

UNAMER

OPERATIONS AND PLANS

20 DEC 1993 - 26 AUG 1994

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[4 CONFIDENTIAL]

[4 PHOTOGRAPHS]

RH/WG JULY 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1002

BOX 183

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0283





TO: Force Engineer  
Major Jerzy Maczka  
HQ UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda

26 August 1994

THRU: Philip Metnick, C/BMS

FROM: Stephen Etsell/BMS Officer

INFO: OIC-ADMIN, DFC, C/PLANS, C/SS, CLOGO

RE: Engineer Construction Priorities, Materials, and Equipment for UNAMIR

Since the force composition, size and troop deployment situations for UNAMIR have changed significantly since the last budget submission, your budget forecasts and estimates are urgently required to ensure correct construction priorities and timely receipt of materials and equipment to support the military units in the field, and in Kigali. Your attention is kindly directed to the following issues:

- A sector accommodation plan must be actioned swiftly in order to provide the necessary facilities and support requirements. BMS serves to assist you in this endeavour, and the subsequent work priorities.
- A water and sanitation program for sectors must be formulated based on existing resources and new requirements. UNAMIR plant will then be distributed according to needs.
- Construction equipment and material requirements must be identified and submitted for the expected duration of the mandate.
- The defense stores requirements needs review and revision so that absolutely required stores can be procured.
- Troop construction capabilities must be developed and projects identified.

The attached preliminary construction schedules depict the existing programs, but fall short of the new requirements that must be identified. We look forward to assisting you and the military contingents in the development of these requirements.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

*Maj Maczka*

*The British engineer  
and here up to Novem-  
ber only. We should  
get them the necessary  
materials to assist*

*most of our  
major engine-  
ering tasks  
before they  
depart.*

*if Jh.  
29/8*

*DFJ/6*



UNAMIR Engineering Service - Project plan - 1994

ID	Name	Duration	Scheduled Start	Scheduled Finish	Predecessors	Resource Names	7 August							14
							S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
3	Renovate Chez Iando	27d	10/8/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00		B&R								
4	Clean up and restore hotel and restaurant	5d	10/8/94 8:00	16/8/94 17:00		B&R								
5	Contract with owner signature	5.88d	19/8/94 12:00	25/8/94 11:00										
6	Restoration of restaurant B&R (waiting for contract)	8d	29/8/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00	5									
1	Erect rubhall in UNNAMIR LOG Base Kigali	3d	29/8/94 8:00	31/8/94 17:00		MIL.ENG								
2	Make office in mini stadium	6d	30/8/94 8:00	4/9/94 17:00		B&R								
20	Temp. transit camp for incoming unit	7d	29/8/94 9:00	5/9/94 9:00		B&R								
7	Reallocate UNAMIR HQ office	10d	29/8/94 9:00	8/9/94 9:00		BMS								
10	ERECT RUBHALLS IN THE SECTORS	14d	26/8/94 8:00	8/9/94 17:00										
14	Erect rubhall Sector (4)	3.25d	26/8/94 8:00	29/8/94 10:00		B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
11	Erect rubhall Sector (1)	2d	1/9/94 8:00	2/9/94 17:00	1	B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
12	Erect rubhall Sector (2)	2d	3/9/94 8:00	4/9/94 17:00	11	B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
13	Erect rubhall Sector (3)	2d	5/9/94 8:00	6/9/94 17:00	12	B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
15	Erect rubhall Sector (5)	2d	7/9/94 8:00	8/9/94 17:00	13	B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
17	HQ security upgrade	10d	5/9/94 8:00	14/9/94 17:00		B&R,MIL.ENG								
18	Material arriving	0d	5/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 8:00		BMS								
19	HQ security upgrade work start	10d	5/9/94 8:00	14/9/94 17:00	18	MIL.ENG								
8	500 man Transit Camp + fence and light Pending arr. date (NO I	6w	1/9/94 8:00	15/10/94 17:00		B&R,MIL.ENG,BMS								
9	Dining facility Chez Iando	5d	12/9/94 8:00	16/9/94 17:00	6									
16	Snack bar in HQ (pending decision)	7d	17/9/94 8:00	23/9/94 17:00		B&R/Crescent								

Project:  
Date: 27/8/94


Critical  
Noncritical



Progress  
Milestone




Summary  
Rolled Up





## UNAMIR Engineering Service - Project plan - 1994




Project:  
Date: 27/8/94

**Critical**



Noncritical


## Progress



### Milestone



## Summary



### Rolled Up





[illegible]

Project:  
Date: 27/8/94

Critical  
Noncriti

Progress	Milestone
100%	100%

Summary  
Rolled Up



UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS:6

TO: GHANBATT ZAMBATT TAC HQ MILOB	FROM: G. TOUSIGNANT MAJ GEN FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA <i>1560L G3 PLANS</i>
INFO: FRAFBATT ETHIOBATT TUNBATT MALAWI COY CANSIGS AUSMED UNCIVPOL	DATE: 23 AUGUST 1994
INTERNAL: DFC D/COS OPS C LOGO  FMO	ORIGINATOR: G3 PLANS
FAX: 00-873-151-5560 00-873-383-020021 00-871-383-020051 00-873-383-020056 00-871-151-5556 00-873-383-020026 00-871-144-6462 00-873-154-5273	FAX: 1-212-963-3090 TEL: 3 3091 <i>Seen 23/9 D/COS</i>

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER.

REFERENCE: OPORD NO 16 AND OP DIR 17.

SITUATION

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN RWANDA IS REPORTED TO REMAIN CALM. CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF SECURITY IN SECTOR 4 IS EXPECTED TO IMPROVE DURING THE COMING WEEKS. ZAMBATT RECCE PARTY WILL ARRIVE KIGALI ON 25 AUG.

*23/9*

*10  
G3  
D/COS OPS  
24-8*



## MISSION

2. ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT ARE TO DEPLOY TO AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 4A AND 2 RESPECTIVELY.

## EXECUTION

3. GENERAL OUTLINE. A TWO PHASE OPERATION AS FOLLOWS:

- a. PHASE 1 ZAMBATT IS TO CONDUCT A RELIEF IN PLACE (RIP) WITH GHANBATT IN SECTOR 4A.
- b. PHASE 2 GHANBATT IS TO REDEPLOY TO AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2.

4. GROUPING AND TASKS

a. ZAMBATT

(1) GROUPING - NO CHANGE

(2) TASKS

(a) PHASE 1

(i) CONDUCT RIP WITH GHANBATT.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS JOINTLY WITH GHANBATT.

(b) PHASE 2. CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 4A IN ACCORDANCE WITH GHANBATT DISPOSITIONS.

(c) GHANBATT

(1) GROUPING - NO CHANGE

(2) TASKS

(a) PHASE 1

(i) CONDUCT RIP WITH ZAMBATT.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS JOINTLY WITH ZAMBATT.



(b) PHASE 2

(i) REDEPLOY TO SECTOR 2.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. TIMINGS

(1) PHASE 1

(a) ZAMBATT RECCE OF SECTOR 4A COMPLETE BY 29 AUG.

(b) GHANBATT RECCE OF SECTOR 2 COMPLETE BY 2 SEP.

(c) RIP COMPLETE BY 101800B SEP 94

(2) PHASE 2

(a) GHANBATT NOT TO COMMENCE MOVE TO SECTOR 2 FROM SECTOR 4A BEFORE 101800B SEP 94.

b) GHANBATT TO BE CLEAR OF SECTOR 4A BY 111800B SEP 94.

(c) SECTOR 2 TO BE OCCUPIED BY 121800B SEP 94.

