deductions

2.3. Central Inter-allied Repatriation Bureau .

Operational department: planning and supervising repatriation :

Technical department: organizing and equipping repatriation stations

Supply department:

Supply of food and clothing;
Health department: concerned with health of repatriates organizing medical care; distribution of medical and sanitary personnel.

Transport department: dealing with utilisation and distribution of means of

functions of inspectors-
general of the sectors'
headquarters action

For carrying out of and control
of repatriation.

transport

transport in accordance with
European Inland Transport
Committee programme;
Budgetary department:
charged with preparation of
financial estimates and liai-
son with financial department
of Central Inter-Allied Repa-
triation Bureau and its bran-
ches.

4.2. Executive Central Power.

a) General Secretary's Office.

Relations with :

- 1) other U.N.R.R.A. Cen-
tral organizations,
European Committee;
- 2) Government authorities
of the European terri-
tories where U.N.R.R.A.
(Displaced Persons) will
function

b) The following functions :

1. Coordination with other
branches of the European
Committee of U.N.R.R.A
and National Repatria-
tion offices;
2. Statistics - geographical
and quantitative repatri-
ation of Displaced persons
(records to be kept up to
date during the duration
of repatriation operations)
identification.
3. Staff - appointments - all
questions relating to the
application of staff rules
and regulations.
4. Lodging prior to transport
feeding until arrival in
home country
5. Sanitary and medical pre-
ventive measures
6. Social welfare
7. Budget and book-keeping

8. Organisation of departure in collaboration with Inland European Transport (convoy transport until destination is reached)

5B. Headquarters.

In addition to Chief of sector:

a) Secretary's Office -

Relations with

1. general headquarters
2. chief authorities of sectors

b) Functions-

On parallel lines with Executive Central Power (9b) except (b1) and, in place of (bIII) management of staff of district Offices.

5C. Districts' Organisation

On parallel lines of Headquarters, (see above), including administration of repatriation centres and flying squads, including staff.

4b. Regional Centres.

Direction and coordination of the work of the classification stations;

Setting up of assembly stations;

Coordination with frontier crossing points services and direction to them of repatriates from classification centres;

Medical and epidemiological control;

Headquarters and directing body for mobile medical

units (disinfecting bacteriological, epidemiological) and if necessary for mobile hospital units.

2.7.i. Assembly Stations

Local registration, authority and public advice bureau for all Displaced persons, regardless of the nationality

3. Repatriation Stations.

Grouping of repatriates dispersed in area;

Medical examination and medical care of repatriates; Provision of clothing for repatriates;

Provision of food for repatriates during their stay at station and for the time of their journey to destination;

Issue of temporary identification cards authorising to cross frontier of country of destination;

Organizing transport for journey.

Functions :

Registration of repatriates.
Social help for repatriates
in billets or hospitals;
Administration of medical
care by local health servi-
ces and by local hospitals;
Communal feeding and bille-
ting;
Transport to classification
stations.

6 (a) Repatriation Centres

Functions ~~are~~ parallel
lines to those of pre-
ceding organisations.

3. Classification Stations

Temporary accomodation and
feeding;
Medical examination (quaran-
tine stations for suspicious
cases), delousing, medical
treatment, hospitalisation of
sick persons.
Further registration (see
Assembly stations) according
to nationality issue of regi-
stration card with medical
record;
Formation of transport to
frontier Crossing stations.

4.17218 Quarantine Stations

BELGIUMCZECHOSLOVAKIAFRANCEPOLAND6(b) Flying Squads .

Functions vary in accordance with urgent needs - sometimes medical and sanitary, sometimes feeding and lodging

3. Frontier Crossing Stations

Control of entry into country - reception and registration of arriving repatriates; Epidemiological control (according to medical record - see above) short medical examination, public health, social welfare.

Transport into interior of country.

In respect of irregulars, services identical with those of classification stations i.e. billeting, feeding, medical supervision, disinfecting and deodorising isolation, quarantine, medical treatment, hospitalisation.

8. National Repatriation Office (on national territory)

Reception of and material and moral assistance to national repatriates.

Repatriation (in cooperation with U.N.R.R.A.) of displaced persons in the country and requiring to be ~~xxx~~ brought back to their own.

13.2 Reception Stations (on national territory)

Reception of repatriates arriving from Classification camps, billeting and feeding them for the necessary period of about 7 days and transferring them to their homes;

Medical quarantine. Control from the medical and epidemiological point of view,

Collaboration with U.N.R.R.A. including the care and treatment of those who are slightly ill;
in the repatriation of own nationals.
Rendering of social care;
Registration and Control by national authorities (Ministers of National Defence and Interior)
Ascertaining (and dealing with) injury to health, morale, personal possessions etc. as a basis for asserting claims for peace negotiations.

FUNCTIONS (Cont.)

