

UNAMIR

TRANSITION FROM UNAMIR I TO UNAMIR II

2 - 10 MAY 1994

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[7 CONFIDENTIAL]
RH/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 103

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0003

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/CONFIDENTIAL/RESTRICTED/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX No. Kmf 800

(1)

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO : Mr. A. Golo, OIC-CAO	FROM: Bernard Fouche - SpTO
PREFIX/No.: <u>misc 605</u>	DATE: 16 Mai 1994
ATTN:	PHONE: 212 963 3091
FAX No.: 254 2 62 26 68	FAX No.: 212 963 3090
INFO:	DRAFTER:
FAX No.:	FILE REF.:
INTERNAL DIST.:	
SUBJECT: STATUS ON OUTSTANDING REQUESTS	
REFERENCE:	

AAA- PLEASE FIND ATTACHED LIST OF REQUESTS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF UNAMIR ADMINISTRATION.

BBB- COULD KINDLY ASK THE CONCERNED SECTIONS TO PROVIDE US WITH A SHORT STATUS ON REQUESTS MADE AND INDICATE THE EXPECTED DELIVERY DATES OF THE ITEMS.

CCC- REGARDS

FC
DFFC
CLO

UNAMIR
194 MAY 16 14 24

(FC)

EDIR

Bernard Fouche
ms
A/MA
17/5/94

194 MAY 16 14 37

UNAMIR

[illegible]

UNAMIR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

1000.7 (DFC) /G/7

To: FC

From: DFC

Date: 15th May 1994

Subject: DESIGNATION OF NEW UNITS IN UNAMIR II

1. It is a common practice in a number of operations mounted by the UN to name the participating units after their countries of origin. As for instance, Ghanaian Battalion as GHANBATT; Nigerian Battalion as NIBATT; Canadian Battalion as CANBATT etc.
2. These unit designations try, in the main, to avoid confusion as and when the units are deployed and re-deployed from one location to another within the Area of operation (AO). The phenomenon of shifting units may become common in our pending operations.
3. Presently, as in our case, BUYBATT is located at the Kigali International Airport. Nonetheless, it is still being called BYUBATT which really loses its original meaning and designation.
4. It is upon the strength of these and for ease of identification that I am suggesting that participating units in UNAMIR II be designated after their countries of origin.



HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

194 MAY 14 09:17

KIGALI RWANDA

UNAMIR

94 MAY 14

OUTGOING FAX NO.

KYF 805

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: BARIL\UNATIONS\NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/ 960	DATE: 19 APRIL 94
ATTN: LCOL MARTIN	PHONE: 250-84271
FAX NO: 212-963-9070	FAX NO: 250-84265
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BUSSIERE FILE REF:
Internal Dist.: DFC, CMO, CMPO Edir FC	
SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF ZIMBABWEAN UNMOS PERSONNEL	
REFERENCE: YOUR FAX YKF 827 OF 29 APRIL 94	

1. THE CONTINGENT SENIOR HAS BEEN CONTACTED AND ARRANGEMENT ARE BEING MADE TO REPATRIATE THE ZIMBABWEANS WITH THE UNAMIR ADMINISTRATION IN NAIROBI.

2. I WOULD HOWEVER LIKE TO ADVISE YOU THAT THE CONTINGENT SENIOR WAS VERY SURPRISED BY THIS ORDER AND DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH THE ARMY COMMANDER IN HARARE. APPARENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE WAS TOTALLY DISAPPOINTED OF THE FAILURE OF UNNY TO APPRAISE THE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES REMAINING IN RWANDA OF THE RWANDESE CRISIS AND THE SITUATION AND CONDITION OF THEIR TROOPS.

3. THE CONTINGENT SENIOR SENT A FAX TO HIS ARMY HQ APPRAISING THEM OF THE GENERAL SITUATION AND PROVIDING HIS VIEWS AS A CONTINGENT COMMANDER, ADVISING HIS COMMANDER OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS CONTINGENT'S PRESENCE BOTH IN RWANDA AND IN UGANDA. THE ARMY COMMANDER ASSURED HIM TODAY THAT HE WOULD SEE THE GOVERNMENT AND SUPPORT HIS REQUEST TO STAY AND WOULD ADVISE UNNY ACCORDINGLY OF THE DECISION WHICH IS EXPECTED TO REACH NY ON 16 MAY.

4. AS STATED IN PARA 1, WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH THE BOOKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH NAIROBI AND WILL ADVISE YOU ONCE THIS IS CONFIRMED. WOULD HOWEVER ASK THAT YOU DISCUSS THIS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ZIMBABWE PERMANENT MISSION.

3. REGARDS.

Noted
14/5
DFC/WR

DRAFT - 1

DATED 14 MAY 94

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA

General

1. In light of the Security Council resolution (1994) of May 1994, there is a requirement to establish a ceasefire throughout the country of Rwanda.

2. The aim of the ceasefire is:

a. To cease the military actions that have resulted in useless bloodshed to the soldiers of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army.

b. To cease assassinations, political killings, and ethnic cleansing

c. To systematically disarm the civilian population including the self-defence groups in order to provide safety for humanitarian agencies.

d. To allow for humanitarian relief operations for the refugees and displaced persons. These actions could be done simultaneously with the above conditions upon an effective ceasefire declaration.

e. To create safe conditions for those people who are trying to protect themselves from random shelling, massacres and also to prevent a massive migration of the population like the one taking place at the present time.

f. To create an atmosphere of goodwill to start preparatory work before peace negotiations.

g. To create proper conditions for the return of law and order.

These aims will be put in place (see the attached annex) as soon as the ceasefire will be in effect, which is essential requirement in order to realize these other goals.

Definitions Related to the Ceasefire

7. Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

8. Observation Posts. Specially selected points throughout the country which allow for the best visibility of surrounding area in terrain held by one or both opposing forces and used primarily to monitor any military troop movements, reinforcing of positions or cease fire violations. The distance between individual OPs should not be greater than 10 km. OPs are to be manned 24 hrs a day and 7 days a week. OPs should be equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, maps, compass and radio and line communication with a HQ.

a. Type of OPs. There may be the following type of OPs, depending on terrain conditions and intensity of operation:

(1) Permanent.

