

[3 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-10002</u>
BOX	<u>125</u>
FILE	<u>0</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0123</u>

MILOB GP HQ

UN RESTRICTED

TO : UNAMIR HQ /OPS/

DATE : 23 MAR 1995

FROM : MILOB GP HQ/OPS/

SUBJECT : MILOB REPORT - GHANBATT INCIDENT 21 MAR 1995

1. Attached is MILOB report of Subject incident.
2. Questions should be directed to MILOB GP HQ/SOO/MAJ McCOMBER.

28/3
J McCOMBER
MAJ
SOO

② cc
Copy to DCOB OPS
pse
25/3
G3 ops.

③ G3 Ops
Pls ask for clarification
on sub-pers. j.

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DCOB OPS
25.3

④
SO2 OPS 1
Pse write to
MILOB Section 2
for clarification
25/3

Acting
27/3

FROM :Milob Sect 2 KIBUNGO
TO :Milob HQ KIGALI

DATE :22 Mar 95
FILE :Ops/2

SUBJECT :INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. Please refer to Sub Para 3(b) of our SITREP dated 21 Mar 95.
2. The matter was investigated. Details are given in the following paras.
3. On 21 Mar 95 an incident occurred between 1430 and 2200h at KABILIZI 5066, involving the Ghanbatt and the RPA which led to a confrontation. The team established the following facts:-
 - (a) A local, SEBUTISI, was arrested at 1420h in KABILIZI by the MUGESERA 4764 commune police on the pretext that his brother who was previously in custody, had escaped.
 - (b) On the way to the commune, SEBUTISI escaped and ran towards the Ghanbatt platoon posn in the area. He was pursued by FRANCOIS NZEYIMANA, a commune policeman who was armed with a grenade along with two other policemen. The escapee and the policeman armed with the grenade both entered the Ghanbatt platoon area.
 - (c) Soldiers in the camp apprehended both men and after interrogating them, the Warrant Officer in charge ordered the release of the policeman. The policeman refused to go back on the ground that he would be punished by his superiors. The other two policemen accompanying concurred and stated that either all should be freed or all should remain in the platoon location. By this time, the policeman had been disarmed by the Ghanbatt tps.
 - (d) The other policemen subsequently left the area, leaving behind their colleague and the arrested person. The bourgemestre of MUGESERA went to the camp with three RPA soldiers at 1600h and apologised for the policeman having entered the camp armed with a grenade. He requested the release of both men, which the WO in charge refused. The WO said that they were free to take the policeman but not the escapee. The bourgemestre refused and left.
 - (e) After some time a courier motorcycled to the platoon location and delivered a letter from the bourgemestre. The letter contained accusations that the Ghanbatt tps had forcibly dragged the policeman into their camp.
 - (f) At approx 1700h the two detained persons were transferred to the Coy HQ at BARE 5448. At approx 1715h the

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platoon was surrounded by two offrs and approx 35 men of the RPA. The platoon occupied defensive posns and reinforcements (three APCs) were moved from BARE to KABILIZI. The milob team also accompanied them. The WO alleged that the RPA fired one shot towards the main gate. The WO in charge went to investigate and the RPA offr apologised saying that it was an accidental shot by a recruit. He further stated that they had not come to the location for a firefight but to negotiate the release of the detained persons. There was a stalemate and the RPA finally left at about 1820h.


(g) The milob team and the Int Offr Ghanbatt alongwith Human Rights reps then contacted the bourgemestre of MUGESERA who took them to the RPA cdr at SAKE. The team reported that the situation was then under control. At that time, approx 2115h, the milob team was ordered to fall back to KIBUNGO. Investigations continued on 22 Mar 95.

(h) The arrested person was interrogated by milobs and Human Rights teams in the morning of 22 Mar. He stated that the bourgemestre had given a list of seven persons to be arrested on various charges and he was one of them.

(j) The arrested person and the policeman were handed over to the local authorities at MUGESERA at 1300h. CO Ghanbatt and CO RPA were present. ICRC and Human Rights were not allowed to participate in the handing over process.

(k) The team visited the RPA cdr at SAKE. He stated that as far as he was concerned, the issue was closed.

4. A fresh issue of assault has arisen. The policeman claims that he was forcibly dragged into the Ghanbatt compound and assaulted by the Ghanbatt soldiers. CO Ghanbatt has ordered the Ghanbatt MP to investigate.


(Vijay Pande)
Major
Ops Offr
For Sect Cdr

(K) The same Agency has been advised by the Bureau of the Department of State that the information received from the source is reliable.

(U) The enclosed below are unclassified as they are not
pertaining to the defense of the United States.

112 UNOFFICIAL COPY

TO: MILOB GP HQ

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 5, GISENYI

DATE: 02 MAR 95

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE KILLING OF 9 CIVILIANS IN THE MUTURA COMMUNE (2332) ON 23 FEB 95.

1. THE INVESTIGATION REPORT OF YM-2 ON THE KILLING OF 9 CIVILIANS IN THE MUTURA COMMUNE (2332) ON THE 23 FEB 95 IS FORWARDED HEREWITH FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND PERUSAL PLEASE.

