

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - CONFERENCES, MEETINGS AND BRIEFS 13 AUG 1994 - 14 NOV 1995

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

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SERIES S-1062

BOX 143

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0283

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14/11

FROM : G3 OPS *AA May* 3000.10 (OPS)

TO : MILOB GP HQ  
95 CMSG  
INDBATT  
GHANCOY I  
GHANCOY II  
MALICOY  
MALAWICOY  
NICOY  
DCOS SP  
FMO  
FEO  
FSO  
G3 AIR  
G3 PLANS  
G3 OPS

INFO : FC  
DFC  
COS

DATE : 14 November, 1995

SUBJECT : FC' CONF OF UNIT/SECTOR COMMANDERS

Reference :

A. 3000.10 (OPS) dated 30 Oct 95.

1. Attached please find a new programme in respect of the above-mentioned subject .
2. Submitted for your action.

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APPENDIX

PROGRAMME FOR THE FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
15 NOV 95

<i>SRL</i>	<i>TIME</i>	<i>ACTIVITY</i>	<i>REMARKS</i>
1.	1000	WELCOME ADDRESS BY OC MALICOY	5 MINS
2.	"	SECURITY BRIEFING BY SECTOR 3A COMD	10 MINS EACH
3.	"	FC's REMARKS	"
4.	"	SECTOR 1 COMD	"
5.	"	SECTOR 2 COMD	"
6.	"	SECTOR 3 COMD	"
7.	"	SECTOR 4 COMD	"
8.	"	SECTOR 5 COMD	"
9.	"	DCOS SP	"
10.	"	CO CMSG	"
11.	"	OC FORCE ENGR COY	"
12.	"	G2 PRESENTATION ON IWAWA OPS	"
13.	"	FC's CONCLUDING REMARKS	"
14.	1200	L U N C H	"
15.	1400	HELI DEPARTURE	"

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2  
56/11

FROM : A/COS ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ *3000.10(OPS)*  
TO : MILITARY & CIV PERSONNEL  
INFO : SRS  
MA TO FC  
MA TO DFC  
SUBJECT : MORNING BRIEFING FOR  
TUESDAY 07 NOV 95

1. All are informed that above briefing will not come on rather there will be FC's briefing to the UNA - USA visiting team from 0800 - 0830 hrs same day.
2. All are to note.

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TO : LIST B & 95 CMSG 3000.10(OPS)  
FROM : A/COS *amunum/altt.*  
INFO : PA TO SRSG  
MA TO FC  
MA TO DFC  
ASST TO CAO  
CIV POL COMMISSIONER  
MILOBS GP HQ

DATE: 20 Oct 95

SUBJECT : MORNING PRAYERS - 21 OCT 95

1. There will be no Morning Prayers (Briefing) tomorrow 21 Oct 95.
2. Normal Working hours must however be observed and all are also reminded of the scheduled sporting activities for the same day.

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C13 Plans 1  
UN RESTRICTED 2  
3


INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

1/5

TO : ALL OPS BRANCH STAFF OFFRS  
FROM : DCOS(OPS)  
FILE : 3000.10(OPS)  
DATE : 4 SEP 95  
SUBJECT : STAFF MEETINGS/CONFERENCES

1. STAFF MEETINGS/CONFERENCES will be held twice every month in Briefing Room.
2. Conference will be held on every first Wednesday and the last Wednesday of the month.
3. The Conference will start at 1000 hrs each Conference day and end at 1100 hrs.

5/9

  
DCK KATTAN  
Col  
DCOS(OPS)

cc  
Please circulate  
to all ops branch  
staff offices.

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Thru 802 of  
5/9

90  
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G.3 PLANS 1

2

3

MINUTES OF THE SECTOR COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

HELD AT SECTOR 1B GITARAMA

ON 25 AUGUST 1995

Present:	Ambassador S. Khan	SRSG	Special Guest
Col Maj	A. Tomia	DFC/CMO	Chairman
Col	C. A. Nelson	DCMO	Member
Lt-Col	M. Ahsannulla	SOO	"
Lt-Col	E. Castro	Comd, 1A	"
Lt-Col	R. V. Blanchette	Comd, 1B	"
Lt-Col	E. A. Mahachi	Comd, 2A	"
Lt-Col	R. M. Manzl	Comd, 2B	"
Lt Col	Nestor Sainz Tranto	Commnd, 3A	"
Lt Col	D.J.K.Akplor	Commnd, 4	"
Lt-Col	V. Belski	Comd, 5B	"
Lt-Col	B. Coulibali	Comd, 5C	"
Lt-Col	G. Adjei	SMPO	"
Maj	K.B.S.Sirohi	Act Commnd	"
Maj	Z.Alam	Act Commnd	"
Maj	H. P. Zimba	SLOGO	"

In attendance:

Lt-Col	T. J. Fox	CHAO	
S/Supt	D. S. Njase	CIVPOL	
Lt-Cdr	Y. D. Gunat	G3 Med	
Maj	M. Fensom	FMO	
Maj	S. Saklayen	SO to DCMO	
Maj	R. Munir Khan	Sig Offr	
Maj	H. Oueslati	Ops Offr, 1B	Secr
Maj	G. Dube	Team Ldr, 1B	Secr

DISCUSSION

ACTION

ITEM 1. WELCOME ADDRESS BY COMD SECTOR 1B

1. Lt-Col Blanchette welcomed all present and gave a short history of Kabgayi and its place into the modern Rwandese history.

ITEM 2. OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

2. The chairman made his opening remark in French. He expressed his honour to have the SRSG present and explained the purpose of the monthly Sector Commanders' Conference. Within two weeks of the mandate half point,

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the Chairman said that it was a good time to review our role and efficiency.

3. He covered the following points:

- a. The situation in Rwanda is improving and the international community is paying a lot of attention to Rwanda;
- b. The economy is picking up but inflation is felt;
- c. The security situation is of concern but it is understandable when considering the war trauma syndrome;
- d. The suspension for one year of the arms embargo has incited Zaire to threaten and to actually forcibly return refugees to Rwanda. The Chairman invited Milobs to pay particular attention to the gathering of information related to this movement of population;
- e. The risk of an external attack has diminished;
- f. The slow pace of reconciliation raises the specter of internal insecurity and the justice system is at the centre of the challenge. The various actors of the judiciary are slowly moving into position and some international help is being made available to speed up the process; and
- g. UNAMIR is doing its tasks according to its mandate.

All Sect  
Cdrs

ITEM 3. REMARKS BY THE SRSG

4. The SRSG stated that he trusted the assessments made by Milobs and that his decisions were often based on such assessments. The SRSG stressed the need to establish good relations with Rwandese authorities in relation to the new mandate. He emphasized the importance of the following points on which he would like to receive specific feedback:

DCMO, all  
Sect Cdrs  
and Milob  
Staff

- a. The improvement of the penitentiary system;
- b. The return of refugees (which he had discussed with the Rwandese President);
- c. The delay in pledges made by the international community to assist the Rwandese government (not a point that Milobs can influence);
- d. The difficulties with the reconciliation process; and

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e. The possible enlargement of existing transit centers and eventual establishment of new centers.

5. At the end of the SRSG's address, the DCMO asked the SRSG to comment on the mine problem in Rwanda. The SRSG advised that the issue was tackled by the US demining team since UNAMIR engineer resources are too limited.

DCMO, all  
Sect Cdrs  
and Milob  
HQ

ITEM 4. DCMO'S REMARKS

6. The DCMO introduced two of the Sector Commanders who were not present at the last conference, namely Cdr Sector 2B (Lt-Col Manz1) and Cdr Sector 4 (Lt-Col Akplor).

ITEM 5. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 1A

7. The Sect Cdr reported that the operational situation in sector 1A has changed drastically for the better as most locals and RPA have become more friendly with UNAMIR personnel.

8. Problems in the sector are:

- a. Lack of funds to pay government workers;
- b. Poor road network linking the various communes making difficult the monitoring of the development; and
- c. Lack of resources for the reconstruction of various infrastructure.

9. Returnees into the sector are gradually integrating themselves into their home communes. Some arrests linked to the genocide and banditry have been reported. Most of the returnees have lost almost all of their property.

10. The Sect Cdr cited the words of the Ugandan President who stated that the division between the Tutsi and Hutu was caused by those whom he called exploiters who support "a divide and rule system" to fulfil their interests. The Ugandan President also encouraged the Rwandese to stay together as one to improve the economy of the country.

11. In concluding, Lt-Col Castro underlined the following problems:

- a. The repatriation of Milobs and posting early in August caused a lot of changes in key personnel in the Sector;
- b. The Sect Comd requested another six vehicles to be able to operate smoothly; and

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c. His new offices require some cooling system, toilet facilities closer than those at INDBATT and a fridge to store cold water.

ITEM 6. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 1B

12. The Sect Cdr stated that in general, the situation in the sector was tense due to numerous killings, arbitrary arrests and acts of banditry. The population shows signs of insecurity throughout the Gitarama prefecture. The RPA does not have the support of the population at large and the local RPA Bde Cdr admits that he is not "winning the battle for the hearts and minds".

13. The Sect Cdr stated that the most significant problem in the prefecture is still the overcrowding of the Gitarama prison. No serious improvement has taken place since the movement of 225 prisoners to Nyanza prison on 14 July 95. Human Rights representatives have indicated that a movement of more than 2 000 inmates was being considered to the temporary detention facilities in Kigali in the first weeks of September. This will be a major undertaking for this sector's resources which will need to be reinforced for the task at hand.

14. Since the last report, the most important change in the prefecture has to do with increased pressure from FRGF forces or its fifth column. Several acts of sabotage have now been investigated and confirmed by Milob teams. They are mostly related to the electrical network where expensive transformers are emptied of their oil, turned on and burnt. Eucalyptus forest burning has also been reported. In line with what could be construed as "economy sabotage", it was also reported that peasants are instructed and pressured not to produce more than what they require to survive. Large towns then lack supply and prices go up, as noted throughout the country.

15. In the same vein, deep FRGF incursions into the northern communes have been reported and confirmed by milob patrols which have verified the information with locals. This new factor was initially reported by the RPA Bde Cdr who was explaining why they had "slightly tightened the screw". The alleged FRGF patrols are apparently not armed to facilitate their movement but they are travelling with radio equipment.

