

UNAMIR

EXPIRATION OF UNAMIR MANDATE

5 DEC 1994 - 28 MAR 1996

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG APR 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1063

BOX 21

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0278

**MEMO RANDUM**

TO: Mr. Abdi Farah

SUMMO
TRAFIPRO

FROM: Isel Rivero 
Special Assistant to the SRSG

DATE: 28 March 1996

SUBJECT: Furniture and Equipment to be Transferred to UNOR

1. As requested please find attached the list of staff members who presently have electrical equipment in their possession.
2. The Fax machine is installed in the SRSG's Office.
3. Since we do not yet have the exact staffing table nor a budget, I have made tentative calculations and have decided that provision should be made for equipment to be transferred to UNOR to equip maximum 5 professionals and 7 GS/clerks. This excludes the SRSG's Office.
4. Should it be decided not to leave a Political Office in Rwanda, the equipment and furniture could be transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal.
5. Your kind cooperation will be appreciated.

cc: ED
CAO
J. Lombardo

Furniture and Equipment to be transferred to UNOR

Mr. Abdul Jabbar

One TV and one Video (at home)

Mr. Dao

One TV (in the Office)

Ms. Isel Rivero

One TV (in the Office)

Ms. Abeba Kifle

One TV and one Video (at home)

Electric typewriters

Ms. Pauline Urasa
Ms. Fatimata Diarra

PCs/EDP

Mr. D. Zorilla
Mr. I. Tikoca
Ms. Abeba Kifle
Ms. Pauline Urasa
Ms. Isel Rivero
Ms. Amsale Retta
Ms. Betty Kiru
Ms. Fatimata Diarra
Ms. Alice Schacht
Mr. Karim Ismael
Mr. A.B.C. Dao
Ms. Sissay Tadesse
Ms. Jean d'Arc
Mr. Javed Khan



UNAMIR - MINUAR

27 March 1996

To: Miss Isel RIVERO-MENDEZ
A: Special Assistant to SRSG.

FROM: Abdi FARAH
DE: SUMMO

SUBJECT: FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT TO BE TRANSFERED TO UNOR
OBJET:

Reference your yesterday's discussion with our Supply Officer,
Miss Mugo, in connection with office space, furniture and electrical appliances for UNOR
please find attached:

- (i) A list of furniture already available in the agreed offices.
- (ii) Requested electrical appliances.

It would be appreciated, if a list of names of the staff members, who signed
for the various electrical appliances, in the above mentioned office could be forwarded to this
office as soon as possible, to enable us to rectify PCIU records for checking-out purposes.

LIST OF ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES.

		<u>REQUIRE</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>	<u>CURRENT LOCATION</u>
1.	Computers	8	7	(1)	Security or HAC
2.	Televisions	4	1	(3)	Dessande/Khan/Ishlika
3.	VCR	1	0	(1)	Dessande/Khan
4.	Fridge	2	2	(0)	
5.	Fax	1	1	(0)	
6.	Photocopier (Small)	2	3	(1)	CAO Office
7.	Typewriter	2	1	(1)	F. Diallo



MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. J. Lombardo
Task Force Officer

FROM: Isel Rivero
Special Assistant to the SRSG *Isel Rivero*

DATE: 21 March 1996

SUBJECT: Re: Matthew Circular No. 023/96 "Deadline of Electrical Equipment Turn-In"

1. As we discussed yesterday, I shall retain the TV set in my office as part of a future UNOR Bureau.
2. I would appreciate it if Mr. Clive would be informed that the generator which is on loan to our housing compound in Kiyovu be removed at the Administration's convenience, but preferably before Mr. Clive's departure.
3. Since I have signed for it, I would not like to be held liable at a later date.
4. Many thanks for your continued cooperation.



Brown & Root Services Corporation

Kigali, Rwanda

Tel/Fax N.Y. (212) 963-2663, Ext 11799

To: To: cor

Gumfo - 21/3/96

Tuesday, 19 March 1996

Mr. Gilles Brière, Responsible Officer
UNAMIR/CMC, Kigali, Rwanda

Subject: Contract PTS/CON/184/95: Expired Visas Late Payment Fees

Dear Mr. Brière:

Please be advised that the following personnel departed Rwanda with expired visas which expired on the 8th of March. As a result, these personnel paid the below listed last fees. However, whereas they paid these fees after entering the customs and transit area, we were unable to secure copies of their payment receipts.

Name	Departure	Late Fees
Landers Joseph	14 Mar 96	20.00
Abot		0.00
		0.00
		5.00
		0.00

Note

Mr. Lombardo,

Re: Matthew Umbar No.

20 023/96

"Deadline of Electrical
Equipment TURN-IN"

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2. It appeared that if M. Clive
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generator which is on loan
to our housing compound
in Kiyovu ~~be~~ removed
at ~~the~~ the Administration's
convenience. ~~For official use~~
But preferably before his current
departure. →

Late Fees

20.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
0.00

1. For your info
action as
deemed app
prior

2. We are no
finally
start
to get
visas
extended

G/NV through the
last applications
verbally advised
be issued no later

no other choice
then to pay the
fine because the

out officials
have been dragging
their feet for more
than 1/2 month to
extend these visas
to 14/4/96!

③ Mr. Nanku/
Legal Office

min 1,225
for your info
1:11:00
CCM
21/3/96

④ special Act to stop
the DRC from moving

UNAMIR'S CLOSING CEREMONY SPEECH
BY THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR RWANDA

8 MARCH 1996

resettlements. We have placed our helicopters and airplanes to meet the essential needs of the Government. In the communes, and prefectures, our soldiers have provided every conceivable assistance ranging from supporting an orphanage to reviving power supply from transporting essential supplies to preparing transit camps. In the fields, our troops have helped to sow the seeds and reap the harvests with refugee farmers beginning their lives anew. And, as we depart, I can assure the Government of Rwanda that a significant proportion of our equipment would be left behind for use in Rwanda by the UN Agencies and by the Government of Rwanda.

For this supreme effort, I am deeply indebted to the extraordinary zeal, discipline and commitment that UNAMIR's contingent, both military and civil have demonstrated. In addressing every member of UNAMIR's family, I want to state that, I feel deeply honoured to have been associated with a group of such dedicated men and women who gave of their everything and more, who walked the extra-mile and who risked their lives for the cause of humanity. Here, in Rwanda, African and European, Asian and American, Australasian and Middle Eastern made deep personal sacrifices to help a people who had been traumatized by tragedy. We all served, not to seek appreciation, jobs or gratitude, but for the cause of human dignity and common fellowship in this global village that we share.

There are many lessons to be learnt by the international community from its experience in Rwanda. Many shortcomings to be corrected, many potential dangers to be pre-empted. Nothing, however, can take away the extraordinary heroism and commitment of those who served with UNAMIR during the traumatic period of genocide and who have, since then, helped the Rwandese people in their quest for recovery and stability.

As the bugles sound UNAMIR's last retreat, each one of you that has served in UNAMIR can hold your head high at the success of your mission. You only have to look around to see how far we have come - from devastation to revival: from degradation to dignity: from terror to security. Today, the military completes its task with distinction. Your achievements will form a roll of honour in the annals of UN's peacekeeping history. Your courage in the months of genocide, your discipline at Kibeho, your commitment throughout the traumatic period of 1994. Your dignified forbearance in the face of unfair criticism and calumnies levelled against you. Your assistance in the revival of Rwanda will form a golden chapter of UN's peace-keeping. The names of General Dallaire, General Tousignant, Brigidaire-General Anyidoho and Brigidaire-General Shivakumar are now part of UN's glorious history. We owe you - the military component of UNAMIR - a profound debt of gratitude.

In conclusion, I want to thank you, Your Excellency, Mr. Foreign Minister and through you the Government and people of Rwanda for the support you have given UNAMIR. As we lower the UNAMIR flag for the last time, we depart with a deep sense of achievement and success. We have shared with you a part of your history - of your tragedy and of your revival - and though Government and politics have their own way of looking at issues we - the United Nations will never forsake the cry of the innocent child for help, anywhere in the world. I thank you .

1-11-95

Present

UNAMIR

SRSS
CONDE SPAO
Matthew CAO
de Souza ED
Raffie Secretary Lt
Military Adviser

David.
Lt. ~~Cato~~ Kattah

Rwandese
GOVERNMENT

HUGBO Theldie - UNAFFET -
SAM NKUSI - MINITRANSCO
Claude Dusindi - Vice President's office.

Lt. Karamzi Karake - Defense Ministry
Major Karamade Kayitare - CLO.
" Karamzi H. HOD

file
Keep with
minutes of
other meetings.



TO: ED
AFC
CAO
SA/SRSG
PO (JNK)

FROM: SRSG *Shaheryar Khan* DATE: 13 March 1996

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Support for Government of Rwanda

I would like to have, as detailed account as possible of the support that UNAMIR has given to Government of Rwanda. Please ask Mr. Javed N. Khan to carry out this exercise in consultation with CAO and the departing military contingent. We already have information in the Spokesman's bullets but more detailed data is required. This would involve searching registers etc. I am giving a week for this exercise to be completed. It should form part of our final report.

cc: CISS

Re

UNAMIR Mission Closure Ceremony

DATE - 8 MARCH 1996

**PLACE - UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS, HOTEL AMAHORO,
REMERA**

TIME - 16:45

- 16:45** - **Arrival and seating of guests: Welcome By Force Commander**
- 17:00** - **Arrival of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Representative of the Government**
 - **General Salute**
 - **Anthems: a) United Nations
b) Rwanda**
- 17:10** - **Reviewing Officers inspect UNAMIR Forces Parade**
 - **Beating of the Retreat**
 - **Address by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan
Address by the Representative of the Government**
 - **Lowering of the flag**
 - **End of the ceremony**
- 18:00** - **Refreshments: in the Main Conference Room and patio at Headquarters**

- 0 -

**COMMENTS ON THE OPTIONS FOR A SUCCESSOR UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA
OUTLINED IN THE DRAFT SG'S REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

The SG's report puts to the SC the suggestion whether it would be desirable to maintain a United Nations presence in Rwanda in order:

"To assist the Government of Rwanda in consolidating peace and stability through justice and reconciliation, to support the return of refugees and to contribute to rehabilitation and reconstruction".

The following paper attempts to examine in some detail two of the alternatives proposed for this United Nations presence: a small United Nations office in Rwanda or a successor mission to UNAMIR.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN RWANDA (UNOR)

The report determines that this office would be headed by the SRSG, who would be entrusted with:

- a) "an enhanced coordination role with regard to the activities of the various United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda, including the HRFOR and some aspects of the Prosecutor's Office of the International Tribunal"; and
- b) "it would also promote and coordinate assistance from the international community to assist the Government of Rwanda in its rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts".

In examining these functions, it is not realistic to assume that the UNOR will have greater capabilities than what UNAMIR, a full-fledged peace-keeping operation, has had during its mandate.

The role of coordination of UN agencies in Rwanda is currently being carried out on a day-to-day basis by the UN Resident Coordinator, who is the Resident Representative of UNDP. At a time where the emphasis will be put on development assistance programs, the functions of the ResCoordinator are not likely to be transferred easily to the SRSG heading a small office staffed with mainly political officers, nor would it actually be desirable.

The relationship of the UNOR with HRFOR is also problematic. To subsume HRFOR into UNOR, which has been debated, is a difficult operation. It could create strains within HRFOR, which considers that its work should be independent from any political activity carried out by the SRSG, and it would add an additional layer in the decision-making process without clear benefits.

As regards the Prosecutor's Office of the Tribunal, its operations are independent and will continue to be so. Even its security will be independently coordinated by the Tribunal with the Government of Rwanda. Any "coordination role" of the SRSG will actually be limited to maintaining privileged channels of communication on the Tribunal's activities, but

- assisting with the improvement of prison facilities

The military support component is composed of:

- a) specialized engineering, logistics and communications units to assist Rwanda with various reconstruction and rehabilitation activities linked to promoting conditions conducive to the return of refugees (350 all ranks);
- b) formed troops (850 all ranks).

The SG expresses in his report his concerns regarding the scarcity of specialized military units and the possibility that no offers of such units will be received. Two alternatives may be contemplated.

These functions could be carried out by civilian engineering and logistics units contributed by Member States. Due to the lack of availability of these civilian units and the time it would take to deploy them, this option is considered unrealistic.

Alternatively, some or all of these functions could be contracted out to a private company. In this respect, and as an example, the current contractor providing third line services to UNAMIR is actually currently ensuring most of the services required by the peace-keeping operation. Capabilities of such private contractors, who are able to deploy or sub-contract locally within 10 days the personnel required to perform all kinds of engineering and logistics functions, should not be underestimated. Their use is also cost-effective. The practical difficulties related to this option relate to the fact that a new international bidding process will have to be engaged. In the meantime, the current contractor could provisionally ensure most of the tasks outlined above.

Regarding the use of formed troops, these are necessary in order to support the activities of the specialized units, be they military or civilian. The figure of 850 all ranks is considered a minimum requirement in view of the nature of the tasks expected to be performed.

III. COMMON ELEMENTS

In any of the two options contemplated above, a number of elements will have to be included so as to minimize the impact of UNAMIR's departure:

- Maintaining helicopter and fixed-wing lift capabilities. These capabilities would be managed by the SRSG and shared with all UN agencies working in Rwanda;
 - Maintaining a UN Radio in Rwanda.
-

THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION OF THE COUNTRY.

In the 1994 Genocide over one Million people were brutally murdered. Each village in Rwanda was affected with about 4 million people internally displaced and 2.5 million refugees lured into exile by the perpetrators of genocide.

The tragedy has left a big problem of orphans, widows, and other helpless people who survived death but have hardly any means of survival. The National wealth, including money in Banks, was looted and both the physical and economic infrastructures were completely destroyed.

The government of Rwanda has stopped genocide and restored relative peace and security, but it is still confronted with the enormous task of rebuilding a nation shattered by genocide. Given the fact that Rwanda lacks adequate resources, the government appeals to the international community to mobilize both bilaterally and multilaterally, and particularly through the United Nations system, for the recovery and rehabilitation of post-genocide Rwanda.

With the end of UNAMIR's peacekeeping mandate on 8 March 1996, there will still be need for meeting specific post-genocide peace building requirements and for undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country for which UN agencies should increase their activities in Rwanda through special programmes and greater collaboration with the Rwandan government. Furthermore, upon UNAMIR's departure UN agencies will need to strengthen their collaboration in order to benefit from common services on a cost-effective basis, so that the bulk of their assistance can benefit Rwanda directly.

Appropriate UN Agencies, in addition to those already present in Rwanda such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR etc. should concentrate their common initiatives in the following areas of activities:-

1. Repatriation of refugees.
2. Resettlement of returnees & internally displaced persons.
3. Support for survivors of genocide.
4. Justice & Human Rights.
5. Improvement of detention centres.
6. Institutional capacity building.
7. Infrastructure rehabilitation.
8. National Reconciliation.

A trust fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction should be pursued as a mechanism for the donor countries to contribute resources to enable the government and UN agencies to undertake these recovery and rehabilitation activities.

A. Repatriation of Refugees:-

Repatriating all Rwandese nationals would promote the process of national reconciliation. The Government is committed to the unconditional return of all Rwandan nationals to the Country. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been reached between the government of Rwanda and the governments of neighbouring countries on the repatriation mechanism.

The government has translated its commitment to the return of refugees through the following actions:-

1. Advocacy for national reconciliation.
2. Restoration of security within our borders.
3. Discouraging revenge through enforcement of law and order.
4. Promoting a culture of transparency by, for example, allowing human rights monitors throughout the country.
5. Enforcement of laws governing Property Rights.
6. Resettlement and reintegration of returnees both in the administration, army and in other social structures.

These measures have already led to the return of 2,272,000 in only one year. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has played an instrumental role in the conclusion of repatriation agreements with neighbouring countries and should continue to be the lead agency during the repatriation process. Resources should be made available so that the UNHCR could continue to coordinate and cooperate closely on that matter with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

B. Resettlement of Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons.

During the Thematic Consultation on Refugees held in Kigali on 15 November 1998, the government of Rwanda presented to the International Community a plan of action for the repatriation, resettlement and social reinsertion of refugees and internally displaced persons.

This plan of action indicates priority actions which are estimated to cost \$ 131 million over the next 3 years to resettle and offer support for the socio-economic reintegration of all refugees coming back to the country and internally displaced persons.

The Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration (MINIREISO) will continue to require support from the UNDP to strengthen its capacities to support, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the plan of action at the national and Prefectoral level. The UNDP, through the various specialised UN agencies, such as the UN center for Human Settlement (HABITAT) and the UN office for project services, should continue to support resettlement and social reintegration in, respectively, urban areas and rural areas. The UNHCR will be expected to facilitate first stage resettlement through the provision of reinstallation Kits and shelter material.

C. Support for the Survivors of Genocide.

The genocide of 1994 left hundreds of thousands of people, such as handicapped, widows, orphans or unaccompanied children, elderly, etc. in Rwanda in deplorable living conditions. These vulnerable groups could be assisted by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Women Fund (UNIFEM) UN Centre for Human Settlement (HABITAT) and World Food Programme (WFP), who will develop, in close collaboration with the government as well as international and local Non-governmental organizations, targeted assistance projects and programmes to reduce the vulnerability of these groups.

D. HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE

1. International Tribunal for Rwanda

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the complementarity of the mandate of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to its own action to bring to justice the Rwandese presume guilty of acts of genocide and will continue to support its work in the country.

2. Monitoring of Human Rights Situation

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the importance of the monitoring of the human rights situation in order to ensure the accountability of the military and police forces, to build confidence in the judicial system and to ensure the effective implementation of the measures to improve the human rights situation in the country, carry out investigations of acts of genocide in the International Tribunal for Rwanda and promote post-conflict confidence building.