2. THE INVESTIGATIONS REVEAL THE KILLING WAS THE HANDIWORK OF SOME PERSONS WHO INFILTRATED ACROSS FROM THE BORDER IN ZAIRE. THOUGH THE KILLERS HAD NO MOTIVE FOR KILLING EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF MR GERALD GATABAZI WHOSE DAUGHTERS WERE KILLED. HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING REGULAR DEATH THREATS FROM THE INTERHAMWE AS HE DID NOT COOPERATE WITH THEM DURING THE GENOCIDE. THE REST OF THE KILLING COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A TERROR CAMPAIGN IN THE BORDER BELT TO DETER THE LOCAL POPULATION FROM COOPERATING WITH THE RPA. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO AS THE LOCAL POPULACE HAD IN FACT ORGANISED A EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF ALARMS IN COOPERATION WITH THE RPA TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF CATTLE RUSTLING IN THE AREA RESULTING IN THE DECLINE OF CATTLE RUSTLING IN THE AREA.

3. THIS INCIDENCE HAS BEEN VOICED WITH CONCERN BY THE RPA AUTHORITIES WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO BEEF UP THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA BY SIDESTEPPING FORCES FROM RUHENGARI. WE ARE CLOSELY MONITORING THE SITUATION IN THE AREA AND ON AVAILABILITY OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THE MILOB GP HQ WILL BE INFORMED.


GOPI MENON
MAJ
OPS OFFICER

②


cc

Copy to COS and
DCOS ops for info. Units will be
info to be vigilant

3/3

③ Treated

4-3
12


08/3

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MI-OBS HQ SECTOR 5

GISENYI

27 February 1995

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE MURDER OF NINE CIVILIANS
IN MUTURA COMMUNE (C) ON 23 FEBRUARY 1995

INTRODUCTION

1. On 23 February 1995 at about 1045 hrs. T. N. BATTI reported the murder of nine civilians in the Mutura Commune (C). The murders were reported to have occurred in the Gakarara and Kora sectors. A team composed of MI-OBS and Human Rights ^{personnel} ~~personnel~~ was sent to investigate the murders, identify the culprits and as much as possible establish the motives.

CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

2. When the team arrived in the commune, it was directed by RPA ^{soldiers} ~~personnel~~ to Lega trading centre (3924) where bandits believed to be former Interamwe ~~attacked~~ fired several ~~shots~~ ^{shots} at the shop, apparently in an attempt to ~~rob~~ commit robbery. At the centre, the team interviewed a young boy aged 12 who was injured during the attack. The boy, named Bwanakwe, stated that at about midnight, bandits numbering about 10 to 20 arrived at the trading centre and started firing at buildings at random. The boy was hit by a rifle butt on the head during the attack and sustained head injuries. He identified one of the attackers as Samvura whom he knew ^{before he rises} ~~before~~ as a former Interamwe ~~staying~~ ⁱⁿ in Zaire. The team made further inquiries about Samvura and was told by the local commander that Samvura was in the area before joining the

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the rest of the Interamwe during the war.

3. After the attack at the trading centre, the bandits headed North. They got to Berire village, in the Gakarara sector and went into Mr Gaturamindi's home ^(at around 0200 hrs) and shot to death 3 teenagers, one boy named Hagumimana aged 16 and his two sisters, Ayihaniye aged 15 and Mukamasoni aged 13. The team established that the parents of the deceased are still in Zaire as refugees. All the neighbours of the deceased who were interviewed could not identify the motive behind the killings.

4. From Mr Gaturamindi's home, the bandits went to Mr Gerald Gatabazi's home where they shot to death 2 girls (sisters) Maryclaire Uwamahoro ^{age 17} and Alfonsine Dusabe ^{age 17}. When the investigating team interviewed Mr Gatabazi, the father of the deceased girls, ~~they~~ ^{he} told that he (Mr Gatabazi) on 09-01-95 received threats from Interamwe. He ~~said~~ ^{told} the team that the Interamwe labelled him a traitor and threatened to kill him together with 15 others in the same village. He took the killing of his daughters as politically motivated.

5. The bandits after killing the Gatabazi sisters went into Rusenge village ⁽³⁹²⁶⁾ in the Kora sector and broke into the home of Mr Kamamutsi. In the home, they shot to death Mr Kamamutsi's son Manirakiza ^{age 17} and his wife Musabyimana ^{age 17}. They then broke into a nearby home and shot to death one man and a woman (Rucekeri and Nywabageni). The motive behind the killing of these four people was not established.

