

3PdeC

TOUR D'HORIZON

JAN/FEB 1985

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

Clear 47

JAN 29 2013

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1022  
BOX 66  
FILE 6  
ACC. 94/152

## AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS

The current economic crisis in Africa has two aspects: continuing emergency situations related to drought and gloomy long-term development prospects.

Current indications are that the effects of the drought will be even more severe in 1985 than last year, with consequent implications for increased hunger and malnutrition, deterioration of health conditions, depletion of livestock, and increased refugees and displaced persons. According to preliminary estimates, food aid requirements for 1985 will be in the order of 5 million tonnes as opposed to approximately 3 million tonnes in 1984. The situation is complicated by serious logistic problems and, in some areas, continuing civil strife.

At the December 1984 meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, donor countries recognized the need for improved co-ordination and agreed to work closely with you to organize effective international emergency action. African states meeting at the November 1984 OAU summit also endorsed your initiative and established a Special Emergency Assistance for Drought and Famine in Africa.

Within the UN, an Office for Emergency Operations in Africa has been established under the leadership of Mr. Bradford Morse with the assistance of USGs Farah and Adedeji. Mr. Maurice Strong of Canada has been appointed as Executive Co-ordinator of the Office.

African leaders have emphasized that emergency measures must be accompanied by more long-term development efforts. This is also the basic approach in the declaration on the critical economic situation in Africa adopted by consensus in the General Assembly.

Prospects are not promising. Although Africa was hard hit by the recent world recession, it has probably benefited least of any region from the recovery which has begun. Attention has focused on the debt problems of major debtor countries, most of which are in Latin America; however, many small African countries face debt service payments which, while not large in the aggregate, represent an almost impossible drain on their very limited resources. Unless trends are reversed, the net flow of financial assistance to Africa will decline significantly in the near future. Commodity prices remain low and the terms of trade unfavourable. It is critical to reverse declining per capita food production, a trend which predates the current drought.

Much remains to be done by African countries themselves in adopting and implementing policies to promote development. Donor countries have emphasized the need for African governments to adopt more appropriate domestic policies and to enter into "consultation" in the formulation and implementation of these policies. Many African governments are in fact attempting to carry out the necessary policy adjustments; however, they are fearful that policy consultations will lead to unacceptable influence over the conduct of their national policies. The UN has a potentially vital role as a neutral participant in such policy consultations.

In your various statements, you have called to the attention of the international community the need to address the more long-term development problems. In addition, you have undertaken in areas under your direct competence, to focus the efforts of the UN on specific priority areas for long-term development, including human resource development, the protection of the disadvantaged and the maintenance and repair of production, transport and communications infrastructures.

H. Omayad  
17 January 1985

From Mr. Morse's office

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Nature of the Emergency Operation

The Secretary-General brought the serious situation in Africa to the attention of the international community over a year ago. His latest action has been the creation of a special Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, and to designate Bradford Morse as its head.

Mr. Morse has emphasized that the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa will focus on putting together a programme to produce effective results in the shortest possible time. Aside from mobilizing assistance, the Office will seek to ensure the establishment of efficient machinery at both the international and country levels, so that aid speedily reaches those in need. In effect, the situation merits an international mobilization of all UN elements, Specialized Agencies, donors, recipient countries and NGOs.

Mr. Morse stresses that the terrible experience that Africa is now suffering should inspire the international community to look not only at the immediate emergency, but at the longer and larger future. Unless effective actions are taken to remedy the problems that plague Africa, there will be successive emergencies. Thus, the emergency operations will also be oriented towards facilitating more lasting solutions in collaboration with the appropriate governments and agencies. Mr. Morse has been in touch with the World Bank on the medium and long-term measures that the latter is undertaking.

The new Office will not superimpose a structure duplicating what already exists, nor does it intend to do anything that some other entity could do. It will rely on existing field establishments.



Mr. Morse and his colleagues will try to inspire, to motivate, to set standards and to insist that people meet the standards, to do the job most effectively.

Immediate action points

The Office is at present concentrating on the following areas:

1. Assessment of needs.

An appraisal process has been initiated for nine countries in addition to Ethiopia, and the field action agents have been requested to provide, by 18 January, an assessment upon which plans could be elaborated and effected. The nine countries are Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger and the Sudan. In addition, assessments have also been requested for ten other African countries which have also been severely affected (Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). These countries have been identified on the basis of objective data compiled by the United Nations.

2. Delineating a framework for action by the different participants in the Emergency Operation.

This includes continuing consultations with all elements of the United Nations to define responsibilities and to focus assistance to Africa in the most effective manner. Mr. Morse is visiting Rome and Geneva from January 10 to January 14 for this purpose. An extraordinary degree of collaboration has already been achieved, in particular between the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions. In addition, Mr. Morse, Mr. Adedeji and Mr. Farah are engaged in consultations with the OAU and recipient Governments, and non-governmental organizations participating in this effort.

3. Encouraging contributions to the emergency effort

The Secretary-General has indicated that he is gratified by the recent U.S. announcement of a contribution of 1.5 million tons of food aid for Africa for the current fiscal year ending 31 October 1985. This represents something in excess of \$1 billion, and meets a considerable percentage of the total requirements that had been identified for Africa this year. Consultations will intensify with donor countries which have already made substantial grants of food aid to Africa, and other potential donors are being identified. Consultations with donor governments will be stepped up on the basis of the assessment of needs to be received in January 1985.

4. Ensuring full operations of the Emergency Office in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Morse will spare no effort in obtaining the best personnel to make the Emergency Office fully operational. A major step is the designation of Mr. Maurice Strong of Canada, as Executive Co-ordinator. Further appointments are expected shortly.

## Refugees in Africa

1. Because of the critical situation in Africa arising from drought, food-shortage and other emergencies, the UNHCR in November 1984 was obliged to launch a Special Appeal for funds to meet the urgent needs of refugees. The four countries particularly affected are:

1. Central African Republic
2. Ethiopia
3. Somalia and
4. Sudan.

Attachement 1 sets out the estimated needs and the status of contributions. Against the total UNHCR cash requirement of US\$27.2 million, only US\$8.7 million have been received leaving a short fall of US\$18.4 million.

2. UNHCR, in cooperation with the Governments and other agencies concerned, began in November 1984 Special Programmes of basic emergency care and maintenance of a temporary kind until such time as appropriate conditions, climatic or political as the case may be, permit either those who can go home or those returnees who have returned home to establish a basically secure life. The emergency programmes are planned within the time-frame up to 30 April 1985. UNHCR will evaluate each situation in March 1985 and will then inform donors of the needs and assistance plans beyond April 1985.

3. The High Commissioner has suggested that the Secretary-General might mention these pressing needs to potential donors during his forthcoming trip to UK, SE Asia and the Pacific.

4. Attachement 2 gives details of the situation in the four priority countries mentioned above.



J.P. Kavanagh/lc  
16 January 1985

Attachment 1

CONTRIBUTIONS IN RESPONSE TO UNHCR APPEAL FOR EMERGENCY NEEDS  
IN AFRICA (as at 10 January 1985)

Total UNHCR requirements (i.e. excluding basic food) \$27,164,205

| <u>Contributions</u>                      | <u>US\$</u>               |
|---|---------------------------|
| Denmark                                   | 727,273                   |
| Germany, Federal Republic of              | 1,545,024                 |
| Japan                                     | 473,251                   |
| Oman                                      | 660,000                   |
| Switzerland                               | 1,376,472                 |
| United Kingdom                            | 1,513,317                 |
| EEC                                       | 1,914,618                 |
| Asahi Shimbun (Japan)                     | 146,914                   |
| Caritas (GFR)                             | 108,583                   |
| Diakonisches Werk/Brot fur die Welt (GFR) | 112,934                   |
| Norwegian Refugee Council                 | 300,000                   |
| Private (Denmark)                         | <u>45,455</u>             |
| Total US\$                                | <u><u>\$8,923,841</u></u> |

## Attachment 2

### Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic, some 40,000 Chadian refugees are being given emergency assistance in the border area while arrangements are under way to move them as soon as possible to more secure areas further inland where decent settlement conditions can be found. The total cash requirement are US\$4.12 million.

### Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, UNHCR with the implementing cooperation of World University Service of Canada (WUSC) is carrying out a relief programme (valued at US\$3.37 million) of food distribution and essential medical supplies to those in need among the returnees (estimated at over 300,000) in the drought-stricken Hararghe area.

### Somalia

In Somalia, special accommodation areas and focal points of assistance have been set up for 60,000 new arrivals and Ethiopia. Basic needs valued at US\$2.05 million such as shelter, blankets, domestic utensils and medical supplies are being met as cash resources permit.

### Sudan

In Western Sudan, UNHCR is carrying out a programme of emergency assistance costed at US\$3.01 million for some 60,000 Chadians who have arrived in the area. The main needs are food, shelter and basic medical supplies. In Eastern Sudan, both the overall situation and the scale of needs are the most critical. Since November 1984, some 170,000 new arrivals have been registered and the influx continues. Basic needs such as tents, supplementary food, blankets and medicines plus the establishment of temporary accommodation centres require some US\$14.52 million.

## Notes on the critical economic situation in Africa

(provided by Mr. Ripert's office, 15/1/1985)

A large number of African countries are presently facing very serious economic and social problems.

### The effects of drought

Firstly, as a result of drought, about 20 countries will experience food shortages in the 1984/85 crop year. Total cereal requirements in these countries, that will not be met by local production, is expected to reach about 10 million tonnes. It is expected that about half of this amount will be met from commercial imports, by African countries who are in a position to do so. However, there is an estimated requirement of about 5 million tonnes for food aid in the 1984/85 season. Pledges of about 3 million tonnes have been made by donor countries (mostly the US and EEC countries).

In several countries, there is a serious threat to human life. The case of Ethiopia (7 million people affected by famine) is well known, having been widely publicized by the media. However, taking into account factors such as the percentage of affected population, resources (human and financial) to deal with the emergency situation, the United Nations believe that, at present, the following countries also are most seriously affected by drought and food shortages: Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Angola, Niger, Mauritania and Kenya.

It is important to note that emergency situations evolve with time. Some of the above countries might witness an improvement in their situation, if rain occurs. Others, not yet listed as being in serious critical situation, might suddenly witness a dramatic deterioration of the situation.

It is also important to note that drought has in fact compounded problems that already existed in a large number of African countries: deteriorating economic conditions, harsh effect of the international environment etc. Most of the affected countries are classified as Least Developed Countries.

### The Economic difficulties of African countries

A large number of African countries has been faced with serious economic difficulties since 1980, partly as a result of ill-oriented domestic policies and partly as a result of the harsh international environment. There are fundamental economic problems of a medium to long-term nature which have to be tackled in an urgent manner, in order to avoid a recurrence of economic crisis.

Over the past year, the rise in interest rates, the strengthening of the dollar (currency in which most borrowings were made) the drop in the price fetched by primary commodities (such as coffee, tea, copper, sugar) have contributed towards a dramatic deterioration of the balance of payments of African countries, an upsurge of their external debt, and internal budgetary difficulties. The situation, according to many analysts, including World Bank's, has been aggravated by the low priority given by African countries to

modernization of their agricultural sector, the mainstay of their economy; as well as by an unsatisfactory return on investments ("misallocation of scarce resources"). The relative ineffectiveness of ODA (development aid) has also been mentioned. Population in Africa, is growing at a faster pace than agricultural production. In addition, both as a result of climatic conditions and of man-made activities, the desertification process in large parts of Africa is growing.

(see attached table for economic indicators for specific countries).

#### Actions taken by African countries

Many countries have embarked on strict austerity programmes, in order to adjust to present economic circumstances. The IMF and World Bank have been active in negotiating with over 15 countries conditions of a financial and economic package that would enable them to improve their economic performance and regain momentum for future growth.

#### Action taken by donor community

Major donors have been, in general, responding to emergency needs (although they have been slow in doing so). It is to be noted that in many countries, the very active role of NGO's, the pressure of public opinion have been instrumental in bringing governments to increase their assistance to African countries.

Major donors, however, are convinced that there could be a better utilization of development aid, than is the case at present. They believe that, with better coordination and effective management, far better results could be achieved. The above remark concerns both multilateral and bilateral aid agencies.

#### Action taken by the United Nations

Early in 1984, the Secretary-General undertook an initiative to increase international awareness for the critical situation in Africa and to mobilize resources to deal with the situation. It appears that his initiative was very timely, as the international community had not yet fully realized the extent of the crisis.

The Secretary-General took certain administrative measures to deal with the emergency situation (Special Representative, temporary office in Nairobi, in 1984, creation of the Office for Emergency Operations, appointment of Mr. Morse, in 1985). This shows the importance the UN attaches to the present situation.

ECA, ECOSOC, and the General Assembly, each in turn, discussed the economic situation in Africa, and proposed action to be taken. The exercise culminated in the adoption by consensus by the General Assembly of a Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, which analyses the present situation, and recommends a broad framework for action by the international community to deal with the causes of such situation. The need for emergency measures is also highlighted.

international community to deal with the causes of such situation. The need for emergency measures is also highlighted.

The United Nations organizations have taken action, within their respective sphere of competence, to deal with the African problems (UNHCR appeals for refugees, UNICEF special programme with a \$60 million target; UNDP and its thorough reorganization of its activities for Africa). In addition, the Secretary-General himself made specific proposals for action in his Note to the General Assembly on the occasion of the debate on Africa (doc. A/39/627, attached). Paragraphs 13 to 16 of this Note contain his main proposals.

There has also been specific action undertaken by the United Nations concerning Ethiopia, (appointment of Kurt Jannsen as Assistant-Secretary-General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia, donors meeting etc). It should be noted that all UN agencies have indicated their support to the Secretary-General's initiative, in particular for the emergency operations.

As concerns capital assistance to Africa, the United Nations, for its part, is giving particular support to the efforts of World Bank for its special medium term programme for Africa, and to IFAD for its interventions in the agricultural field.



Table 1 Basic indicators

|                                      | Population<br>(millions)<br>mid-1982 | Area<br>(thousands<br>of square<br>kilometers) | GNP per capita <sup>a</sup> |   | Average annual<br>rate of inflation<br>(percent) |                      | Life<br>expectancy<br>at birth<br>(years)<br>1982 | Index of<br>food production<br>per capita<br>(1969-71 = 100)<br>1980-82<br>(average) |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|---|--|----------------------|---|--|
|                                      |                                      |  | Dollars<br>1982             | Average<br>annual<br>growth rate<br>(percent)<br>1960-82 <sup>b</sup> | 1960-70  | 1970-82 <sup>c</sup> |   |  |
| Low-income economies                 | 213.5 t                              | 12,992 t                                       | 249 w                       | 0.7 w   | 2.6 m  | 10.8 m               | 49 w  | 88 w   |
| low-income exclud                    | 29.3 t                               | 4,714 t  | 218 w                       | -0.1 w  | 3.4 m  | 9.8 m                | 44 w  | 85 w   |
| 1. Chad                              | 4.6                                  | 1,284  | 80                          | -2.8  | 4.6  | 7.8                  | 44  | 95   |
| 2. Mali                              | 7.1                                  | 1,240  | 180                         | 1.6   | 5.0  | 9.8                  | 45  | 83   |
| 3. Upper Volta                       | 6.5                                  | 274  | 210                         | 1.1   | 1.3  | 9.7                  | 44  | 95   |
| 4. Somalia                           | 4.5                                  | 638  | 290                         | -0.1  | 4.5  | /12.6//              | 39  | 60   |
| 5. Niger                             | 5.9                                  | 1,267  | 310                         | -1.5  | 2.1  | 12.1                 | 45  | 88   |
| 6. Gambia, The                       | 0.7                                  | 11   | 360                         | 2.5   | 2.2  | 9.7                  | 36  | 74   |
| low-income other                     | 184.2 t                              | 8,278 t  | 254 w                       | 0.9 w   | 2.6 m  | 11.7 m               | 49 w  | 88 w   |
| 7. Ethiopia                          | 32.9                                 | 1,222  | 140                         | 1.4   | 2.1  | 4.0                  | 47  | 94   |
| 8. Guinea-Bissau                     | 0.8                                  | 36   | 170                         | /-1.7//   | ..   | 7.1                  | 38  | 88   |
| 9. Zaire                             | 30.7                                 | 2,345  | 190                         | -0.3  | 29.9   | /35.3//              | 50  | 87   |
| 10. Malawi                           | 6.5                                  | 118  | 210                         | 2.6   | 2.4  | 9.5                  | 44  | 99   |
| 11. Uganda                           | 13.5                                 | 236  | 230                         | -1.1  | 3.2  | 47.4                 | 47  | 86   |
| 12. Rwanda                           | 5.5                                  | 26   | 260                         | 1.7   | 13.1   | /13.4//              | 46  | 105  |
| 13. Burundi                          | 4.3                                  | 28   | 280                         | 2.5   | 2.8  | 12.5                 | 47  | 96   |
| 14. Tanzania                         | 19.8                                 | 945  | 280                         | 1.9   | 1.8  | 11.9                 | 52  | 88   |
| 15. Benin                            | 3.7                                  | 113  | 310                         | 0.6   | 1.9  | 9.6                  | 48  | 100  |
| 16. Central African Rep.             | 2.4                                  | 623  | 310                         | 0.6   | 4.1  | 12.6                 | 48  | 104  |
| 17. Guinea                           | 5.7                                  | 246  | 310                         | 1.5   | 1.5  | 3.3                  | 38  | 89   |
| 18. Madagascar                       | 9.2                                  | 587  | 320                         | -0.5  | 3.2  | 11.5                 | 48  | 94   |
| 19. Togo                             | 2.8                                  | 57   | 340                         | 2.3   | 1.3  | 8.8                  | 47  | 89   |
| 20. Ghana                            | 12.2                                 | 239  | 360                         | -1.3  | 7.5  | 39.5                 | 55  | 72   |
| 21. Kenya                            | 18.1                                 | 583  | 390                         | 2.8   | 1.6  | 10.1                 | 57  | 88   |
| 22. Sierra Leone                     | 3.2                                  | 72   | 390                         | /0.9//  | ..   | 12.2                 | 38  | 81   |
| 23. /Mozambique//                    | 12.9                                 | 802  | ..                          | ..  | ..   | ..                   | 51  | 68   |
| Middle-income oil<br>importers       | 56.1 t                               | 5,959 t  | 634 w                       | 0.9 w   | 2.4 m  | 11.4 m               | 49 w  | 91 w   |
| 24. Sudan                            | 20.2                                 | 2,506  | 440                         | -0.4  | 3.9  | 15.2                 | 47  | 87   |
| 25. Mauritania                       | 1.6                                  | 1,031  | 470                         | 1.4   | 2.1  | 8.7                  | 45  | 73   |
| 26. Liberia                          | 2.0                                  | 111  | 490                         | 0.9   | 1.9  | 8.5                  | 54  | 88   |
| 27. Senegal                          | 6.0                                  | 196  | 490                         | (.)   | 1.8  | 7.9                  | 44  | 93   |
| 28. Lesotho                          | 1.4                                  | 30   | 510                         | 6.5   | 2.7  | 11.4                 | 53  | 84   |
| 29. Zambia                           | 6.0                                  | 753  | 640                         | -0.1  | 7.6  | 8.7                  | 51  | 87   |
| 30. Zimbabwe                         | 7.5                                  | 391  | 850                         | 1.5   | 1.1  | 8.4                  | 56  | 87   |
| 31. Botswana                         | 0.9                                  | 600  | 900                         | 6.8   | 2.4  | 11.5                 | 60  | 73   |
| 32. Swaziland                        | 0.7                                  | 17   | 940                         | 4.2   | 2.4  | 12.8                 | 54  | 107  |
| 33. Ivory Coast                      | 8.9                                  | 322  | 950                         | 2.1   | 2.8  | 12.4                 | 47  | 107  |
| 34. Mauritius                        | 0.9                                  | 2  | 1,240                       | 2.1   | 2.2  | 15.0                 | 66  | 110  |
| Middle-income oil<br>exporters       | 110.3 t                              | 3,256 t  | 889 w                       | 3.2 w   | 4.5 m  | 12.6 m               | 50 w  | 92 w   |
| 35. Nigeria                          | 90.6                                 | 924  | 860                         | 3.3   | 4.0  | 14.4                 | 50  | 92   |
| 36. Cameroon                         | 9.3                                  | 475  | 890                         | 2.6   | 4.2  | 10.7                 | 53  | 102  |
| 37. Congo, People's Rep.             | 1.7                                  | 342  | 1,180                       | 2.7   | 4.7  | 10.8                 | 60  | 81   |
| 38. Gabon                            | 0.7                                  | 268  | 4,000                       | 4.4   | 5.4  | 19.5                 | 49  | 93   |
| 39. /Angola//                        | 8.0                                  | 1,247  | ..                          | ..  | ..   | ..                   | 43  | 77   |
| Sub-Saharan Africa                   | 380.0 t                              | 22,207 t                                       | 491 w                       | 1.5 w   | 2.7 m  | 11.4 m               | 49 w  | 89 w   |
| All low-income countries             | 2,266.5 t                            | 29,097 t                                       | 280 t                       | 3.0 w   | 3.2 m  | 11.5 m               | 59 w  | 110 w  |
| All lower middle-income<br>countries | 669.6 t                              | 20,952 t                                       | 840 w                       | 3.2 w   | 2.9 m  | 11.7 m               | 56 w  | 108 w  |
| All upper middle-income<br>countries | 488.7 t                              | 22,079 t                                       | 2,490 w                     | 4.1 w   | 3.0 m  | 16.4 m               | 65 w  | 115 w  |
| Industrial market economies          | 722.9 t                              | 30,935 t                                       | 11,070 w                    | 3.3 w   | 4.3 m  | 9.9 m                | 75 w  | 114 w  |

Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

a. See the technical notes.

b. Because data for the early 1960s are not always available, figures in italics are for periods other than that specified.

c. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82.