16. The minister of the interior's announcement concerning the disbandment of "local defence forces", made on Radio Rwanda during the weekend 12 and 13 august 95, is not being followed in this prefecture. The prefet does not seem to want to make waves about the fact that the LDFs may have been disbanded *de jure*, but *de facto* they are alive and kicking. Citizens night



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patrols are still sent in the various sectors where banditry is suspected. It turns out, however, that these patrols are often accompanied by RPA soldiers and proceed with arbitrary arrests at night time. The RPA Bde Cdr, Lt-Col Kayonga, who is also chairing the war counsel (military tribunal for serious offenders from the rank of private to captain inclusive), is only paying lip service to the disbandment order. He was responsible for the training of this personnel but, as he puts it, that is where his input ended since the LDFs were paid by the communes. The Minister of the Interior, to say the least, is not a popular man with the RPA.

17. There has also been a lot of pressure being exerted on various civilian authorities. At the top level, the Prefet is obviously heavily relying on UNAMIR observers to provide him at least an "institutional protection". In that respect, he often visits the Sector 1B HQ and seizes every opportunity to be seen with UNAMIR. The murder of the Ruhango sous-prefet has made a serious dent in whatever little confidence the political class had. The dismissal of the Mugina bourgmestre by the Minister of the Interior was seriously contested through organized demonstrations which could have easily turned violent. The bourgmestre of Bulinga commune is now fearing for his life, following his decision to dismiss his IPJ who was accepting bribery.

18. In Kabgayi, a clear tug-of-war is being witnessed between the RPA and the Catholic Church. In the aftermath of the killing of a priest in Taba commune, this tension was crystallized with two arbitrary arrests which were cancelled following interventions by the Bishop directly to the Prime Minister. The Bde Cdr, in a private conversation, said that he considers the Bishop to be Interhamwe. Obviously, the RPA keeps a close eye on Kabgayi which is seen as a hotbed of nationalist Hutu intellectuals.

19. On the humanitarian scene, there has been little change since the last report when it was reported that a critical point had been reached where supply can no longer meet demand. There is a growing sense of frustration at the bourgmestre level which translates into more difficulties in obtaining information or visiting commune cachots. From Sector 1B's perspective, however, the transport support provided by INDBATT resources has been outstanding. A monthly coordination and security meeting with NGOs has been institutionalized and has proved to be a success.

20. As requested, complete updated statistics concerning returnees were provided to Milob HQ. These numbers are being constantly reviewed everytime commune offices are visited. With regards to the upcoming wave

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of returnees, the local population shows mixed emotions, that is to say happiness of possible reunions but fears of reprisal. No major changes are reported on the situation of returnees, IDPs and rescapes.

21. As explained in the last report, it is difficult to make such an assessment which is obviously based on "gut feeling". The lifting of the arms embargo has obviously changed the strategic or at least the operational disposition of the sub-region. The Zairian decision to force the return of refugees is speeding up what ultimately needs to happen but the risk of "slippage" in conducting these operations, both in Zaire and in Rwanda, is high. The RPA Bde Cdr is of the opinion that the RPA is facing a stiff disciplinary challenge but that they can be up to this challenge, just like they did during the war.

22. Sector 1B was privileged with a UNHCR sponsored seminar on arrest procedures and this subject is obviously the corner stone of an "orderly reconciliation". Milobs should be very familiar with the distinction between an arbitrary arrest and an illegal arrest. At all levels, milobs are sending the clear message that illegal arrests will continue because of a lack of means but that arbitrary arrests must stop. To achieve this, the RPA must use their newly installed IPJs and be familiar with what constitutes an illegal arrest. In parallel with this, Sector 1B has a serious problem with a complete void of gendarmes. The Prefet is working hard at obtaining the deployment of a gendarme group in the prefecture but progresses are slow. The current national recruitment of communal police is seen as an encouraging sign but locals do not foresee the RPA conceding too much of its authority.

23. The Ugandan President's visit has been perceived, at least in this very politicized prefecture, as a reflection of the sub-region's instability. The increasing pressure from the neighboring countries adds to the expectation of renewed fighting. Both the FRGF and the Rwandese government are exaggerating the risk of invasion, thus creating what is labelled as a "war dynamics". This results in a climate where both Hutu and Tutsi can hardly consider reconciliation when rumors of war are looming.

24. The level of tension in the population can still be perceived through casual discussions. The impression that worse days lay ahead of them is quite symptomatic of a very slow reconciliation process, perhaps even a regressing one.

25. The departure of all Mali Coy troops from sector 1B has been delayed with the 63 soldiers remaining in Kabgayi. The transition to the new perimeter, much

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smaller, with the very walls of the Petit Seminaire, is going smoothly.

26. Sector 1B is now manned with only 21 officers and its strength will go down to 17 as of 26 August 95, that is to say only 60 % of its authorized strength. The Sect Cdr expressed hope that the reinforcement plan be known as soon as possible.

27. There is a certain amount of uncertainty concerning the FC's letter dated 7 Aug 95 that expressed that "all sector MILOBs are under direct command and control of the formed troop (sic) Commanding Officer". This letter was not followed by any change of situation on the terrain but it would be advantageous to clarify the command and control relationship, especially if the theater of operations "heats up" in the future.

28. Lt-Col Blanchette concluded in saying that he has now completed his observation period and that there was a clear feeling amongst Milobs that a lot of action lay ahead of them.

ITEM 7. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 2A

29. The Sect Cdr explained that the situation was relatively calm. Relationships with local authorities and other agencies are very cordial and the general security situation has tremendously improved. The prefecture has not yet been affected by the exodus of refugees from Zaire.

30. Developments and projects are road construction, rehabilitation of schools, health centers and drilling of bore holes. There are three orphanages in the prefecture.

31. There is a tremendous improvement of the general living conditions in most of the communes in the Sector. There is a continuous flow of returnees from the neighboring countries. Their accommodation is provided by UNHCR, WFP and ADRA whilst on transit. Milobs continue to monitor the returnees in their new places of settlement to ensure that they are peacefully integrated into the community.

32. Problems that are common to all communes are lack of essential services such as potable water and electricity. There is a lot of loose explosive ordnance and unmarked mines in some communes, thus resulting in the injury or death of livestock and human beings.

33. The only computer and fax terminals allocated to the Sector often break down and create serious delays in reporting. Three of the vehicles allocated to the sector have been in the workshop since April 95.

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Manpower shortage has also hit Sector 2A due to a large number of Milobs who have been repatriated without replacement.

34. Lt-Col Mahachi concluded by recommending that additional computers be allocated to his Sector, that the replacement of repatriated Milobs be speeded up and that cannibalization be authorized to facilitate the repair of vehicles that have been in the workshop for a long period.

ITEM 8. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 2B

35. The Sect Cdr reported that the security situation in his sector is more than calm and that it is actually peaceful. He left his written text to talk about the history of his sector and some of the peculiar inhabitant of the swamps which make the largest part of his sector. In his written report, the Sect Cdr explained that the rate of intimidation and indiscriminate arrests of locals has been reduced. However some cases of infiltration by armed elements of the FRGF, with the aim of taking their relatives to Tanzania, have been reported.

36. In response to an anticipated FRGF threat, the RPA has deployed its troops along the Southern border with Burundi and Tanzania. The relationship between UNAMIR and the RPA has improved considerably.

37. So far, 1574 returnees have been registered in August. Their overall condition is quite satisfactory. They face problems of accommodation and a shortage of cultivation equipment. Returnees are being assisted by NGOs in terms of health, educational aid, food distribution, reunion of lost family member and establishment of local cooperatives. There have been positive signs of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups.

38. The Sect Cdr expressed the same concern about the command and control of Milobs and Formed troops as expressed by Cdr Sect 1B. He explained that he loosely interpreted this letter since he could not understand how the Commanding Officer of formed troops could actually tell him how to run his sector. In his written brief, the Sect Cdr stated that the security of Milobs was a matter of some concern. This could be overcome to a certain extent by co-locating Milobs with formed troops when feasible.

39. Lt-Col Manz1 concluded in making reference to problems of accommodation, lack of adequate food storage facilities, inadequate office and communication equipment and slow repair of vehicles at the workshop.

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40. The SRSRG asked three questions to the Sect Cdr. Firstly, he wanted to know if there were any potential prison facilities in Sector 2B. Secondly, he inquired whether Radio UNAMIR was heard in his sector and thirdly whether he knew anything about an old cross-over area which could greatly facilitated the movement of population if a bridge could be built thereto. The Sect Cdr said that he would find answers to these questions.

Cdr Sect  
2B

ITEM 9. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 3A

41. The Sect Cdr announced that the security situation in all the communes has remained stable since the last conference. In his written brief, the killing of the Sous-prefet was noted as a serious indicator of tension within the communes.

42. There still exists two camps in the prefecture, with 2150 and 420 returnees. The NGOs, other UN Agencies and UNAMIR operating in the sector supervised the evacuation of the Murambi Camp IDPs which began on 7 Aug 95. So far, 354 families of approximately 1450 persons have been evacuated to their home communes namely, Kivu, Mubuga and Rwamiko. The evacuation of the remaining 185 families (400 people) which was scheduled to resume on 16 Aug was postponed because of a perceived insecurity in Rwamiko commune. This development resulted, as far as the Sect Cdr can assess, in the arrest of between 100 and 130 people in the communes suspected of having been involved in the Genocide.

43. There are clear indications that some NGOs are doing everything possible to rehabilitate the returnees by providing food and shelter in their communes. The Sect Cdr stated that the gradual increase in the commune population has made the health care and the food delivery system grossly inadequate. Most of the clinics are short of drugs and facilities to cope with patients. The withdrawal of ZAMBATT formed troops which used to assist the clinics has worsened the situation. The locals need seeds, farm implements and fertilizers. Most of the schools in the prefecture are functioning at 80%.

44. The Sect Commd concluded his remarks by reporting that the logistic situation in his sector is most unhealthy. Out of nine vehicles allocated to the sector, five are presently in the workshop.

ITEM 10. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 3B

45. The Acting Sect Cdr reported that the situation in all 20 communes is generally stable and calm. Milob teams still face problems with the RPA in performing

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their day to day duties. The security of material especially UN property transported out of SENBATT location on its departure is of concern.

46. A team from the Force Engr Coy has started work at the rehabilitation center in Butare. The Reconnaissance of two bridges was also carried out by Force Engr Coy representatives. No progress report have been heard of since then.

47. The flow of the returnees into the sector has been slow and gradual. Since the closure of IDP camps in April 1995, a total of 73,303 of them have registered. A large number of humanitarian activities were undertaken in coordination with UN agencies and NGOs. There are two prisons in the prefecture. As of 24 Aug 95, one is holding 6660 and the other one 1067.

48. Major Sirohi concluded by stating that he was facing an acute shortage of vehicles as there are only six vehicles while eight patrol teams need to operate.