(2) Temporary.

(3) Unmanned.

9. Secured Area. An area such as a refugee camp, where access of the opposing forces would be controlled and regulated by UNAMIR-A forces. Within the secured area there must be sufficient security for UNAMIR-A military and civilian components.

10. UN Installations. All UNAMIR-A military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfill its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR-A assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by separate UNAMIR-A regulations.

11. Refugee Camp Guards. In order to provide protection to refugee camps against acts of lawlessness particularly acts of ethnic cleansing, UNAMIR-A units will be responsible for the required security arrangements.

12. Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the ceasefire agreement. These may be static or mobile.



3. The ceasefire will come into effect only when both sides in the conflict declare a willingness to participate by signing an agreement.

Responsibility

4. Political Leaders and High Commands of both the RGF and the RPF will bear political and military responsibility for compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

5. UNAMIR-A will be responsible for monitoring the ceasefire agreement through the use of deployed forces, UNMOs and sensing devices.

Role of Rwandese Armed Forces, and the Rwandese Patriotic Army for the ceasefire.

a. To keep UNAMIR-A informed of the ceasefire violations by the opposite force, and progress in disarming the civilian population by prefectures, subprefectures and sectors in areas controlled by both Forces and under their responsibility and their Gendarmerie. UNAMIR-A could probably assist in the effort of disarming the population under conditions that still have to be defined.

b. To report atrocities committed by the opposite force

c. To refrain from taking unilateral actions.

d. To dismantle all road blocks controlled by Armed Forces of both parties and self-defence groups.

e. To use negotiations as a primary means of solving problems with the opposite force.

f. To send a liaison officer from both parties to the UNAMIR-A FHQ and in the sector headquarters.

g. To keep a close relation with the FHQ and the sector headquarters.

Areas where a ceasefire may be possible to enforce

6. There are two options:

a. Throughout the entire country.

e. Search. Search operations should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It should be done at irregular intervals.

f. Patrolling. Schedule of patrolling, elaborated for both patrols from UNAMIR-A units and UNMOs shall cover all major roads, tracks of sensitive areas of operational importance. UNMOs shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.

g. Cordon. This will be carried out on specific information related to discovery of non-official stores of weapons, ammunition or explosives. Cordon operation shall be avoided at night. Cordon operations would be undertaken in conjunction with local authorities.

h. Investigation Teams. Special groups of UNMOs and UN CIV POLs designated for investigating, clarifying and reporting all cases of ceasefire violations.

i. Inspection Teams. Groups of UNAMIR-A and UNMO personnel to monitor RGF and RPF activity in assigned places.

j. Committees for Civic Matters. Organization structure for solving all important citizens' matters connected to humanitarian activity in towns.

k. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked of all data collection regarding refugee camps, location and finding out the best option for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

26. All arriving units will be deployed in their assigned areas and moved in columns not bigger than one company depending on transportation possibilities on a priority worked out on a basis of current situation development. Troops deployment should be preceded by recce party carried out by UNMOs with interested troop commander.

Rules of Engagement

27. Instructions for all Members of the UNAMIR-A Military Component Authorized to Carry Arms and Ammunition Regarding Opening Fire in Rwanda.

- b. In specially selected areas such as prefectures, cities, towns, regions, arterial roads etc (when specifying, Rwandese terms shall be used).

Definitions Related to the Ceasefire

7. Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

8. Observation Posts. Specially selected points throughout the country which allow for the best visibility of surrounding area in terrain held by one or both opposing forces and used primarily to monitor any military troop movements, reinforcing of positions or cease fire violations. The distance between individual OPs should not be greater than 10 km. OPs are to be manned 24 hrs a day and 7 days a week. OPs should be equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, maps, compass and radio and line communication with HQ.

a. Type of OPs. There may be the following type of OPs, depending on terrain conditions and intensity of operation:

(1) Permanent.

(2) Temporary.

(3) Unmanned.

9. Secured Area. An area such as a refugee camp, where access of the opposing forces would be controlled and regulated by UNAMIR-A forces. Within the secured area there must be sufficient security for UNAMIR-A military and civilian components.

10. UN Installations. All UNAMIR-A military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfill its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR-A assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by separate UNAMIR-A regulations.

11. Refugee Camp Guards. In order to provide protection to refugee camps against acts of lawlessness particularly acts of ethnic cleansing, UNAMIR-A units will be responsible for the required security arrangements.

DRAFT - 1

DATED 13 MAY 94

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA

General

1. In light of the Security Council resolution (1994) of May 1994, there is a requirement to establish a ceasefire throughout the country of Rwanda.
2. This ceasefire is aimed at preventing the following:
 - a. Military actions causing unnecessary bloodshed to both RGF and RPF forces.
 - b. Political assassinations/killings/massacre of innocent men/women/children.
 - c. To create safe conditions for people seeking shelter from random shootings, shellings, and killings, and thereby stopping the large scale migration of people as is presently taking place.
 - d. To allow humanitarian relief operations for refugees and displaced persons to take place.
 - e. To create a goodwill atmosphere for the initiation of peace talks.
 - g. To create an atmosphere for the return of law and order.
3. The ceasefire will come into effect only when both sides in conflict declare a willingness to participate by signing an agreement.

Responsibility

4. Political Leaders and High Commands of both the RGF and the RPF will bear political and military responsibility for compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

12. Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the cease-fire agreement. These may be static or mobile.

a. Static Check Points. Troops/UNMOs are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally on important road junctions, at the entrances/exits to controlled area etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line communication with a HQ.

b. Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on an irregular schedule. It must have radio communication with a base/unit's HQ.

13. Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English and Kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching vehicle.