3. Rehabilitation of the Judiciary and Improvement of Detention Conditions

The rehabilitation of the judiciary is one of the main priority of the Government of Rwanda and it will continue to need the assistance of the international community in order

to support its proper functioning over the years to come. The United Nations Development Programme and its executing agency in that sector the UN Department for Development Services and Management Support (UNDDSMS) will be requested to continue to provide assistance to strengthen national capacity and support the coordination of external assistance in that sector.

Following the tragic events of 1994 during which thousands of criminals participated to the genocide of up to 1 million persons, large number of Rwandese are currently in custody. Detention conditions in Rwanda have been largely recognized as being below human standards and should be radically improved. The United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) will be requested to continue to bring to the attention of the International Community the need for their support to improve the detention conditions. The United Nations Development Programme, in collaboration with the Government, will continue the implementation of the rehabilitation work.


E. HUMAN SECURITY

1. Internal Security

The Government of Rwanda has already started to reorganize and strengthen its Gendarmerie and Communal Police and has expressed its intention to proceed to the demobilization of part of its army. The United Nations Development Programme will continue to provide support to the strengthening of Rwandese Gendarmerie and Communal Police, particularly in the areas of training and non lethal equipment, and the World Bank will support the preparation and implementation, in collaboration with other agencies such as the International Organization for Migration and UNICEF, of a comprehensive demobilization and social reinsertion programme.

D. TRUST FUND FOR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF RWANDA

It is suggested that financing of the above mentioned activities be provided by bilateral and multilateral donors through the expanded Trust Fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda. All funds contributed will be managed by a committee composed of representatives of the Rwandese Government, bilateral and multilateral donors and United Nations agencies. UNDP will assure the secretariat of the committee and will report to donors on the use of the funds.



1st March, 1996

**REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
& COOPERATION
P. O. BOX 179
KIGALI**

His Excellency Boutros-Boutros Ghali
United Nations Secretary General
United Nations
New York

**RE: THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUED
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL RECOVERY AND
REHABILITATION OF THE COUNTRY.**

In the 1994 Genocide over one Million people were brutally murdered. Each village in Rwanda was affected with about 4 million people internally displaced and 2.5 million refugees lured into exile by the perpetrators of genocide.

The tragedy has left a big problem of orphans, widows, and other helpless people who survived death but have hardly any means of survival. The National wealth, including money in Banks, was looted and both the physical and economic infrastructures were completely destroyed.

The government of Rwanda has stopped genocide and restored relative peace and security, but it is still confronted with the enormous task of rebuilding a nation shattered by genocide. Given the fact that Rwanda lacks adequate resources, the government appeals to the international community to mobilize both bilaterally and multilaterally, and particularly through the United Nations system, for the recovery and rehabilitation of post-genocide Rwanda.

OFFICE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

With the end of UNAMIR's peacekeeping mandate on 8 March 1996, there will still be need for meeting specific post-genocide peace building requirements and for undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country for which UN agencies should increase

Rwandan government. Furthermore, upon UNAMIR's departure UN agencies will need to strengthen their collaboration in order to benefit from common services on a cost-effective basis, so that the bulk of their assistance can benefit Rwanda directly.

new In order to coordinate the United Nations assistance to National recovery and Rehabilitation of the Country, the Rwandan Government accepts the proposal of the United Nations Secretary General to maintain the office of the special representative in Kigali for a period of six months. In addition to coordinating all UN activities, the special representative should monitor political developments and use his good offices to support the promotion of peace and national reconciliation.

Appropriate UN Agencies, in addition to those already present in Rwanda such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR etc. should concentrate their common initiatives in the following areas of activities:-

1. Repatriation of refugees.
2. Resettlement of returnees & Internally displaced .
3. Support for survivors of genocide.
4. Justice & Human Rights.
5. Improvement of detention centres.
6. Institutional capacity building.
7. Infrastructure rehabilitation.
8. National Reconciliation.

A trust fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction should be pursued as a mechanism for the donor countries to contribute resources to enable the government and UN agencies to undertake these recovery and rehabilitation activities, but should make the disbursement of required funds easy.

A. Repatriation of Refugees:-

Repatriating all Rwandese nationals would promote the process of national reconciliation. The Government is committed to the unconditional return of all Rwandan nationals to the Country. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been reached between the government of Rwanda and the governments of neighbouring countries on the repatriation mechanism.

The government has translated its commitment to the return of refugees through the following actions:-


1. Advocacy for national reconciliation.
2. Restoration of security within our borders.

collaboration with the government as well as international and local Non-governmental organizations, targeted assistance projects and programmes to reduce the vulnerability of these groups.

D. HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE

1. International Tribunal for Rwanda

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the complementarity of the mandate of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to its own action to bring to justice the Rwandese presumed guilty of acts of genocide and will continue to support its work in the country.

new  The UN Secretary General should continue to mobilize both human and financial resources for the tribunal so that it can accomplish its task.

2. Monitoring of Human Rights Situation

The Government of Rwanda recognize the importance of the monitoring of the human rights situation in the country as a factor contributing to the establishment of a climate of confidence. The UN Human Rights Operation in Rwanda will thus continue to monitor the human rights situation in the country, carry out investigations on acts of genocide for the International Tribunal for Rwanda and promote post-conflict confidence building.

3. Rehabilitation of the Judiciary and Improvement of Detention Conditions

The rehabilitation of the judiciary is one of the main priority of the Government of Rwanda and it will continue to need the assistance of the international community in order to support its proper functioning over the years to come. The United Nations Development Programme and its executing agency in that sector the UN Department for Development Services and Management Support (UNDDSMS) will be requested to continue to provide assistance to strengthen national capacity and support the coordination of external assistance in that sector.

Following the tragic events of 1994 during which thousands of criminals participated to the genocide of up to 1 million persons, large number of Rwandese are currently in custody. Detention conditions in Rwanda have been largely recognized as being below human standards and should be radically improved. The United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) will be requested to continue to bring to the attention of the International Community the need for their support to improve the detention conditions. The United Nations Development Programme, in collaboration with the Government, will continue the implementation of the rehabilitation work.

E. HUMAN SECURITY

1. Internal Security


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D. TRUST FUND FOR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF RWANDA


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The Government of Rwanda takes this opportunity to renew its commitment to the principles and ideals of the United Nations, and wishes to express its great appreciation for the sacrifices and contributions UNAMIR personnel have made during their tenure in Rwanda.

Please accept, your Excellency, the expression of my Government's compliments and highest consideration.




Dr. Anastase GASANA
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation



c.c. H.E. The President of the Republic of Rwanda
" H.E. The Vice President and Minister of Defence
" H.E. The Prime Minister

Analysis of Estimate of
Funds Expended in Rwanda by UNAMIR

(Average monthly expenditure for second half of 1995)



Item

Estimated Average
per month in US\$

MSA - International Civilians	153,000
MSA - Milobs and CivPol	215,400
Troops Daily Allowance	69,000
MPs Meal Allowance	59,000
Staff Officers Meal Allowance	67,000
UNVs Sub:	114 000
Local Staff	
Local Proc	

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: SRSG
A:

FROM: CAO
DE:

Room No. - No de bureau	Extension - Poste	Date
		6/3/96

\$1

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?	POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

NOTE:

The figures above
country - they c

I hope the attached provides the information the
you requested from CSS
on Monday 4 March

note

This is a conservative estimate. I
came out with an average of individual
expenditure in Rwanda of 1,000/1,500 US\$ a mo.

COM-6 (2-78)

SRSg:

UNA/USA REPORT ON RWANDA

The report's merit^{is} is that even if belatedly^{sheds} sheds some light on the thinking of some individuals.

Riza, Annabi and Lindenmayer pages 6 and 7

Rawson, Oden and Whaley, pages 11 through 14

Gasana (FM) pages 14 and 15

see comment by UNA/USA on page 17

Dusaidi, pages 19 and 20

Kagame, pages 23 and 24


Isel Rivero
16 February 1996

*Time change reservation
to the guide against 200.012
on the 17th it is
17.2 wish impossible I want
to work back to 14.00*

*See
17.2*

18.1

NATIONS UNIES
DEPARTEMENT
DES AFFAIRES HUMANITAIRES



UNITED NATIONS
DEPARTMENT
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

36/00819

NN

A - To: Ms. Norah Niland
DHA-New York

Facsimile No:

DE - FROM: Sergio Piazzi

Palais des Nations
CH-1211 GENEVE 10

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In case of emergency ONLY: + (4122) 917-2010

OBJET - SUBJECT: MONT-LORE STUDY / Rwanda

UNA Report

Date: 23 January 1996

Ref: DHAGVA FX -

36/0438

Account: ugerre

Total No. of pages: 26

File(s): ORG 231/6 UK / USA
Rwanda Civil Strife

Dear Norah,

Please find attached copy of a UNA-USA Report on the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) that I just received. It is very interesting with a complete different approach from the one of ODI. While UNREO is referred to at page 7, it is worth to note US Embassy's comments on UN and UNHCR at page 13.

Best Regards

REC'D

JAN 23 1996

SF
1) Highlights - most interesting comments
2) Do not know if points were being quoted verbatim
3) FIND DPKO comments on Page 9 amazing
not helpful if circulated in Kigali.
N 9/62

cc: Martin Griffiths, Director DHA-Geneva
Debbie Saidy, CESU, DHA-Geneva



British Embassy
Addis Ababa

1 March 1996

*File
prudent*

P.O. Box 858
Ethiopia
Addis Ababa

Telephone: 61 23 54
Facsimile: 61 05 88

HE Shaharya M Khan
Room 717
Hilton Hotel
Addis Ababa

Dear Ambassador

RWANDA: VISIT BY VICE-PRESIDENT KAGAME

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed papers regarding the visit by Vice-President Kagame and to pass on the following message.

not enclosed restricted material

Due to Ms Evans' (Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's United Nations Department) travel arrangements she is now unable to meet you for dinner on Friday as requested. She would, however, be pleased to meet you for breakfast on Saturday morning. *Shah Khan* *best*

PI' 1122 (12)

Michael Stead

*This is a record
of Kagame's visit
to the UN. It is a
very important
document.*

12/1/96

Memorandum for the Record**Date:** 13 November 1995**CC:** ANSER International Security Division**From:** Andrew J. Harris, Ph.D.**Subject:** United Nations Association of the USA Peacekeeping Trip Report-Rwanda**Introduction:**


From 4-7 November 1995, I visited Rwanda as a member of a 10-person delegation sponsored by the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA). The objectives of the visit, consistent with the UNA-USA's charter, were to review the progress of the UN in meeting its stated peacekeeping objectives in the country as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandate. UNAMIR was established to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, protect internally displaced persons and other civilians affected by the civil conflict that wracked the country during April and July 1994, provide security to human rights monitors and members of the international tribunal investigating the massive genocidal killing that occurred during April 1994, and assist in training and establishing a new police force.

10-person team!

These tasks are complicated by the presence of over one million refugees located in camps in neighboring countries along Rwanda's borders, the largest and most famous of which is located in Goma, Zaire. Among these refugees are members of the deposed former government and the ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR), who are waging a low-level insurgency campaign along the Zairian border and are conducting economic sabotage operations in the interior parts of the country. The return of the refugees is being inhibited by a number of factors including attacks against returnees by the ex-FAR; concern about retribution against the refugees, who are primarily of Hutu ethnicity, by the government, which is controlled by the Tutsi-dominated Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RPF) party; the desperate economic condition within Rwanda, which suffers a 44 percent chronic malnutrition rate; and lingering concerns over the security situation and the threat of another civil war. As a result, the refugee flow has slowed to a trickle, with about 8,000 refugees returning from outside the country per month. This situation may change as a result of the agreement brokered by former President Carter in Cairo in late November.

During the course of our visit we met with the Vice President/Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Justice Minister. We had extensive discussions with the leadership of all elements of the UN presence in Angola, including the UNAMIR Force Commander, the Secretary General's Special Representative to Rwanda, several representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Development Programs Resident Representative, the director of World Food Program (WFP) operations in Rwanda, and with several members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We also met with the U.S. Ambassador and members of his mission, including the military attaché and chief political officer.

Who they met



Historical Context:

The current situation in Rwanda is a result of a number of complex ethnic relationships that have evolved over the past five to six hundred years. There are currently three ethnic groups in the country: the Twa, a pygmy tribe which inhabits the southern part of the country and makes up about 1 percent of the population; the Hutu, which account for about 85 percent; and the Tutsi, which make up the remaining 14 percent. Rwanda is about the size of Maryland and prior to the genocide in 1994 was the most densely populated country in Africa. The first known inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa. The Hutu, probably from the Congo River basin, were well established by the 15th century, when the Tutsi came down from the north and conquered the area. In the feudal society imposed by the Tutsi, the Hutu became a caste of serfs forced into subjugation and economic dependency by a Tutsi nobility. German explorers arrived in the 1880s, and Roman Catholic clergy established missions in the area. Later in the decade, Rwanda (then called Ruanda) and Burundi (then called Urundi) were incorporated into German East Africa. The indigenous rulers maintained good relations with the Germans and, later, with the Belgians, who occupied the country during World War I. After the war, the area was mandated to Belgium by the League of Nations and became known as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Following World War II it became a United Nations trust territory.

As political consciousness increased among Africans after World War II, the Hutu grew more vocal in protesting the political and social inequalities in Rwanda. In 1959, the antagonism between Tutsi and Hutu erupted into violence. The next year the Tutsi king fled the country, and an exodus of some 200,000 Tutsi followed. A republic was established in January 1961. In elections held the following September, the Parmehutu party won a large majority of the seats in the National Assembly, and a 4-1 majority voted against the return of the king.

At the insistence of the United Nations trusteeship council, Belgium granted Rwanda independence on 1 July 1962, with the Hutu-led Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) assuming control. The MDR won the elections in 1965 and 1969, with Kayibanda, the first President, reelected in both elections.

In 1963 some exiled Tutsi returned to Rwanda as a rebel army. Although unsuccessful, the takeover attempt prompted a large-scale Tutsi massacre by the Hutu, later to be followed by periodic ethnic violence. At the same time, thousands of victimized Hutu from Burundi took refuge in Rwanda. In July 1973 the defense minister, General Juvénal Habyarimana, led a bloodless coup that ousted Kayibanda. Habyarimana, a Hutu from the north, charged that Kayibanda favored southern Hutu and was trying to monopolize power in the country. Both parliament and the MDR were suspended after the coup. Political activities resumed in 1975 with the formation of a new ruling party called the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD). In 1978, a new constitution was approved, and President Habyarimana was confirmed in office for another 5 years. After thwarting a coup attempt in 1980, he was reelected without opposition in 1983 and 1988. In 1990, Belgium and several central African nations sent troops to Rwanda to oppose an uprising by Tutsi exiles, who had formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party, and invaded from Uganda. A new constitution authorizing the establishment of a multiparty democracy became law in 1991. Despite this political détente, the conflict continued between the RPF, becoming increasingly trained and organized, and the government.

In 1992, Habyarimana and a number of moderate members of his government advocated entering negotiations with the RPF. The United Nations first formed an observer mission followed by a UNAMIR I to oversee the repatriation of exiled Tutsis and multiparty elections. As this proc-

ess progressed during 1993, hard-liners within the NRMD and the Army formed a nationalist Hutu paramilitary organization and began to actively oppose the peace process. Sporadic incidents of violence erupted, culminating in the 6 April 1994 crash at Kigali airport of an aircraft carrying President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi. Hard-liners immediately assumed control in an apparent coup, and the Hutu paramilitary organization, assisted by members of the Army, immediately began executing moderate Hutu leaders. The violence quickly spread to the small Tutsi population, as well as those Hutus who attempted to stop the violence. As many as 100,000 Rwandans were directly involved in the killing, and several hundred thousand more played supporting roles according to international observers. Estimates of the deaths in the genocide run as high as one million. Following the victory of the RPF's military wing, the Revolutionary People's Army (RPA), close to two million people fled the country over a million of these in a 5 day period in July 1994.

The United Nations initially reacted to the genocide with confusion, ordering UNAMIR to refrain from becoming involved in the conflict to stop the violence. The UN Security Council reduced UN garrison in Kigali from 2,500 to a bare minimum of 270 troops. The failure of UNAMIR to stop the bloodshed has undermined the confidence of the RPF in UNAMIR. Moreover, recent statements indicate that the government will not support renewal of the mission's mandate when it expires on 8 December 1995.

Apr. 94
SC Response

Findings:

The renewal of the UNAMIR mandate is uncertain for a number of reasons. The history of UNAMIR II and the failure to take a more active protective role during the genocide has left a deep-seated mistrust of both the UN's mission and the United Nations. Since there is no truce or cease-fire to maintain between the RPA and the ex-FAR, UNAMIR's security function in traditional peacekeeping terms is unclear, and the RPF resents the implication that the force is needed to maintain internal security or oversee the Army to prevent retribution killings. As Paul Kagame, the Vice President and Defense Minister noted the RPF may "accommodate" UNAMIR, primarily to ensure the continued flow of development assistance. The government feels it is under pressure to accept the continuation of the mandate as a precondition for continued assistance that this, in turn, undermines their legitimacy. Much will depend on the Secretary General's report and the envisioned future role for the mission.

A possible role for the mission may be providing support for the international tribunal investigating the genocide. The primary value of the mission in this context is logistical; it is unlikely that the current force of 2,100 will be allowed to remain without a significant reduction in force. This reduction will undermine the ability of UNAMIR to provide any real security, other than mere presence. On the other hand, the investigators will require transportation and escorts, and the presence of "blue helmets" may deter any potential violence. If the Security Council authorizes this mission for UNAMIR, it must do so with the clear understanding that the mission will be capable of little more than self-protection and will be challenged to extricate itself, let alone the foreign community, should widespread violence erupt between the RPA and the ex-FAR. In fact, as members of the current mission made clear, the mission in its current structure is severely limited in operational capability.