(d) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2 BY 131800B SEP 94.

b. LIAISON

(1) ZAMBATT TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH UNAMIR TAC HQ TO COORDINATE PASSAGE THROUGH SECTOR 3.

(2) GHANBATT TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH UNAMIR TAC HQ TO COORDINATE PASSAGE THROUGH SECTOR 3.

(3) MILOBS TO ESCORT ZAMBATT RECCE PARTY KIGALI TO SECTOR 4A AND RETURN.

6. ADMIN AND LOG

a. AMMO

(1) PHASE 1 AND 2 AS DIRECTED IN OPORD 16.

b. POL

(1) ZAMBATT

(a) PHASE 1



(i) DEPLOY WITH STOCKS TO 10 SEP TO BE COLLECTED FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE KIGALI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT FROM KIGALI.

(a) PHASE 2

(i) RESUPPLY BY 2ND LINE TRANSPORT TO ZAMBATT LOG ELEMENT 9 SEP 94.

(2) GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1

(i) FIRST LINE STOCK HOLDINGS.

(b) PHASE 2

(i) RESUPPLY OF 7 DAYS TO BE COLLECTED BY GHANBATT LOG ELEMENT 9 SEP 94 ON MOVE THROUGH KIGALI.

c. RATIONS AND WATER

(1) ZAMBATT

(a) PHASE 1

(i) DEPLOY WITH RATIONS AND WATER FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND MAIN BODY TO 10 SEP. TO BE COLLECTED FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE PRIOR TO MOVE FROM KIGALI.

(b) PHASE 2

(i) RESUPPLY BY 2ND LINE TRANSPORT TO ZAMBATT LOG ELM ON 9 SEP.

(2) GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1

(i) FIRST LINE HOLDINGS TO 10 SEP. IF RESUPPLY REQUIRED BEFORE THIS TIMING, GHANBATT TO NOTIFY LOG COORD CELL HQ UNAMIR.

(b) PHASE 2



- (i) GHANBATT LOG ELEMENT TO COLLECT FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE 7 DAYS ON MOVE THROUGH KIGALI ON 10 SEP.

d. TRANSPORT

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) SELF DEPLOY. IF UNABLE TO SELF DEPLOY AN ELEMENT THEN CONTINGENTS ARE TO BID AT THE EARLIEST NOTICE TO LOG COORDINATION CELL HQ UNAMIR FOR 2ND LINE TRANSPORT SUPPORT.

e. REPAIR AND RECOVERY

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) A VEHICLE RECOVERY TO BE FORWARD WITH FIRST LINE ELM. IF FIRST LINE ASSET NOT SUITABLE RECOVERY BID TO LOG COORDINATION CELL HQ UNAMIR FOR SECOND LINE RECOVERY TASKING.
- (ii) B AND C VEHICLE RECOVERED FORWARD BY FIRST LINE ASSET.
- (iii) FORWARD REPAIR TO BE EFFECTED. BACKLOADING ONLY, ON ASSESSMENT OF TASK BY SECOND LINE REPAIR AGENCY (BRITCON).

f. MEDICAL

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) TREATMENT AT UNIT LEVEL. EVACUATION TO BE COORD BY AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL (AUSMED) STAFF, HQ UNAMIR TO AUSMED BUTARI OR TO AUSMED FIELD HOSPITAL KIGALI.



COMD AND SIG

7. TAC HQ LOC BUTARE.

REMAINING LOCS PER REF A.



56

## Draft Preliminary UNAMIR Public Relations Plan

### Objectives

The objectives of UNAMIR's public relations efforts shall evolve as its possibilities and mandate gain greater focus. However, some objectives can be envisaged now.

#### I. Peace

The obvious and overwhelming advantages of peace and prosperity over war and poverty should be an easy message to put across, but it is not. The vested interests and personal ambitions that foment war, through, inter alia, propaganda, must be countered by an effective United Nations message.

#### II. Security

The safety of UNAMIR and other humanitarian personnel may be jeopardized by anti-UNAMIR propaganda as has been amply demonstrated by UNAMIR's recent history. The PR campaign must thus diffuse hostility to the Mission by

- 1.) explaining to Rwandans the true nature of its mission, i.e., the international community's genuine will, to alleviate their suffering and help them to rebuild their country and
- 2.) countering any anti-UNAMIR propaganda.

#### III. Logistics

Relief distribution and displaced persons operations may be greatly hindered or facilitated by the attitude of the people receiving aid, being moved, or otherwise involved in transport, storage, supply, etc. Cooperation and willingness to help might be promoted by such a campaign.

#### IV. Democracy

In the long term, some form of democracy is to be established in Rwanda. Its benefits as well as its nuts-and-bolts functioning at the voter level must be explained.

One of Rwanda's problems is its isolation. Like a hillbilly village, it is vulnerable to bad habits. UNAMIR's campaign needs to open the country to those outside ideas, influence and pressures liable to promote democracy and prosperity.

### Content

UNAMIR has in its favor a simple truth: peace, prosperity, democracy and happiness go hand in hand and are infinitely preferable to war, hate, violence, hunger, etc. Paradoxically, this message generally has few harbingers, more so in Rwanda. UNAMIR shall be one.

The images, sounds, smells and music of hutus and tutsis from north and south living normally together in everyday Rwandan situations must be cast in a positive, even joyful light. Hate propaganda has encouraged the Rwandans in their isolation to dwell on the negative and destructive. The carrot of health and prosperity, and peace and harmony as its essential prerequisite, must be fixed firmly, brightly and visually in the Rwandan mind. (The stick of war and massacre bears no repeating.)



More concretely, leaflets, performing-arts (theater, mime, music, dance) groups, conferences, broadcasts, paid advertisements must explain and show clearly and simply UNAMIR's purpose, methods, needs, and mandate. They must also make clear to the people what is expected of them with respect to cooperation with UNAMIR and other agencies, competitive subcontracting opportunities, future plans for eventual elections, the need to rid the country of weapons, etc.

If elections are planned, not only the voting process, but the normal functioning and problems, with their solutions, of elected bodies must be explained and demonstrated (through articles, plays, broadcasts, fiction and real situations) repeatedly and well in advance of any actual voting.

### Approach

It is absolutely essential that the campaign be adapted to local conditions: language, traditions, recent history, sensitivities, ideals, etc. It should be associated with Rwandan hero figures, myths, unifying historical leaders, family and local figures of moral or other authority, etc.

In order to compete with other possible opposing interests it must also be lively, innovative and entertaining and bring the attractive, pertinent news first to listeners (in the case of broadcast media and press).

In exchange for UNAMIR protection and logistic assistance, relief, press and other organizations could commit to helping to convey our message and associate UNAMIR with the goodies. Some examples:

1. UNAMIR's name/logo next to organization's logo on trucks, food sacs, etc.
2. distribution of UNAMIR leaflets, toys, tools, etc. with aid.

### Tentative Time Frame

Phase I: Minimal budget and ill-defined situation (2-3 months)

- a. leaflet distribution through UNMO's, NGO's, other UN agencies, journalists, etc.
- b. UNAMIR logo display on relief vehicles, bags, etc.
- c. budget and staffing proposals submitted quickly for following phases.
- d. inclusion in peace or cease-fire agreements of provisions limiting war propaganda or even granting UNAMIR legal authority to close down violators of specific peace-promoting criteria.

Phase II: Moderate PR budget and relative freedom of movement (following 3-6 months)

- a. leaflet distribution through UNMO's, NGO's, other agencies, journalists, etc.
- b. UNAMIR logo display on relief vehicles, bags, etc.
- c. distribution of simple, visible toys or tools (farming or kitchen utensils), in blue and white, with UNAMIR's name, perhaps in conjunction with other agencies planning to provide such implements.
- d. Purchase of advertising in any existing media.