14. Search. A search operation is necessary to eliminate infiltration, however it causes harassment and inconvenience to the population. This operation, therefore, must be quick, methodical, accurate, involve correct behavior and be based on solid drills by the soldiers carrying out a search mission. Search operations would be conducted in coordination with local authorities. Following principle should be employed during search operation :

a. Due care must be taken to avoid damage to any vehicle or property being searched.

b. Coffins carrying funeral convoys should not be searched.

c. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individuals.

d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver/passenger areas, the chassis etc. Suspicious vehicle must be thoroughly searched.

12. Check Point. A manned point where as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and personnel in order to prevent unauthorized access, search and seizures pertinent to the search line operation. These may be static or mobile.

A. Static Check Point. These points are permanently located at fixed points. They will be normally on permanent road junctions at the entrance/exit to controlled areas etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line communication with a HQ.

- 13 -

B. Mobile Check Point. These check points may not be permanent to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a number of a section assigned (in some cases) with two or three vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on an operational schedule. It must have radio communication with a headquarters HQ.

13. Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have along-standing "Road Block" in English and Kiswahili and be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching vehicle.

14. Search. A search operation is necessary to eliminate infiltration, however it causes harassment and inconvenience to the population. This operation therefore must be quick, methodical, accurate, involve correct behavior and be based on well-defined criteria. Search operations are carried out in a search area. Search operations would be conducted in consultation with local authorities. Following principle should be applied during search operation:

a. The operation must be based on a valid search to any vehicle or property being searched.

b. Vehicles carrying (human) convoys should not be searched.

c. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and reported given to authorities.

d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver's passenger areas, the vehicle who. Suspicious vehicles must be thoroughly searched.

e. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the unit commander may authorize a personal search which is to be carried out in a dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual. Women will only be searched with ferromagnetic metals' detectors and will NOT be physically searched. If however they have to be searched, women must be used.

f. Area Search. Area searches are aimed at locating non-official weapons and ammunition stores etc. Such actions will only be done in conjunction with a cordon operation. During an area search, locals should be segregated. A house or a shop shall be searched in the presence of its owner.

15. Cordon. UNAMIR-A may have to carry out cordon operations to search for weapons, ammunition or explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR-A FHQ is needed to carry out a cordon and search operation. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and a reserve.

16. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of the cease-fire. This will be done by UNAMIR-A forces, UNMOs, and local authorities.

a. Types of patrols. There may be the following types of patrols depending on terrain conditions and the complexity of operation:

- (1) Foot patrol.
- (2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol.
- (3) Air patrol.
- (4) River/lake patrol.

b. Aim of Patrolling.

- (1) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or ceasefire violation.
- (2) To obtain information about terrain, topography etc.
- (3) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition, explosives etc.

Annex

Schedule of the Aims following an effective ceasefire declaration to take effect on D - Day.

Aims	Start of operations	End of operations
a. Deployment of UNAMIR-A elements.	D Day - 1	
b. To stop all firings and military actions throughout the country.	D Day	D Day
c. To cease political killings and ethnic cleansing.	D Day	D Day
d. To disarm the civilian population including the self-defence groups throughout the country and dismantle all road blocks.	D Day + 1	Day + 15
e. Redeployment of Units and Subunits for security reasons between the two factions.	D Day + 3	D Day + 7
f. To allow humanitarian actions for the refugees and displaced persons.	D Day + 3	The end of operations, depending on the situation.
g. To create safe conditions for those people trying to protect themselves from random shelling and massacres.	D Day + 3	The same as above (see f)
h. To create atmosphere of goodwill to start preparatory work before peace negotiations.	D Day + 2	Day + 15
i. Exchange of POW.	D Day + 10	D Day + 30
j. To create proper conditions for return to law and order.	D Day + 15	The end of operations after significant success.

To be noted :

D Day is the effective ceasefire day.

(4) To show a UN presence.

(5) To provide protection for NGOs or the population, and in particular for displaced persons.

(6) To prevent infiltration of unwanted elements into selected and controlled area/zone.

c. Strength. In no circumstances should a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men), while a vehicle patrol or river /lake patrol should be no less than two vehicles or boats.

d. Security. Security of UN patrols depends on how much they know about an area of their operation. However following aspects need consideration:

(1) Patrol routes should be free of mines. Only routes known to be absolutely free from mines may be patrolled. DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas.

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag and UN head-gear are clearly visible during patrolling.

17. Escort. In UNAMIR-A elements two types of escort will be used:

a. UNMO Escort. This will be unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger the escort shall be augmented by an armed escort from a UNAMIR-A unit. Unarmed escorts shall be normally provided to VIPs, NGOs and another visiting persons, provided that there is no threat.

b. Armed Escorts. Armed escorts will be composed of soldiers from a UNAMIR-A unit. They will be provided to humanitarian relief operations' convoys, UN convoys or to VIPs of both factions.

c. Authority of Detailing Escorts. FHQ shall have the sole authority to detail escorts.

18. UN Convoys. UN Convoys will be conducted for UNAMIR-A deployment and is necessary for fulfillment of its mandated tasks in an area of operation assigned.

- a. Movement of military troops, if any.
- b. All cases of shooting, no matter what kind of calibre has been applied.
- c. Humanitarian relief convoys' movement.
- d. Civil harassment, political party meetings, both hostile propaganda and provocation acts, by radio or directly to the public opinion of society, if any.

Conclusions

26. Establishment of the ceasefire is significant for peace process development in Rwanda. Moreover short time expectancy for the ceasefire implementation will decide if most of presently living victims of war survive, but from the other hand attitude of all people engaged in this act is of importance to the success of an evolving Peace Process.

19. Investigation Teams (IT). ITs are composed of UNMO and UN CIV POLs and will be employed to clarify all cases of ceasefire violations and will submit relevant reports to FHQ.

20. Committees for Civic Matters. Committees comprising specially selected groups of staff personnel from UNAMIR-A components designated for humanitarian assistance forwarded mainly to townspeople and will work to solve important civic matters.

21. Humanitarian Recce Teams. Personnel of UNAMIR-A units and UNMOs which will be tasked for collecting all data regarding displaced persons' concentrations as well as refugee camps and road infrastructure to be used for food transportation purposes.

