

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 30

FILE 3

ACC. 1998/0278

CNR 312 P 1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 October 1995
NUMBER: 3392

SUBJECT: UK position on the future of UNAMIR

info.

RECEIVED
OPERATIONS
27 OCT 21 P 8:31

FC
ED

28.10.95

1. Mr. Derek Plumbly, Head of Chancery at the UK Mission, came to see us on 26 October to convey the views of his Government concerning the future of UNAMIR. They consider that there is no valid case for the continued presence of formed UNations troops after 8 December. The troops are, in their view, under-employed now and it would be difficult to devise a useful set of tasks for them in the next mandate. On the other hand, the UK feels there would be room for a UNations presence headed by a Special Representative, consisting mainly of Milobs and Human Rights monitors who would act as the eyes and ears of the international community. The British Government did not accept the argument that military observers might be subject to intimidation in the absence of formed troops.
2. Continuing, Mr. Plumbly indicated that there was also a valid case to be made for the protection of the International Tribunal which might require the retention of a small military unit. It was important to avoid giving the impression that the UNations was disengaging from Rwanda. In particular, radio UNAMIR should continue its programmes which were seen as playing a useful role. In the course of his recent visit to London, General Kagame had "conceded" to Lady Chalker that if the international community so wished, some UNations presence could be retained. Concerning the SecGen's forthcoming report to the SecCo, the UK considered that it would be preferable if it contained specific recommendations as to the future of UNAMIR, rather than a list of options. The latter would only result in a protracted debate in the Council. Best regards.


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28 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

Reçu le 28 OCT. 1995

TOTAL P.01



CNR 309 P 1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 26 October 1995
 NUMBER: 3380
 SUBJECT: UNAMIR's Mandate

FC
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 27-10-95
 86 03
 26 OCT 1995
 10:26 P 9:25
 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Many thanks for your very useful MIR-3675 of 24 October 1995. Indeed time is pressing and it is necessary that specific progress be achieved very soon in your current consultations with the Government of Rwanda on the future of UNAMIR. We hope that our comments below will prove helpful in the forthcoming meeting with your Rwandese interlocutors on 31 October.
2. Concerning your para. 2 (i), you may wish to remind the Rwandese that UNAMIR, though called an "assistance" mission, was obviously never intended to be a channel for humanitarian or development aid. It was designed to help implement the military/security aspects of the Arusha Agreements. The type of assistance which the Rwandese seem to have in mind is a function of UNDP and the UNations agencies, not of peace-keeping and certainly not of Milobs.
3. Concerning your 2 (ii), we consider that it is important to disabuse the Rwandese Government of the notion that the UNations

Reçu le 27 OCT. 1995

CNR 309 P 2/3

- 2 -

is pressing for an extension of the mandate and is prepared to make concessions to the Rwandese in exchange for their consent. It may be useful to remind the Rwandese that peace-keeping operations are not deployed as "a favour" to the international community, but at the request of the host country in response to a particular need. You may in fact wish to point out to your interlocutors that, in the absence of such a request, we will have no choice but to proceed with preparations for the withdrawal of UNAMIR after 8 December. At a time of increasingly scarce resources, there should be no misunderstanding on this point. We are not there to "drum up" business for ourselves and would certainly be ready to phase out at any time, should that be the wish of the Government of Rwanda.

4. It is essential for the Rwandese Government to clarify, as soon as possible, its stands on this issue, so that we can proceed with our planning in an orderly manner. The sooner they clarify their position, the better.

5. You might add that the international community is not likely to react favourably to the argument that the quid-pro-quo for accepting a continued UNations presence is a commitment by UNAMIR that it would leave equipment behind upon its withdrawal. In this connection, the decision to relinquish any such equipment upon closure of the mission will, as already discussed, be determined on the basis of well-established UNations rules and

CNR 309 P 3/3

- 3 -

regulations which must apply equally to all peace-keeping operations.