The RPF appears to be in control of the country, based on information from both government and international sources. The U.S. Military Attaché, Col. Odom, spoke highly of the RPA but noted that it lacks a solid NCO corps, adequate transportation, and communications capabilities. He described Mr. Kagame as a very capable strategist, leader, and tactician. The RPA may

be restraining itself in coming to grips with the insurgency due to concern over international reaction. This restraint may be loosened if the International Tribunal investigating the genocide fails to produce results or if economic development assistance is not forthcoming. All of the government leaders with whom we spoke seemed to be concerned with the international community's perception of Rwanda. However, they are much more concerned with bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to justice. Several government representatives emphasized the need to deal with the "culture of impunity" that is developing due to international inaction. They noted that 18 months have passed since the genocide, yet none of the responsible parties have been brought to trial or even apprehended. They emphasized that they are giving the UN a chance to solve the problem but are willing and prepared to take matters into their own hands should international resolve flag.

7! The Rwandans are increasingly concerned about the value of international humanitarian assistance. They view the refugees as living a "soft" life in the camps, to the tune of \$1 million per day of international investment, while those who stayed home struggle to rebuild the country. Rightly or wrongly, the perception exists that the UN is protecting and coddling, rather than bringing to justice and punishing, a group of mass murderers. Many with whom we spoke questioned the relief community's motives in not taking a more active role in encouraging repatriation. Some intimated that it may be against the interests of the UN relief agencies and NGOs to "solve" the crisis. That is, by keeping the crisis going, donations will remain high. On the other hand, the UNHCR personnel emphasized the need to ensure that the refugees are returning to a secure environment. They pointed out that there are currently 50,000 prisoners living in a Rwandan prison system that was built for 15,000, in conditions they described as "medieval." Again, the central question becomes the existence and adequacy of a justice system to identify and punish the guilty.

Issue
Repatriation;
ref storage

Another aspect of the relief effort is the focus on emergency assistance at the perceived expense of long-term development aid. The Rwandans resent the image of young Europeans and Americans driving around their country in new Land Cruisers and Land Rovers, digging latrines and drafting reports on Rwanda's problems. Mr. Kagame emphasized that his people need jobs and can dig perfectly good latrines. He resents the implication that the RPF is incapable of providing for its people.

Overall, Rwandan frustration with the international community is growing. It is apparent that they will oppose any continuation of UNAMIR. The focus of successful future UN effort will have to be on justice and development, and this will have to be made clear to the government and people of Rwanda.

Rwa. frustration
with int.
community

1. 3 November 1995: The UNA arranged a number of initial briefings on the current situation in Rwanda. The briefings were geared to provide a general overview of the country and focused on UN programs and their impact on the situation. Several senior representatives of UNDPKO also provided general commentary on UN peacekeeping operations and considerations in general. A brief description of the presentations follows.

Ambassador M. Manzi Bakrumusta, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN: Mr. Bakrumusta stressed that there was a long history of genocide, that the Tutsis were forced out of Rwanda in 1959, and that for the past 30 years most have lived in exile in Uganda. He himself had only seen Rwanda for the first time after the RPA forced the Hutus from power. He said that if he had to worship anyone he would worship CNN because that's the only thing that stopped the genocide. Some bad feelings remain on the part of the RPF that UNAMIR pulled out during the genocide, leaving only a residual force that was unable to protect the local population. The Ambassador indicated that there are video tapes showing UN troops turning away from people who were pleading for pro-

tection and who were subsequently murdered. He also indicated that there was some tension with UN HRA organizations (e.g., HCR, DHA, etc.) because they only operated through some groups to the exclusion of segments of the population. This has been resolved, however. The Ambassador was optimistic for Rwanda's future prospects, despite the genocide. The Rwandan government is placing great hope at the UN Genocide Commission, which is meeting in Rwanda 1-5 November, the first indictments being handed down on 6 November.

UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Ashok Riza; Mr. Hedi Annabi, Director, Africa Division; Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmyer, Principal Officer (joined in progress): Mr. Annabi noted that the Rwandans view UNAMIR as a mixed blessing. While the force is required to deter a recurrence of ethnic violence and boost peoples' confidence, by implication, it highlights the government's inability to establish basic control on its own. They also feel that the UN withdrew when the situation intensified in 1994, providing no guarantee that they would not pull out unexpectedly again. The RPF is currently debating on whether to extend the UN mandate past the current 8 December expiration date.

When asked if UN PKOs have peaked in terms of numbers, ASG Riza offered a number of observations. PKOs are characterized by a dramatically increased level of complexity and a broadened range of involvement. This has made peacekeeping much more difficult to manage. A typical objective of a peacekeeping operation is to integrate the insurgent party into the government structure as a legitimate political group. This must often be done following an extended and bloody conflict. PKO forces and their political counterparts must cajole and intimidate parties into compliance with truces, and all of this has to be accomplished with a minimum use of force. When no truce is in effect, this process becomes even more difficult. ASG Riza indicated that there are three alternative approaches to peacekeeping, or more broadly, to the UN involvement in armed conflicts: the Desert Storm approach, which was undertaken under Article 9 of the UN charter; more "muscular" PE operations where peace is enforced; and traditional PKOs, where a truce is maintained or observed. He indicated that the UN does not have a good feel for this new way of doing business. By way of example, he asked if the UN was doing the right thing with NATO bombing the Serbs under a UN mandate. Should the UN be impartial in the face of genocide?

Mr. Annabi noted that all too often it appears that countries expect PKOs to solve all problems. Instead, they need to be applied at the right time in the right place. In Rwanda the world saw a situation where genocide was occurring, but no country was willing to unilaterally move in and stop it. A more frequent response is to pass a resolution asking the UN to stop the killing but then having passed the problem to the UN, countries are unwilling to provide forces and resources to form PK missions. As a result, the international community has a convenient way of appearing to solve difficult problems; PKOs all too often become a veneer of political action that covers the inability of countries to take decisive action. The UN then becomes a convenient scapegoat, allowing countries to publicly say they are doing something, then blame the UN for continued problems.

Even when forces are provided, often countries fail to back up PKOs with development assistance to stabilize the country following the conflict. The UN must have the capability to rebuild infrastructure and jump start the economy; otherwise, the hard won peace is quickly lost.

Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmyer indicated a strong possibility that UNAMIR will transition to an observer only force after the 8 December mandate. (Currently there are both peacekeepers and observers on the ground.) U.S. intelligence sources have told the UN that something big is going to happen in Rwanda—possibly a retribution genocide against the Hutus carried out by the RPA. If the mission becomes observer only, there would be no way that they could control the situation. However, leaving observers is better than a total pull out. Nonetheless, the general feeling among relief workers and UNAMIR is that there is a high probability that another genocide will occur. The question is how to develop and position a UN peacekeeping force to prevent the genocide from occurring. UNHCR is resettling Hutus back in their homes on a daily basis—sometimes in the same areas where they butchered their neighbors in April 1994. Even now, UNAMIR is a very lean force, having only 1,800 troops on the ground and a small number of observers. The Indians make up the largest contingent with a battalion of infantry (about 800), and the remainder are made up of support forces. If the Indians pull out, other forces will not have the capability to defend or extricate themselves.

Mr. Cary Alan Johnson, former UNHCR Field Officer, and Rwanda Representative, Africare: Mr. Johnson was in Rwanda prior to the April 1994 genocide. Arriving in January, he found the country aid effort short of even the most basic supplies. UNHCR had no trucks or radios and was not approaching the minimum food requirements of the refugee population, apparently due to problems with the supply pipeline. After the crash of the President's aircraft in April and the general convulsions that followed, there was a massive influx of Hutu refugees into Zaire as the Tutsi-led RPF took power. Several hundred NGOs responded, and Mr. Johnson indicated that there was "surprisingly good" coordination between the UN and the NGOs. These were facilitated by semi-weekly meetings at the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). By this time, Mr. Johnson had left UNHCR and joined Africare. Africare assumed the sanitation task of cleaning up bodies, attempting to prevent the outbreak of mass disease.

The Rwandan government experienced a number of growing pains as it transitioned from a rebel movement to an institutionalized entity. As the situation evolved from crisis to increased stability, there was a gradual attitude change regarding the UN relief organizations and the NGOs. The UN and the NGOs basically were running the country, providing power, water, sanitation, and food, infrastructure. As the government evolved, it started to view the assistance as undermining its legitimacy, and as it attempted to assume control over a greater number of functions, tensions began to build. Massive amounts of funds (in relative terms) were flowing through the NGOs into Rwanda without ever passing through the government's hands. The government began to feel that the money should go to it and that it would fund the NGOs as it saw fit. As the situation progressed, the RPF increasingly viewed this situation as a lack of international support for the government.

In general, Mr. Johnson indicated that the relationship between the UN agencies and the NGOs was very productive, and that UNREO, in particular, was a highly effective organization. He noted that UNREO made facilities available to the NGOs, including SATCOM faxes. This further encouraged cooperation. On the other hand, the number of NGOs responding was so large that many came unprepared and were asked to leave. For the most part, however, the larger NGOs were well organized and equipped and were quickly able to assume sectoral functions on the ground.

was this the
basis for the
SG's comments?

SF: this is
kind strange

RED prints
for UNREO

ditto

2. **UNAMIR Operations.** UNAMIR Force Medical Unit; Observer Operations; UNHCR Operations at Gynsenyi Transition Camp; UN Human Rights Monitoring Operations—November 1995. The UNAMIR medical clinic supports the peacekeeping force personnel. They operate an out-patient clinic and hospital. There are two resident surgeons and six beds and capacity for two additional beds in a crisis. They have made provisions to airlift seriously injured personnel to Nairobi. The primary medical problem faced by the PKO force is malaria. The clinic is jointly staffed by Norway and Canada.

Lt. Col. Vladamir Belcki is the head Military Observer in Sector 5 of UNAMIR's operational area (see map). Ninety-five percent of the population in Sector 5 is Hutu. Three percent of this population was killed in the genocide. There have been no major clashes between the RPA and the Former Government Army in the area, although Lt. Col. Belcki described the situation in the area as tense with an escalating number of infiltrations and incidents of economic sabotage. He is convinced that the Kanama massacre that occurred in an IDP camp in August (80 Hutus killed by the RPA in the only incident of its kind since the RPF took power) was due to infiltration by the ex-FAR. Lt. Col. Belcki indicated that many of the ex-FAR's operations are launched out of refugee camps on the border and that the insurgent force has a small popular base of support among the population in the interior. It is his observation that the RPA has not yet been able to secure the border, given its length and remoteness. The ex-FAR apparently has a base camp in the Gishuati area within a national forest. Most of this area falls within sector 5. The RPA is particularly vulnerable to infiltration operations at night. The insurgents are adopting a strategy of launching economic sabotage raids in the interior of the country and are sending in assassination teams to kill returnees in hopes that the murders will be blamed on the government. Initially, the insurgents followed a strategy of launching economic attacks against targets along the border (power lines, roads, bridges) but have grown bolder and have started conducting similar operations further in as they develop support and confidence. It is Lt. Col. Belcki's opinion that the ex-FAR is attempting to provoke the RPA into cracking down on the local Hutu population, further increasing the potential for support for the insurgents. The RPA has at least a small number of people stationed in each village and is attempting to form some sort of civilian militia. The population of Sector 5 was 750,000 before the war and dropped to 400,000 by the time the war ended. It is currently at about 550,000 people.

Military observers act as the SRSG's special representatives in each sector. They patrol the entire sector on a weekly basis, visiting each commune at least twice a week. (There are 12 communes in the area.) The Mil Obs report on clashes between the RPA and the ex-FAR and demonstrate UN presence in the area to reassure the population and promote stability. The unarmed Mil Obs also escort NGOs as they conduct operations and provide some food security for convoys, though they are unarmed. Part of their mission is to establish rapport with the RPA. There are 24 Mil Obs in Sector 5, and they have an area of about 2,000 sq km to cover during the course of their operations.

In addition to the Mil Obs, there is a company of 133 Nigerian Infantry troops operating in Sector 5. They typically do not accompany the Mil Obs on their patrols, as they are armed. Both the UNAMIR force and the Mil Obs hold daily briefings with the local NGOs operating in the area to apprise them of the security situation.

Mr. Alessandro Bolzoni is the acting UNHCR Field Officer for Sector 5. UNHCR's primary function in Sector 5 is to facilitate the transport of refugees from Goma back to their

homes in Rwanda. They operate several transit camps along the border area, including the one we visited in Gisenyi. The transit camps have a capacity of about 25,000, and the returnees stay 2 or 3 days before being transported home. MSF-Belgium (MSF-B) provides medical treatment for the refugees in the camps, and Food for the Hungry provides food distribution services. WFP transports right into the camps, maintaining extended delivery points (EDPs) at each location, as well as every commune in the country (147).

In operating the transit camps, HCR must work closely with the RPA. After transporting the refugees in from Goma on UN trucks, the RPA questions them to determine if they are criminals, or, more directly, if they played a role in the genocide. This process is observed by monitors from the HC for Human Rights. Following this interview, there are examined by MSF-Belgium personnel to identify major medical problems and determine whether they are carrying infectious diseases. The refugees are then processed into the transit center and given food and shelter. After a 1 or 2 day stay while transport is arranged, the refugees are transported back to their home communes, where they are met by the bourgmestre. By in large, the refugees are attempting to return home where they will be recognized; otherwise, there is a danger that they will be arrested. Nationwide HCR recently repatriated 9,230 people in September and 7,350 in October. They have been averaging about 7,000 people per month; the total has been estimated at over 1 million remaining outside the country in camps.

HCR in Zaire is working closely with the refugees to entice them to return home. They have begun interviewing returnees who have been back in their home communes for a while, video/audio taping the interviews to play back over the loudspeakers in Goma and other camps. The logic behind this initiative is that people will hear the voices of friends and relatives, reassuring them that it is safe to return home.

HCR indicated that they have the capacity to accept 8,000-9,000 people per day nationwide, with surge capability to 20,000. Currently, they are planning on a rate of 6,000 per day. Several NGOs are assisting HCR: MSF-B, Campaigns (an Italian NGO sp.), Inter-source (also Italian), CRS, Food for the Hungry International, and Save the Children UK.

- HCR Point of Contact in Rwanda: Khassime Diagne - Assistant to the HCR Representative for Rwanda. SATCOM link through Florida (Harris Corp.) 407-726-5018 voice; 407-726-5019 fax. Will provide detailed list of NGOs operating in Rwanda and what functions they are performing.

The Human Rights Field Officer for Sector 5, Angela ?? noted that she was in a difficult position with the RPA in performing her job. It is difficult to explain to the RPA why the UN is so concerned about the rights of the returning Hutus given its lack of action during the genocide. At the same time, HCR is in a difficult position, appearing to be providing food and shelter to those who committed the genocide while, directly across the border people are working subsistence-level farms.

3. Sukerhino Hasegawa, UNDP Resident Representative 6 November 0800. In addition to his role as UN Resident Representative, Mr. Hasegawa serves as human rights coordinator and as deputy for security matters. He raised concerns regarding how long UNAMIR will remain in Rwanda and noted that the departure of UNAMIR will raise security concerns for those agencies left behind. He noted that UNAMIR provides security for the refugees returning home as well as the human rights monitors. The government of Rwanda is not asking for an extension of the UNAMIR mandate, and neither is the Secre-

Hasegawa

??

Nothing E.T.
Field spoken

tary General. In a recent meeting in Geneva that he attended, Mr. Hasegawa indicated that about half of the donors indicated that they supported an extension of UNAMIR. Mr. Hasegawa stated that the UN has to be particularly sensitive to the position of the government on UNAMIR, and the UN should not be seen as attempting to impose its will on others. Continuing UNAMIR in its current state, or at a slightly reduced level of forces, significantly undermines the effectiveness of the operation.

There is also a significant linkage between UNAMIR and the effectiveness of humanitarian relief operations. Working together, UNAMIR and HCR can transport up to 6,000 refugees out of transit camps to their homes. If the requirement were to jump to 10,000 per day, the current capability would be overwhelmed. This is of particular concern since President Mobutu has indicated that the refugees may be forced out of the camps in his country in December, and the leadership in Burundi, having its own set of ethnic problems, is making similar statements. UNDP and HCR have developed contingency plans, including setting up way stations every 5-10 km and encouraging people to walk back to their homes.

The Genocide Conference, nearing completion, raised a number of questions of fairness: Are the Hutus, who executed the genocide, being given better treatment than those who stayed in their homes. The issue of the perception of bias favoring the Hutus will be raised at a donors conference scheduled for 21-22 November in Geneva. The RPF sees the international community sheltering and feeding people responsible for the murder of up to 1 million people, and this colors their response to proposals for increased aid as well as the extension of the UNAMIR mandate. In these discussions, however, it is important to remember that the UNAMIR forces lost 14 of their own. Mr. Hasegawa noted that virtually every member of the missions staff lost a family member in the genocide - that he as well as the rest of the international community in Rwanda is very sensitive to the need for justice before the country can go forward.

Regarding reconstruction, UNDP has been pledged \$580 million to assist in the reconstruction of Rwanda. Mr. Hasegawa noted that USAID in particular has been very forthcoming. Much of this funding, however, has yet to appear. The RPF is also very concerned about the way the funding is being implemented; they expected to be given a large portion of the funding directly. In fact, the funds are provided through the UN agencies and NGOs. This further creates the impression that the RPF cannot govern the country effectively. The NGOs in particular are often conducting projects without coordinating with the government. Rwandans find the spectacle of young Europeans and Americans driving around in Land Rovers and Land Cruisers particularly galling - Mr. Hasegawa pointed out that at the Ministry of Defense compound you only find two or three cars in the parking lot at any given time.

He mentioned that the Minister of Defense also stresses that no foreigners have been killed since the RPF took power. This is often brought up when UN representatives argue that UNAMIR is needed to provide security. Their thinking is that the UN was not able to provide security during the genocide, causing limited, if any, confidence that they will be able to do so in the future. Mr. Hasegawa emphasized the best chance for success and security of the UN operation is to make as much direct aid as possible available to the people of Rwanda.