# A F R I C A

## STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 17 December 1984

It was about a year ago that I first met with you to share my growing anxiety about the critical economic and social situation in Africa. I called on the international community to undertake more effective, concerted and timely action, and warned that if we failed to do so, the economic survival of many countries would be seriously threatened.

Events have subsequently confirmed that my concern was fully justified. As we are meeting here today, millions of Africans are suffering from hunger and malnutrition, and many have already died. Health conditions are deteriorating. Vast numbers of people are moving within and across national boundaries in search of food. As for the children, even many of those who escape death will be impaired for life.

There is, of course, no accurate measure of the extent of the crisis. But the orders of magnitude are indicative: 150 million people threatened by starvation or malnutrition; food aid requirements increasing to approximately 5 million tonnes a year; an estimated 4 million refugees and returnees and an untold number of displaced persons; emergency resources required in the health field estimated at approximately \$370 million.

Major efforts have been made by the Governments and peoples of Africa, the donor community, including non-governmental organizations and the organizations of the United Nations system. But the unfortunate reality is that these efforts have not kept pace with the growing needs. The peoples in many countries of Africa are worse off now than they were at the beginning of the year and their prospects for the future are dimmer. No one can be proud of this record, and the world must share the responsibility.

We are agreed on the seriousness of the problem and know that it will be with us for some time. There is no need for further analysis and prescription on my part. The Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa recently approved by consensus in the General Assembly represents a common expression of what needs to be done. Recent developments have demonstrated the capacity of everyday peoples for genuinely humane response. The challenge is to transform the current level of concern into a continuing commitment over time and to translate the principles of the Declaration into concrete action.

I call on all those represented in this room - governments, international and intergovernmental organizations, the volunteer community - to respond more effectively to this challenge in 1985. To do so will require short, medium and long-term activities covering the full range of economic and social issues. I wish to assure you that as Secretary-General, I will do everything that I can to see that the United Nations does its part.

Distinguished guests,

In recent weeks, we have all been painfully reminded of the reality of famine and malnutrition in Africa. As you know, I myself recently visited the drought stricken areas of Ethiopia. I was appalled by the human suffering which I witnessed. The world can rightly ask how this was allowed to happen in spite of the many warnings which were given. Must we wait for media publicity to inspire our actions? Perhaps more important now is, how can we respond to minimize the human suffering and how can we prevent this in the future?

The organizations of the system have been involved since the beginning of the crisis in Ethiopia and they also alerted us to the impending disaster. Given the magnitude of the crisis engulfing the country, I appointed an Assistant Secretary-General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia to complement the on-going efforts of the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator. The Assistant Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Government and the donor community, formulated a specific programme of emergency assistance covering all aspects of the situation. Following consultations with interested parties in Addis Ababa, I am convening a meeting of interested donors at UN Headquarters tomorrow morning. We will also be meeting later with interested non-governmental organizations on the programme. I sincerely hope that all those in a position to do so will respond to the commonly-agreed emergency needs of the country.

Distinguished guests,

As we are all aware, Ethiopia is not the only country facing the immediate threat of massive starvation. We cannot ignore any situation which poses a threat to human life, and some demand urgent attention.

Since the beginning of the year, the United Nations Resident Co-ordinators, upon my instructions, have been consulting with the Governments of affected countries and the resident donor community to identify the most urgent needs. The results of these consultations have been reported to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly by my Special Representative, Mr. Adebayo Adedeji.

Everyone agrees that some of these countries are in a particularly critical situation and require urgent action. These include Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso and the Sudan. In many cases the basic elements of a specific programme of emergency assistance are already known as a result of our continuing consultations and need only to be integrated and refined with particular emphasis on identifying the gap between needs and commitments. I have asked the Resident Co-ordinators in the most affected countries to arrange as soon as possible, and not later than 31 January 1985, country meetings with all interested parties to reach common agreement on common action. Field representatives of non-governmental organizations are to be fully involved in this process, taking into account the excellent work they are doing.

I will undertake follow-up action as recommended by the country meetings for the actual implementation of the agreed country programme. This may involve donors meetings focussing on a specific country, as in the case of Ethiopia, or on groups of countries. This may also involve, as it has been suggested, the convening of a special meeting on emergency situations in all affected countries in Africa. This would, of course, require the agreement of all those involved, both donor and recipient.

In this context, let me note that while the process outlined above is focussed on country situations, it is important to have a global perspective so as to assure comprehensiveness and equity in our efforts. It is most important to look ahead rather than simply react to developments. My Special Representative, in consultation with the relevant organizations of the UN system, is completing a study on perspectives and needs for 1985.

Given the dimensions of the present crisis, we must make fullest use of the process of country meetings, and do so without delay. I urgently appeal to the donor community in particular to participate constructively in the various meetings and to carry out the agreed programmes of action by providing the necessary emergency supplies, be they food or medicine or other essentials.

All the organizations of the United Nations system concerned have played a positive role in responding to emergency situations in Africa. But clearly our performance can be improved. After reviewing the field capacity to deal with emergency situations, I have undertaken certain actions in co-operation with my colleagues at Headquarters:

(1) I have asked each UN organization directly involved in emergency operations in Africa to designate a senior official at Headquarters who will be able to devote full attention to backstopping emergency operations in the field. Given the overall responsibilities of Resident Co-ordinators, I am pleased to note that a senior UNDP official has been so designated. He will monitor preparations for country meetings as well as assume co-ordination of other emergency activities of UNDP.

(2) Similarly, I have asked each of these organizations to review its field staff to ensure that we have the right people in place. I have been assured that this review is underway and will be acted upon.

(3) I have asked UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UNDRO to establish high level, operational oriented teams to visit field offices when necessary to ensure that our collective field capacity in the affected countries is fully equipped to carry out its responsibilities. An important element in this exercise is ensuring the closest possible co-ordination of both personnel and operations.

The above measures, taken together, should ensure that we have the right people in place and that together they form cohesive teams, drawing upon and utilizing, in an optimum fashion, the special expertise of each of the organizations.

I have reviewed the temporary arrangements I had made at the beginning of the year. In the light of experience, I have taken the following decisions as of the 1st of January:

(1) I have established under my direct supervision a special unit - the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa. This Office will assist me to ensure that all elements directly responsible to me as Secretary-General work together with the highest degree of effectiveness and harmony in bringing to bear their respective competences in assisting the African countries which have been so severely affected, in meeting the emergency situation. The establishment of this Office will have no implications for the regular budget.

(2) I have asked my colleague, Mr. Bradford Morse, one of the most senior officials of the United Nations, to direct this undertaking and to devote a major part of his time, energy and experience to the endeavour.

(3) I have also requested Under-Secretary-General Adebayo Adedeji, who will continue to serve as my Special Representative in Africa, and Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim Farah, to serve as members of the Office.

In addition to ensuring effective co-ordination of the assistance and support of the United Nations for those African countries which have been so cruelly and tragically affected by catastrophic drought and famine, this new Office will provide all appropriate and necessary assistance as may be requested by the affected countries and the international community at large, including the donor governments and other non-governmental organizations, in order to help to ensure a broad yet concentrated international response to the continuing crisis.

The Office for Emergency Operations in Africa has been established in order to ensure my personal and constant involvement with the assistance of the Director-General in the critical situation which many countries of Africa face. I urge all governments and all elements of the United Nations system to extend to it, and thus to me, their fullest co-operation.

As a consequence of the above arrangements, I have decided that it is no longer necessary to maintain the temporary office established in Nairobi or the Advisory Group in Headquarters.

There are other areas on which we must work. For example, I believe it is important for the United Nations system to better integrate field missions so as to reduce the number and provide more comprehensive coverage, and thus to enhance their credibility and facilitate an adequate follow-up to their recommendations.

I am also aware that the multiplicity of appeals made by the various organizations of the United Nations may be confusing to the donor community. We must find a way to provide a more coherent framework for these appeals. In saying this, however, let me emphasize that the



various appeals that have been made are valid and genuine. They have my fullest support. It would be both disingenuous and unfair for the donor community to use "multiplicity" as an excuse for not responding immediately to all the appeals, whether launched by UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDRO, UNDP, FAO/WFP or others.

On these, as well as other related issues, I will be consulting with my senior advisors in UN Headquarters as well as executive heads of the organizations of the UN system. It is my intention to raise these issues in forthcoming meetings of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. However, neither the United Nations nor the United Nations system as a whole can do it alone. We will need the full co-operation and support of all interested parties.

Distinguished guests,

My comments thus far have focussed on the emergency situation in Africa. This is an area in which the United Nations can and must act immediately. The question of saving human lives simply cannot be put off. I am greatly encouraged by the recent endorsement of my efforts by the OAU Summit Meeting in November, by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD meeting in December and by the General Assembly.

But, as I have emphasized from the beginning, it is equally important to attack the more long-term problems of rehabilitation and development. I can assure you that we in the United Nations have not and will not ignore this side of the equation. Our regular programmes are directed for the most part to development issues. In the note which I submitted at the opening of the general debate in the General Assembly on the critical situation in Africa, I outlined measures which I proposed to undertake with the co-operation of all my colleagues to assure that our programmes focus on the priority needs as identified by the countries of Africa. I identified specific programmes in the general fields of human resource development, the protection of underprivileged groups, and the maintenance and repair of production, transport and communications infrastructure. I intend actively to pursue this in the coming weeks.

During my recent visit to the OAU Summit Meeting, I had the opportunity to meet with many Heads of State and Government in Africa. I was impressed by their genuine commitment to undertake, individually and collectively, policy measures to improve the performance of their economies. This has been reconfirmed in the gracious letter sent to me by President Julius Nyerere, Chairman of the OAU, which has been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

In its resolution on the Declaration on Africa, the General Assembly requests me to take all measures necessary for the full and speedy implementation of the objectives contained therein. There are some measures which we in the United Nations or in co-operation with our colleagues throughout the system can begin to implement, and we have already started to do so. On other issues, such as debt, commodity trade, and official development assistance, the United Nations provides an appropriate forum for consensus and guidance. It has been one of my consistent pleas to Member States that they make fullest possible use of

the institutions of the United Nations, and this is particularly relevant to the range of fundamental issues which must be addressed if Africa is to have a brighter future.

If we are to play our full role, we must have the resources to do so. I was encouraged by the results of the recent pledging conference for UN funds and programmes, though I remain concerned about the adequacy of voluntary funding for multilateral activities. I have repeatedly called on and would like once more today to urge Member States to be responsive in the on-going negotiations for the replenishment of IFAD, as well as the forthcoming World Bank meeting on a special fund for Africa.

I am extremely pleased that Mr. Edouard Saouma, Director-General of FAO, was able to join us this afternoon. FAO was in the forefront of those who have been attempting to warn of the impending tragedy and, in co-operation with WFP, to mobilize an effective response. Agriculture is clearly one of the keys to the future development of Africa and we must initiate immediate rehabilitation efforts if we are to break the cycle of crisis.

Similarly, I am pleased that Mr. Stern, Senior Vice President of the World Bank, is with us to discuss some of the actions being taken by the World Bank to support development efforts in Africa, in particular in mobilizing additional concessional resources for development.

Finally, I look forward to hearing your views today and in the days to come. This meeting is part of a process of consultations which I began a year ago. It is essential that we talk frankly among ourselves if we are to achieve the degree of consensus and action required for a coherent and effective response.

- - - - -

3 January 1985

2001

PRESS BRIEFING ON EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

At the outset of this afternoon's press briefing, Bradford Morse, newly appointed Director of the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, recalled that at his last briefing on 19 December he had said that he would continue to inform correspondents of the activities set in motion by the Secretary-General to mobilize all of the organizations of the United Nations, in total co-operation with specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations and the donor community, which would act with the approval and at the request of the developing countries concerned.

He wanted to bring correspondents up to date on what could be "one of the historic responses of the United Nations system", if it could achieve what the Secretary-General had asked Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions and Co-ordinator of Special Economic Assistance Programmes, Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, and himself to do.

The Secretary-General's decision of 17 December 1984 to establish the new Office had already "inspired the most extraordinary and complete collaboration between all elements of the United Nations". He referred specifically to the co-operation between the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions.

Mr. Morse stated that he had held valuable consultations with the World Bank since he last met the Press, and reported that he and Mr. Farah met yesterday (2 January) with representatives of the African Group and the Organization of African Unity, and indicated immediate plans and decisions taken. They had also met with representatives of Western European and other countries. He would meet with other potential donors in the days ahead.

He said that he and the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation had put in motion an appraisal process for nine countries, in addition to Ethiopia. These had been identified by a task force which initially established by the Director-General Jean Ripert, and was now functioning as an operational arm of the Emergency Operation, as the most seriously affected countries. These nine countries are: Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Sudan, Angola, Niger, Mauritania and Kenya. He said that appraisal should provide an accurate, objective, and persuasive assessment of needs. Action would be taken only in response to requests by the sovereign African countries.

Mr. Morse reiterated that the countries had been identified on the basis of objective data provided to the United Nations. It was a provisional list. At least 10 other countries faced very serious problems.

(more)



Of the nine countries already identified, Mr. Morse had charged the Resident Co-ordinators or the representative of the World Food Programme to provide by 18 January an assesment upon which plans could be elaborated and effected.

The response to date by the various elements of the United Nations had been extraordinary, he said. Recalling that he had already talked with Edouard Saouma, Director-General of FAO, and the senior leadership at the World Bank, he said he felt confident that the United Nations system could serve as a catalyst for an international mobilization to meet the calamity facing so many African countries.

He was gratified to report that the United States had announced today that it would make 1.5 million tons of food aid available for Africa in the current fiscal year which ends on 31 October 1985. This represented something in excess of \$1 billion. The 1.5 million tons of food aid is equivalent to between 40 and 50 per cent of the total requirements that had been identified for Africa this year. Following the meeting with Western European and other States, and noting that the Governments of that Group had already made substantial grants of food aid to Africa, he felt confident that there would be announcements of additional assistance forthcoming.

He was "exceedingly gratified" that such action had occurred within two weeks of the Secretary-General's announcement, he said, recalling that the Secretary-General had sought to alert the world to the extent of the problems affecting African nations over a year ago.

With recent commitments, he said, there can be a degree of confidence in meeting the terrible catastrophe that has plagued Africa for these many months.

Mr. Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions and Co-ordinator of Special Economic Assistance Programmes, who is Deputy Director of the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, said the exercise had really just begun. The idea was not just to mobilize international assistance, but to ensure that at the country level efficient and effective machinery was established to make sure that the aid was effectively disbursed and reached those who were in need.

A correspondent asked for details on discussions with the World Bank. Mr. Morse said that discussions focused on ensuring the complementarity of emergency activities with the medium- and long-term measures that the World Bank was undertaking. Food must be provided as a matter of utmost priority, but there must also be a linkage between emergency and developmental activities. He noted that UNDP had already initiated important developmental activities in Ethiopia, valued at \$26 million, financed by the Italian Government.

Had all nine countries approved the emergency plans and given permission to operate? a correspondent asked. Had any of them set conditions? Mr. Morse said that each of the Resident Co-ordinators designated by the Secretary-General had an agreed authority by virtue of his designation. In every

(more)

country, there had been an acceptance and a respect for the role of the United Nations in this regard. If a different situation arose, he suggested, then adjustments would have to be made.

Another correspondent asked if Mr. Morse had plans to travel. He recalled that he had been to Africa three or four times in the last eight to 10 months, and had visited many seriously affected areas. He stressed that the important thing now was to put together a programme to produce effective results in a very short time. In response to a question about the assessments, he outlined the procedures. He added that he expected to meet the deadlines that he had established.

How long would the emergency last? a correspondent asked. Perhaps one to two years? "Who can predict?", Mr. Morse replied. In the Sahara, he said, there was a glacier of sand. The immediate effects may last more than one, two, or even three years. He hoped that this terrible experience that Africa was now suffering would inspire the international community to look not only at the immediate emergency, but at the longer and larger future. Unless effective actions were taken to remedy the problems that plagued Africa, there would be successive emergencies.

Mr. Farah, addressing the question of how long the emergency would last, said that it was in God's hands. At a minimum, it would be a year. Even if rains fell in the west or the east, usually between March and July, the harvest time would not be until later in the year. It was not possible to predict what kind of harvest there would be. "A year was the minimum", he said, "the maximum could be anything".

A correspondent asked who sought out the development projects. Mr. Morse said it was the Government of the developing country. Another correspondent asked if Mr. Morse saw this as a managerial operation, or would the office actually be operating in the field. Mr. Morse said that he did not intend the new office to do anything that some other entity could do. It would rely on the existing field establishments. It would not superimpose a structure to duplicate what already existed. He and his colleagues would try to inspire, to motivate, to set standards and to insist that people meet those standards, to do the job most effectively.

In response to a question about aid for the nine countries, Mr. Morse said that each had different requirements. Some countries had had a satisfactory amount of food pledged, and the problem was management and distribution. In other countries, an insufficient amount of food had been pledged. He and Mr. Farah hoped to move forward vigorously after receipt of the assessments. He would start the assessments of other countries within the next two weeks.

A correspondent asked if the Office was telling donors that they did not want "tied" aid. Mr. Morse said that he did not have to. He had not heard any such suggestion in his discussions with donors about emergency assistance. "None, from any donor source". Mr. Farah said he could support that.

(more)

3 January 1985

Asked about the efforts of the World Bank for medium- and long-term development, and co-ordination with emergency efforts, he said that there were linkages between emergency and rehabilitation needs. The international community must work against the recurrence of these kinds of emergencies.

\* \* \* \* \*



## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/39/29  
7 December 1984

Thirty-ninth session  
Agenda item 139

### RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/39/L.22)]

#### 39/29. Critical economic situation in Africa

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the critical economic situation currently prevailing in Africa,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General in sensitizing the international community to the plight of Africa,

Noting the increased concern of the international community for the worsening plight of African countries affected by the crisis,

Having considered the critical economic situation in Africa, the note by the Secretary-General 1/ and his report on the subject, 2/

Taking note of the Declaration and resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twentieth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 12 to 15 November 1984,

Taking note also of the statement of the Committee for Development Planning, at the conclusion of its twenty-first session, held at Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1984, on the critical economic situation in Africa,

Convinced of the need for concerted action by the international community to assist the efforts of the African Governments by providing immediate emergency relief, and medium-term and long-term development aid,

---

1/ A/39/627.

2/ A/39/594.

1. Adopts the Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa set forth in the annex to the present resolution;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures for the full and speedy implementation of the objectives contained in the Declaration;
3. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring the Declaration to the attention of all States, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations;
4. Further requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation, to assess the needs and the responses thereto, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fortieth session through the Economic and Social Council.

83rd plenary meeting  
3 December 1984

ANNEX

Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa

1. We the States Members of the United Nations express our deep concern at the profound economic and social crisis that Africa is experiencing. Over the last few years the situation has assumed alarming proportions, seriously jeopardizing not only the development process but, more ominously, the very survival of millions of people.
2. We are alarmed by the spectre of widespread famine hanging over many African countries. Over 150 million people are facing hunger and malnutrition. Prolonged unprecedented drought, accelerating desertification and other natural disasters have compounded an already serious situation, dislocating normal life all over the continent. Alarming shortages in food and water supplies and the depletion of livestock have led to the displacement of millions of people within and across borders.
3. All these factors are further straining fragile economies crippled by deep-rooted structural deficiencies, that is to say, weak physical and social infrastructures, lack of trained human resources and dependence on the export of a few primary commodities.
4. Africa, despite its enormous potential, remains the least developed of all continents, lagging far behind by every economic indicator. Economic performance of many African countries is characterized by declining per capita incomes and stagnant or negative rates of growth. Furthermore, food production has not kept pace with population growth. According to all projections, prospects for recovery, growth and development remain very dim unless the efforts currently under way in African countries are fully supported by the international community.

/...

5. Furthermore, the international economic environment continues to affect developing countries adversely and, particularly, it had a devastating impact on the already fragile African economies. This is manifested in deteriorating terms of trade, sharp declines in export earnings, the heavy burden of external debt and stagnating resource flows to African countries.
6. We are aware that African countries recognize they have the primary responsibility for their development and for addressing the present crisis. They have therefore undertaken and continue to undertake painful adjustment measures at very high social and political costs. While recognizing the determined efforts of African countries and the support provided by the international community, much more needs to be done as the situation remains very grave.
7. We recognize that, in dealing with the present crisis, African regional and subregional efforts towards economic co-operation and integration as well as enhanced economic and technical co-operation among developing countries play an important role in the achievement of national and collective self-reliance and sustained development in Africa.
8. We are aware that the maintenance of peace and security and the strengthening of international co-operation are important for meeting the challenge of development.
9. We fully recognize that emergency relief aid on a massive scale is urgently needed in the following areas: additional food aid and other emergency supplies, together with the technical and financial assistance necessary for their transportation, storage and distribution to the affected populations; improvement of water supplies; improvement of health and nutrition, particularly for vulnerable groups, including refugees and displaced persons; safeguarding national nuclei of herds of livestock; establishment of income-generating projects and promotion of new and renewable energy projects, particularly in rural areas. In addition to the assistance already provided by the international community, further urgent assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors and non-governmental organizations is required to meet the above and other identified emergency needs in a comprehensive manner, as well as to strengthen the emergency prevention and preparedness capacities of African countries.
10. Of particular importance is the need to undertake urgent action to speed up and support the recovery and rehabilitation process in African countries, especially of the agricultural and industrial sectors as well as for physical and social infrastructures. Assistance for increasing the import capacity for vital imports, through adequate balance-of-payments support and other relevant measures, would help to establish a sound basis for the resumption and acceleration of sustained economic and social development in Africa.
11. We agree that in confronting the challenge of development, national policies and measures, such as those outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa 3/

---

3/ See A/S-11/14, annex I.

and the Special Memorandum on Africa's Economic and Social Crisis adopted by the ECA Conference of Ministers, 4/ provide a framework for national and subregional action and international support.