Phase III: Enhanced PR budget and well established mission (mid-1995)

- a. leaflet distribution through UNMO's, NGO's, other agencies, journalists, etc.
- b. UNAMIR logo display on relief vehicles, bags, etc.
- c. distribution of simple, visible (preferably collective) toys or tools (farming or kitchen utensils), in blue and white, with UNAMIR's name, perhaps in conjunction with other agencies already providing such implements.
- d. Purchase of advertising in existing media.
- e. participation in local media programs
- f. Mobile performing-arts group(s) and other events in refugee/displaced persons camps, villages, schools, etc.
- g. conferences in educational and training establishments, religious groups, etc.
- h. UNAMIR sports teams in local competitions.
- i. Establishment of modest radio studio for own production.
- j. Establishment of radio station for purchased or produced news, music and debating programs of a competitive and entertaining nature.
- k. Production through sub-contracting (perhaps later a UNAMIR studio) of television programs for Rwandan TV.
- l. UNAMIR association with development projects: well-digging, school and clinic building, etc.

*Handwritten:*  
Line-Contract  
↑  
↓

#### Conclusion

This first sketch is naturally vulnerable to the great uncertainty of the situation and will endure, at best, many revisions, at worst, the voracious and dreaded UN filing cabinet. However the stakes, UN and other lives and Rwanda's future, are great. The Rwandan people deserve better than miserable Radio Mille Collines.



MEMORANDUM

5000.1 (C Plans)

18 Jul 94

FC

ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE UNAMIR ROLES IN SECTORS 1, 2, 3, AND 5

UN RESOLUTIONS

1. After review of all UN Resolutions pertaining to UNAMIR, there are two paragraphs in Resolution 925 which have an impact on our future roles:

- a. Noting that UNAMIR is not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties, and
- b. Noting also that UNAMIR's expanded military component will continue only as long as and to the extent that it is needed to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations.

2. It could be argued therefore that if we don't have any displaced, refugees or civilians at risk and no requirement to protect humanitarian operations then UNAMIR has no role.

THREAT

3. Once the RPF have completed their capture of Sector 5/6 the threat in all areas except Sector 4 will be minimal. The threat may remain moderate in Sector 5 for some time because of the remnants of militia in that area.

POTENTIAL ROLES

4. The following paragraphs outline some of the potential roles in Rwanda under new government rule:

a. **Armed Troops.**

- 1) Physical security of UNAMIR installations in Kigali, MILOB HQ's in the other sectors. The wide spread looting, reduction of useable infrastructure, lack of food and lack of material goods will continue for some time. The UN provides a



target rich environment for organized theft by armed gangs, criminals etc. There is some potential for lawlessness, like Somalia, if food and other supplies remain in short supply.

b. **Engineers.**

1) Although not specifically covered in the Resolutions, there is obviously an engineer demining task. This is particularly true in the north, probably in areas of Kigali, if the reports are correct and perhaps in the west between Gitarama and Kibuye.

2) This task is of course the bread and butter of military engineering units, however it could be contracted out as in other areas.

c. **MILOBS.** The military observers could still serve an important role in any future UNAMIR deployment.

1) In Sector Three they could play a key role in providing transparency with regard to the RPA actions along the HPZ.

2) In all other sectors they could:

a) maintain a UN presence.

b) provide an important interface with NGO organizations as our troops know the area and have hopefully developed a good working relationship with the local commanders and prefectures.

c) provide patrols which will provide current info on the humanitarian situation and perhaps be able to identify areas of concern that have been overlooked and also provide info on reconstruction projects etc.

d) provide a liaison office for the coordination of effort in their areas of concern.

e) win hearts and minds for the UN and humanitarian effort.

d. **Communications.**

1) There will continue to be a requirement for a military comms capability as long as there are armed troops in Rwanda because of the nature of the comms hardware.

2) If the mission evolves to strictly an observer type status then the military comms could be phased out, to be replaced by a UN civilian comms system (as



currently employed).

e. **CIVPOL.**

- 1) The CIVPOL could be a key element in conducting liaison between the military and civilian authorities in which ever form the finally appear.
- 2) Provide training to civilian police orgs if that is what the RPA decides to create.
- 3) Provide investigative assistance to the International Board of Inquiry.

f. **MP Coy.**


- 1) Provide police services to the UNAMIR uniformed troops as a long as they are in Rwanda.
- 2) Provide training to Gendarmarie/paramilitary police forces if the RPA decide to opt for this choice.

g. **HAC (Mil)**

- 1) Required until NGO's fully org.
- 2) Could be reduce to a small cell in Force HQ and some of the duties taken up by the MILOB Sector liaison cell.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

5. Maintenance of a MILOB Sector HQ and patrol/ liaison capability in each of the sectors. The size could be between 15 to 20. This would provide a patrol capability as well as a 24 and 7 comms ability. Double that number will be required in Sector 3 to provide the coverage nec along the line of the HPZ.
6. Maintain at least one coy or more of armed troop capability in each of the sectors and a battalion in Kigali to ensure the protection of UN installations. This would provide some protection against looting, theft etc.
7. Maximize CIVPOL to help ease the transition to civilian/ paramilitary police implementation.



AM Austdal  
LCol  
C Plans





09 40

OUTGOING FAX NO. KYF 1054

PAGE 1 OF 5

TO: ANNAN, UNNY	FROM: BGEN ANYIDHO DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/ 1250	DATE: 30 JUN 94
ATTN:	PHONE: 1-212-963-3092
FAX NO: 1-212-963-4879	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: LCOL AUSTDAL C PLANS
Internal Dist.:	
SUBJECT: INTERIM SOP-VOLUNTARY DISARMING OF MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, SELF-DEFENCE AND CIVILIAN FORCES.	
REFERENCE:	

1. WE RECENTLY RECEIVED A QUERY FROM YOUR OFFICE REQUESTING MORE DETAILS REGARDING THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED IN THE ABOVE NOTED UNAMIR INTERIM SOP.

2. THE UNAMIR POLICY (PAGE 3) WAS WRITTEN BASED UPON PROTOCOL I, PART III, OF THE GENENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. COPY OF APPROPRIATE PAGES ATTACHED.

3. IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ICRC, KIGALI, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT IT MAY BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO BASE THE POLICY ON CHAPTER FIVE, PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE FOUR CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II. THIS PREMISE IS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE RWANDESE CONFLICT IS NOT INTERNATIONAL. COPY ATTACHED. ALL COPIES ARE BASED ON THE PUBLICATION PRODUCED BY THE ICRC, GENEVA SEP 1983, REPRINT DEC 1987.

4. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROCEDURES AND CONDUCT OF THE HANDOVER WERE DEVELOPED INTERNALLY BY UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS AND ARE NOT BASED ON ANY PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

5. HOPEFULLY THIS WILL CLARIFY THE SITUATION. IF YOU WISH LCOL AUSTDAL, UNAMIR CHIEF OF PLANS CAN CONTACT YOU DIRECTLY TO DISCUSS ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS APPRECIATED.

DFC

C. PLANS

E/DIR

94 JUN 30 09 53

UNAMIR



observance of this rule is essential to respect the Convention and the Protocol.