1.3 Netherlands Nationals to be placed at the disposal of the Allied Command:
Registration Survey of local state of food supplies and accommodation;
Survey of health and hygienic and sanitary conditions special tasks,
such as Segregation into National Groups and establishment of contact
with Reception Centres in countries of origin.

1.2 Netherlands National Repatriation Organisations in co-operation with UNRRA. Registration and Identification; medical care and hygiene, including sanitary measures for the prevention of diseases and the combating of epidemics;
Distribution of food and clothing; Supervision of accommodation and camp management; Social and financial aid, including the organisation of social and recreational centres; Transport

Re-establishment of contact with the family and the provision of religious aid;

(i) by missions, composed as far as possible of compatriots

(ii) by establishing postal and telegraphic services, broadcasting and general information.

Co-operation with Army Authorities in preventing non-organised movements of Displaced Persons.

Note 5. Netherlands Organisation (Foreign Section) Central Office

Commissioner for Repatriation

Liaison Officer

Administrative and Executive Sections:

Secretariat, Finance, Accountancy, Legal,

Central Control, Welfare of Staff:

Field Service (execution of repatriation work on the spot);

Relief (Food Supplies, Shelter)

Medical Service

Registration

Transport

Welfare, Spiritual Aid, Information and Recreation

2. Regional Offices

The local registration of all Netherlands repatriates in accordance with international and national requirements;

The tracing of missing persons;

The co-ordination and direction of all relief and medical activities;

The organisation and supervision of the camps;

The tracing, segregation and concentration (where possible), in national camps of all Netherlands Nationals in the areas under their control;

To provide spiritual aid and financial assistance; to organise recreation, arrange postal facilities and provide information of general interest to repatriates.

Administrative services required in connection with above.

TO: Dr. Langrod
FROM: M. Scott

Nov. Langrod WR 36

I was talking to a
friend of mine the
other day who is
President of Thomas
Cooks & Son for the U.S.A.
about our D.P. breakfast
problems. The result
was he gave me five -
to vote immediately on
subject in Cooks (London)
last November. He also
advised inclusion that could
help us by sending out on

about from books for
outgoing broadcast. I
will follow this last
point up if you want
me to.

RB

6/8/2-

NOTES:

*Mr T. T. Scott 19-11-43
from W. W. White*

REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS.

It seems absolutely essential that a mass movement of this kind should be handled from start to finish under Governmental control. Strict, and possibly very strong discipline will be essential, which would be impossible if dealt with through any organisation of travel agents.

We feel that the transport and arrangements would need to be controlled by either military or police, in uniform and probably armed, under possibly special dispensations with regard to their acting outside their own territory.

A Central Organisation would need to be established which would be in touch with all military and civil authorities. The main duties of this Central Organisation could be subdivided as follows :-

- A. To receive definite instructions as to the points from which, and to which, transport must be provided, with details as to the numbers, and eventually the actual names of the people to be repatriated:

- In regard to the people to be transported, very strong authority will be necessary that only those agreed, should travel. Otherwise, probably all the people in the particular centre will endeavour to get away

immediately and great confusion and trouble would arise. This is one of the reasons why we feel the matter must be dealt with either in a military or a police way, so that absolute authority could be exercised.

We suggest that as the people are selected for travel according to the trains that can be provided, a means should be found to identify and mark them definitely, and we consider each passenger, irrespective of a passport if they have to hold this, should have a letter and number which could be fastened to that person in a conspicuous way, perhaps by a chain bracelet or necklace which could not be removed except by an official key when the need for the identification has passed. Alternatively, the identification number might be stencilled indelibly (for a period of seven or ten days) on the forehead or hand of each person, if this is not felt to be too derogatory.

- B. To arrange with the transport authorities, probably on the basis of military orders, detailed timetables and train schedules, and for the necessary rolling stock together with the necessary traction for same:

- We feel that at any rate in the immediate future after the Armistice, movement through Germany and elsewhere on the Continent will be very slow; there can be no thought of fast trains. Therefore, a journey from

Central or Eastern Germany may be a question of several days. It will be essential that schedules and timetables be drawn up for the running of each train, both laden with passengers and eventually for its empty return to the next point from which it is to take passengers, with necessary intermediate stops for feeding etc., as commented on hereafter. Rolling stock, and particularly engines, are, we understand, in a bad state of repair, and, therefore, breakdowns must be expected and the consequences foreseen.

It was suggested by you that about 750 people should travel in each train. In our opinion, the make-up of such a train would have to be on the following lines :-

A very important point would arise as to whether corridor stock will be available. If it be, the matter is simpler from the sanitary and toilet point of view. If, however, corridor stock cannot be relied upon, the schedules of the trains will have to be so drawn up so that at least every hour and a half a stop of half an hour is foreseen for the physical needs of the passengers, and that sufficient, possibly temporary, installations have been made at the foreseen intermediate stopping places for this purpose. Even with the corridor coaches, a stop of at least half an hour about every three hours would still be necessary for this purpose.

