

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - HAC

22 DEC 1994 - 30 AUG 1995

OPERATIONS

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

[3 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

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ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

CHAO

FROM : DCOS OPS *de. Dahl* 5000.46 (Plans)
 TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST
 DATE : 30 Aug 95
 SUBJECT : AMMENDMENT : SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

1. Page 15, Paragraph 52 a. Now read it as under:

" Nonessential military personnel, NORMED personnel and the Civilian Core Group are to be escorted to the air port and evacuated."

2. Page 43, H/7/7, row 3 (EVACUATION STAGE TWO), under last column (OTHERS). Read it as under;

" NORMED and Civilian Core Group evacuated"

Distribution :

Action :

LIST B (less RPA LO)
 LIST C

Information :

LIST A
 OFFICE OF SRSG
 CAO
 UNAMIR CSO
 UNDP
 UNHCR
 UNHRFOR (Human Rights)

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OPS 135

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.46 (Plans)

To: Distribution List

From: A/DCOS OPS

Date: 21 Aug 95

Subject: SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

1. The Security and Evacuation Plan has been approved by the Force Commander and is enclosed for your action.
2. All Sector Commanders (not Milob Sub Sector Commanders) are to prepare their plans to support the Security and Evacuation Plan and forward them to the Force Commander by 8 Sep 95 for his perusal. These plans should address the following issues:
 - a. Identification of all Milobs and UN Agencies and NGOs personnel in your sector.
 - b. The method of concentrating these personnel when and if required.
 - c. A communications plan (this may require the assistance of the Force Signals company).
3. An updated list of UN Agencies and NGOs personnel will be forwarded once it has been received from the UNAMIR Chief Security Officer. However, this should not stop you from immediately gathering all UN Agencies and NGO personnel in your sectors for a security conference to address the above issues.
4. If you have any questions relating to the Security and Evacuation plan please direct them to MAJ P.K. Malik, G3 Plans 3, on Ext 11162.
5. Acknowledge receipt.

Enclosure:

1. Security and Evacuation Plan dated 14 Aug 95

Distribution:

Action:

- List B (less RPA LO)
- List C

Information:

List A
Office of SRSG
CAO
UNAMIR CSO
UNDP (Attn: John Cleeland)
HNNCR

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

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To: See Distribution

File: 5000.26(Plans)

From: G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

Date: 4 Aug 95

Subject: FORCE STRUCTURE & DRAW DOWN OF UNAMIR FORCES

References:

A. G3 Plans 5000.26 (Plans) dated 27 Jun 95

B. FC Brief (Re-allocation of the Medical company strength) dated 4 Aug 95

1. At Reference A you were advised of the UNAMIR force structure and draw down plan to comply with the new mandate. In that plan a formed troop strength of 100 personnel was allocated to the medical company replacement for AUSMED. However, due to the inability of the UN to get a military replacement for AUSMED, medical support will be provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (Level 2 hospital) from 23 Aug 95.

2. Therefore, the Force Commander has approved the re-allocation of the medical company formed troop strength (vide Reference B) as follows:

a. INDBATT will maintain their current formed troop strength at 725 by retaining the 65 personnel that were to be repatriated over the period 5 - 8 Oct 95.

b. The Military Police platoon will be maintained at its current strength of 58 personnel by retaining the 13 personnel yet to be repatriated.

c. The staff officer strength of the HQ will be ^{increased} ~~decreased~~ to 42 personnel, instead of 35, to allow extra support to be provided in the area the FMO, G4, etc; and

d. The Indian Movement Control Unit of 15 personnel will remain for the duration of the mission to assist with the final withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda. This is yet to be officially approved by UN HQ New York.

3. Please find enclosed an updated UNAMIR Drawdown and Rotation Plan (effective date 4 Aug 95) for your information.

Distribution List:

- List A
- List B
- List D
- List E

EFFECTIVE: 4 AUG 95

UNAMIR DRAWDOWN AND ROTATION PLAN

SER	CONTINGENT	FLIGHT DATES	PERS DEPARTING	PERS ARRIVING	FORCE STRENGTH (5622)	REMARKS
1.	TUNBATT	30 JUN 95 6-9 JUL 95	80 4 X 181	0	4808	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF) (4 MAN REAR PARTY UNTIL 19 JUL)
2.	NIBATT	12 JUL 95	184	0	4624	135 PERS REMAIN (PLUS STAFF)
3.	ETHIOBATT	17-20,22 JUL 95	830	0	3794	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
4.	95 FLSC	24/26 JUL 95	91	85	3788	ROTATION
5.	MP PL	26 JUL 95	8	0	3780	58 PERS MP PL REMAINS
6.	MOVCON	EARLY AUG 95 (TBC)	0	15	3795	FROM INDIA
7.	ZAMBATT	3-5 AUG 95	795	0	3000	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
8.	MALAWICOY	6-8 AUG 95	179	135	2956	ROTATION (STAFF REMAIN)
9.	SENBATT	11 & 13 AUG 95	237	0	2719	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
10.	AUSMED	23 AUG 95	310	0	2409	ALL PERS GONE
11.	MALICOY	1-3 SEP 95	198	135	2346	ROTATION (STAFF REMAIN)
12.	GHANBATT	6-9 SEP 95	530	0	1816	270 PERS REMAIN (PLUS STAFF)
13.	HQ STAFF	9 OCT 95	16	0	1800	42 STAFF REMAIN

INDBATT	725
GHANBATT	270
NICOY	135
MALAWICOY	135
MALICOY	135
HQ STAFF	42
ENGR COY	125
SIGNALS	75
95 CMSG	85
MOVCON	15
MP PL	58
TOTAL	1800

NOTE: HQ STAFF WILL COMMENCE DRAWDOWN THROUGH PERIODIC NATURAL ATTRITION TO BE COMPLETED BY 9 OCT 95.

SEEN SLIP

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UNITED NATIONS

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.26 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 27 Jun 95

Subject: RECOMMENDED DRAWDOWN AND ROTATION OF UNAMIR FORCES

1. Please find attached the UNAMIR drawdown and rotation plan recommended to UNHQ NY.
2. These dates are only a recommendation and are subject to change by UNHQ due to availability of aircraft and contract requirements. Therefore, they should only be used as a guide to develop contingency plans at this stage.

Enclosure: (1) UNAMIR Drawdown and Rotation Plan

Distribution List:

List A
List D
G3 Ops

UNAMIR DRAWDOWN AND ROTATION PLAN

SER	CONTINGENT	FLIGHT DATES	PERS DEPARTING	PERS ARRIVING	FORCE STRENGTH (5622)	REMARKS
1.	TUNBATT	28-30 JUN 95 4-8 JUL 95	814	0	4808	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
2.	MOVCON	3 JUL 95	0	15	4823	TBA
3.	NIBATT	12-13 JUL 95	184	0	4639	135 PERS REMAIN
4.	ETHIOBATT	17-19 JUL 95	830	0	3809	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
5.	95 FLSG	24-25 JUL 95	91	85	3803	ROTATION
6.	ZAMBATT	1-4 AUG 95	795	0	3008	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF) IF NOT DIRECT TO ANGOLA
7.	MALAWICOY	6-7 AUG 95	179	135	2964	ROTATION, REPLACED BY 135 (PLUS STAFF)
8.	MEDCOY	9-10 AUG 95	0	100	3064	TBA
9.	SENBATT	11-13 AUG 95	237	0	2827	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
10.	AUSMED	21-23 AUG 95	310	0	2517	ALL PERS GONE
11.	MALICOY	1-3 SEP 95	198	135	2454	135 REMAIN OR ROTATION?
12.	GHANBATT	6-9 SEP 95	530	0	1924	270 PERS REMAIN (PLUS STAFF)
13.	INDBATT	5-8 OCT 95	65	0	1859	660 PERS REMAIN
14.	MP COY	9 OCT 95	21	0	1838	45 PERS MP PL REMAINS
15.	HQ STAFF	9 OCT 95	23	0	1815	35 STAFF REMAIN
16.	MOVCON	9 OCT 95	15	0	1800	

INDBATT 660
 GHANBATT 270
 NIBATT 135
 MALAWICOY 135
 MALICOY 135
 HQ STAFF 35
 ENGR COY 125
 SIGNALS 75
 MEDCOY 100
 FLSG 85
 MP PL 45
 TOTAL 1800

NOTE: MP COY & HQ STAFF WILL COMMENCE DRAWDOWN THROUGH PERIODIC NATURAL ATTRITION TO BE COMPLETED BY 9 OCT 95.

SEEN SLIP

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ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.26 (Plans)

To: List A, B, C & E

From: G3 PLANS

[Signature]

Date: 23 Jun 95

Subject: STRUCTURE OF INDEPENDENT COMPANY GROUPS

Reference:

A. G3 Plans 5000.26 (Plans) dated 13 Jun 95

General

1. Reference A advised the Force Commander's concept of operations for the formed troops under the revised mandate. It identified the requirement to have four independent company groups located at Kibungo, Nyundo (near Gisenyi), Gisakura and Gikongoro. Below are the guidelines for the structure and support of these companies.

Strength

2. The company groups are to have a strength of 135 personnel consisting of the following:
 - a. Company group commanded by a LTCOL.
 - b. Three infantry platoons (30 personnel each).
 - c. Company HQ plus a Combat Support Platoon of 38 personnel. The Combat Support Platoon is to contain a Transport Section, Maintenance Section, Supply Section, Communication Section and an Engineer Liaison Detachment.
 - d. One Medical Section consisting of RMO, Nursing Officer, Preventive Health Assistant and three medics.

Administrative Requirements

3. Transport. The following transport resources are to be allocated to each independent company group:
 - a. Four Trucks.
 - b. 21 Patrolling Vehicles (these include Mambas and APCs).
 - c. Two Ambulances.

4. Accommodation and Ancillary Facilities.

- a. Proper living accommodation for the company groups with the facilities for maintenance of vehicles.
- b. Appropriate sanitation and bathing facilities within the accommodation.
- c. For Withdrawal/Evacuation Contingencies.
 - (1) Nine living tents (16 men tents).
 - (2) One large store tent/two medium size store tents.
 - (3) One kitchen and dining shelter.

5. Water. One bladder of 100,000 ltr capacity for potable water (including 20 days reserve) is to be allocated to each company group. The resupply will be from Kigali once a week. Any requirement of non potable water will be gained from the local resources.

6. POL. One tank of 10,000 ltr capacity that will include the reserve of 20 days. Resupply will be from Kigali once a week.

7. Combat Rations. Companies to hold 10 days reserve.

8. Miscellaneous Stores.

- a. Two generators of 40 KVA capacity.
- b. One refer (freezer).
- c. One refer container (cooling).
- d. Cooking gas and kerosene supply will be as required.

Communications

9. All independent company groups are required to provide their own integral communications. The Force Signal Company will provide communication from the Force HQ to the independent company HQ. Any rear link to the home countries is to be provided by the contingents.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR HQ
Kigali
RWANDA

23 June 1995

See Distribution List

GENERAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE DOWNSIZING OF UNAMIR

General

1. With effect 09 June 1995 UNAMIR has received a revised mandate which will require UNAMIR to reduce its formed troops strength to 1800 personnel by 09 October 1995 passing through a strength of 2330 by 09 September 1995, or sooner. The force level of 2330 will be used as a bench mark rather than an intermediate stage in order to avoid disruption and turbulence in redeployments. The Military Observers and the Civilian Police strengths will remain at their current authorised levels of 320 and 120 respectively.

Aim

2. The aim of this instructions is to effect the coordinated withdrawal/rotation of selected Military units and the withdrawal/reallocation of UN owned equipment.

Assumption

3. The downsizing will be based on the following assumptions:

- The security/operational situation remains calm;
- There will be concurrent movement between withdrawing and relieving units; and
- The Military will provide security for UN owned equipment.

Concept for Downsizing

4. The withdrawal/rotation of selected UNAMIR personnel and equipment will involve movement by road, rail, sea and air to concentration areas, staging areas and points of departure as designated by the Movement Coordination Centre (MCC). The method of movement for the withdrawal of formed Military units and UN equipment are as follows:

- a. Military Formed Units: Controlled and planned Movement utilising 3rd and 4th line Air assets, 4th line maritime assets and 3rd and 4th line road transport assets.
- b. UN owned equipment: Controlled and planned movement utilising 3rd and 4th line air assets, 4th line maritime assets and 3rd and 4th line road transport assets.

Task organisation

5. All movement will be controlled by the MCC. Integrated Support Services (ISS) will be the central agency for the consolidated planning, and direct repatriation of UNAMIR selected troops and UN owned equipment. Accordingly it is responsible for:

- a. Commercial travel and shipping arrangements.
- b. The acquisition of required Movement resources.
- c. The movement of personnel, material and equipment to designated concentration areas and points of departure.
- d. The administration of UNNY charters of air and sea assets and other related contracts to facilitate the movement.

6. The other agencies/sub units involved are listed below. Responsibilities of each are listed at Annex A.

- a. G3 Plans (PLANS BR).
- b. Support Branch (SPT BR).
- c. Movement Coordination Centre (MCC).
- d. Field Service Administration (FSA).
- e. Communications Unit (COMMS).
- f. Logistic Support Group (95 FSLG).
- h. Property Control and Inventory Unit (PCIU).
- i. Military Police.
- j. Integrated Transport and Maintenance Management (ITMM).
- k. Building and Engineering Services (BES).
- l. Air Operations.
- m. Military contingents.
- n. Medical Branch (MED BR).

Movement of Personnel and Equipment

7. The critical points along the withdrawal route are concentration areas, points of departure (road, rail, sea, air) and staging areas. Definition of terms are:

a. Concentration Areas (CONC)

- locations where elements of the same unit will concentrate to be transported to staging areas, other concentration areas or points of departure. ie: Sector HQ, Kigali transit camp.

b. Staging Areas (SA)

- locations within Rwanda or adjoining countries where equipment will be staged for further movement to points of departure. ie: selected locations in Kigali, Uganda, Tanzania or Kenya.

c. Points of Departure (POD)

- locations where personnel/equipment will depart the mission region for final destination. ie: Kigali, Mombasa or Dar Es Salaam.

8. If a contingent is withdrawing or downsizing, all equipment, both UN or contingent will be concentrated at Sector HQ locs or chosen secure areas, if practical and operationally feasible.

Modes of Movement

9. The modes of movement which will be employed for the withdrawal of Military contingents are as follows:

- a. Movement of personnel and personal luggage of up to 45kg per man will be effected by UNAMIR and chartered Air assets and road assets as deemed necessary by MCC.
- b. All vehicles, except "A" and "C" vehicles will self deploy to the concentration areas or POD.
- c. Freight/Cargo and vehicles will be road moved to concentration areas or PODs and then moved by maritime assets to home locations.

10. UN owned equipment will be withdrawn as follows:

- a. All UN vehicles, except "A" vehicles will self deploy to conc area Kigali utilising contingent drivers unless vehicles are reassigned to the relieving company.