12. We recognize that, in view of the high priority attached by African countries to food and agriculture, the first urgent task is the early attainment of national and collective self-reliance in food production. In this connection, as highlighted in the Harare Declaration adopted by the thirteenth FAO Regional Conference for Africa, national food strategies and integrated rural development plans play an important role, especially in the achievement of food security. Moreover, we recognize the important role of women in rural development, particularly in food production, a role for which greater support is needed. Also important are the provision of appropriate incentives, credit, improvement of storage and transport, reduction of food losses, in particular post-harvest losses, achievement of a better balance between agricultural export commodities and food production, diversification of agricultural production and utilization of irrigation potential, particularly in the drought-prone areas.

13. Urgent action is needed at the international level to support national and regional efforts to implement the Regional Plan of Action to Combat the Effects of Drought in Africa and the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification. 5/

14. Increased resources for rapid implementation of the Industrial Development Decade for Africa and the Transport and Communications Decade in Africa are required. Furthermore, efforts at national, subregional and regional levels to develop the necessary and much needed skilled manpower, and to build technological capacities, require increased international support.

15. We fully acknowledge that, in the light of the worsening economic situation in Africa, the interrelationship between the debt problem, concessional flows and export earnings and their direct impact on recovery, growth and development assume even greater significance. It is vital, therefore, to take urgent and mutually-reinforcing measures in those areas, taking into account the Special Memorandum on Africa's Economic and Social Crisis, 4/ the Addis Ababa Declaration on Africa's External Indebtedness 6/ and the World Bank Special Programme for Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to complement and support domestic adjustment efforts in African countries.

16. Africa is experiencing a very serious debt problem, repayment and servicing of which is taking a very high percentage of already reduced export earnings. The problem is further exacerbated by factors such as deteriorating terms of trade, decline in concessional flows in real terms and increased use of short-term

---

4/ E/1984/110, annex.

5/ Report of the United Nations Conference on Desertification, Nairobi, 29 August-9 September 1977 (A/CONF.74/36), chap. I.

6/ E/1984/110/Add.1.



commercial credit. Without an increase in net capital inflows and urgent debt relief measures, prospects for recovery and development in Africa will be undermined.

17. Bilateral and multilateral creditors should take concerted measures to ease the debt burden of African countries. For official and officially-guaranteed debt, total or partial conversion of official development assistance (ODA) debts into grants, longer maturities and grace periods, lower or concessional interest rates and extended multi-year rescheduling are among the measures to be dealt with urgently within the framework of close consultation with each of the debtor countries concerned, as well as any other measures to be agreed upon. It is essential to ensure the full and urgent implementation of Trade and Development Board resolution 165 (S-IX) of 11 March 1978. 7/ Multilateral financial institutions should expedite resource disbursement. Reduction in international interest rates would further alleviate the debt burden. Moreover, the full co-operation of commercial banks is indispensable. The capacity of African countries to manage their debt should be improved through the provision of technical assistance, particularly by international agencies.

18. We recognize that African countries, in view of their heavy dependence on concessional financial flows and their limited access to alternative sources of external finance, require a substantial and sustained increase in the volume of these flows through bilateral donors and multilateral channels for development finance and technical co-operation. The international community, in particular the developed countries and the multilateral financial institutions, should endeavour to provide the additional financial resources to maintain and increase a net transfer of resources to African countries. The World Bank is strongly urged to explore with donors possible approaches, including a special facility, in mobilizing the resources required to implement the Bank's Special Programme for Sub-Saharan Africa.

19. The full and speedy implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980s for the Least Developed Countries, 8/ particularly with regard to the ODA level, would greatly augment resource flows to many African countries. Supplementary funding for the International Development Association and the early completion of the replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development would ensure at least the maintenance of the real value of resources channelled to Africa.

20. The heavy dependence of African countries on the export of a few primary commodities renders them particularly vulnerable to the sharp price fluctuations that result in drastic shortfalls in export earnings. Urgent action is therefore

---

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/33/15 and Corr.1), vol. I, part two, annex I.

8/ Report of the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Paris, 1-14 September 1981 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.I.8), part one, sect. A.



needed to stabilize commodity prices on long-term trends and to improve and increase the use of compensatory financing arrangements for export earnings shortfalls, such as the Compensatory Financing Facility of the International Monetary Fund. Improved market access for African primary and processed products, efforts of African countries to diversify production, and the early and effective operation of the Common Fund for Commodities require intensified international action.

21. The modalities and quality of ODA flows in terms of a greater grant element, untied resources and simplified procedures for aid delivery should be improved through, inter alia, speedier disbursements and greater reliance on more flexible forms of assistance, such as non-project programme and sector aid, including local and recurrent costs.

22. We acknowledge that there is room for further improvement in the co-ordination of assistance and the efficient and effective use of resources. Co-ordination of multilateral as well as bilateral assistance is primarily the responsibility of recipient Governments and, in this connection, effective national co-ordinating mechanisms can play an important role. The United Nations system should extend technical assistance in this field to Governments, upon request, and should pursue its own efforts to enhance co-ordination at the programme and operational levels, in conformity with relevant General Assembly resolutions.

23. We are convinced that in addressing the critical needs of African countries there are many areas where the United Nations could play an important role both in mobilizing the necessary resources and in carrying out specific activities. In this respect, existing resources allocated for programmes in Africa should, in consultation with African Governments, be refocused to address identified priority areas. There is need for further improvement in the efficiency and programme delivery of United Nations activities in Africa. Furthermore, additional voluntary contributions should be mobilized to ensure the implementation of projects and programmes in priority areas.

24. We urge all organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system to give greater attention to Africa and to continue to mobilize resources for assisting African countries in dealing with the current crisis and its longer-term ramifications.

25. We further urge bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as non-governmental organizations, to take all necessary measures to support the efforts of the African countries aimed at alleviating the critical economic situation in Africa.

26. We request the Secretary-General to continue his commendable efforts in alerting and sensitizing the international community to the plight of African countries, in mobilizing additional assistance to Africa, as well as in co-ordinating the activities of the United Nations system in Africa and in monitoring the situation, and to present periodic reports thereon.

27. We are convinced that unless urgent action is taken the rapidly deteriorating situation in Africa may well lead to disaster. We are therefore fully committed to supporting the efforts of African countries to meet the dual challenge of survival and development by taking concerted and urgent measures commensurate with the needs outlined in the present Declaration.



## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERALA/39/627  
1 November 1984  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCHThirty-ninth session  
Agenda item 139

## CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN AFRICA

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to address the following statement to the members of the General Assembly on the occasion of their consideration of the question concerning the critical economic situation in Africa:

1. I am happy that the General Assembly has decided, following similar action by the Economic and Social Council, to include in its agenda the item entitled "Critical Situation in Africa". In deciding to hold a debate on this item in plenary the Assembly has further emphasized the importance of this action.
2. The international community has now been made fully aware of the gravity of the economic and social ordeals which the peoples of Africa are undergoing. Many heads of Government and ministers have made it one of the principal themes of their statements at the beginning of this session. You have before you the report prepared by my special representative analysing the situation (A/39/594). I therefore do not intend to describe this tragedy in detail. I should prefer to stress the action which we must take not only to prevent further aggravation of the situation but also to lay the foundation for a resumption of economic growth and development in the region.
3. A year ago, we were alarmed by the dimensions of the drought and by the imminence of mass starvation and immense suffering. This sense of alarm has not yet been dispelled today, although, thanks to improved climatic conditions in some countries, the determination and courage of the African Governments and peoples and the positive response of the international community, we have succeeded in limiting the scope of the disaster.
4. The fact is that even if the whole of Africa is perhaps no longer on the brink of the precipice, a large number of Africans are still struggling to survive and many of the countries are still in a critical situation. Last week I issued an urgent appeal to the international community for immediate assistance to Ethiopia,

where almost a million people are facing the prospect of death from starvation. There are other countries where the situation is also extremely ominous: Chad, the Niger, Mali and Angola, to name a few. The need not only to provide essential food aid in adequate quantities but also to ensure its transportation and distribution to those who need it must be met. The plight of refugees as well as deteriorating health conditions must also be dealt with.

5. However, as I said in my first appeal last year, it is necessary to treat not only the symptoms of the crises but also their causes, namely, the more long-term structural problems confronting the countries of Africa. I am happy to see that this approach is generally accepted and that a growing consensus is emerging with regard to the action to be taken. However, results have not been forthcoming. The process of development has virtually been brought to a standstill in Africa and prospects for economic recovery are not encouraging. In spite of the measures taken, much remains to be done. The African Governments must continue their courageous efforts to bring about reforms and adjustments. The developed countries must strengthen their support. Both must join in an effort to create an international economic environment favourable to sustained growth and development.

6. As each African country has its own problems, the challenge is to respond effectively to their specific needs and to do so in a concerted manner. Certain general priorities, however, emerge. I should like to mention first certain areas in which, in my judgement, concerted action by the international community would have immediate decisive importance. I shall then speak of actions which the United Nations could undertake or expand as a matter of priority.

#### A. Priority areas calling for international action

7. First of all, there must be a consensus in the international community concerning the need to maintain and, if possible, increase net financial flows to Africa. Present trends are alarming. If they continue, net flows are likely to diminish significantly in the years to come. The efforts being made to improve aid co-ordination will undoubtedly enhance the effectiveness of current flows but they cannot be a substitute for adequate assistance. Given the present difficulties, increased aid is necessary not only for projects but also for programmes. Governments need more assistance to cover local and recurrent costs of externally financed projects. It is important to increase concessional flows through both bilateral channels and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the other funding institutions of the United Nations system. In this context, let me indicate my concern that the countries of Africa should not be held hostage to a debate among donor countries on how their respective contributions to the multilateral institutions are to be determined.

8. Another problem which is closely related to that of financial flows is the issue of external debt. Debt service payments by African countries now represent almost 25 per cent of their export earnings and are expected to increase dramatically in the next few years. This drain of capital seriously affects the capacity of African countries to adopt and implement policies that will restore growth in their economies. Immediate action to redress the situation must be a priority for the international community. I fully recognize that the composition

/...

of debt varies from country to country and that country-specific solutions are required. With regard to public debt, however, the measures provided for in resolution 165 (S-IX) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) should be fully implemented in the case of the least developed countries and the other poor countries of Africa. Attention should also be given to the problem of private debt, especially supplier credits benefiting from export guarantees.

9. Another question which is closely linked to the foregoing is that of commodity export earnings. For the past five or six years, the volume of African commodity exports has remained practically unchanged, while earnings from these exports have dropped sharply. This situation, which reflects an overall deterioration in the terms of trade, contributes significantly to the severe balance-of-payments problems confronting most African countries. It must be understood that changing from the production of one major commodity to another judged to be more remunerative is an extremely difficult process. In addition to the technical problems which it would inevitably entail, it would disrupt patterns of living which have been moulded by patterns of cultivation and have been sustained over generations. Moreover, the volatility of international markets is such that it would be very difficult to form a clear idea of the advantages which might result from such a change. Thus it is essential to ensure reasonable earnings from current production before assisting, if necessary, in effecting a gradual shift to more diversified and remunerative production. In my view, steps must be taken to enable the Common Fund to become operative as soon as possible. I also feel that progress must be made in the negotiation of individual commodity agreements. Lastly, in the present circumstances I attach importance to improving compensatory financing arrangements.

10. The last but by no means least of the priorities I have in mind is, of course, increasing agricultural production, not only for export but, even more important, for domestic consumption. The alarming reality is that per capita food production in Africa has been declining over the past decade and Africa has become dependent both on food imports and food aid for a growing proportion of its food needs. It is important to recognize that this is not simply the result of drought. This is a complex problem which involves, among other things, domestic policies, increased investments, research and development efforts and food security strategies. For the immediate, food aid is a necessary feature of the African scene, but effective co-ordination between donors, recipients and the concerned United Nations organizations is essential to ensure that food aid is not a disincentive to increased domestic production. There must also be an all-out attack on the problem of desertification. The continuing encroachment of the desert, whether the result of climatic factors or human mismanagement, must be halted.

#### B. Action to be taken by the United Nations

11. In these broad areas, the General Assembly should establish a sense of priority and direction. I should like now to refer to the areas directly open to the United Nations.

12. Already a major effort has been made by the United Nations to assist countries in Africa through specific programmes and the mobilization of concessional

/...

resources. Thus, rather than a new set of activities, I am basically suggesting a clearer sense of focus involving a reordering of existing priorities and a clearer commitment to action. This, of course, will require administrative flexibility as well as adequate financing, whether through the reallocation and more efficient use of available resources, co-financing arrangements, or from additional resources. The objective would be to provide assistance that would produce immediate results and would not only relieve short-term constraints but also provide the basis for long-term action.

13. Taking into account the priorities of African countries and the capacity of United Nations organizations, I would like to suggest that we intensify our action in three broad areas.

14. We first need to strengthen our support of national programmes for the development of human resources, particularly regarding management and administration in the public and private sectors. This is a long-term process. However, some immediate action is possible:

(a) There should be a crash programme to provide technical assistance, over a limited period, in the area of planning and management of external and internal resources;

(b) Vocational training programmes focusing on skills needed in rural areas, to include non-agricultural activities, should be strengthened;

(c) Programmes should be expanded for the temporary use by African countries of the services of their own nationals employed abroad.

15. Let me now mention the protection of the underprivileged groups. The saddest part of the suffering in Africa is that it is those who are the most vulnerable, in particular the women and children, who suffer the most. In order to address the situation:

(a) There should be a major increase in child survival programmes, using recent developments and low-cost techniques;

(b) There should be a significant intensification of programmes to provide drinking water linked to health education;

(c) Lastly, steps should be taken to ensure the provision of essential drugs and other requirements for health centres, along with the necessary support for their distribution.

16. The third area concerns the maintenance and repair of production, transport and communications infrastructures, so as to permit a speedy resumption of development. The priority being given to such activities is not jeopardizing the long-term programmes already adopted for Africa. Under the proposed approach:

(a) Priority must be given, so far as agriculture is concerned, to assistance to output-oriented food crop projects; greater support should also be given to reforestation programmes designed to forestall the encroachment of the desert;

/...

(b) In the industrial area, emphasis should be placed on the rehabilitation of the existing industrial set-up and the creation of small enterprises, for example repair and maintenance shops;

(c) Access to water should also be given priority, especially in the worst affected areas and particularly in drought-prone countries. There is thus a need to expand technical and financial support for the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing wells and drilling sites;

(d) Lastly, it is important to take the necessary action for the rehabilitation and maintenance of the transport and communications infrastructure, particularly in areas where problems have arisen in channelling assistance to the stricken populations.

17. Should Member States agree with the line of action I have proposed, my colleagues and I will enter into immediate consultations and take the necessary initiatives to translate them into specific measures. We are already making arrangements to strengthen our field offices in Africa and redeploy our personnel. We are also mindful of the need for co-ordination both in the field and at Headquarters, in order to ensure the most efficient use of resources, and are ready to work closely with Member States, most of which have undertaken to intensify their efforts on behalf of Africa. Lastly, I wish to assure you that the action which we are going to take will be implemented in close collaboration with the specialized agencies. In particular, our co-operation with the World Bank is very important and I am pleased with the results of the consultations which we held recently with the heads of that agency.

\* \* \*

18. Whatever the nature of the action to be taken, the above-mentioned need for concerted and co-operative efforts permeates all the responses to be made to the African crisis. This is now generally recognized. It is, of course, the African countries that should take the initiative for consultations and define the framework within which they should be held. A very important role can be played by co-ordinating machinery such as the round-tables organized by the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank's consultative groups.

19. The time has come to move from words to deeds. I have indicated the directions which, in my view, they should follow. By their recent actions, the African countries have demonstrated their will to overcome their difficulties and to prepare a better future for themselves. The Lagos Plan of Action already showed their determination to take their own fate firmly in hand. But the peoples of Africa need us: their trials are ours too and it is together that we shall overcome them.

-----



TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

DATE: 17 January 1985

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General  
DE: Department for Disarmament Affairs

SUBJECT: US-USSR Bilateral Disarmament Negotiations:  
OBJET: an updated position paper

1. After a 13-month break in the Soviet-American talks on strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A. Gromyko, and United States Secretary of State, G. Shultz, met in Geneva on 7 and 8 January to discuss, without conditions, the subject, objectives and framework of new arms control negotiations. No issues pertaining to the substance of disarmament problems to be negotiated were considered, as such. Questions concerning the prevention of nuclear war and Soviet-American relations in general also figured in the talks, along with some of the international topics of mutual interest.
2. According to the official reports the two sides were able to agree:
  1. to hold new negotiations on nuclear and space arms;
  2. that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship;
  3. that the objective of the negotiations will be to work out agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability;
  4. that the negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups, with each group addressing, respectively, space arms (whether based on earth or in space), strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-range nuclear arms;
  5. to set the date for the beginning of the new negotiations and their site within one month through diplomatic channels.
3. The two sides also expressed the belief that the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. Further, they reiterated their stated intention to hold serious negotiations in a search for practical solutions to the arms control issues they faced and recognized that their relationship was crucial to the preservation of peace and stability.

/...



4. Thus, it appears that the Geneva meeting has accomplished its main tasks: 1) to open a USSR-United States dialogue, and 2) to produce agreement between the participants on the subject, objectives and the format for new arms control negotiations. This development, coming as it did after five years of escalating tensions and accelerating arms race, may mark a tangible turning point in Soviet-American relations in general and, may lead to practical steps in the limitation and reduction of armaments, particularly in the nuclear field.

5. The apparently successful outcome of the Geneva "procedural" meeting was due to flexibility on the part of both sides and to their shared willingness to move out of the stalemate. They acknowledged, however, that the agreement was only a first step on what looks like a hard and rather long path towards finding mutually acceptable solutions to many very complicated issues during the forthcoming negotiations.

6. It is apparent from a variety of press reports, as well as on the basis of knowledge of the background of the issues raised, that there are many problems to be faced. These are rooted in the general "atmospherics" of Soviet-American relations as well as in the great complexity of the specific issues to be negotiated: strategic nuclear weapons, medium-range nuclear weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Formidable as they are, these difficulties appear to be compounded by different interpretations by the participants of the degree and the nature of the "interrelationship" for consideration of and resolving of the three issues involved, particularly with regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The key problem seems to be whether the negotiations should produce an accord, simultaneous and interrelated in all three directions, including the space weapons programme, as the Soviet Union appears to insist they should, or whether such an accord should omit the strategic defence space segment in the research stage, or if it becomes feasible, in the deployable stage, as the United States seems to prefer.

7. In any event, it would seem that the two sides will have to manifest a great deal of flexibility, accommodation and determination to achieve meaningful results in their future arms control negotiations.



UNITED NATIONS  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES  
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

*PK*

TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

DATE: 16 January 1985

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

Confidential

FROM: Jan Martenson  
DE: Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs

SUBJECT: Background Notes on Disarmament Issues  
OBJET:

1. I am sending you herewith enclosed background notes on the disarmament position of the countries which you are going to visit during your forthcoming trip.
2. I would like to draw your attention in particular to the prevailing situation in the Pacific region where the questions of nuclear test explosions carried out by France and the port-calls of US Navy nuclear-armed ships are the center of public debate in this field. There is also growing concern and involvement of the general public in disarmament matters throughout the region.
3. It is also relevant to note that in the last several years the Governments of both Australia and New Zealand have been focusing ever-greater attention on disarmament and arms regulation matters, particularly with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty. The support of these two countries for a resolution on the test ban and the Australians' support of a resolution on the nuclear freeze, adopted by the General Assembly last December, has created a certain strain in their relationship with the United States.
4. The States which you will visit attach considerable importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the forthcoming third Review Conference. In your discussions with political leaders of these States you may wish to underline the need for concerted efforts to make the Conference a success.

-----

NB The country notes provided with this memo have been included in the individual country sections of this brief.

## Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The fear of the spread of nuclear weapons has existed since the beginning of the nuclear age. Already in the autumn of 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada proposed the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes". The Baruch plan of 1946, drawn up by the United States when it was the sole State possessing nuclear weapons, was intended to avoid proliferation by putting all nuclear material, facilities and information under international ownership and control.

This attempt failed. By the mid-60s there were four further nuclear-weapon States (USSR 1949, United Kingdom 1952, France 1960 and China 1964) and it had become obvious that other States would sooner or later be capable of acquiring the technological know-how to develop nuclear weapons, whereas the material needed was less scarce than had originally been supposed. An increasing number of States were acquiring nuclear reactors which contained or produced material that might be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and concern about this possibility grew with the awareness that the possession of nuclear weapons by further countries would pose a threat to world security. This concern prompted nuclear Powers as well as non-nuclear-weapon States to take initiatives to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to States that did not yet possess them. One step in this direction was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

In 1961 the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution submitted by Ireland calling on all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. For several years the matter was discussed in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva and negotiated bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union and in March 1968 agreement was reached in the ENDC on a draft for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On June 12, 1968, the General Assembly approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depositary governments to open the Treaty for signature.