Data Necessary For the Ceasefire Agreement

- a. RGF, and RPF must provide to UNAMIR-A FHQ data about their manpower, weapons (incl. artillery/mortar/air defence systems), their disposition/location of all formations at the moment the ceasefire comes into force.
- b. Both forces should put forward any questions on the ceasefire agreement terminology to ensure clarity.
- c. A Buffer Zone (BZ)/Area of Separation (AOS) with the Ceasefire Line (CFL) would be created in between the forces. The area would be manned by UNAMIR-A.

Concept of Operation

22. UNAMIR-A military component and UNMOs must at all times ensure that preconditions set out in the foregoing paragraphs are implemented/adhered to.

23. To establish conditions necessary for monitoring of the ceasefire agreement's observance, both UNAMIR-A military component and UNMOs should carry out following operations:

- a. Establishment of Observation Posts. OPs should be established in highest terrain points to ensure the best visibility even in difficult weather conditions and at night. Observation Posts should allow for maximum of information regarding movement of troops, if any, and other observable proof of the ceasefire violation.

- (7) when attempts are made to compel UNAMIR-A personnel by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors;

Escorts and Patrols:

- a. An escort and a patrol is authorized to use their weapons against armed persons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

- (1) in self-defence;
- (2) against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR-A personnel;
- (3) when other UN personnel or other lives are in mortal danger;
- (4) in defence of UNAMIR-A and other convoys and also patrols' vehicles with personnel in a case of armed attack;
- (5) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their commanders ; and
- (6) when attempts are made to abduct or arrest UN civilians or military personnel using force.

Check Points and Road Blocks:

- a. Personnel of Check Points and Road Blocks is authorized to use their weapons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

- (1) in self-defence;
- (2) in defence of UNAMIR-A premises or vehicles under armed attack; and
- (3) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their superiors;

25. UNMOs shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate and report about:

b. Refugee Camp Guards. Protection of this kind should be set up in all refugee camps, because of the threat to people living there.

c. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions, and entry and exit points into an area. Static check points must be established in the entry/exit point of troop position.

d. Road Blocks. In conjunction with check points, road blocks will be set up especially during night.

e. Search. Search operations should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It should be done at irregular intervals.

f. Patrolling. Schedule of patrolling, elaborated for both patrols from UNAMIR-A units and UNMOs shall cover all major roads, tracks of sensitive areas of operational importance. UNMOs shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.

g. Cordon. This will be carried out on specific information related to discovery of non-official stores of weapons, ammunition or explosives. Cordon operation shall be avoided at night. Cordon operations would be undertaken in conjunction with local authorities.

h. Investigation Teams. Special groups of UNMOs and UN CIV POLs designated for investigating, clarifying and reporting all cases of ceasefire violations.

i. Committees for Civic Matters. Organization structure for solving all important citizens' matters connected to humanitarian activity in towns.

j. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked of all data collection regarding refugee camps, location and finding out the best option for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

Rules of Engagement

24. Instructions for all Members of the UNAMIR-A Military Component Authorized to Carry Arms and Ammunition Regarding Opening Fire in Rwanda.

b. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (eg. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); **AND**

c. the person refuses to stop when called to do so; **AND**

d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

(7) FIRE WITHOUT WARNING. You may fire without warning on a person:

a. who has used or is using a firearm or other offensive weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; **OR**

b. who is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon **AND** who is clearly about to use it **AND** you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself or the persons it is your duty to protect.

c. retaliation is prohibited, and all wounded should be given first aid.

UN Installation and Refugee Camps:

a. A Guard of UN installation is authorized to use armed force against armed persons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

(1) in self-defence;

(2) against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR-A personnel;

(3) when other UN personnel or other lives are in mortal danger;

(4) when attempts are made to infiltrate UNAMIR-A premises or to destroy or them;

(5) in defence of UNAMIR-A premises being under immediate attack;

(6) when attempts are made with the use of armed force to penetrate UN premises or cut off UN force and;

(1) Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire.

(2) You must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** involves the following sequential actions:

- a. open display of weapons.
- b. verbal warning.
- c. barring access to the point being protected.
- d. physical restraint.
- e. pointing weapons, and
- f. firing weapons.

(3) If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted to your immediate commander.

(4) You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.

Warnings.

(5) **WARNINGS BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in English or Kinyarwanda or in French:

STOP-HANDS UP/HAGARARA AMABOKO HEJORU/ARRETE LES MAINS EN L'AIR
(pause)
STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/HAGARARA CYANGWA NDAKURASA/ARRETE OU JE
TIRE

(6) **FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person only if:

- a. you believe the person is about to attack you or any person it is your duty to protect; **AND**

DRAFT - 1

DATED 14 MAY 94

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA

General

1. In light of the Security Council resolution (1994) of May 1994, there is a requirement to establish a ceasefire throughout the country of Rwanda.
2. The aim of the ceasefire is:
 - a. To cease the military actions that have resulted in useless bloodshed to the soldiers of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army.
 - b. To cease assassinations, political killings, and ethnic cleansing
 - c. To systematically disarm the civilian population including the self-defence groups in order to provide safety for humanitarian agencies.
 - d. To allow for humanitarian relief operations for the refugees and displaced persons. These actions could be done simultaneously with the above conditions upon an effective ceasefire declaration.
 - e. To create safe conditions for those people who are trying to protect themselves from random shelling, massacres and also to prevent a massive migration of the population like the one taking place at the present time.
 - f. To create an atmosphere of goodwill to start preparatory work before peace negotiations.
 - g. To create proper conditions for the return of law and order.

These aims will be put in place (see the attached annex) as soon as the ceasefire will be in effect, which is essential requirement in order to realize these other goals.

b. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (eg. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); AND

c. the person refuses to stop when called to do so; AND

d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

(7) **FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person:

a. who has used or is using a firearm or other offensive weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; OR

b. who is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon AND who is clearly about to use it AND you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself or the persons it is your duty to protect.

c. retaliation is prohibited, and all wounded should be given first aid.