- b. All UN owned equipment will be handed to FSA in loc who will reassign some equipment to the relief in place company. The remaining equipment will be moved in bulk to Trafipro for eventual onforwarding to another UN mission or reassigned to elements based in Kigali.

Coordination Instruction

11. Withdrawal dates for contingents will be confirmed in OP ORDER No. 22 which will be issued in the near future.

12. Allocated resources. With the exception of operational requirements to provide security, life support services and essential service, aircraft as required, vessels and vehicles under UNAMIR control will be allocated to the withdrawal or redeployment of UNAMIR formed Military units/UN-owned equipment.

13. MCC is the coordination and tasking body for all UNAMIR movement assets and chartered/contracted movement assets.

14. Movement Orders. Individual movement orders for contingents /units will be promulgated by MCC. MCC will be the central point of contact for all matters relating directly to the withdrawal/rotation of contingents.

15. Movement Liaison Group. A movement liaison group will visit all units once units withdrawing and precedence of withdrawal have been finalised. Liaison group will consist of MCC reps, PCIU and FSA reps.

Administration and Logistics

16. UN ID Cards. Personnel are permitted to retain UN ID Cards however, UN security will be responsible to cut the signature block from the bottom of each card during the Immigration procedures at the Airport. MCC will coordinate details.

17. Transit accommodation. The use of the Kigali transit camp will be maximised. The current 500 man camp will soon be expanded to cater for up to 1000 personnel. MCC is to ensure that no more than 1000 personnel are moved into the transit camp at any one time. All personnel withdrawing will be moved to the transit camp as close as possible to air departure dates. The majority of personnel will be housed in the transit camp for one or two days however, there may be a requirement to house some personnel for up to five days.

18. Rationing. Whilst personnel are housed in the transit camp they will be self supporting and will be fed on combat rations. Additional water resources will be provided.

19. Details on refuelling, repair and recovery and other administrative and logistic requirements for the withdrawal/rotations will be covered in covered in specific Movement Orders.

Medical

20. Prior to Vacating Areas of Responsibilities. The Unit Medical Officer is to ensure the following action occurs prior to a contingent vacating its area of responsibility:

- a. De-commissioning of deep trench latrines to ensure that contamination to the environment does not occur.
- b. Removal of all rubbish and sanitary closing of any refuse pits.
- c. Pump out of any septic tank system within the facilities.
- d. Return/reallocation of medical stores/equipment into central UNAMIR stores.
- e. Return/reallocation of UNAMIR owned medical assets.
- f. Residual treatment of building if time and resources permit.
- g. Provision of a clearance certificate indemnifying the UN of further costs.
- h. All class 8 medical consumables, less emergency stock, are to be returned to Trafipro force stocks.

21. While in Transit Camp. Arrangements for Medical support in the transit camp are as follows:

- a. Units are to maintain an organic level 1 capability for initial medical assessment and treatment.
- b. Level 2/3 medical support will be provided by AUSMED (or the replacement medical company post August 1995).
- c. Requests for casualty evacuation are to made through OPS BR HQ UNAMIR as per current arrangements.
- d. Contingent Medical Officers are to ensure that the area of the transit camp is left in a hygienic condition on departure.
- e. A post deployment medical check list will be provided to each contingent by MED BR HQ UNAMIR for insertion in each soldiers medical documents. This will give recommendations for future medical precautions following return to home country.

22. Details on specific medical considerations will be covered in each Movement Order.

Command and Signal


23. Coordination Conference. A coordination conference for the move of each contingent will be arranged by MCC as deemed necessary.


24. Monitoring of Withdrawal. MP support and MOVDETS are to report progress of move to MCC as directed in individual Movement Orders.

25. Amendments. No amendments to respective Movement Orders are permitted without MCC approval.

25. Communications. Comms unit will be requested to assist with additional Motorola support to MCC with motorolas programmed so as to maintain convoy control. MCC is to liaise with Comms unit for all technical details.

26. Authority. This instruction is the authority for the downsizing of UNAMIR.


MR W. CLIVE
CISS
HQ UNAMIR


Colonel J. Arp
A/COS
HQ UNAMIR

Distribution List:

LIST A
LIST B
LIST C
LIST E
CMOVCON/AIROPS
GEN UNIT SPV

Annex:

A. Tasks/Responsibilities

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. G3 Plans. Responsible for the planning of the withdrawal or downsizing of UNAMIR troop contributing nations. To coordinate the effect relief in place of remaining contingents and to act as the central point of contact for the Movement Coordination Centre.

2. Support Branch (SPT BR). In conjunction with Integrated Support Services (ISS) provide administration and logistic support during the withdrawal/downsizing ie: rations, water, accommodation. Support Branch will be required to modify the resupply plan to the new sector locations as required.

3. In conjunction with Building and Engineering Services identify the following:

- a. Identify a concentration Area (CONC) for the short term storage of vehicles and contingent owned equipment being withdrawn from the area.
- b. Ensure the transit camp in Kigali has been expanded to cater for 1000 personnel.
- c. Provision of packing material and lubricants required for the packing of sensitive equipment and sea move of vehicles.

4. Movement Coordination Centre (MCC). Maintaining direct liaison with MCC UNNY on the withdrawal plan. Responsible for the overall coordination and implementation of the movement plan such as:

- a. Tasking of all UNAMIR movement assets, contracted, chartered or LOA.
- b. Establishing movement control dets at all points of departure ie; Airheads, Rail and Ports.
- c. Responsible for the control and movement of passengers.
- d. Provision of movement advise to contingents.
- e. Issue of Movement Orders.

5. Field Service Administration (FSA). FSA is the central point of contact in the field for all administration, logistic matters such as:

- a. Occupation of new sites, including repositioning of satellite equip.
- b. Receipt of UN owned equipment.
- c. Release from existing land sites.
- d. Hiring of local labour as required.
- e. Purchase of local resources as required.
- f. Act as central point of contact for MCC.

- g. Act as central point of contact for PCIU during the outsurvey; and
- h. Act as central point of contact for FMO during the health/medical inspection of sites.

6. Communications Unit (COMMS UNIT). The Comms unit is the central point of contact for the communication plan. Some specific tasks are:

- a. Physical repositioning of satellite equip as requested by FSA in loc; and
- b. Provision of comms spt to MCC as req'd to enable command and control of convoys both within Rwanda and adjoining countries (if possible).

7. Logistic Support Group (LSG). 95 FSLG is responsible for maintaining logistic support throughout the mission area including transportation support to the withdrawal. 95 FSLG will remain the central point of contact for the MCC for all UNAMIR transport support requirements.

8. Property Control and Inventory Unit (PCIU). PCIU are responsible for conducting all outsurveys and the write off of equipment. PCIU will padlock or seal all containers and advise liaise with MCC to ensure all COE is moved in a timely manner.

9. Military Police (MP). Provide Military Police, if available in roles as follows:

- a. Convoy control within Rwanda;
- b. Convoy control through adjoining countries to POD; and
- c. Passenger and vehicle control at Air POD.

10. Integrated Transport and Maintenance Management (ITMM). The ITMM will be the central point of contact for the return or redistribution of UN owned vehicles. CITMM is to advise the MCC of how many vehicles per Battalion are to be returned to CONC area and how many are to be redistributed (if any).

11. Building and Engineering Service (BES). BES as part of ISS is responsible for the following:

- a. In conjunction with Support Branch identify a secure concentration area for Contingent owned equipment (COE).
- b. BMS is to ensure that the CONC area is prepared to accept COE not later than 28 June 1995.
- c. Upgrading/expansion of the 500 man camp to a 1000 man camp.
- d. Liaison with FSA on the major/minor works required in the sectors.

12. Air Operations. Air Operations are to provide all ground support, fuel and funds if required in support of the Air movements plan and the production of an Air Task Order to ensure that Kigali International Airport authorities are aware of Air movements in support of the withdrawal.

13. Military contingents (MIL CONT). Provide manpower assistance and information as required by MCC.

14. Medical Branch (MED BR). Plan medical support to all phases of the withdrawal/rotation.



ops/33

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

1000.7(DFC)/G/4

FROM: MA TO DFC

DATE: 19 JUNE 1995

SUBJECT: DFC'S BRIEF

1. The DFC will like you to brief him orally on your various department on the following dates.

- a. D COS OPS : Wednesday 21 June 1995 at 1000 hrs.
- b. D COS SP : Tuesday 20 June 1995 at 1600 hrs.
- c. FMO : Monday 19 June 1995 at 1600 hrs.
- d. HAC : Wednesday 21 June 1995 at 1400 hrs.

2. The brief should also be submitted in writing.

3. The location of the brief will be at the FC Conference room.

Distribution List

Internal:

Action:

D COS OPS

D COS SP

FMO

HAC ✓

DHAC

MAJ ALBERT TO PREPARE

on FWD BRIEF to me BY 20/000HRS.

THANK YOU.

[Signature]

Info: MA TO FC

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Seen Dan
19/6

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info to all Hqs

DATE	APPT	SIG	REMARKS
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	DCHAO	28 8/6	
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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 06 Jun 95

REF: AIR OPS 250

TO: All UNAMIR Military and Civilian Personnel

FROM: C. Ouziel
Chief Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: UNAMIR WEEKLY FLIGHT SCHEDULE

1. Due to circumstances beyond our control, we are no longer able to utilize our medium transport aircraft, the Antonov-26. In order to compensate for this shortcoming, we have been utilizing a far more expensive aircraft on a daily basis, in the hopes that a solution to our problem would be forthcoming.

2. We have reached a point where we are certain that we will no longer be able to use the Antonov-26, however the daily use of the Hercules has become a financial liability. In order to keep our operation cost-effective, while maintaining operational capability and flexibility, it has been decided that a modified regular weekly flight schedule will be brought into force.

3. Until further notice, UNAMIR will run regularly-scheduled flights each day except Sunday and Wednesday. Notwithstanding VIP movements and other special requirements, the flight schedule will be as follows:

Schedule for Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday (ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL)

**DEPART NAIROBI AT 0900HRS CHECK-IN AT 0700HRS
ARRIVE KIGALI AT 0945HRS**

**DEPART KIGALI AT 1015HRS CHECK-IN AT 0815HRS
ARRIVE NAIROBI AT 1300HRS**

4. Once again, there are no flights on either Sunday or Wednesday.

5. Thank you for your continued cooperation. Best regards.

FROM : COS

3000.12(OPS)

TO : LIST A, B AND E
MILOB GP HQ
FSO
FORCE ENGR COY
AUSMED
95 FL SG

INFO : CSO
UNCIVPOL
STO
B & R
UNDP

DATE : MAY 95

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT AT NIGHT

Reference:

A. 3000.12(OPS) dated 20 Apr 95. Security of UN vehicles.

1. In view of the recent incidents of vehicles being taken away at gun point and deteriorating law and order situation, movement of UNAMIR vehicles after last light will be restricted to essential minimum. such movement when warranted would be with proper escort and preferably in pairs.

2. Units are requested to restrict their social events to mid day/AM timings and avoid semi official or official transaction slated for evenings.

3. Ack.


**REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
ET DE LA COOPERATION
B.P. 179 KIGALI**

N°0513/03.03/PROT

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise présente ses compliments à la Nonciature Apostolique, aux Missions Diplomatiques et Consulaires accréditées à Kigali, aux Organismes Internationaux ainsi qu'aux Organisations Non-Gouvernementales et a l'honneur de porter à leur connaissance qu'ils sont cordialement invités à une rencontre avec le Chef de l'Etat à KIBEHO, dans la Préfecture de GIKONGORO, ce Jeudi le 27 Avril 1995 à 10h précises.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à la Nonciature Apostolique, aux Missions Diplomatiques et Consulaires accréditées à Kigali, aux Organismes Internationaux ainsi qu'aux Organisations Non-Gouvernementales les assurances de sa haute considération.

- NONCIATURE APOSTOLIQUE
 - MISSIONS DIPLOMATIQUES ET CONSULAIRES
 - ORGANISMES INTERNATIONAUX
 - ORGANISATIONS NON-GOUVERNEMENTALES
- KIGALI



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

File: 5000.26 (Plans)

To: FC
DFC
COS
DCOS SP
FMO
DCMO
CHAO

From: DCOS OPS

Date: 28 Apr 95

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. L. M.' or similar, written over the 'From' field.

Subject: POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR A REVISED MANDATE

Please find attached a revised brief on the possible force structure for a revised mandate for further discussion with SRSG, Political Adviser to DPKO and others as determined by the FC.

BRIEF ON POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE

TO

FULFIL A REVISED MANDATE

- *The force structure identified below should only be implemented if the Rwandan Government agrees to adhere unconditionally to all aspects of the SOMA.*

Proposed Tasks and Troop Requirements - Current Mandate

- Deploy into Sectors as Required (to provide aura of security)
 - 143 communes. One section to visit four communes each day, therefore, 36 section are required. This equates four companies (3 x section per platoon x three platoons per company x four companies per battalion) Two companies would be required for relief and as a reserve. Therefore, two battalions of 800 troops per battalion would suffice and at the same time allow a certain amount of flexibility to react to unforeseen situations.
 - Total: 1600 Troops
 - *If a deterrence is desired, it will call for additional troop strength.*
- Protect Displaced Persons and Refugees
 - Although the return of refugee is a possibility it should not be a force determinant. If the refugees at some time in the future decide to return to Rwanda, which is highly unlikely at this time, an increase to the force structure will be required.
- Provide Armed Escorts to Human Rights Personnel and Representatives from the International Tribunal, including Full Time Protection to the Prosecutors Office
 - 143 x Human Rights Field Officers will each require on the average two troops for protection (286).
 - Protection of the HQ will require a platoon (35 troops).
 - Protection of the 35 x Tribunals representatives will each require on the average two troops (70).
 - Therefore, a 391 troops are required for these tasks which equates to three infantry companies. However, HQ and support elements are also required to command and administer this number of troops (approx 109 troops).
 - Total: 500 Troops

- Assist Operations of Relief Agencies and NGOs
 - No specific troops to tasks; by product of presence and protection troops.
 - Assist in the distribution of aid to communes (integral unit transport, no additional resources required).
 - HQ (six Milobs) plus HAC/MILOB teams (four Milobs per team) in each of the eleven Prefecture (44 Milobs).
 - Total: 50 Milobs
 - *Milobs teams of four will cater for CTO and leave.*
- Monitor Cross Border Movement of Refugee Flow
 - Due to the terrain, a combination of boat (three boats x six Milobs in each) and helicopter (3 helo x 4 Milobs in each) patrols will be required (30 Milobs).
 - Monitoring 15 x border crossings will require a team of three Milobs at each (45 Milobs).
 - HQ/Coord for these elements (10 Milobs)
 - Total: 85 Milobs
 - *If vehicle or foot patrolling of the border is envisaged it would require a significant increase to the force structure (Milobs and formed troops)*
- Monitor/Observe the Conditions in Communes
 - 143 communes. One team to visit four communes each day, therefore, require 36 teams of four Milobs (144 Milobs).
 - One MILOB/HRFO Ready Reaction team (four Milobs per team) for each of the eleven Prefecture (44 Milobs).
 - HQ/Coord (12 Milobs).
 - Total: 200 Milobs
- Train Commune Police and more Gendarmes (to civilianise police)
 - CIVPOL activity. Commissioner to evaluate requirement of current 125 authorised strength.
- Build up Civil Service/Public Servants
 - Political staff to evaluate this requirement.