ITEM 11. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 4

49. The Sect Cdr indicated that he had just taken command of his sector and that the general situation was relatively calm. However, a series of continuous banditry activities ranging from household robberies, stolen livestock and farm products to indiscriminate killings, including political killings, have taken place in the Bugarama subsector. There, bandits have clearly focussed their action on traders and returnees with money as well as livestock who are being systematically targeted. RPA soldiers are still suspected of having committed some of these crimes.

50. In terms of political killings, one took place in Gishoma commune on 5 Aug 95 and an attempted one in Mukinbangiro sector where the counsellor was seriously wounded by unknown individuals for reasons suspected to be political. On 30 July 95, a firefight took place between unidentified elements and the RPA at Kamembe commune. Rifle launched grenades were used and the commune office sustained damages.

51. Airspace violations continued during the period from 16 to 30 June where 19 sightings of unidentified aircraft violating the Rwanda airspace were reported. 15 other sightings were reported during the period 1-31 July. In August, there were seven sightings. All of these aircraft are of a grey metallic color and no clear markings have been observed.

52. On 9 August at Kirangira sector, the bodies of four suspected FRGF soldiers were photographed by UN personnel along the Rwanda-Burundi border and a joint



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UNAMIR/UNHCR investigation was launched. These soldiers are alleged to have been shot by the RPA.

53. All refugees arriving from Zaire in Sector 4, both in Bugarama and Rusizi I and II, are processed through the Nyagatare transit camp. This camp has been developed to accommodate 10,000 refugees and the another one at Nyarushishi can accommodate 15,000 refugees.

54. The Sect Cdr assesses that the FRGF does not possess the force preparedness and the necessary logistic support from the Zairian Government to launch major offensives in the Cyangugu Prefecture. The military option is fading although it is expected that political killings and low level operations to disrupt command, control and communication systems will continue under the cover of "bandit" activities. Also, acts of terrorism and intimidation of the population along the border areas will continue as a warning not to overtly support the Government of Rwanda.

55. Lt-Col Akplor ended his remarks by stating that there is a lack of vehicles in Sector 4.

ITEM 12. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 5A

56. The Acting Sect Cdr described the operational situation in his sector during the past month as quite satisfactory. Rumors of FRGF invasion has considerably died down. There was a peaceful demonstration on 31 July in the town of Ruhengeri by government employees and civilians against the promotion of the Ruhondo and Kigombe bourgmestres to the respective positions of Ruhengeri and Kibuye subprefects.

57. There has been some tension at the RPA occupied former TUNBATT position in Nemba, including the hospital area run by an NGO. The general humanitarian situation has improved tremendously. The general situation in the communes is considered to be similar to the national average. Although there are three hospitals and 26 Health Centers in the Prefecture, the area is still not adequately covered.

58. The reconciliation process is apparently gaining root but its success will likely take a long time, depending on the people's attitude towards the arrival of returnees.

59. Major Alam concluded by stating that his sector had vehicle, computer, telephone and fax problems.

ITEM 13. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 5B

60. The Sect Cdr stated that the overall situation may be deemed as tense. Incidents include infiltration,

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patrol clashes, sabotage, mine explosions and killings of suspected FRGF by the RPA. The relations between Milobs and the RPA has remained at a distance and guarded.

61. The refugee figures increased considerably over the last few days to approx 2,000 per day. It was observed that a large percentage of the refugees are women, children and aged males. The contingency plan for the large repatriation of returnees was put into effect.

62. The plan included the setting up of two transit camps at Nkamira and at the College Complex, depending on the number of returnees. In addition, NGOs have made plans for the distribution of food, water and medical care at the border posts and transit camps. The NICOY was incorporated in the plan to provide necessary security and additional transport. It is understood that UNHCR officials in Goma consulted the Chief of security in Zaire and learnt that authorities are going to interrupt forced repatriation for the present. They were going to encourage voluntary return as of 26 Aug 95. The Goma border remained closed to all Milobs and Humanitarian food convoys.

63. The conditions in the Gisenyi Prison are considered good when compared to other prisons in Rwanda.

64. The Sect Cdr stated that from June to 24 August 95 a total of 12,925 have returned to the Sector. The main problem the returnees are facing is the distribution of land.

65. The problem of reconciliation, though not simple, is not being addressed in the correct perspective. The RPA, the local authorities and the Government have made it clear that the perpetrators of the Genocide would be brought to courts but the arbitrary arrests that are being perpetrated are seriously hindering the reconciliation process.

66. There is a propaganda campaign going on in the GOMA camps. Led by the politically active refugees, the campaign aims at discouraging the returnees from leaving. The propaganda also relies on the fact that UNHCR and NGOs are providing greater accessibility to education for children, free and better medical care than what is available in Rwanda.

67. It is estimated that the FRGF's strength in the Goma area is approximately 30 000 but they are poorly equipped, not receiving any significant arms deliveries. There are about 40 AMLs and 25 artillery pieces (presumably 105 mm) located immediately west of GOMA and guarded by some Zairian soldiers. This equipment is serviceable, however it is felt that there is a limited

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amount of ammunition available. Consequently, the chances for the FRGF to launch a massive organized attack across the border are very little.

68. The presence of FRGF in the area of the Gishwati Forest is suspected. This assessment has been reinforced by a few recent incidents which have forced Milobs to avoid certain locations. The presence of mines is also strongly suspected.

69. Lt-Col Belski concluded by stating that he needed Force Engrs for the following tasks:

- a. Demining of road Kayove - Kibuye;
- b. Illumination of the area near the border post and the transit camp; and
- c. Improvement of the road circuit at the Nkamira transit camp.

ITEM 14. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 5C

70. The Sect Cdr said that the period under review was calm but that there had some serious moments of tension. In his written brief, he stated that the general security situation which earlier seemed to be improving, later started to deteriorate. The recent mass killing of the mine workers by RPA soldiers and a mine explosion in Rutshiro commune has changed the situation abruptly. In a separate development, rumors are on the increase that the FRGF will be launching an attack by infiltration in the near future.

71. A significant development is the deterioration of the security situation in Rutshiro commune where nearly 1080 returnees have arrived in the past three months. The population is facing problems related to a lack of piped water, medical centers, accommodations, arable land and education facilities and materials.

72. The reconciliation process has not changed in its perception by the local population. Nothing is really materializing although the situation appears to be calm. The Hutu population feels that the reconciliation is not required because they anticipate that the FRGF will return and save them from persecution and harassment from the Tutsi RPA.

73. The Sect Cdr stated that a high percentage of his vehicles are off road at any given time. The creation of a mobile repair teams or the establishment of a repair element is recommended. The sector needs two more computer sets.

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74. Lt-Col Coulibali concluded by saying that the situation was not conducive for the dreamt development to take place. The frequent harassment, arrests and killings of local people are still jeopardizing the establishment of a durable peace.

ITEM 15. DEPARTING REMARKS OF THE SRSG

75. Before his departure, the SRSG emphasized on the following points:

a. Although transit camps are functioning but he needs the inputs from Milobs as regard to where new ones should be established or existing ones be enlarged;

DCMO, All  
Sect Cdrs

b. Bourgmestres and prefets may not be quite ready to accept the large number of returnees we can expect and that a "gentle pressure" could be the right action for Milobs to execute when dealing with these civilian authorities;

c. There is a need to review the situation of Milob sectors which are without formed troops, both in terms of security and resources available to cater for humanitarian needs.

d. Relations with local authorities seem to be relatively good throughout the country and this should actually spread to all NGOs operating in a given sector;

e. The penitentiary system needs a lot of attention, both in the short and the long terms. The expansion of prison should be preferred to the creation of new ones since the latter require a lot more personnel and efforts.

ITEM 16. REMARKS BY THE FORCE MEDICAL OFFICER

76. The FMO informed the conference that Casevac by helicopter was available and explained the procedures by handing out some written documentation. She emphasized the prioritization system which can best ensure that the operational efficiency of resources available is optimized.

DCMO, All  
Sect Cdrs

77. The DCMO noted that priority would be given according to the seriousness of the injuries, independently of the person who needs the evacuation. He also asked that the FMO review the situation of Milob group which operate away from formed troops. The discussion evolved towards the need of emergency first aid kits and Maj Fensom said she would look into the matter.

FMO

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ITEM 17. REMARKS BY THE CHAO

78. The CHAO emphasized the need to work at the lower level when contacting authorities to prepare the arrival of returnees. He considers that a lot more can be achieved at the counsellor level than at the prefet level for example.

All Sect  
Cdrs

79. MILOBS have to continue to collect as much information as possible and Sect Cdrs have to do a proper screening of priorities. In the same vein, Milobs were reminded not to make any promises since it was causing a lot of frustration and was actually quite counter-productive.

All Sect  
Cdrs

80. Lt-Col Fox concluded in announcing in a nutshell that he needed the help of Milobs if he wanted to be able to help Milobs.

ITEM 18. REMARKS BY THE CIVPOL SUPERINTENDANT

All Sect  
Cdrs

81. The acting CIVPOL Superintendant stressed his concern on the shortage of CIVPOL personnel in the sectors. He explained that the bulk of his CIVPOL personnel were actually needed at the Ruhengeri Gendarmerie Training Institute.

82. He also explained, in answering a remark by Cdr Sect 1B, that CIVPOL had absolutely nothing to do with either the gendarmerie recruiting or posting process. He realized that the void created by a lack of gendarmes in most prefectures was very much linked to insecurity and this was probably the reason why the new UNAMIR mandate had specified this need of training a national gendarmerie.

83. In terms of the use of CIVPOL members among a Milob group, a discussion developed and it was felt that there were actually little difference between what a CIVPOL and a Milob have to do in their observation duties. The suggestion came out that CIVPOL could advantageously be employed in investigation linked to criminal action but that the Sect Cdr would always have the prerogative of using this specialized resource as he best sees fit.

84. The DCMO asked that the CIVPOL Superintendant prepare a study on how to best employ CIVPOL resources in the UNAMIR context. S/Supt Njase said that he would inform Col Diarrha of this request.

CIVPOL

ITEM 19. REMARKS OF THE SOO

85. The SOO informed the forum that Milob Group HQ is now located at UNAMIR HQ Ops Branch. He advised that all Milobs have to have an updated knowledge of current

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events and that for this reason information had to be passed precisely and in a timely manner. He announced that Channel 12 has to be reprogrammed on all sets as soon as possible. Humanitarian requests have to be followed up by the sectors. He emphasized the need to coordinate and cooperate closely with UN Agencies and NGOs. He suggested, like it is done in some sectors, that joint patrols and meetings be coordinated and executed. He stressed the need to give correct grid references in the daily SITREPs and to remember that UNAMIR HQ is using a small scale map and that all features and names cannot be found on this map. Additionally, a prompt and early warning when a significant incident occurs.