Under the Treaty the nuclear-weapon States parties undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient and not to help any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire such weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties undertake neither to obtain nuclear weapons nor to manufacture them. (The Treaty equates nuclear weapons with any other nuclear explosive device, in the assumption that no technical distinction can be made between a nuclear explosive for peaceful or for military purposes). To help ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States do not divert nuclear material from peaceful to weapons use the Treaty provides for safeguards to be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency. To offset this obligation the Treaty provides that parties shall have the fullest possible access to materials and information for peaceful purposes (Article IV). The

renunciation of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States is balanced by the commitment of the nuclear powers "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date ..." (Article VI). The assurance sought by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear parties to the Treaty ("negative security guarantees"), was not included in the text.

To date, 124 non-nuclear-weapon States have become parties to the Treaty, as have three nuclear-weapon States: USSR, UK and the USA. France has not joined but has declared that it would behave like a party. Of the non-nuclear-weapon States that have significant nuclear capabilities Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa are not parties. IAEA safeguards are applied pursuant to the NPT in forty States.

Ever since its initial conclusion the Non Proliferation Treaty has been the object of criticism: it has been called discriminatory and one-sided in its approach, consolidating a distinction between nuclear "Haves" and "Have-nots". India in particular is prominent among non-aligned nations in pointing to "vertical proliferation" (i.e. the growth in the nuclear arsenals of the Super Powers) as the principal danger, which the NPT not only does not prevent but would even seem to accept. Against this background the lack of progress in giving effect to Article VI - especially the absence of any advance towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban - has been a source of major criticism at the first NPT Review Conference in 1975 and even more so at the second one, in 1980.

The implementation of Article IV has been another ground for controversy. A number of non-nuclear-weapon States, especially among the Group of 77, hold the view that States which give up the military nuclear option and accept the burden of safeguards should benefit by full access to nuclear information and have the right to acquire the nuclear installations they consider necessary for their peaceful nuclear development, preferably on privileged financial terms. Nuclear suppliers, on the other hand, tend to be restrictive in their export policies; considering that safeguards may not in themselves prevent States from "going nuclear" in a military sense, a number of both Eastern and Western States, members of the so-called "London Suppliers Group", have agreed on various conditions and restrictions on their nuclear supplies which apply equally to recipients that are parties to the NPT and to others. In reaction to this "policy of denial" developing nations have been seeking a forum to discuss the promotion of international nuclear co-operation, where the non-proliferation aspects would be secondary. In that context, several developing nations criticize the IAEA for stressing its safeguards functions at the presumed cost of its promotional tasks. The entire issue has led to the idea of holding a United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE). The purpose and working methods of that conference were subjects of dispute between developing and developed nations at several inconclusive meetings of the preparatory committee and the Conference itself has been put off until 1986. Meanwhile, in the framework of the IAEA, efforts are being made to internationalize aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, by such means as a multinational storage scheme for excess plutonium and arrangements to assure a reliable supply of nuclear material and facility.

These problems have been reflected in the deliberations of the first and second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty held respectively in 1975 and 1980. At the first Review Conference, in 1975, a final document could be adopted only with great difficulty. At the second Conference, in 1980, no agreement was reached on a final document although agreement on the part of the text dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was close. The third Review Conference, to be held in Geneva, early in September 1985, is expected to be faced with the same difficult problems.

The Preparatory Committee for the third Review Conference has held two sessions in 1984 and the third and final session will be held in April 1985. It is expected that all the preparatory work (rules of procedure, background papers, budgetary questions, etc.) will have been solved by the end of the third session, but the outcome of the Review Conference is depending on other factors, above all on progress by the two major Powers in their efforts to check the nuclear arms race.

The effective survival of the Treaty should be of keen concern to the international community in general, whose security is already at great risk as a result of the present arms race but would be even more endangered in a state of nuclear anarchy. The security considerations of the nuclear Powers are predicated to a large degree on the continuation of the present balance. Since the Treaty thus serves their strategic interests, the nuclear-weapon States should be ready to make substantive concessions to strengthen its implementation, for instance by the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The non-nuclear-weapon States that have become parties to the Treaty have done so in the clear realization that this would serve their security interests; it is obviously to their interest to continue their adherence to the Treaty and to help strengthen it. International exchanges in the nuclear field are possible only when there exists an effective system of assurances against nuclear proliferation. Therefore, besides serving a general security interest, the NPT is an important element in the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy and efforts to reconcile that promotion with the maintenance of an effective non-proliferation system within the framework of the Treaty deserve the active and continuing support of all the parties.

# United Nations

## Press Release

Department of Public Information  
Press Section  
United Nations, New York

CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT  
For release on delivery  
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY



SG/SM/3635  
DC/1785  
12 December 1984

### SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Following is the text of a statement on disarmament questions to be made to the General Assembly this afternoon by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar:

You have before you at this session 64 resolutions dealing with disarmament. During the past weeks in the First Committee, your able and dedicated representatives have worked diligently to devise resolutions on almost every aspect of nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms limitation. Their efforts have been painstaking and thorough.

I believe I would be failing in my responsibility as Secretary-General, however, if I did not take this occasion to voice my alarm with the current state of disarmament endeavours in the world. We must ask ourselves if we are truly committed to the first precept of the United Nations Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

The Charter gives both the General Assembly and the Security Council responsibility for considering disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Today, there is no more important task before us. The threat of nuclear catastrophe is not one issue among many. Preventing such a horror is the pre-condition of all our endeavours. The great tasks before this world Organization, the challenges of economic and social development, progress in human rights, the construction of a world of justice and human dignity -- all will be in vain if we fail to prevent nuclear disaster.

Imperfect as it may be, the United Nations is the only existing expression of the entire international community. The common aspirations of the world's people must be articulated here. And none is more fundamental than the survival of humanity. I will not rehearse once more the terrifying statistics that seem to have numbed us with their repetition. Suffice it to say that a nuclear war could never remain limited and could never be won. Its effects would not be confined to the nuclear adversaries but would threaten the existence of all the peoples on this earth. It could lead to the extinction of humanity. Doomsday scenarios need not be proven: the existence of the risk is enough. For the worst only needs to happen once.

(more)

12 December 1984

As I look across this Hall, I see the delegations of 159 Member nations. Almost all the world's peoples are represented here. And all of them — all of us — live under the nuclear threat. As Secretary-General of this Organization, with no allegiance except to the common interest, I feel the question may justifiably be put to the leading nuclear-weapon Powers: by what right do they decide the fate of all humanity? From Scandinavia to Latin America, from Europe and Africa to the Far East, the destiny of every man and woman is affected by their actions. No one can expect to escape from the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war on the fragile structure of our planet. The responsibility assumed by the great Powers is now no longer to their populations alone: it is to every country and every people, to all of us.

No ideological confrontation can be allowed to jeopardize the future of humanity. Nothing less is at stake: today's decisions affect not only the present, they also put at risk succeeding generations. Like supreme arbiters, with our disputes of the moment we threaten to cut off the future and extinguish the lives of the innocent millions as yet unborn. There can be no greater arrogance. At the same time, the lives of all who lived before us may be rendered meaningless. For we have the power to dissolve in a conflict of hours or minutes the entire work of civilization, with all the brilliant cultural heritage of humankind.

For almost 40 years we have lived under the nuclear shadow. Many have claimed that it alone has kept peace in the world. If nuclear weapons are indeed peace-keepers, does it follow that they ought to be acquired by every nation on earth? On the contrary, it is clear that to rely on nuclear deterrence is to accept a perpetual community of fear. That is very far from the community of human worth and understanding foreseen by the United Nations Charter.

It is neither desirable, nor feasible in the long term, to find true stability through nuclear deterrence. It is not desirable because in the long term human values are inconsistent with the threat to bring about the indiscriminate death of millions of our fellow men and women. No humane society that recognizes individual worth and dignity can contemplate such an action. Conversely, the very fear and hatred of an adversary believed to be capable of carrying out such an attack would destroy the basis of a civilized society.

Even if we ignore its inhuman aspects, in the long run can we really expect stability from a balance of fear and the suspicion that it breeds? With the accelerating pace of military technology, the need to counter each new threat will become ever more frantic and desperate. Every innovation in arms will tend to destabilize the fragile balance. Every perceived advantage will lead to fears of first-strike capability and the resulting temptation, at a time of great crisis, to launch a pre-emptive attack. And will our scientific vanity allow us to forget the double fallibility we face from human and technological error? Offensive capacity must certainly be reduced. Ultimately, however, there is no deterrence, since any initiation of nuclear hostilities would be to no one's advantage. This is made cruelly clear by

(more)



12 December 1984

suggestions that a "nuclear winter" could follow a nuclear strike, even without any retaliation. To launch any nuclear attack could then indeed be suicide. The fruits of such violence would fall equally and with grim justice on the initiator and the victim alike.

Six years ago in this Hall we decided on the fundamental objective facing all of us: "Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation." It remains our most acute and urgent task. Every representative in this room, I am sure, shares the hope that the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the USSR will be a step in the direction that we all seek. Indeed, every one of us has a right to urge the start of a new and determined process of disarmament negotiations by the nuclear Powers. Next September we will hold the Third Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The corollary for horizontal non-proliferation under that Treaty was the undertaking given in article VI, particularly by the great Powers, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". Is it reasonable to expect restraint in one direction and uncontrolled expansion in the other? With progress in both directions the Non-Proliferation Treaty could become the embryo of a Treaty, however distant, for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

It is not for me to make detailed observations on the course of the negotiations to be undertaken. However, it seems clear that fundamental security needs have to be acknowledged and taken into account. Paradoxically, both sides have an interest in the other's security since insecurity can only lead to mutual peril and to pre-emptive considerations. Given the enormous complexity of today's weaponry and the varying composition of arsenals, advantages in different spheres will have to be balanced against each other. Finally, serious talks can only take place at the negotiating table and not through the airwaves of the media. The international community will no longer be reassured by the mere appearance of progress.

United Nations Member States have at their disposal the world's only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. I have said on more than one occasion that its endeavours should not be made to depend upon progress on the bilateral side. Moreover, we can make a contribution to the bilateral process in various ways. I appeal for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. No single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament. Is it wise to develop new classes of ever more lethal, ever more technically complex weapons, whose control is ever more difficult to verify? We are at the point of leaving the decision on humanity's future to the automatic -- and fallible -- reactions of computers. Talks on a comprehensive test ban have been in abeyance for too long and their value has even been questioned. As with all

(more)



12 December 1984

arms-limitation negotiations, there will never be a perfect time to begin them in the opinion of all sides. The time to recommence these talks is now: they should not be delayed any further.

The time is equally pressing for talks on space weapons. It seems that where weapons are concerned, the only way to halt a race is to prevent its starting. Once the race is under way, agreement is far more difficult. And the winner enjoys only a few, insecure moments of victory before the other side catches up, leaving both to look back over yet more wasted human effort and ingenuity. There is no final advantage in the arms race. It is therefore crucial that a ban on weapons in the new theatre of outer space be concluded at the earliest possible time, before it is once again too late.

Next year is the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. It is also the fortieth anniversary of the first and only use of nuclear weapons, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While we have so far avoided global conflagration, we have made only halting and inadequate progress in disarmament or arms limitation over these past 40 years. Discussions have taken on a life of their own. All too often it seems as if the players are only moving their lethal pawns in a global chess game. We cannot calculate the quantity of our precious and limited resources that has already been poured into the endless arms race.

At a time of uncertainty for the young and despair for the poor and the hungry, we have truly mortgaged our future to the arms race — both nuclear and conventional. Several brilliant studies have shown us how expenditure on arms distorts our economies. We know that development will be a casualty of the arms race. In this sense, the arms trade impoverishes the receiver and debases the supplier. Here there is a striking resemblance to the drugs trade. Yet we continue on the same course even when faced with the silent genocide of famine that today stalks millions of our fellow men and women. The international community has to focus and act on the link between disarmament and development. We should take concrete and far-sighted steps towards the conversion of arms industries from military to civilian production. And we should begin to redress some of the enormous imbalance between research on arms and research on arms limitation and reduction.

The role of the Secretary-General under the Charter requires him to confront any matter which may threaten international peace and security. It is my belief that nothing poses a greater threat to the international community than the continuing arms race, above all the nuclear-arms race. The leaders of the great Powers have recently expressed their commitment to the prevention of war between them. The announcement that their two Foreign Ministers will soon meet is most welcome. I appeal to the two leaders to ensure that these talks lead to persistent, determined negotiations. I would also hope that they will eventually meet together in the recognition of their responsibility for humanity's survival. I would urge them to enhance the prospects for disarmament by taking steps to strengthen the collective security framework afforded by the United Nations. This Organization and I are at their disposal.

(more)

Many words have been spoken in the cause of disarmament. We are all aware of the goals, as outlined in the first special session's Final Document. Only the political decisions of Governments can take us towards the realization of these goals. And only the peoples of the world can urge their Governments to move in that direction. The Charter of the United Nations speaks of "We, the peoples", since it was to fulfil their hopes that this Organization was created. Every person on this earth has a stake in disarmament. In the nuclear age, decisions affecting war and peace cannot be left to military strategists or even to Governments. They are indeed the responsibility of every man and woman. And it is therefore the responsibility of all of us in this chamber to break the cycle of mistrust and insecurity and respond to humanity's yearning for peace.

\* \* \* \* \*



## General Assembly

Distr.  
LIMITED

A/C.1/39/L.71\*  
18 November 1984

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-ninth session  
FIRST COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 47

### URGENT NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Iceland,  
Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,  
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain,  
Sweden and Vanuatu: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Reaffirming its conviction that an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development, and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water <sup>1/</sup> undertook not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the environments covered by that Treaty, and that in that Treaty the parties expressed their determination to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

---

\* Reissued for technical reasons.

<sup>1/</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

Recalling also that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2/ recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this subject,

Taking into account that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/39/27) concerning consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear-test ban" during its 1984 session,

Also taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives put forward in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1984 session,

Expressing its profound regret that, in spite of strenuous efforts, the Conference on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the re-establishment at its 1984 session of an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban",

Recognizing the important role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Recognizing the importance to such a treaty of the work on a global seismic detection network, assigned by the Conference on Disarmament to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,

Recalling paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ relating to verification of disarmament and arms control agreements, which stated that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on, and should be determined by, the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement,

1. Reiterates its profound concern that, despite the express wishes of the majority of Member States, nuclear testing continues;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of greatest importance;

---

2/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

3/ Resolution S-10/2.

3. Expresses the conviction that such a treaty would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to establish at the beginning of its 1985 session an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban" and

(a) To resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject;

(b) Taking into account the work previously performed by and the results of the technical test being conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, to take steps for the establishment as soon as possible of an international seismic monitoring network to

(i) monitor nuclear explosions; and

(ii) determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

5. Urges all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate within the Conference in fulfilling these tasks;

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its fortieth session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session an item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

-----

On 19 January the Argentine Ambassador rang the Secretary-General to make the four following points:

1. Argentina was informed that Britain had licensed off-shore exploration and exploitation of petroleum near the islands and the Government considered this an extremely serious development.
2. It was also informed of a proposal to reform the Constitution of the islands in order to provide for self-determination by the islanders. This was very grave because it had the consequence of closing the door to a negotiated solution with Argentina.
3. Financial and banking negotiations with the British group, on the other hand, were progressing favourably and Argentina, for its part, intends to soften the requirements for repatriation of profits.
4. There had been comments in the Commons regarding reported Argentine rearmament. These were false. Argentina, on the contrary, was calling back on the military budget causing some unrest in the Armed Forces. Spare parts, on the basis of existing contracts, were naturally being received but this cannot be construed as rearmament.

Also on 19 January, the Secretary-General received a positive reply from Argentina to his letter of transmittal of the General Assembly resolution charging him with good offices regarding the dispute with the United Kingdom.

Note: The Secretary-General may wish to mention these questions with the Foreign Secretary and restrict his discussion with the Prime Minister to the more general question referred to earlier.

dictated by A. de Soto  
19 January 1985

9-1  
AS

Note for the Secretary-General

QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

1. Since the abrupt termination of the Anglo-argentine talks in Berne the diplomatic situation between Argentina and the United Kingdom has remained frozen. It will be recalled that while the initiative for the Berne meeting had been a British one, the talks, according to the Swiss Secretary of State, failed as a result of the British representative not merely stating that the U.K. was "not prepared" to discuss sovereignty, as had been agreed by the two sides in advance, but also adding that "sovereignty could not be discussed". Moreover the British delegation received instructions from London not to agree to a communiqué, drafted by the Swiss and the Brazilians and tentatively agreed to by two sides, which inter alia stated that the two delegations had agreed to "carry forward" talks on the subjects raised (one of which being, of course, sovereignty).

2. The General Assembly by a vote of 89 - 9 - 54 adopted on 1 November 1984 resolution 39/6 on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) which was generally couched in milder terms than in the two preceding years. Of the countries to be visited by the Secretary-General in his forthcoming tour, New Zealand voted against the resolution, Australia, Singapore and Thailand abstained, while Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam voted in favour.

3. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published last month a report on the Falkland Islands. Amongst its conclusions and recommendations may be noted the following:

a) The Committee was unable to reach a categorical conclusion on the legal validity of the historical claims to the Falkland Islands of either Argentina or the U.K., though it considered that Argentina's claims had been seriously weakened by its illegal resort to arms. On the other hand it considered Argentina's claims to South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands to be without legal foundation, though it noted that in the terms of reference agreed to by the U.K. and Argentina in 1977, the U.K. had agreed to discuss the question of sovereignty over those two set of islands alongside the Falkland Islands themselves.

b) The Committee concluded that H.M.G.'S refusal to discuss sovereignty with Argentina was no doubt "prudent" in the present situation when direct bilateral talks towards the restoration of normal relations had not yet been joined and Argentina had not formally declared an end to the state of hostilities.\*/ The Committee added that the "present situation", though understandable in the short term, could only offer an uncertain future for the islands in the long term and that some kind of accomodation was not only inevitable, in view of the cost of the present policy to the U.K., but also desirable if the Falklands were to have any prospect of long-term economic

---

\*/ It will be recalled that President Alfonsín and Foreign Minister Caputo have repeatedly stressed before the UN and elsewhere their determination to pursue Argentine claims by peaceful means only.



prosperity and political stability. The Committee therefore recommended that H.M.G., while it should not now agree to the inclusion of the "sovereignty dispute" on the agenda for talks in the immediate future, it should nonetheless be willing to discuss the means by which progress could be made to try to find a negotiated settlement with Argentina as requested by the U.N.

- c) The Committee recommended that H.M.G. should now:
- (i) announce its intention to lift the "Protection Zone" as soon as the Argentine Government communicates a formal declaration of the end of hostilities.
  - (ii) give a public undertaking that no further fortification of the islands is being contemplated and that its military presence will be progressively reduced provided there is no evidence of renewed hostile Argentine intentions.
  - (iii) consider making a public announcement of non-sovereignty issues it is prepared to discuss with Argentina including possibly the exploitation and regulation of the hydrocarbon and fisheries resources in the area of the Falklands and Dependencies without prejudice to territorial claims.
  - (iv) consider extending an invitation to the UN Decolonization Committee to visit the Falklands assuming agreement is reached on constitutional changes which would move the Islands closer to internal self-government.

d) The Committee reminded the Government that under article 73 of the Charter the "interests" and not the "wishes" of the inhabitants of non-self-government territories are paramount.

e) The Committee warned that time is running out for the establishment of a viable economy in the islands. It will be recalled that after the 1982 conflict Lord Shackleton recommended a series of development programmes without which he predicted the internal collapse of the Falklands economy "in the next five years or so".


f) The Committee concluded that leaseback as a solution was hard to contemplate given the "understandable mistrust of Argentina" amongst the Falklanders. In the long run a solution acceptable to the Falklands' immediate neighbours was essential to the Islanders themselves: neither independence nor integration into the UK could conceivably achieve that objective.

4. Mrs. Thatcher, in her special Christmas broadcast to the islands, implicitly repudiated the Committee's report and once again reiterated that the "wishes" of the inhabitants were "paramount" and would continue to be so. "Democracy is about the right to self-determination ... The Government and people of the Argentina should know now they have democracy, they have self-determination, and they should know they must extend that same right to the people of the Falklands". This public and repeated reiteration by Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher that the wishes of the islanders are paramount and her

close identification with the Falklands campaign of 1982 seem to have made it difficult for her politically to accept that the question of sovereignty cannot be excluded indefinitely from any Anglo-Argentine discussions.

5. On the other hand, President Alfonsín cannot conceivably concede on this point which is central to the Argentine position. It is not surprising therefore that Foreign Minister Caputo reacted strongly to Mrs. Thatcher's assertion in her message that the islands will always be British, and described it as an 'act of arrogance'. In a statement issued on 3 January to mark the 152nd anniversary of the British 'occupation' of the islands, the Argentine Foreign Office accused Britain of hindering peace negotiations and worsening tensions in the South Atlantic. The statement added that "the Argentine government and countries in the region view with concern the continuation and worsening of tension in the South Atlantic, as a result of events produced by the British government".

6. In these circumstances, a resumption of a dialogue in earnest between the two sides is difficult to foresee in the immediate future unless the British eventually accept the idea of an open and flexible agenda.