- Assist in the Establishment of Justice System (judges, lawyers)
 - Engineer elements could assist in vertical construction in prison renovation and construction (See below).

Additional Tasks and Troop Requirements - Peace Building Mandate

- Repair and Improvement of Infrastructure
 - If military involvement is desired, repair of town/commune water supply, construction of roads and bridges and repair of building (schools, government buildings etc) could only be carried out by army engineer elements. It is estimated that a Construction Regt, with heavy plant, would be required. This would be both expensive and likely very difficult to obtain from contributing countries. Furthermore, this is likely best achieved through the international aid community, donor countries and the world bank. However, if this task were incorporated into the force structure it would entail a increase of approximately 500 troops to the force structure.

Support Functions to the Force

- Force Headquarters
 - Provision of command and control, liaison and planning in operations and logistics functions.
 - Total: 55 Troops
- Self Protection Forces
 - Protection Kigali infrastructure, such as UNAMIR HQ, UN facilities and contractors, and the provision of a RRF and escorts (for resupply and VIPs) will require a battalion (800 troops).
 - Total: 800 Troops
- Engineer Support
 - Provision of EOD, limited road and site preparation and limited vertical construction would require a engineer squadron.
 - Total: 200 Troops
- Medical Support
 - The support provided by a medical Support Force would include a level one, two and three treatment facility, trained aero medical evacuation (AME) and road evacuation crews, and preventative medicine advice through environmental health teams. This will also include a Force Medical Officer and staff.
 - Total: 200 Troops

- Signals Support
 - The terrain and the dispersion and location of formed troops will require signal detachments in all prefectures/sectors.
 - Total: 125 Troops
- Logistic Support
 - Continuation of the Integrated Logistics System will be required.
 - Total: 85 Troops

Required Force Structure

- Total Units Required
 - Three battalions (800 pers each battalion)
 - One battalion (-) (500 pers)
 - One engineer squadron (200 pers)
 - One medical company (200 pers)
 - One signal company (125 pers)
 - One Logistic Group (85 pers)
- Total Military Personnel Required

Troops	3,565
Milobs	<u>335</u>
Total Force	<u>3,900</u>

Brief prepared by: LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3 Plans
 Cleared by: COL J. Arp, DCOS OPS
 28 Apr 95

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.26 (Plans)

To: FC
DFC
COS
DCOS SP
FMO
DCMO
CHAO

From: DCOS OPS

Date: 27 Apr 95

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. D. Smith' or similar, written over the 'From:' line.

Subject: POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR A REVISED MANDATE

Please find attached a brief on the possible force structure for a revised mandate. I would appreciate your comments/suggestion by COB 29 Apr 95.

BRIEF ON POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE

TO

FULFIL A REVISED MANDATE

- *The force structure identified below should only be implemented if the Rwandan Government agrees to adhere unconditionally to all aspects of the SOMA.*

Proposed Tasks and Troop Requirements - Current Mandate

- Deploy into Sectors as Required (to provide aura of security)
 - 143 communes. One section to visit four communes each day, therefore, 36 section are required. This equates four companies (3 x section per platoon x three platoons per company x four companies per battalion) Two companies would be required for relief and as a reserve. Therefore, two battalions of 800 troops per battalion would suffice and at the same time allow a certain amount of flexibility to react to unforeseen situations.
 - Total: 1600 Troops
- Protect Displaced Persons and Refugees
 - Although the return of refugee is a possibility it should not be a force determinant. If the refugees at some time in the future decide to return to Rwanda, which is highly unlikely at this time, an increase to the force structure will be required.
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 - 143 x Human Rights Field Officers will each require on the average two troops for protection (286).
 - Protection of the HQ will require a platoon (35 troops).
 - Protection of the 35 x Tribunals representatives will each require on the average two troops (70).
 - Total: 391 Troops
- Assist Operations of Relief Agencies and NGOs
 - No specific troops to tasks; by product of presence and protection troops.
 - Assist in the distribution of aid to communes (integral unit transport, no additional resources required).
 - HQ (five Milobs) plus HAC/MILOB teams (three Milobs per team) in each Prefecture (35 Milobs).
 - Total: 35 Milobs
 - *Milobs teams of three will cater for CTO and leave.*

- Monitor Borders

- Due to the terrain, a combination of boat (three boats x six Milobs in each) and helicopter (3 helo x 4 Milobs in each) patrols will be required (30 Milobs).
- Monitoring 15 x border crossings will require a team of three Milobs at each (45 Milobs).
- HQ/Coord for these elements (10 Milobs)
- Total: 85 Milobs
- *If vehicle or foot patrolling of the border is envisaged it would require a significant increase to the force structure (Milobs and formed troops)*

- Monitor/Observe the Flow of Refugees and Conditions in Communes

- See Monitor Border (previous)
- 143 communes. One team to visit four communes each day, therefore, require 36 teams of three Milobs (108 Milobs).
- One MILOB/HRFO Ready Reaction team (three Milobs per team) for each of the ten Prefecture (30 Milobs).
- HQ/Coord (9 Milobs)
- Total: 147 Milobs

- Train Commune Police and more Gendarmes (to civilianise police)

- CIVPOL activity. Commissioner to evaluate requirement of current 125 authorised strength.

- Build up Civil Service/Public Servants

- Political staff to evaluate this requirement.

- Assist in the Establishment of Justice System (judges, lawyers)

- Engineer elements could assist in vertical construction in prison renovation and construction (See below).

Additional Tasks and Troop Requirements - Peace Building Mandate

- Repair and Improvement of Infrastructure

- If military involvement is desired, repair of town/commune water supply, construction of roads and bridges and repair of building (schools, government buildings etc) could only be carried out by army engineer elements. It is estimated that a Construction Regt, with heavy plant, would be required. This would be both expensive and likely very difficult to obtain from contributing countries. Furthermore, this is likely best achieved through the international aid community, donor countries and the world bank. However, if this task were incorporated into the force structure it would entail a increase of approximately 500 troops to the force structure.

Support Functions to the Force

- Medical Support
 - The support provided by a medical Support Force would include a level one, two and three treatment facility, trained aero medical evacuation (AME) and road evacuation crews, and preventative medicine advice through environmental health teams. This will also include a Force Medical Officer and staff.
 - Total: 200 Troops
- Engineer Support
 - Provision of EOD, limited road and site preparation and limited vertical construction would require an engineer squadron.
 - Total: 200 Troops
- Signals Support
 - The terrain and the dispersion and location of formed troops will require signal detachments in all prefectures/sectors.
 - Total: 125 Troops
- Logistic Support
 - Continuation of the Integrated Logistics System will be required.
 - Total: 85 Troops
- Self Protection Forces
 - Protection Kigali infrastructure, such as UNAMIR HQ, UN facilities and contractors, and the provision of a RRF and escorts (for resupply and VIPs) will require a battalion (800 troops).
 - Total: 800 Troops

Required Force Structure

- Total Units Required
 - Three battalions (800 pers each battalion)
 - One engineer squadron (200 pers)
 - One signal company (125 pers)
 - One medical company (200 pers)
 - One Logistic Group (85 pers)

• Total Military Personnel Required

• Troops	3,401
• Milobs	<u>267</u>
• Total Force	<u>3,668</u>

Brief prepared by: LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3 Plans
Cleared by: COL J. Arp, DCOS OPS
27 Apr 95

HAC

From: DCOS Ops

File No: 3000.12 (Ops)

To: List C
List D

Info: List A

Date: 24 April, 1995.

Subject: PROTECTION OF RETURNEES IN HOME COMMUNES

1. Reports reaching UNAMIR HQ indicates that some IDPs returning to their home communes, especially those in Sectors 4A and 4B, are mistreated and even assaulted by the RPA and other locals.
2. Indications are that these incidents are not being adequately reported. Units are therefore reminded that it is within the UNAMIR mandate to assist/protect citizens of this country whose lives or basic human rights are flagrantly being violated.
3. Units are further advised to inform UNHRFO in their respective sectors when such violations/abuses occur and are to provide the necessary liaison and security to enable them carry out thorough investigations.

FROM : DCOS OPS

3000.12 (Ops)

TO : MILOB GP HQ
TAC HQ
✓SECTOR 3
SECTOR 4B
CHAO

DATE : 23 APRIL 95

SUBJECT : MONITORING OF IDPs AND RPA ACTIVITY AT BUTARE STADIUM

1. Reports received by this HQ indicate that approx 12,000 IDPs from Kibeho DP camp are now concentrated at Butare Stadium which has now been cordoned by RPA troops.
2. To ensure that the IDPs are not unduly targetted by RPA, it is imperative that MILOBS, HR and CIVPOL monitors of sectors 3 and 4B, deploy to the stadium to show maximum UNAMIR presence and to monitor RPA activities in the vicinity of the stadium.
3. CHAO to coord necessary relief assistance and transport with agencies and NGOs.



UNAMIR - MINUAR



To: All UNAMIR Civilian & Military personnel
B&R
UNDP, UNHCR, UNHRFO, UNREO (With a request to inform
all NGOs and UN Agencies)
From: SRSG *Sharon G. Shan*
Date: 11 Apr 95

Subject: SEARCHING OF UNAMIR VEHICLES BY RPA

1. Under SOMA, all UNAMIR vehicles are exempted from being searched by RPA, or any security agencies of the Rwandese government. In practice, this is manifested in another manner through varying interpretations by the parties involved. Rwandan officials interpret the SOMA to read that they have the right to search the personal luggage of members of UNAMIR. UNAMIR's interpretation is that personal property of the members of UNAMIR "...required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR" is immune to search.

2. In a joint UNAMIR/RPA meeting, it was agreed that searches of vehicles could only be conducted under very exceptional circumstances, which may involve the following:

- a. Transportation of unauthorised (non-UN) personnel.
- b. Transportation of unauthorised equipment or stores.
- c. Personnel in the vehicle have been observed committing a crime.

3. As a result of the modified interpretation by the RPA, these searches have nearly become a routine exercise in many areas of Rwanda. Therefore, it is clear that the original understanding of para 2 has been misused. We are actively discussing a more reasonable approach. For the interim all personnel are cautioned to use restraint and diplomacy in these demands for searches. Requesting Milob or formed troop assistance for negotiation and not proceeding through the check point are possible alternative options to allowing the search to take place. All should be reminded that these searches are not worthy of escalation in the use of force resulting in increased tension or injury.

4. When assisting other personnel or agencies such as UNHCR and UNHRFO, Milobs and formed troops should remember it is the responsibility of the various agencies to determine whether or not to subject themselves to searches and under which parameters those searches can or can not be conducted.

②
Staff
Orders
Lush
F.O.
Shan
Lush

5. UNREO's security plan directs its personnel to indicate that their vehicle is owned by the United Nations, is on official business and that they are protected from searches by formal agreement with the government. They are further directed, if the request for search persists, to permit the search but indicate that a report will be filed and forwarded to the host government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6. UNHCR's and UNHCRFOR's personnel have been directed by similar guidelines but are more concerned with the search of pouches. Their personnel have been directed to allow the search of pouches if demands persist but to indicate that documentation in pouches is not to be read.

7. Until an agreed policy is reached with the RPA please ensure these guidelines are followed.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: DCOS (Sp)

To: List A,B,D

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG 8

Date: 3 Apr 95

Subject: UNAMIR ACTIVITIES - 7 APRIL 1995

1. The SRSG has directed, in the attached directive that on 7 April 1995 UNAMIR offices will be closed and the UN Flag will fly at half mast.

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Staff A
Note + File
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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

P.O. Box 749, Kigali, Rwanda

The Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan on behalf of all United Nations personnel in Rwanda joins the Government and people of Rwanda in commemorating a day of mourning for the victims of genocide.

On 7 April 1995, all offices of UNAMIR and United Nations Agencies will remain closed and the United Nations flag will fly at half-mast.

Beginning on April 3rd, Radio UNAMIR will observe a commemorative week culminating on April 7th with a statement from the Secretary General of the United Nations that will be broadcast live by the Special Representative to Rwanda.

The Special Representative wishes to express his sincere condolences to the Government and people of Rwanda on this tragic occasion and reiterates the hope of the international community for a lasting peace in the Great Lakes Region.

03 April 1995

② MA

For your action
Thank.

COS

Younis

FC has copy

LT CO 2

MA

3 Apr 95

File

All boxes
N605
Field Officers

IMVAHO NO 1070 27 MARCH - 2 APRIL 1995 PAGE 9

HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATIONS IN THE COUNTRY MAY HAVE OTHER HIDDEN AGENDA!

It is now almost one year since Rwandans were victims of the most atrocious crimes the whole world has ever seen. Babies were savagely killed, young girls and boys were slaughtered with machetes, pregnant women were forced to miscarry, old men were thrown into toilets. Many others were thrown into rivers as the gospel of Mugesera Leon predicted [Mugesera was an extremist Hutu who, in a meeting of his party, had made an appeal to Hutus to throw Tutsis into the Nyabarongo river].

All such evils happened before the eyes of the international community, worse still, those who were in the country fled the country together with their families. The international newspapers got their scoops. Radio and television broadcasts and images abounded with dead bodies in the Nyabarongo and Akagera rivers. These are of course places where the International Journalists could reach because they did not see what happened in what was known as "Zone Turquoise"[sic] where today people are discovering mass graves and destroyed houses. Who can tell the numbers of people who passed through Kivu Lake and Rusizi river?

Such atrocities were stopped by RPA together with other honest Rwandans who did not support the killers. The part played by foreigners was to create Turquoise pretending to protect Rwandans, and at the end they told them: "We are going back home, loot and cross the border."

When the genocide was stopped, those who were following events on televisions rushed into Rwanda to defend human rights. You ask yourself if they came to protect bones because they should have intervened when they were watching televisions. It is not only Human Rights Monitors, even UN saw that the genocide was over and increased the number of her troops, but when the situation was very hot, they decreased the number of soldiers to remain with an insignificant unit.

To tell the truth, how can UN explain the fact that they doubled their soldiers in Rwanda when genocide was stopped! What reasons did Boutros Boutros Ghali have to take such a decision to reduce troops when the situation was worse! Maybe he was advised by his special representative Roger Booh Booh, and on the decision of doubling his soldiers, perhaps he was advised by his special advisor Francois Mitterrand.

Doubtless UNAMIR has something positive good in its mandate, but not regarding the defence of Human Rights. There are some criticisms, for instance, that UNAMIR is protecting such places as Gikongoro camps which shelter many people who participated in massacres and genocide whereas they came to fight against human rights abuses. Why do they not disarm them? They are even cultivating drugs with UNAMIR's knowledge! For how long will the Government continue to stand that? Instead, UNAMIR soldiers are killing one another because of prostitutes though they communicated on Radio that one had accused his comrade of having been absent without permission! Such a man who kills his brother and then commits suicide, if he does not respect his own life, to what extent are we going to expect him to defend human rights for a Rwandan!

