

[ 9 CONFIDENTIAL ]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 65

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0283

UNRESTRICTED

TO : ALL SECTOR COMMANDERS  
ALL COUNTRY SENIOR MILOBS  
BRANCH HEADS 300

FILE : MILOB/OPS/53


FROM : CMO

DATE : 07 Mar 96

**SUBJECT : ASSESSMENT OF MISSION**

1. In view of the closing down of UNAMIR, you are requested to submit a report on your personal assessment of the Mission since inception, from the MILOBS' point of view. This report should include recommendations, if any, for future UN Missions.
2. Please note that, this paper is different from the Final Reports of the Sectors and should be forwarded to this HQ by Sat 09 Mar 96.

  
CHARLES A NELSON  
Col  
CMO

05/02  
To be Sorted Out  
 05/03

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From : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BRANCH)

File : MILOB/OPS/53

To : ALL SECTOR COMMANDERS

Date : 04 Mar 96

SUBJECT : WITHDRAWAL OF MILOBS FROM SECTORS

Ref:

a. MILOBS/REPAT/97 dated 01 Mar 96.

1. I am to inform you that, you are to start thinning out immediately so as to remain with only a patrol and a duty team. You are to ensure that all clearances are made by MILOBS coming earlier than 10 Mar 96.
2. All MILOBS appearing on the CMO's Interview on 09 Mar are to report to KIGALI by 07 Mar 96. Please note that their confidential reports must reach this HQ before the Interview date.
3. For Sector Commander (Sector 5) only, you are to delegate your OPS Officer to wind up the Sector.
4. For your quick action.



WM CHOMBA  
Lt Col  
SOO

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**From** : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BRANCH)

**File** : MILOB/OPS/53

**To** : ALL SECTOR COMMANDERS

**Date** : 64 Mar 96

**SUBJECT : WITHDRAWAL OF MILOBS FROM SECTORS**

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WM CHOMBA  
Lt Col  
SOO

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MILOBs : OPS BRANCH MAIL (DATE.....3/2.....)

	REMARKS	SIGN	DATE
C M O			
S O O			
A S O O	seen	Dr	3/2
OPsOFFR	Seen Sir	1/2	5/2
SIG OFFR	seen	1/2	05/2
S D O			
S M P O	Seen	Dr	05/02
SLOGO	seen	1/2	6/2

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FROM : GHANA CONTINGENT *Amunurafat*

TO : ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN  
COMPONENTS OF UNAMIR

INFO : FC  
CAO  
COS  
GHANCOY 3 (ITR)

DATE : 2 FEBRUARY 1996

SUBJECT : PROMOTION OFFICERS  
MAJ FQ OWOO (M10812)

1. With retrospective effect from 29 Jan 96 Maj FQ Owoo (M10812) has been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
2. Above mentioned officer is the Ghanaian Independent Company Commander.
3. Accept for necessary information.

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
CNR 355 P 1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1995 DEC 28 A 9:20

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 27 DECEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3952

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Concept of Operations, Deployment and Drawdown Plan

1. Reference UNAMIR code cable No. MIR-4217 of 13 December and LOG 003/95 No. 6853 of 16 December 1995. Related to your proposed concept of operations, deployment and drawdown plan, our comments and recommendations are given in the following paragraphs.
2. Immediate Drawdown Plan: Based on your recommended sub-division of 1200 troops and 200 additional personnel, ( MILOBs, Staff Officers and Military Police ), you are requested to forward at the earliest a drawdown plan for attainment of these mandated force levels, in Rwanda by the end of January 1996.
3. Concept of Operations: Your proposed concept of operations has been viewed in light of the prevailing security environment in Rwanda, as also discussed with the outgoing Force Commander and Troop Contributing Countries. As a consequence of this, it is recommended that all UNAMIR forces be concentrated in Kigali and the immediate surroundings (i.e. Sector 1). It must also be clearly understood, that UNAMIR will not provide security for refugees. With regard to forward deployment, the following aspects are recommended.
  - A. Related to your proposal, to locate forward logistic elements at Nyondo and Shagasha, it is reiterated that these may only be deployed if satisfactory security arrangements are made by the Government of Rwanda. Only administrative, logistic and guard elements from UNAMIR (to prevent theft and pilferage) will be deployed. The responsibility for overall security will remain that of the Government of Rwanda
  - B. Consequent to deployment of the reduced number of MILOBs to various sectors (as envisaged in your proposal), their usefulness needs to be reassessed. Further, the security needs of these MILOBs should be closely monitored, and in case the security is inadequate or doubtful, the MILOBs should be withdrawn to Sector 1, in a timely manner.