  
Rafeeuddin Ahmed  
9 January 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

On 19 December, Mr. de Soto gave Mr. Gore-Booth SG's letter transmitting the GA resolution of 39th session. Mr. Gore-Booth said that the British Government found itself at this moment before a "blank page". They were taking stock of the failed Berne talks as well as the results of the General Assembly debate and resolution and other events such as the recent report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Falklands Affairs. It was not his expectation that the UK would be likely to approach Argentina again with an attempt to address a package of issues. Rather, more likely, it would in due course try to address, piecemeal, specific issues among which that of sovereignty would of course not be included. He remarked that, despite the considerable play given in Argentina to the Committee Report, it had in fact held that Argentina had seriously jeopardized its case by its actions of April 1982.

The UK has signified that they will not bring up the Falklands question during your visit but that they understand that you might raise it. There are erroneous press reports in Argentina according to which you will not be raising the matter which could give the impression that you are being remiss with respect to your mandate by the General Assembly. Obviously the time is not right for a strong push but it is suggested that you raise it so that you will have fulfilled your duty. The form which this could take might be of a reminder, that is, you may wish to recall to the Prime Minister and/or Foreign Minister that you remain available as a conduit either within the General Assembly resolution or even outside it. You might also inquire what Britain plans to do in the light of what Mr. Gore-Booth told Mr. de Soto.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

RECEIVED JSS  
DEC 27 1984

Tel: 01 630-1981  
Cables: Omnipress London

Please note our new address:  
UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE  
SHIP HOUSE  
20 BUCKINGHAM GATE  
LONDON SW1E 6LB

.18 December 1984

Dear Virendra,

I enclose a report on press and television coverage  
for the week 12 - 18 December 1984.

Will be back with you for Christmas and New Year

New Year

New Year

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Erik Jensen'.

Erik Jensen  
Director

Mr Virendra Dayal  
Chef de Cabinet  
Executive Office of the Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York, N.Y. 10017  
USA

cc : Mr Y Akashi



## INFORMATION CENTRE

630-1981  
Tel: 01-629-6411  
Cables: Omnipress London

Please note our new address:  
UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE  
SHIP HOUSE  
20 BUCKINGHAM GATE  
LONDON SW1E 6LB

18 December 1984

FALKLANDS(MALVINAS)

The report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the Falklands(Malvinas) was summarised in The Financial Times (17 December); "On the one hand, it supports the British Government in its refusal to negotiate with Argentina over the sovereignty of the islands and praises its wisdom in seeking to make progress through 'practical and sensible' arrangements for relations between the two countries. On the other hand, it argues that 'an accommodation with Argentina is not only inevitable, in view of the cost of the present policy to the United Kingdom, but also desirable if the Falklands are to have any prospect of long-term economic prosperity and political stability.'

"The committee questions whether either country has an unanswerable legal claim on the islands and maintains that Argentina's claim was seriously weakened by the invasion."

An editorial in The Guardian (13 December) calls the report "a ludicrous exercise in schizophrenia." It goes on to ask: "Is there truly nothing that can be done? Of course there is. We can negotiate with this elected Government of Argentina, just as Sir Geoffrey ... has just negotiated with this unelected Chinese Government about Hong Kong." The Financial Times, in an editorial (13 December) and in a major article on the Falklands headlined "A solution made in Hong Kong" (17 December), claims that the Hong Kong Agreement shows a way forward for negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Daily Telegraph (13 December), however, supports the refusal to discuss sovereignty.

The Falklands(Malvinas) were the subject of a BBC2 documentary, "Brass Tacks", on 12 December. Interviews were conducted by the former UK Ambassador to Washington, Nicholas Henderson, including one with Mr Dante Caputo, the Argentinian Foreign Minister. Mr Caputo implied that a formal declaration of the end of hostilities was not a prerequisite for a solution to the problem. He mentioned Suez, where the UK had made no such formal declaration. In answer to a question regarding the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, Mr Caputo pointed out that Argentina had the largest population of British citizens outside the Commonwealth. Under the federal system of Argentina, he said, there was no reason why the islanders should not decide on forms of administration, social organisation, education, etc. best suited to their interests. He stressed the need to include sovereignty

in any discussions but said that Argentina did not think that an abrupt transfer process was possible; transitional arrangements, he said, should be found, such as those applied in other places.

David Steel, the leader of the opposition Liberal Party, said, when interviewed, that he felt it was "dangerous" to say that the wishes of the islanders were paramount as this contradicted the paramountcy of Parliament.

When this point was put to Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, he said that although Parliament was paramount, it was "inconceivable" that Parliament would not give the "highest regard" to the wishes of the islanders. He rejected any comparison between Hong Kong or Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, saying that the Falklands were geographically, historically, politically and legally different. He accused Argentina of being unwilling to negotiate about "sensible, practicable steps to establish more normal relations" between the two countries.

Note for the Secretary-General


Meeting with Mr Klibi

Iran/Iraq

At the moment no new ideas can be entertained, given the unyielding positions taken by Iran and Iraq in the context of a military stalemate.

Any move toward proposing a formula for a comprehensive solution appears quite unrealistic. The "incremental" approach started by the Secretary-General is held up by Iraq's refusal to give commitments on the non-use of chemical weapons, but the undertakings of June 1984 on the end of deliberate attacks on civilian areas appear to be holding.

The outcome of the mission on POWs might give some indication if any possibilities exist for a revival of mediation efforts.



Diego Cordovez  
14 January 1985

Confidential

Note for the Secretary-General  
(Briefing for visit to South East Asia)

Iran/Iraq

On the military level, a stalemate continues in the Iran/Iraq conflict. Iran still maintains an offensive posture and has recently launched limited drives in the centre and north, but has been immobilized in the principal theatre of operations in the south. Iraq, in a strengthened and powerful defensive posture, of late has started air attacks against Iranian troop concentrations, particularly in the south. It also retains the option of using chemical weapons.


On the political level the positions of both sides largely remain rigid. The Iranian attitude plays a more critical role since Iran consistently has rejected negotiations unless its onerous preconditions are met. These are: the removal of the Iraqi regime, payment of reparations, and repatriation of expelled Iraqis of Iranian origin. There has been no official change in this position, but a new nuance appeared in the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in December. Iran, which previously had rejected all moves by the Conference, cooperated in formulating a resolution adopted by the Conference referring to the need for an immediate cease-fire and also calling for observance of the 1925 Protocol on chemical weapons. Iran also continues to cooperate with the United Nations Inspection Team in Tehran. Its cooperation with the Secretary-General's mission on POWs follows an earlier change of position which reflected factionalism within the ruling party in Tehran. Whether these moves presage emerging flexibility in an effort to reduce Iran's international isolation is still to be seen.

While Iraq remains anxious for a negotiated settlement, its new military strength and increasing support from friendly countries concerned by the "Iranian threat" have given it a renewed confidence, reflected in its rigid insistence that any negotiations must be unconditional. While Iraq's effort to interdict Iran's oil exports by attacking merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf has not yet proved a success, it is anticipating an increase in its own oil exports when a new pipeline across Saudi Arabia is completed early next year.



In this situation the Secretary-General's mediation efforts aimed toward a comprehensive settlement have to be held in abeyance. A more likely possibility is the "incremental" approach. This would build on the agreement on ending attacks on civilian areas by completing an undertaking to abstain from using chemical weapons, and moving to an end to attacks on merchant shipping which Iraq demands to be linked to the ending of Iranian attacks on its ports so that they can be repaired and used for oil exports. Efforts to further this approach have been halted by Iraq's refusal to relinquish the option of using chemical weapons and Iran's refusal to allow Iraqi ports to be restored to use.

In this state of affairs, the Secretary-General can only reiterate his readiness to assist whenever both parties show political will to move toward negotiations. The outcome of the mission on POWs might serve to indicate whether any more hopeful possibilities exist.

  
I.R.  
4 January 1985

REMARQUES DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL AUX CONSULTATIONS  
DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE LE 15 JANVIER 1985

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

I R A N / I R A Q

BIEN QUE LES NATIONS UNIES AIENT RÉCEMMENT PRIS PART À UN CERTAIN NOMBRE D'ACTIVITÉS CONSTRUCTIVES CONCERNANT LA SITUATION IRAN/IRAK, LES CHANCES DE VOIR ABOUTIR LE CONFLIT NE SE SONT MALHEUREUSEMENT PAS AMÉLIORÉES. LES DEUX PARTIES NE SONT TOUJOURS PAS PRÊTES À NÉGOCIER SANS PRÉCONDITIONS.

DANS CE CONTEXTE, J'AI ESSAYÉ L'AN DERNIER D'ADOPTER UNE APPROCHE "AUGMENTATIVE" SE BASANT LARGEMENT SUR DES MESURES HUMANITAIRES DESTINÉES À ATTÉNUER LES CONSÉQUENCES DE CE CONFLIT DESTRUCTIF. L'ENGAGEMENT QUE J'AI OBTENU EN JUIN DE L'IRAN ET DE L'IRAK DE METTRE FIN AUX ATTAQUES MILITAIRES DÉLIBÉRÉES DANS DES ZONES PUREMENT CIVILES SEMBLE AVOIR ÉTÉ RESPECTÉ : IL N'Y A PAS EU DE RAPPORTS SELON LESQUELS LES CIBLES CIVILES AURAIENT ÉTÉ VICTIMES D'ATTAQUES DE PROJECTILES LOURDS OU AÉRIENNES SUR UNE ÉCHELLE AUSSI DRAMATIQUE QUE CELLE QUI M'AVAIT CONDUIT À LANCER MON APPEL. DE MÊME, DEPUIS QUE J'AI PRÉSENTÉ AU CONSEIL LE RAPPORT DES SPÉCIALISTES SUR L'UTILISATION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES, IL N'A PAS PU ÊTRE PROUVÉ QUE CES ARMES ONT ÉTÉ EMPLOYÉES À NOUVEAU.

CEPENDANT, MES EFFORTS POUR OBTENIR DES PARTIES UN ENGAGEMENT SPÉCIFIQUE DE RENONCER À L'UTILISATION D'ARMES CHIMIQUES N'A PU ÊTRE OBTENU QUE DE L'IRAN, PAS DE L'IRAK. JE DEMEURE POURTANT CONVAINCU QU'UN TEL ENGAGEMENT FACILITERAIT L'OBTENTION D'UN ACCORD SUR UNE CESSATION DES ATTAQUES CONTRE LES NAVIRES MARCHANDS DANS LE GOLFE, LAQUELLE SERAIT NÉCESSAIREMENT LIÉE À UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU PARTIEL DANS LA ZONE DE SHATT-AL-ARAB QUI PERMETTRAIT LA REPRISE DE LA NAVIGATION MARCHANDE IRAKIENNE. LE RAPPORT QUE J'AI SOUMIS LE 31 DÉCEMBRE 1984, CONFORMÉMENT À LA RÉOLUTION 552, MONTRE QUE LES ATTAQUES CONTRE LES NAVIRES MARCHANDS N'ONT MALHEUREUSEMENT PAS CESSÉ.

COMME LES MEMBRES DU CONSEIL LE SAVENT, DES ÉQUIPES D'INSPECTION ONT ÉTÉ MISES EN PLACE À BAGDAD ET À TÉHÉRAN, CONFORMÉMENT À L'ACCORD CONCERNANT LES ZONES CIVILES. BIEN QUE LES DEUX PARTIES AIENT RENDU COMPTE D'UN CERTAIN NOMBRE D'INCIDENTS AYANT CAUSÉ DES DOMMAGES DANS LES ZONES CIVILES DURANT UNE PÉRIODE DE SEPT MOIS, UNE SEULE INSPECTION A ÉTÉ RÉCLAMÉE POUR L'ANNÉE 1984 PAR L'IRAK, EN SEPTEMBRE DERNIER. DÉBUT JANVIER, UNE ATTAQUE DE DIMENSION APPAREMMENT SÉRIEUSE, A FAIT L'OBJET D'UN RAPPORT DE L'IRAN ET UNE INSPECTION A EU LIEU LA SEMAINE DERNIÈRE. JE VIENS JUSTE D'EN RECEVOIR LE RAPPORT QUI SERA BIENTÔT PUBLIÉ.

LES MEMBRES DU CONSEIL SE RAPPELLERONT QUE DEUX MISSIONS AYANT DES BUTS BIEN SPÉCIFIQUES AVAIENT ÉTÉ DÉPÊCHÉES SUR LES LIEUX : L'UNE, EN 1983, POUR INSPECTER LES DOMMAGES CAUSÉS DANS LES ZONES CIVILES; L'AUTRE, EN 1984, SUR L'UTILISATION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES.

UNE TROISIÈME MISSION A ÉTÉ ENVOYÉE SUR LES LIEUX POUR RÉPONDRE À CERTAINES PRÉOCCUPATIONS DES DEUX GOUVERNEMENTS CONCERNANT LES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE. LA MISSION SE TROUVE MAINTENANT EN IRAK ET SE RENDRA À TÉHÉRAN À LA FIN DE LA SEMAINE. J'AI PRIS L'INITIATIVE DE CETTE MISSION - QUE JE CONSIDÈRE UNE MESURE EXTRAORDINAIRE - EN CONSULTATION AVEC LE COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX ROUGE QUI EST NORMALEMENT RESPONSABLE DES QUESTIONS RELATIVES AUX PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE ET À LA TROISIÈME CONVENTION DE GENÈVE. LA MISSION EST COMPOSÉE DE TROIS SPÉCIALISTES EXPÉRIMENTÉS ET QUALIFIÉS D'AUTRICHE, DE LA NORVÈGE ET DU VÉNÉZUÉLA. LE RAPPORT QU'ELLE DOIT M'ENVOYER EST ATTENDU DÉBUT FÉVRIER ET J'AI L'INTENTION DE LE TRANSMETTRE AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ.

L'OBJET DE CETTE BRÈVE DÉCLARATION EST DE RÉCAPITULER LA SITUATION, TELLE QU'ELLE A ÉVOLUÉ, POUR LES MEMBRES DU CONSEIL, AINSI QUE LES EFFORTS, FORCÉMENT LIMITÉS, QUI ONT ÉTÉ DÉPLOYÉS PAR LES NATIONS UNIES. BIEN ENTENDU, JE SAISIS TOUTES LES OCCASIONS POUR RAPPELER À L'IRAN COMME À L'IRAK QUE JE SUIS PRÊT À LEUR FAIRE DES PROPOSITIONS DÈS L'INSTANT OÙ ILS FERONT PART DE LEUR INTENTION DE PROCÉDER À DES NÉGOCIATIONS.

\*\*\*\*\*

Confidential

Note for the Secretary-General

KOREA

The Korean Peninsula, where a continuing division creates conditions for constant tension, is an area potentially harbouring one of the greatest dangers to international peace and security.

The Secretary-General was particularly concerned about the heightened tension that followed the incident in Rangoon in October 1983. Accordingly, in July 1984, the Secretary-General asked Mr. Cordovez to undertake a visit to Pyongyang and Seoul. The purpose of that visit was two-fold: to convey the Secretary-General's concern and to seek a better understanding of the positions of the two Governments through face-to-face discussions. The Secretary-General is pleased that those two aims were fully accomplished. Both Governments gave firm assurances that they would not initiate any action that might exacerbate tension. The Secretary-General also feels that, following those contacts, the Secretariat now has a clearer and fuller understanding of the positions, aims and interests of the two sides.

Both Governments express their commitment to reunification. However, their respective approaches to achieving that end differ widely. The South considers unification (the term it prefers to reunification) as a long-term objective which can only be brought about by a step-by-step approach through adoption of concrete measures - such as reunion of families - to increase mutual confidence and normalize relations. It wants at an early stage admission of two Koreas to the United Nations. The North considers that the decision to reunify the country should be the first step and that, in that context, other measures - humanitarian or otherwise - should be considered. The North feels strongly that separate membership in the United Nations would only solidify the division of Korea.

On procedural aspects, North Korea advocates tripartite talks, with the participation of North Korea, South Korea and the United States, to discuss, first, replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, and withdrawal of US troops and, second, reunification of the country. South Korea firmly insists on bilateral dialogue. It has proposed holding high-level meetings, including an exchange of visits by the two Presidents.

While there have been in recent months some encouraging developments, the signs are mixed and their lasting implications are not yet clear. The provision by North Korea in October 1984 of relief aid to flood victims in South Korea was followed by the resumption in November 1984 of direct talks between the two sides on Red Cross matters and economic issues. These talks, however, were interrupted first by the shooting incident in the DMZ and now by North Korea's objection to "Team Spirit 85", joint US-ROK military exercises that are held annually from February to April.

Diplomatic sources expect that the North's intention is not to end the talks, which have aroused international interest, but to delay them until after the military exercises. The North meanwhile has suggested that, if those talks progressed smoothly, they could lead to "high-level political talks" (such as the South has been proposing), and proposed a meeting of Deputy Prime Ministers of the two sides to "remove the obstacles"; at the same time it has again stressed recently its demand for tripartite talks. The South is insisting on holding the economic and Red Cross talks as planned. It would be willing to hold a meeting of the Deputy Prime Ministers later.

Although North Korea is still deeply resentful of the United Nations owing to its role in the Korean conflict, it has high respect for the Secretary-General, who is in frequent contact with the Permanent Representative of both North and South. The Secretary-General intends to follow developments closely and he is prepared to assist the parties whenever and in whatever manner both Governments desire.

*Hisako Shimura*

Hisako Shimura  
17 January 1985



Briefing Notes on Law of the Sea  
-----

UNITED KINGDOM : The United Kingdom did not sign the Law of the Sea Convention and has reiterated its difficulties with the deep sea-bed mining provisions. Unlike the United States which rejected the Convention, the U.K. Government stated that it seeks improvements to the deep sea-bed mining part before accepting the Convention. One way this can be achieved is for the United Kingdom to participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission where it can propose the improvements which it seeks in the course of the drafting of the deep sea-bed mining regulations. Accordingly, if opportunity permits, the United Kingdom might be urged to continue its participation in the work of the Preparatory Commission as an observer.

THAILAND: Thailand is a signatory of the Convention although not always entirely enthusiastic about it, since it is an important distant-water fishing country and has found that many of its fishing grounds fall within the national jurisdiction of other States. Thailand is, however, an important member of the ASEAN Group and should be urged to ratify the Convention at an early date.

VIETNAM : Vietnam has signed the Convention. However, the question of its early ratification may be complicated by a number of disputes over continental shelf jurisdiction and certain off-shore islands, especially with China.

LAOS : Laos is a signatory of the Convention and, hopefully, it will eventually ratify it.

MALAYSIA : Malaysia has signed the Convention and is a strong supporter of it. The previous Foreign Minister had indicated that Malaysia was ready to ratify the Convention immediately since procedurally this is an executive act. However, the Foreign Minister has since changed. It may be useful to raise the question of ratification with the current Foreign Minister. Ratification by Malaysia would be significant since it is an important strait State (Straits of Malacca). Singapore is most likely to be influenced by the actions of Malaysia and Indonesia.

INDONESIA : Indonesia, which has signed the Convention, has decided to ratify it also. Late in 1984, the Government had initiated in the Legislature the necessary legislative procedures. This process should have been completed or should be nearing completion. Indonesia is an enthusiastic supporter of the Convention. In fact, its Foreign Minister (Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja) was the leader of the Indonesian Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference for many years and continues to take keen interest in the work of the Preparatory Commission. Since Indonesia is an important maritime State in the region, its ratification will be politically significant and influential. It is a strait State, as well as an

archipelagic State which is strategically located and has jurisdiction over important sea routes. Ratification by Indonesia would influence ratification by the remaining ASEAN countries (Philippines has already ratified) and possibly will also influence the decisions of Vietnam, China and Japan on the one hand and of Australia on the other hand. It would, therefore, be extremely useful to raise the question of ratification with the Indonesian Government.

AUSTRALIA: Australia is a signatory of the Convention. Its intentions regarding the timing of ratification are unclear. It has always been a keen supporter of the Convention and has played an important role as a conciliator. It is one of the largest beneficiaries of the Convention, having obtained very large areas of economic zone and continental shelf jurisdiction. Ratification by Australia would influence the moderate countries of Europe, such as the Scandinavian countries, Austria, the Benelux countries to also ratify. However, Australia is very sensitive to the problems of the United States and the United Kingdom with the Convention and might hesitate in taking early action. It would, however, be worthwhile raising the issue with the Prime Minister since the Labour Government in Australia has a tendency to be more forthcoming.

NEW ZEALAND : New Zealand is a signatory to the Convention and supports it strongly. It too has made important gains through the Convention in terms of economic zone and continental shelf jurisdictions. Regarding ratification, it is in a similar position to that of Australia although at one time there was some indication that the new Labour Government might be willing to proceed to ratify early. They were somewhat concerned, however, about the cost implications for States parties to the Convention. It is nevertheless worth trying to persuade them to ratify as that may trigger off action by Australia and the Scandinavian countries. We need to encourage countries other than those of the "77" to ratify.

-----

GENERAL INFORMATION : The Convention has been signed by 159 countries from all regions and ratified by 14. It requires 60 ratifications to come into force. The Preparatory Commission for the establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea began its work in spring 1983 and is engaged in drafting regulations for deep sea-bed mining and preparing for the establishment of the Sea-Bed Authority, the Enterprise and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Preparatory Commission has already received applications from four States (France, India, Japan and the USSR) for registration as pioneer investors in sea-bed mining.