Apart from that it is reported all over the country that UNAMIR is trying to hide the suspects of genocide. Even sometimes UNAMIR moves people from places to other places saying that they are bringing them to Justice. For instance they take someone from

Kibungo to Kigali, isn't that a sign to show that they do not trust the local security apparatus? There are reports which state that some UNAMIR soldiers visit people and tell them: "You should trust us more than the National Army because we have similar features."

What happened in Byumba is quite disgraceful. In addition to killing a Rwandan, had they the right to take the dead person to their Head Quarters without the local administration being informed? I cannot say any thing more to avoid misinterpretation that I am bringing tensions among Rwandans.

Progressive think that such misdeeds by UNAMIR due to the fact that their mission is coming to an end. In order to stay in the country, there should be insecurity. That would allow UN to stay in the country. If there is security they can not justify their presence unless they say that "interahamwe are going to launch a war" as a British Television recently showed where interahamwe are under training near Rusizi. The Mobutu Government denied it was not in Zaire. Or perhaps Zaire has given that part to Rwanda as happened during the defeated regime when the Rwandan Government had given Shonga sector to Uganda denying the presence of RPF in Rwanda.

If UNAMIR or UN continues to be in Rwanda for a long time, it will replace the local administration. The Special Representative will change into a Resident Representative and he will have his own press while the local public press will be controlled by the private press. I have reasons for saying this: it is said that Rwandans who fled cannot return home without the UNAMIR presence and Radio UNAMIR programmes can only convince people to go back home and work for reconciliation. This is like undermining the administration in place.

UNAMIR is not the only body mandated by the UN to defend Human Rights in Rwanda, there is also an association of Human Rights called HCFRO which will have 150 Monitors all over the country. They are like 'Bourgmestres.' What is scandalous is that those Human Rights Monitors have changed their primary mandate of investigating the genocide which took place in Rwanda and they turned their mission in what they called 'human rights abuses' which are being perpetrated. Yes, they should do that but they should not hide the truth.

As it has been stated by some members of that Association, some people resigned after having noticed that their leaders had changed the objectives of their mandate. The genocide which took place in Rwanda can in no way be forgotten as some developed countries are trying to make it.

The same applies to Amnesty International. Someone who was sent to investigate human rights abuses was told about what happened in Gikongoro during genocide, instead of taking into account what he was told, he said: "You might have learnt this from an arrogant Tutsi." What is such a man doing in the country? Did he come to laugh at the victims! I wonder how a report of such a man will look like?

More and more is said about HCR and ICRC, it is not necessary to expand on that again.

All that shows clearly that there is a plan to cover up what happened in Rwanda so as to make people forget. If we had to accuse all those who participated in genocide, some UNAMIR and UN leaders may find themselves at Arusha standing before Judge Goldstone! If he will ever start his work, it is still a dream because there are many important men who are fighting against that Tribunal.

However, given the fact that we have some courageous Rwandans who fought the genocide, we still have the possibility to show what happened so that no one can succeed in making us forget. Such men should not rest, we are now crossing very hard times, we

should fight against anybody who wants to hide the truth that no genocide ever existed in Rwanda. The planners, the executors and the supporters should be found and punished accordingly.

Otherwise, to trust these international associations for Human Rights is worthless. We saw that those whom we fought against have turned out to be the privileged. We should pay close attention to those associations. There must be what we can call " Human rights industry" and perhaps some people come in the country for their own interests.

Kalibata Anaclet

Translated by UNREO -INFO UNIT
John Bosco Karengera

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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DCMO-8 4/6
Copy to Secs and B.S.
NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
SMBO

From: DCOS (Sp)

To: List A,B,D

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG 8

Date: 3 Apr 95

Subject: UNAMIR ACTIVITIES - 7 APRIL 1995

1. The SRSG has directed, in the attached directive that on 7 April 1995 UNAMIR offices will be closed and the UN Flag will fly at half mast.

②

Staff A

File

May

①



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

P.O. Box 749, Kigali, Rwanda

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Our flag in MINUB HQ to be half-mast.

Beginning on April 3rd, Radio UNAMIR will observe a commemorative week culminating on April 7th with a statement from the Secretary General of the United Nations that will be broadcast live by the Special Representative to Rwanda.

The Special Representative wishes to express his sincere condolences to the Government and people of Rwanda on this tragic occasion and reiterates the hope of the international community for a lasting peace in the Great Lakes Region.

03 April 1995

②) MA

*For your action
Thank.*

COS

Gen. Sec.

He has copy

*LT COZ
JMA
3 Apr 95*

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is a global organization that was created in 1945 to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and promote economic and social progress and cooperation.

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: Lists A, B & D

From: COS

Date: 29 March 1995

SUBJECT: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

References:

- A: UNAMIR ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO.002/94/Rev 1 dated 09 Mar 95.
- B: SRSG's BULLETIN NO.1 DT. 14 Mar 95
- C: This Office letter on Conduct of UNAMIR Military Personnel dated 09 Jan 95.

1. Recently, there has been an increase in the number of incidents involving UNAMIR Military Personnel and civilians in avoidable controversial circumstances. Though there is a need by formed troops and Milobs to maintain constant liaison and interaction with the local population to instill mutual confidence and create a secure environment, these relationships should not degenerate into altercations at public houses involving local women under the pretext of excessive drinking or other excuses.

2. It must be remembered by all that such incidents tarnish the image of UNAMIR and are totally counter-productive to the overall mission and aim of UNAMIR. All contingent, sector and unit/sub-unit Commanders will ensure that their Command remains fully disciplined and does not indulge in any activity, be it drinking in public places, prostitution or selling of UN rations, goods meant for troops.

3. The Government of Rwanda and the RPA in particular are keenly waiting for opportunities to defame UNAMIR and would exploit every occasion presented to them. In order to guard against such attempts, contingents and units are requested to forward factual and accurate incident reports or special reports immediately on occurrence, to enable this HQ to counter adverse implications.

4. Please acknowledge. Regards.

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To: CAO
CISS
Chief Protocol
Chief Air Ops
UNREO
UNDP
UNHCR
UNHRFOR
Distribution Lists A, B, C, D & E.

Info: FC
COS

From: SRSG

Date: 28 Mar 95

Subject: AUTHORITY TO TASK UNAMIR HELICOPTERS

Reference:

A. Meeting SRSG/Force Commander dated 07 Mar 95.

1. Over recent weeks there have been instances of UNAMIR helicopter flights being offered to outside agencies without the approval of the appropriate helicopter tasking authority within HQ UNAMIR. On occasions, this has resulted in unnecessary disruption to the daily helicopter programme, and the cancellation of other important sorties. I have discussed the matter with the Force Commander during the meeting at Reference, where it was agreed that addressees should be reminded of the formal arrangements for tasking UN helicopters.

2. I have delegated the administrative responsibility for UNAMIR aviation jointly to the CAO and Force Commander. However, while the overall administration of helicopter flying is the responsibility of the CAO's Air Operations Staff, they should not be plagued by direct requests for helicopter tasking. This is the responsibility of our helicopter tasking officer, S02 G3 Air. He is responsible to me, through the CAO and Force Commander, for the efficient management of all UN helicopter flying in Rwanda. Accordingly, in future, no helicopter flying will be permitted unless comprehensive helicopter tasking requests are passed to S02 G3 Air at least 24 hours in advance of the sortie required. Regardless of the signatory, the helicopter tasking request does not in itself constitute approval for the flight concerned. Tasking will be accepted or rejected by S02 G3 Air based on the following priorities:

a. Pri 1. Casevac, Search and Rescue and other urgent and immediate missions.

- b. Pri 2. Operational deployment of troops in support of the UN mandate in Rwanda by day and night. Medevac of stabilised casualties and VIP tasks.
- c. Pri 3. Routine UNAMIR support tasks including recce and surveillance missions, air patrols and troop redeployment.
- d. Pri 4. Routine UN tasking for other agencies.
- e. Pri 5. NGO humanitarian support operations (and only when tasking requests are approved by me).

3. Additionally, addressees should be aware that the UN has recently instituted a system of cost recovery for all helicopter flights. This means that agencies using UN helicopters may be charged for the flying hours they expend. Where sorties include passengers from a number of agencies, the cost will be shared on a pro-rata basis. Accordingly, helicopter task requests will only be accepted on the basis that the signatory accepts the financial liability for the requested task. Heads of Department may therefore wish to review their arrangements for helicopter tasking, to ensure that adequate financial delegations are in place.

BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE GENOCIDE

Major Don Mc Neil, UNAMIR

First of all, in as far as the UNAMIR Mandate is concerned. The UNAMIR force was sent to Rwanda on a Chapter 6 resolution. What that meant was that we were to monitor a peace operation that was presently in effect and that we were armed and mandated to use deadly force in self-defense and in the protection of UN installations. Chapter 7 on the other hand, means that you are sent in by the Security Council to impose peace in a particular country or conflict. Examples of a Chapter 7 operation would of course be Operation "Restore Hope" which took place in Somalia, in fact the "Operation Turquoise" which took place in this country under the United Nations and if you want Operation "Desert Storm" in Iraq. It must be understood that the forces that were here in-country prior to the start of the conflict were equipped with self-defense weapons. Chapter 7 forces which are sent into theatre will be equipped to fight. One only has to look at the difference between how UNAMIR was armed and how the French were armed when they came into this country. The French were equipped with mortars, heavy anti-tank weapons, attack helicopters and fighter ground attack aircraft. Certainly the UNAMIR force that was here were not equipped with those type of weapons.

Second of all, in the case of the conflict here in Rwanda, very early on in the conflict, the Belgian contingent were accused of complicity in the death of the President. At that particular time, the Belgians had they stayed here would, in my view, probably have been fighting against the local authorities as they were considered at that time to be an enemy force to the Rwandan authorities. That certainly would have caused some difficulties in their ability to operate as members of the United Nations force in Rwanda. ^{under the revised mandate} Another thing that I feel should be considered is that, in the early days of the conflict, certain countries put their troops in theatre under a specific set of rules or a specific agreement which that country had made directly with the Security Council. That agreement or set of rules dictated what was expected of those soldiers once they were put in theatre. At that particular time, you have to realize that we had military observers from various countries here in Rwanda who were unarmed and were under a mandate that they did not need to be armed. That was the agreement that the home country made. It was then the decision of that home country to arm those observers and use them to fight within the theatre of operations. ^{is reasonable to assume discussion} It was unreasonable to think that the diplomacy and discourse that would have to take place in that particular instance between the Security Council and the host country would not take a reasonable amount of time.

UNAMIR troops were reduced from 2500 to 400 troops. This decision was made by not by the forces on the ground but by the international community. The force commander was given the orders to reduce a force and keep only 400 troops on the ground to monitor the situation. At that time UNAMIR was given the mandate to try to arrange a cease fire between the opposing forces and to try to assist wherever possible with humanitarian relief throughout the country. In the early days, in addition to arranging for the evacuation of the Belgian peacekeepers and the Bangladesh peacekeepers (Belgium and Bangladesh had decided to repatriate their soldiers to their home countries rather than allow them to continue to fight in Rwanda) the force was also involved with the evacuation of foreign nationals prior to the intervention of the French and Belgian forces. The soldiers who were left in Rwanda at that time were considerably involved in those operations. I do not

want to speak on the behalf of any of the peacekeepers who were here in that first week, that in fact were in fact involved in convoys and had to pass through road blocks en route where there was actually in fact slaughter and massacres taking place on the routes on which they were travelling. That is, first of all, an explanation of the what the two mandates consist of, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. It is important to note that we are still under Chapter 6 in this country and were never ordered to function under Chapter 7 mandate.

The second portion of my presentation will involve my personal memories and perceptions and with this I seek to demonstrate that the type of governmental authority that was in place in the early part of the war was, as mentioned earlier, acting without international humanitarian laws and rules which govern societies. Even UNAMIR had difficulties dealing with what was representing the authority here in the country during the war. It is a very strange situation when you have in front of you a high ranking professional soldier who has been trained in foreign countries who is telling you on his word then realizing that his authority means nothing to the thugs on the street.

I will just outline some of my memories of Kigali in April through July. I can remember upon my arrival meeting some of the Military Observers and foreign troops that were involved in the evacuations at that time, and seeing the drawn expressions on their faces as they were carrying out their duties with all that was going on around them.

I was present at formal discussions where high ranking members of the Rwandan authorities gave their guarantee for the safety of threatened Rwandan citizens who were to be put under UNAMIR escort while moving through the city. In one such situation, we were then given this agreement from the highest ranking authority within the government and while en route, the convoy was stopped by drunken militia thugs at a road block. Completely disregarding the agreement, we then have to sit and negotiate with the one of the members of the militia as his cronies wanted to kill the people we were trying to evacuate. At that time, no matter who the highest ranking authority was, or what they said, to the people on the road blocks that authority meant nothing.

Agreements on the safe passage of people being negotiated with the government authorities could not be implemented until they were agreed to by a room full of young supposed "leaders" dressed in various colourful uniforms. Each one of them represented a small cell of some self-defense group or a neighbourhood. At one of these meetings the head of the gendarmerie was "shouted down" by the local members of the Interhamwe.

On many occasions, we received requests from people outside of the country asking that we rescue their friends and family from areas of the city where they were stuck. We received many of these requests, and most of them involved going to extremely dangerous areas of the city. Realizing that there were up to twenty or thirty of roadblocks to negotiate, and realizing that, militarily, with a force of only 250 armed soldiers in the entire country, we did not have the forces available to go in and ensure their safety going out. We often heard, after going to a certain home and not finding people there, that the militia and the Interhamwe would follow up and enter the house just after the departure of UN troops.

In the peace talks between the RPF and the former government forces, the RPF had stated that, as a prerequisite for cease fire, the massacres must stop before any talk of a cease fire was possible. I remember, passing a note to the deputy force commander at the peace talks, informing him that, in fact, another massacre had occurred while the negotiations were taking place.

It was, at that time, impossible to move freely about the city, we had to negotiate at every single road block. We were stopped at one road block and a boy of only eight or nine years old leaned into the truck with a grenade in each of his hands. His task was to be a part of the "fighting force" of that particular road block.

The phrase "C'est la guerre, il faut comprendre, c'est la guerre", was an excuse for any form of senseless killing taking place throughout the city.

Also at this time the Prefect of Kigali's bodyguards were disarmed in Nyamirambo by drunken militia men who then turned the arms to shoot into an orphanage.

There were 24 road blocks in the Nyamirambo area and as I tried to negotiate my way through them I was often accused, as a Canadian, of being Belgian and harassed.

One particularly frustrating situation was the lack of consistency or criteria for passage at the road blocks. A group of military observers on their way out of town on patrol negotiated their way through three road blocks and were turned back at the fourth, only to then have to negotiate their way back through the road blocks they had just passed.

We had to complete all our operations in the city before 1:00PM because after 1:00 the people at the roadblocks were completely drunk and could not be negotiated with.