UN Installation and Refugee Camps:

a. A Guard of UN Installation is authorized to use armed force against armed persons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

(1) in self-defence;

(2) against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR-A personnel;

(3) when other UN personnel or other lives are in mortal danger;

(4) when attempts are made to infiltrate UNAMIR-A premises or to destroy or them;

(5) in defence of UNAMIR-A premises being under immediate attack;

(6) when attempts are made with the use of armed force to penetrate UN premises or cut off UN force and;

(7) when attempts are made to compel UNAMIR-A personnel by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors;

These aims will be put in place (see the attached ~~as~~ ~~Escorts and Patrols~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~ceasefire~~ ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~effect~~, which is essential requirement in order to realize these other goals.

a. An escort and a patrol is authorized to use their weapons against armed persons or cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

f. To create an atmosphere of good will and preparatory work before peace negotiations.

(2) against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR-A personnel; to prevent a massive migration of the population like the one in past years; to prevent the use of arms or other weapons in mortal danger; and also to create safe conditions for those people who are trying to leave the area.

(4) in defence of UNAMIR-A personnel and also in defence of the population against armed attack; these actions could be taken by UNAMIR-A personnel.

(5) when attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their commanders; and for humanitarian agencies including the self-defence groups in order to provide safety for UN civilians or military personnel using force.

b. To cease assassinations, political killings, and ethnic cleansing
Check Points and Road Blocks:

and the Rwandese Patriotic Army.
authorized personnel of the Rwandese Patriotic Army and the Rwandese Armed Forces to use their weapons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

2. The aim of the ceasefire is:

(1) in self-defence;
(2) in defence of UNAMIR-A personnel and vehicles and installations; and to establish a requirement to establish a ceasefire.

1. In light of the Security Council resolution (1994) of May 1994, there is a requirement to establish a ceasefire.
(3) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their superiors;

25. UNMOs shall investigate and report about:
FOR

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

DATED 14 MAY 94

- 11 -

DRAFT - 1

(7) when attempts are made to compel UNAMIR-A personnel by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors;

Escorts and Patrols:

a. An escort and a patrol is authorized to use their weapons against armed persons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

(1) in self-defence;

(2) against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR-A personnel;

(3) when other UN personnel or other lives are in mortal danger;

(4) in defence of UNAMIR-A and other convoyed and also patrols' vehicles with personnel in a case of armed attack;

(5) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their commanders ; and

(6) when attempts are made to abduct or arrest UN civilians or military personnel using force.

Check Points and Road Blocks:

a. Personnel of Check Points and Road Blocks is authorized to use their weapons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

(1) in self-defence;

(2) in defence of UNAMIR-A premises or vehicles under armed attack; and

(3) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR-A personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their superiors;

25. UNMOs shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate and report about:

f. Area Search. Area searches are aimed at locating non-official weapons and ammunition stores etc. Such actions will only be done in conjunction with a cordon operation. During an area search, locals should be segregated. A house or a shop shall be searched in the presence of its owner.

15. Cordon. UNAMIR-A may have to carry out cordon operations to search for weapons, ammunition or explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR-A FHQ is needed to carry out a cordon and search operation. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and a reserve.

16. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of the cease-fire. This will be done by UNAMIR-A forces, UNMOs, and local authorities.

a. Types of patrols. There may be the following types of patrols depending on terrain conditions and the complexity of operation:

- (1) Foot patrol.
- (2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol.
- (3) Air patrol.
- (4) River/lake patrol.

b. Aim of Patrolling.

- (1) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or ceasefire violation.
- (2) To obtain information about terrain, topography etc.
- (3) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition, explosives etc.
- (4) To show a UN presence.
- (5) To provide protection for NGOs or the population, and in particular for displaced persons.
- (6) To prevent infiltration of unwanted elements into selected and controlled area/zone.

- a. Movement of military troops, if any.
- b. All cases of shooting, no matter what kind of calibre has been applied.
- c. Humanitarian relief convoys' movement.
- d. Civil harassment, political party meetings, both hostile propaganda and provocation acts, by radio or directly to the public opinion of society, if any.

Conclusions

26. Establishment of the ceasefire is significant for peace process development in Rwanda. Moreover short time expectancy for the ceasefire implementation will decide if most of presently living victims of war survive, but from the other hand attitude of all people engaged in this act is of importance to the success of an evolving Peace Process.

c. Strength. In no circumstances should a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men), while a vehicle patrol or river /lake patrol should be no less than two vehicles or boats.

d. Security. Security of UN patrols depends on how much they know about an area of their operation. However following aspects need consideration:

(1) Patrol routes should be free of mines. Only routes known to be absolutely free from mines may be patrolled. DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas.

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag and UN head-gear are clearly visible during patrolling.

17. Escort. In UNAMIR-A elements two types of escort will be used:

a. UNMO Escort. This will be unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger the escort shall be augmented by an armed escort from a UNAMIR-A unit. Unarmed escorts shall be normally provided to VIPs, NGOs and another visiting persons, provided that there is no threat.

b. Armed Escorts. Armed escorts will be composed of soldiers from a UNAMIR-A unit. They will be provided to humanitarian relief operations' convoys, UN convoys or to VIPs of both factions.

c. Authority of Detailing Escorts. FHQ shall have the sole authority to detail escorts.

17. UN Convoys. UN Convoys will be conducted for UNAMIR-A deployment and is necessary for fulfillment of its mandated tasks in an area of operation assigned.

18. Investigation Teams. ITs are composed of UNMO and UN CIV POLs and will be employed to clarify all cases of ceasefire violations and will submit relevant reports to FHQ.