4. Final Reduction of UNAMIR: consequent to the drawdown of UNAMIR and attainment of a strength of 1400 personnel (by end-January 1996), you are requested to intimate modifications to your present liquidation instructions which will enable final drawdown of UNAMIR, within six weeks of termination of the present mandate.

5. Your draft liquidation instruction has been sent to FALD for their attention. Comments on this will be conveyed to you at the earliest.

Best regards.



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TO: UNAMIR OPS  
INFO: COS  
FROM: MILOB GP HQ

FILE: OPS/1122.23

DATE: 28 NOV 95

SUBJECT : END OF MISSION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Since the inception of UNAMIR on 05 Oct 93, Military Observers, as part of the force, have played a crucial role in assisting in the peace process in Rwanda. Initially, the observers' primary job was that of monitoring the cease fire, particularly the 19-km wide Demilitarized Zone created in the northern part of the country to separate the warring factions.
2. After the war had broken out in April 94, Milobs became predominantly useful when the force was reduced from 2,517 to just under 500. They were deployed to cover the whole country and southern part of Uganda bordering Rwanda.
3. Today, Milobs continue to monitor the security situation and provide certain amount of humanitarian assistance to the needy. It is therefore important to review Milobs activities at this crucial time of an anticipated pull out of UNAMIR from Rwanda.

AIM

4. To highlight Milobs operations in Rwanda.

SCOPE

5. This paper covers the following:
  - a. Milob Operations.
  - b. Humanitarian Activities.
  - c. UN Agencies / NGO cooperation.
  - d. Local Authorities / Military cooperation.
  - e. Achievements.
  - f. Limitations.
  - g. Conclusion.

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**MILOB OPERATIONS**

6. Milobs carry out diverse operations in ten (10) sectors, each representing a Prefecture in Rwanda. These include patrolling, escorting, visiting communes and investigation.

7. **Patrolling.** Milobs conduct daily patrols to most of the communes by foot, road and air. It is estimated that Milob patrols cover more than half of the country everyday. These patrols are essential for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing security situations in the communes. It is also a tool for confirming, verifying and supervising an incident, agreement or violation. The general situation of the communes are best assessed through these patrols. There was the need for Milobs to show UN presence in the hinterland to instil confidence in the local populace. Monitoring of refugees was carried out on daily basis by Milobs in conjunction with UNHCR officials at all entry points and Refugee/Transit Camps.

8. **Escorts.** Milobs provide unarmed escorts to VIPs, NGOs and IDPs being transported to their communes, as occurred during Operations Hope and Retour. It is interesting to note that some representatives of Human Rights and NGOs often insist on Milobs accompanying them to the communes for their duties.

9. **Visits to the Communes.** Milobs do visit various communes in their areas of responsibility to enquire about commune problems, take commune details and assess the living conditions of the local population. They check availability of food and water in the communes. The number and conditions of orphans in the communes are normally reported upon so that sympathizing NGOs can assist them. Milobs do check on the conditions of prisoners, human rights violations and the judiciary system available in the communes. They also assess the security situation in the communes and report on cases of banditry, arrests and killings carried out by RPA or any faction. They undertook information collection tasks assigned them by the SRSG and UNAMIR Ops from time to time.

10. **Investigations.** As the eyes and ears of the FC, Milobs obtained information on the movements and actions of FRGF/Iterhamwe as well as RPA. Sources of information were mainly the communal authorities, local population, NGOs, UN Agencies and at times, the RPA themselves. In many instances such as acts of sabotage, killings and ambushes Milobs carried out joint investigations with UNCIVPOLs.

**HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES**

11. Milobs monitored the humanitarian situation in their respective communes. Each sector has a Humanitarian Officer who works in close liaison with HAC, Human Rights Monitors and NGOs. Weekly visits are made to some schools, hospitals, health centres and orphanages to assess their requirements for onward transmission to the appropriate NGOs for assistance.

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Milobs have physically assisted in distribution of drugs to some commune health centres, conveyed farming implements, seedlings, fertilizer and food items to the required areas. Humanitarian assistance to the population was generally a success.

### **COOPERATION WITH UN AGENCIES/NGOS**

12. Milobs maintained close working relations with UN Agencies and NGOs. they enjoyed a very good rapport and participated fully in the activities of the agencies. Interactions with the agencies have helped Milobs to gather certain valuable information which formed the basis of most patrols conducted. Information gathered by Milobs on the state of refugee camps across the borders were mainly received from these agencies. More often than not, weekly security meetings are held with these agencies in the sectors to update them and thereafter, coordinate their activities.

### **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES/MILITARY**

13. Our relationship with the local authorities and RPA could not be said to be the best. This was mainly due to the attitudes and policies of the authorities. Some local authorities even issued orders that people who communicated with Milobs would be punished, preventing Milobs of having free access to information and observation. The situation where a Milobs heli-patrol was prevented from performing its normal duties in the Kibuye Prefecture is a clear case in point. It can be said, however that the authorities only cooperate when they need assistance from Milobs.

### **ACHIEVEMENTS**

14. Milobs tried to fulfil the requirements of UNAMIR HQ within the framework of the mandate. Their achievements, among others are:

- a. Successfully monitored and reported human rights violations within prisons and camps. The reported maltreatment in commune cachots as well as the mass killings in the Kibeho Camp and the Kanama massacre are good examples. This function helped the weak to have justice administered to them.
- b. Gained the confidence of the locals through constant patrolling of the rural areas. No wonder the locals volunteered information even when they had been warned against such an act. The presence of Milobs in the communes is seen as a security against likely RPA hostilities. For that reason, when rumours of UNAMIR withdrawal spread, there was a significant sense of insecurity amongst the locals.

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- c. Established good working relations with all NGOs and UN Agencies to the extent that they responded to requests for various requirements of the communes without hesitation. The UN Agencies and NGOs consider Milobs as elements of protection. With the anticipated withdrawal of UNAMIR, they seem worried about their future in Rwanda.
- d. Notwithstanding the limited resources, Milobs provided transport assistance to convey the sick, farming implements, seedlings, textbooks, ration and other items to the communes in aid of the local authorities and RPA. They also obtained body bags, plastic sheeting, rubber gloves and chemicals for reburial programmes.
- e. Milobs supported Operations Hope, Retour and all the events surrounding the Kibeho incident. Milobs provided unarmed escorts for IDPs to their home communes and continued to visit them to ascertain their conditions of resettlement.

### **LIMITATIONS**

15. The achievements of the Milobs did not come easy. They were confronted with certain limitations which are mainly:


- a. The extremely bad roads and difficult terrain posed as a serious challenge to Milobs patrols. These roads deteriorate fast during the rainy seasons, as a result, Milobs are unable to physically reach certain areas by road.
- b. Milobs are also limited in their operational capabilities due to depleted vehicle resources. The current fleet of vehicles are very old and cannot withstand the rigours of long patrols. The vehicles often breakdown yet there are no effective spare parts backing.
- c. Though the current mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance to the locals, Milobs in particular and UNAMIR in general, had inadequate resources to fulfil the requirements of the local authorities.
- d. More often than not, there is lack of cooperation between Milobs and the local authorities. The authorities tend to hold back essential information from the Milobs. In certain communes, RPA intimidate the locals and demand that they avoid any contact with Milobs. Information gathering as a result, becomes difficult.

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**CONCLUSION**

16. Milobs have had a relative success in influencing the situation in Rwanda. They have actually contributed to the confidence building of the locals. Milob patrols visit, escort and provide the necessary information to the appropriate agencies to give meaning to the new mandate.