6. Concerning your para. 3, we fully endorse your analysis in 3 (iv) of the reasons why a further reduction of UNAMIR troops is feasible only as part of a complete withdrawal of the formed infantry units. In this connection, the suggestion in 3 (v) for a specific increase in the UNAMIR troop strength cannot be entertained in the climate currently prevailing in the Security Council. We would, however, appreciate clarification of your suggestion for "fine-tuning" the mandate to make our military presence relevant.

7. In the meantime, we will continue to press the Rwandese Permanent Representative here for clarifications on the views of his Government. As indicated in our cable 3316 of 19 October, we expect a reply from the Rwandese Ambassador by end of this week. We shall also continue to seek the views of interested Governments on the future mandate of UNAMIR.

9. We will of course keep you fully informed of developments at this end. Best regards.

FE
Please read and if
you have any corrections
or further suggestions
you may do so and you
may sign on his
behalf. A copy is kept
with ED.

1152
24-10-95



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

GOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

NG/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1995

NO.: MIR _____

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. Please refer to my previous code cables on the above subject.
2. As we near the date for the conclusion of the present mandate, now only six weeks away, the following parameters have emerged in bolder relief:
 - i) The Rwandese Government has given no indication that it has changed its position that UNAMIR's present mandate should end after December 9 when the military component (essentially formed troops) should phase out. The Rwandese Government may accept Milobs, some Civpol trainers and possibly a small (300) contingent of formed troops for guard duties. The Rwandese Government feels that UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian assistance mission aiming to channel UN aid into Rwanda.

He is now to be seen in his hand on the issue at all
levels of relations and secretariat demarches, and here in Kigali.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

95 OCT 25

195 OCT 25

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EPN-366

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1995

NO.:

MIR - 3675

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. Please refer to my previous code cables on the above subject.
2. As we near the date for the conclusion of the present mandate, now only six weeks away, the following parameters have emerged in bolder relief:
 - i) The Rwandese Government has given no indication that it has changed its position that UNAMIR's present mandate should end after December 9 when the military component (essentially formed troops) should phase out. The Rwandese Government may accept Milobs, some Civpol trainers and possibly a small (300) contingent of formed troops for guard duties. The Rwandese Government feels that UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian assistance mission aiming to channel UN aid into Rwanda.



ii) The Rwandese Government is aware of the positive role that UNAMIR's continued military presence would play in the critical 6-12 months ahead to persuade refugees to return voluntarily. It is aware also that a phase-out of UNAMIR troops at this critical juncture would be viewed with concern by donor countries, UNHCR and other agencies. Rwanda leaves itself "open to persuasion" by the international community for the continuation of the current mandate. Any agreement to continue the mandate would be presented as a "favour" to the international community for which a quid-pro-quo would be expected. This would take the form of matériel to be left behind on conclusion of the mandate.

iii) Rwanda feels it is likely to gain maximum advantage by allowing negotiations to take place nearer the time of the mandate's termination.

iv) As far as the UN is concerned, it has a completely neutral view on the extension of the current mandate for a further period. Unlike the negotiations for the present mandate, in June, when the UN had a clear interest in staying on even in reduced form, the UN has no particular preference and would willingly phase out after the current mandate.

v) Only the donor countries (minus USA?), UNHCR and UN Agencies appear keen that UNAMIR should continue its mandate as, otherwise refugee return could be adversely affected. Zaire, Tanzania and OAU are likely to adopt a similar approach, as may the non-aligned caucus in the Security Council. Incidentally, the majority of people in Rwanda, though not necessarily the ruling elite, would also prefer UNAMIR to stay on in Rwanda mainly for security reasons.