All Sect  
Cdrs

86. Lt-Col Ahsannulla concluded in reminding everyone that a high priority must be given to the gathering of information concerning IDPs and returnees.

ITEM 20. REMARKS BY THE SMPO

87. The SMPO said that the most significant issue since the last conference was the repatriation of 81 Milobs in August 95 and that 28 more were expected to be repatriated in September 95. This situation has affected Milobs strength in all sectors and branches except MILOB GP HQ. He also said that Milobs overdue for posting will be considered for deployment after the situation stabilizes in all sectors. He stated that Milobs would have a minimum stay of six months in each sector.

All Sect  
Cdrs

88. Unless a fax message is received at Milob GP HQ about a Milob's extension of tour of duty, they will assume that Milobs are repatriating on their DDMS. To avoid confusion, Milobs should coordinate these matters long before their DDMS.

89. The MSA is likely to be late in view of the movement of finance to Traffipro. A discussion was initiated by Cdr Sect 2B to the effect that this was his first Peacekeeping Mission where MSA was not being paid on the first of the month since this money was required to pay rents which are due on the first of the month. The DCMO acknowledged the problem and tasked Cdr Sect 2B to prepare a correspondence which should reach the new CAO.

Cdr Sect  
2B

90. Lt-Col Adjei concluded in saying that he hoped the Milobs shortfalls will stabilize by mid-Sep 95.

ITEM 21. REMARKS BY SLOGO

91. The SLOGO stated that after the vehicle allocation meeting, the vehicle strength for Milobs was increased



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from 89 to 107. The registered holding is 94 but only 55 are serviceable. He stressed the need to take more care of the vehicles in the sectors and encouraged Sect Cdrs to supervise closely the use and maintenance of vehicles. Accident reports are to be forwarded within 24 hours in Kigali and its neighborhood or, at the latest, within 48 hours in sectors further away.

All Sect  
Cdrs

92. Major Zimba concluded in requesting that a list of all Milobs without a driving permit be forwarded by sectors ASAP to Milob Group HQ.

ITEM 22. REMARKS BY THE DCMO

All Sect  
Cdrs

93. In articulating his closing remarks, the DCMO emphasized the following points:

a. After three Sect Cdrs' conferences, he is now convinced that information does not actually filter down to individuals. Sect Cdrs have the responsibility of not only passing this information but also to ensure that it is well understood. In that respect, all Milobs need to be thoroughly familiar with the UNAMIR mandate and its five main parts;

All Sect  
Cdrs

b. There is a need for better leadership and discipline. The problem is not that the personnel is not aware of the rules. Rather, there is too often only a weak enforcement of these regulations. Accordingly, negligence will not be tolerated anymore, especially in the mishandling of vehicles which, with communication means, are actually the only weapons or tools to accomplish our mission with. As of 1 Sep 95, there will be no more tolerance in that area of activity and driving licenses will eventually be withdrawn.

c. CTO has to be deserved and Sect Cdrs should allocate it accordingly.

d. In terms of Command and Control, in response to the questions raised by two of the Sect Cdrs, the DCMO suggested that if any problem were encountered in implementing the recent FC directives, there was always the possibility of faxing immediately the details of the communication obstacle to the Milobs HQ. Meanwhile, the DCMO will review the impact of the new command and control instructions in coordination with UNAMIR authorities.

DCMO

e. Col Nelson concluded the conference by requesting Sect Cdrs to brief their Milobs as soon as administratively possible and to have the minutes of the meeting available to all for their

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perusal. He then thanked all the participants and the hosts of the conference. The next two monthly conferences will respectively be held in Kibuye (Sector 5C) and Ruhengeri (Sector 5A).



( G Dube )  
Major  
Secretary

Distribution


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13. SLOGO
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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : ALL OPS BRANCH STAFF OFFRS  
FROM : DCOS(OPS)  
FILE : 3000.10(OPS)  
DATE : 4 SEP 95  
SUBJECT : STAFF MEETINGS/CONFERENCES

1. STAFF MEETINGS/CONFERENCES will be held twice every month in Briefing Room.
2. Conference will be held on every first Wednesday and the last Wednesday of the month.
3. The Conference will start at 1000 hrs each Conference day and end at 1100 hrs.

  
DCK KATTAN  
Col  
DCOS(OPS)

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**INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA**

**KIGALI, RWANDA**

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**INTERNAL MEMORANDUM**

May 31, 1995

**TO:** COLIN PORT

**FROM:** JEAN ROMEY

**SUBJECT:** Limited Security Survey on the Office of the Prosecutor, Rwanda

**1. Purpose:** To provide you a limited security survey and recommendations on the Office of the Prosecutor in Rwanda.

**2. Summary:** The presently stable and relatively secure situation in Rwanda as it affects the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) may change in direct proportion to the effectiveness of our investigative effort. All intelligence sources point to a fluid socio-political situation centering upon a growing insurgency and aggravated by the inevitable reduction of UNAMIR presence as a measure of accommodation with the government of Rwanda (GOR). There also has been an increase in the incidence of harassment and criminal activity (auto theft, robberies, residential burglaries) directed against personnel, equipment, vehicle, and work and housing facilities of UNAMIR, other UN agencies, and NGOs. OTP security and logistical support depend, by mandate, upon UNAMIR which has the means to provide or coordinate such. While some advantages could be found in the OTP operating independently, the situation demands that the OTP take full advantage of UNAMIR's capabilities to provide for its outer and inner perimeter security. Opposition to the work of the OTP should be expected to take hostile action against the OTP using insurgency tactics including low-skill terrorist actions. Measures to protect OTP personnel, facilities, information, equipment, and communications need be identified and implemented immediately.

**3. Survey Scope**

The scope of the survey comprises the environment in which the OTP is to operate in Rwanda includes the following areas:

- Physical security of OTP personnel, facilities (offices and housing), vehicles, and equipment, including transportation.

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- Information Management Systems (automated and non-automated) Security
- Communications Security
- Security Awareness Training
- Personnel Security (Change 1 addition)

### 3. Sources:

This preliminary security survey is based on historical multinational/multiagency multisource intelligence (UN/US/UK), UNAMIR civilian and military staff, local human sources, and direct observations and contacts made by undersigned during the period May 15 to 31, 1995. Sources are as follows:

- G-3, UNAMIR
- Security Officer, UNAMIR
- UN Security Officer assigned to OTP (16 months in country)
- Regional Security Officer, U. S. Embassy, Kigali
- OTP staff liaison with RPA/GOR
- CDR, INDBATT
- Other personal contacts developed locally, including expatriate nationals with long-term country experience.

### 4. Findings and Recommendations:

#### a. Finding A. Personal Security.

(1) The personal security (PS)/Executive Protection (EP) of OTP personnel and leadership is inadequate. The present EP/PS resources allocated to the OTP consist of a one man protection detail (PD) working extended hours to cover the Deputy Prosecutor for Rwanda (DPR) during working hours. The lowest threat conditions require a minimum of three men per principal, each working not more than a nine hour shift for safety and effectiveness under normal circumstances. Under present and foreseeable conditions, a twelve-man team plus supervisor will provide the OTP a close protection capability to complement the military outer perimeter and travel escort assets provided by UNAMIR.

(2) The threat level facing the OTP is expected to increase in direct proportion to the investigative effort put forth, and especially results obtained, by the OTP. The threat source is the ongoing insurgent activity whose main elements and support are externally based and which is conducting an infiltration effort be supported by the Hutu ethnic majority ousted from power. Hostile action against OTP personnel must be anticipated. While this threat applies particularly to high-profile OTP personalities, including the DPR and the DOI, it will no doubt extend to the rest of the investigative staff as their effectiveness is felt. Hostile action against OTP leadership and other

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opportunity. These actions, typical of insurgency situations, commonly range from grenade and sniper attacks to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)(car and letter bombs being most common). It should be noted that the most dangerous components of the insurgency, the former Rwandese army and their militia (*interhamwe*), in exile, should not lack in arms thanks to their international supporters, and have amply demonstrated their will and effectiveness in the past to attack the most vulnerable and the defenseless.

### Recommendation A:

(1) Obtain a fully trained 12-man protection detail (PD), plus supervisor, and dedicated drivers, to provide simultaneous 24-hour one man PD coverage for the DPR and two other OTP principals or OTP investigators/staff members whose particular circumstances will require personal protection. This requirement will apply particularly to the low-visibility escort of unarmed investigators in the field whose interview effectiveness would be negatively affected by the immediate presence of an armed, uniformed military escort. While the latter form the required outer perimeter for all OTP static and mobile situations as the OTP outer perimeter (See Finding/Recommendation E), Travel, our investigators require the availability an inner perimeter of close protection by plainclothes PD assets. Given the increasing, insurgency-driven threat situation developing in areas of Rwanda where our investigative efforts will focus, this requirement should be given the highest priority.

(2) Apply Standards of Executive Protection: It should be clearly understood by all concerned that personnel protection (PS/EP) is based primarily on defensive measures, to include security awareness training of the principal, intelligence and advance work, surveillance countermeasures, communications and communications security, well-rehearsed mounted and dismounted (vehicular vs. pedestrian) reaction/evasive action drills, evasive driving, and close-quarter combat (CQC). Support measures include armored vehicles and body armor (for both principal and PD). The whole purpose of EP is to evacuate the principal quickly and safely out of the hostile area. Offensive measures, i.e. returning hostile fire or using a vehicle as a weapon, make up a very small but critical percentage of EP, and serve only to break contact and gain critical time by not only disabling some of the attackers but creating a surprise shock effect designed to gain reaction time. Supporting EP personnel skills are communications evasive/offensive driving, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). All OTP personnel should receive basic PS awareness (4 hours) training, to include car bombs/ and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), travel and communications procedures (plan route, travel in twos, insure communications), evasive/offensive driving, and emergency medical/trauma assistance. Fifty percent of OTP personnel should be trained in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR).

(3) Request a military special operations (Special Forces, SAS) counterterrorist (CT) team as a national contribution to the Tribunal. This will

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insure proper vetting, standards of training and capabilities, and a timely (immediate upon approval, agreement, and tasking) implementation.

**b. Finding B:** (1) The present OTP location, the UNICEF building has numerous vulnerabilities and will require some work to properly secure, particularly in the long term, with the anticipated increase in threat level against the OTP. As presently installed on the ground floor of this building, OTP facilities and the offices of the DPR are highly vulnerable to intrusion, surveillance, and low-skill terrorist attack and lack in several aspects of physical security.