UNDP is involved in three major areas in reconstructing the Rwanda judicial system. First, they support justice programs. DP is assisting in establishing courts and other ad-

tional leadership. This history has undercut the country's sense of tradition. As independence approached, the Rwandans staged a peasant land revolt. The land tenure system that had preceded independence was totally at odds with the evolving democracy of the country. As a result of land pressures, during the 1960s there were numerous incidents of communal violence. Tension between the northern and southern parts of the country continued until 1973, when a coup occurred. A very efficient government took over and kept up the basic infrastructure. UNDP and several international donor countries were very impressed with the progress the country's leadership was making and invested heavily in development programs. Despite the progress made, there was no resolution to the ethnic violence, which pitted the now disenfranchised Tutsis against the Hutu, who are the majority population but historically formed a lower class. While the international community focused on the development successes, they missed the growing undercurrents of ethnic tension.

These tensions have carried forward and become more evident during the Arusha treaty process. The failure was due to a treaty structure that focused on political parties while ignoring the ethnic undercurrents. When the accord was signed, this ethnic tension was thrown open to competition on the political stage. Violence broke out, and the incidents became increasingly more bloody. The role of UNAMIR I was to separate the political parties into two armed camps. The Ambassador considers these operations very effective, and the UN started to lock up weapons and discuss the formation of cantonments. However, the focus was on peacekeeping operations at the expense of formulating a political settlement, and as a result the political problems were never fully resolved. Following the April 1994 crash of the President, the government troops initiated a series of massacres, first killing moderate Hutus that were part of the government. Wholesale slaughter of Tutsis followed. At the same time, the RPA, operating from Uganda in the north and Burundi in the south, stepped up their campaigns, and within about 3 weeks the RPF had taken control of the country. UNAMIR was not structured to prevent the genocide, as the UN has repeatedly pointed out. UNAMIR II was not structured to prevent wholesale political violence either; rather it was focused on the protection of UN buildings and supporting humanitarian relief operations.

The military attaché, Col. Tom Odem, observed that even this limited view of the mission was challenged by the government, who insisted on a 50 percent reduction in the size of the mandate. Shortly after UNAMIR achieved their force level of 5,500 troops, they began to reduce their force size to the current level of about 1,800. The force commander at that time believed that just the presence of UNAMIR could provide stability in the country. The Kabaya IDP camp massacre burst that bubble. The massacre was not a surprise at all; many people saw it coming. Prior operations in Kibeho and Ndago IDP camps (among others) had boiled down the remaining IDPs to hard-core supporters of the former government. The camp should have been emptied with a forced closing, and those who remained in the camp were "hard core" Hutus who refused to go home for a variety of reasons. Col. Odem observed that the UNAMIR offered the IDPs a false sense of security, when in fact the UNAMIR force was a company of Zambians who were participating in their first PKO. This company was at the center of an IDP camp containing over 100,000 people. Col. Odem estimated that a solid, well-trained battalion of experienced peacekeepers probably could have prevented the tragedy. He sees no role for armed forces in a peacekeeping capacity.

The Embassy's political officer, Peter Whaley, indicated that he believed the effect of UNAMIR and many of the other UN agencies was to keep the crisis going. He views the UN as essentially a destabilizing force in the country. The presence of UNAMIR is inhibiting, as opposed to facilitating, the return of refugees (if everything is so safe, why are there still blue helmets here?). In other IDP camps, when the RPA appeared on a hill outside of camp, the ex-FAR guerrillas moved out of camp (for example, a widely covered operation in Kibeho in January 1995), and Mr. Whaley's assessment is that the ex-FAR figured the government would not do anything with UNAMIR there.

Reception?
purpose?
Relief effort?

He views the negative impact of the UN as even more pronounced when considered in the context of the camps across the border. He indicated that it appeared the UN relief agencies and the NGOs want to keep the crisis going "for their own reasons." The government is more interested in development assistance as opposed to emergency relief: "Think about it - if your house just burned down and somebody offered you a toaster, would you rather have a toaster or the cost of a toaster? The RPF wants cash - the gift that keeps on giving." It appears that the international community did not want the government to succeed, particularly with respect to closing down the Kabaya IDP camp, and actually expected the government to get a comeuppance. The UNHCR and other relief agencies stalled on closing down the camp despite repeated warnings. Numerous other IDP camps had been closed down, and this was the last remaining. After the massacre, the remaining 90,000 IDP were peacefully resettled in their homes. The bottom line is that Mr. Whaley recommends that the international community look hard at the government's ability to assume responsibility for most functions. Although many other ambassadors are not sure that UNAMIR should pull out now, a danger is seen that the situation could explode, particularly if Mobutu creates a forced repatriation situation.

Although he was not specifically stating that UNHCR was self-perpetuating, Mr. Whaley believes that its focus is typically not the return of refugees (UNHCR is not focused on getting people out of camps, but rather on getting them in.) HCR officers operate essentially as free lancers, having very little coordination with anybody else. In Rwanda, there is not really a focused, unified operation. It is easier for HCR to keep the refugees in the camps than to take a chance on their return. Mr. Whaley views this as an institutional impetus to grow. Again, when all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. HCR in the other affected countries operates independently of HCR in Rwanda, and it is his view that there is little coordination between the Goma and Kigali offices. There are no unified objectives. Mr. Whaley was told by President Mobutu in July, 1994 that the refugees had to be moved and repatriated, that he could not have a million and a half people sitting on his border indefinitely. HCR is well aware of this feeling but as of yet has made no attempt to facilitate large-scale repatriation.

No common
Relief agenda

The difficult conditions in Rwanda are a further disincentive for people to leave the camps. Mr. Whaley painted the following picture: imagine you are a farmer across from the camps in Goma, and you see your former neighbors getting fed regularly, living with electric lights and clean water. Then imagine if you are in the camps, and under the best circumstances you know you will be returning to a hard life of subsistence farming. It is Mr. Whaley's feeling that the refugees in the camps have never had it so good, pointing out that some of the NGOs even run discos at night.

Ambassador Rawson stated that the RPF must be clear on what it thinks the UN can do, while recognizing that the RPF is waiting for the SG's report on UNAMIR. He noted that

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prior to June 1993 UNAMIR was ill-equipped and undermanned. The Ambassador stated that if the prior force commander, McGen Dellein, was given the mandate, he could have stopped the outbreak of the civil war. In April 1994, even with the forces he had, and in the summer he was faced with, he could have saved 10,000 or more lives if he had the right mandate. The United States voted for the increased force mandate to save lives. Regarding the extension of the mandate, the Ambassador's recommendation to Washington is that the mission be terminated but that the military observers continue. He indicated that Washington supported a continuation of the mandate.

5. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Government of Rwanda, Mr. Augustin Gasama 6 November, 1100: (Note: The Foreign Ministry is in an orange building surrounded by white UN vehicles. There were only two or three civilian cars in the parking lot, one obviously being the Minister's, and a couple of Army light trucks. The desk of the Minister's chief aid had a broken leg, and the chairs in his office were all mismatched, yet all the activity seemed very focused with people running in and out. The Minister's office was nicely appointed; the only accommodation to the heat was a small oscillating fan in the corner. There was a hole in the wall where an air conditioner had been at one time.)

In his opening statement, the Minister indicated that he appreciated Rwanda's relationship with the U.S., noting that we were among the first to recognize the RPF. He then indicated that prior to the genocide, UNAMIR I had a force of 2,500, many of whom evacuated when the genocide started. He finally stated that they failed to accomplish their mission of protecting the Rwandese people. In May, after the genocide, the UN decided to send a big force to Rwanda - after the people had already died. The concept in May, when the decision to build a larger force of 5,500 peacekeepers was made - was much different than in August and September after the RPA had consolidated control of the country. But it took until September for the full force to arrive in the country. We no longer needed such a large force. There were 3,500 soldiers hiding in Kibeho; the UN did not protect the people in these IDP camps from the guerrillas. The people of Rwanda feel abandoned by the UN.

The Minister asked rhetorically, "What are the modalities the UN uses when choosing an SRSO?" Mr. Booth-Booth (the former Minister of External Relations for Cameroon) was clearly a bad choice in our view. But we are open to discuss the modalities of UNAMIR IV with the SG. We are just not sure what they would do now.

The Foreign Minister noted that the only reason he was not killed during the genocide was due to the fact that he was out of the country on a mission.

When asked if the UN had accomplished anything beneficial in Rwanda, the Minister replied that one must make a distinction between UNAMIR I, II, and III. In terms of logistics, UNAMIR has been very helpful; for example, when the Government leadership had to travel outside the country, the SRSO provided them with planes. The UN has also been helpful in receiving the refugees from Zaire. But with respect to extending the mandate, the Minister stated that they would wait and see what the SG's report on UNAMIR had to say. UNAMIR could continue to help with returning the refugees and assist with MII Ops and human rights monitors. He also noted that the justice program the UN was supporting was very helpful - that this was a key to lasting stability in Rwanda. He noted that the RPF would like to avoid seeing the UN fail again. He emphatically stated that Rwanda cannot allow the UN to fail in the justice program regarding the international tribunals and if UNAMIR can help with this process, the situation would be much further along. He

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said that the Government has no problem with the human rights monitors, indicating that the RPF asked them to be in Rwanda. He stated that we have authorized a total of 300 to be in the country and again emphasized that there has to be a strong focus on the element of justice. He refused to place a figure on the size of UNAMIR IV, noting that we want them to be the right size to be effective.

The Minister again returned to the UN's support for developing the Rwandan justice system, noting that Rwanda lost many members of the judicial system in the genocide. He indicated the country needed help in establishing the infrastructure necessary to build a post-genocide legal system. He also noted that the country could use a lot of help in the agricultural area. In health, he noted that malaria is now the biggest killer in Rwanda.

When asked if he had expressed these views to the SG, the Foreign Minister indicated that he had not, again stating that he preferred to wait until the SG's UNAMIR report comes out. Regarding the other UN agencies, he said that in general they have been very helpful in providing assistance, noting the functions of UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNDP in the country. He stated that he was not so sure about the SG's own personal initiatives in the country; it was unclear what aspect of the UN's activities this statement referenced.

Regarding the prospect of forced repatriation in December, the Minister said that this posed a very big problem for Rwanda in that they would not have the justice system in place to process all the people that were involved in the genocide. He stated that many of the planners and implementers of the genocide are hiding out in the refugee camps in Zaire, as well as in Kenya and other countries in the region. He stated that these people have committed crimes against humanity, and the government has asked President Mobutu to return them to Rwanda. He has refused. The government has invited President Mobutu to come to Rwanda in December, and he accepted. An official visit is planned for 10-15 December. The Minister said that Rwanda will try diplomacy with Mobutu to avoid conflict, noting that the Zairian and Rwandan people have no problem between them. He stated that "we need to measure Mobutu very carefully." He emphasized the RPF is committed to finding a just way to lead Rwanda to foster ethnic harmony. He noted the colonial past of the country, emphasizing that France and Belgium fostered disunity in the way they ran the country. The RPF is committed to resolving the issue of the genocide and then moving forward.

6. Ambassador Shambaugh-Kahn, Secretary General's Special Representative to Norway-
but, 1400: (Note: The meeting with the SRSB took place in the bar of the former hotel UNAMIR occupies as its headquarters. The bar serves as the conference/working room for UNAMIR. The conditions are very spartan. By way of apology, the SRSB noted that he felt it was inappropriate for the UN to be living in anything that might resemble luxury to the Rwandans.)

The SRSB said there are four main preoccupations of UNAMIR: refugees and repatriation, justice, aid to Rwanda and the manner it is given, and reconciliation. When he arrived on 4 July 1994, the SRSB said there were bodies strewn all over, and there was no food or electricity. Only the dogs were well fed, and that was because they were eating the bodies. There were only 400 troops on the ground, and the SRSB said the Rwandans were right when they said that we let them down. The SRSB brought up the incident that at the outset of the genocide the 400 Canadian and Belgian troops were providing shelter for the 20,000 Rwandans in a stadium near the UNAMIR compound, and when the time came to protect them from the government soldiers, they pulled out, leaving them to be slaughtered.

This event did not cover the UN in glory, but the UNAMIR force was in an impossible situation and had to consider saving itself. As it was, some of their numbers were killed.

To place Rwanda in context, the SRSO stated that one has to bear in mind that after Bangladesh, Rwanda is the most populated non-island state in the world. The pressures are enormous. But the SRSO emphasized that the country has made an astounding recovery, achieving 80 percent of its prewar agricultural capacity.

Regarding the refugee situation, the SRSO indicated that there are now about 1.6 million Rwandans living outside the country in camps in Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. He asked how the situation could be normalized until the refugees returned home and cited three reasons that were holding them back. Most feel insecure that they will be arrested. Second, within the camps there is a degree of intimidation by the ex-FAR. They are afraid that officials of the former government will send in hit teams to kill them if they try to return home. Third, many of them have never had it so good - why return home to a life of poverty and deprivation? The SRSO noted that the rate of return has dropped significantly; only about 200,000 of the new seasonal refugees that make up the 1.6 million figure have returned home. The Zairians have indicated that they will push the refugees out of the country at the end of the year. The last time they conducted a forced repatriation, the UNHCR, UNAMIR, and the RPA processed 14,000 through transition camps in 2 days. Only 1 percent were detained by the government for suspicion of participation in the genocide. The SRSO indicated that Tanzania may also attempt to push the refugees out, further compounding the problem in the east. But, overall, only a trickle are coming in now. Regarding IDPs, the SRSO indicated that there were about 800,000 IDPs in the sector controlled by the French under Operation Turquoise, launched in June 1994. By in large, the government and UNAMIR were successful in closing these camps down. The first 350,000 went home with no problem. The remaining 250,000 were reluctant to leave the IDP camps, but when asked to leave 180,000 returned home. The remaining refugees were the ones that were caught up in the Kibeya disaster. About 70,000 people were in the camp at the time. The SRSO emphasized that one can't lose sight of the fact that over 700,000 people were resettled successfully by the government, UNAMIR, and UNHCR.

Regarding a justice system, the SRSO indicated that this has to be addressed as a priority. He stated that the leaders of the genocide are hiding out in various capitals, and despite the existence of the international tribunal, nobody helped return them to justice. The government is watching the world feeding those who participated in or carried out the genocide at a cost of \$1 million a day. They ask, "what about the victims of the genocide?" A key component to this effort is to have a police force, so that when the refugees come home they have a legal authority to turn to.

Funds are also a critical issue. The SRSO noted that at the Geneva Round Table, the international community pledged \$748 million, and 6 months later only 10 percent has flowed into the country. Of the \$7 million that came in, the government was told that they had to put two-thirds of that money to paying off debts accrued with the World Bank and the IMF by the old regime. As a result, the cash to pay for restoring a shattered country does not exist. The army has not been paid, and the fact they have not rebelled given the intrinsic pressures they are under is a testament to their discipline. Witness the fact that an army of 15,000 defeated a force three times their size. The SRSO noted, however, that if you don't pay an army, they quickly become an undisciplined bush army. The government also needs funds to pay the civil servants and rebuild the infrastructure.

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The SRSOG said that the feedback from the Rwandan people was that most felt the presence of UNAMIR and the Mili Ols to be reassuring. The increasing incidents of infiltration, economic sabotage and killings of returnees, as well as the militarization of the refugee and IDP camps foster RPA distrust of the UN. To them, the UN appears to be shielding the ex-FAR. But all in all, the climate has improved dramatically since the drawdown, and UNAMIR is viewed as working closely with the RPA.

Regarding the general security environment, the SRSOG indicated that the situation with cross-border infiltration is accelerating into a sustained guerrilla campaign. There are increasing incidents of economic sabotage in the interior of the country and directed assassination campaigns against local officials as well as the refugees who have returned home. The ex-FAR's strategy is obviously to bring down the wrath of the RPA on the local population and turn popular opinion against the RPF. The SRSOG stated that if an uprising does occur, UNAMIR will only have the capability to pacify parts of Kigali to protect the foreign population; it would have to pull back the 900 troops deployed in the regions. He stressed that he does not have the capability to stop a civil war if it occurs. He would defend the UNAMIR compound and a few other key locations such as the airport.

7. Martha Mukamuruzi, Minister of Justice, 6 November, 1998. (Note: Mrs. Mukamuruzi is probably in her early or mid-thirties, very dynamic. Unlike the other Ministers we met, she did not speak English but was very fluent in French. The justice ministry had been shot up pretty badly and had still not been repaired. Her office looked like it had been furnished by a Salvation Army fire sale. The elevator in the building didn't work, and our delegation, including 75-year-old Fran Shattuck, hiked up seven floors to her office. There was only one phone line out of her office and that of her administrative assistants. The holding room we were kept in was characterized by broken furniture, broken windows, and walls with bullet holes in them. The most memorable image, however, was the fact that her predecessor had apparently glued the former president's picture on the wall, leaving an "X" of ripped-off glue. The new president's picture had been hung to the right of the where old one was....)

Regarding the state of justice reform, the Minister explained that after the war and the genocide, all of the justice infrastructure was destroyed—the buildings, judges, police, prisons - everything. Thanks to the help of the international community the RPF has started to rebuild the justice system and has started a training program for judicial personnel, monitors of the judicial system, and judicial system officers for the office of the magistrate. They have also developed a training program for magistrates with little or no experience. They now have the capacity to monitor the court system but have few courts in place.

At the same time, they are attempting to deal with overcrowding in the prisons, which were built to hold about 15,000 people but are now housing over 50,000. They have started this process by improving the existing facilities, then renovating buildings that were built for other purposes but can be modified to hold prisoners. The Minister said that they have four prison sites selected and have just completed building one new prison but have not started moving people in yet. Their total capacity is now 20,000 with the new facility. All of the new construction and renovation is being done through the aid of the international community, in particular UNDP, ICRC. UNAMIR is providing construction engineers and building materials. Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands have contributed to the process. USAID has funded the physical renovation of the courts.

overview of the structure of his force, which is composed primarily of an Indian Battalion, then one company each from Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Nigeria. In addition, various smaller elements from several other countries are serving in force support capacities. The total strength of the operation as of 1 November is 1,783 peacekeeping troops, 85 civil police, and 85 Mil Obs. He recently had his helicopter fleet reduced from 5 to 3. MG Tousignant characterized the security situation as "tense," particularly in the western part of the country. He said that the Mil Obs act as his "eyes and ears" throughout the country, and they track incidents throughout the country. MG Tousignant's Chief of Staff noted that the UNAMIR force had many of the traditional peacekeeping tasks replaced with humanitarian support tasks and that the PK troops often appeared to the general population to be working for the aid workers and the Mil Obs. The CoS was not sure this was such a good thing.