Conclusion

3. Given the parameters stated above, the following broad conclusions may be drawn:

i) It is in our interest to engage the Rwandese immediately in discussions on the future mandate. The Rwandese Government should be asked to reveal its hand on the issue at all levels, eg, in New York, through friendly delegations and secretariat demarches, and here in Kigali.



ii) It is important that the Security Council should be made aware of the need to engage in discussions now rather than close to the wire which would be Rwanda's preference.

iii) It needs to be made clear to the Rwandese government that the UN is willing to phase-out after 9th December.

iv) It should be made clear to Rwanda and to Security Council members that a further reduction in formed troops is not feasible because a) we cease to be an operational unit, b) we are unable to provide the security and logistic back-up that is expected of us to induce refugee return, c) we give the negative image of "garrison Kigali" in which peace-keepers are seen only to be protecting themselves and d) we are not capable of fulfilling our mandate particularly if events turn ugly. Therefore, a reduction of our formed troops is not feasible. However a reduction from 320 to 280 Milobs and from 120 to 55 Civpol is possible.

v) Ideally, we need an additional two companies in the prefectures (Kibuye and Gitarama) where we currently have no presence. Moreover if we are to continue, the relevant subparagraphs of our mandate should be fine-tuned so that our military presence in Rwanda becomes relevant.

vi) An indication may be given to Rwanda that as much material as possible (ie that is redundant or is counter-productive to transport elsewhere) would be left behind.

Recommendations

4. Based on the above conclusions, I would recommend the following course of action:

i) We may take advantage of President Bizimungu's visit to New York for the 50th Anniversary Celebration and place the ball squarely in his court regarding his government's stand in UNAMIR's future mandate. I shall endeavour to do the same with Vice-President Kagame who has just returned from a visit to UK.



ii) The UN may also make it clear to President Bizimungu that it is prepared to phase-out.

iii) It should also be explained to Rwanda and to Security Council members that a curtailment of the military contingent is not feasible.

iv) Important donor countries and Security Council members may also take the opportunity of President Bizimungu's presence in New York to inform him of their expectations of Rwanda regarding the future mandate.

v) In Kigali, during my next round of negotiations with the Rwandese delegation planned for 31 October, I may be authorised to make points at para 4 (i-iii) above.

Best regards.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONSTO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 19 October 1995

NUMBER: 3316

SUBJECT: Conversation with Permanent Representative of Rwanda

RECEIVED

20 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

1. The Permanent Representative of Rwanda came to see us on 18 October at our request to discuss the future status of UNAMIR. We pointed out that we were yet to hear about his Government's position on this subject, since no clear indications were being given by the Government in your discussions with them. We stressed that, for planning purposes, we needed this information within two weeks, since we wished to ensure that our decision as to what was operationally and financially feasible in this regard should fully take into account the Rwandese position. We therefore asked him to press his Government for an early reply, failing which, we told him, we would have no option but to proceed on the assumption the mission will close upon the expiration of its mandate on 8 December.

2. Ambassador Bakuramutsa promised to convey these points to his Government and to get back to us next week. We agreed, however, that the substantive discussions on this issue would have to continue in Kigali. You therefore should press for clear presentations by the Government of its position. We hope these will be forthcoming after our démarche here.

Best regards.

FC
(E)See
20/10copy to
Mr. Conde
Ms. Rafu
for info

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-10-19 23:17 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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CNR - 300 P1/1

UNITED NATIONS
CELL OPERATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

FC
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20.10.95

TO: OCT 19 P 7:14
KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 19 October 1995
NUMBER: 3315
SUBJECT: UNAMIR Mandate



RECEIVED
20 OCT 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG UNAMIR

Following our telephone conversation of 19 October, I wish to confirm our understanding regarding the rotation of UNAMIR Milobs whose tours of duty are due to expire prior to 8 December. We will ask the governments concerned to extend the tours of these observers until 8 December, by which time we will know the future status of the mission. Milobs whose governments are unable to extend their tours will be repatriated without replacement.

Best regards.

Please copy
to Mr Conde
Ms Rafii

The position is
should the pilots rotate
in now be kept on (and
not rotate). Grateful for your
views.

FC.

See
20/10