Radio RTLM announced over the airwaves that the force commander was an RPF mercenary and was also accused of personally shooting down the President's aircraft on April 6, 1994.

The Ghanaian troops, while evacuating people by convoy, were constantly shot at. Although dangerous and frustrating for the troops they still showed up to run another convoy the next day.

There were also reports by the ICRC that Tutsi wounded who were being carried by ambulance to their compound were pulled from the ambulance and killed or hacked to death on the spot in front of the drivers. This directly effected our operations and effectiveness in moving Tutsi from one section of the city to another.

Military Observers had to bribe their way through roadblocks in order to follow orders. Since the military and the UN do not provide soldiers and observers with bribe money, the troops had to use their own.

Finally, I must admit that on the 4th of July when Kigali city finally fell to the RPF, I felt a great sense of relief. It was amazing to watch how Kigali, after only 72 hours under RPF rule, returned so quickly to some form of normalcy. There was an immediate

change.

About what happened to the Belgian Peacekeepers. On the night of the 7th of April, the former Prime Minister Agathe had 5 Ghanaian troops that were attached to her and assigned to protect her at all times. There was considerable fighting within the city and the Prime Minister requested additional security be placed at her residence. The call was answered by a Belgian Lieutenant, who was operating in Kigali city and he moved to the location with 8 troops and 4 vehicles. When they arrived at the location, after having had to negotiate their way through several road blocks, they found that the house was being fired upon. The Belgians managed to get in to the compound and meet up with the Ghanaian soldiers but were soon after forced to take cover as they were immediately being fired upon. In the meantime the Prime Minister and the two gendarmes who were attached to her had escaped from the residence in an attempt to flee the area. At this point in time the Belgian and Ghanaian peacekeepers were surrounded by the Presidential Guard. They were also equipped with two armoured cars. They were outnumbered and they were told, by the officer in command of the Presidential Guard, that if they laid down their weapons that they would then be escorted back to UNAMIR headquarters. They received authorization to lay down their by their commander.

They were then bundled into a vehicle and taken to Camp Kigali. When they were brought into Camp Kigali they were forced to the ground, and were then beaten by the Rwandan government troops with iron bars and sticks. They were also kicked and punched continuously and relentlessly. The Rwandan army officers initially tried to calm their troops down and stop the beating, but it was to no avail the soldiers carried on. The soldiers were brought into a sentry room. At this point, the survivors indicate, one of the Belgians was shot point blank and killed. Inside the sentry room the violence continued. The Presidential Guard commander did nothing to intervene. The Ghanaians and one military observer from Togo were separated from the Belgians and brought to another area. As they were dragged out of the room and across the compound they heard the firing taking place behind them in the room they had just left.

The force commander then arrived at Camp Kigali and arranged for the release of the Ghanaians and the Togolese military observer and they were brought back to headquarters. By the time the force commander arrived, it was too late, the Belgians had already been killed and he was denied access to see them. He then went and made further arrangements with the military authorities and finally he was allowed to view the bodies of the soldiers which had then been taken to the hospital in Kigali. He arranged to have the bodies put into a more dignified manner and moved them to King Faical Hospital and from there they were flown back to Belgium.

Q: Many people said that they saw french troops in Kigali in the early part of the war. Where there any French troops in Kigali, before Operation Turquoise?

A: No, not to my knowledge.

Q: We were hiding from government troops at St. Andre church in Nyamirambo. We tried to call UNAMIR many times requesting evacuation and they did not respond. We wrote a letter to UNAMIR on the 1st of May there were about 100 people who signed that

letter. On the 8th of May the soldiers came and killed thirty people. As the war continued, the military came in and set up a mortar from which they launched mortar fire to which the RPA would respond. In early June the soldiers came and killed every one who was left. Why didn't UNAMIR help the hundreds of people who were trapped at St. Andre's Church?

A: I think it is important to remember that there were only 250 armed troops with UNAMIR in Rwanda at the time. Firstly, those troops were protecting Rwandan citizens who had taken refuge in UNAMIR compounds, at Amahoro stadium, King Faical Hospital, Mille Collines Hotel, the Meridian Hotel and the Airport. Most of the troops were involved in that particular operation. We also did an assessment and discussed what we had learned from negotiations with the "Authorities" up until that time, and given the number of road blocks between the St. Andre and escape (about 24 or 25 roadblocks manned by Interhamwe), the extreme risk had to be calculated into the equation as well as the ability of or possible failure of unarmed military observers to negotiate their way through twenty-five road blocks while carrying 100 people to safety. The second thing was there was still fighting going on between both opposing forces in that area and we had to obtain a truce before we could load these people into a vehicle and drive them to safety. Based on the risk factor, the narrowness of the Nyamirambo valley and the possibility that the operation might not be able to get in and negotiate a cease fire unless we were given a Chapter 7 and left all other operations taking the entire fighting force to go in and secure the area we felt the risk to be too great. The risk was not only to the troops but, if the mission did fail chances are that all the people being transported would have been killed as well as the entire fighting force. It basically came down to two choices; one - we could try to bluff our way through, or two - we would have to fight our way in and our way out. At that time we just didn't have the troops to do it. It is also important to note that the recognized government was at that time the former or interim government and that the security of the Rwandan was in the hands of the Rwandan authorities.

Q: My point is that even at the time that the letter was written by those stranded in St. Andre, the UNAMIR forces had come in to evacuate the white missionaries who were next door. This Chapter 7 is applied to some and not to others when it comes to evacuation.

A: I would have to check on that. I know that there were two priests in the area when the fighting began. They say that they ran from the location to the Red Cross. They were then picked-up by UNAMIR at the Red Cross and brought to UNAMIR headquarters. I know that we did send one mission in with the Prefect of Kigali. As I mentioned earlier the drunken militia members then disarmed the bodyguards of the Prefect and fired into an orphanage in the area. One priest came out to assist with one of the wounded and "fell" into the truck with the wounded person and came out with one of our guys at that time.

Faustin Kagame, Journalist

I would like to talk about the negation of the genocide and all of the forms that this negations takes. This genocide was prepared at the same time as the arguments for its negation. I would like to tell you about an astonishing story that I heard on the BBC yesterday morning. The RPF was suing the dictionary "Petit Robert." The June, 1994

version of "Petit Robert" said the following, "The RPF shot down the plane of President Habyarimana, which provoked massacres and the exodus of 2 million people, who were protected by France." For me, this is the worst form of negation that I have ever heard about the genocide. I would like to remind you all that 1 million people were killed here, and that the worst thing that can be done is to negate their memory. This is just a way of spitting on their common graves.

I would also like to explore the idea of the "tribal war" between Hutus and Tutsis. This "war" was sparked by the anger of the Hutu people following the assassination of their president. Obviously, the promoters of this idea are the organizers of the genocide themselves. In other words they want to arrive at the point where they can say "It was everyone who did this, not us." Though it is a small, easily identifiable group, this idea was present even in their organization of the genocide.

The second form of negation that this text evokes is the intentional confusion between genocide and cholera and the flight of refugees. In Europe, it was the images of the exodus that dominated the TV, while the genocide went without TV coverage. There were no journalists in Rwanda during the genocide. I was here in Kigali during all of these events, and I saw only two photographers who were here after April 6th. Rwanda was not a major news story at the time, and became one only with the extraordinary phenomenon of the exodus. Then the TV cameras came, but their view of the situation was that these refugees were fleeing the genocide of the RPF. They thought that it was the "rebels" who were massacring the population. After that, Rwanda became Bukavu and Goma, became images of the international community coming to save the population. The genocide of a million people passed unnoticed by the international community.

The third form of negotiation is to pretend that the genocide is still taking place, that the government of Rwanda is organizing another genocide. You have probably read articles that say that the new government is intentionally destabilizing the situation, without mentioning that the new government does not have the means to establish the security of the country, and has asked the international community to help it in establishing security.

Unfortunately, there is another form of negation which is implicated in the International Tribunal. These include the limitation of terms, the time allowed for investigations and the seat of the Tribunal itself, all of this leads us to think that Rwandans aren't considered human beings who deserve justice, who merit that attention be paid to their sufferings. I would hope that the international community will not take a part in this kind of revisionism and to kill us a second time.

Lieutenant Jean Marie Cameron, RPA

They were not yet killing people in missions. People took refuge in missions. The only thing that the international community could think of was food. They gave us food, but we couldn't stay in Rwanda. We took refuge in neighboring countries. When we arrived there, they continued to give us food. In 1963 there were more massacres. People fled into neighboring countries, and the international community again gave us food. In 1967 there were more massacres, planned massacres, organized by the government and implemented by unemployed youths who had been trained to kill. In 1973 the Second Republic orchestrated more massacres, this time of the intellectuals, university professors

intellectual effort to refer to the past, because the reference was made at exactly the same time on exact same station. And still the international community did nothing. Our failure in Rwanda will have even a greater cost than our failure in Somalia in the future.

Major Don McNeal, UNAMIR

I would like to add that at this same time there were Ghanaian, Tunisian and Canadian troops on the ground, waiting, just like everyone else was, for relief troops to come. It's true. They did not come until after the conflict was over. I would also like to add a point on General Delleaie. When he was told that his force was to be reduced from 2,500 to 400 people, he had two choices. He could have stayed at his headquarters at the Amahoro Hotel, sandbagged the building and done nothing, just observed what was happening and not intervened at all. Instead, he did what he could with the forces he had available on the ground. He had 400 UN troops here covering the entire country of Rwanda. He had been promised other troops, but none came.

Charles Petrie, UNREO

It wasn't UNAMIR that let down Rwanda, it was the international community. UNAMIR was not allowed to intervene.

Speaker

The Security Council was the executive organ of the UN in Rwanda. We appreciated the fact that certain of our leaders were protected by UNAMIR. Many of them were killed in the end. In the end I can't excuse what the international community did, but let's look at things directly. Up to now, no one has acknowledged our own responsibility, the responsibility of Rwandans in this affair. Who taught us to kill each other? No one. What must we do now? In my opinion, as long as we do not accept the fact that this country belongs to all of us, and that everyone who is a Rwandan citizen has the right to live in this small country, it we have no right to condemn the international community. It is us who are at the heart of all of this. If we are incapable of resolving our problems ourselves, the international community cannot do anything for us. The problems of daily life in Rwanda, it is us who must live them, it isn't the international community. What the international community can bring us is support to help us do what we do not have the financial resources to do. They should only be advisors, the implementation must be ours. If reconciliation is not possible in this country, if justice is not possible in this country, if we cannot share all of the potential which exists in this country, all of us Rwandans, it isn't worth condemning the international community. Let's stop killing each other. I am sure that if we start right now to massacre each other again, that the international community will leave. They will leave, and will we be able to accuse them again of abandoning us? It isn't true and it isn't fair. Let's stop massacring each other, let's accept each other as we are and then things will work out. It is possible for us to work things out, it is possible. Why have we suffered from so much intolerance? Let's ask ourselves this question. What is the source of this problem? I am 34 years old. For years I heard Hutu, Tutsi and I never knew what it meant. In my family I never learned these things. In school I did not learn these things. I only learned that the Hutu, Tutsi split existed when I began to work for the government in 1994. Who invented these terms? We accuse the colonialists of having done it. When the whites arrived here did they really invent these terms, or did they exist before. If the colonialists invented them, then they should be condemned. It was us, the Rwandans who invented these terms. If the

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: FC

FROM: Maj MacNeil HAC

DATE: 29 Mar 95

SUBJECT: UNREO SEMINAR ON GENOCIDE

1. This seminar was held about two months ago under the sponsorship of UNREO. The aim of the seminar was to educate the newly arrived UN and NGO agency personnel who had not witnessed what had taken place in Rwanda and were consequently unable to relate the newly formed Government's actions with regards to the operations of security forces under their control. Many aid workers viewed the new government as being of the same ilk or worse than the previous authorities without in fact being aware of what the previous government had perpetrated in Rwanda.
2. Mr Charles Petrie saw this as a hinderance to humanitarian operations, particularly in view of the vast humanitarian support being given to the refugees in Zaire and in the camps in Sector 4 while limited concern was shown towards the survivors of the genocide. He decided that the seminar would be a means of educating the humanitarian community on what took place in Rwanda.
3. UNAMIR was requested to provide someone to speak on UNAMIR operations during the war. It was asked that someone who had been with the force during the war participate and after verifying with Colonel Yaache it was decided that I would participate in the seminar.
4. It should be noted that the crowd was not exactly friendly as many present, particularly the Rwandese, felt that the UNAMIR force under Gen Dallaire should have immediately saved the country from the previous government albeit with only 400 troops. To my chagrin I found this out as I was challenged by the participants at the seminar.
5. While UNAMIR rather than the international community is perceived to have been responsible for what happened in April-May, the seminar served also to educate the participants that it was not the troops on the ground who decided what the UN should do in Rwanda but rather the participant's representatives in the UN, specifically the international community.
6. I have recently been informed that the UN has plans to publish the entire seminar in book form. Prior to giving my approval to the authors, I told them that I would first have to clear this with my Force Commander.

7. Attached therefore are the points I covered during this seminar which they wish to use in the book. Following your approval I will submit them to UNREO.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D.J. MacNeil', with a large, stylized loop at the end.

D.J. MacNeil

Maj

HAC Ops

REVISION OF TEXT GENOCIDE A COLLECTIVE MEMORY

INTRODUCTION

I have read over the text which I assume is a word for word transcript of what I presented during the seminar. I was not aware at the time that there were plans to publish a book. For this reason I should like to summarize what I said in the seminar rather than to be published word for word. I think that this would be fair, and represent better the UNAMIR position rather than just a personal perspective. The following then is a third person discourse on the points I presented.

I have not included the details of the slaughter of the Belgian peacekeepers and I do not feel that it would be appropriate for these details to be included without the express permission of Secretary General, the Belgian Government and the relatives of the deceased.

" Major D.J. MacNeil was a member of the UNAMIR peacekeeping force during the civil war in Rwanda. He arrived in theatre on the 18th of Apr 94 and remained in Kigali throughout the duration of the civil war. The section of UNAMIR in which he worked was involved in monitoring the security and humanitarian conditions of the internally displaced people in camps under UNAMIR protection and where possible those in the Government controlled areas of Kigali. He was also involved in negotiations for the safe passage of Rwandan citizens between front lines.

He was invited to speak at the conference to provide the perspective of the UNAMIR troops who remained in Rwanda during the war.

Major MacNeil commenced his presentation by explaining to the participants the difference between a Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 mandate as it applies to peacekeeping operations. His purpose for this was to explain to the participants at the seminar why UNAMIR troops did not use deadly force from the onset of hostilities.

He explained that a Chapter 6 resolution involves the use of deadly force in self defence and in the protection of UN installations and material. Chapter 7, on the other hand, involves authorization by the Security Council to use deadly force to establish law and order even through the use of deadly force against the belligerents. Any authorization for troops to use deadly force against the citizens of a host country must be given by the international community through the Security Council. He went on to stress the fact that at no time was the UNAMIR mandate changed to Chapter 7 which would authorize UNAMIR forces to engage Rwandan government forces or citizens operating with the various militias and self defence groups. He also felt that the authorization of the participating countries would have to be sought to enable the troops to revert to Chapter 7 operations and considerable discussion would undoubtedly be required before the countries gave their approval.