19. Inspection Teams. Several persons groups of UNAMIR-A and UNMO personnel, which will be employed to monitor current activity of troops in selected places such as:

a. Military : - positions

**Schedule of the Aims following an effective ceasefire declaration
to take effect on D - Day.**

Aims	Start of operations	End of operations
a. Deployment of UNAMIR-A elements.	D Day - 1	
b. To stop all firings and military actions throughout the country.	D Day	D Day
c. To cease political killings and ethnic cleansing.	D Day	D Day
d. To disarm the civilian population including the self-defence groups throughout the country and dismantle all road blocks.	D Day + 1	Day + 15
e. Redeployment of Units and Subunits for security reasons between the two factions.	D Day + 3	D Day + 7
f. To allow humanitarian actions for the refugees and displaced persons.	D Day + 3	The end of operations, depending on the situation.
g. To create safe conditions for those people trying to protect themselves from random shelling and massacres.	D Day + 3	The same as above (see f)
h. To create atmosphere of goodwill to start preparatory work before peace negotiations.	D Day + 2	Day + 15
i. Exchange of POW.	D Day + 10	D Day + 30
j. To create proper conditions for return to law and order.	D Day + 15	The end of operations after significant success.

To be noted :

D Day is the effective ceasefire day.

a. Static Check Points. Troops/UNMOs are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally on important road junctions, at the entrances/exits to controlled area etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line communication with a HQ.

b. Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on an irregular schedule. It must have radio communication with a base/unit's HQ.

13. Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English and Kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching vehicle.

14. Search. A search operation is necessary to eliminate infiltration, however it causes harassment and inconvenience to the population. This operation, therefore, must be quick, methodical, accurate, involve correct behavior and be based on solid drills by the soldiers carrying out a search mission. Search operations would be conducted in coordination with local authorities. Following principle should be employed during search operation :

a. Due care must be taken to avoid damage to any vehicle or property being searched.

b. Coffins carrying funeral convoys should not be searched.

c. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individuals.

d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver/passenger areas, the chassis etc. Suspicious vehicle must be thoroughly searched.

e. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the unit commander may authorize a personal search which is to be carried out in a dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual. Women will only be searched with ferromagnetic metals' detectors and will NOT be physically searched. If however they have to be searched, women must be used.

TO: FHQ

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 14 MAY 94

FILE: REPATO

SUBJ: REPATRIATION OF MILOBS

1. Following MILOBs will be finishing their tour of duty with UNAMIR on 10 Jun 94. Details are given below:

SER	RANK	NAME	NATIONALITY	UNID	DOA	DDM	REMARKS
a	MAJ	ANWARUL KADIR	BANGLADESH	554	29-OCT-93	10-JUN-94	
b	MAJ	JOYNAL ABEDIN	BANGLADESH	B0030	29-OCT-93	10-JUN-94	
c	MAJ	SHAHIDUL HAQUE	BANGLADESH	674	29-OCT-94	10-JUN-94	

2. Following MILOB finished his tour of duty with UNAMIR on 28 April 94 but waiting for decision for repatriation in Nairobi. Details are given below:

SER	RANK	NAME	NATIONALITY	UNID	DOA	DDM	REMARKS
a	LT CDR	ARTHUR S	GHANA	B0032	29-OCT-93	28-APR-94	

3. You are request to process and arrange their repatriation formalities.

4. Regards.

I D TIKOCA
Col
CMO

(4)
CMPO
I agree. Go ahead
and process their
papers.
H/S
DFC/CO

(2)
DFC

For your info. I will make
necessary arrangements
for those at para 1 in due
course. I will give priority
to Lt Col Arthur because he should
have left already. mns
CMPO 14/5/94

(3)
MA
Note this. I am app
the CMO is now
a check mail
let us wait out
what happens


TO: MILOBS

FROM: CMO

DATE: 13 MAY 94

SUBJ: DRESS STANDARD FOR KIGALI

1. All MILOBS are reminded that the dress for military personnel in Kigali will be military uniform throughout accept when resting.
2. This instruction is to be adhered to at all times.
3. For your compliance.


I D TIKOCA
Col
CMO

My Love

Granny



OUTGOING FACSIMILE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

21651

FROM: *for* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 13 May 1994

NUMBER: _____

Kingsley Moghale

Please find attached clippings of press articles relating to UNAMIR from today's newspapers and Bulletins.

Best regards.

C

③
afed
14/5
DFC/WS

②
DFC
Please note second article
14/5

Lull in Rwanda Fighting Allows Aid Deliveries

KIGALI, Rwanda, May 12 (AP) — A lull in the rebel attack on Rwanda's capital enabled relief workers to deliver food and other supplies today to thousands of refugees here, the United Nations said.

"The place is so quiet we are attempting to make some deliveries," said Abdul Kabia, a spokesman for the United Nations. "We are taking advantage of the relative lull."

In recent days there have been fierce exchanges of rocket, howitzer and mortar fire between rebels of the mostly Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front and troops of the Hutu-dominated interim government. The fighting has blocked deliveries of food to about

15,000 refugees who are under the protection of the United Nations.

Sporadic small-arms and machine-gun fire, along with occasional artillery shell explosions, could be heard in the capital during the afternoon. Rebel attacks appeared to be losing momentum near Ruhengeri, 45 miles northwest of the capital, and near Bugasera, 15 miles southeast of Kigali, United Nations observers said.

An estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in the fighting between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, the United Nations and relief groups say. About 1.3 million people have also been displaced by the fighting, which erupted

after the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, both Hutu, were killed in a plane crash on April 6.

In an attempt to end the warfare and insure aid for refugees, José Ayala Lasso of Ecuador, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, met today with members of the Hutu-dominated interim Government. He had met with the rebels on Wednesday and said he had appealed for both sides to guarantee the delivery of relief supplies.

Limited protection for refugees and relief shipments is now being provided by 450 lightly armed United Nations soldiers in Rwanda, a number that Mr. Kabia, the United Na-

tions spokesman, said was insufficient.

On Wednesday, a United Nations relief convoy of two big trucks and a small pickup was attacked twice when it took food to a refugee camp in Runda, a Government-held town 10 miles to the southwest of Kigali. Several bursts from automatic rifles were fired at the trucks about a mile outside Kigali as they headed for the camp, which houses about 20,000 people who fled from Kigali. On the way back, more rifle fire and a single rocket-propelled grenade were aimed at the convoy.

None of the trucks was hit in the attacks, which occurred in an area controlled by government troops.