II, 43

In naval warfare, ships and craft entitled to the protection of the Convention will be marked as follows:

- a) *all exterior surfaces must be white;*
- b) *one or more dark red crosses, as large as possible, must be painted on each side of the hull as well as on horizontal surfaces, so as to afford the greatest possible visibility from the sea and from the air. A white flag with a red cross shall be flown at the mainmast, as high as possible.*

I, 44

*The international Red Cross organizations and their duly authorized personnel are permitted to use the emblem of the red cross on a white ground at all times.*

I, 53

Apart from these regulations, the use of the emblem or the designation "red cross" or "Geneva cross", or any sign or designation constituting an imitation, shall be prohibited at all times; the necessary measures will be taken to prevent and repress any abuse of these distinctive signs. The perfidious use of the emblem of the red cross (and other protective signs or signals) is a grave breach.

I, 54

II, 45

P. I, 18

P. I, 85

P. I, 18

and Annex I

In addition to the distinctive emblem, the Parties to the conflict may authorize the use of distinctive signals (light, radio and secondary radar signals, internationally recognized codes and signals).

## CHAPTER III

### RULES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF COMBATANTS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

#### GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(Convention III of 12 August 1949)

#### ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, PART III

### SECTION I

#### STATUS

III, 4

P. I, 43

44

The status of prisoner of war is governed jointly by article the Third Convention and by articles 43 and 44 of the Protocol. The general principle is the following: *any member of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict is a combatant and any combatant captured by the adverse Party is a prisoner of war.*

This general rule is supplemented by three types of provisions which specify the conditions in which armed forces are recognized as such, to extend the qualification (or the treatment) of prisoners of war to categories of persons not covered by the general rule and finally to deprive, in a specific case, a captured combatant his qualification as a combatant and hence of his status as prisoner of war.

- a) *To be recognized as such, the armed forces of a Party to a conflict must be organized and placed under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or other authority not recognized by the adverse Party. In addition, these armed forces must be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, enforces compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts. In particular, this (*

2/5



## CHAPTER V

### PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

#### ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE FOUR CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II

The general rules relating to non-international armed conflicts refer to the two following cases:

- a) *any situation where, within a State's territory, clear and unmistakable hostilities break out between the armed forces and organized armed groups (see Section I);*
- b) *any situation where dissident forces are organized under the leadership of a responsible command and exercise such control over a part of the territory as to enable them to conduct sustained and concerted military operations (intensive fighting, see Section II).*

#### SECTION I

#### ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE FOUR CONVENTIONS

Article 3 common to the four Conventions applies to all armed conflicts of a non-international character and occurring in the territory of one of the Powers parties to the Convention. In such a case, persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those who are *hors de combat* for any other reason will in all circumstances be treated humanely without any adverse distinction.

The common article 3, of which it has justly been said that it is, in itself, a small Convention within a larger one, states what constitutes a minimum of humane treatment. The following acts,

committed against the persons mentioned above, *are and must remain prohibited at all times and in all places:*

- a) *violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;*
- b) *taking of hostages;*
- c) *outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;*
- d) *the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.*

Common article 3 adds that a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict and that these Parties should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. Finally, it declares that the application of these provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

#### SECTION II

#### ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II

In the case of intensive fighting, and in the absence of the acknowledgement of a state of war involving the application of the entire law of war, the provisions of the common article 3 still apply. In addition, the rules of the second additional Protocol must be observed.

#### 1. Wounded, sick and shipwrecked

##### a) Protection and care

All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked must be respected and protected, treated humanely and cared for without any distinction founded on any grounds other than medical ones. All possible measures must be taken without delay, particularly after an engagement, to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked and to pay the last honours to the dead.

P. II, 7  
8



#### b) Medical personnel

9 Medical personnel must be respected, protected and helped in  
0 the performance of their duties in aiding all the wounded and sick  
1 without discrimination. Nobody may be punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, whoever may have benefited therefrom, nor be compelled to perform acts contrary to the rules of medical ethics, or refrain from performing acts required by these rules.

#### c) Medical units and transport

1 Medical units and transport must be protected and respected in the same way as medical personnel as long as they are not used to commit hostile acts.

#### d) The distinctive emblem

2 The distinctive emblem of the red cross and the red crescent, used under the direction of the authority concerned, must be respected. It must not be used improperly.

### 2. Protection of the civilian population

The chief interest of Protocol II lies in the extension to non-international armed conflicts of the principal rules of Protocol I relating to the protection of civilian populations against the effects of hostilities.

The Protocol thus declares that *neither the civilian population as such, nor individual civilians may be the object of attacks*; moreover, acts of terrorism against them are prohibited. Civilians benefit from this protection as long as they do not take a direct part in hostilities. Starvation of civilians is a prohibited method of combat.

The displacement of the civilian population may only be ordered if its safety or imperative military reasons require it, and only after all possible measures have been taken to ensure it will be received under satisfactory conditions.

Relief societies, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, may offer their services and if necessary provide impartial, humanitarian relief, subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.

### 3. Protection of certain objects

P. II, 14  
P. II, 16

Certain objects benefit from special protection. This applies to objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. It also applies to *cultural property* and *places of worship* which constitute the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples and which must neither be attacked nor used in support of the military effort.

P. II, 15

Installations such as dams, dykes and nuclear stations, containing *dangerous forces*, the release of which could cause severe losses among the civilian population, must not be attacked even if they are military objectives.

### 4. Humane treatment

#### a) Fundamental guarantees

P. II, 4

*All persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities will be treated humanely in all circumstances and will benefit from the fundamental guarantees without any discrimination whatsoever. Whether or not they have been deprived of their liberty, it is specified that their person, honour, convictions and religious practices must be respected. The following acts against any person, whether committed by civilian or military agents, and for any reason whatever, are prohibited:*

- a) *violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being, particularly:*
  - murder;
  - torture in any form, whether mental or physical;
  - corporal punishment;
  - mutilations;
- b) *outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;*
- c) *the taking of hostages;*
- d) *collective punishments;*
- e) *threats to commit the foregoing acts.*

*Children must receive the care and aid they need, particularly with regard to education, including religious and moral educa-*



tion, and steps must be taken to return them to their families when they have been temporarily separated from them. Children under fifteen must not be recruited into the armed forces nor allowed to take part in hostilities.

All measures must be taken, if necessary, with the consent of their parents or those responsible for them, to evacuate them from an area where hostilities are taking place.

**b) Persons deprived of their liberty**

P. II, 5

In addition to the fundamental guarantees and to those granted to the wounded and sick, persons detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict must be accorded all guarantees with respect to medical care, food, hygiene, safety, relief, the practice of their religion and working conditions.

The Protocol prescribes that men and women must be separated, except when they are members of the same family; that they must be allowed to send and receive letters; that places of internment and detention must not be located near the combat zone and that the physical or mental health and integrity of the internees or detainees must not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission.

**c) Penal prosecutions**

P. II, 6

*Sentences may only be pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality:* the accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him, exclusion of collective responsibility and of conviction for an act or omission which did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed, presumption of innocence, judgement passed in the presence of the accused, no coercion to obtain confessions, information of the right of appeal. The death penalty must not be pronounced on those who were under eighteen at the time of the offence nor on pregnant women or mothers of dependent infants.

**d) Non-discrimination**

P. II, 2

All these guarantees must be applied without any adverse distinction founded on any grounds whatever; they continue to be applicable until the end of the deprivation or restriction of liberty.