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6. After killing the last four people, the bandits headed North West into the National Park. On a follow up operation, an RPA unit picked up a ^{note} ~~photograph~~ on the ~~spoor~~ ^{note} of the bandits. The ~~photograph~~ was written ~~behind~~ in Kingarwanda and it was translated to mean the following "We shall come back and kill the RPA one by one down to the last man"


~~From~~Comments

7. The team found that most people in the affected areas could not identify the motive behind the killings. However the team deduced that the killings could be aimed at creating an atmosphere of insecurity among the Hutu people since all the murdered people were Hutu. This atmosphere of insecurity would force the Hutus to ~~swipe~~ ^{swipe} ~~seen by all~~, as they will ~~for fear the new govt cannot provide them security.~~ ^{provide them security.}
8. The team ~~is of the opinion~~ ^{also thinks} that recent events which include the attack on TUNBATT, the murders at Gisenyi Hospital and ~~the murders~~ in the Mutura Commune are closely linked and could have been planned and coordinated centrally. The attack on TUNBATT indicates that UNAMIR personnel may not be exempted from attacks by bandits/assassins.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

9. The team recommends that:
- a. The security of all UNAMIR ~~personnel~~ ^{personnel} be reconsidered ~~close to the borders with Zaire~~ ^{seriously} especially those living and working close to the borders with Zaire.
 - b. All patrols by UNAMIR ~~personnel~~ ^{personnel} into remote areas be accompanied by armed escorts.



A Gunibo (psc zw)
Maj
Team Member

①

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ (OPS)

FILE : OPS/INVEST


FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 02 MAR 95

INFO : DFC/CMO


SUBJECT : SHOOTING INCIDENT AT TUNBATT HQ LOC ON NI 28 FEB/01 MAR
INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. Please find herewith attached an investigation report on the above subject for perusal and necessary action.
2. Best regards.


A ANOCHKINE
LT COL
FOR CMO

②
cc
copy to COS and
DCOS ops

4/3
③ COS and DCOS ops
Copied.
4-3


06/3

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MILOBS SECTOR 5 HQ
GISENY

01 March 1995

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE SHOOTING INCIDENT AT TUNBATT HQINTRODUCTION

An exchange of fire occurred between sentries at TUNBATT HQ and an RPA patrol on the night of 28 February 1995. The shooting was reported to MILOBS sector 5 HQ on 28 FEB 95 at 2315H. A team composed of MILOBS and CIVPOL was sent to investigate the shooting incident.

CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

The team first went to TUNBATT HQ where they interviewed Maj Ghedifi who is the contingent OPS Offr. Maj Ghedifi stated that at 2230 hrs on 28 February 95, one of his sentries saw some movements of people a 100m from his sentry position. The sentry informed the command element about the movement. A few minutes later, the sentry reported hearing some crying in a village near the sentry post. The TUNBATT commander and the OPS officer ^{then} went to the sentry post to investigate what was going on. When they got to the sentry post they saw a person running from the village towards their positions, the sentry ordered the person in English, French and Kinyarwanda to stop. When the person did not respond, the TUNBATT commander ordered the sentry to fire warning shots in the air.

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The warning shots fired by the sentry provoked a reaction by the RPA patrol in the village who took up positions and returned fire. The fire was directed towards the TUNBATT positions. The firing lasted for about 30 seconds. There were no casualties from the shooting.

Mr Samura
Bonitale

4. From interviewing the TUNBATT OPS Officer, the investigation team went ~~into the~~ to interview the villagers who had runaway to TUNBATT for protection. The villagers stated that at about 2230 hrs on 28 February some 10 to 13 RPA soldiers entered his home. They ordered the people who were seated in one of the houses to open the door and ordered everybody out of the house. When the people were out they were ordered to take off their clothes and seat down, then the RPA soldiers started to ~~beat~~ beat them. Mr Samura then ran away shouting for help towards the TUNBATT positions. He did not hear the order from the sentry for him to stop, he only heard the shots but continued running. The team asked him what he thought could have been the reasons ~~why~~ for the RPA to beat them and he said the soldiers accused them of having been making a lot of noise in the night.

5. The team after the interview with Mr Samura went to the RPA camp where they interviewed Maj Rugamba and Maj Rugambwa the second in command of the local RPA. The two majors denied that their patrol ever exchanged fire with the TUNBATT. They state that their patrol which included Maj Rugambwa only went to TUNBATT after hearing the shooting and they wanted to go and investigate the cause of the shooting. They said at TUNBATT they were told that the firing occurred when TUNBATT sentries heard noise from the village and they thought that there were bandits in the village who were killing civilians and the fire was

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meant to scare the bandits away. Maj Rugambwa stated that when they went into the village to investigate they were told by the villagers that the noise had been caused by drunken people who had a fist fight. The two officers maintained that their patrol only went into the village after the shooting had occurred.

Comments

6. The team is of the opinion that the shooting occurred due to lack of coordination between the TUNBATT and RPA patrols. The team is also of the opinion that the RPA has no patrol programme ^{ever} ~~there~~ soldiers patrol the villages at will and on their own accord. There also seems to be ~~not~~ no ~~limits~~ limits placed by the TUNBATT beyond which the RPA should not patrol at night.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. The investigation team recommends that:
- a. There be coordination between TUNBATT and RPA on patrols.
 - b. Liaison between TUNBATT and RPA be closely maintained.
 - c. UN instructions on when to open fire should seriously be adhered to by all contingent forces.

[Signature]
A Gumbo