(2) OTP facilities are located on the ground floor of a three story concrete and brick building located in a flat area, at a road intersection approximately 200 meters southwest of UNAMIR headquarters.

(3) The building is a three story thin-walled concrete and brick structure with aluminum frame entry doors and windows fitted with integral external aluminum grillwork, and asbestos ceilings. The front (north) and rear (south) sides of the building have extensive window glass areas which extend well below head level. The offices of the DPR are located at the northwest corner and are particularly exposed due to the glass door and windows on the north side. A minor explosion can generate several pounds of glass shrapnel causing major injuries.

(4) The building is situated in a paved courtyard used as a parking lot and surrounded by a five-foot iron grill fence bordered externally with a thick hedge of the same height which obstructs vision and provides concealment both internally and externally.

(5) Dominant features adjacent to the building are tall trees outside the northeast perimeter which dominate the courtyard, and a three story office building 50 meters to the southwest.

(6) The rear (southeast) of the perimeter is most vulnerable to penetration and attack, given the concealment offered by the adjacent roadway vegetation. Building exterior and perimeter lighting is almost non-existent.

(7) Interior north entry door to OTP has no lock and cannot be secured. Exterior south entry door is closed shut since the key to the lock was lost.

**b. Recommendation B:** In order of priority:

(1) Install lock on interior north OTP door and exterior south door. Use latter as OTP entrance, keeping north door closed. Access to DPR's office should be through south door

(2) Install net and opaque curtains on DPR's office windows.

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(3) Install triple strand concertina wire from top to bottom of perimeter fence between fence and outer hedge.

(4) Cut down trees to northeast of perimeter and vegetation in ditch along southeast portion of perimeter.

(5) Replace DPR office window and exterior door glass with armor glass.

(6) Build decorative six foot stand-off brick wall along outer edge of walk bordering DPR's office.

(7) Install laminate on all other ground floor OTP exterior windows and glass doors.

(8) Install high intensity lights high on the four sides of the OTP/UNICEF building illuminating the perimeter, and cut down excess vegetation along roadway and ditch on the southeast side of the perimeter.

(9) Install swing barrier on both entry gates.

**c. Finding C.** (1) OTP perimeter manned security is inadequate. Approximately half an infantry squad (4-5 soldiers) have been assigned to secure the UNICEF/OTP building perimeter.

(2) The building and building perimeter situation requires 24-hour coverage by a full infantry squad (9-10 men).

**c. Recommendation C.** (1) Assign infantry platoon to OTP/UNICEF building.

(2) Man OTP perimeter as follows:

- o Front (north gate) two men plus squad leader
- o Side (west) gate two men
- o Roving patrol two men
- o Tribunal north and south door--one man each

**d. Finding D:** OTP personnel housing will require armed sentry security.

**Recommendation D:** (1) That UNAMIR provide soldiers in sufficient numbers to secure OTP personnel housing outer perimeter.

(2) That elements of PS/EP team will reside with OTP personnel as the situation dictates.

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**e. Finding E:** (1) OTP personnel travel in country raises the threat level, creates additional security and plain safety problems.

(2) The safety hazards alone of ground travel--due to the local vehicular and pedestrian traffic culture, roads conditions, weather, and lighting--present a major threat to OTP personnel. Accidents and vehicle breakdowns further expose personnel to acts of banditry or terrorism.

(3) Road blocks have, up to this time, represented a form of harassment and UN vehicle theft, conducted probably by disgruntled RPA soldiers. It would be relatively easy for such roadblocks to be taken over or set up in certain areas of the country (border with Zaire) by insurgents. This will raise the threat level and, once identified as a probable threat, require a higher level of security, including military escort and close protection.

(3) Air travel, however convenient and efficient, should be carefully analyzed in terms of the threat. Man-carried, shoulder-launched missiles have made shooting down aircraft a growing sport in all conflicts.

### **Recommendation E:**

(1) Establish and require compliance with the following in-country travel rules. This applies to both local and out-of-town travel.

- o Travel only when necessary. Tourism and leisure are not on the priority list in an insurgency environment.
- o Plan all travel, however short, using all available intelligence sources and common sense. On trips to other UN Sectors, coordinate closely with the G2 (Intelligence) and G3 (Operations) officers of the Sector(s) through which travel will occur, through the UNAMIR G3.
- o Plan, request, and coordinate armed escort and, if necessary, close protection, as early as possible
- o Keep all travel plans discrete, investigative trips confidential. Never discuss travel plans in public places, hotel rooms, or any area not cleared of listening devices.
- o Plan route on the map, carry a map--everywhere.
- o Carry enough water, a good first-aid kit, and a flashlight.
- o Let a colleague who will stay behind at the office know
- o Travel in twos or with a driver, and stay within curfew limits.
- o Drive defensively and according to conditions.
- o Establish and stay in radio communications.
- o Know where you are at all times on the map. If with a driver, be your own navigator. If traveling in twos, one drives, one navigates.

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- o As the threat increases, do not follow routines and patterns to and from work. Terrorist attacks are always based on sometimes extensive surveillance of the target; and surveillance thrives on the target's routine. This may be the hardest security measure to take for most of us compulsively punctual workers!

(2) That armed soldiers, and PD as the situation requires, escort OTP personnel in travels throughout Rwanda.

**f. Finding F:** (1) The anticipated threat level environment in which OTP personnel are to operate justifies issuing all personal body armor.

(2) Standard issue "one-size fit all" UN issue vests are too bulky and impractical for civilian wear. They do not provide side protection, not having close fitting side panels; and their bulk alone makes them impractical for wear under civilian clothes. A key consideration in selecting body armor is the level of protection versus practicability and even comfort of wear. Stopping high power rifle or machinegun rounds (7.62mm, 5.56mm) requires a degree of protection, i.e. thickness and weight, totally impractical for most work, including the military. A compromise always has to be reached between all these factors which provides the maximum degree of practical protection within the wearer's tolerance level. Concealability and comfort often tend take precedence) for the wearer over protection. This certainly is the case for OTP personnel. The body armor market offers individually fitted vests thin and lightweight enough for wear under even light clothing, such as tropical shirts. These state of the art models are made of a combination of layers of spectra-shield and kevlar and will stop most large-caliber handgun rounds (9mm, .357 magnum., 45 ACP) and some submachinegun rounds. This partial protection level--in body armor parlance, Level II--is practical for OTP PS/EP applications. Key to the body armor protocol is that all personnel in the same situation (location, mission, circumstances) do the same, wear or not wear (see Recommendation G(4).

**Recommendation F:** Provide OTP personnel individually fitted body armor for concealed comfortable wear under civilian clothing, of following specifications:

- o Protection Level II, with Level III heart plate.
- o Wrap-around side panels
- o Ordered by mail, custom-sized.

**g. Finding G:** Armored sedans and escort four-wheel drive vehicles are necessary to support the PS/EP requirements of the OTP.

**Recommendation G:** Provide the OTP with the following Personnel Protection Vehicle (PPV) support:

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(1) Three armored sedans, to transport three high visibility principals or other OTP staffers simultaneously. A fourth standby vehicle is highly recommended for transparent reasons--breakdowns and additional VIP visits.

(2) Two dedicated PPV escort vehicles (4X4) with partial armor (doors, windshield, and floor panels) and independent long distance communications. A third standby vehicle is recommended for the same reasons as stated in (1).

(3) Dedicated drivers. PD personnel should not drive if possible.

(4) All PPV should contain the following minimum equipment and supplies:

- o Body armor for all occupants. See Finding and Recommendation F.
- o Emergency trauma treatment kit, including IV materials and oxygen.
- o Gas masks for all occupants. These must be stowed as inconspicuously as possible of course, inside the passenger compartment.

**h. Finding H:** (1) Information Security is next only to personal/physical security for the OTP.

(2) The OTP has no other means of protecting its information than by the application of basic information security discipline by the staff, including shredding of all discarded paperwork, using diskettes in lieu of the hard drive in computers, storing the latter under lock and key when not in use, and avoiding traveling in country with document. Vehicles and briefcases have been searched at road blocks for contraband mail.

(3) OTP offices and document containers/file cabinets are vulnerable to undetected forced entry from within the building. There are no hard storage containers, such as safes, for securing diskettes and sensitive case documents.

(4) OTP personal computers have only one port, thus requiring the use of the hard drive to transfer files between diskettes.

(5) OTP does not have and needs a computer technician and a Local Access Network (LAN). The OTP needs to establish clear, simple guidelines or a standing information security standing operating procedure (SOP).

**Recommendation H:** (1) Partially sanitize all computer hard drives by erasing all current information after transfer on diskettes. (Note the "partially": erased information on a disk can still be recalled using more advanced technical applications.)

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(2) Work only on diskettes, do not use the hard drive. Two kinds of diskettes should be used: working disks used by each staff member to draft and create documents and main disks, on which final case documents are stored. Until two port (drive "A" and "B") machines can be obtained, it will be necessary, in the interim, to use the hard drive to transfer documents between diskettes.

(3) Install an alarm system in OTP offices with the following specifications:

- o Triggers on all doors and windows
- o Beam in each room
- o Combination keypad

(4) Obtain six standard, four-drawer, government specification, combination lock document safes, four for Operations and two for Intelligence, for storage of case documents and diskettes.

(5) Replace present one-port personal computers with two port (drives "A" and "B") machines which will allow transferring information or files between diskettes without making full use of the hard drive. While this disk-to-disk transfer through a third disk still requires some hard drive participation, the imprint left on the latter is more difficult to access and read.

(6) Obtain the services of a computer security technician who will maintain the system, including fully sanitizing hard drives and monitoring the LAN.

**i. Finding I:** (1) OTP has no communications security to protect the transmission of sensitive information.

(2) OTP has no secure telephone for communications with The Hague and other locations. OTP telephone lines have not been swept for electronic intercepts (listening devices/bugs).

(3) OTP offices have not been swept for and are vulnerable to all types of internally emplaced and/or externally directed voice intercept monitoring devices.

**Recommendation I:** (1) Conduct a complete technical survey telephone lines and install intercept detectors.

(2) Conduct an initial technical survey of OTP offices for voice intercept devices.

(3) Install secure voice telephone, type STUIII, with INMSERSAT system, in OTP offices connecting with a similar system in The Hague.

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(4) Install vibration system on windows to counter externally based directional voice intercept measures.

(5) Provide portable scramblers to OTP staff for secure communications while traveling.

**j. Finding J:** The level of security awareness expected to be encountered among OTP personnel will vary, according to individual background, training, and experience. Given prevailing conditions in Rwanda as described in this survey, OTP staff need a Personal Security Awareness (PSA) orientation.