On Wednesday, the United Nations Security Council began considering a request from Secretary General Bou-

trus Boutros-Ghali for more troops, but a decision is not expected before the end of the week. Mr. Boutros-Ghali said Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania had offered soldiers, which under the plan could use force only in self-defense and would not try to stop the ethnic fighting.

In the meantime, thousands of bodies are washing down the Kagera River, which marks the border with Tanzania. The Lutheran World Federation in Geneva said it had begun clearing the bodies out of the river near where it empties into Lake Victoria in Uganda. It said the operation was requested by Uganda and financed by \$100,000 provided by the United States. It said the operation did not include collection of an estimated 25,000 bodies that already had washed into the lake.



A United Nations relief convoy came under fire near Kigali.

US and Russia sink plans to send 5,500 troops

Leary, United to New York

THE United Nations backed away yesterday from sending a peace-keeping force to Rwanda after the United States and Russia joined forces to scupper a plan to send 5,500 troops.

Fearful that the UN is over-estimating itself at a time of severe budgetary problems, the US is backing a more modest proposal to set up a secure area on the Rwandan border to cope with refugees from the civil war.

The Security Council meets in New York today to discuss four separate proposals for UN intervention in the central African conflict. But one leader said yesterday: "What the US wants, the US gets."

A final decision is unlikely until Monday, but the American and Russian delegations

were both cautious about UN involvement in the struggle between government forces and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front.

America's long-boy approach to the crisis was a severe rebuff to the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who announced on Wednesday that he had ordered troops from Nigeria, Tanzania and Ghana for his 5,500 force.

America, however, holds the key to implementing Mr Boutros-Ghali's plan, since only Washington can provide the logistical back-up to ensure the speedy and safe transport of men and equipment.

Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of the Security Council, is proposing that the UN adopts Mr Boutros-Ghali's plan.

But despite the support of South Africa's new president, Nelson Mandela, sources said the US and Russia would "chip

away at it" when a working group looks at it today.

"Both the Americans and the Russians want to work from the outside in, starting at the border and taking things one step at a time," the sources said.

Under Mr Boutros-Ghali's plan — a watered-down version of two separate proposals tabled by developing countries and New Zealand — the UN force would have been authorised to use force only in self-defence.

Mr Boutros-Ghali said the troops would try to control the airport at Kigali, securing a life-line for supplies. They would also concentrate on protecting civilians and guarding rebel warrens and their deliveries.

But Madeleine Albright, the US envoy to the UN, made it clear that the White House had reservations about the cost and the risk of intervening directly in the civil war.

She told the Security Council

that the UN should consider sending a force to set up a protection zone well away from the centre of the fighting.

As the UN dithered over what to do about Rwanda, US sources said it had become apparent that member states were wary of committing troops to a conflict in which an estimated 200,000 civilians have been slaughtered. They believe that Mr Albright's limited intervention would be easier to organise and that African countries would be more likely to contribute to it.

Officials at the UN said there was no chance of the toughest resolutions being agreed. New Zealand has been pressing for a Bosnia-style resolution, with peacekeeping troops mandated to use force.

Some developing countries wanted to go further, with a resolution promising that "all necessary means" would be used to impose law and order.

'Both parties . . . will fight to the end

A tiny proportion of the injured made it to hospital, writes Mark Hubbard. Once there, if they leave, they will be killed

ROCKET fire shattered several hours of relative calm in the Eswatini capital last night as rebel forces launched attacks and heavy mortars at government troops who were pinned down on three sides of the city.

Small groups of civilians who have survived more than a month of slaughter drifted along streets patrolled by heavily-armed government troops and civilian militiamen. A few market stalls sold bags of salt and dried tomatoes to those who heaved the streets of the largely deserted city from which more than 100,000 people have fled since April 6.

A United Nations flight managed to land at Eswatini international airport carrying a supply of high protein bi-

odules for civilians who have continued to take refuge in a city centre church and the football stadium. A team of doctors, engineers and nurses from international aid agencies were battling yesterday to treat 50 more people, suffering from new mortar and rocket blasts and machete wounds.

Foreign aid workers have been running the laboratory Committee of the Red Cross hospital since April 13 with these Eswatini staff who were not slaughtered in the massacres specifically aimed at MRC staff two weeks ago. Since then, 10 convicts carrying medical supplies have reached Eswatini from the Burundian capital Bujumbura.

No one has been discharged from the MRC hospital since mid-April, when it became

clear that as soon as they left they would be slaughtered within eight of the hospital gates by the very people who first attacked them, or their murderous allies. Those receiving treatment have since been transferred to MRC houses in the compound, which now accommodate just 200 people, a figure that reveals the tiny proportion of those injured in fighting who managed to reach the hospital.

Corvus Ross, head of the hospital's intensive care unit, said: "We have bullets, mortar and machete wounds, but we're only able to treat them if people manage to make it to the hospital. "We can't even do the check-ups to try and find injured people because the people will kill the patients," she added, tapping her agitated fingers on a cardboard box in which an abandoned one-month-old baby lay screaming in pain from mortar blast wounds.

Almost all of the city's injured are now being treated to the end."

either in the MRC hospital or the Eswatini hospital, where there are 200 more. Four hundred victims have been moved to an MRC health centre at Kelpay, 30 miles south of the city.

"This is it. Where are the others? Where are the rest? They have all been massacred," said a UN official as the exhausted remnants of Eswatini hobbled through the corridors on crutches, too frightened to leave the compound and with no question of them returning to the houses where they saw their families slaughtered.

Philippe Gallard, head of the MRC delegation, said: "I'm very, very pessimistic. After spending 10 years in Latin America, then in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war and during Desert Storm, I have never seen anything like this before."

Tears of frustration and horror welled up in his throat. "It's unimaginable," he said. "Both parties are so desperate that they will fight to the end."

THE INDEPENDENT - 13 May 1994

Rwanda fraught with problems for UN

THE PROBLEMS faced by a United Nations force intervening in Rwanda are immense. During the next two days consultations in Washington and New York will try to come to grips with the country's particular difficulties but there is evidence of fundamental misunderstanding of the Rwanda tragedy. Until recently, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, spoke of Tutsis and Hutus killing each other and said a ceasefire could stop the killings.