He felt that UNAMIR was equipped for Chapter 6 operations and not Chapter 7. He gave examples of Chapter 7 forces such as those sanctioned by the Security Council for operations during the Gulf War of 1990, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Op Turquoise during the French intervention in Rwanda. During the civil war UNAMIR was equipped with small arms for use in self defence and some heavy weapons to protect installations. The French forces under Op Turquoise were given a Chapter 7 mandate and were equipped with a full array of offensive weapons such as anti- tank weapons, mortars, attack helicopters and fighter attack aircraft. These forces were adequately equipped to engage either of the opposing forces while retaining a reasonable chance of success.

He stated that the decision to reduce the UNAMIR force from 2,500 troops to 400 was a decision made by the international community. The Force Commander was given orders to reduce the force to 400. A change of mandate was given the Force which tasked it with attempting to arrange a ceasefire between the Government forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army and assisting wherever possible, with humanitarian relief operations in the country. The Force remained under Chapter 6 rules of engagement for the execution of this revised mandate. In addition to working to implement this new mandate, the reduced force was also involved in the evacuation of foreign nationals and UN civilian workers prior to the arrival of combat forces dispatched from foreign countries. The Force also had to arrange for the repatriation of the Belgian and Bangladesh troops called home by their governments. The evacuation of the Belgians was a significant issue as they had been implicated by the Rwandese citizens as having been responsible for the death of the president.

The second portion of his presentation served to illustrate to the participants the difficulty the UN forces had in dealing with the Rwandese authorities who were at this time still recognized by the international community and the local defence groups who had mobilized to protect themselves from an enemy force they perceived to be present in their neighbourhoods.

He reflected on his first experiences in arriving in Kigali and observing the gaunt faces of Military Observers who had been involved in the evacuation operations while the killing of civilians was taking place around them.

He stated that he had been involved in negotiations whereby the leadership within the Government had guaranteed the safe passage of civilians under UNAMIR escort. During the evacuation however, the authority of the leaders would be ignored by militias manning roadblocks and the peacekeepers at this time reverted to attempting to avoid the mass killing the citizens under escort through negotiation or through force as a last resort.

Negotiations for the safe passage of civilians could not be agreed upon by the Government leadership alone, but rather required the agreement of the heads of various extremist militia and self defence groups. On one occasion, he was present when a high ranking official of the Rwandese Gendarmerie was shouted down by Interahamwe during discussions on plans to evacuate Rwandese citizens trapped in Nyamirambu. The evacuation had to be cancelled as security could not be guaranteed by the authorities.

Armed youths guarded neighbourhoods through the use of roadblocks and were on many occasions drunk by one o'clock in the afternoon. As a result, limited operations could be conducted after this time due to the unpredictable actions which might take place at the roadblocks.

He saw children of nine or ten years old at roadblocks armed with fragmentation grenades.

The ICRC had informed UNAMIR and the authorities that wounded citizens travelling in ambulances had been dragged out and butchered in front of the ICRC workers. This had a significant effect on the Forces' ability to transport Rwandese in UNAMIR vehicles.

While the RPF had insisted upon a cessation of the massacres as a prerequisite for a ceasefire, he stated that on one occasion he had to inform the Deputy Force Commander who was chairing the meetings that in fact another massacre was taking place as the negotiations were in progress.

Radio propaganda stating that the Force Commander was an RPF mercenary.

Ghanaian troops involved in convoy operations being shot at yet returning daily to continue the operation.

He related the difficulties the Forces had with the numerous roadblocks whereby several could be successfully negotiated but then an operation had to be suspended because an armed group had decided to restrict UN movement. In some cases military observers had to bribe their way through roadblocks.

Major MacNeil was challenged by a member of the seminar panel as to the effectiveness of the Force Commander and the UNAMIR force left in place.

He stated that in his view, the Force Commander had two options open to him with the reduced force. He could either have barricaded the force in the headquarters and observe what was happening or do what he could with the limited forces available. He decided on the latter. The Force arranged for a transfer of endangered Rwandese between the front lines, attempted to negotiate a ceasefire, guarded citizens who had sought protection at UNAMIR installations and monitored the security of endangered Rwandese citizens, as guaranteed by the authorities, in areas of the city threatened by Interahamwe and militias. He said that the international community must remember that there were only about 400 troops to cover the entire country. The Force Commander had been promised additional troops and the troops in place eagerly awaited their arrival, however none arrived until the war was over.

Major MacNeil was then challenged by a member of the panel who had been in Saint Andre Church in Nyamirambu together with about 100 other Rwandese as well as some foreign priests. He wanted to know why UNAMIR had not rescued them as they requested and consequently 30 of them were killed by the Interahamwe.

In response, Major MacNeil stated that he was aware of the request from the Saint Andre Church and was also aware of the

Nyamirambo district as he had been through there during the war. He felt it was again necessary to remind the participants of the seminar of the size of the UNAMIR force left in Rwanda. There were about 250 armed UNAMIR troops who were already deployed protecting Rwandese citizens who had taken shelter at UNAMIR installations at the Amahoro Stadium, the Milles Collines Hotel, the Meridian Hotel, the King Faical Hospital and the Kigali Airport.

Negotiations with the authorities had been conducted to arrange an evacuation. Many Interahamwe and militias in the area were against evacuation and a previous rescue operation had almost resulted in disaster at the Milles Collines Hotel. A UNAMIR military observer had visited the site with a representative of the Kigali Prefecture's Office. Upon arrival, the bodyguard of the official was disarmed by drunken militias and they fired into an orphanage in the area as they thought an evacuation operation was in progress. A foreign journalist accompanying the party was shot and seriously wounded.

He stated that the Nyamirambo district had 24 roadblocks manned by armed militias. The district is congested and very narrow, in other words an excellent ambush area for a convoy. Fighting was also raging at close quarters between the opposing forces. In studying the situation, any decision for an evacuation operation had to be based on its chances of success. We felt that it would require the entire armed force of UNAMIR if there was a requirement to fight through the area in order to evacuate those people. There was also a requirement for a truce in the area which we were unable to obtain. The decision not to deploy was based on the risk not only to the Force, but the possibility that the passengers in the vehicles would also be killed in any attempt to fight through the entire district to safety.

The panel member again pressed the issue by stating that UNAMIR had rescued the white missionaries at the Church but left the Rwandese behind.


Major MacNeil stated that he knew of no operation planned by UNAMIR to only rescue the white missionaries in the church. He stated that one of his colleagues had accompanied the representative of the Kigali Prefecture's office on the day the journalist was shot. A white missionary assisted the UNAMIR military observer in placing the wounded journalist in the UNAMIR vehicle and remained in the vehicle when it left the area. He stated that when the church was attacked two white missionaries fled to the ICRC hospital and were subsequently brought from that location to UNAMIR HQ the following day. Both were subsequently interviewed by the international press at UNAMIR HQ. He stated that was all the information he was aware of concerning white missionaries who had escaped Sainte Andre.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES
MISSION D'APPUI A L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA


From: COS 
To: List A, B, C, D and E.
Date: 23 March 95
Subject: RUMOURS IN UNAMIR AOR

1. It will soon be a year since the commencement of the genocide and the civil war in Rwanda. Rumours of all kinds are therefore expected to be abound within the country in anticipation of the impending anniversary on 7 April. It should be noted that this is not the first time that rumours of imminent attacks and revenge killing have been circulated in the country. Although 7 April has been designated by the Rwanda government a day of remembrance to recollect the atrocities committed during the war, there is no evidence to support the rumours.

2. It is therefore imperative that UN personnel and international staff and organizations in the country should continue to report facts and not be seen to be contributing to the spread of these rumours through misinterpretation and analysis of events that may not be connected to justify preconceived ideas and notions.

3. UN personnel are however, strongly encouraged to reassure the local population that UNAMIR troops, in conjunction with security agencies of Rwanda, are doing everything possible to maintain a favourable security environment in the country during this period.

4. For your necessary attention and action please.

file


HAC

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: List A, B, C and D

DATE: 21 Mar 95

UNAGMIS on HR

SUBJECT: SEARCHING OF UNAMIR VEHICLES BY RPA

1. Under SOMA, all UNAMIR vehicles are exempted from being searched by RPA.
2. UNAMIR vehicles will only be searched by RPA in very exceptional circumstances when security agencies have reason to believe that a UNAMIR vehicle is being used to carry illegal cargo, which is likely to cause insecurity in the country.
3. For your information.

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.26 (PLANS)

01 01 031400Z MAR 95 RR UUUU

PLANS 050

HQ UNAMIR//G3 PLANS//

LIST A

LIST B

LIST C

UNCLAS PLANS 050

SUBJ: CHANGE OF DESIGNATION

REF: A. UN/DA/OPS/108/G DATED 23 FEB 95

1. THE NIGERIAN GOVT HAS FORMALLY CHANGED THE DESIGNATION OF THE NIGERIAN COMPANY GROUP TO A BATTALION GROUP MINUS TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS SIZE AND THE NATURE OF ITS EQUIPMENT
2. PLEASE NOTE THAT WITH EFFECT 01 MARCH 95 NICOY WILL NOW BE REFERRED TO AS NIBATT
3. PLEASE ENSURE THAT ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS ARE TAKEN

CAPT I. DENNY, G3 PLANS 4, 11162

LT COL S. DUNN, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED



To: The first ten

From: ADC

Date: 28 January 1995

Subject: MEMORABILIA OF OUR CIVIL WAR

-
1. I would like to proposed to you a project to commemorate what we went trough during the first three months of our tour. I think we lived something special here and we should ensure we always remember it.
 2. What I propose is a drawing or print that would represent ea of us during the performance of our duties, or close to it. The propose layout is attached with information from the artist.
 3. In a nut shell I recommend the following:
 - a. 14x17 print
 - b. colour
 - c. framed
 - d. qty 11 including one for Dallaire, (a gift)
 4. Cost could be past the \$100. mark, but I believed it to be worth it, this was a once in a lifetime experience. If we want this before our departure, we must agree to it soonest, and there is no room for long winded discussion on what it should look like. Therefore I need your go ahead within a week.
 5. If we agree to do so, you need to provide me with a picture of yourself with a Rwanda background, hopefully representing your work. If you do not have it just a picture of yourself will do, I'll make up the rest... If they are not here then ask your wife to send it to the enclose address ASAP.
 6. I am really excited by this project and I hope you will support it. Thanks.

don, andre,
andre luc

john,
B

RWANDA - 94, THE FIRST 10

first of july picture with dallaire in focus

jean-pierre
paul

"BECAUSE WE ARE HERE LAOS"

mike,
nelson,
sarlo

IN 399

ARTIST

NANA'S LIFE-LIKE PENCIL DRAWINGS

MARIANNE NANA BETTS-RODGERS

Vendor Permit # 6897-4744
Fax: 1 613 732 9677

Box 0, RR # 7, Pembroke
Ontario K8A 6W8 Canada
OS Phone: 1 613 732 9677

Specializes in Military and Personalized Prints and Drawings

January 28, 1995

CPT ST DENIS
Executive Assistant for the Commanding Officer
Canadian Group Rwanda
Fax 1 212 963 3090

PAGE 1 of 5

Sir

As per our telephone conversation January 27, 1995, here is the information on the work I do. I am very excited about doing a print for Rwanda.

I have reviewed my price list, and in order for you to get only 11 prints done, it would be quite costly, following my usual print lay-out. It would cost about \$65.00+ per print, with such a small number being made. In order to do one of my larger prints, with a minimum of nine to twelve photos depicted, I usually spend at least three to four weeks drawing, in order to get a perfect rendering with all the details. You also pay the cost of getting a plate made and the printing set up.

In order, to keep the cost down for you, I would suggest a smaller print, as we had discussed on the phone; 14 x 17" or 11 x 14", and less scenes. For example a center scene and four surrounding it, or just one main scene, with smaller scenes to the corners of it. (see below).

A 14 x 17" with 5 scenes would cost \$40.00 each.



" " " 3 " " " 30.00 " .

A " " " 1 " " " 20.00 " .

An 11 x 14" with 5 scenes would cost \$35.00 each.

" " " 3 " " " 27.00 " .

" " " 1 " " " 20.00 " .



The next place that we could cut costs would be in the paper that the prints are on. I use Royale Certificate White, 130lb, and 100% Acid Free (which means that the printed drawing will not fade in time, nor the paper yellow) paper. Although the main cost is my drawing time and the print plate and set-up, you could reduce the cost by a dollar or perhaps two by going to a lesser quality paper. If this option interests you, please let me know and I can make the necessary inquiries. If you send me an address, I could also send you paper samples, for you to explore this option.

Please contact me with your thoughts or questions on this matter. The prices quoted above are for black and white prints. Color prints would be approximately double-triple the cost. If color interests you, I could also get the exact quotes within a day.

This letter shall serve as an introduction to myself and the services I offer.

I am an artist with a military background, as a dependant daughter and civilian component for 27 years. I spent 10 of those years working for CFB Baden-Söllingen, Germany, as a bar supervisor and instructor. gate guard, among others. Although, I have been an Artist for as long as I can remember, it wasn't until I had a bike accident and head-injury, in '92, that unable to do my regular activities, I made the decision to make Art my career. In December '92, I married my husband, and came with him to Petawawa,

(FC)

EIDIR

Ontario in January '93. This winter I am finally skiing again, and putting all my energies towards improving my Art business and services.

My husband returned from a tour of duty in the former-Yugoslavia; April-October '92, with a nice, but very impersonal laser plaque with an area map and the participating units' crests around it.

For a competitive price, I can offer a more personalized print depicting scenes of their particular experience, whether it be a tour of duty, or a one-scene print for a military course. By now, most members of the CAF have numerous certificates and plaques from their various tours and courses. I offer a new angle.

I have done prints for the RCR in Gagetown; OP Cavalier, Airborne; OP Deliverance, Base Transport Petawawa; OP Marquis, 427 Sqn; OP Deliverance, 1 PPCLI, Calgary; OP Harmony, Cdn War Museum; Cdn Peacemakers in ...Somalia, the former-Yugoslavia, Cambodia, as well as, one-scene Infantry prints; Advancing and The Range. They also have the Cdr Frigate at Sea print. I have recently finished a print for the RCR Battleschool, and five small drawings for Croatian/Bosnian Greeting cards, for the soldiers in the Former-Yugoslavia. My prints are in galleries and Kit shops. Their mark-up is profit for the shops. The prices vary with the size and number of prints ordered, as well as, preference to black and white or color prints. I reduce my original drawing up to 10% for the prints, which are 100% acid-free, meaning that they won't fade in time. They have a 2-3 inch border for framing. Drawing, printing and signing may take up to 40 60 days.

I use clear, concise, close up, angled shot, photos, which you supply, depending on your desired print lay-out. A detailed map and correct spelling is essential. A minimum of 40 prints must be ordered for each new plate. A new plate is required each time there is a change in the original drawing; lettering, Insignia, scenes.