**Recommendation J:** Provide a basic Security Awareness Orientation for incoming OTP personnel, including the following topics:

- o Violent crime and Terrorism
- o The local and international work environment of the ITR and OTP.
- o Threat Awareness
- o Surveillance Awareness
- o IEDs and Car Bombs
- o Building Security
- o Travel Security
- o Evasive Driving
- o Operational Security (OPSEC)
- o Compromise and Blackmail
- o Personal Risk Assessment



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PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: <b>H. Medili</b> Director FALD <b>B. Sevan</b> UN Security Coordinator, <b>Major General Baril</b> UN Headquarters, New York	FROM: Major General Toussignant Force Commander and Acting Head of Mission UNAMIR Kigali, Rwanda
FAX NO: 212-963-0383 & 4104 & 9070	DATE: June 6, 1995
INT DIST'N: FC, COS, CISS, CSO, DCOS OPS	PHONE : 212-963-3582 Ext. 11221 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
DRAFTED BY: G3 Plans J. Lombardo	If all pages are not received in good order please contact number listed above.
THROUGH: C. Ouziel Chief Administrative Officer	SECTION: Division of Administration and Management
SUBJECT: <b>UNAMIR PROTECTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL</b>	

A security requirements plan is presently being written by a member of the International Tribunal. While the report is due in the near future, an advance draft copy has raised a number of concerns within UNAMIR.

The draft report identifies a requirement for twelve personnel for close protection (bodyguards). Currently one UNAMIR security officer (with no training in close protection) provides security to the Deputy Prosecutor. This is obviously insufficient to provide 24 hour close protection to the entire Tribunal staff. The military component of UNAMIR does not have the capability to provide personnel trained in close protection.

Three options have been raised to provide personnel the Tribunal will require for close protection:

1. UN hire and train staff in close protection.
2. Request contributing nations to provide police officers already trained in close protection.
3. Request contributing countries to provide military personnel (Special Forces, SAS) who are already trained in close protection.

FC COS CISS CSO DCOS OPS G3-PLANS J. LOMBARDO



The other requirements identified in the report will mean a 'Company' would be required for protection of the Tribunal office in Kigali (and later on in Arusha, Tanzania) and for the provision of escorts when Tribunal members move outside of the Capital.

Finally, the Tribunal staff currently reside in the Meridien Hotel in Kigali without security. However, if the Tribunal staff move to a building called the 'Chinese Compound' (which they are expected to do in five to six weeks) additional troops will be required. As the Tribunal staff numbers are expected to increase to approximately 40-45 persons in Kigali, more accomodation sites will need to be found and troops allocated to secure them.

These concerns are provided for your information and early action as required.

P2/2  
MIR 1990

24/05 '95 16:45

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UNAMIR GH 2

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI

001

File 5000.9 (PLANS)

LT. COL APOGAN - YELLA  
MESSAGE

PRIORITY

21/1945 B MAY 95

FROM : GHANBATT HQ (KIBUNGO)

RESTD

TO : UNAMIR HQ (KIGALI)

INFO: UNAMIR TAC HQ (BUTARE)  
GHANCON HQ (KIGALI)  
SECTOR MILOBS

G/12/OPS

=====

INCREP NO. 03 PD ESCAPED ZAIREAN CONSCRIPTS PD AT ABOUT 1000HRS  
EIGHT YOUNGMEN CLAIMING TO BE ZAIREANS ARRIVED AT GHANBATT FWD  
POSN MULINDI GR 76668 PD MN PERS NAMELY CMM KAPOME MAYANGA BONDIT  
CMM MAKANBO MUTAMBALA MANENO CMM MUSAFIRI MATAYO CMM FASSONI  
HASISSI CMM INNOCENT BALEKE CMM HENRI MUSENGE CMM EUGENE MATIGIRE  
AND MUNU RURANGWA CLAIM TO HAVE ESCAPED FROM A MIL TRG BASE IN  
THE AKAGERA NATIONAL PARK AFTER THREE MONTHS TRAINING PD PERS  
CONSCRIPTED FROM ZAIRE IN DEC 94 UNDER PRETEXT OF BEING FOUND  
JOBS IN NAIROBI KENYA PD ROUTE TO CAMP PD ARRIVED IN RWANDA  
KAMEMBI IN DEC 94 STAYED FOR ONE MONTH WITH MILITARY FRIEND  
OF CONSCRIPTER CMM MOVED KIGALI WHERE THEY STAYED FOR TWO  
DAYS WITH RPA COL KAYOMBA CMM MOVED TO RWAMAGANA AND STAYED  
FOR TWO MONTHS WITH RPA MAJ RODOVIKO PD THEN TRANSPORTED TO  
CAMP TO TRAIN IN PREPARATION FOR THE GOVT OF ZAIRE  
PD GROUP MENTION ONE KEKESI ANDRE GANDO AS LEADER OF  
MOVEMENT PD PERS BEING HELD FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION PD  
ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION //

=====

DRAFTER'S NAME

APPT

TELE

CAPT A AMADU-MAHAMA

MIO

11275

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE  
WITH RANK:

INFORMATION ON 8 ZAIREANS HANDED OVER  
TO RPA BY GHANBATT ON 22 MAY 95

SRL	NAME	AGE	SCHOOL	LANGUAGE/SPOKEN
1.	Kapomey Maganga Bundit	24 yrs	Istce University Uvira Province	English Swahili French
2.	Mardgaiko Matigire	24 "	"	English, Swahili French
3.	Musenga Sawatugu	21 yrs	Hekima Institute	Swahili French
4.	Mulilwa Rurangea	26 yrs	Mwanga Institute	Swahili French
5.	Fassoni Hactissi	22 yrs	Kalundu Institute	Swahili French
6.	Innocent Balake	26 yrs	Taraja Institute Kaliba District	Swahili French
7.	Manewo Mutambali	26 yrs	Taraja Institute	Swahili French
8.	Musafiri Matago	33 yrs	Educated up to P6	Swahili

UN MEDICAL CONFIDENTIAL

MEDICAL REPORT ON EIGHT (8) SUSPECTED ZAIREANS MALES AT  
'D' COY HQ ON 22ND MAY, 1995

KAPONE - MAYANGA BONDIT, 24yrs, said to be the leader of the group. He looked confident and physically fit. No obvious scars were seen. His pulse was 72/min and blood pressure 130/80. His chest was clear and heart sounds normal.

MANENO - MUTAMBALA - NAKIHINGA, 26yrs, also looked physically fit but seemed apprehensive and rather nervous. His pulse rate was 100 beats per minute and his blood pressure 130/100. His chest was clear and heart sounds normal.

INNOCANT - BALEKE, 26yrs, also physically fit, pulse rate 84 beats per minute and BP-120/90 with chest sounding clear and heart sounds normal.

FASSONI HADISI HEWRI, 22yrs, also looks physically fit. His pulse rate was 72/min and his blood pressure 150/100. Heart sounds were normal but breathe sounds were slightly reduced on the right side.

MULOLWA RURANGWA - MUMU, 26yrs, also looks physically fit and well built. Has a scar in the epigastric region. Pulse rate was 52/min and blood pressure 110/80. Chest was clear and heart sounds normal.

MANGAIKO - MATIGIRE EUGENE, 24yrs, physically fit and well built, blood pressure 140/90 and pulse rate 72/min. Chest clear. Has slight curvature at lower sternum. Heart sounds were normal.

MUSAFIRI - MATAYO MUBALAMA, 33yrs, looked physically fit had extensive fungal infection in groin and anal region. Also had a scar on left breast, right nostril and above right eye. Pulse rate was 75/min and BP - 130/100. Chest clear and heart sounds normal.




UN MEDICAL CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

MUSEWCE - SAWATUAU HEWRI, 21yrs, looks physically fit no visible scars but has a mole below left clavicle. Pulse rate was 72/min, BP - 110/70. Chest clear and heart sounds normal.

All the young men looked well built and fit. Most of them looked apprehensive and a bit nervous which showed in some of their pulse and blood pressures.

  
P HYDE  
Capt  
MO-GHANBATT

UN MEDICAL CONFIDENTIAL


G3 PLANS - 2. 10

3- 11

4- 12

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : G3 PLANS   
FROM : GHANBATT HQ  
INFO : G3 AIR  
DATE : 11 MAY 95  
SUBJECT : OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF GHANBATT

GH2/014/2(OPS)


## Reference :

A. 5000.9(PLANS) dated 09 May 95.

B. Tele conversation between GHANBATT OPS OFFR and UNAMIR HQ  
Duty Offr at 111820B MAY 95.1. Below find the list of personnel to be picked up for the Ops  
briefing at UNAMIR HQ tomorrow 12 May 95 at 0840 hrs.

a.	M6641	LT COL	- JK ATTIPOE
b.	M10643	LT COL	GE AMAMOO
c.	M10791	CAPT	AMADU MAHAMAH
d.	M10655	LT	A ALOBAWONE
e.	M10651	LT	JS PRIKA
f.	M10657	LT	D BANGSIIBU
g.	M6960	CPL	I AGGREY

2. Please accept for your nec action.

  
AY ASSANE  
Maj  
Ops offr

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5000.9(Plans)

①

MILOB GP HQ

*file*

TO : FHQ (OPS)

FILE : OPS/INVEST

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 02 MAR 95

INFO : DFC/CMO

SUBJECT : SHOOTING INCIDENT AT TUNBATT HQ LOC ON NI 28 FEB/01 MAR  
INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. Please find herewith attached an investigation report on the above subject for perusal and necessary action.
2. Best regards.

*fr*  
A ANOCHKINE  
LT COL  
FOR CMO

②

cc

copy to COS and

1.12.95

*ff*

3/3

③ COS and DEOS ops  
Copied.  
DE 4-3

④ G3 Plans

*Passed 8/3*  
I concur with the att recommendations  
of para 7. Pls discuss with CO / OpsO  
Turbett re how to implement and ensure  
that ROE is reviewed.

⑤

G3 Plans  
Copied  
DE 6-3

*DEOS ops*  
5-3

to fire warning shots in the air

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MILOBS SECTOR 5 HQ  
GISENY

01 March 1995

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE SHOOTING INCIDENT AT TUNBATT HQINTRODUCTION

An exchange of fire occurred between sentries of TUNBATT HQ and an RPA patrol on the night of 28 February 1995. The shooting was reported to MILOBS sector 5 HQ on 28 FEB 95 at 2315H. A team composed of MILOBS and CIVPOL was sent to investigate the shooting incident.

CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

2. The team first went to TUNBATT HQ where they interviewed Maj Ghedifi who is the contingent OPS Offr. Maj Ghedifi stated that at 2230 hrs on 28 February 95, one of his sentries saw some movements of people a 100m from ~~his~~ the sentry position. The sentry informed the Command element about the movement. A few minutes later, the sentry reported hearing some crying in a village near the sentry post. The TUNBATT commander and the OPS officer <sup>then</sup> went to the sentry post to investigate what was going on. When they got to the sentry post they saw a person running from the village towards their positions, the sentry ordered the person in English, French and Kinyarwanda to stop. When the person did not respond, the TUNBATT commander ordered the sentry to fire warning shots in the air.



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The warning shots fired by the sentry provoked a reaction by the RPA patrol in the village who took up positions and returned fire. The fire was directed towards the TUNBATT positions. The firing lasted for about 30 seconds. There were no casualties from the shooting.

Mr Samvura  
Bonitale

4. From interviewing the TUNBATT OPS Officer, the investigation team went ~~into the~~ to interview the villager who had run away to TUNBATT for protection. The villager stated that at about 2230 hrs on 28 February some 10 to 13 RPA soldiers entered his home. They ordered the people who were seated in one of the houses to open the door and ordered everybody out of the house. When the people were out they were ordered to take off their clothes and seat down, then the RPA soldiers started to ~~beat~~ beat them. Mr Samvura then ran away shouting for help towards the TUNBATT positions. He did not hear the order from the sentry for him to stop, he only heard the shots but continued running. The team asked him what he thought could have been the reasons ~~why~~ for the RPA to beat them and he said the soldiers accused them of having been making a lot of noise in the night.

5. The team after the interview with Mr Samvura went to the RPA camp where they interviewed Maj Rugamba and Maj Rugambwa the second in command of the local RPA. The two majors denied that their patrol ever exchanged fire with the TUNBATT. They stated that their patrol which included Maj Rugambwa only went to TUNBATT after hearing the shooting and they wanted to go and investigate the cause of the shooting. They said at TUNBATT they were told that the firing occurred when TUNBATT sentries heard noise from the village and they thought that there were bandits in the village who were killing civilians and the fire was

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meant to scare the bandits away. Maj Ruga stated that when they went into the village to investigate they were told by the villagers that the noise had been caused by drunken people who had a fist fight. The two officers maintain that their patrol only went into the village after the shooting had occurred.

Comments

6. The team is of the opinion that the shoot occurred due to lack of coordination between the TUNBATT and RPA patrols. The team is also of the opinion that the RPA has no patrol programme in <sup>the</sup> ~~there~~ soldiers patrol the villages at will and on their own accord. There also seems to be ~~not~~ no limits placed by the TUNBATT beyond which the RPA should not patrol at night.

Recommendations

7. The investigation team recommends that:
- a. There be coordination between TUNBATT and RPA on patrols.
  - b. Liaison between TUNBATT and RPA be closely maintained.
  - c. UN instructions on when to open fire should seriously be adhered to by all contingent forces.

*[Signature]*  
A Gumbo

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REF: 5000.4 (LOG)

KIGALI

13 August 1994

TO : ALL IN-COMING CONTINGENTS

FROM : C PLANS

SUBJECT: INFORMATION PACKAGE FOR IN-COMING CONTINGENTS

1. Below is a table of content on the above-mentioned subject.

SERIAL	ITEM(S)	QUANTITY	REMARKS
1.	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)	1	
2.	MAP OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	1	GRIDDED MAPS
3.	KIGALI CITY MAP	1	
4.	ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF RWANDA	1	
5.	DRAFT 2 - HPZ CEASEFIRE DOCUS ( PART 1 & 2)	1	
6.	BRIEFING NOTES	1	
7.	OP ORDER NO.16 AND AMMENDMENT	1	
8.	OP DIRECTIVE NO.17	1	
9.	UNAMIR SOPs	1	
10.	LOG INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND AMMENDMENT	1	
11.	WEEKLY AND DAILY SITREP	1	

2. Please accept for your information and necessary action.

  
A. BRIMELOW  
Lt Col  
C PLANS

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

6 AUGUST, 1994

## **BRIEFING NOTES FOR IN-COMING CONTINGENTS**

### **GENERAL**

1. The information given below is intended to provide general guidance to all newly arrived UNAMIR contingents, personnel and visitors on matters pertaining to security, general administration and basic health requirements. A historical brief on Rwanda is also attached for additional information.

### **SECURITY SITUATION**

2. The current situation in Rwanda could be described as generally calm after a military victory of the Rwandese Patriotic Front over the Rwandese Government Forces in early July 1994. This followed a three months bloody civil war in which over five hundred thousand innocent civilians were believed to have been massacred by government forces and government-backed militia (or *interahamwe*).

3. In June, a French-led humanitarian intervention force occupied the South-western part of the country, (see attached sketch), with bases in GOMA, KIBUYE and GIKONGORO. This area is designated as a **Humanitarian Protection Zone** or HPZ. The French operation was aimed at curbing the wanton destruction of human lives and more importantly, providing emergency relief. Other participants of the intervention force included Chad, Egypt and Senegal.

4. So far the activities of the force have led to an improvement in the security situation in the HPZ. This is mainly because retreating government forces on both sides of the Rwanda-Zaire border have been largely disarmed. Despite this, recent reports indicate the prevalence of armed banditry in the HPZ and some hostile activities by the *interahamwe*. Pronouncements by exiled members of the previous regime and leadership of the RGF further indicate the intention of the army to re-group for a major counter offensive, though this is rather unlikely in the very near future.

5. The HPZ is in the process of being handed over to UNAMIR by the French-led force. This is in accordance with a planned French withdrawal from the region after two months of humanitarian activity. Currently, Ghanbatt HQ and two companies are relieving the French force in GIKONGORO.

6. **Refugees.** About one million people fled the war across the border into Zaire and concentrated in GOMA and BUKAVU. An additional 500,000 and 200,000 are also known to have entered Tanzania and Burundi respectively. In Zaire, the lack of adequate food, water, medicine and accommodation to cater for the large concentration of refugees, has caused a catastrophic humanitarian disaster that many nations and humanitarian organisations are still grappling with. This situation could further be aggravated by more people fleeing the HPZ when the French pull-out is completed, as the local population have questioned the ability of UNAMIR to protect them. A confidence building process is, however, in motion with UNAMIR presence in the area and humanitarian assistance.

### **REPORTING PROCEDURE**

7. **Travel Notification.** Troop-contributing countries are required to give a minimum of 7 days notice before arrival of reconnaissance parties or contingents. Such information should provide details of composition of group to enable UNAMIR HQ obtain the necessary clearance from the government and to make arrangements for reception.

8. **Operational Briefing.** On arrival, reconnaissance parties or command elements will be given a briefing by branch heads at FHQ OPS ROOM.

9. **Documentation.** Contingents are also to report the detailed composition of elements to the Chief Military Personnel Officer (CMPO) within 24hrs of arrival. This is to enable the Personnel Branch proceed with the necessary documentation, including arrangements for ID cards.



#### USE OF FLAK JACKETS AND STEEL HELMETS

10. Flak jackets and steel helmets are not required during movement in Sectors 1, 2, 3 and 5. They should, however, be readily available for use in emergencies.

11. In Sector 4 it is compulsory for all UNAMIR personnel to wear the above clothing and elsewhere, while within 15 km minimum of the border of the HPZ. It is further advised that personnel take the same precaution for movement close to the Zaire border in the GISENYI prefecture.

#### CARRYING OF WEAPONS

12. It is mandatory for all military personnel to carry weapons in Sector 4 for protection. Weapons may be carried in all other areas according to the alert status, and within 15 km of the HPZ border and Zaire border in GISENYI prefecture.

#### PROCEDURE FOR TRAVEL CLEARANCE

13. Clearance for travelling within sectors is the responsibility of sector HQs. Clearance for intra-sector movement is the responsibility of UNAMIR HQ for which 24hrs notice should be given to FHQ(OPS) in order to liaise with the RPF and the relevant agencies. This procedure is constantly being revised and so it is important to remain posted with FHQ liaison and ops staff.

#### TRAVELLING AT NIGHT

14. There is no restriction on movement at night except any restrictions that apply to day movement. In Sector 4, only operational movement may be carried out at night. All are advised to complete routine duties by last light and to limit any night movement to only very essential duties. Social activities at night are to be held to a minimum for at least the next 2 to 4 weeks in order to reduce any possible identification problems.

#### PREVAILING HEALTH CONDITIONS

15. Water. At present there is no reliable water supply system operating in the country. It is advised that all UNAMIR personnel drink only bottled water provided to the mission. If it is necessary to take water from other sources this is to be treated with sterilising tablets and, or boiled.

16. Foods. The western part of the country is cholera prone. A few cases of cholera have also been reported among refugees who have returned to KIGALI from these areas. There is no guarantee for the quality of already prepared foods purchased locally. All personnel are therefore urged to take food from UNAMIR sources only. Fresh meat from the local markets are to be particularly avoided.

17. Malaria. Like other countries in the region, mosquitoes abound in Rwanda. It is therefore important to cover as much of the body as is possible in order to avoid mosquito bites. Mosquito repellants are also to be used on the body or sprayed in accommodations as appropriate. Anti-malaria tablets provided to the force are to be taken regularly and under supervision where necessary. The tablets are usually to be taken on a weekly basis.

18. SIDA/AIDS. Prior to the war, it was estimated that 80% of the prostitutes in Rwanda had the HIV virus and that 50% of the women population in general was also infected. The situation could have been further aggravated by the war. Indiscriminate sexual relation with the locals is therefore to be avoided. It is highly recommended that the **triple-condom** option is adopted if one must.

#### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

19. Essential parts of the Rules of Engagement for guiding all military actions are attached for study. It includes information on the various states of readiness and an aide memoire on use of **FORCE**


## RWANDA

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. It is well known that today's Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire once constituted an area for which the Germans and Belgians competed during World War I.
2. Historically, Burundi and Rwanda were originally inhabited by the Twas. Hundreds of years later the Hutus arrived, followed in the 18th Century by the Tutsi cattle breeders who migrated from the Horn of Africa. The new arrivals gradually reduced the Hutus to serfdom. In a contract system known as abuhake Hutu farmers provided services to the Tutsi lords in return for cattle and the use of pastures and arable land.
3. In 1899 Germans occupied Rwanda and made it a protectorate. Later in 1916 Belgian forces in Zaire took over the country and from 1920 Rwanda formed part of Ruanda-Urundi confederacy administered by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate. When the UN replaced the League of Nations, Rwanda became a Trust Territory. Throughout the colonial era the Tutsis took advantage of western education and socialisation and consequently they continued to be the more dominant ethnic group in the socio-economic and political life of the two countries. In this regard the power and privileges of the traditional Tutsi ruling class was enhanced by the colonial authorities.
4. In 1959 the advent of Independence, a phenomenon which was sweeping the African continent, saw many Rwandan Tutsi elite becoming radical nationalists pushing for an end to colonial rule. The Belgian response to this was to whip up existing anti-Tutsi sentiments among the majority Hutus. In an ensuing Hutu rebellion, the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown. About 20,000 were massacred and more than 160,000 fled into neighbouring countries.
5. In 1961 after a UN supervised elections, the "Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) was swept to power. Thus for the first time in the history of Rwanda, power was now concentrated in the hands of the majority Hutus. Belgium granted internal autonomy in January 1962. The status of Trust was finally terminated by the UN in the same year. Effectively Rwanda became independent on 1 July 1962.
6. The new government soon became corrupt and inefficient. After a bloodless coup led by the Army Commander, Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, a new government was formed. This was in 1973. Five years later a new constitution was approved in a referendum. Twice Habyarimana was re-elected President, first in December 1983, and later in 1988.
7. The period after 1982 was marked by cross-border refugee problems that soured Rwanda-Uganda relations. A declining economy did not help either. On 1 October 1990 an estimated 10,000 force (Rwandese Patriotic Front) dominated by exiled Rwandese of ethnic Tutsi origin mounted an offensive from Uganda and occupied the northern parts of the country. This first major incursion was easily repulsed by Rwandan Government Forces. Belgian and French troops that were called to assist did not fire a shot. From then on, however, the rebel force adopted guerilla tactics. Fighting continued sporadically between 1991 and 1992. In March 1993 a ceasefire was reached and under a truce, a 19km wide demilitarized zone was created in the north of the country.
8. On 4 August 1993 the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed by the Rwandan Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front after several months of negotiations. The agreement provided for a transition period of 22 months during which a Broad Based Transition Government (BBTG) was to administer the country. The formation of the BBTG never took place as the President and the RPF could not reach an agreement on the composition of Deputies in the government.
9. On 6 April 1994 a plane carrying the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda was shot down while approaching KIGALI Airport, an event that immediately sparked off the war in the country.

# DEPLOYMENT

ANNEX D IV  
MODIFICATION NO. 1  
TO OPO 16 DATED 5 AUG 9



NOTE: FOR EXACT BOUNDARY - DRAW TRACE FROM OPS ROOM

## RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

### 1. Rule No. one: Authority to Carry Arms

- a. State A: No authority; and
- b. State B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

### 2. Rule No. Two: Status of Weapons

- a. State A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.
- b. State B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

### 3. Rule No. Three: Response to Hostile Intent or Hostile Act without the Use of Fire

- a. State A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own force.
- b. State B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.
- c. State C: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
- d. State D: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

### 4. Rule No. Four: Disarmament of Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians

- a. State A: No authorization granted.
- b. State B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.

### 5. Rule No. Five: Intervention and Warning Shots

- a. State A: Intervention is prohibited.
- b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.



6. Rule No. Six: Control of Weapons Systems

a. State A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.

b. State B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict is permitted but will be specified by the following notes:

- (1) Man (type of system);
- (2) Prepare (type of system);
- (3) Move (type of system); and
- (4) Fire (type of system).

7. Normal Rules and States. In normal, daily situation, the following ROE status shall apply:

a. Rule No. One, State B (Authority granted to carry weapons.);

b. Rule No. Two, State A (Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.);

c. Rule No. Three, State B (Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.);

d. Rule No. Four, State B (Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.);

e. Rule No. Five, State A (Intervention is prohibited.); and

f. Rule No. Six, State A (Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited).

**Note:** Changes in normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole, as directed in this paragraph, will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorized by the Force Commander or his delegate.

**UNAMIR LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT**

SL	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	ACTION
1	GREEN	ALL	1. Normal activities.  2. ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status A Rule 3-Status B, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.
2	YELLOW	HQ	1. Planning for next higher status commences. 2. Liaison increased. 3. VIP visits postponed. 4. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds.
		UNITS	1. Precautionary stage. 2. Double sentries. 3. Night movement restricted. 4. Test shelters. 5. Stand-to/Local alarm practice. 6. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds. 7. Back-up comms/units/wpns. 8. Reserves put on 3hrs NTM.
		ALL	ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2 Status B, Rule 3-Status C, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.
3	RED	HQ	1. General alert. 2. VIP visits cancelled. 3. No leave granted. 4. Emergency movements only. 5. Special SITREPS to UNHQ. 6. Civilian evacuation if the situation warrants.
		UNITS	1. Troops in defensive positions. 2. Troops in Stand-to positions. 3. Reserves put on one hour NTM 4. No leave granted. 5. Troops on duty outside to wear flak jackets.
		ALL	ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status D, Rule 4-Status B, Rule 5-Status B, Rule 6-Status B.

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AIDE MEMOIRE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF  
THE UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT  
REGARDING OPENING FIRE IN RWANDA**

1. *You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.*
2. *Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force in self-defence to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire (see over).*
3. *If you have to use force, you must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** normally involves the following sequential actions:*
  - a. *open display of weapons.*
  - b. *verbal warning.*
  - c. *barring access to the point being protected.*
  - d. *physical restraint.*
  - e. *warning shots.*
  - f. *pointing weapons, and*
  - g. *firing weapons.*

**WARNINGS**

4. **WARNING BEFORE FIRING.** *Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in ENGLISH/ FRENCH or KINYARWANDA:*

**STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ LEVEZ LES MAINS/HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU**

UN RESTRICTED

**UN RESTRICTED**

**(PAUSE)**

**STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE/HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE**

**5. FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if:

- a. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (e.g. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); AND
- b. you believe the person is about to attack you, your unit, or any person it is your duty to protect; AND
- c. the person refuses to stop when called upon to do so; AND
- d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

**6. FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if that person:

- a. has used or is using a fire arm or other dangerous weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; OR
- b. is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon, AND is clearly about to use it, AND you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself, your unit, or the persons it is your duty to protect.

**7.** If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted in writing to your immediate commander.

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9/RECCE/9/002/1

FC  
COMBRITCON  
COO  
C Plans  
Engrs

*14/8*

13 Aug 94

ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE REPORT : BUSORO BRIDGE

1. Please find attached an initial reconnaissance report on the Busoro Bridge carried out by 9 Para Sqn on 9 Aug 94.
2. A further reconnaissance has been tasked, and a further report submitted in due course.

*[Signature]*  
I S JAMES  
Maj  
OC

Encl:

9/002/1 dated 13 Aug 94.

INITIAL ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

TASK NUMBER: 9/002/1

TASK DESCRIPTION: BASORO BRIDGE - EXISTING  
STRUCTURE

GRID 301469

LATEST RECCE CARRIED OUT: 090894

REPORT LAST UPDATED: 100894

TASK ORIGINATOR

1. OC 9 Para Sqn RE was tasked by the Force Commander to carry out a reconnaissance of the damage to the BASORO Bridge.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2. The bridge at Basoro was originally a 3 span DS Bailey Bridge spanning the river AKANYARU. It is served by a 4m compacted earth road, which provides East - West communication immediately north of the BURUNDI border and Lake CYOHOHA. The bridge has been totally destroyed by explosive demolition, and the river is currently being crossed using an expedient solution utilising one of the destroyed spans, earth fill, and timber baulks. It is assessed that this structure will not survive a significant rise in river level. The long span of this bridge, coupled with the destruction of the existing piers and the eastern abutment, indicates a major construction task to totally replace the structure.

3. A more detailed reconnaissance of the structure has been initiated by the Squadron, and the report will be submitted in due course.

REPORT4. Access Roads.

a. The recce team approached the bridge from the GITARAMA - BUTARE road, via NTONGWE and BUSORO. The route is a compacted earth road, varying in width from 2 - 4m. This is a torturous route, with maximum speed in a 4x4 vehicle being around 25mph, but generally around 10mph. A number of small culverts, crossed by timber baulk bridges, particularly on the section immediately north of BUSORO, would limit its use to 4 x 4 Land Rover type vehicles.

b. During the move in and out, apart from RPF vehicles only one small car was seen travelling in either direction, and no vehicles crossed the bridge during the recce.

## 5. Structure.

a. Span. The original bridge is assessed as having been a 3 span DS Bailey Bridge, with spans of approximately 20m, 30m and 20m, total span 70m. The Load Classification of this bridge would have been MLC 40. The eastern span has dropped into the river, with the eastern end remaining on the site of abutment, although the abutment has been destroyed, presumably by a camouflet or similar charge. The centre span has been totally disrupted. The western span has been totally disrupted, and only remnants of the structure remain intact.

b. Abutments The eastern abutment has been destroyed, probably by camouflet. The western abutment is intact, rising approximately 10m above the river level. It could be used without further reconstruction.

c. Piers. The remains of 2 piers were identified. The are assessed as having been (reinforced?) concrete structures, on piled foundations. The western most pier has been attacked using a cratering charge and has been totally destroyed, leaving a dry 8m crater. The centre pier has been very badly damaged, and remnants of the piled foundation remain protruding into the wreckage of the centre span.

6. Current Expedient Solution. The gap is currently being crossed using an expedient solution utilising one of the destroyed spans, earth fill, and timber baulks. It is assessed that this structure will not survive a significant rise in river level.

7. UXO/Mines. There was no sign of mines or booby traps, and the local RPA VCP did not know of any. The site of the bridge has been used as a refugee area, and there were many people moving around on foot during the recce. It might be assumed that the presence of a great number of local people in the area reduces the likelihood of mines being present.

## CONCLUSIONS

8. The long span of this bridge, coupled with the destruction of the existing piers and the eastern abutment, indicates a major construction task to totally replace the structure. This will be beyond the capabilities of 9 Para Sqn RE in theatre, with resources likely to be available within the timescale of deployment.

9. The expedient repair is sufficient for small vehicles to continue to cross the river, however, a rise in river level would almost certainly sweep away the timber baulk structure. An improved expedient structure is unlikely to be successful with local resources.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

10. Replacement of the BASORO bridge is a significant engineering task, requiring detailed technical reconnaissance and planning. The engineering materials likely to be required are

probably not available in Rwanda.

11. It is recommended that the reconstruction of the BASORO bridge be undertaken either by a civilian civil engineering contractor, or by a formed military unit specifically brought in to carry out the task. Initiating action for such a project should be initiated with alacrity.