PK

BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I. Middle East

UNIFIL and the Naqoura talks

Since the Israeli invasion in June 1982, UNIFIL has not been able to fulfil its original mandate and has been carrying out interim tasks, namely to maintain its positions in south Lebanon and provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. This situation is clearly unsatisfactory. However, the Security Council has repeatedly decided, at the request of the Lebanese Government and upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to extend the mandate of UNIFIL because the Force remains an important element of stability in south Lebanon and also in the belief that, when Israel agrees to withdraw from Lebanese territory, the Force can play a crucial role in facilitating the withdrawal process and in assisting the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority in the area.

In his report of 9 April 1984 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General suggested that in the context of an Israeli withdrawal UNIFIL might be given an expanded role involving the following elements:

- a) its temporary deployment in the areas evacuated by the Israeli forces;
- b) its immediate deployment in the Sidon area to ensure the safety of the local population including Palestinian refugees in the camps, and
- c) the working out of the necessary arrangements to ensure that south Lebanon becomes a zone of peace under the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government.

In his report of 9 October 1984, the Secretary-General indicated that recent developments seemed to have brought about more positive prospects for the realization of the action he had outlined in April 1984. It was his impression from recent discussions with Israeli, Lebanese and also Syrian leaders that there was general agreement on the objective of an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, on the necessity of working out arrangements which would ensure peace and security in the region and the restoration of Lebanese authority and sovereignty in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, as well as an expanded mandate of UNIFIL and a widening of its area of operation.

After the Security Council considered the Secretary-General's report and decided to extend UNIFIL for a further period of 6 months until April 1985, the Secretary-General approached the Governments of Israel and Lebanon in an effort to work out a suitable negotiating process. On 31 October 1984, he announced that, following consultation with the two Governments, he had convoked a conference of military representatives of Lebanon and Israel at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura to discuss military aspects relating to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and security arrangements in south Lebanon.

The Israeli and Lebanese military representatives, together with General Callaghan and other officials of UNIFIL, have held 13 meetings so far, the last one on 7 January 1984. They have reached agreement on certain basic principles, namely the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, the sovereignty of Lebanon over the entire south Lebanon and a larger role for UNIFIL in the context of an Israeli withdrawal. But the positions of the two sides have remained far apart on the question of the modalities of the Israeli withdrawal, the security arrangements and the role of UNIFIL, and there is a possibility that the talks may break down if no progress is made.

On 9 January, the Secretary-General decided to send Mr. Urquhart to the Middle East to discuss the situation with the parties concerned with special reference to UNIFIL and the Naqoura talks. Mr. Urquhart will visit the area (Jerusalem, Beirut and also Damascus) from 14 to 20 January. He will report to the Secretary-General on his mission in London on 21 January.

Search for a comprehensive settlement and the proposed International Peace Conference on the Middle East

The search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict in the Middle East has remained deadlocked. The Secretary-General has on numerous occasions stressed the need to make progress in this important matter. He has also repeatedly expressed the belief that a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement can be best achieved through negotiations within the UN framework and that such a settlement will have to meet the following conditions: withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied territories, recognition of all States in the area and a just settlement of the Palestinian problem based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

In December 1983, the General Assembly called for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East in an effort to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem and it requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to undertake preparatory measures to convene the proposed conference. The reports undertaken by the Secretary-General in 1984 on this matter were inconclusive because of the opposition of Israel and the United States to the proposed conference.

In December 1984, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution in which it reaffirmed its endorsement of the call for convening the peace conference, called upon Israel and the United States to reconsider their positions and requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts for the convening of the conference.

The Secretary-General brought this matter to the attention of the Security Council in a letter dated 8 January 1985. It would seem unlikely that Israel and the US will change their positions regarding the proposed conference at this time.

## II. United Nations Peace-keeping Operations

Australia provides 12 observers for UNTSO, 6 observers for UNMOGIP and a civilian police contingent of 20 men for UNFICYP.

New Zealand has 4 observers serving with UNTSO.

It may also be recalled that Indonesia contributed an infantry battalion to UNEF from December 1973 until its withdrawal in July 1979. General Rais Abin of Indonesia served as the last Commander of UNEF. Indonesia and Malaysia (then Malaya) each contributed an infantry battalion to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (now Zaire).

During the visit to Australia, the following matters relating to peace-keeping operations might be raised:

### Australian observers with UNMOGIP

In a letter dated 28 December 1984, the Australian Permanent Representative, Ambassador Woolcott, informed the Secretary-General of the decision of his Government to withdraw from UNMOGIP. To cause the least disruption to the mission, the Government proposed to implement the withdrawal gradually with the last observer leaving in September 1985.

The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP has stated that the departure of the 6 Australian observers will have a very adverse effect on the functioning of the mission for the following reasons:

- a) The present 40 observers are barely enough to man the headquarters and the various stations maintained by UNMOGIP.
- b) The participation of Australian observers is considered especially valuable because they are familiar with the staff systems of both India and Pakistan. Another reason is that Australia is the only contributing country with English as its mother tongue.

It is suggested that the Secretary-General raise this matter with the Australian Government and request it to consider the possibility of reducing the number of Australian observers from 6 to 3, rather than withdrawing them altogether.

Australian proposal concerning military advisers of the Secretary-General

In a press release dated 4 January 1985, the Australian Foreign Minister indicated that Australia would propose, as a step towards the collective security goals proposed in the UN Charter, that the Security Council authorize the appointment of military advisers to help the Secretary-General deal with international conflicts. The Foreign Minister has also announced that he intends to discuss this matter with the Secretary-General during his visit to Australia.

This is a matter of extreme delicacy and must be handled with great care. While the Secretary-General appreciates the intention of Australia and its support for him, he fears that the proposal concerning military advisers may be counter-productive for the following reasons:



a) This proposal will most probably be opposed by the Soviet Union, which has always been suspicious of any move which might dilute the functions and responsibilities of the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee on matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.

b) The Secretary-General already has military advisers to assist him on international conflicts in the context of UN peace-keeping. The first military adviser of the Secretary-General was appointed by Dag Hammarskjöld in 1956 at the time of the establishment of UNEF I. The Secretary-General now has one military adviser (Brigadier-General Dibuama) and 3 assistant military advisers. The practice concerning the appointment of the Secretary-General's military advisers has never been challenged and is working satisfactorily. The Australian initiative could create a controversial issue out of this well established practice.

REMARQUES DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL  
AUX CONSULTATIONS DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE  
LE 15 JANVIER 1985

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

L I B A N

DANS SA RÉOLUTION 555 DU 12 OCTOBRE 1984, LE CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ A DÉCIDÉ DE PRORGER LE MANDAT DE LA FINUL POUR UNE NOUVELLE PÉRIODE INTÉRIMAIRE DE SIX MOIS, JUSQU'AU 19 AVRIL 1985. EN MÊME TEMPS, LE CONSEIL A RÉAFFIRMÉ QU'IL SOUTENAIT FERMEMENT LA CAUSE DE L'INTÉGRITÉ TERRITORIALE, DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET DE L'INDÉPENDANCE DU LIBAN À L'INTÉRIEUR DE SES FRONTIÈRES INTERNATIONALEMENT RECONNUES ET IL M'A PRIÉ DE POURSUIVRE LES CONSULTATIONS AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT LIBANAIS ET LES AUTRES PARTIES DIRECTEMENT INTÉRESSÉES AU SUJET DE L'APPLICATION DE LA RÉOLUTION ET DE LUI FAIRE RAPPORT. DANS LE CONTEXTE DE CETTE RÉOLUTION ET APRÈS AVOIR CONSULTÉ LES PARTIES INTÉRESSÉES, J'AI CONVOQUÉ UNE CONFÉRENCE DE REPRÉSENTANTS MILITAIRES ISRAÉLIENS ET LIBANAIS POUR DISCUTER DES ASPECTS MILITAIRES CONCERNANT LE RETRAIT DES TROUPES ISRAÉLIENNES ET LES ARRANGEMENTS DE SÉCURITÉ AU SUD-LIBAN.

LE 30 NOVEMBRE DERNIER, J'AI PRÉSENTÉ UN RAPPORT ORAL AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ SUR LES POURPARLERS DE NAQOURA. J'AI INDICÉ NOTAMMENT QUE LES REPRÉSENTANTS ISRAÉLIENS ET LIBANAIS AVAIENT TENU SIX SÉANCES ET S'ÉTAIENT MIS D'ACCORD SUR LES OBJECTIFS GÉNÉRAUX D'UN RETRAIT ISRAÉLIEN COMPLET, DE LA RESTAURATION DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ LIBANAISE ET LA PRISE DE MESURES DE SÉCURITÉ APPROPRIÉES AU SUD-LIBAN. TOUTEFOIS, LES POSITIONS DES PARTIES CONCERNANT LES MOYENS PRÉCIS POUR RÉALISER CES OBJECTIFS SONT RESTÉES DIVERGENTES. LA POSITION LIBANAISE EST QUE L'ARMÉE LIBANAISE DOIT ASSUMER LE CONTRÔLE DU SECTEUR NORD DE LA ZONE OCCUPÉE, APPROXIMATIVEMENT DE L'AWALI AU LITANI, ET QUE LE SECTEUR SUD, DU LITANI À LA FRONTIÈRE, DOIT ÊTRE PRIS EN CHARGE PAR LA FINUL AVEC L'ARMÉE LIBANAISE. ISRAËL, POUR SA PART, VEUT QUE LE GROS DES FORCES DE LA FINUL SOIT DÉPLOYÉ ENTRE L'AWALI ET LE ZAHRANI, TANDIS QUE LES ARRANGEMENTS DE SÉCURITÉ DANS LE SECTEUR SUD SÉRAIENT LA RESPONSABILITÉ DES FORCES LOCALES AVEC UNE PRÉSENCE SYMBOLIQUE DE LA FINUL.

DEPUIS MON DERNIER RAPPORT, LES REPRÉSENTANTS ISRAÉLIENS ET LIBANAIS ONT TENU SIX AUTRES SÉANCES À NAQOURA, LA DERNIÈRE AYANT EU LIEU LE 7 JANVIER. LE JOUR PRÉCÉDENT, LE PRÉSIDENT GEMAYEL A DÉCLARÉ À BEYROUTH QUE LA POSITION DU LIBAN CONCERNANT LE SUD RESTAIT INCHANGÉE ET QUE CETTE POSITION AVAIT ÉTÉ EXPRIMÉE PAR SON GOUVERNEMENT À MANTES OCCASIONS ET, PLUS PARTICULIÈREMENT, PAR SES REPRÉSENTANTS À LA TRIBUNE DE L'ONU. EN RÉAFFIRMANT CETTE POSITION, LE PRÉSIDENT A SOULIGNÉ LA VOLONTÉ DU LIBAN DE COOPÉRER AVEC L'ONU ET SES FORCES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX POUR HÂTER LA PROCÉDURE DE RETRAIT DE L'ARMÉE ISRAÉLIENNE DU LIBAN ET POUR FACILITER LE DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'ARMÉE LIBANAISE DANS LA ZONE OCCUPÉE. DANS LA SÉANCE DU 7 JANVIER À NAQOURA, LE REPRÉSENTANT LIBANAIS A RÉITÉRÉ LA POSITION DÉFINIE PAR LE PRÉSIDENT GEMAYEL. IL A DEMANDÉ DE NOUVEAU À LA DÉLÉGATION ISRAÉLIENNE DE SOUMETTRE UN PLAN CHRONOLOGIQUE POUR LE RETRAIT DES FORCES ISRAÉLIENNES ET IL A INDiqué QUE SON GOUVERNEMENT DISCUTERAIT DU RÔLE DE LA FINUL AVEC LES AUTORITÉS DE L'ONU APRÈS AVOIR RECU CE PLAN.

AU COURS DE LA MÊME SÉANCE, LE REPRÉSENTANT ISRAÉLIEN A INDiqué QU'ISRAËL CONSIDÉRerait QUE LE DÉPLOIEMENT D'IMPORTANTES TROUPES DE LA FINUL DANS LA RÉGION ENTRE LE ZAHRANI ET L'AWALI ÉTAIT UN ÉLÉMENT CENTRAL DES ARRANGEMENTS DE SÉCURITÉ ENVISAGÉS PAR ISRAËL.

IL A ÉGALEMENT INDIQUÉ QUE LA RÉPONSE DU REPRÉSENTANT LIBANAIS ÉTAIT INSUFFISANTE ET QU'IL ALLAIT LA TRANSMETTRE À SES AUTORITÉS POUR QU'ELLES DÉCIDENT DES SUITES À DONNER. LES POURPARLERS DE NAQOURA SONT SUSPENDUS DEPUIS LE 7 JANVIER.

DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES, J'AI DÉCIDÉ DE DEMANDER À MONSIEUR BRIAN URQUHART, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL ADJOINT AUX AFFAIRES POLITIQUES SPÉCIALES, DE SE RENDRE DANS LA RÉGION POUR DISCUTER DE LA SITUATION AVEC LES PARTIES INTÉRESSÉES ET POUR LES AIDER À SURMONTER L'IMPASSE ACTUELLE. COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, LE GOUVERNEMENT ISRAÉLIEN A ANNONCÉ HIER, 14 JANVIER, QU'IL A ADOPTÉ UN PLAN DE RETRAIT DES FORCES ISRAÉLIENNES DU LIBAN EN TROIS PHASES. LA PREMIÈRE PHASE QUI DOIT PORTER SUR LE SECTEUR NORD-ouest, Y COMPRIS LA RÉGION DE SIDON, DOIT COMMENCER DANS CINQ SEMAINES. LES DEUX AUTRES PHASES DÉPENDRONT DE L'EXÉCUTION DE LA PREMIÈRE PHASE, ET DEVRONT ÊTRE L'OBJET DE DÉCISIONS ULTÉRIEURES DU CABINET ISRAÉLIEN.

MONSIEUR URQUHART, QUI EST ARRIVÉ À JÉRUSALEM HIER SOIR, APRÈS L'ANNONCE DU GOUVERNEMENT ISRAÉLIEN, A EU UN ENTRETIEN CE MATIN AVEC LES AUTORITÉS ISRAÉLIENNES. CES AUTORITÉS SONT CONVENUES QUE LES POURPARLERS DE NAQOURA CONTINUENT ET PUISSENT SERVIR DE FORUM POUR UNE COORDINATION MILITAIRE PENDANT LE RETRAIT.

ILS ONT INFORMÉ MONSIEUR URQUHART DE LEUR INTENTION DE PRÉSENTER LE PLAN DE RETRAIT À LA DÉLÉGATION LIBANAISE À NAQOURA, PROBABLEMENT À LA SESSION DE JEUDI PROCHAIN. MONSIEUR URQUHART DOIT SE RENDRE À BEYROUTH CET APRÈS-MIDI POUR S'ENTREtenir AVEC LES AUTORITÉS LIBANAISES.

LE CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ COMPRENDRA QU'À CE STADE DÉLICAT, JE NE SUIS PAS EN MESURE DE DISCUTER EN DÉTAIL DE CETTE QUESTION, MAIS JE TIENS À SOULIGNER QUE LES EFFORTS DÉPLOYÉS PAR MONSIEUR URQUHART ET MOI-MÊME VISENT À FACILITER LES NÉGOCIATIONS EN COURS ET À RÉALISER LES OBJECTIFS DÉTERMINÉS PAR LE CONSEIL CONCERNANT LE LIBAN. IL NE S'AGIT PAS DU TOUT D'UNE MISSION DE MÉDIATION. IL EST ÉVIDENT QU'IL APPARTIENT AUX GOUVERNEMENTS INTÉRESSÉS EUX-MÊMES DE SE PRONONCER SUR LES DISPOSITIONS À PRENDRE. IL VA SANS DIRE ÉGALEMENT QUE, SI À LA SUITE DES NÉGOCIATIONS, LE GOUVERNEMENT LIBANAIS DEVAIT DEMANDER UN CHANGEMENT CONCERNANT LES EFFECTIFS, LE DÉPLOIEMENT OU LES RESPONSABILITÉS DE LA FINUL, JE SOUMETTRAIS UNE TELLE DEMANDE AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ POUR SA DÉCISION.

MONSIEUR URQUHART DOIT ME RENCONTRER À LONDRES LE 21 JANVIER POUR ME FAIRE UN RAPPORT DÉTAILLÉ SUR CETTE MISSION. JE NE MANQUERAI PAS DE TENIR LE CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ PLEINEMENT INFORMÉ DÈS QU'IL SERA POSSIBLE DE LE FAIRE.



General Assembly    Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/39/600  
S/16792  
26 October 1984

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Thirty-ninth session  
Agenda item 36  
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL  
Thirty-ninth year

Report of the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

|  | <u>Paragraphs</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------------|-------------|
| I. INTRODUCTION .....  | 1                 | 2           |
| II. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING<br>ACTIVITIES ..... | 2 - 9             | 2           |
| III. SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES .....                               | 10 - 18           | 4           |
| IV. PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM .....  | 19 - 22           | 6           |
| V. QUESTION OF PALESTINE .....   | 23 - 26           | 7           |
| VI. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT .....                                     | 27 - 33           | 8           |
| VII. OBSERVATIONS .....  | 34 - 49           | 10          |



## I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 38/180 D of 19 December 1983. In that resolution, the Assembly dealt with various aspects of the situation in the Middle East and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report covering the developments in the Middle East in all their aspects. The report is based mainly on information available in United Nations documents, to which reference is made whenever appropriate.

## II. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES

2. The status of the cease-fire in the Middle East and the activities of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the area up to September 1983 were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General of 30 September 1983 (A/38/458-S/16015, paras. 3-8). The activities of the United Nations in this field have remained essentially the same. There continue to be three United Nations peace-keeping operations in the area: two peace-keeping forces, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and one observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). At present, they operate mainly in the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors.

### (a) Israel-Syria sector

3. UNDOF, with some 1,300 troops provided by Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland, is deployed between the Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in accordance with the disengagement agreement concluded between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in May 1974. A group of UNTSO observers is detailed to the Force and assists it in the performance of its tasks. The mandate of UNDOF has been extended twice by the Security Council during the reporting period, the last time on 30 May 1984 for a further period of six months until 30 November 1984 (resolution 551 (1984)). The activities of the Force since September 1983 are described in two reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, dated 21 November 1983 and 21 May 1984 (S/16169 and S/16573 and Corr.1). As reported by the Secretary-General, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained generally quiet; UNDOF has continued to perform its functions effectively with the co-operation of the parties, and there have been no serious incidents.

### (b) Israel-Lebanon sector

4. There are two United Nations peace-keeping operations in Lebanon: UNIFIL and the Observer Group Beirut, which is a part of UNTSO. UNIFIL, which is deployed in southern Lebanon, was established by the Security Council on 19 March 1978 following the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Its terms of reference were to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces as called for by the Security Council, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The second Israeli

/...

invasion of Lebanon, which was launched in June 1982, radically altered the situation in which UNIFIL had to function. Following the invasion, the Secretary-General instructed the Force, as interim tasks, to maintain its positions in its area of deployment and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. With the approval of the Security Council, the Force has continued to carry out these interim tasks. The activities of UNIFIL since September 1983 are described in three reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 12 October 1983, 9 April 1984 and 9 October 1984 (S/16036, S/16472 and S/16776). During the reporting period, the Security Council has extended the mandate of UNIFIL on an interim basis three times, the last time on 12 October 1984 for a further interim period of six months until 19 April 1985 (resolution 555 (1984)). The authorized strength of UNIFIL is 7,000, but, because of its reduced activities, it had until recently some 5,680 troops provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal and Sweden. A group of UNTSO observers assists the Force in the performance of its tasks.

5. Observer Group Beirut (OGB) was established in August 1982 in pursuance of Security Council resolution 516 (1982) and given the task of monitoring the situation in and around Beirut. OGB comprises up to 50 observers headed by an officer-in-charge under the overall command of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

6. In February 1984, following heavy exchanges of fire in the Beirut area, the Security Council met at the request of France (S/PV.2514-2516, and 2519) and on 29 February voted on a French draft resolution by which it would have issued an urgent appeal for an immediate cease-fire throughout Lebanon and decided to constitute a United Nations force to take up a position in the Beirut area as soon as all elements of the Multinational Force had withdrawn from Lebanese territory and territorial waters (S/16351/Rev.2). The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

7. In August/September 1984, the Security Council met at the request of Lebanon (S/PV.2552-2556), and on 6 September voted on a draft resolution submitted by the Lebanese representative by which it would have affirmed that the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 1/ applied to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon and demanded that Israel immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of that Convention (S/16732). The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

8. During the period under review, the Security Council also dealt with hostilities that took place in northern Lebanon in the autumn of 1983. On 11 November 1983, the President of the Council made a statement (S/16142) and, on 23 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 542 (1983), in which it deplored the loss of human life caused by the events in northern Lebanon; reiterated its call for the strict respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; requested the parties concerned immediately to accept a cease-fire; and requested the Secretary-General to follow the situation, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Council. On 26 November,

/...

a cease-fire was agreed by the parties involved in the fighting in the Tripoli area. On 1 December, the Secretary-General received a request from the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for permission to use the United Nations flag to facilitate the departure of PLO forces from Tripoli. In a statement made on 3 December during consultations of the Security Council, the Secretary-General indicated that he had decided, on humanitarian grounds, to authorize the flying of the United Nations flag alongside the national flag of the ships which would evacuate the armed elements of PLO (S/16194). That statement was supported by the members of the Council (S/16195). The evacuation took place on 20 December 1983 (see the Secretary-General's report of 21 December 1983 (S/16228)).