-cont'd.-

A third class corridor coach has an average of 64 seats, but obviously in a mass movement of this kind use would have to be made of all sorts of coaches, even first and second class, although the latter will be unsuitable from the sanitary point of view. It would be far better if wooden seated third class coaches could be used.

If, therefore, 750 people are to be transported, under the most favourable conditions this means at least 12 passenger coaches for each train. In addition to these passenger coaches, we feel there ought to be a sanitary coach with a doctor and two nurses in attendance for dealing with people who fall ill during the journey, and which coach could be divided into two, for infectious and non-infectious diseases which may make themselves apparent during the journey. Possibly a coach would be necessary for the use of the staff on the train referred to in the last paragraph of these notes.

The passengers being packed into the train almost to its maximum capacity, would not enable any serious amount of baggage to be taken into the compartments. Therefore, regulations would have to be drawn up to specify the maximum weight and size of the luggage that could be taken into the compartment, and all excess would have to be placed in baggage cars. We do not know how much luggage these people have. That would have to be assessed, and whether one baggage car on the train or two would be necessary is a matter for investigation. The baggage could be labelled under the identification number of the passenger and delivered only to the person with corresponding identity.

The feeding, we understand, will be organised by the U.N.R.R.A., but is it intended that the food for each train should be carried on the train, or provided at suitable intermediate points? The latter will be the better. If the food is to be provided on the train it would necessitate a further coach or coaches to carry and prepare it. In any case, however, it would be desirable that emergency rations of food and water should be carried on each train in case of a breakdown of the train at some point where no food could be obtained for perhaps some hours.

These practical suggestions based on our experience, will have arrived at a train of 15 or 16 vehicles, which in the normal way in peacetime, is more than most engines could haul. Under present conditions the tonnage is probably far greater than would be practicable for the railway authorities to tackle. It, therefore, rather tends to suggest it is optimistic to think of 750 people in one train, and half that number seems more practicable, in which case a part of the suggested sanitary coach could be used by the staff, thus saving an extra vehicle, and making the train load 8 or 9 coaches.

In the organising of this movement we would suggest that endeavours should be made to keep the trains as fixed units until the movement is completed, and that each train should have a letter, or combination of letters, in order to identify it, thus - Train "A" or Train "A.A." etc. We would suggest that the identification disc or mark of each passenger referred to in clause 'A' above should be that of the train and seat. Each seat should be prominently numbered, the numbers being also clearly painted on the outside of the coach on both sides, from 1 onwards. As the make-up of the train would be known before any allocations are started, if the stock is not all corridor, then the places allocated to the women would be as far as possible in the corridor stock, leaving the males in the non-corridor.

Depending on the season, the question of heating the train might arise. Steps would have to be taken for re-watering and superficially cleaning the train frequently, particularly the lavatories. Very ample authority must be given to the leader on the train that in the event of any breakdown (such as an overheated axle or anything else), that the local railway authorities must comply with his instructions to supply another vehicle to replace the one damaged. Alternatively, and as we have found in practice - since even in peacetime it is frequently very difficult to obtain an additional vehicle at short notice - it might be found possible to leave a few empty places in each coach, so that in case of need the damaged coach could be taken off the train and the passengers in it accommodated at some inconvenience in the surplus places in the other coaches until such time as a new coach could be provided. This would, however, lessen the total carried in each train.

To organise the question of feeding the people in the trains or en route,

as we suggest, to feed them at certain fixed points. This would have to be organised in advance on the lines that the military already supply soldiers. Our idea would be that passengers should not leave their coaches for meals, but suitable packed meals should be available, the requisite number handed in to each compartment under supervision of the military or police guard by a staff previously organised, at the stopping places, and soup or hot drinks also handed in to each compartment.

- As already mentioned, the question arises as to whether it be intended to feed the passengers from the train, or,

D. The question of medical and sanitary arrangements - possibly before any people are admitted to the train and subsequently during their journey:

- We assume there will be an examination of the passengers before they are allocated to the train to see they are in a proper state to travel, but

as mentioned in the paragraph regarding the make-up of the train, incidents are bound to occur en route, for which purpose a medical attendant, and at least two nurses, should be available, with first-aid equipment, to deal with them, and also possibly accommodation to endeavour to restrict any infectious outbreak.

There will also be the question of invalids to be transported (those that on the examination are found unsuitable to travel in the normal way). This will necessitate, presumably, an organisation more or less of ambulance trains, with very much stronger medical and nursing attendance, and with different ideas in regard to feeding.

E. To see that the necessary reception control, when refugees reach their destination, is in a position to deal promptly with the people and trains.

Finally, we suggest there should be a commandant for each train assisted by staff in uniform, either military or police, and probably it will not be excessive to suggest one uniformed man for each coach to keep order, to see that everybody does as they should, that only authorised people are on the coach, and to organise receipt of food and processions to lavatories etc.

E.H.
19th November, 1943.