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→ DFC

U N A M I R

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: DFC

Date: 26 June 1994

Subject: PLANNING DIRECTIVE 2 (for OP PLAN 14)

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1. MISSION

a. AIM: To detail the move of people and organizations to coincide with the deployment in OP PLAN 14 over the 4 to 6 weeks.

b. TASKS: Read in four columns:

SER.	EVENT	COMPLETION DATE	RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZAT.
1.	Establish UN-protected camp on Kigali Golf Course suitable for 15,000 persons	15 Jul	HAC
2.	Move displaced persons from Amahoro Stadium	Begin 15 Jul	HAC
3.	Move displaced persons from Meridien Hotel	Begin 15 Jul	HAC
4.	Move displaced persons from King Faysal Hospital	1 Aug	HAC
5.	Move displaced persons from Airport	15 Jul	HAC
6.	Establish some offices for CAO and guest accommodation at Meridien	23 Jul	CAO
7.	Establish Hotel "Chez Lando" for offices and Qtrs	15 Aug	CAO
8.	Move A COY GHANBATT from Amahoro Stadium to	15 Jul	GHANBATT



9.	SIG SQN occupy Stadium	Begin 15 Jul	CAN SIGS
10.	Establish RWANDEX as LOG Base	At cease-fire only	C LOG O
11.	Use of CENTRE D'EFFETS SCOLAIRES as LOG Base and accom for GHANIAN PL and CDN LOG PL	4 Jul	C LOG O
12.	KIA Presidential Hanger + old Tower + Main Terminal (C COY and B COY GHANBATT)	15 Jul	GHANBATT
13.	KIA LOG COY GHANBATT will use old flying club and fire hall on North side of field and area now used by displaced persons.	15 Jul	GHANBATT
14.	Establish CENTRE CHRISTOS as GHANBATT BN HQ and A COY	7 Jul	GHANBATT
15.	TUN COY (-) to move to Amohoro Stadium (Basket Ball Court)	1 Aug	TUN COY (-)

## 2. COORDINATION


- a. The DFC is to organize and chair a meeting between the RPA Senior Liaison Officer, or an RPA authority who can provide appropriate decisions, and the following Sections/Units:
  - 1) OPS
  - 2) HAC
  - 3) LOG
  - 4) CO GHANBATT
  - 5) A/CAO
  - 6) TUN COY (-)
- b. The meeting must take place NLT than 30 Jun 94.
- c. The meeting must cover:
  - 1) Not getting this infrastructure will call for our delay of deployment.
  - 2) We will move sub-units into Kigali City (BYUBATT Golf building) as soon as it is safe as a first priority.



- 3) We wish to move a Coy to BUGASERA and GITARAMA as soon as possible, as the concentration of GHANBATT in KIA and around Force HQ is temporary.
- 4) The KIA Presidential Hangar can be given up to RPA once we can move to Kigali centre and outlying areas.
- 5) All tasks outlined above.
- 6) Immediate access for detailed recce.
- 7) Determine all requirements dictated by the RPA for the use of all locs listed above.

3. CONCLUSION

To ensure the smooth deployment of incoming personnel and the smooth occupation of the infrastructure, a sense of URGENCY and IMMEDIATE REACTION is required.



---

BGen H.A. Anyidoho  
DFC

---

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action: COO, C LOG O, HAC, GHANBATT, TUN COY (-), CAO (NAIROBI), A/CAO (KIGALI), CAN SIGS

Info: FC, CMO, CMPO, EX DIR, MIL SPOKESMAN, AMA, ADC, CAMP COMD, UNHA, MSF, FSF



FC

SOMMAIRE SUR LA RENCONTRE ENTRE LE  
GEN-MAJ R. DALLAIRE/MAJ-GEN P. KAGAME  
RESPECTIVEMENT COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE DE LA MINUAR  
ET CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMEE DU FPR

KABUGA, LE 6 JUIN 1994

ETAIENT PRESENTS:

MINUAR:

M. Beadengar DESSANDE, Conseiller  
Politique, Col MOEEN, Chef des Opérations

FPR:

Cdt KAMANZI, Officier de Liaison

1. Notons tout d'abord que cette rencontre a eu lieu à la demande du Général DALLAIRE. Elle s'est tenue dans une villa privée abandonnée qui appartenait au Directeur de l'OCIR (Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda).

2. Les discussions ont porté sur les points essentiels ci-après:

- Tir d'obus sur l'Aéroport International de Kigali (AIK) le 5 juin 1994;
- Neutralité de l'AIK;
- Evacuation des déplacés;
- Cessez-le-feu;
- Changement à la tête de la Gendarmerie Nationale.

3. Le Général DALLAIRE informe le Général KAGAME du tir d'obus par les FAR à l'AIK, juste au moment où l'avion Hercule (Canadien) des Nations Unies venait de se poser sur l'aire de parking, exprime sa profonde préoccupation devant cette action qui a ainsi empêché la visite de la délégation italienne conduite par le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat pour la Coopération en Afrique au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Monsieur Franco ROCCHETTA, de Kampala, où il est reparti. Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat lui a parlé au téléphone et a indiqué les buts de sa visite: évaluer la situation et déterminer avec les autorités les domaines où son pays pourrait intervenir (assistance humanitaire et force). Pour le Général DALLAIRE, le niveau de précision du tir et le moment choisi pour le faire ne laissent pas de doute qu'il s'agit d'un acte délibéré. En réponse, le Général KAGAME dit que c'est bien un acte délibéré, qu'un ordre spécifique a été donné.

②

②  
DIE  
This is a  
summary of my  
last meeting with  
M Gen  
Kagame.  
I recon-  
sider you  
being  
Mr Desande  
with you  
8/6

③

I am seeing Mr Gen  
Kagame myself  
soon for  
some pertinent  
discussions.  
9/6  
DSC



2. Parler de neutralité de l'AIK n'a pas de sens, a dit le Général KAGAME, car ici les gens ne respectent pas la parole donnée. Ceux qui s'engagent sont les mêmes qui commettent ces actes. Quelle que soit l'appellation que vous donnerez, vos gens seront en danger à l'aéroport. Le Général DALLAIRE informe son interlocuteur qu'il a décidé de suspendre l'usage de l'aéroport jusqu'à ce qu'il obtienne une clarification de la situation, et a pris des mesures alternatives (entrée par Entebbe, Kampala) pour pallier cela.

3. S'agissant de l'évacuation des personnes, le Général DALLAIRE indique que la proposition des FAR concernant BUTARE pose des problèmes de garantie, de transport, de mobilisation de ressources humaines dont la MINUAR ne dispose pas en ce moment. Pour que cela marche, répond le Général KAGAME, il faut que les deux parties s'engagent à respecter le corridor à suivre. Il n'accède pas à la proposition de la MINUAR concernant le Camp Kami, car le FPR l'utilise. L'option Hôpital Fayçal rencontre l'agrément du Général KAGAME. Le Général DALLAIRE compte en discuter avec les FAR.

4. Le point relatif au cessez-le-feu piétine, déclare le Général DALLAIRE. Quelle est votre perspective pour les discussions, a-t-il demandé au Général KAGAME. Oui, que les discussions se poursuivent, répond le Général KAGAME. Et le Général DALLAIRE d'ajouter, des difficultés existent qui se rapportent à l'arrêt des massacres, aux médias; il dit qu'on note une certaine inflexion du ton du RTLM: Voulez-vous que les FAR aillent la fermer, demande DALLAIRE. Pour KAGAME, cette radio "libre" n'a pas de différence avec l'autre (Radio Rwanda). Le Général termine le point en disant, tout en fixant le Major KAMANZI, qu'à la prochaine réunion il faut aller au document sur le cessez-le-feu.

5. Quant au changement survenu à la tête de la Gendarmerie Nationale, le Général DALLAIRE exprime sa préoccupation, car la Gendarmerie Nationale jusqu'alors est aux côtés de la MINUAR dans les opérations d'assistance humanitaire. Pourquoi le font-ils maintenant? Le Général KAGAME, lui, en ignore les motifs et se demande si c'est la bonne direction. C'est une façon de mettre l'actuel chef de côté, parce qu'il est peut-être un peu hors de leur cercle, renchérit le Général KAGAME, qui ajoute que ce changement n'arrange en rien leur situation.