Regarding the potential extension of UNAMIR, the Force Commander stated that unless the mandate changes, "there is no reason for us to stay in Rwanda. The government does not want us here and the UN does not have the funds." He indicated that he was aware that there would be continued pressure from donor countries to continue the mission primarily to facilitate the return of refugees, but he said that if this was the case the mandate must be changed to facilitate military operations. He indicated that the mandate should be structured to facilitate the creation of an environment to support the safe passage of refugees back to their home communes. This function must be performed in conjunction with the RPA. He indicated there was no question of neutrality involved in this operation. UNAMIR must work in close cooperation with the government. Specifically, MG Tousignant indicated that UNAMIR could facilitate the return of refugees by patrolling the borders to provide a shield. To do this effectively, UNAMIR required boats to patrol the lake front, which is the primary infiltration site. He indicated that the terrain along the shoreline was ideally suited to infiltration operations, and the RPA lacked boats to perform this function themselves.

Regarding his overall force structure, MG Tousignant indicated that he had fewer forces than could be reasonably expected to protect themselves. He emphasized that General Kagame wants UNAMIR out, and that the RPA is not getting paid. The RPF and the RPA resent the appearance that they can only stay in power by using the UN as a crutch. The Force Commander emphasized that General Kagame needs bilateral agreements to provide training and reshape what is currently a bush army into a credible defense force. He indicated that the RPA needs to build pride and train junior leaders to really have a credible force. This function is not in the UNAMIR mandate, and to MG Tousignant's knowledge has never been part of a UN PKO mission. He again stressed that Rwanda was a unique mission.

MG Tousignant called demining the most disappointing aspect of this mission. He indicated that he had submitted a proposal to conduct demining operations to New York and was told that this is a DHA responsibility. The U.S. came in and provided training to the RPA, and as a result of this training, the RPA now has 16 mine detectors and a small number of trained demining troops. The Force Commander emphasized that UNAMIR is currently providing mine awareness and education as opposed to training. UNAMIR and the RPF have been waiting 15 months for DHA to let a demining contract. He stated that the best mine detectors now in widespread use are cows and people.

Regarding the concept of providing security for the tribunal investigators, MG Tousignant indicated that the only real security that UNAMIR provides is through the potential for embarrassment and the RPA, in particular, is primarily deterred by the potential of "being embarrassed by doing something embarrassing." He indicated that maybe security could be better provided by a contract service, that a contractor would be less restricted in what it could do than would UNAMIR and in general would have more flexibility.

MG Tousignant said that the bottom line is that the UNAMIR Commander must have a credible force with a credible task, a task that can be communicated to the troops. Although it is difficult, every effort must be made to "keep the military mission pure, and keep the politics out." He flatly stated that the permanent, political arm of the UN paralyzes the military arm, and as a result can place PK troops in very dangerous conditions. // ←

11. Paul Kagame, Vice President and Minister of Defense; and Anastase Gasana, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 November, 1100: (Note: Mr. Kagame was very soft-spoken, very ascetic looking. He had a quiet intensity and spoke with great conviction. We met in a large conference room-about half the chairs matched. The floor was linoleum. Only two guards were present, and neither had visible arms. A male aide took notes. Mr. Kagame shook hands with each member of the delegation personally. The Foreign Minister, and later the U.S. Ambassador, told us that it was very unusual for Mr. Kagame to meet with such a large group. The Ambassador mentioned that this was only the second time that he was aware of that Mr. Kagame met with a group of this size.)

Mr. Kagame began by saying that the failure of UNAMIR II was very costly in terms of Rwandan lives. There are many explanations offered for their failure: not enough forces, not the right mandate. The stated purpose of the mission, Mr. Kagame reminded the group, was to provide security for Rwandans and at a minimum provide the people with a sense of security. This did not work. As soon as the President's plane crashed, the killing started. At the stadium near UNAMIR the people gathered, and UNAMIR failed to protect them. People ran to where UNAMIR was but were turned away. When the RPA saw what the government forces were doing, they moved to intervene. They saw government forces moving toward the stadium to kill the people gathered there. Even though the RPA was out numbered seven to one, they moved to stop the killing. The RPA leadership told UNAMIR, if you do not have the mandate, ask for it. Mr. Kagame said he even suggested to the UNAMIR commander that he could establish a special safe zone that could be defended with the forces he had available. But he did not do this, and many people were killed.

When the new mandate came into effect, the RPF asked why a force of 5,500 troops just to watch and observe? Mr. Kagame stated that they put up with UNAMIR because they wanted to be "transparent." They did not want the world to think they were plotting something. The Europeans wanted to send monitors (for human rights), and we assented. The RPF feels like it is under a microscope, but Mr. Kagame said that's OK. But, he stressed, more important than actually observing is really changing the conditions in the country in real terms. That gives rise to another question, he said. Does UNAMIR want to come in and do what the government should be doing? He is afraid that UNAMIR wants to assume what should be government responsibilities. If the UN and the donor countries want UNAMIR to stay, that's fine; the RPF will accommodate them. But, he emphasized, the government wants to develop its own capacities-don't expect the RPF to depend on UNAMIR or the UN in general. He stressed that he does not want the UN to

interfere with what the RPF and the RPA are trying to do. Mr. Kagame said that the RPA has no problem providing security for anybody. He stated flatly that it is his responsibility to provide security. If UNAMIR had acted during the genocide, they would have more credibility. The government is waiting to hear from the UN on what they want UNAMIR to do next.

Mr. Kagame said that even UNDP and the aid agencies are problematic because they raise expectations and then don't meet them. They should be focused on developing internal capabilities and capacity. These agencies are doing many other things now, he said. They need to coordinate aid programs with the government. Mr. Kagame said that the UNDP takes many people out to observe things, and they have educated people working for them. But, he said, their programs do not result in increased capacity. He asked, do countries only focus on us because UNAMIR is here or because we need aid programs? They should focus on what the government and the people of Rwanda need. Do we just take UNAMIR to appease them?, he asked. He said that this makes no sense.

Regarding UNAMIR's potential deterrent role, Mr. Kagame was skeptical. They did not act as a deterrent when the genocide was taking place. He emphasized that the current insurgency was not a problem. The RPA is providing security and UNAMIR is taking the credit, he said. He stressed that the problem is in Zaire. The UN should be dealing with security problems there if they really want to help.

When asked about the ethnic composition of the cabinet, after some discussion with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Kagame said that there are currently eight Tutsis and 14 Hutus on the cabinet.

Regarding the return of the refugees from camps outside the country, Mr. Kagame said the government welcomes the return of the refugees. He said that he was a refugee for 30 years, and he understands their problems maybe better than anyone. He indicated the government felt they could handle 20,000 refugees per day if they are processed in an orderly manner. But, he said, there are security problems associated with this process. But first and foremost the government must deal with the problem of refugees. The government must develop a secure environment for the people to live in. He said that the RPF is planning on holding elections, based on the principle of one man, one vote. He emphasized that they will respect the rights of all minorities. Their main concern at this time is for security and stability in the country.

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JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 10 JANUARY 1996

The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Maj. Musho Frank Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Maj. Kayitare Kamarade	RPA Liaison Officer
Mr. Musoni James	Ministry of Youth & Cooperation
Mr. Bagambik Felix	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Brig. Shiva Kumar	Acting Force Commander
Mr. Bill Clive	Acting Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to SRSG
Mr. M. Ncube	Legal Officer

Mandate

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by outlining UNAMIR's withdrawal schedule which was proceeding on time. The Acting Force Commander supplemented the information in greater detail and indicated that a platoon was presently providing protection to Tribunal personnel in Kibuye. Mr. Dusaidi stated that consultations concerning security provisions for the Tribunal needed to take place with the Government of Rwanda as spelled out by the Security Council. The SRSG indicated that Mr. Goldstone would be arriving in Kigali on 11 January and would be apprised of Mr. Dusaidi's concern. He added that he had already requested the International Tribunal to prepare security contingency plans to replace UNAMIR which would withdraw on March 8.

Equipment

2. SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi of the latest instructions received from New York on this issue as contained in Mr. Beissel's telegramme of 3 January 1996, paragraphs 4 (a), (b), (c) and (d), copy attached as Annex A. He reiterated that a decision by the General Assembly was required regarding disposal of United Nations equipment if a departure from existing guidelines was being sought. SRSG also informed Mr. Dusaidi that lethal, leased, and contingent owned equipment

was not part of the available pool. In addition, SRSG repeated that equipment items required by other peace keeping operations were prioritized to leave Rwanda as requested by New York. He reassured Mr. Dusaidi that every effort was being made to allow for flexibility in this matter. He requested Mr. Dusaidi's cooperation in facilitating the exit of equipment brought in by different UNAMIR contingents.

3. The Government of Rwanda's point of view as reflected by Messrs. Dusaidi, Nkusi and Major Kamanzi was that, in spite of communications addressed to the Secretary General and discussions having taken place for over six months, there was no movement. The inevitable conclusion was that the matter was being deliberately delayed by the United Nations. It was clear that United Nations gave a greater priority to United Nations agencies and NGOs than to the Government of Rwanda. It was also clear that the equipment left behind for the Government's use would be of negligible value and possibly of little use to the Government. Mr. Dusaidi wondered whether it was worthwhile continuing discussions on the issue, specially as UNAMIR would withdraw by March 8.

4. SRSG explained that though the process was slow requiring the approvals of the United Nations Controller, the ACABQ, and ultimately the General Assembly, there was no deliberate delay and that the discussion was worth continuing. The Rwandan Government response to the Trust Fund list of loaned equipment was awaited.

5. Mr. Dusaidi requested that a list of equipment which was not available for transfer be provided to the Government. Sometimes the items indicated in packed containers did not correspond to the actual equipment being transferred out of the country. Mr. Nkusi added that equipment which was being packed and shipped out by UNAMIR sometimes contained sensitive items which had not been declared to the Government. Both Messrs. Dusaidi and Nkusi pointed out that the equipment issue was crucial during the negotiations in New York on UNAMIR's new mandate. Mr. Nkusi further inquired from SRSG whether he had requested the Secretary General that priorities in the disposal of UNAMIR's assets be changed in favour of the Rwandese government.

6. Responding to the points made by the Rwandan side, SRSG stated that he could not provide a list of equipment until such time as it had been approved by New York Headquarters. In any case it would be misleading to provide lists that had not been cleared by New York. He added that UNAMIR's recommendations had been communicated to New York and it was evident from New York that they were being given due consideration. He wished to underline that the Secretariat was sympathetic to the request and was doing all it could within existing regulations to expedite. The process was cumbersome but patience was required in a system that had so many checks and balances.

7. Mr. Nkusi suggested that the present Trust Fund ceiling should not be a major constraint as the Government would be amenable to purchasing items in good standing. SRSG took note of this remark and stated that he would inform Headquarters.

8. Mr. Dusaidi then requested SRSG to convey to New York the Government of Rwanda's impatience on the outcome of this matter as well as its skepticism on any positive results being achieved. The Secretary General may be informed, that the Government was counting on his goodwill to find a solution. He also requested that the Secretary General report on his efforts to the Security Council.

SOMA

9. It was agreed that a meeting of the working group would be held on Thursday, 11 January at the Ministry of Defence.

Other Business

Repairs

10. SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi on progress regarding repairs to the Amahoro Stadium where contractors and Habitat were proceeding as scheduled. A total of US\$209,000 had been earmarked for the first phase. The Acting CAO also informed Mr. Dusaidi that repairs to the Infantry School used by AUSMED were proceeding. The Government of Rwanda was the executing partner and so far RWFr. 11.3 million had been disbursed. The total estimated cost was RWFr. 20 million.

11. Continuing, SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that the Housing Sub-Committee had met five times and work was proceeding satisfactorily.

Belgian Village

12. In response to a query raised by Mr. Dusaidi at a previous meeting regarding the Belgian Village contract, SRSG informed that the Force Commander Gen. Dallaire and the Belgian Military had concluded an agreement to enable UNAMIR to repair and use the facilities. It was expected that following UNAMIR's withdrawal, other United Nations programmes such as Human Rights and the International Tribunal would wish to take-on the accommodations.

13. Mr. Dusaidi explained that a previous agreement had been concluded between the Rwandese Ministry of Defence and the Government of Belgium. Unfortunately, the Belgian Government had not consulted the Government of Rwanda and any future use of the Belgian Village would have to receive the Rwandan Government's approval.

Sub-contractors

14. SRSG then indicated that he had received instructions from New York Headquarters on taxation of UNAMIR subcontractors and provided Mr. Dusaidi with a Non-Paper containing the main points, copy attached as Annex B. The United Nations Legal Office was of the opinion that since sub-contractors were performing a function which the United Nations could not perform, and were in Rwanda solely for the purpose of assisting the United Nations, they should be considered as part of UNAMIR and therefore not subject to taxation.

15. Mr. Dusaidi replied that his Government categorically rejected such interpretation. Any company's earnings were taxable as they were utilising the Government's facilities and making a profit while in Rwanda. The United Nations had previously taken a clear-cut position stating that the contractors were independent bodies that were not covered by United Nations privileges. The present United Nations's stand that the contractors were part of the United Nations and not liable to tax was not acceptable. In this regard, the activities of the UNAMIR Subcontractors would be suspended. He further requested that the United Nations position be placed in a formal letter. Mr. Nkusi also referred to a precedent which had been established with Brown and Root with regard to the installation of their satellite system in Rwanda. In that case, the United Nations had agreed that Brown and Root should be taxed. He would provide the SRSG with the relevant documentation.


Local Staff in Prisons

16. The SRSG then referred to United Nations local staff members who were in prison. He wished to inform Mr. Dusaidi that the United Nations offices in Rwanda would be retaining the services of a Defence Lawyer. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Ministry of Justice would be informed.

Communications Equipment


17. Mr. Nkusi then referred to fees that the Government of Rwanda would be charging for the use of frequencies and equipment. He also referred to the problem of outstanding bills left by UNAMIR staff specially telephone bills and bills for utility services. SRSG informed Mr. Nkusi that he would shortly be receiving from the United Nations Resident Coordinator an answer on Rwanda's proposals for charges for the use of frequencies and equipment which he believed would be satisfactory to the Government. On the second point, unpaid bills, he explained that a difference existed between United Nations civilian and military staff. In the former instance it was likely that costs could be recuperated. In the latter instance it would be almost impossible. Mr. Nkusi requested UNAMIR's cooperation in the clearance process, prior to departure, to ascertain whether staff had paid all their outstanding bills. The Acting CAO said he would look into the matter.

18. The SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that he would be away on leave and official business until the end of the month.



Claude Dusaidi

Date: 1/2/96



For Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 17 January 1996

3. Therefore, notwithstanding the Security Council's statement in S/RES/1029, "request[ing] the Secretary-General to examine,...the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment,...for use in Rwanda;..." it will still be necessary to submit UNAMIR's proposals for asset distribution in the context of a separate report of the Secretary-General. In this regard, please also find attached a copy of the asset disposal plan for ONUMOZ, A/49/649/Add.2 which should be used as a template for the UNAMIR submission. (For your information, the aforementioned documentation was also provided to Mr. Michael Haner during his recent visit to New York, should the quality of this facsimile transmission prove inadequate.)

4. In this connection, we wish to emphasize that the current legislative authority for disposal of assets is as follows (in order of priority):

(a) "All equipment that meets the requirements of other United Nations operations and that it is cost-effective to move shall be redeployed to such operations or held in reserve for use by future operations;

(b) Other equipment shall be transferred to United Nations organizations, as well as to national and international non-governmental organizations already operating in [mission area] or in the process of establishing a presence there, upon request and against appropriate credit to the Special Account for the United Nations [Assistance Mission to Rwanda];

(c) Any remaining material that cannot be moved shall be sold commercially on an 'as is, where is' basis in accordance with standard United Nations procedures;

(d) Assets or installations that cannot be dismantled, including airfield installations, shall be [donated] to the Government of [Rwanda];..." upon authorization of the General Assembly. (Source: A/RES/49/235 on the Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.)

5. Consequently, UNAMIR is not authorized to proceed with any disposition of assets to the Rwandan Government until a submission is made to the Controller and subsequently to the ACABQ. While your arguments and indications are fully supported here at Headquarters, we must mention that in the absence of a mandate from the General Assembly we would not be in a position to support your previous requests to transfer assets to the Government of Rwanda.

6. Accordingly, we would appreciate receiving a draft disposal plan in the format of the ONUMOZ report not later than 15 January 1996. Upon receipt this report will be reviewed, finalized and forwarded to printing for submission to the Advisory Committee in mid-February at which time we would expect a decision to be taken regarding those assets recommended by UNAMIR for outright contribution to the Government of Rwanda. In this same report it will also be necessary to present the liquidation budget for UNAMIR for the six-week period after 08 March 1996, for which we would also request your input by 15 January.

Annex B.

UNAMIR operations are run in Rwanda making use of an integrated structure composed of military assets,² civilian assets and assets provided by contractors.

Contractors deliver essential goods and services to UNAMIR, which aims to provide assistance to the recovery and rehabilitation of Rwanda. UNAMIR contractors are in Rwanda for the sole purpose of providing goods and services to UNAMIR and they should therefore be considered by the Government as an integral part of the UNAMIR machinery for implementing the Security Council mandate.

In view of the fact that contractors do not operate permanent establishments in Rwanda and in view of the essential support they are offering to UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, contractors operating in Rwanda should not be requested to pay corporate taxes. In fact there is no precedent of such companies working with UN peace-keeping operations paying taxes in host countries anywhere else in the world.

Handed over to Dushy.

Sub.