17. However, Milobs have their limitations in the execution of their tasks. Extremely bad roads, old vehicles and denial of information coupled with local authorities' hostilities at times, made the Milob mission a trying one.

  
MD AHSANULLAH  
Lt - Col  
SOO



TO : See Distribution FILE REF: MILOB/REPAT/6448.99

FROM: MILOBS GP HQ

DATE: 23 October 1995


SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF MILOBS IN NOVEMBER

REFERENCES:

- A. MILOB/REPAT/30 dated 18 Sept 95
- B. MILOB/REPAT/84 dated 18 Sept 95
- C. UN HQ FAX NO 3315 dated 19 Oct 95

1. In view of Ref C, the repatriation of MILOBS in November is suspended. The MILOBS are to continue with their normal duties until otherwise advised.

2. Please accept for action.

  
GK ADJEI  
Lt-Col  
For CMO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

CMPO  
CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER  
TRAVEL UNIT  
ALL SECTORS/BRANCHES

Internal:

Information:

MA to DFC/CMO  
DCMO

19-10 23:17

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

066 P0

CNR - 300 P1/1

FC  
ED

UNITED NATIONS  
DEPT. OF OPERATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: OCT 19 2 14  
KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 19 October 1995  
NUMBER: 3315  
SUBJECT: UNAMIR Mandate

RECEIVED

20 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG  
UNAMIR

Following our telephone conversation of 19 October, I wish to confirm our understanding regarding the rotation of UNAMIR Milobs whose tours of duty are due to expire prior to 8 December. We will ask the governments concerned to extend the tours of these observers until 8 December, by which time we will know the future status of the mission. Milobs whose governments are unable to extend their tours will be repatriated without replacement.

Best regards.


SRSG

We should keep our MILOBS until 8 Dec. Perceptions are everything and we should not send a signal that we are giving up the game.

The position is  
should be Milob's rotation  
in now to kept on (and  
not rotated). Careful for  
others

See  
20.10

FC



*800*  
*4/17/6*  
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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

TO : MILOB GP HQ, SECTOR 3 HQ

DATE : 13 JUNE 95

FROM : SUB-SECTOR 3A KIBUYE

SUBJECT : PROPOSED RESTRUCTURE FOR MILOBS - SUB-SECTOR 3A

REFERENCES : A. YOUR FAXED LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT DATED 10 JUNE 95  
B. UNAMIR 5000.26 (PLANS) DATED 13 JUNE 95  
C. FC VISIT TO THIS SUB-SECTOR 14 JUNE 95

INTRODUCTION

1. Your letter at reference A requested we give our views on subject matter by 15 june 95. With the reception of reference B higher headquarters' proposed force structure, and with reference C Force Commander's personal concept and comment in view of the changing mandate, we submit this proposed restructure for MILOBS in the KIBUYE prefecture.

PLANNED REORGANIZATION

2. MILOBS operations in this sub-sector are based on one HQ group controlling the activities of five patrols. Four patrols are responsible for operating in two communes, with the exception of one patrol who is responsible for three communes. The HAC is also considered a patrol. In view of the changing mandate, we do not plan to change the main groupings and tasks of this present organization. However, due to the increased emphasis to humanitarian assistance, monitoring of the reconciliation progress and security situation, we will require to increase our present strength in MILOBS.

PLANNED REDEPLOYMENT

3. MILOBS, we were assured during reference C visit, will be allowed in increase in strength both in manning and equipment. However, we were also informed that MALAWI COY will be redeploying completely from this sub-sector, leaving the KIBUYE prefecture void of armed UN forces. With this departure means the striking of the MALAWI HQ CAMP, leaving us without physical security and office space it presently affords.

*agreed by FC*  
4. Subsequently, we request to move our MILOBS HQ, and the INDIAN Signals Detachment necessary to it's operation, to the GULF EDEN ROC HOTEL, KIBUYE where we MILOBS are all presently accommodating. This central relocation would afford us the best all around operational flexibility, as well as security, which we could get in the KIBUYE prefecture. Space must be rented as described below.