6. Sur une requête du Général DALLAIRE visant le déploiement des observateurs militaires derrière les lignes du FPR, avec un point de coordination à MULINDI, pour les aides humanitaires, le Général KAGAME n'y voit pas d'inconvénient.

7. Le Général DALLAIRE termine en informant le Général KAGAME de ses recommandations au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies concernant le mandat de la MONUOR.


**La séance, commencée à 15h00, a pris fin à 16h30.**



8. Puis les deux Généraux tiennent un bref tête-à-tête avant de se prêter aux questions des journalistes de la presse internationale venus à KABUGA pour la circonstance.

9. DIVERS. A cette occasion, M. Dessande a rencontré M. Bernard MAKUZA, qu'il a présenté au Général DALLAIRE. M. MAKUZA était Conseiller aux Affaires Juridiques et Administratives à la Primature. Déplacé aux Milles Collines, il a choisi de rejoindre la zone FPR. L'intéressé lui a remis deux documents de prise en charge (copies ci-jointes) et a réitéré son désir de rejoindre son frère à NAIROBI. Notons que M. MAKUZA a représenté le Gouvernement au sein de la Commission d'Enquête créée par la MINUAR le 15 décembre 1993 pour conduire des investigations sur les massacres survenus dans certains secteurs et communes de la Préfecture de RUHENGERI et dans la Sous-Préfecture de KIRAMBO.

Fait à Kigali, le 7 juin 1994

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Le Rapporteur  
B. DESSANDE

reunifc.rpf



A L'ATTENTION DU GENERAL ROMEO DALLAIRE  
COMMANDANT EN CHEF DES FORCES DE LA  
MINUAR. FAX 25076541

RE: PRISE EN CHARGE DE MR. MAKUZA BERNARD


NOUS, SEMUTUTSI EUGENE, HOMME D'AFFAIRE  
RWANDAIS OPERANT A DAR-ES-SALAAM, TEL. N°  
0025551 36235 (OFFICE) ET MAKUZA-MICHEL,  
FRERE A MAKUZA BERNARD, RESIDANT A NAIROBI  
TEL. 00254 2556369 (OFFICE) NOUS ENGAGEONS  
A PRENDRE EN CHARGE MR. MAKUZA BERNARD  
QUI SE TROUVE A L'HOTEL DES MILLE COLLINES  
CHAMBRE 217, AU CAS OU IL SERAIT EVACUE  
SUR NAIROBI (KENYA), DAR-ES-SALAAM (TANZANIE)  
OU AILLEURS.

FAIT A NAIROBI, LE 4/05/1994

SEMUTUTSI EUGENE



MAKUZA MICHEL





A l'Attention du Général Roméo DALLAIRE,  
Commandant des Forces de la MINUAR.

Objet : Engagement de prise en charge.

Je, Soussignée, Madame CYRIQUE épouse SENDASHONGA, née NIKUZE, fonctionnaire du Secrétariat Général des Nations-Unies auprès du Programme des Nations-Unies Pour l'Environnement (PNUE) à Nairobi, m'engage à prendre en charge les personnes dont les noms suivent, une fois que ces personnes auront été évacuées de Kigali sur Nairobi. Tout service qui peut être rendu à ces personnes afin de faciliter leur évacuation sera sincèrement apprécié.

- M. MAKUZA Bernard
- M. NYAMASWA Eugène
- M. MUTSINZI Edouard
- Mme MUKANYARWAYA Schola, épouse MUTSINZI
- MUTSINZI Eric (Enfant).
- M. MUTALIKANWA Félicien.

Fait à Nairobi, le 03 Mai 1994.

Mme C. Sendashonga

Tel : 254-2-561313  
Fax : 254-2-561313  
P.O.Box : 30552 NAIROBI

United Nations Nations Unies



UNAMIR  
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 20 42

P1/10

KYF991

TO: DPKO ATTN: MAJOR GENERAL BARIL	FROM: BRIGADIER GENERAL ANYIDOHO UNAMIR - KIGALI
DATE: 15 JUN 94	DRAFTER :
FAX NO: PH. NO: 3 4879	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090 PH. NO: 1-212-963-3094
SUBJECT: NEW UNAMIR POLICY ON DISARMAMENT OF RWANDESE PEOPLE.	REF: INTERIM SOP
	NO. OF PAGES: 2 10

MIR-1174

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED COPIES OF SOP REGARDING NEW UNAMIR POLICY ON DISARMAMENT OF RWANDESE PEOPLE.
2. THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS IN OUR HEADQUARTERS REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF GENEVA PROTOCOL FOR PRISONERS OF WAR IN RWANDA.
3. THE ADVICE OF LEGAL EXPERTS ON THIS MATTER AS IT PERTAINS TO THE RWANDESE SITUATION WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. PARA 15.4 REFERS.

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 20 52

DFC

E/O 12



## SECTION 15

### VOLUNTARY DISARMING OF MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, SELF -DEFENCE AND CIVILIAN FORCES

#### GENERAL

15.1 Given the current situation in Rwanda, as both the RGF and the RPF attempt to hold as much of the country as possible, it is inevitable that UNAMIR will become involved with individuals from all factions that have had enough of the fighting. As a result, UNAMIR will encounter individuals who wish to give themselves up to our forces either at UNAMIR installations, Humanitarian aide stations or to UNMO's.

#### AIM

15.2 The aim of this SOP is to describe the UNAMIR policy and procedures regarding the disarming of individuals and the control of all weapons seized.

#### DEFINITIONS

15.3 The following definitions will be used:

15.3.1 Armed Forces. The organized armed forces are considered to be the RGF, Gendarmerie and the RPF.

15.3.2 Paramilitary Forces. Paramilitary forces (or commonly referred to as Militia) are groups organized like but not part of the official armed forces. Current examples are:

a) Interahamwe (Militia) including fighting squads from the following parties:

- 1) MRND;
- 2) CDR party youth;and
- 3) MDR;

15.3.3 Self- Defence Groups. Generally, self-defence groups are loosely organized, possessing little training and are usually formed to protect their villages or towns.



15.3.4 Armed Civilians. Civilians armed with either, stolen or officially issued weapons. They have received little or no formal training. They have taken up arms to protect themselves, their families and their homes.

15.3.5 Displaced Persons. Rwandese citizens who have been forced or who have fled from their normal place of residence. They remain displaced persons as long as they remain within the borders of Rwanda.

15.3.6 Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, grenades, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

15.3.7 Force. Force is the use of physical means to impose one's will. It must be understood that the whole ethic of peace-keeping is that the mandate be achieved with the minimum use of military force.

15.3.8 Self-Defence. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use their wps in self-defense only. Self-defense includes resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent UNAMIR from discharging its duties:

- a) Accordingly, UNAMIR pers are authorized to use their weapons to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats on their lives; and
- b) To resist attempts such as disarming of UNAMIR personnel, forcing of UNAMIR positions, forced entry into UNAMIR positions.

15.3.9 UNAMIR Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfil its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by separate UNAMIR regulations.

15.3.10 Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the cease-fire agreement. These may be static or mobile.

15.3.11 Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for veh movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road block" in English, French and Kinyarwanda and also be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching veh.