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(6)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

12 January 1996

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Heads of Agency meeting held on 10 January 1996, UNAMIR wishes to engage the services of a Rwandese local lawyer, fluent in Kinyarwanda, to assist UNAMIR legal officers with the studying of the dossiers of UN local staff detained in Rwandan prisons.
2. The work will involve accompanying, as requested, UNAMIR legal officers to visits to prisons and parquets, carrying out interviews with the Substitut-Procureurs in charge of the dossiers and making a legal analysis of the situation of these detainees.
3. The selected candidate will be engaged by UNAMIR for a period of two months. Further arrangements to work on the cases of these detainees after the initial period of two months will have to be arrived at on an ad-hoc basis with each of the concerned UN agencies.
4. Maître Gaspard MULIGANDE, who has already undertaken with success legal work for UNHCR and who is an experienced and respected Rwandese lawyer, has been selected as the best candidate for this post. Please find attached his curriculum vitae.


Diego Zorrilla
Legal Officer

C U R R I C U L U M V I T A E.

1. NOM ET PRENOM : MULIGANDE Gaspard
2. AGE : 45 ans
3. ETUDES FAITES : - Humanités générales jusqu'en 1970
- Premier cycle d'Université
- 2 ans à l'Ecole de la Magistrature

4. EMPLOIS OCCUPES : a) de 1974 à 1981

- Substitut de Procureur près le Tribunal de Première Instance (RUHENGARI, GIKONGORO et BUTARE).
- Substitut de Procureur près la Cour d'appel de RUHENGARI et celle de NYABISINDU.
- Officier du Ministère public près la Cour de cassation.
- Commissaire du Gouvernement près le Conseil d'Etat.

b) de 1981 à 1986


- Conseiller juridique près la Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda.
- Mandataire en justice de la Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda.
- Chef du Service de Recouvrement à la Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda.
- Conseiller Juridique personnel du Directeur Général de la Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda et chargé du Secrétariat de direction.

c) de 1987 à 1995

Profession d'Avocat-Titulaire d'un Cabinet sis à Kigali.

Fait à Kigali, le 22/12/1995

Maître Gaspard MULIGANDE.



**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 19 DECEMBER 1995**

On 19 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Mr. Sam Nkusi

Mr. Musoni James

Major Kamarade Kayitare

Office of the Vice-President

Ministry of Transport and
Communication

Ministry of Youth and Cooperatives

RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan

Brig. Shiva Kumar

Mr. Bill Clive

Ms. Isel Rivero

Mr. Ismael Diallo

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

Deputy Force Commander

Acting Chief Administrative Officer

Special Assistant to SRSG

Spokesman

1. SRSG opened the meeting by stating that the meetings of the Joint Commission had been valuable in clarifying the Government of Rwanda's position on the mandate. He suggested that the meetings continue over the phase-down period and be held twice a month. He informed Mr. Dusaidi that the scaling down of UNAMIR had already begun with the CIVPOL, Military Police and MILOBS. A more precise schedule would emerge in a few days' time. Taking note of UNAMIR's scaling down, Mr. Dusaidi agreed that meetings of the Joint Commission should be held fortnightly starting from Tuesday, 9 January.

2. SRSG then referred to the International Tribunal which was beginning its technical work in Kibuye during the present week. UNAMIR would be providing the security required. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that the Tribunal had been informed that as of 8 March 1996, they would have to provide their own security. The Acting Force Commander indicated that the International Tribunal would be sending out forensic experts to Kibuye from Wednesday, 20 December. He asked for cooperation from the Rwandese authorities to assist and facilitate their work. Mr. Dusaidi replied that he would be informing the appropriate authorities.

3. On the issue of equipment, SRSG stated that following Security Council guidelines UNAMIR and UN HQ were examining possibilities on how to move forward. As a separate issue, he urged Mr. Dusaidi to provide a response on the equipment list to be financed from the Trust Fund. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Rwandan Ambassador was pursuing the matter at the United Nations. Regarding the list provided by UNAMIR he indicated that a reply to the Trust Fund list would be forthcoming shortly.

4. On the question of the SOFA, Mr. Dusaidi informed the SRSG that his colleagues were studying UNAMIR's comments and would revert to the matter as soon as they had completed their review. It was noted that the housing/administration sub-Committee had met and would continue its work in the following week.

5. SRSG then explained that a legal interpretation of UNAMIR Sub-contractors terms was expected from New York. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that delays in the discussions with the Sub-contractors was an internal United Nations technical problem and not an unwillingness to negotiate with the Government of Rwanda.

6. Mr. Nkusi reverted to the problem of UNAMIR staff which were departing the mission area and not paying their telephone bills. The SRSG replied that the Administration was in the process of finalizing a list of staff who were departing.

7. Mr. Nkusi pointed out that the equipment list provided by UNAMIR included equipment which was out of service and which needed repair. Mr. Clive, as Acting CAO, reiterated UNAMIR's position to cooperate with the Government of Rwanda in examining the reservations expressed by Mr. Nkusi at the technical working group level. He added that faulty equipment would not be placed against the Trust Fund. It was agreed that technicians from both sides would attempt to evaluate the depreciation of each item.

NON - P A P E R

UNAMIR operations are run in Rwanda making use of an integrated structure composed of military assets, civilian assets and assets provided by contractors.

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Handled over to Dusaib.

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Ministry of Transport and
Communication
Ministry of Youth and Cooperatives
RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan

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Special Representative of the
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**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 12 DECEMBER 1995**

On 12 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Mr. Felix Bagambiki	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Brig. Shiva Kumar	Deputy Force Commander
Mr. Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Mathew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero ✓	Special Assistant to SRSG
Mr. Ismael Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Officer

1. SRSG opened the meeting by noting that a final decision on the mandate would most likely be taken during the afternoon [12 December] by the Security Council. UNAMIR had all along been ready to implement the decision of the Security Council of which Rwanda was a member. The Secretary-General's report had clearly stated United Nations's position regarding the mandate. He added that the Sub-Committees on SOFA and Property should begin meeting as early as possible in order to finalize all pending matters prior to the holidays.

2. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the Sub-Committees should start their work during the current week. Referring to the mandate, Mr. Dusaidi recapitulated that security was the exclusive prerogative of Rwanda and that there would be no compromise on this item. He remarked that even numbers were negotiable, but Rwanda would not compromise on the issue of security. He explained that following the Cairo Conference, and because of the views

expressed by friendly countries, the Government of Rwanda had acquiesced in UNAMIR's presence. He was certain that the problem of refugee return was not related to UNAMIR and the real reason for their not returning was that they were being held hostage by the criminals. He regretted that ten days after the conclusion of the Cairo Conference, Zaire appeared to be resiling from its decision to hand back assets which did not augur well for the implementation process.

3. Mr. Dusaidi added that though he understood that the International Tribunal needed protection, Rwanda was ready to provide it. In fact Rwanda shared the Tribunal's objective of bringing genocide criminals to justice and there was no conflict of interest. The Tribunal had known all along that UNAMIR was phasing out and should have made appropriate arrangements. Rwanda was ready to fill the gap by providing security until the Tribunal made its own arrangements.


4. The SRSg recalled that UNAMIR was ready to phase out at the end of the current mandate but the international community felt that its departure might give negative signals to the refugee population. It was also the feeling of the international community that should there be forced repatriation, as in August this year, UNAMIR had the means to provide support for a massive influx. While noting Mr. Dusaidi's statement regarding security for the Tribunal, he emphasized that the International Tribunal had insisted on being protected by an international force, a principle that had been accepted by the Vice-President during his meeting with Judge Goldstone. SRSg stated that Mr. Dusaidi's views would be communicated to New York.

5. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to international contractors associated with UNAMIR who were not fulfilling their financial obligations, some had even left the country without paying their dues. He had asked the contractors to meet with the Ministry of Finance officials to sort out the problems of financial dues and taxes. SRSg explained that the contractors were under the impression that it was up to UNAMIR to meet their financial obligations vis a vis the Rwandese Government. This matter was being studied by New York. However, meetings of contractors with the Government could proceed as planned so that the issue is negotiated in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.


6. Regarding UNAMIR's equipment, Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he was aware that there was a paragraph in the draft Security Council Resolution mentioning Rwanda's request to the Secretary General. SRSg reminded Mr. Dusaidi to provide at the next meeting, the Government's views on the equipment to be acquired through the Trust Fund.

7. Mr. Nkusi then referred to the increasing number of international staff who are leaving without paying their telephone bills. He asked that a list of staff be provided in order to enable the Government to identify the officials against whom dues might be outstanding. SRSg informed him that he had issued an Administrative Instruction asking for all Staff to clear their outstanding telephone bills prior to departing.

8. Referring to the recent eviction of NGOs by the Government, Mr. Nkusi also indicated that all communication equipment leaving Rwanda would have to obtain a clearance. He also remarked that cooperation with UNAMIR staff had recently deteriorated. SRSB replied that he would look into the matter since cooperation between the Government and UNAMIR had always been positive.



Claude Dusaidi
Date: 18/12/95



Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 16-12-95

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 5 DECEMBER 1995**

On 5 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Bagambiki Felix	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Major-General Guy Tousignant	Force Commander
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Mathew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero ✓	Special Assistant to SRSG
Mr. Ismael Diallo	Spokesman

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by summarizing the Observations Chapter of the United Nations Secretary General Report to the Security Council. Specifically he drew the attention of Mr. Dusaidi to paragraphs 45 through 51. He recalled that United Nations Peace Keeping Missions were financed from assessed contributions while developmental activities were financed from voluntary contributions through the UNDP and specialized agencies.

2. SRSG also pointed out that the United Nations would respect the views expressed by Rwanda and the Security Council regarding UNAMIR. He added that the Secretary General, having stated his position in the report would respect any decisions taken by the Council.

3. Mr. Dusaidi thanked the SRSG for his introduction and views on the report. He added that the Government of Rwanda was open to receive any proposals either from the Secretary General or from the Security Council, including the extension of UNAMIR for an additional three months. His Government had already submitted its position which indicated that the modalities for UNAMIR's presence would have to be negotiated.

C 4. SRSG indicated that the United Nations was not likely to make any proposal or take any initiative. It was now up to the Security Council to discuss options with the Government of Rwanda. He added that he was ready to transmit any views that the Government of Rwanda wished to make to the Council if so requested. The SRSG added that a decision on whether the services of the CIVPOL trainers were required by the Government of Rwanda would have to be made. Otherwise the CIVPOL would leave after December 8. He added that he hoped the Council would make recommendations on the equipment issue.

5. Mr. Dusaidi took note and informed the meeting that the Security Council was holding Informal Consultations at 10:30 a.m. on 4th December.

6. The SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that Messrs. Ncube and Zorrilla would be the UNAMIR representatives in the discussions on SOFA. He then gave Mr. Dusaidi a letter requesting that equipment be released for shipment outside Rwanda. He added that there were three categories of equipment which should be released: a) equipment which belonged to other countries, b) APC's and c) equipment which was required by other peace keeping missions. He recalled that Mr. Dusaidi had agreed to their release.

7. Mr. Dusaidi gave the SRSG a copy of the Finance Minister's report on UNAMIR's contractors. The SRSG suggested that the Government contact the contractors directly since they were not part of the United Nations. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that the Contractors were not cooperative and the Government would be hesitant in carrying out reprisals that would implicate the United Nations. There were four companies that were included in the Finance Minister's report. The SRSG promised to contact their Management in order that discussions would proceed in a cooperative manner.

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 28 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 28 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Ndazero Lazare	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Mr. Higiro Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liason Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Mathew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Ismael A. Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Senior Legal Officer

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by indicating that he expected to continue holding the Tuesday meetings since these were useful in expediting pending matters. He then informed Mr. Dusaidi that the Secretary General's report to the Security Council was expected to be circulated by 1 December. The report was also expected to reflect Rwanda Government's view on UNAMIR's mandate as also the views of the G-10. United Nations was ready to implement whatever decision the Council would take.
2. On the equipment issue, a reply had been received from Headquarters. Firstly, the equipment already on loan to the Government of Rwanda could be adjusted through the Trust Fund. Secondly, the United Nations considered that any equipment which

was too costly to remove, or which was not required by other peace keeping missions or United Nations agencies, would be made available to Rwanda in accordance with General Assembly Resolutions. He provided Mr. Dusaidi with a list of equipment on loan to the Government which indicated a depreciated value of US\$144,000.

3. Referring to the mandate, Mr. Dusaidi stated that the Government's decision was final and could not change. He also added that the Government of Rwanda was always prepared to consider another United Nations mission appropriate to the needs of the country. Mr. Dusaidi welcomed a partial decision on the equipment. He hoped that the General Assembly would respond favorably to Rwanda's request for equipment. He assured the SRSG of his Government's full cooperation in UNAMIR's withdrawal.

4. Mr. Dusaidi continued by saying that he had communicated to the SRSG the names of the Rwandese team which jointly with UNAMIR would look into the damages caused by rental of premises or use of infrastructure. He also wanted a speedy solution to the problem of UNAMIR's subcontractors by preventing legal actions against it, as it had occurred in Somalia.

5. Mr. Nkusi referred to the list of equipment on loan to the Government of Rwanda and stated that he thanked UNAMIR for placing a large generator on the list. However, items listed on pages 2, 3 and 4 were not separate but part of one set of communication equipment. This equipment was not operational, was antiquated and the Government of Rwanda would rather return it. He had approached UNAMIR unsuccessfully to repair the equipment. In addition, the depreciated value was too high. Mr. Nkusi underlined that the Government of Rwanda had not charged UNAMIR for the use of RwandaTel infrastructure and that these charges should offset the cost of the equipment.

6. The SRSG commented that the Government of Rwanda was not obliged to retain the equipment on the list. He welcomed comments also on non-communication equipment. However, he again clarified that any equipment transaction had to be made according to General Assembly Resolutions.

7. Mr. Nkusi pointed out that many UNAMIR staff were leaving without paying their telephone bills which, so far, amounted to over RFr. 2 million.

8. The SRSG replied that the use of Rwanda's infrastructure was regulated by SOFA. He suggested that a communication expert should be added to the names

proposed for the working group which is to review damages inflicted by UNAMIR on Rwanda's property. The suggestion was accepted. The representatives from UNAMIR would be Messrs. Lombardo, Solbek and Anglin. The SRSG also stated that administrative measures would be taken to prevent outstanding telephone bills to remain unpaid by UNAMIR staff.

9. Ms. Mathew requested the names and copies of telephone bills from UNAMIR staff who had not honoured their commitments.


10. The SRSG then provided Mr. Dusaidi with an Aide Memoire on a pending case related to communication equipment being held at the airport. He also provided Mr. Dusaidi with a non-paper on SOFA and suggested that nominations be made for another working group to study the amendments suggested by the Government. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he would secure the release of equipment being held at the airport.

11. Mr. Nkusi explained that the reason why the equipment had been held up was due to UNAMIR's lack of explanation on its intended use. One set contained satellite hardware to boost Radio UNAMIR's transmission. The second set did not even have documentation. If UNAMIR would have provided a reasonable explanation the equipment would have been released.


12. SRSG thanked Mr. Nkusi and pointed out that the equipment intended for Radio UNAMIR had been requested as a fall back position should its transmissions not reach the camps in neighboring countries. However, since the Government of Rwanda had made transmission facilities available, the equipment had not been required. With the cooperation of the Government, this equipment could now be shipped elsewhere.

13. Before closing, the SRSG requested the assistance of the Rwandese Government in issuing visa extensions to UNAMIR staff beyond December 8.

Mr. Dusaidi stated that he saw no problems in complying with this request.



Claude Dusaidi
29/Nov/95



Shaharyar M. Khan
29. November 1995



Inf. Ms. Isel Ribeiro

TO: Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

DATE: 21 November 1995

FROM: Ismaël A. Diallo
Spokesman *Ismaël A. Diallo*

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Highlights

The mandate of UNAMIR expires on 8 December 1995. Whether the expiry will be final or simply a transition to another mandate, the occasion is undeniably an important milestone. It would seem to call for a special publication, focussing on the history of UNAMIR. In this respect, the second issue of UNAMIR Bulletin would be an appropriate medium to highlight the landmarks of the Mission to date, with a compilation of official documents comprising the following:

- All resolutions adopted by the Security Council on UNAMIR, starting with resolution 872 of 5 October 1993.
- Reports of the Secretary-General on Rwanda.
- Status of Mission Agreement.
- Highlights of humanitarian operations.

The publication would be worth producing as a work of reference for now and in future. It would consist of about 80 pages for the English version and 80 pages for the French version. If approved, the production deadline would be around 5 December.

Mandate

NON - P A P E R

Mandate

1. Most of the amendments to the current SOFA for UNAMIR proposed by the Government of Rwanda constitute fundamental departures from the customary practices and principles applicable to United Nations peace-keeping operations as codified in the Model SOFA adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution A/45/594, which forms the basis upon which the current SOFA for UNAMIR was concluded.
2. Moreover, some of the changes proposed either run counter the provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to which Rwanda acceded without any reservation or cast a doubt over the Government's willingness to fully abide by these provisions.
3. There are only very few amendments proposed by the Government of Rwanda which are either acceptable to the United Nations or which could be subject to negotiation so as to arrive to an arrangement which is agreeable to both parties.
4. In light of the above, the United Nations does not feel that the proposal put forward by the Government of Rwanda constitutes a basis upon which negotiations leading to an agreement which meets the required standards of SOFAs could be conducted.

4. Decides that in light of its composition and the current situation in Rwanda [UNPEBOR][UNHSOR] will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Support the Government of Rwanda's ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence, stability and trust through carrying out confidence building and monitoring tasks throughout the country;

(c) Assist the Government of Rwanda through transport, logistics, communications and medical support by facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees to their homes, and particularly in assisting in their transfer from the border to their secure, just and humane reintegration in their home communes;

(d) Support the provision of humanitarian aid and assist the Government of Rwanda through its expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining activities;

(e) Assist in the training of a national police force;

(f) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

...

X. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 60 days of the progress made by [UNPEBOR][UNHSOR] in the discharge of its mandate;

...

See

Mandate : Suggestions for Mandate

1. UNAMIR should discontinue and be replaced by a UN presence under a different politico-civilian mandate and acronym.
2. The phase-out period for UNAMIR's military contingent (71-97 days) should be included in the new mandate.
3. This civilian presence should be backed by a meaningful mandate so as not to give the impression of UN walking away from Rwanda.
4. The Civilian Option should be linked to the following immediate tasks:
 - a) Secure and efficient refugee return encompassing the humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in preparation for a possible massive return of refugees.
 - b) Urgent post conflict, socio-economic reconstruction tasks and repair of civil war damage.
 - c) Revival of national justice system which would include police/gendarmerie training, triage commission support, improving prison conditions, preparation for genocide trials etc.
 - d) National Reconciliation at all levels.
 - e) Support for regional efforts to ease regional tensions bearing in mind activities of International Commission on Arms transfer and regional conference initiatives.
 - f) Assist Tribunal, Human Rights and UN Agencies in fulfilling their objectives.

All the above points should be included in the new mandate.

5. The post conflict, peace-building image of the next "civilian" mandate as opposed to the current military mandate may be projected by the following measures:

- a) A clear reference in the resolutions to UN's post-conflict peace-building role to preserve and sustain peace and stability that has been achieved in Rwanda.
- b) A "White Helmet" assistance component which would consist of a technical assistance unit (doctors, engineers, agronomists, logistics, communications). This unit would be drawn from UNV's or technicians provided by member States. The unit would use the equipment available from UNAMIR's pool.
- c) In addition, the Unit may be assisted by the specialised units currently part of UNAMIR's military contingent [200 Indian Engineering Unit, 50 Indian Communication Unit, 100 Canadian Logistic Unit plus 50 Headquarters co-ordinating staff, total 400 approx.]. This unit could remain as a military contingent or, if agreed, could become part of the "White Helmet" unit, essentially performing their present tasks.

6. The funding of the contingents at para 5 (b) & (c) above would be from assessed contributions.

7. In addition to the White Helmet proposal at para 5 and in order to provide continued protection to the Tribunal, the Human Rights Monitors and UN Agencies in Rwanda, a military contingent of 300-400 formed troops may be retained in Kigali.

8. In order to fulfil the objectives of the mandate and to assist Human Rights Monitors, a contingent of 240 Military Observers may be deployed in Rwanda. [Current-strength 320].

9. In order to assist in the training of Gendarmerie and Communal Police a component of 55 CIVPOL may be deployed. [Current strength 120].

10. UNAMIR's equipment/material may be taken over according to the following priorities:
 - a) Equipment required by civilian replacement to UNAMIR, particularly for use by White Helmets.
 - b) Equipment required by UNDP and UN agencies for Refugees Accelerated Plan of Action for Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. This equipment would be eventually handed over to GOR.
 - c) Equipment required for other peace-keeping operations.
 - d) Equipment required by GOR/NGO's.
-

*Free
Mandate*

Disposal of UN Assets

1. UN Policy for the disposal of its assets used for peace-keeping operations has been prescribed by a resolution passed in the UN General Assembly which cannot be altered except through another decision by the General Assembly.
2. The prescribed policy providing priority for disposal of equipment is as follows:
 - i) Other Peace-Keeping Missions
 - ii) Local UN Offices/Agencies
 - iii) Local NGO's and Host Government.
3. The process of identifying which items are required by other peace-keeping operations and which would be available for UN Agencies, NGO's and host government is currently being addressed. This process is expected to be completed by 27 November. A clear picture of disposable items will be available after that date.

Non-paper on UNAMIR Mandate

A Summary of positions taken at discussions

1. UN's position on the mandate remains that when its mandate ends on 8 December, it would phase-out. Any change in this assumption would need to be agreed in the Security Council of which Rwanda is a member.

2. At a meeting in New York on 2 November, the donor countries and troop contributing countries (G-10) agreed on a consensus view related to UNAMIR's mandate. G-10 requested UN to convey this consensus view to the Government of Rwanda. The consensus view conveyed by SRSB on November 7 at the weekly meeting was as follows:

a) UNAMIR's present status-quo should be maintained for the next six month mandate period. This would, in effect, mean retaining the current strength of i) formed troops [1800] ii) Military Observers [320] iii) Civpol [120] and civilian. Adjustments could be made in the strength of Milobs and Civpol and also in the mandate to make it more relevant.

b) The essential reason for this request was related to the safe and secure return of refugees. In the wake of the threatened forced repatriation by Zaire/Tanzania, a concerted effort was currently being made by Rwanda, UNHCR and the neighbouring countries for the voluntary repatriation of refugees from Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. Tripartite Meetings had been held and the international community was supporting efforts by UNHCR and regional states to mount a supreme effort with a view to persuading refugees to return voluntarily. UNAMIR's continued presence in Rwanda during this campaign was viewed by G-10 as a positive factor in encouraging voluntary return and in providing practical assistance to Rwanda in their return and resettlement.

c) The UN Agencies, notably UNHCR, the Tribunal and UN High Commissioner for Refugees also favoured a continuation of UNAMIR in its present strength.

d) The next three to six months were seen as critical in this effort. UNAMIR's presence was therefore not open-ended but essentially viewed in the context of the next six months .

d) There was no guarantee of success in the current efforts for a voluntary repatriation of refugees. However, even if the effort failed, there was the prospect of forced repatriation which could lead to a mass influx of refugees. In either eventuality, UNAMIR's presence, in the short term, was seen as a positive, helpful factor in cooperating with the Rwandese Government to receive and re-settle refugees.

e) Examples of successful cooperation on the ground between the Government of Rwanda, UNAMIR and the Agencies were: i) during the forced repatriation by Zaire of 14000 refugees in August. These refugees were efficiently and humanely received and settled in their communes. ii) Similarly, nearly a million IDPs in the Zone Turquoise were settled through cooperation between the Rwandese Government and UN. During the critical six month period ahead, G-10 were of the view that similar practical cooperation between the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR would enable a smooth transfer and resettlement of refugees. UNAMIR's specialised engineering, transport and communications units would be particularly useful in this process.

f) On the other hand, if, during this critical period, UNAMIR was seen to be withdrawing, it could send a negative message to the refugees and also to regional countries.

g) G-10 fully accepted that security and protection of refugees was essentially the responsibility of the Rwandese Government. UNAMIR's role was to provide practical support at a critical time and to help in confidence building measures.

3. G-10 considered 1800 formed troops to be a minimum " critical mass" and added that a reduction in the number of formed troops was not considered advisable as it would mean concentrating UNAMIR's formed troop contingent in Kigali and projecting the undesirable

image of UN forces protecting themselves. The basic task of providing confidence and practical help to incoming refugees would not be met. A reduced military contingent would cease to be an operational unit and the practical advantages of having an engineering, transport and communications unit would no longer be available. Moreover, Milobš acting on their own, had no relevant mandate as their presence was not related to military objectives such as monitoring a cease-fire or cross border operations. UNAMIR's presence could not be justified only to protect the Tribunal and other agencies, even though at present it performed this task as an ancillary role.

Disposition des avoirs de l'ONU

1. La Politique suivie par l'ONU pour la disposition de ses avoirs en ce qui concerne les opérations de maintien de la paix a été prescrite par une résolution de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies qui ne peut être modifiée, sauf par une autre décision de l'Assemblée générale.

2. La politique prescrite pour accorder les priorités lors de la disposition de l'équipement, est la suivante:

- a) Autres missions du maintien de la paix
- b) Agences et bureaux locaux des Nations Unies
- c) ONG locales et Gouvernement hôte.

3. Le processus d'identification des articles requis par d'autres opérations de maintien de la paix et qui pourraient être mis à la disposition des agences de l'ONU, des ONG et du Gouvernement hôte est en cours. Ce processus est prévu se terminer le 27 novembre. Un état précis des articles dont on pourra disposer sera disponible après cette date.

e) Des exemples d'une coopération réussie sur le terrain entre le Gouvernement du Rwanda, la MINUAR et les agences étaient: 1) au cours du rapatriement forcé par le Zaïre de 14000 réfugiés en août. Ces réfugiés furent reçus et établis dans leur commune de façon efficace et humaine. 2) De même, environ 1 000 000 de personnes déplacées de la Zone Turquoise ont été établis grâce à la coopération entre le Gouvernement rwandais et l'ONU. Au cours de la période critique vers laquelle nous allons, le G-10 a été d'avis qu'une coopération pratique semblable permettrait un transfert et un rétablissement sans heurt de réfugiés. Les groupes spécialisés de la MINUAR dans les domaines de l'ingénierie, des transports et des communications seraient particulièrement utiles dans ce processus.

f) Par contre, si, durant cette période critique, on pouvait penser que la MINUAR se retirait, cela pourrait avoir un effet négatif sur les réfugiés et également sur les pays de la région.

g) Le G-10 a entièrement admis que la sécurité et la protection des réfugiés incombaient essentiellement au Gouvernement rwandais. Le rôle de la MINUAR était de fournir le support pratique à un moment crucial et de fournir des moyens de consolider la confiance.

3. Le G-10 a estimé que le nombre de 1 800 hommes de troupe est la "masse critique" minimale et a ajouté qu'une réduction de ce nombre n'était pas conseillé car cela voudrait dire que le contingent des troupes de la MINUAR devrait se concentrer sur Kigali, et ce faisant donner l'impression non souhaitable que les forces de l'ONU se protégeaient elles-mêmes. La tâche fondamentale d'assurer la confiance et d'apporter une aide pratique aux réfugiés qui rentraient ne serait pas réalisée. Un contingent militaire réduit ne serait plus une unité fonctionnelle et les avantages pratiques de disposer d'un groupe dans les domaines de l'ingénierie, les transports et les communications ne seraient plus disponibles. En outre, les observateurs militaires agissant seuls n'ont pas un mandat approprié à la situation car leur présence n'est pas liée à des objectifs militaires, le contrôle d'un cessez le feu ou les opérations trans-frontières, par exemple. La présence de la MINUAR pour la seule protection du Tribunal et des autres organismes ne peut se justifier, même si à présent elle remplit ce rôle à titre secondaire.

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 20 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 20 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Major Mushyo Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer
Mr. Higiyo Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ndazero Lazare	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reintegration

UNAMIR

Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Maj. Gen. Guy Tousignant	Force Commander
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Ismaël A. Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Senior Legal Officer
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Affairs Officer

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by offering two clarifications. First, that UNAMIR was ready to discuss the SOMA either in Kigali or in New York. Second, that the issue of equipment was not a matter to be decided at the SRSG level but at Headquarters. The Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary General had been brought to the attention of New York Headquarters. The issue was being given urgent attention and should it be completed before 27th November, Mr. Dusaidi would be immediately informed in order to proceed with consultations.

2. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Government was also ready to discuss the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He asked SRSG to give him a paper outlining the general position of the United Nations on the Status of Forces Agreement. Regarding equipment, he had prepared a list (copy attached) enumerating the requirements of the Rwandese Government in order to facilitate UNAMIR's task,

3. The SRSG suggested that the letter to the Secretary General referred to before, should be circulated to member states. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that the Rwandan Permanent Representative to the United Nations had been instructed to circulate it among Security Council members.

4. Mr. Dusaidi then stated that the Rwandese Ambassador had been called by Mr. Riza, DPKO, to protest the impounding of UNAMIR APCs by the Rwandan Government. This was not the case, and there had obviously been a misunderstanding. The SRSG replied that he was surprised at the news. The question of APCs had already been discussed with the Government which had taken note of the fact that the equipment was owned by a particular member state who was not agreeable to the equipment being left behind. Both the Force Commander and the CAO agreed and added that only logistical problems were delaying the transport of the APCs and that there had been no disagreement by the Government. The Force Commander also mentioned that as far as the military were concerned, the only outstanding issue was the demolition of Belgian ammunition. New York had been consulted and a reply was still pending.

5. Referring to the transfer out of Rwanda of UNAMIR equipment, SRSG clarified that he would ensure that equipment under negotiation with the Rwandese Government would not be sent out while a decision on the issue was being taken. However these items that were clearly not part of the pool of equipment that could be left behind for Rwanda e.g for Angola (UNAVEM), would be trans-shipped but only after SRSG had himself signed the document. This procedure required his personal clearance to ensure that nothing was moved out of Rwanda that belonged to the pool of items under negotiation. The recent consignment of spare parts and electrical sundries was destined to UNAVEM (ANGOLA) and fell within the first priority category of equipment transfer.

6. Both the SRSG and Mr. Dusaidi agreed that a committee to review repairs and rehabilitation of facilities occupied by UNAMIR should begin its work as early as possible. In this regard, the CAO provided a summary of repairs and rehabilitation work carried out by UNAMIR, to date.

7. Mr. Dusaidi then explained that the UNAMIR's future mandate had been discussed by Rwandan authorities at the highest level. They had authorized him to convey the Rwandan Government's reactions. Mr. Dusaidi continued explaining that when renewing UNAMIR's mandate on 9th June, it had been made very clear that UNAMIR would phase out after the current mandate. In the interim period, the Rwandan Government saw no serious reason to revise its earlier decision. Accordingly, when the mandate was completed on December 8, UNAMIR should phase out.

8. Mr. Dusaidi also stated that in Rwanda's view if the United Nations still had a role to play in the country, it was in the practical field of providing Rwanda the support to bridge the gap created by last year's events in the form of technology, rehabilitation, doctors, agricultural experts, technicians, etc. As these activities could not be part of UNAMIR, it was best for it to close down after December 8.

9. The SRSG thanked Mr. Dusaidi for a concise clarification and indicated that these views would be conveyed to New York Headquarters.

10. Mr. Dusaidi then stated that he wished to put on record the Government's appreciation for the sacrifices and contributions that UNAMIR personnel had made during their tenure in Rwanda. He said that their efforts, often made in difficult conditions, had contributed significantly to Rwanda's reconstruction.

11. The Force Commander added that he had two points to make. First he was thankful to the Government of Rwanda for the words of appreciation. Soldiers were not always aware of the political aspects of their work, and it would give them enormous satisfaction to receive recognition for job well done. Second, he wished to inform the meeting that the withdrawal of UNAMIR would take from 71 to 97 days.

12. Mr. Dusaidi assured the Force Commander of his Government's full cooperation.

Claude Dusaidi

Shaharyar M. Khan

EQUIPMENT ON LOAN TO THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT

SECTIONS	ACQUISITION COST	DEPRECIATED VALUE
COMMUNICATIONS	57,467.00	32,134.72
EDP	9,431.78	2,724.90
GENERATORS	66,965.40	55,734.00
TRANSPORT	140,454.71	53,846.84
GRAND TOTAL	274,318.89	144,440.46

**EQUIPMENT ISSUED TO GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA
AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES**

Vednesday, October 18, 1995

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ARDEC KIGALI

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
PHOTOCOPIER	2483020044	BR-900/435	1	NASHUA	3115	\$1,700.00	\$680.00

TOTAL COST OF AQUISITION): \$1,700.00

TOTAL DEPRECIATED VALUE): \$680.00

GITARAMA PRISON

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
PHOTOCOPIER	PCG02252	BR-900/398	1	CANON	NP3050	\$4,105.00	\$205.25

TOTAL COST OF AQUISITION): \$4,105.00

TOTAL DEPRECIATED VALUE): \$205.25

RPA

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
REPEATER	388CSQ0502	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	MSF5000	\$8,500.00	\$3,717.05

TOTAL COST OF AQUISITION): \$8,500.00

TOTAL DEPRECIATED VALUE): \$3,717.05

RPA LIASON OFFICER

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
RADIO	1741TEC248	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GP300	\$500.00	\$306.10
RADIO	1741TEC584	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GP300	\$500.00	\$306.10

TOTAL COST OF AQUISITION) : \$1,000.00

TOTAL DEPRECIATED VALUE) : \$612.20

RWANDATEL

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
SOLAR PANEL	00237	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00238	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00239	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00241	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00250	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00251	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00261	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00262	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00264	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00265	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00267	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00275	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00841	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00842	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00843	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	00849	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01141	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01144	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01325	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00

WANDATEL

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
SOLAR PANEL	01331	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01332	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01378	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01381	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01409	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01441	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01442	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01466	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01468	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01469	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	01496	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	03793	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	03794	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	03795	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	03796	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
RADIO TX	159TTJ7211	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GM300	\$200.00	\$200.00
RADIO RX	159TTJ7511	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GM300		
RADIO RX	159TUS6839	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GM300		
RADIO TX	159TUS6840	N/A	1	MOTOROLA	GM300		
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	227617	BT-7250/034	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	232185	BT-7250/033	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	232458	BT-7250/047	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	243232	BT-7250/027	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
PABX	5BIG002980	N/A	1	PANASONIC	KX-T123210BE	\$1,775.00	\$1,775.00
PABX	5BIG002999	N/A	1	PANASONIC	KX-T123210BE	\$1,775.00	\$1,775.00
SOLAR PANEL	674095	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	690942	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	699650	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	699782	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00

RWANDATEL

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	DECAL #	QTY	MAKE	MODEL	COST OF AQUISITION	DEPRECIATED VALUE
SOLAR PANEL	699783	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	699784	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	699785	N/A	1	SIEMENS		\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	699788	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	839705	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	839716	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	839741	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SOLAR PANEL	839771	N/A	1	SIEMENS	M55	\$200.00	\$200.00
SUBSCRIBER UNIT	N/A	BT-7250/001	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
EXCHANGE UNIT (RWA	N/A	BT-7250/009	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
SUBSCIBER UNIT (KIBU	N/A	BT-7250/017	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
EXCHANGE UNIT	N/A	BT-7250/028	1	EXICOM		\$3,126.50	\$1,367.22
REPEATER	N/A	BT-9230/002	1	MOTOROLA	GR300	\$2,200.00	\$1,885.62
REPEATER	N/A	BT-9240/016	1	MOTOROLA	GR300	\$2,200.00	\$1,346.84
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	N/A	N/A	1	EXICOM	SR210		
RURAL TELEPHONE LIN	N/A	N/A	1	EXICOM	SR210		
SOLAR PANELS	N/A	N/A	8	SEIMENS			

TOTAL COST OF AQUISITION) : \$42,162.00

TOTAL DEPRECIATED VALUE) : \$26,920.22

30.10.95

EDP EQUIPMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

Page: 1

ExDecal	Serial Number	Description	Make	Model	Cost of Acquisition	Date of Acquisition	Depreciated Value	Cost of Shipment	Cost of Shipment
	N/A	CPU	SIREX	486	2,265.00	1 7.92	594.56	0.0028	15.63
	DX9344409	CPU-486	SIREX	486	1,380.00	1 7.92	362.25	0.0028	15.63
	DX9356520	CPU-486	SIREX	486	2,265.00	1 7.92	594.56	0.0028	15.63
	N/A	MODEM	TELEBIT	T-4000	150.00	1 7.92	76.25	0.0011	3.26
	1T34726334	MONITOR	AOC		325.00	1 7.92	85.31	0.0020	15.63
	HS0842415	MONITOR	AOC		325.00	1 7.92	85.31	0.0020	15.63
	N/A	MONITOR	AOC		325.00	22.11.93	162.50	0.0020	15.63
	N/A	PRINTER	HEWLETT PACKARD	DESKJET 500	299.78	1 7.92	78.69	0.0020	10.97
	N/A	PRINTER	HEWLETT PACKARD	DESKJET 500	339.00	1 7.92	88.99	0.0020	15.63
	N/A	PRINTER	HEWLETT PACKARD	DESKJET 500	339.00	1 7.92	88.99	0.0020	15.63
	N/A	PRINTER	HEWLETT PACKARD	DESKJET 500	339.00	1 7.92	88.99	0.0020	15.63
	93050478125	UPS	APC	SMART 600I	360.00	1 7.92	94.50	0.0004	2.22
	N/A	UPS	APC	SMART 600I	360.00	1 6.93	162.00	0.0004	2.22
	N/A	UPS	APC	SMART 600I	360.00	1 6.93	162.00	0.0004	2.22

Total Values 14

\$ 9,431.78

\$ 2,724.90



GENERATORS ON LOAN TO THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT

Oct-95

PAGE 1.