9. Since the thirty-eighth session, a number of communications have been addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General on various aspects of the situation. Those communications, which have been circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, were sent by France on behalf of the 10 States members of the European Economic Community (A/39/123-S/16389), Israel (A/39/57-S/16233, A/39/75-S/16276, S/16377, A/39/120, A/39/125, S/16391, S/16458, A/39/166, A/39/177-S/16474, S/16479, A/39/181, A/39/328-S/16645, A/39/350-S/16671, A/39/355-S/16678, A/39/377-S/16691, A/39/410-S/16706, A/39/542-S/16762), Lebanon (A/39/63-S/16252, S/16471, A/39/282-S/16597, A/39/330-S/16650, A/39/340-S/16660, A/39/365-S/16682, S/16772) and the Syrian Arab Republic (S/16520, A/39/360). Communications were also received from PLO and were circulated at the request of Egypt (S/16570, annex) and Democratic Yemen (A/39/509-S/16749, annex).

### III. SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

10. The action taken by the United Nations prior to September 1983 on the situation in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, was outlined in the Secretary-General's report (A/38/458-S/16015, paras. 9-16).

11. The General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth session, after considering the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/38/409), which is composed of Senegal, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, adopted resolutions 38/79 A to H on 15 December 1983. By these resolutions, the General Assembly demanded that Israel immediately release Ziad Abu Eain, as well as other prisoners who were duly registered to be freed (38/79 A); reaffirmed that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, was applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and demanded that Israel acknowledge and comply with its provisions (resolution 38/79 B); demanded that the Government of Israel desist forthwith from taking any action that would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the occupied territories (resolution 38/79 C); demanded that Israel desist forthwith from certain policies and practices mentioned in the resolution and renewed the mandate of the Special Committee (resolution 38/79 D); demanded that the Government of Israel rescind the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron and that it facilitate

/...

their immediate return (resolution 38/79 E); determined that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken or to be taken by Israel that purported to alter the character and legal status of the Syrian Arab Golan Heights were null and void and constituted a violation of international law (resolution 38/79 F); condemned Israeli policies and practices against Palestinian students and faculty in the educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories and demanded that it rescind all actions and measures taken against those institutions, ensure their freedom and refrain from hindering the effective operation of those institutions (resolution 38/79 G); expressed deep concern that Israel had failed to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators of the assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh, and demanded that Israel inform the Secretary-General of the results of the relevant investigations (resolution 38/79 H).

12. The reports submitted by the Secretary-General under resolutions 38/79 E, F, G and H have been circulated as documents A/39/527, A/39/532 and Corr.1, A/39/501 and A/39/339 respectively. The reports under resolutions 38/79 A and D will be submitted at a later date.

13. In January 1984, concern was expressed to the President of the Security Council regarding legislation then under consideration by the Israeli Knesset (see S/16249, S/16255 and A/39/70-S/16261). The President of the Council also received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel on the subject (S/16269). Following consultations of the Security Council on 26 January 1984, the President issued a statement saying that the Council recalled in this connection its previous resolutions stressing the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and urged that no steps be taken that could lead to further aggravation of tension in the area (S/16293).

14. On 20 February 1984, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolutions 1984/1 A and B concerning the question of violation of human rights in the occupied territories. In those resolutions the Commission condemned Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories along lines similar to those of General Assembly resolution 38/79 D.

15. Furthermore, the Commission adopted resolution 1984/2 of 20 February 1984 by which it declared that Israel's decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights had no legal validity, and called upon Israel to rescind it. By resolution 1984/3 of the same date, the Commission condemned Israel for its continued occupation of and persistence in developing the colonialization of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, which aimed at changing their demographic composition, institutional structure and status. The Commission reaffirmed that such measures constituted a grave violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the Hague Convention of 1907, and that they were null and void with regard to international law.

16. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories held periodic meetings in

/...

implementation of the request of the General Assembly under resolution 38/79 D. During the period between the meetings, the Special Committee was kept informed of events taking place in the occupied territories relevant to its mandate. Information was gathered from a variety of sources, including oral testimony and written communications. At its periodic meetings, the Special Committee reviewed this information and assessed the human rights situation in the occupied territories with a view to deciding whether any action was required. The report of the Special Committee under Assembly resolution 38/79 D will be circulated as document A/39/591.

17. During its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 38/85 (15 December 1983) concerning Israel's decision to build a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea, resolution 38/144 (19 December 1983) concerning permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, and resolution 38/166 (19 December 1983) concerning living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories. These questions are the subject of reports which have been circulated under agenda item 77 (A/39/142), 12 (A/39/326-E/1984/111), and 80 j (A/39/233-E/1984/79).

18. Since the thirty-eighth session, a number of communications have been addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General on various aspects of the situation in the occupied territories. Those communications, which have been circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, were sent by Democratic Yemen as President of the Council of the League of Arab States (A/39/206-S/16501), Israel (A/39/319-S/16640), Jordan (A/39/119-S/16379 and Corr.1, A/39/237-S/16538, A/39/278-S/16589, A/39/283-S/16598, A/39/321-S/16642, A/39/395-S/16695) and Morocco (A/39/257-S/16562). Communications were also received from PLO and were circulated at the request of Egypt (S/16311, annex; S/16360, annex; S/16392, annex; S/16450, annex).

#### IV. PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

19. The Palestine refugee problem and the efforts of the United Nations to assist the refugees up to September 1983 were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General (A/38/458-S/16015, paras. 18-21).

20. Following its consideration of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the period 1 July 1982 to 20 June 1983, 2/ at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted 11 resolutions on 15 December 1983. In resolution 38/83 A, the Assembly noted with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 had not been effected, that no substantial progress had been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of its resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern; expressed its thanks to the Commissioner-General and to all the staff of UNRWA, recognizing that the Agency was

/...

doing all it could within the limits of available resources; reiterated its request that the headquarters of UNRWA should be relocated to its former site within its area of operations as soon as practicable; noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report to the Assembly as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1984; directed attention to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of UNRWA, as outlined in the report of the Commissioner-General; noted with concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to UNRWA was still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in 1983; called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA; and decided to extend the mandate of UNRWA until 30 June 1987, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III).

21. The other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly dealt with the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (resolution 38/83 B), assistance to persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities (resolution 38/83 C), offers by member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees (resolution 38/83 D), Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip (resolution 38/83 E), resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees (resolution 38/83 F), population and refugees displaced since 1967 (resolution 38/83 G), revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties (resolution 38/83 H), protection of Palestine refugees (resolution 38/83 I), Palestine refugees in the West Bank (resolution 38/83 J), and the University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees (resolution 38/83 K).

22. The situation of the Palestine refugees and the activities of UNRWA since the adoption of these resolutions are described in the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period 1 July 1983 to 30 June 1984. <sup>3/</sup> The reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA under resolutions 38/83 A and B appear in documents A/39/455 and A/39/575. The reports of the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolutions 38/83 D, E, G, H, I, J and K have been circulated as documents A/39/375, A/39/457, A/39/411, A/39/464 and Add.1, A/39/538, A/39/372 and A/39/528 respectively.

#### V. QUESTION OF PALESTINE

23. The action taken by the United Nations on the question of Palestine up to September 1983 was outlined in the report of the Secretary-General (A/38/458-S/16015, paras. 23-32).

24. At its thirty-eighth session, on 13 December 1983, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions under the agenda item entitled "Question of Palestine". In resolution 38/58 A, the Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and authorized

/...



the Committee to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations. In resolution 38/58 B, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the Division for Palestinian Rights continue to discharge its tasks and to provide it with the necessary resources to expand its work programme, and invited all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee. In resolution 38/58 C, the Assembly endorsed the Geneva Declaration on Palestine of 7 September 1983, welcomed and endorsed the call for convening an International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with certain guidelines; invited all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other concerned States, to participate in the Conference; requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, urgently to undertake preparatory measures to convene the Conference; and invited the Security Council to facilitate the organization of the Conference. It also requested the Secretary-General to report on his efforts no later than 15 March 1984. In resolution 38/58 D, the Assembly urged the meeting of specialized agencies and other organizations, referred to in its resolution 38/145 on assistance to the Palestinian people, to be convened in 1984, to take into account the recommendations of the five preparatory meetings of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine and the relevant United Nations resolutions in developing a programme of economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people, and to implement that programme. In resolution 38/58 E, the Assembly requested that the Department of Public Information disseminate all information on the activities of the United Nations system relating to Palestine and take certain measures to that end.

25. The report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People appears in document A/39/35. 4/ The report requested of the Secretary-General in resolution 38/58 C was submitted on 13 March 1984 (A/39/130-S/16409). An addendum to that report was submitted on 13 September 1984.

26. Since the thirty-eighth session, a number of communications have been addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General on various aspects of the question of Palestine. Those communications, which have been circulated as official documents of the Security Council and/or the Security Council, were sent by India (A/39/139-S/16430) and the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (A/39/99-S/16327, A/39/116-S/16366, A/39/117-S/16373, A/39/157-S/16442, A/39/201-S/16493, A/39/234-S/16531, A/39/263-S/16568, A/39/329-S/16646, A/39/403). Communications were also received from PLO and circulated at the request of Yemen (A/39/449-S/16724, annex) and Jordan (A/39/548-S/16766, annex).

## VI. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

27. An outline of developments relating to the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem from November 1967 until September 1983 may be found in the Secretary-General's reports of 18 May 1973 (S/10929), 17 October 1978 (A/33/311-S/12896), 24 October 1979 (A/34/584-S/13578), 24 October 1980 (A/35/563-S/14234), 11 November 1981 (A/36/655-S/14746), 12 October 1982 (A/37/525-S/15451) and 30 October 1983 (A/38/458-S/16015).

/...



28. At its thirty-eighth session, on 19 December 1983, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/180 A to E concerning the situation in the Middle East. In resolution 38/180 D the Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that the question of Palestine was the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region would be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights; reaffirmed that a just and comprehensive settlement of the situation in the Middle East could not be achieved without the participation on an equal footing of all the parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization; declared that peace in the Middle East was indivisible and must be based on a comprehensive, just and lasting solution under the auspices of the United Nations; welcomed the Arab Peace Plan adopted unanimously at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference at Fez; condemned Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories and demanded the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all the territories occupied since June 1967; rejected all agreements and arrangements that violated the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradicted the principles of just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem; determined that Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem and to declare it its "capital" as well as the measures to alter its physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and status were null and void and demanded that they be rescinded immediately, condemned Israel's aggression, policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and outside, particularly Palestinians in Lebanon; strongly condemned Israel's annexationist policies and practices in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights; considered that the agreements on strategic co-operation between the United States of America and Israel signed on 30 November 1981, together with the recent accords concluded in that context, would encourage Israel to pursue its aggressive and expansionist policies and practices; called upon all States to put an end to the flow to Israel of any military, economic and financial aid, as well as of human resources, aimed at encouraging it to pursue its aggressive policies against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people; strongly condemned the collaboration between Israel and South Africa; and reaffirmed its call for the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East as specified in paragraph 5 of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine. The other parts of General Assembly resolution 38/180 concern Israeli policies in the Syrian Golan Heights and the other occupied territories (resolution 38/180 A), Palestinian cultural property that had been seized in Lebanon by the Israeli forces (resolution 38/180 B), Jerusalem (resolution 38/180 C) and supply of arms and economic aid to Israel (resolution 38/180 E).

29. The Secretary-General's report under resolution 38/180, which includes comments made by Member States on the resolution, has been circulated as document A/39/533.

30. At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 38/58 C concerning an International Peace Conference on the Middle East (see para. 24 above). The reports submitted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of that resolution are contained in documents A/39/130-S/16409 and Add.1.

31. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General has engaged in continuous discussions with the parties to the Middle East conflict and with others

/...

concerned. In June 1984, he visited Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic and had discussions with the leaders of those countries on various aspects of the Middle East problem. Thereafter, in July 1984, the Secretary-General met with the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Geneva. His continuing contacts on the Middle East have included further discussions with the permanent members of the Security Council and others at Headquarters and with the leaders of Governments whom he has met in various capitals.

32. On 31 July 1984, the *Chargé d'affaires a.i.* of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General a letter by which he transmitted a text dated 29 July 1984 and entitled "Proposals by the Soviet Union on a Middle East settlement". The proposals deal with the principles to be applied to a settlement as well as the organization and the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East (A/39/368-S/16685).

33. Since the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a number of communications have been addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General on various aspects of the situation in the Middle East. In addition to those referred to in the preceding sections of this report (see paras. 9, 18 and 26), communications were received from Afghanistan (A/39/287-S/16602), Bangladesh (A/39/585-S/16783), France on behalf of the ten States members of the European Economic Community (A/39/161-S/16456), India (A/39/560-S/16773), Israel (A/39/79 and Corr.1, A/39/180 and Corr.1), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (A/39/322-S/16643), Morocco (A/39/131-S/16414 and Corr.1) and Niger (A/39/236-S/16535). A communication was also received from PLO and circulated at the request of Yemen (A/39/378-S/16693, annex).

#### VII. OBSERVATIONS

34. The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and its key issue, the Palestinian problem, have remained unresolved despite intensive efforts undertaken by the United Nations and individual Member States during the past 37 years.

35. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East has followed a pattern that has become all too familiar. Each of the five destructive and inconclusive wars has been followed by a new peace effort, spurred by the renewed awareness of the dangers of continued stalemate. On each occasion proposals were put forward and in some cases partial agreement reached, but the peace effort soon became deadlocked because of the intransigence of one party or another. In time, the sense of urgency was lost and a deadlock was once again allowed to persist until the next major crisis.

36. However, delay does not facilitate a solution of the problem in any way. Each succeeding war becomes more destructive because of the development of new and more sophisticated weapons. Far from resolving old issues, it creates new ones and widens the circle of resentment and mistrust among opposing parties. The interests of major Powers, which have political, economic and strategic concerns in the

/...

region, are also inevitably involved. New layers of complexity are thus added with each new war and the passage of time.

37. The continued stalemate in the Middle East has also had adverse effects on the authority and status of the United Nations itself. As I observed in my last annual report to the General Assembly, 5/ the international community's inability to solve many of its problems has given rise to a process of side-stepping the United Nations and recourse to other means - force, unilateral action or confronting military alliances - that has weakened reliance on the Organization. I also mentioned that the non-implementation of resolutions, as well as their proliferation, tend to downgrade the seriousness with which Governments and the public view the decisions of the United Nations. Those observations apply especially to the Middle East conflict with the antagonisms and frustrations it has entailed.

38. It seems obvious that the Middle East conflict, involving as it does complex interrelated issues, can ultimately be fully resolved only by a comprehensive settlement covering all its aspects. This fact needs to be kept firmly in mind by the parties concerned, since all the agreements that have been reached in the past, whether within the United Nations framework or outside it, were clearly intended as interim steps in the search for a comprehensive peace. I continue to believe that a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East will have to meet the following conditions: the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied territories; respect of and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force; and, lastly, a just settlement of the Palestinian problem based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. In this context, the question of Jerusalem also remains of primary importance.

39. It also seems obvious that a comprehensive settlement will have to be reached, at least in its final stage, if not earlier, through a process of negotiation in which all the parties concerned will participate. In addition, it is generally recognized that the support of the major Powers, especially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, is essential for any lasting settlement in the Middle East. From a purely rational point of view, all these requirements could best and most readily be met if negotiations were undertaken under some form of United Nations auspices.

40. At its last session, the General Assembly called for the convening of an International Peace Conference in an effort to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem and requested me, in consultation with the Security Council, urgently to undertake preparatory measures to this end. In the light of the consultations I have held with the parties concerned, the Members of the Security Council and other interested Governments, it is quite evident that the conditions required for convening the proposed conference with any chance of success are not met at the present time.

41. The various responses to the proposal for a Middle East peace conference exemplify many of the basic problems that have since 1948 hampered all attempts to

/...

negotiate a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. There has always been the question of whether talks should be direct, or indirect through some intermediary. There has been the question of whether negotiations should be between Israel and her Arab neighbours one on one, or conducted by all the parties concerned together. There has been the question of whether the negotiating process should be comprehensive or step by step. And there has been the controversy over the manner in which the Palestinian people should be represented.

42. Apart from the above problems, questions of timing and of the willingness to negotiate have tended to frustrate the efforts of third parties to initiate a practical search for a just and lasting settlement. The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and of the Palestine question has thus been a long record of missed opportunities punctuated by wars and violence that have only served to complicate the situation further and to create new misery and new obstacles to peace.

43. It seems clear to me that none of the parties to this historic and tragic conflict can hope to attain its maximum demands if there is to be a state of real peace in the region. In the changes of fortune, the shifting balance of power and the inexorable development of underlying trends in the Middle East, no party can view the future with equanimity, nor will the world escape the repercussions of continuing violence in this unique area.

44. I believe that the United Nations has a special obligation to make another determined effort to find the means by which we can move forward to a negotiated peace in the Middle East. We have the basis for such a peace in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). We have the experience of all the efforts that have been made from many quarters since 1948 to solve this problem. Given the pressing need for a more durable peace in the area, it should surely be possible to devise a negotiating process acceptable to all the parties concerned on the basis of the two resolutions mentioned above.

45. Earlier this year, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, I discussed with a number of Governments concerned the possibility of using the machinery of the Security Council in a new way to work with the parties concerned on various aspects of the Middle East problem and to distil from the various proposals and plans that have been put forward in recent years the common elements that could help to work out the basis of a negotiating structure. I believed that such a process, if it could be initiated, might still have served to clear the ground and to prepare for a full-fledged effort to negotiate the problem.

46. As far as the proposal for a Middle East peace conference is concerned, I recall that the previous peace conference that met in December 1973, and of which the United States and the Soviet Union were co-chairmen, did in fact serve a useful purpose in relation to the arrangements that followed the 1973 war in the Middle East.

47. I think it is important to consider what a Middle East peace conference could now entail. It could mean many things. It does not necessarily have to be a conference in permanent session. What is now needed, it seems to me, is a

/...

framework for negotiations and an umbrella under which the necessary contacts could develop according to the demands of the problems that were being considered. It is this kind of framework or auspices that I believe could most usefully serve the needs of all the parties to the Middle East conflict.

48. I do not expect such a concept to be immediately acceptable in the light of views that have been expressed, in some cases very strongly, in the past year. I do however urge that the concept be given careful consideration.

49. For my part, I intend to remain in close consultation with all the parties to the Middle East conflict in case, at any particular juncture, the Secretary-General can play a useful role in furthering the negotiating process. In the light of the deep tension in the Middle East and the emergence of new factors in the situation, nothing could be less realistic than to expect the indefinite continuation of the present situation of no peace - no war.

Notes

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/38/13).

3/ Ibid., Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/39/13).

4/ Ibid., Supplement No. 35 (A/39/35).

5/ Ibid., Supplement No. 1 (A/39/1).

-----

## NAMIBIA

1. South Africa commenced the disengagement of its troops from southern Angola at the end of January 1984, on the understanding that neither SWAPO nor the Cubans would take advantage of the resulting situation to create a security problem for Namibia. By the Lusaka Agreement of 16 February 1984, Angola and South Africa established a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to supervise the disengagement.
2. Under the supervision of the JMC, South African forces have gradually disengaged in successive phases to Ngiva, 40 miles from the Namibian border. Since the forces reached Ngiva at the end of April, South Africa has repeatedly accused SWAPO of violating the truce agreement, and has indicated that it will not complete the disengagement until SWAPO ceased its violations.
3. Namibia independence talks were held in Lusaka in May 1984. The delegations of Zambia, the Administrator General (Namibia), SWAPO and the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) participated in the talks. The talks were jointly chaired by President Kaunda and the Administrator General. At the conclusion of the talks, President Kaunda announced that it had failed to achieve its objective, namely a cease-fire which would lead to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435. The Secretary-General sent an observer to Lusaka during the period of the talks.
4. The Administrator General of Namibia met with a SWAPO delegation led by President Sam Nujoma in Cape Verde on 25 July 1984. The purpose of the meeting was to get both SWAPO and South Africa to send parallel letters to the Secretary-General agreeing to the cessation of hostilities in Namibia.



5. At the meeting, SWAPO insisted on a cease-fire for the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia, in accordance with Security Council resolution 435. South Africa, on the other hand, wanted a cessation of hostilities between the two sides, which would constitute a pre-implementation cease-fire, pending agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops. The Cape Verde meeting failed to achieve its objectives because neither party was prepared to depart from its entrenched position.

6. The United States, Angola and South Africa now envisage that steps leading to a settlement would include:

- a) Extension of the Angolan-South African peace-keeping mechanism;
- b) Completion of the disengagement;
- c) An Angolan commitment on Cuban troop withdrawal; and,
- d) South African agreement on a date for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435.



## QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA

### A. Angolan proposals

7. Following discussions between the United States and Angola, President dos Santos, on 17 November 1984, communicated to the Secretary-General Angolan proposals (S/16838) for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The proposals reaffirmed the following four conditions for Cuban withdrawal:

- a) Unilateral withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory.
- b) Strict implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), including the total withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia.
- c) Cessation of acts of aggression against Angola by South Africa.
- d) Cessation of all aid to Unita by South Africa.

8. According to the Angolan proposals, subject to the above conditions, it would be prepared to proceed with the withdrawal of the Cuban forces once implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is in progress. The Angolan proposals provide for the following:

- a) a phased withdrawal of the Cuban forces in southern Angola within a 36-month period.
- b) As from the 24th month no Cuban troops would cross the 13th parallel which is more than 500 kms. from the land border with Namibia.
- c) Approximately 20,000 men of the total number of Cuban troops in Angola will be withdrawn within the 36-month period under a) and b) above.