POLICY

## 15.4 UNAMIR policy is:

15.4.1 All individuals or groups who approach a UNAMIR installation or checkpoint with the stated intention of giving up themselves and their weapons, or are found to have weapons on their persons shall be treated in accordance with Protocol I, Part III of the GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR which states:

a) any member of the armed forces of a conflict is a combatant and any combatant captured by the adverse Party is a prisoner of war;

b) To be recognized as such, the armed forces of a Party to a conflict must be organized and under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or other authority not recognized by the adverse Party; and

c) The status or treatment of prisoner of war is extended to various categories of persons who do not come under the definition given above, or who are not combatants. The following are thus also entitled to the status of prisoners of war:

1) those taking part in a levy en masse, that is, when the inhabitants of a non-occupied territory spontaneously take up arms on the approach of the enemy to combat invasion without having had time to organize themselves as laid down under point b) above, if they carry their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war; and

2) persons authorized to follow the armed forces without directly being part of them.

15.4.2 For the purposes of the UNAMIR mandate, all groups and armed civilians taking part in the conflict in Rwanda are considered to fall into the definitions listed above. Therefore, those individuals found with weapons will be considered to be combatants and after appropriate negotiations will be turned over to the faction that claims them as prisoners of war.

15.4.3 In all cases these persons or groups will be kept separate from the general population to ensure the safety of those found with weapons and to ensure the safety of the general population of unarmed displaced persons.



## PREPARATION

15.5 It is expected that all individuals or groups ready to hand-over their weapons will likely approach UNAMIR Installations or to other locations where UNAMIR troops presence is visible such as at Checkpoints, and Road Blocks.

15.6 It is imperative, therefore, that all UNAMIR commanders responsible for the security of their assigned compounds and all team leaders appointed to man checkpoints or roadblocks be prepared to conduct this operation. The following prior preparation is required:

15.6.1 To find an appropriate area that can be guarded. It should be separated from the general population of displaced persons as far as possible and out of sight;

15.6.2 To select and train individuals in the procedures regarding the handover of weapons;

15.6.3 To have all necessary forms for handover available, (Annex A, Annex B and Annex C); and

15.6.4 To have reserve forces on stand-by for emergencies or if help is required to guard the compound.

## SECURITY

15.7 For security reasons, it is imperative to be vigilant and to take appropriate precautionary measures, in proportion to the number of people still armed in the vicinity of the UN Installation. Individuals or groups still waiting to be disarmed must be under observation at all times.

## PROCEDURE

15.8 Make Contact with Group Leader. It is important to come into contact with a leader/comm of individuals to be disarmed. He should be used to keep the group waiting to be disarmed, informed regarding the necessary procedures to be followed and to keep them under control throughout the procedure. If a leader cannot be identified, at least one soldier must be designated to keep the group informed and to maintain order.

15.9 Conduct Disarmament Outside the UNAMIR Installation. If it is possible, the disarmament process must be carried out outside of the UNAMIR Installation;

15.10 Reception. An appropriate number of reception points must be set up. The number of reception points will depend on how many people are waiting. Such reception points must be well



organized in order to maintain high efficiency. At least three soldiers should be appointed to one reception point;

15.11 Displaced Persons. The main body of displaced persons must stay sufficiently far away from the UNAMIR Installation to ensure that the reception point does not become over crowded. (the necessary orders should be given by cmd/leader of the group);

15.12 Approach. All individuals must approach the reception point one by one. The soldiers responsible for registry must write in all the necessary information on the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex A). An official **RECEIPT** must then be given to the individual who has given up his weapon (Annex B). The **DETAINEE LIST** (Annex C) must be completed. After completion of the registration and handover of the weapon, the individual must be escorted to the guarded area. He must not be allowed to rejoin the other armed individuals or the unarmed displaced persons; and

15.12.1 Completed Annex A. The completed confiscation forms will be delivered to UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell).

15.12.2 Completed Annex C. The completed list of detainees will be delivered to UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell).

15.13 Weapons. The soldier responsible for checking weapons must inspect each weapon carefully, removing the magazine and clearing the chamber. The soldier will then give the weapon data to be registered. Finally, the weapon is to be secured in a guarded location. Weapons, ammunition, grenades etc. must be stored separately.

#### PROCEDURE FOR THE HANDOVER OF PRISONERS

15.14 Faction Claiming Prisoner. The faction claiming the prisoner must provide in writing the following assurances:

15.14.1 That Protocol One, Part III of the **GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR** will be followed;

15.14.2 They will provide the location at which the prisoner of war will be held; and

15.14.3 Permit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor the Prisoners of War camp.

15.15 UNAMIR Responsibilities. UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell) will ensure that the following actions take place:

15.15.1 Ensure that an armed guard is provided during the handover;



15.15.2 Ensure that a representative from the ICRC is present during the handover;

15.15.3 Ensure that, if available, there is media coverage to cover the handover;

15.15.4 Ensure that the ICRC and the Humanitarian Assistance receive a copy of the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex A);

15.15.5 Ensure that the ICRC and the Humanitarian Assistance Cell receive copies of **DETAINEE LIST** (Annex C); and

15.15.6 Arrange a location for the handover that is agreeable to both UNAMIR and the faction claiming the prisoner.



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ANNEX A

CONFISCATION FORM

1.	CHP: _____	DTG: _____	(B) _____
2.	Wpn by type and Ser No _____		
3.	Magazines: _____		
4.	Ammo/Expl: _____		
5.	Other items: _____		
6.	Other info: _____		
a.	Name _____		
b.	Faction _____		
c.	Village _____		
d.	Veh License No. _____		
7.	Map Reference (if found) _____		
8.	Individual taking name (print) _____		
Signature _____			
Copies: 2 copies forwarded with wpns to UNAMIR Force HQ			



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ANNEX B

OFFICIAL RECEIPT

Date: \_\_\_\_\_.

Place: \_\_\_\_\_.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_.

Weapon Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_ Type: \_\_\_\_\_.

Ammunition: Quantity \_\_\_\_\_ Type \_\_\_\_\_.

Other Items Found: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of OIC



[illegible]





MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE  
CABINET DU MINISTRE  
BP 23 KIGALI

*Ops*

KIGALI, le 04 MAI 1994

N° 80 /06.1.9

③ made for  
CPS APC  
G&A  
mv

①

②  
DRC  
le little  
got it to day.  
4/6

Monsieur le Commandant de la Mission  
des Nations Unies d'Assistance au RWANDA  
(MINUAR)

K I G A L I . -

Monsieur le Commandant,

Nous avons appris avec chagrin que  
le FPR a pilonné ce 03 Mai 94 l'Aéroport International Grégoire  
KAYIBANDA faisant des blessés parmi les militaires ghanéens de  
la MINUAR dont trois ont été atteints gravement.

Nous saisissons cette occasion pour  
vous présenter notre compassion et vous rassurer encore une fois  
que les Forces Armées Rwandaises ne pourront en aucun cas poser  
un geste pareil.

S'agissant précisément de ce cas, les  
Forces Armées Rwandaises ne peuvent pas tirer sur l'aéroport  
alors que ses éléments y ont des positions de combat.  
Nous restons convaincu qu'une telle action est de l'initiative du  
FPR qui a l'intention de voir la MINUAR partir pour continuer à  
s'engager dans sa logique de guerre.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant,  
nos assurances de franche collaboration.

Le Ministre de la Défense





092





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# OPS - PLANS

TO : F HQ

THROUGH : COS

FROM : CMO

*C*  
*Colonel*  
*09 Jan 94*

SUBJECT : PROPOSED WORK PLAN FOR RPF AND RGF MILOB SECTOR HQ FOR  
JANUARY 94

1. Attached please find subject above .
2. For your information and comments.

③  
*COS*  
*Good info*  
*for ops briefing*  
*at Monday's comd*  
*conference*  
*[Signature]*  
*FC*  
*12/1*

②  
*For info please*  
*[Signature]*  
*FC*  
*COS*  
*17/1/94*

④  
*DFC*  
*for your info*  
*and pass to COS*  
*[Signature]*  
*FC*  
*17/1*

⑤  
*Seen*  
*19/1/94*  
*DFC/COS*

⑥  
*[Signature]*  
*COS*  
*21/1/94*



To: CMO

FROM: RGF Sector Comd

*James* Lt Col. DOUMBIA

SUBJECT: RGF SECTOR WORK PLAN FOR JANUARY

1. The main objective of the phase will be to provide demarcating of the assembly points and ensuring all the preparation and constructions for disengagement, demobilization and integration process.