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5. The Hotel has a small office room, which FC, during his visit, has personally seen and found quite satisfactory for our needs. There is a quite adequate conference room which we would need, and the INDIAN Signals Detachment would also need rooms to live and carry out their operations.

6. We recommend this option as the most economical for the funding necessary which would be incurred by contract by MILOBS GP HQ for our necessary redeployment. As we are quite, at this time, on good terms with the management, we offer to broker the contract as agents of MILOBS GP HQ in order to get the most economical rates possible for the rental of the necessary work space.

FUTURE ORGANIZATION

7. Strength. We propose the following disposition of organization totalling 28 x MILOBS and 4 x CIVPOL, not counting the personnel, resources and equipment requirement as listed below.


7. Concept of Operations. We shall not change from our present concept, save to increase the size and resources presently available to our HAC, in order to fit the spirit of the tasks as stated at the reference B proposal.

8. Requirements. In order to achieve this, we propose to have the following detachments and resources in our organization :

- a. Signals det,
- b. Maintenance and Fuel det,
- c. Medical det,
- d. Heavy transport det,
- e. 10 x vehs (2/ptl),
- f. 05 x interpreters (1/ptl),
- g. 1 x base station,
- h. 14 x hand held radios,
- i. 1 x photocopier,
- j. 2 x computers sets complete,
- k. 4 x generator (3.9 kw minimum), and
- l. Office equipment. Will depend on office space, and will be ordered later separately.

9. For your consideration.

10. Best regards,

  
Bakary Coulibaly  
LtCol  
Cmdr Sub-Sector 3A

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TO : MILOBS GP HQ

DATE : June 13, 1995

FROM : SECTOR 3B

SUBJECT : REDEPLOYMENT / REORGANIZATION OF MILOBS

A. REFERENCE YOUR LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 95

1. VIEWS ON THE PLANNED REORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

As the note dated june 95 request I am to inform you my view as follow :

- at all!*
- a. Since the Milobs will take over some tasks that had been assigned to troops so far, and with the main task remaining like now and also with special emphasis : to humanitarian assistance, monitoring of the reconciliation progress and the security situation; even with the actual strength Milobs in Sector 3B are in conditions to perform the tasks in the best manner with the only restrictions of the capacity of movements because of the lack of ~~vehicles~~ and the negative incidence of the actual security situation with the planned RPA hostile actions.
- b. I agree emphatically with the idea of the separation of the Prefectures in independent Sectors i.e. Sub Sector 3A in a Sector like some time back used to be, mainly because of organization, control and operational flexibility and capacities.

2. POSSIBLE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF SECTOR 3B GITARAMA

The organization that I propose is the actual and the same strength is enough to perform our tasks.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The operation will consist in a constant collection of information, support of the humanitarian activities, monitoring of the reconciliation progress and of the security situation.

Due the incidence of the security situation on our own personnel and properties the whole operation will be done under special security measures and cares.

The operation will consist in three phases as follow :

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## a. PREPARATORY OF THE REDEPLOYMENT

To be carried out by Mali Coy staff and Sector staff will consist in the reccue and arrangements to withdraw the actual platoons deployment and concentrate the Mali Coy in Gitarama, with the aim of keeping strength and control over an area enough to bring security to people and organizations in order to serve an eventual evacuation.

## b. REDEPLOYMENT

Organized resettlement and security installations in Gitarama area.

## c. FULL ACTION

It will consist in patrolling with elements with self defence ability, in daily basis, visiting Communes, Sectors and Cells of the jurisdiction, supporting like as usually different organizations, health centers, orphanages and local authorities in carrying out humanitarian aid, and all our current tasks.

4. REQUIREMENTS OF VARIOUS ITEMS :

## a. VEHICLES :


MAMBAS : 6  
TRUCKS : 5 4RUNNERS OR SIMILAR  
LORRIES : 8 (5 TON)

## b. ELECTRICAL DEVICES

GENERATORS : 3 (3.9 kw)  
FRIDGES : 3 (9 Feet)  
FREEZERS : 2

## c. OTHERS

CANADIAN TENTS (enough for 3 platoons)

  
TOMAS FOX  
LT COLONEL  
SECTOR CDR

UN CONFIDENTIAL