ACK / DECAL	DESCRIPTION / SERIAL No	QTY	RECEIVED FROM PURCHASE ORDER	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	COST OF ACQUISITION	DEP VALUE	REMARKS
M MAINTENANCE AND GARAGE EQUIPMENT							
- 3080/ 242	GENERATOR ALT 2003888	1	UNOSOM		9,342.00	7,785.00	RPA DETENTION CENTER
1- 3080/ 262	GENERATOR ALT 2003881	1	UNOSOM		9,342.00	7,785.00	RPA DETENTION CENTER
M- 3080/ 425	GENERATOR ENG 3369245	1	UNOSOM		9,504.00	7,920.00	RWANDATEL
M- 3080/ 427	GENERATOR ENG 3369640	1	UNOSOM		9,504.00	7,920.00	RWANDATEL
BM- 3080/ 1121	GENERATOR	1	UNPROFOR		9,342.00	7,785.00	RPA DETENTION CENTER
BM- 3080/ 1122	GENERATOR	1	UNPROFOR		9,342.00	7,785.00	RPA DETENTION CENTER

STOCK / DECAL	DESCRIPTION / SERIAL No	QTY	RECEIVED FROM PURCHASE ORDER	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	COST OF ACQUISITION	DEP VALUE	REMARKS
BM MAINTENANCE AND GARAGE EQUIPMENT							
BM- 3080/ 2208	GENERATOR	1	UNOSOM		1,514.70	1,377.00	RWANDATEL
BM- 3080/ 2353	GENERATOR	1	UNOSOM		1,514.70	1,377.00	RPA KIGALI
BM- 3080/ D-154	GENERATOR PLANT SO205319/0	1	UNAVEM		7,200.00	6,000.00	T.V STUDIO KIGALI

GRAND TOTAL OF THE GENERATORS ON LOAN TO THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT DEP/VAL	55,734.00	US DOLLARS.
GRAND TOTAL OF ITEMS	9.	

VEHICLES ON LOAN TO RWANDA GOVERNMENT

GOVTTPT2.WQ1

S/N	MAKE/TYPE	VEHICLE NUMBER	DATE TRANSFERED	ORIGINAL VALUE US \$	RESIDUAL VALUE US\$
1	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 1182	17/03/95	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
2	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 1193	17/03/95	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
3	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 1167	24/02/95	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
4	TOYOTA LANDCRUISER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 802	01/01/95	\$16,079.03	\$4,182.00
5	TOYOTA LANDCRUISER 4X4 PICK-UP	UNAMIR 3016	10/02/95	\$31,253.00	\$7,758.50
6	MINISUBISHI MINI BUS 12 PASSENGER	UNAMIR 226	5/7/95	\$8,790.70	\$3,955.82
7	MINISUBISHI MINI BUS 12 PASSENGER	UNAMIR 207	5/7/95	\$8,790.70	\$3,955.82
8	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 1085	02/12/94	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
9	TOYOTA HILUX PICK-UP DOUBLE CABIN	UNAMIR 836	06/06/95	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
TOTAL				\$126,716.03	\$47,664.39

VEHICLE ON LOAN TO RPA LAISON OFFICER

S/N	MAKE/TYPE	VEHICLE NUMBER	ORIGINAL VALUE US \$	RESIDUAL VALUE US\$
1	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER 4X4 JEEP	UNAMIR 1039	\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45
	TOTAL		\$12,360.52	\$5,562.45

VEHICLE ON LOAN TO FOSSY GORILLA MOVEMENT

S/N	MAKE/TYPE	VEHICLE NUMBER	ORIGINAL VALUE US \$	RESIDUAL VALUE
1	HONDA MOTOR CYCLE	155 M	\$1,378.16	\$620.00
	TOTAL		\$1,378.16	\$620.00

List of Equipment for Disposal

Generators
Vehicles - Heavy Duty and Sedan
Water Purification Units
Pumps
Tanks/Containers
Tents
Office Furniture/Equipment
Photocopiers
Radio/VHF equipment
Freezers/Refrigerators
Photograph/Microfilm Equipment
TV/VCR Sets

Pl. send to agencies — outline of list

A & B

E1
CAB

M. DAO

Phase discons
29-11-95
WS

Scamyl
29.11

Reçu le 2^e NOV. 1995

P5/6
CRN 400

A. UN HOSPITAL

WITH ALL ITS EQUIPMENT

B. TELECOMMUNICATION

- MOBILE & PORTABLE RADIOS
- REPEATER SYSTEMS
- HF SSB RADIOS
- SATELLITE SYSTEMS (VSATS, INMARSATS)
- MULTIPLEX EQUIPMENT
- TELEPHONE PABXS
- TELEPHONE RURAL LINKS
- METERING, TEST EQUIPMENT & TOOLS
- SPECTRUM ANALYSERS

C. BROADCAST EQUIPMENT

- RADIO UNAMIR + ACCESORIES

D. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

- BONOCULARS
- NIGHT VISION GOGGLES
- DIRECTION FINDERS
- MOBILE RADAR/RADAR GUN
- MINE DETECTORS
- METAL DETECTORS (PORTABLE & WALK THROUGH)

E. GENERATORS

- VARIOUS SIZES (LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL)

F. OFFICE EQUIPMENT

- COMPUTER
- PRINTERS
- OFFICE FURNITURE
- SHREDDERS
- FAX MACHINES
- COPY WRITERS

pg 12
CRW 405

G. VEHICLES

- **HEAVY DUTY VEHICLES**
- FORKLIFTS
- GRADERS
- CRANES
- DOZERS
- GARBAGE COMPACTORS
- SEWAGE TRUCK
- VIBRATOR ROLLER
- BUMP TRUCKS
- LOW LOADERS
- UTILITY VEHICLES (HEAVY) * see attached
- **TRANSPORT VEHICLES**

H. UTILITY UNITS

- WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEMS
- TENTS
- PREFAB UNITS
- PUMPS, TANKS, BLADDERS
- TRAFIPRO COMPLEX
- MAINTENANCE WORKSHOP


I. ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(APCs)



AMBASSADE
DE
BELGIQUE

*Rel
mandate*

TELEFAX



Ambassade de Belgique - - BP 81 - Kigali - Rwanda - Fax 739 95 - Tel. 755 51

Aux Ambassades de :

- France
- Allemagne
- USA
- Canada (Ambassadeur B. Dussault)
- Pays-Bas
- Représentation du Foreign Office
- Délégation de la C.E.
- PNUD (M. S. Hasegawa)
- Ambassadeur Khan (MINUAR) ✓

Total pages :
N° : 2884

fax :

769.57
77.267
72.128
72.719
74.671
85.109
743.13
76.263
86.877

date : 24.11.95

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, Cher Collègue,

J'ai l'avantage de vous inviter à une réunion ce vendredi 24 novembre à 16:00 h
en ma résidence pour discuter les possibles formules de suivi à la MINUAR.
La réunion a été suggérée par l'Ambassadeur Khan.

Cordialement

F. De Coninck

*Free
mandate
recut here*

Consensus view - Donors Meeting - Kigali 22 November 1995

1. UNAMIR Chapter must be closed on December 8. There should be no amendment or alteration to UNAMIR's mandate. Any continuation of UN's presence in Rwanda should be in a different form and mandate to UNAMIR.
2. A take-it-or-leave-it policy in the current negotiations for the new mandate should be avoided. Now that G-10 position and Rwanda's response is known, the door should be kept open for further discussion for a new mandate.
3. Generally, the Civilian Option (Option 4) was favoured. It responded more closely to the situation on the ground. It required, however, an innovative approach if it was to succeed. The Half-way [Option 2] and Monitoring [3] Options were not advisable but had some merit and should not be discounted.
4. The Civilian Option should be aimed at addressing the immediate problems of secure return of refugees, their rehabilitation and resettlement, restoring the judicial process (including police training, prisons, triage commissions, trials etc.), demobilisation and repair of infrastructure damaged in the civil war. Essentially, UN should move to a post-conflict peace-building role from a peace-keeping role. A meaningful, effective Civilian Option would allay the negative impact of the UN 'walking away' from Africa.
5. This peace-building role may be undertaken by "White Helmets" that would replace Blue Helmets. Thus a core of technicians, logisticians, communicating experts would be mandated to assist in safe refugee return, to prepare for their resettlement rehabilitation in communes, repair of infrastructure etc. The White Helmets could be raised by converting the existing UNAMIR specialised units (engineers, logistics, communication i.e. about 420 military personnel) into White Helmets. Alternatively, or in addition, a unit consisting of civilian doctors, engineers, agronomists etc. may be raised through UNVs or through other sources to act as a "White Helmet" brigade carrying out a civilian mandate for humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Rwanda.

6. The funding for the Civilian Option must come through assessed contributions and not through voluntary sources. Preferably, DPKO budget should continue to fund the White Helmet peace-building Civilian Option. Alternatively, the Trust Fund should serve for financing the civilian White Helmet contingent.

7. The issue of equipment was important and urgent. It needed sensitive and responsible handling. Government of Rwanda felt strongly that non-lethal equipment should remain in Rwanda on completion of the mandate necessitating new resolution in the UNGA and Security Council on disposal of equipment. One way in which this flexibility could be achieved would be for most of the equipment to be handed over to UNDP who have priority rights on the equipment and which utilise it for the implementation of the Refugee Accelerated Plan of Action for Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation based on the suggestions of the recent Round Table Thematic Conference.

8. The equipment would remain the property of UN but would be used in Rwanda for the duration of the mandate. All lethal military equipment would be excluded from the list.

9. The issue of security for the Tribunal, Human Rights Monitors, other agencies and white helmets needed to be addressed in the event of UNAMIR phase-out after December 8, 1995.

UNITED
NATIONS

A



General Assembly

*Mandate**White
Helmets
initiative*Distr.
LIMITEDA/49/L.19/Rev.1
5 December 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 37 (a)STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND
DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: STRENGTHENING
OF THE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Suriname,
Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay: revised
draft resolution

Participation of volunteers, "White Helmets", in
activities of the United Nations in the field of
humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical
cooperation for development

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 46/182 of 19 December 1991, in particular, the
guiding principles embodied in the annex thereto, 47/168 of 22 December 1992 and
48/57 of 14 December 1993,

A/49/L.19/Rev.1
English
Page 2

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 1993/205 of
12 September 1993 and the agreed conclusions of the coordination segment of the

12 February 1993 and the agreed conclusions of the Commission on Human Rights, Council of 1993, 1/ as well as Council decision 1994/291 of July 1994,

Recalling also its resolutions 45/264 of 13 May 1991 and 48/162 of 20 December 1993,

Recognizing, in the light of the increasing number and growing magnitude and complexity of natural disasters and other emergencies, the need to utilize fully the national potential of countries in providing the United Nations, on a stand-by basis, with support for its activities in the area of humanitarian emergency assistance, as well as in the promotion of a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development,

Also recognizing the importance of enhancing the national capacity of countries in disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness, as well as the importance of eradication of poverty in developing countries, in order to reduce their vulnerabilities,

Welcoming national initiatives, such as the establishment of a national volunteer corps called "White Helmets", undertaken in order to strengthen the stand-by capacity of developing countries, to support the United Nations activities in the area of humanitarian emergency assistance, as well as in the promotion of a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Volunteers, including in the mobilization of resources oriented towards the provision of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical cooperation for development,

1. Notes with satisfaction the initiatives undertaken by the international community in order to facilitate quick and adequate response to humanitarian emergencies and to provide effective support to the rehabilitation and development efforts of affected countries;

2. Encourages voluntary national and regional actions aimed at providing the United Nations system, on a stand-by basis, with specialized human and technical resources for emergency relief and rehabilitation, and, in this regard, notes with satisfaction the establishment, in particular in developing countries, of national volunteer corps;

3. Also encourages those national volunteer corps to develop the appropriate capabilities in order to cooperate, at the field level and in their respective area of expertise, with the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations, in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 46/182 and other relevant United Nations resolutions;

1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/48/3/Rev.1), chap. III.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



VICE-PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CABINET DU VICE-PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
B.P 23 KIGALI

P 4/2
CRN 406

File with
minutes of
Joint meeting
on mandate

20th November, 1995,

H.E. Ambassador Shariyar Khan,
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General,
UNAMIR,
KIGALI.

Your Excellency,

Further to the Rwandese Foreign Minister's letter of 13th August 1995 to the United Nations Secretary General, requesting the transfer of UNAMIR's equipment to the Government of Rwanda, please find attached to this letter a list of equipment the Government of Rwanda wishes to request from the United Nations.

Please accept, your Excellency, my compliments and highest regards.

Yours Sincerely,

Claude DUSAIDI
POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Enc.

P5/6
CRN 406

A. UN HOSPITAL

WITH ALL ITS EQUIPMENT

B. TELECOMMUNICATION

- MOBILE & PORTABLE RADIOS
- REPEATER SYSTEMS
- HF SSB RADIOS
- SATELLITE SYSTEMS (VSATS, INMARSATS)
- MULTIPLEX EQUIPMENT
- TELEPHONE PABXS
- TELEPHONE RURAL LINKS
- METERING, TEST EQUIPMENT & TOOLS
- SPECTRUM ANALYSERS

C. BROADCAST EQUIPMENT

- RADIO UNAMIR + ACCESORIES

D. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

- BONOCULARS
- NIGHT VISION GOGGLES
- DIRECTION FINDERS
- MOBILE RADAR/RADAR GUN
- MINE DETECTORS
- METAL DETECTORS (PORTABLE & WALK THROUGH)

E. GENERATORS

- VARIOUS SIZES (LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL)

F. OFFICE EQUIPMENT

- COMPUTER
- PRINTERS
- OFFICE FURNITURE
- SHREDDERS
- FAX MACHINES
- COPY WRITERS

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CRW 406

G. VEHICLES

- **HEAVY DUTY VEHICLES**
- FORKLIFTS
- GRADERS
- CRANES
- DOZERS
- GARBAGE COMPACTORS
- SEWAGE TRUCK
- VIBRATOR ROLLER
- BUMP TRUCKS
- LOW LOADERS
- UTILITY VEHICLES (HEAVY) * see attached
- **TRANSPORT VEHICLES**

H. UTILITY UNITS

- WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEMS
- TENTS
- PREFAB UNITS
- PUMPS, TANKS, BLADDERS
- TRAFIPRO COMPLEX
- MAINTENANCE WORKSHOP

I. ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(APCs)



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: See Below

FROM: Shaharyar M. Khan *Shaharyar M. Khan* DATE: 24 November 1995
SRSG

SUBJECT: Mandate - 4 p.m. Meeting of G-10 at Belgium Ambassador's Residence

I enclose a paper summarising the discussions on 22 November 1995. Attached are the following:

- i) List of Equipment sought by Government of Rwanda
- ii) Copy of Resolution

Distribution to Representatives of:

Canada
Belgium
European Union
France
Germany
Netherlands
USA
UK
UNDP
HRFOR

First draft

Confidence building measures for a new UNAMIR mandate

1. Confidence-building is already implied in the current mandate (help promote national reconciliation, support provision of aid and assistance).

2. The Government does not want to hear about political reconciliation. Therefore, UNAMIR's confidence-building measures will have to focus on the return of the refugees and supporting the provision of assistance by UN agencies. This involves:

- Creating the conditions for a safe and voluntary return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities through providing security by the deployment of troops;
- Promoting such return by a rehauling of radio UNAMIR programming so as to make of it a more targeted and dynamic instrument, and the launching of a written bulletin;
- Reclaiming a role for UNAMIR at the regional level, without giving the impression of competing with the Carter initiative;
- Creating a policy coordination mechanism with the agencies centered on the SRSG. The necessary presence of UNAMIR to facilitate the agencies activities should be made clear to the GoR and to the agencies themselves.