2. Mission.

a. To establish confidence between the RGF and UNAMIR by constant visits to Government Administrators, Military and Gendarmerie Commanders of districts levels.

b. To make sure all the preparations and construction for disengagement, demobilization and integration process.

3. Execution

a. Pay courtesy visits to administrators, Military & Gendarmerie Comds at RUHENGARI, Giseny, Kibuye, Gitarama, Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Butare - Kibungo.

b. Recce all assembly points within the sector.

c. Recce all Government units/bases within the sector and priority along DMZ south line.

4. Timings

4th January: Recce for establishment of RGF Sector HQ at RUHENGARI.

5th January: Courtesy Visit to Administrators, Military and Gendarmerie Comds at KIBUNGO.

6th January: Gitarama - Kibuye - Gikongoro - Cyangugu - Butare

8th January: Gisenyi - Ruhengeri.

b. Week 10th - 15th January Reconnaissance of assembly points located in south of DMZ. Giseny - Kola - Mutura - Ngaru - Rushashi - Mbogo - Shyorongi - Rutare.

c. Week 17th - 22nd January recce of assembly points in south Rwanda - Runda - Gitarama - Kibeye - Satagara - Gikongoro - Cyangugu - Butare.



UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA  
U N A M I R

Date : 03 Jan 94  
File : 10002 WORKPLAN

TO : MILOB GP HQ  
(Attn ; CMO)

FROM : SECTOR COMMANDER  
RPF MILOB SECTOR HQ

*[Handwritten signature]*  
2/1/94

SUBJ : WORK PLAN OF RPF MILOB SECTOR FOR JAN AND FEB 94

1. RPF MILOB Sector HQ has been established on 26 Dec 93 with 9 UNMOs. In the face of shortage of UNMOs and logistics and other constraints the HQ is not yet operationally functional. With the available resources the Sector HQ plans to carry out following operational and administrative missions in the month of Jan and Feb 94 :-

a. Establishment of HQ at MULINDI

(1) A temporary HQ has already been established at MULINDI by taking two small rooms of an office building of the RPF. As of 30 Dec 93 the RPF MILOB HQ is functional at MULINDI. As there is no living accommodation for the HQ UNMOs and as the UNAMIR communication is yet to be established, we are travelling to MULINDI on daily basis.

(2) The proposed permanent location selected earlier, has been reconnoitered by the Sector Comd and his team. The building is in very bad shape and needs major repair and renovation. Some photographs were taken during the recce which are attached herewith for an over view of the site. It is suggested that the repair work should start immediately so that we can move the HQ as soon as possible. RPF has agreed to sign in the contract form on behalf of the owner (the actual owner of most of the houses in the RPF held areas are missing) of the building to ease the process of UN contractual arrangements to start the renovation work. The Engineering/Building and Accommodation department of Management and Administration Division of UNAMIR may go to MULINDI along with the officers of this HQ to sort out the details and start the renovation work immediately.

b. Establishing UNAMIR Communication. This is an immediate requirement. At the moment RPF has given a HF set with an operator with which we are maintaining communication with the MILOB GP HQ through the RPF liaison officer at the MILOB GP HQ. It is suggested that following communication arrangement be made on priority basis :-



(1) A base station at MULINDI to be linked with the repeater at BYUMBA. But RPF MILOB Sector must have separate channel or the same channel as that of MILOB GP HQ.

(2) The vehicle mounted set to be made operational in the same net as that of the base station mentioned above.

(3) At least 4 hand held Motorola sets be issued for the HQ staffs.

c. Recce of Operational Area. The recce of operational area has already started. This recce is aimed at orientation with the terrain and topography of the area of operation and to show UN presence. This will continue till the end of Jan 94.

d. Visit RPF HQs. Sector HQ has proposed to the RPF to visit their various Regional and Zonal HQs/establishments. The proposal has been accepted in principle by HQ RPF. Following locations will be visited :-

- |     |              |                 |
|-----|--------------|-----------------|
| (1) | BUTARO 8144  | 01 TO 10 JAN 94 |
| (2) | KIVUYE 9236  | 01 TO 10 JAN 94 |
| (3) | RUBAYA 9938  | 01 TO 10 JAN 94 |
| (4) | RUSHAKA 1238 | 11 TO 20 JAN 94 |
| (5) | CYONDO 1341  | 11 TO 20 JAN 94 |
| (6) | KARAMA 1749  | 11 TO 20 JAN 94 |

e. Visit to RPF Units and Deployed Troops. Sector HQ plans to visit and see the units and deployed troops of RPF during the visit to their HQs. No fixed timing has been kept for this, as it will depend on whether and when the RPF agrees.

f. Recce and Finalization of Proposed Assembly Points, Cantonment site and Integrated Training Centers. Sector HQ has planned to reconnoitre the proposed assembly points, cantonment sites and integrated training sites within the month of Jan 94. After the recce we shall be able to forward recommendations for their selection or otherwise. The task will take approximately one and a half month (with the present UNMO strength and vehicle state). To carry out this task following assistance is required :-

(1) A list of proposed sites/locations are to be made available for reference. This is not available to RPF MILOB Sector.

(2) An Engineer Recce Team from Force Engineer Coy may be made available to RPF MILOB Sector to estimate the requirement of engineering assets for the sites.



g. Recce for Location of UNMO Teams at the RPF Sector. The 12 UNMO Teams would be located primarily to monitor and supervise the disengagement, demobilization and cantonment process of the RPF forces. Besides this they will also be responsible to monitor, check, investigate and report about the present deployment, disposition and movement of the RPF forces. Deployment of the UNMO teams should therefore be such that it facilitates the UNMOs to carry out their mission. Along with this, the security and safety of the officers should as far as possible be ensured. Keeping these points in mind the sector HQ has planned to deploy the UNMO Teams in the following order of priority :-

(1) Stage I. First, second, third, fourth and fifth Teams will be placed at MULINDI 0337, CYUMBA 0133, KIVUYE 9235, BUTARO 8144 and at KIDAHO 7047 to cover the western and north western portion of the RPF held areas. The UNMO area of influence will be gradually extended from MULINDI (the center) towards the west and north west.

(2) Stage II. The sixth, seventh and eighth Teams will be located at RUGARAMA 1035, CYONDO 1341 and KIYOMBE 0940 to extend the area of influence from MULINDI (the center) to the east and to cover Byumba-Gatuna highway.

(3) Stage III. The ninth, tenth and eleventh team will be placed at KARAMA 1747, GATUNDA 2044 and TABAGWE 2358 to cover the extreme north eastern areas.

(4) Stage IV. The twelfth Team will be kept as a reserve team at the HQ to carry out investigations, escort duties, and other special tasks like interrogation, rescue etc.

2. This is a tentative plan of action and success will primarily depend on the attitude and willingness of the RPF to cooperate with the UNAMIR in the days to come. To facilitate in executing the above work plan, posting of UNMO Teams and provision of essential logistics support in the form of issue of vehicles and communication equipments may be given due priority. Support of engineers recce team from Force Engineer Coy should also be given due consideration.