- d) Cuban troops stationed in Cabinda province and other regions in the north of Angola would be withdrawn in accordance with an independent timetable to be agreed upon by Angola and Cuba when the time comes.

9. The Angolan proposals were endorsed by the summit meeting of the Frontline States held in Arusha on 7 December 1984.

B. South African counter-proposals

10. The Government of South Africa submitted its comments on the Angolan proposal to the Secretary-General on 23 November 1984 (S/16839). It stated that South Africa continued to insist on an agreement which should provide for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola parallel and simultaneous with the reduction of South Africa's own forces in Namibia in terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Based on the above, it has called for the phased withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola within 12 weeks from the commencement of the implementation of the United Nations plan. In this connexion, it should be noted that the Angolan proposals provide for the phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Southern Angola within 36 months.

C. United States initiative

11. The United States is continuing its initiative with the two sides in order to narrow down differences between their respective positions. At an appropriate time, the U.S. intends to table its own proposal on the subject, taking into account the concerns expressed by both parties. Mr. Frank Wisner, Deputy to Mr. Chester Crocker, will visit Angola on 26 January for further discussions on this matter.



TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

DATE: 22 January 1985

THROUGH: Mr. Virendra Dayal  
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: William B. Buffum  
DE:

SUBJECT: Human Rights Aspects of the Secretary-General's Visit  
OBJET: to South-East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand

I. GENERAL

A. Ratification of principal human rights instruments

In his Human Rights Day message (1984) the Secretary-General made a special appeal to Governments to become Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Convention against Racial Discrimination. Australia, New Zealand and Vietnam are Parties to all three. The Secretary-General may wish, as appropriate in his conversations, to appeal to the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to ratify the three instruments and to Australia, New Zealand and Vietnam to consider ratifying the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

II. COUNTRY SITUATIONS

A. Australia

In recent years Australia has shown itself a strong supporter of the United Nations Human Rights programme. In 1984 Australia indicated to the Centre for Human Rights its readiness to provide technical assistance in the field of human rights to States in need of such assistance, to support the Centre's fellowship programmes by organizing appropriate programmes in Australia and by helping the Centre in the field of publication, in particular by putting out certain pamphlets. Concrete discussions are presently underway between the Centre and Australian representatives in Geneva on these issues. Australia has also co-operated closely with the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.

The Secretary-General may wish to express pleasure at the positive attitude of Australia toward Human Rights issues.

/...

B. Indonesia

The major human rights issue concerning Indonesia is the situation in East Timor. This aspect is included in a separate briefing paper dealing with the East Timor problem.

C. Vietnam

The question of re-education camps in Vietnam has been brought to the attention of the United Nations in the past. The case of Nguyễn Chan, an 81 year-old man, detained from 1979 and reportedly held in a re-education camp in Ha-Nam-Ninh in the north of the country might be brought to the attention of the Government for any humanitarian treatment which might be given.

D. Malaysia/New Zealand/Thailand

No specific cases are in the Centre's files which would warrant intervention by the Secretary-General.

## Human Rights - General Observation

### Status of ratification of important human rights instruments

It appears that among various regional areas, the Asian area has proportionately the lowest number of ratifications of important human rights instruments. In respect of the six Asian countries which the Secretary-General is going to visit, the status is as follows:

|             | Covenant<br>EcSocCu | Covenant<br>CivPol | Optional<br>Protocol | CERD |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------|
| Australia   | yes                 | yes                | -                    | yes  |
| Indonesia   | -                   | -                  | -                    | -    |
| Malaysia    | -                   | -                  | -                    | -    |
| New Zealand | yes                 | yes                | -                    | yes  |
| Thailand    | -                   | -                  | -                    | -    |
| Vietnam     | yes                 | yes                | -                    | yes  |

It would be appropriate if the Secretary-General, in his personal talks with leading statesman of these countries, were to express the hope that these countries should seriously consider becoming parties to the instruments. This would be in line with the Secretary-General's appeal made, inter alia, in his 1984 Human Rights Day message where he stated the following:

"Let us also sustain a determined effort to achieve universal ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. On this occasion, I should like to make a special appeal to Governments which have not done so to become parties to these instruments as soon as possible."

Such an appeal would furthermore be in line with a request addressed to the Secretary-General by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to hold "information discussions concerning prospects for ratification of human rights instruments, with government delegations".

K. Herndl  
Geneva

E S C A P

Programme budget proposals for 1986-1987

The budget appropriations for ESCAP for 1984-1985 amount to \$34,998,000. Its current establishment consists of 194 professional posts (1 USG, 1 D-2, 14 D-1, 27 P-5, 56 P-4, 63 P-3 and 32 P-2/1) and 360 local level posts.

ESCAP proposes a a budget with a rate of real growth of about 20 per cent (\$7,380,000), one of the highest, both in terms of dollars and rate of growth. In addition, about \$2,540,000 is requested as non-recurrent growth.

Growth is requested in practically all objects of expenditure. ESCAP's proposals are being reviewed in the over-all context of the guidelines prepared by the Programme Planning and Budgeting Board (PPBB) and endorsed by the Secretary-General. Specific recommendations will be made to the PPBB which is scheduled to review ESCAP'S submission during the last week of January.

The highlights of the increases requested are given below with indicative figures and percentages of growth, where applicable.

I. Posts:

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| <u>New posts:</u>         | 32 professional (10 P-5, 11 P-4, 10 P-3, 1 P-2) and 48 Local Level               |
| <u>Temporary posts:</u>   | 1 Professional (P-4), 1 General Service  |
| <u>Reclassifications:</u> | 24 Professional posts (1 P-5 to D-1, 10 P-4 to P-5, 11 P-3 to P-4, 2 P-2 to P-3) |

The requests are being reviewed against the guidelines that the over-all permanent establishment of the Organization should be kept at its present level and, that temporary staff, where appropriate, should be preferred to additions to the permanent establishment. The possibility of eliminating vacant posts or those which are expected to become vacant in the period 1985-1987 is also being examined.

The reclassifications to the higher levels are being scrutinized in collaboration with the Classification Section of the Office of Personnel Services. In this review, one serious concern is that the over-all effect of the reclassification proposals would have an unbalancing effect on the current staffing structure.

II. Non-post areas:

|                                     |             |                 |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| New computer system                 | \$2,463,000 | (non-recurrent) |
| Rental and maintenance of equipment | 506,400     | (369%)          |
| Interpretation                      | 356,800     | (108%)          |
| Travel of staff                     | 360,600     | ( 67%)          |
| Expert groups                       | 166,500     | (148%)          |
| Consultants                         | 131,300     | ( 44%)          |
| Supplies and equipment              | 128,100     | ( 23%)          |

The non-post requirements are being reviewed against the guidelines that some growth can be envisaged in non-post areas when there is potential for a decrease in the permanent establishment and that the real growth of resources allocated to executive direction, common support functions and other infrastructure costs should be kept as close to zero as possible. Particular attention will also be paid to consultants and travel.

/...



The proposal for a new computer system is being reviewed in collaboration with the Electronic Data Processing and Information Systems Division with a view to finding more economical alternatives, with comparable efficiency as the original proposal, if possible. Because of the high cost involved, weighed against ESCAP's pressing need for an efficient computer system, as well as the PPBB guidelines that common support and infrastructure costs should be kept as close to zero as possible, this item is being given as exhaustive an analysis as might be possible. Three alternatives prepared by EDPISD are being forwarded to ESCAP for comments.

It is unlikely that all of ESCAP'S proposal for additional resources can be accomodated. Should the issue be raised , it would be desirable to reiterate this point and, at the same time, assurances should be given that ESCAP's proposals are being given sympathetic consideration.

-----

A major construction project is currently underway in Bangkok. The General Assembly, at its session last year, approved a programme for the expansion of conference facilities at ESCAP, the cost of which is estimated at \$44,177,700. Construction will start in 1985 and is due for completion in 1988.

## Briefing Note

### Secretary-General's Meeting with ESCAP Staff Council

1. Two salary items which are most likely to be raised are (a) the recent reductions in the level of post adjustment of Professional and higher level staff and (b) the General Service salary survey.

#### Post Adjustment

2. Two events have been the subject of exchanges of communications between Headquarters and ESCAP. The first relates to the results of the place-to-place survey comparison of cost-of-living between Bangkok and New York conducted by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). From that survey the Commission concluded that the post adjustment index in Bangkok was too high by approximately 9.2 percent. However, in accordance with normal practice, the ICSC did not reduce the level of post adjustment but rather "froze" it until such time as the revised index, as adjusted by future cost-of-living changes, overtakes the old index.

3. However, the recent devaluation of the Thai Bhat from 22.96 per dollar to 26.90 on 7 November 1984 and to 27.0 per dollar at the present time has resulted in reductions of the post adjustment multiplier used to determine post adjustment payments, thereby reducing the US dollar remuneration by approximately 7.4 percent. However, the remuneration in Bhat terms has not gone down and in some cases has even gone up because of the higher exchange rate.

4. The purpose of the post adjustment system is to equivalence purchasing power in US dollar terms over location and time. Therefore, post adjustment payments in US dollars are adjusted upward whenever the dollar weakens and downward when the dollar strengthens vis-a-vis the local currency. However, in situations of local currency devaluation, the ICSC does not reduce the post adjustment by the full amount of the percentage devaluation. Instead, according to the special measures promulgated by the Commission the reduction is mitigated on the assumption that steep devaluations are usually followed by rapid inflation. In the case of Bangkok, application of the special measures to the "correct" index derived from the place-to-place survey would have yielded a less favourable result than direct and full reduction to the old index. The ICSC applied the latter as it gave the better result (see the attached extract from ICSC circular ICSC/SEC/PA/152 of 15 November 1984).

5. After consulting the ICSC secretariat, we have had to advise ESCAP that it was not possible for the ICSC to make an exception for Bangkok to maintain the level of post adjustment.

#### General Service

6. The main problem is the anxiety among the ESCAP staff and the Administration over the conclusions which might be drawn by Headquarters as to the results of the recent survey of the best prevailing conditions of employment in Bangkok. This survey was co-ordinated by two staff members from

Headquarters with extensive experience in conducting such surveys, one from the Salaries and Allowances Section of OFS and one from UNICEF. While the co-ordinators' draft report was being reviewed in New York prior to its submission to the Local Salary Survey Committee (LSSC) in Bangkok for comments, a separate report was sent, on behalf of this Committee, to New York indicating a finding that the General Service salaries should be increased by an average of 17.3 percent retroactive to 1 October 1983. The finding of the LSSC varies significantly from the initial conclusions of the two co-ordinators which indicate that the current salaries are too high on average by some 10 to 11 percent. The Controller therefore requested the two co-ordinators to undertake a thorough comparative review before their report is sent to Bangkok for comments. He further cabled Mr. Kibria as to his concerns that the LSSC report may lead to unwarranted expectations of a salary increase by the staff. The draft report of the co-ordinators will be finalized, in the light of the review requested by the Controller, and sent to Bangkok for comments.

7. General Service salaries are set in local currency terms and therefore are not subject to adjustments upward or downward according to exchange rate changes. However, the salaries are revised upward to the extent that comparator employers have revised their salaries as a result of the devaluations and/or cost-of-living increases.

Suggestions for responding to staff representations

8. On post adjustment, it is suggested that the Secretary-General emphasize that the responsibility for determining post adjustment levels at all duty stations rests with the ICSC. All the concerns conveyed to Headquarters have been taken up with the ICSC Secretariat and the current situation reflects the decisions of the ICSC Chairman. The ICSC has agreed to undertake, at an appropriate time, a time-to-time survey to assess the consequent impact of the devaluation on cost-of-living changes in Bangkok.

9. On General Service, the Secretary-General could indicate his understanding that the analysis of the results of the General Service survey has been the subject of exchanges of correspondence between the Executive Secretary and the Controller and that he can assure ESCAP staff and Administration that all the views submitted will receive full and careful consideration. In view of the large differences in the two reports at this stage, it is important that no statements be made which could lead to unwarranted expectations of an increase in salaries.

18 January 1985

points and the application of class 8/+3 (multiplier 51) with effect from 1 November 1984. The remaining 5 points (i.e., 25-20=5) will be applied effective 1 December 1984. If the above special measures had not been applied, post adjustment class 5/+1 (multiplier 29) would have become applicable for Sudan effective 1 November 1984.

#### Thailand

13. With effect from 1 November 1984 the currency of Thailand was devalued by 17.2 per cent from 22.96 to 26.90 Baht to the United States dollar. The special measures for abrupt devaluation of between 15 and 33.3 per cent have not been applied in the case of Thailand as this would have resulted in a lower post adjustment classification than that obtained using the regular procedures. In the circumstances post adjustment class 4 (multiplier 22) was established by reducing the existing multiplier (34) by the difference between the indexes at the old and new rates of exchange, i.e.,  $119.91 - 107.34 = 11.99$  (or 12 multiplier points). As a result, post adjustment class 4 (multiplier 22) became applicable effective 1 November 1984.

#### Uganda

14. With effect from 1 November 1984 the Ugandan currency was devalued by 17.7% from 396 to 466 shillings to the United States dollar. However, the reduction in the post adjustment index from 105.13 at the old rate of exchange to 101.43 at the new rate of exchange was less than 10% of the PAI at the old rate of exchange. As a result, the special measures for abrupt devaluation of local currency of between 15 and 33.3 were not applied. The 1 November 1984 post adjustment classification for Uganda was therefore established by reducing the existing multiplier (5) by the difference between the indexes at the old and new rates of exchange, i.e.,  $105.13 - 101.43 = 3.6$  (or 4 multiplier points). As a result, post adjustment class 0/+1 (multiplier 1) became applicable effective 1 November 1984.

#### Uruguay

15. With effect from 1 November 1984 the Uruguay currency was devalued by 19.1% from 56.25 to 67.00 new pesos to the United States dollar. However, the reduction in the post adjustment index from 106.10 at the old rate of exchange to 96.84 at the new rate of exchange was less than 10% of the PAI at the old rate of exchange. As a result, the special measures for abrupt devaluation of local currency of between 15 and 33.3 were not applied. The 1 November 1984 post adjustment classification for Uruguay was therefore established by reducing the existing multiplier (22) by the difference between the indexes at the old and new rates of exchange, i.e.,  $106.10 - 96.84 = 9.26$  (or 9 multiplier points). As a result, post adjustment class 2/+3 (multiplier 13) became applicable effective 1 November 1984. It should be noted that Uruguay is also under special measures for high inflation.

#### Rental data for government housing duty station

16. The table below provides information collected as part of the latest cost-of-living (housing) surveys on the range of rents used in the calculation of rental subsidy thresholds at duty stations where the thresholds as well as the rent component of the post adjustment index are based on rents for government and UN agency housing.

mentioned substantial difference between the post adjustment index and the current post adjustment classification as well as that which would come into effect as of 1 March 1985. It would therefore be inappropriate to pay rental subsidies to those in government provided housing.

c) In the case of those who have acquired housing on the commercial market subsidies should be calculated on the basis of threshold rent of 2600 cedis per month.

#### Guinea Bissau

9. In view of the special conditions being encountered by the international staff stationed in Guinea-Bissau with regard to the availability of certain goods and services and the lack of a local consumer price index, the Chairman of ICSC has decided as an ad hoc measure to freeze the post adjustment classification for that duty station at class 2/+2 (multiplier 12) with effect from 1 July 1984 pending the results of the October 1984 place-to-place survey or until the current notional index (112) is overtaken by the post adjustment index currently at 94.9.

#### Somalia

10. With effect from 1 November 1984 the Somali currency was devalued by 48.1 per cent from 17.38 to 25.74 shillings to the United States dollar. Following the application of the special measures for abrupt and substantial devaluation of local currency of between 33.4 and 66.6 per cent, a hypothetical index of 184.5 was calculated which would have resulted in the reduction of the existing multiplier by 24 points, i.e.,  $108-84=24$ . However, in accordance with the Commission's decisions (20th session) to phase in reductions of post adjustment which exceed 16 multiplier points, the Chairman of ICSC has approved the reduction of the existing multiplier by  $(24-16)/2 + 16 = 20$  points and the application of class 12/+8 (multiplier 88) with effect from 1 November 1984. The remaining 4 points, (i.e.,  $24-20=4$ ) will be applied effective 1 December 1984. If the above special measures had not been applied, post adjustment class 9/+7 (multiplier 62) would have become applicable effective 1 November 1984 for Somalia.

11. It should be also be noted that Somalia is under special measures for high inflation.

#### Sudan

12. With effect from 1 November 1984 the Sudanese currency was devalued by 62.5 per cent from 1.28 to 2.08 pounds to the United States dollar. Following the application of special measures for abrupt devaluation of local currency of between 33.4 and 66.6 per cent a hypothetical index of 146.4 was calculated, which would have resulted in the reduction of the existing multiplier by 25 points, i.e.,  $71-46=25$ . However, in accordance with the Commissions decisions (20th session) to phase in reductions of post adjustment which exceed 16 multiplier points, the Chairman of ICSC has approved the reduction of the existing multiplier by  $(25-16)/2 + 16 = 20.5$  or 20 multiplier

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Alvaro de Soto, Special Assistant  
A: to the Secretary-General

DATE: 17 January 1985

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Charles-Edouard Bourbonnière,  
DE: Officer-in-charge of General Services

SUBJECT: Secretary-General's visit to Thailand  
OBJET:

I have just been in touch by telephone with Mrs. Weil who is in Bangkok. She informs me that the negotiations with the Thai Authorities concerning the supplementary agreement required for the expansion of ESCAP conference facilities are going extremely well. There is every expectation that these negotiations should be concluded in time for the Thai Cabinet to approve the agreement at its next meeting on Tuesday 22nd January.

I hope to know more when I speak to Mrs. Weil again to-morrow and if there are any new developments I shall let you or Mr. Kavanagh know. In the meantime, we can still assume that the signing ceremony will indeed take place while the Secretary-General will be in Bangkok.

Concerning the remarks to be made by the Secretary-General at the ceremony, Mrs. Weil tells me that they are being prepared by the ESCAP Secretariat and that they will be available on the Secretary-General's arrival in Bangkok.

*CE Bourbonnière*

*JPK*

cc. Mr. Kavanagh





TO: Mr. Paul Kavanagh, Second Officer  
A: Executive Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 10 January 1985

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Ramaswamy Mani, Director  
DE: Office of the Director-General/DIEC

SUBJECT: Briefing points on ESCAP for the Secretary-General  
OBJET:

As requested, I am giving below on basis of material provided by the Regional Commissions Liaison Office, points relating to ESCAP for the Secretary-General's observations at the luncheon to be hosted by the Executive Secretary:

- ESCAP plays a unique role as an intergovernmental forum for Asia and the Pacific, which does not have any parallel region-wide intergovernmental grouping as exist in the other regions such as the OAU or the OAS. Therefore, at annual meetings of ESCAP, very often, countries make major policy statements, including on political issues.

- ESCAP is able to perform as an additional channel of North-South dialogue because of the long time membership of five non-regional developed countries (U.S., UK, USSR, France and the Netherlands) and three regional developed countries (Japan, Australia and New Zealand).

- At its annual sessions, decisions and resolutions are adopted by consensus and never voted upon. This traditionally "Asian" way results in businesslike discussions and avoidance of direct confrontation.

- ESCAP's geographical responsibilities embrace almost a quarter of the earth's land area and its 2.6 billion people comprise 56 per cent of the world population, including the majority of its poor and hungry.

#### Recent economic performance

The impression of remarkable resilience of Asian economies is largely due to relatively buoyant growth in the early Eighties, particularly in East and South-East Asia where growth rates of 4 to 6 per cent substantially exceeded the growth rates of the industrialized world and of developing countries in other regions. Indeed, the dynamic changes taking place in the newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, the ASEAN countries and more recently, China, and elsewhere in Asia, may very well become the dominant story of the rest of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the region is not without its problems. More than 900 million people in the region, outnumbering the combined populations of Africa and Latin America, subsist below the so-called poverty line.

.../



### ESCAP's priority areas

During the fortieth session of ESCAP's commission session in Tokyo last april, two unanimous resolutions were adopted in which the Commission favoured stepped-up drives to accelerate development of both the region's technological base and capabilities and its vital but now inadequate transport and communications infrastructure. In adopting the ESCAP Plan of Action on Technology for Development, the main goals are stronger technological self-reliance, greater competitiveness in the increasingly sophisticated marketplace, and avoidance of an ever-widening technology gap.

In resolving to proclaim a regional Transport and Communications Decade from 1985 through 1994, a resolution which was endorsed by ECOSOC and the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the region is committed to develop, expand and update the region's basic infrastructure, and to integrate all modes and means of transport and communications.

### ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre (EPOC)

In early October, the Executive Secretary visited Port Vila, Vanuatu, for the inauguration of the new ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre which will enable ESCAP to step up assistance activities to the Pacific area in close co-operation with the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation, the South Pacific Commission and UNDP.

### Expansion of Conference Facilities

Now that the General Assembly has approved the resolution on the expansion of ESCAP's conference facilities, ESCAP, in co-operation with the Office of General Services in New York, will go full steam ahead with construction. Mr. Kibria gives a lot of personal attention to this project as at present the conference facilities at ESCAP are hopelessly inadequate. ESCAP organizes around 200 meetings, seminars, workshops, annually, of which half are held outside Bangkok.