There is no GST, but PST is applied to all orders from within Ontario. I cover all shipping and handling charges. I send my prints 'registered' and 'insured', or with 24 hour delivery, courier post. Large orders are shipped in extremely well-packed cardboard boxes. The delivery of my prints in excellent condition is guaranteed. I will replace any damaged goods, free of charge. Local units shall have the prints hand-delivered.

I require a \$150 deposit at the time that you send an order, photos, map and lay-out. This shall go towards the 50% deposit that I require before I go to print. The remaining 50% of the total order is required upon delivery of the prints.

A suggestion of photos, is local people, locations, uniforms, vehicles, equipment, and Insignias. Indicate the insignias required, and their placement in the lay-out. Please enclose a clear picture/photo of the insignia(s); 2x2".

The enclosed prints are selling for \$30.00, \$25.00 and \$20.00; respective to their size, in the galleries. (For additional prices, see attached price list.)

I would greatly appreciate it if you could make this (these) print(s) available to all interested personnel. Perhaps you could form a sign-up list of people willing to buy the print, for the interested sections. Or perhaps, the sections would like to offer the prints to all participating members as a token and remembrance. If applicable to your situation, of course.

I also offer small prints in a less expensive paper, on which I can imprint documentation, with my computer. These are particularly great for course graduation certificates. Another idea is a print

encompassing what your unit or course entails, and presenting one of these to departing personnel, or personnel with outstanding performances.

I would very much like to do a print for your upcoming UN tour of duty. I have found that the 14 x 17" print is more popular than the 16.5 x 18", because of it's smaller size. If you were to opt for the idea, of presenting a 'tour' print to each of your participating soldiers, then the Greeting cards could be sold through your Kit shop, to offset the cost of the prints. I also offer 6-month calendars.

I can offer an excellent deal, 30% off the professional framing costs, when I receive an order of 40 frames in the same size and matt color.

I expect to be circulating a brochure of my military and other art work in the next few months. I shall be happy to forward one to you. Enclosed is a return envelope for the convenience of your reply.

Please send money-orders 'registered' mail. Although, I cannot offer you 'postage paid' at this time, if the receipt is enclosed, I shall deduct the price from your order invoice amount. For local units, this will be done during a meeting with myself.

I would appreciate constructive criticism, advice and suggestions. I aim to please, and perfect my services so that you would make use of them, time and time again.

All referrals are welcome. Thank-you very much for your time and interest.

Sincerely,

A few Quotes from some of my Satisfied Customers

"I was impressed with the images you were able to capture. I congratulate you on the quality of your artwork." Major CP Hoffman, 2PPCLI; Winnipeg, Man.

"The coloured version of the Somalia sketch is very well done. I'm about to have it framed and hang it in my cubicle here at NDHQ." Rod Mackay (former DCO, Cdn Airborne Regiment; Petawawa, On.)

"I would like to thank you for the effort and time you invested in creating our sketch. The troops seemed genuinely satisfied with the way each section and sub group was represented. The troops really liked the center map layout of our area displayed on the Canadian flag. They also liked the way they could recognize the people in the sketch and the amount of detail you used for the images. If the opportunity were to present itself again, I would not hesitate to recommend you." Mpl RJ Desilets, 1PPCLI; Calgary, Alta.

"The OP Cavalier print is a remarkable piece of work and I wish to commend you for your obvious talent. I will certainly keep you in mind for future work and pass your name to others." Major B Horn, OC 3 Commando, Cdn Airborne Regiment; Petawawa, On.

ARTIST

MARIANNE NANA BETTS-RODGERS

NANA'S LIFE-LIKE PENCIL DRAWINGS

Vendor Permit # 6897-4744

Fax: 1 613 732 9677

Box 0, RR # 7, Pembroke

Ontario K8A 6W8 Canada

Phone: 1 613 732 9677

Specializes in Military and Personalized Prints and Drawings

PRICE LIST for Winter/Spring 1995

Please contact me for special orders/requests...If you have a picture(s), I can do it.

Black & White and Color PRINTS are on Royale Certificate White; 130lb and 100% Acid-free (- won't fade in time) paper.

16.5 x 20" and 14 x 17" Color (Unit price based on the number of prints ordered)

1250...\$6/@, 1000...\$7/@, 850...\$10/@, 700...\$12/@, 500...\$15/@, 300...\$20/@, 100...\$32/@* (40...\$56.13/@)

16.5 x 20" Black and White

1250...\$4/@, 1000...\$5/@, 850...\$7.50/@, 500+...\$12/@, 300...\$15/@, 100...\$22/@, 40...\$28/@**

14 x 17" Black and White

1250...\$3.67, 1000...\$4.59/@, 850...\$7/@, 500...\$10/@, 300...\$12/@, 100...\$18/@, 40...\$25/@**

11 x 14" Black and White

1250...\$3/@, 1000...\$4/@, 850...\$6/@, 500...\$8/@, 250...\$10/@, 100...\$12/@, 40...\$16/@**

10 x 12" Color

1250...\$4/@, 1000...\$5.50/@, 850...\$7/@, 700...\$8.50/@, 500...\$10/@, 300...\$12/@, 100...\$22/@* (40...\$48.25/@)

5 x 7" Color

1250...\$2.50/@, 1000...\$3/@, 850...\$4/@, 700...\$5/@, 500...\$6.50/@, 300...\$8/@, 100...\$19/@* (40...\$44/@)

3.5 x 5.5" Color

1250...\$2/@, 1000...\$2.50/@, 850...\$3/@, 700...\$3.50/@, 500...\$5/@, 300...\$6/@, 100...\$17/@* (40...\$40/@)

Black & White and Color CARDS are on Mayfair White; 130lb and 100% Acid-free, with matching envelopes.

SET of 5 3.5 x 5.5" Color (Unit price based on number of sets ordered)

250 sets...\$10/@, 200...\$16/@, 150...\$20/@, 100...\$30/@,* (50...\$58/@)

SET of 5 3.5 x 5.5" Black and White

250 sets...\$8/@, 200...\$10/@, 150...\$13/@, 100...\$17/@* (50...\$35/@)

SINGLE 3.5 x 5.5" Color (Unit price based on number of cards & envelopes ordered)

1000...\$2/@, 500...\$3/@, 250...\$6/@, 100...\$11/@

SINGLE 3.5 x 5.5" Black and White

1000...\$1.50/@, 500...\$2.50/@, 250...\$4/@, 100...\$8/@

* A minimum order of 100 is suggested.

** A minimum order of 40 is required.

ALL PRICES GUARANTEED FOR ORDERS AND CONTRACTS DATED PRIOR TO MAY 1, 1995

ARTIST

MARIANNE NANA BETTS-RODGERS

5

NANA'S LIFE-LIKE PENCIL DRAWINGS

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Fax: 1 613 732 9677

Box 0, RR # 7, Pembroke
Ontario K8A 6W8 Canada
Phone: 1 613 732 9677

Specializes in Military and Personalized Prints and Drawings

ADDITIONAL COSTS

- A) \$100.00 to hand-color a black & white print.
 - B) \$130.00 to make up to fifty prints, with blank Insignia space, with new Insignia.
 - C) \$ 15.00 to hand-draw an Insignia on a print with a blank Insignia space.
 - D) Free to Halftone the prints. This will enhance the detail.
- PST (8%) is added to all prices. All prints are signed and numbered. You decide the length of the edition - #'s 1/xxxx - xxxx/xxxx.

It is more economical to order a larger number of prints, and leave some of them with a blank Insignia space. Then the printers can apply a small plate, made with the required alternate Insignia, to the desired number of prints.

CONTRACT - PURCHASE ORDER

Size	B&W/Color	# of prints	Unit Price	Description	Amount	Date Paid

Additional A/B/C/D	# of Prints	Unit Price	Description	Amount
D			Halftone	Free
			Sub-Total	
			PST (8%)	
			TOTAL	

Commitment required at time of signing contract \$ 150.00

At print time. 50% of total - \$150.00 already paid.

At time of delivery, 50% of total order; balance.

Please keep a photocopy of this, as this copy shall be given on completion of order, with delivery of the prints.

DATE + SIGNATURE

MARIANNE NANA BETTS-RODGERS

NAME

UNIT

ADDRESS

PHONE/FAX

END

ANNEX G TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 1994


HAND OVER PROFORMA

I, J.P.N. Chouinard MCpl (1), A MILITARY MEMBER OF UNAMIR MP Coy.
UNAMIR/MINUAR HAVE HANDED OVER MR USABUWEKA Urask (1970)
TO THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF Kigali, Rwanda. (3).

SIGNED THIS DAY 18 OF January 19 95


UNAMIR

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR


Halimshuti Flouquet

- (1) Insert here the name of the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over.
- (2) Insert here the name of the person being handed over.
- (3) Insert here the name of the Prosecutor's Office.

1507 hrs, 18 Jan 95



Minute

From: DCOS Ops
To: COS
Info: HAC
Date: 14 Jan 95
Subject: HAC MANNING

1. The scope and nature of duties in the UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Cell have changed over time. Notwithstanding that during the civil war and times of uncertainty the permanent manning of a dedicated HAC is required, currently the staff is under-employed. Concurrently, the CHAO is rotating on completion of tour of duty and the HAC has been asked to vacate its accommodation in the UNDP building.
2. After several discussions with the D/CHAO the following is recommended:
 - a. UNAMIR HAC be reconfigured to consist of a total of 5 Milobs (2 mobile teams of two and a fifth to work in the IOC on a rotational basis);
 - b. The HAC Cell be accommodated in UNAMIR HQ;
 - c. The HAC Cell should be available to UNAMIR HQ G3 Ops for tasking to perform a variety of other tasks related to UNAMIR Milob duties, such as investigations, escort duties, etc when not involved in HAC duties; and
 - d. The CHAO position should be down-ranked to Maj.
3. After consideration of the above, I would be pleased to discuss with you at your request.

CONTACT LIST FOR ORGANISATIONS AND AGENCIES REGISTERED WITH UNREO COORDINATION CENTRE

1. NGO's/PVO's

ORG	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
ACORD	ACORD		74619	73614	Rue du Mont Huye	
ACTION NORD-SUD/HANDICAP INTL	ACTION	Alain Furlan	83689	83689	Kimihurura	
ACTION INTL CONTRE LA FAIME (FRANCE)	AICFFR	Pascal Lefort	77682	77682	14B, rue de Progres	
ADEPR/PMU INTERLIFE	ADEPR	Alfred Tobler, Jean Sibomana	72155		Rue de Recolte, Nyarugenge	76
ADRA	ADRA	Carl Wilkens, Ranjan Kulaserere (BP 2)	72570	72571	BP2	
AEF INTL	AEF	Dr Wesongah	76390		Justice Street, Nyarugenge	
AFRICA JAPAN FORUM	AJF	Yukika Shiawel				
AFRICA MUSLIMS AGENCY	AMA	Bishar Ismail Ibrahim	72849	77690	Nyamirambo	
AFRICAN REVIVAL MINISTRIES	ARM	Stany Biziyaremya				
AFRICAN MEDICAL & RESEARCH FUND (KENYA)	AMREF	Jean Marc Michel			Byumba	
AFRICAN HUMANITARIAN ACTION (AHA)	AHA	Teferra Shiawel	72239		Rue dep Kayuku #37	
AFRICARE	AFRICARE	Cary Alan Johnson	83731	83731	former Restaurant Hellenique, Kimihurura	
AJCF (USA)	AICFUS	Louise Griep			P O Box 2349, Kigali	
AIDE ET ACTION	AIDACT	Kassa Alain/Jean Paul Thyron	73129	72384	2 Rue de L'Akagera	ALPHA
AIR SERV INTL	ASI	Kristine Bresser			Kimihurura	
AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DIST. COMM.	AJJDC	Manlio Dell Ariccia, Charles M Gahire			c/- IRC	
AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITTEE	ARC	John Keys	86777		PB 2860	
AMERICARES (USA)	ACARES	Doug Sandok			8 Km frm Namba twds Ruheng Kgli Ruhon Rd	
AMURT (SWITZERLAND)	AMURT	Thierry Desmier	72271		C/- WPF Warehouse, Industrial area	
ARMEE DU SALUT	ADS	David Burrows			Kicukiro	SAVLO-KILO
ARTC	ARTC					
ASB (GERMANY)	ASB	Walter Schmidt			Cntre Nutritional Kinyinya	

ORG	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
ASSN FINSTRIENNE DE SOLIDARITE AVEC LE	AFSR				Remera	
ASSN FRANCAISE DES VOLONTAIRES DU PROGR	AFVP	Manasse Rwibogora			Rue de L'amitie	
ASSN OF MEDICAL DOCTORS OF ASIA	AMDA	Navin Takur	72992		10 Rue de Deputy Kajangwe	
ASSN POUR L'ACTION HUMANITAIRE	AAH	Jenny Frische	75186	75186	5 Rue du la Mpanga, Nyarengenge	
ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	ATLAS	Thierry Zobel	75333	75333		
AUSTRIAN RELIEF PROGRAM	ARP	Jean Mutamba	76141		Boulevard de la Revolution 16	
AVSI ITALY	AVSI	Chiara Mezzalana	72326		1 Rue du Mont Juru	
BAMBINI DEL RUANDA	BAMBINI	Roberto Esposito			Hotel des Mille Collines	
BAPTIST RELIEF SERVICES	BRS	Larry Randolph	76877		12 Rue du Lac, Burera	
BORNEFONDEN	BORNE	Hans H. Krarup	84413	84413		
BRITISH DIRECT AID	BDA	Isaac McQuade	76792		Workshop "Dany" BP 1072, Indust estate	BDA BASE KBI-27
BUFMAR/MEMISA	BUFMAR	Hennie Zonderland	86176		Rue de Ministères opp Chambre Commerce	
CANADIAN PHYSICIANS FOR AID AND RELIEF	CPAR	Gizaw Shibu	268064			
CARE INTL	CAREINTL	Christy Gavitt	72402			
CARITAS SWITZERLAND	CARISUI	Ewald Zimmer	256486 23420		P O B 956, KABALE	
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES	CRS	Chris Hennemeyer	82109, 82112	82127	Kyociru nr Meridian Hotel	
CESAL SPAIN	CESAL	Javier Restan	5825		1 Rue Mont du Juru	
CHILDREN'S RELIEF (GERMANY)	CRA	Christa Lehrer, Thomas Franke				
CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE	CRWRC	Patsy Orkar, Lou Haveman	73654, 85711		C- FETH, 30 Ave Depute Kamazinzi	
CHURCH WORLD SERVICE	CWS	Ruth Brown			c/- AFRICARE	ROMEIO BRAVO
CHURCH WORLD ACTION/LUTHERAN WORLD FED	CWA/LWF	Angelline Ludakubana	74182, 74547	77102	33 Rue Depute Kayuku, Kiyovu, BP966	
CHURCH WORLD ACTION/ACIST (WCC)	CWA/ACIS	Ben Holtrop	74182, 74547	77102	33 Rue Depute Kayuku, Kiyovu	
CITIZENS' NETWORK	CITIZEN	Caroline Petiaux	84664	84664	Kacyiru	
COMMUNAUTE EMMAUS	EMMAUS	Abbe Marinu, M van der veen	73955		Gatsata BP 2058	
COMPASSION INTL	COMPASS	Vivian			Ave de la Justice (1st floor INdR build)	
CONCERN WORLDWIDE	CONCERN	Dominic MacSorley	72208		10 Rue Mont de Juru	CHARLIE KILKEE
COOPERAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE	COOPI	Raffaello Muraro			Magasin de l'Imprimerie Scolaire, Gisenyi	
CROIX ROUGE BELGIQUE	CRB	R Bracke	72954, 73640	72955	Ave de L'Akagera	BUREAU SECOURS

ORG	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
CUAMM	CUAMM	Dal Lago Tito	75722		41 Rue Depute Kayunu	
DISASTER RELIEF AGENCY	DRA	Sjaak de Boer	75619,72386	74671	5 Rue Depute Kajangwe	
ECOTERRA INTL	ECOTERRA	Louis Isabagara			c/- OXFAM Quebec	
ENFANTS DU MONDE	EDM	Jerome Aubry	77768		Bugarama Street	
EQUILIBRE	EQUIL	M'bomo Yvan	72989		36 Rue Kamuzenzi	
EURONAIID	EURONAIID	Chris Brice			c/- TRANSINTRA	
FEED THE CHILDREN (EUROPE)	FTCEUR	Ulfur Bjornsson, Ovid Jacota	82592	82592	Kimihurura, next to Pentapostal Ch.BP3025	KIGALI FTC
FONDATION AIDE DENTAIRE AFRIQUE	FADA	Dr Arnold Daams	76541		Hotel Mille Collines	
FONDATION TERRE DES HOMMES - RWANDA	HOMMES	Laurent Tatford			7 Rue du Bugarama, Kiyovu	
FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY INTL	FFTHINTL	J. Kila Reimer, S Michelle Loeffler	73654		30 Ave Depute Kamazinzi	KILO ZULU
FRATERNITE NOTRE DAME INC	FRAT	Aere Marie Joseph, Marie Jeanne				
FRIENDS OF THE WEST INTL (USA)	FWI	Kathryn Snyder, Tara Rice			Past IVECO towards airport	
GERMAN AGRO ACTION	GAA				11 Ave Kiyovu	
GERMAN EMERGENCY DOCTORS	GED	Michael Smeeck, Serge Gasana			Kabuga 20 km east of Kigali	
GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARB	GTZ	M Strahler			11 Ave Kiyovu	
GLOBAL OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT	GOD	Jacqueline Hodgkins	72570		c/- ADRA PB2 Kigali	
GOAL (IRELAND)	GOAL	John Ging	73296		rue de Ntaruka, Kiyovu	KILO OSCAR
HEALTH AID UK	HEALTH	Carrie O'Mahony, Robert Powles	73997			
HEALTH UNLIMITED	H/UNLTD	Jane Thomas, Colin Alfred	75108		Hotel Kiyovu	
HEIN NEBELING ISENSEE, ALLEMAGNE	HNI	Daniel Meier	75222	77267	PO.Box 1211 Kigali or c/- German Embassy	
HELP (GERMANY)	HELP	Ulrike Kirchaesser	75388		C/- GTZ	HOTEL KILO
HOPITAL SANS FRONTIERE	HSF	Christian Cardamore			Hopital Saint Francois, Cyangugu	
INTER SOS	INTERSOS	Sandro Pocaterra	77329	77329	Kiyovo 7	
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS	IMC	Sarah Archer	76158	76158	36, Ave Rugunga, Kiyovu, BP 3118	INDIA MIKE BRAVO (mobile)
INTL COOP FOR DEVEL. & SOLIDARITY	CIDSE	Peter Schlang	82109,82112	82127	c/- CRS Kacyiru Nord	
INTL HILFSFONDS	INTLHILF	Petra Campbell			Kagenza School, GITARAMA	
INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE	IRC	Greg Beck	86036	86036	Kacyiru	
ITALIAN COOPERATION	ITLCOOP	Eugenie Cocozza	83835		41 Rue de la Dovane, Magerura	

ORG	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
JA OLPHAM PAGE	JAOLP	Marco Vaiter			Ecole Francaise St Expeny, Rugunga	
JAPAN INTL VOLUNTEER CENTRE	JVC	Kazahito Suga			c/- OXFAM Quebec	
JOHANNITER UNFALL-HILFE	JOHAN	c/- HELP				
JOINT RELIEF & REHAB SERVICES KENYA	JRRS	Dr Siraj Warfa, John Bideri			Rue Depute Kanjagwe, Kiyovu	
JUMULAGE RHENANIE- PALATINAT/RWAN (GERM)	JRPR	Rudolph Fischer	73618	72475	39 Blv de la Revolution	
LVIA	LVIA					
MALTESER HILFE DIENST	MALTESER				Butare	
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES	MSF	Nicolas de Torrente	75930	75930	Parc Industriel, Gikondo	MIKE SIERRA, PIGALLE
MEDECINS DU MONDE	MDM	Beatriz Courau	75143		Rue de Progres	
MEDICAL EMERGENCY RELIEF INTL (MERLIN)	MERLIN	Rebecca Trafford-Roberts	72182	72182	4 Rue de la Culture	
MEDICINE POUR LE TIERS MONDE	MDM	Dreelinck Ann				
MEDICOS EN CATASTROFE	MEC	Javier Calisaya			Hopital Mbuye, GITARAMA	
MEDICUS MUNDI (SPAIN)	MMSPAIN	Crescente Martinez			Paroisse de Gihara BP858, Remera	
MEMISA MEDICUS MUNDI	MMM	Marcel Berkel	86176/7/8	83008	Kimihurura (BUFMAR)	
MINES ADVISORY GROUP	MAG	Fabienne Bully	83383		c/- Trimed House, Kimihurura	
NETHERLANDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION	SNV	Peter van Doren	75619,72386	74671	5 Rue Depute Kajangwe	
NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID	NPA	Corin Jones	72616		C/- Bournefondanines	KILO PAPA 1-10
ORA INTL	ORA	Heinrich Floreck	77207			
ORPHELINS DU RWANDA	ORPHEL	Vienot Jacques-Henry			c/- ACTION Nord/Sud	
OXFAM QUEBEC	OXFAM/QB	Michel LeFevre	86957	86957	Kimihurura	
OXFAM UK	OXFAM/UK	Robert Maletta	82912		Kimihurura (nt to Kigali Nights)	OSCAR KILO
PHARMACIENS SANS FRONTIERES	PSF	Stephanie Rinville	75186		5 du Lac Mpanga, Nyarugenge	
PREMIERE URGENCE	PREMIERE	Pierre Verdoja			French Cultural Centre	FROG 1-10
PRODEVA/AVIONS SANS FRONTIERES	PRODEVA	G Larocque	86957	86957	Kimihurura (at OXFAM Quebec house)	
RADIO AGATASHYA (RSF-SUISSE)	RADIOAG	Philippe Dahinden	76901	74723	Village Suisse, 32 Ave Depute Kayuko	
RED BARNET (SCF DENMARK)	RBARNET	Lars Heyn			c/- SCF (US) 10 rue de Masaka	
REFUGEE TRUST IRELAND	RTI	Anne Malone			1 Ghadaffi Rd + Kiyovu	
SAFE HARBOUR (USA)	SAFE	Ron J. Neely			Airport Warehouse-ODA	

SAMARITAN'S PURSE INTL RELIEF	SAMAR	Don Norington	84780		CHK Hospital, Remera	SPK
SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION (US)	SCFUS	Jay Zimmerman	76078		Rue Masaka, near CARE Australia	
SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (UK)	SCFUK	Steve Rifkin	73381		Avenue de la Justice Manumetal Compound	
SECOURS POPULAIRE FRANCAISE	SPF	Vigroux Phillipe			Hotel Mille Collines	
SENTINELLES	SENT	Dominic Vuichard	75738	72461	Swiss Embassy	
SERVICE ALLEMAND DE DEVELOPPEMENT	SAD	Ancilla Mukangira	76348		Face a L'ecole Belge	
SOLIDARITES, FRANCE	SOLID	Sylvie Robert	76619	76619	20 Ave de L'armee	SOLIDARITES
SOS CHILDRENS VILLAGES	SOS	Klaus Keller	83870		Kakiru	
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE SUPPORT FOR ORPH	SASO	John Hunwick			Gasetta, Kibungo	
TERRE DES HOMMES NETHERLANDS	DRA	Marguerite Miedema	75619		Hotel Mille Collines	
TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE	TRIANGLE	Lionel Tivert, Frederic Poupard	77970		38 Ave du Depute Kamuzinzi BP 372	
TROCAIRE	TROCAIRE	Olga Mc Donogh	72937	72190	41 Rue Depute Kayuku	
US COMM FOR REFUGEES	USREFCOM	David Hawk			Hotel des Diplomates	
VISA SANTE + ASSOC FRATERNIERE	VISA	Jean Marc Dueymes			Hopital de Rwamagana , 54 km frm Kigali	
VOLCANO VET CTR/MORRIS ANIMAL FOUND	VOLCANO	John E. Cooper	75601		c/- US Embassy Kigali	
WORLD VISION INTL	WVISION	Norbert Clement	76229/75762		3 Rue Depute Kamuzinzi	VISION 1 to 13
WORLD SOC. FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS	WSPA	Mike Pugh			Muhima Road	
WORLD CONCERN INTL	WCONCERN	David Downing			Kacyiru Nord	
WORLD RELIEF INTL	WRELIEF	Jean Gakwandi, David van Vuuren	77868/72613		11 Rue Kalisimbi	
ZOA/MEDAIR/AEE	ZOA	Dirk Frans			Postal box at UNREO (NYAMATA)	

II LOCAL NATIONAL (RWANDAN) NGO's

ORGANISATION	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
ADEHAMU	ADEHAMU					
ADRI	ADRI					
ARAMET	ARAMET					
ARBEF	ARBEF	Dr Mungwakuzwe Canisius	76127		BP 1580, Kigali	
ARDI	ARDI	Habyarimana Mwpanda	73961	73961	BP 1295, Kigali	
ARTC FEMMES	ARTCF				3 Ave du Mont Juru	

ORGANISATION	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
ASBL LOGUE	ASBL	Charles Karemano				
ASSN POUR LE DEFENSE DES DROITES D	HAGARUKA	Zaina Nyiramatama Karemera	73961			
BARAKABAHO FOUNDATION	BARAK	N. Lexis Birindahagabo	84102		Kayiru	
CARITAS RWANDA	CARIRWA	Vincent Briac	76331		next to La Rwandaise, Rue du Lac, Rivero	
CCOAJB	CCOAJB	Landrado Mukayiranga	72217			
CFRC (IWACU)	CFRC					
DUTERIMBERE	DUTER	Judith Kanakuze	73598		Boulevard de l'Oya, BP 738	
INADES	INADES	Vincent Kayijuka, Alphonse Marie Nkubito	84713		BP 866 Remera	
KORA ASBL	KORA	Francois Lefitima				
LA DOLCEVITA MILOT	DOLCE	Jean de dieu Hakizimana	7414077031		Remera, Kigali, BP 830	
RESEAU DE FEMMES POUR LE DEVELOPPMENT	RFD	Inmaculee Mukankubito	73268		Nyamirambo	
RWANDAN FAIR CHILD FOUNDATION	RWAFAIR	Elijah Nduwayesu	77031		near secteur Nyarugango	
SOC DE ST VINCENT DE PAUL	SSVP	Mathias Byusa	74495		BP 287	
SYNESER	SYN	Jean Baptiste Munderere				
APIDERBU	APIDERBU	Athanase Gakwaya	86625			
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE CONCERTATION DES ORG	COSYLI	Mungwakuzwe Canisius, Habiyaenye Gabriel			Ave Nyabugogo, Muhioia	

III GOVERNMENTAL, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND OTHERS (NON UN)

ORGANISATION	SHORT NAME	CONTACT	PHONE	FAX	ADDRESS	VHF CALL
AIDAB AUSTRALIA	AIDAB	Andy Oliver				
INTL FED OF THE RED CROSS (GENEVA)	IFRC	Adrian van Drongelen	76530	76541	Mille Collines Rm 324	
INTL COMM OF THE RED CROSS	ICRC	Jean Francois Sangsue				
INTL ORG FOR MIGRATION	IOM	Paul Howard				
PROG DU SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE AU RWANDA	PSA	Alain Houyoux, Jacqueline Uwumwiza	75586 75589	74313	Rue Depute Kamuzinzi (Deleg du la CEE)	KILO INDIA
SWISS DISASTER RELIEF	SDR	Swiss Embassy				

Cr. D

Copy to all Secs
for action.
SMPD 8/24/12
28/12

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
Rwanda


1000.7(DFC)/G/5

22 December 1994

ALL CONTINGENTS/UNITS

SEDUCTION OF GIRLS BELOW THE AGE OF 18 YEARS BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL

1. In a meeting between UNAMIR Principal Staff and RPA representatives held recently at the FHQ, it was drawn to my notice by RPA representatives, that cases of seduction of young girls by UNAMIR personnel are becoming more and more common.
2. RPA officials have expressed their strong disapproval of such acts and the SRSG has fully endorsed these sentiments and has further directed that exemplary punishments be meted out to the perpetrators of such acts.
3. In order to protect and uphold the good image of UNAMIR, you are directed to advise all ranks to desist from such activities.
5. Accept for information and guidance of all under command.


HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
DFC/CMO

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CC: SRSG, FC, CA



INFORMATION CIRCULAR No. 001/95

DATE: 3 January 1995

TO: All UNAMIR Civilian and Military Personnel

FROM: Kimso Nilsvang, Officer-in-Charge
Administration

SUBJECT: Change of Rwandese Currency

This is to inform all military and civilian personnel of UNAMIR that the Central Bank of Rwanda has decided to change the bank notes of the following denominations: Rw.Fr. 5000.-, 1000.- and 500.- to new ones effective immediately. The exercise is taking place on 3 and 4 January 1995.

We are now requesting the Bank to assign a representative to UNAMIR Headquarters for about one hour on 4 January 1995 to enable all our personnel to change the old notes in their possession into the new ones. Should the Bank agree with our request, you will be informed immediately of the place and time of operation.

In the meantime, in order to expedite the exercise, it is suggested that each Office/Section or Contingent designates one or two persons as focal points who will collect the old notes within their respective offices/Section/Contingent and will assume responsibility for operating the changes.

These designated persons are requested to contact the Cashier's Office on 4 January 1995 by 10:00 a.m. to find out whether the operation will take place at UNAMIR Headquarters.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/5

22 December 1994

ALL CONTINGENTS/UNITS

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23
12

HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
DFC/CMO

The contents are to be noted
and complied with by all.

23
12

CC: SRSG, FC, CAO