The massacres are being carried out by gangs of Hutu extremists. The rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), largely Tutsi, has so far maintained its discipline despite the powerful desire for revenge.

The killings are not directly part of the war except in Hutu areas where the minority Tutsis are being slaughtered.

UN proposals released on Tuesday called for the first contingents to secure the airport in Kigali within a week of Security Council approval but the US, which will transport the force, is suggesting that the force be sent to the border area to create "protective zones" for refugees and displaced people.

The first problem is language. There are no Francophone countries offering troops to the proposed 5,500-strong force. It is hard to see how English-speakers could operate in Francophone Rwanda.

The second problem is that nei-

RICHARD DOWDEN
Africa Editor

ther the hardline Hutu interim government nor the largely Tutsi RPF rebel force has given its full backing to the UN force. An RPF spokesman in New York said the force would be accepted "as long as it was not an intervention force but a humanitarian effort".

In Kigali, the government is equally untrusting of the UN. Some there believe that UN troops shot down President Juvénal Habyarimana's plane. Joseph Nzirorera, secretary-general of the ruling Mouvement Republicain National pour le Développement, said this

week on the hardline Hutu radio that such a force was only acceptable if neutral. He said UN troops there now turned toward the RPF.

The UN does turn a blind eye to RPF breaches of pledges. There is an 80-strong UN contingent operating along the Rwanda-Uganda border at the request of the Ugandan government to prove that Kampala is not supplying weapons to the RPF. But this force is not allowed to patrol the main crossing point between Uganda and the RPF area at Kagitumba. There is a steady flow of fresh arms and ammunition to the RPF. Without agreement of the two main players there is no question of a peace-keeping force patrolling an agreed ceasefire.

The exact mandate of the UN force will be crucial. The previous force was mandated only to use its weapons in self-defence, and the troops were forced to watch as women and children were butchered in cold blood. This would be the worst of all worlds, if a force was sent in but was then found to be powerless to stop the killings.

■ NEW YORK — The US suggestion of a much reduced effort is typical of its minimalist approach to peace-keeping and the role the UN should be playing in future regional conflicts, writes Peter Frimble. The UN Secretary-General is seeking a compromise that would provide a US airlift of at least some reinforcements into Kigali.

War and neglect spell disaster for 22m

Ian Black
Diplomatic Editor

UP TO three million Rwandans have been killed, displaced or need emergency international aid as a result of the civil war, a leading United Nations humanitarian official said yesterday.

Peter Hansen, under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, gave details of the grim statistics in London as the Security Council in New York was arguing about sending a UN force to the central African country.

According to the latest information from the capital Kigali, the most urgent need is for water purification tablets because of the large number of decomposing corpses. Basic drugs are in short supply and malaria and diarrhoea rampant. Several cases of cholera have been reported.

But Mr Hansen warned that despite the enormity of the problems facing Rwanda — because of the savagery and scale of the killing and the unprecedented speed of the refugee exodus to Tanzania — emergencies were looming all over sub-Saharan Africa.

At a conservative estimate, 22 million people in the region were directly at risk because of a deadly combination of drought, famine, war and international neglect.

"You're looking at a complex of interwoven crises that will take a more determined effort by the international community than has been seen so far," he said.

He painted a devastating picture of brutality and deprivation in the besieged Angolan town of Cuito, where refugees grow corn between the graves of their dead; of an entire generation reared in war; of limbs shattered by mines; and of a society torn apart by conflict.

Mr Hansen said his humanitarian affairs department, set up in 1992 to cope with the grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, needed better co-ordination with the political processes of the Security Council and the peacekeeping department in New York.

His predecessor, Jan Eliasson, resigned after a series of disputes with the secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Mr Hansen has a reputation

as a quiet, effective administrator. "You have to work in a collegiate way," he said. "It's not for under-secretaries-general to run around with their own agenda."

Despite the withdrawal of the UN force in Rwanda, the organisation had functioned well, he argued. Speedy information had been gained from having previously agreed access to French and Belgian military communications and this had enabled a swift response.

He had been to Kigali 10 days after the crisis began and a UN Rwanda Emergency Office (Unreo) was operating in Nairobi in collaboration with Unicef, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme and other international agencies.

"We're dealing with a complicated world and we don't solve anything by coming up with simplistic plans," Mr Hansen said. "We need to make our co-ordination services indispensable for those working in the field."

Calls for the establishment of a UN co-ordinating department — after the creation of the safe havens for Iraqi Kurds — had emphasised the need for early warning and a quick reaction to humanitarian crises.

In Rwanda, some pre-positioning of emergency food stocks had been possible.

Careful planning for delivery of relief supplies was vital. "It is important that you don't just rush in with trucks and start unloading."

"In a situation like Rwanda there is a real risk when you get into the killing frenzy that these trucks will act as the fly paper and the militia will start dealing with the beneficiaries with their machetes."

IPS TERRAVIVA (NEW YORK) - 13 May 1994

U.S. DIFFERS WITH THIRD WORLD ON RWANDA PEACEKEEPING

by Farhan Haq

UNITED NATIONS, May 12 (IPS) - Efforts to re-deploy U.N. peacekeepers to Rwanda hit a snag Thursday as the United States and other U.N. Security Council members differed sharply on what form a new peacekeeping mission will take. On one side is a coalition including the Non-Aligned Caucus — Djibouti, Nigeria, and Pakistan, as well as Rwanda itself — and New Zealand, who seek an expansion of the existing U.N. force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to 5,500 troops. That group supports a draft U.N. resolution, largely in agreement with a plan worked out by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to expand UNAMIR's mandate to protect Rwandese refugees and humanitarian aid convoys.

On the other side is the United States, which only a month ago pushed unsuccessfully for UNAMIR's complete withdrawal from the war-racked nation and now envisions the creation of a U.N.-patrolled "protective zone" along Rwanda's border. The U.S. plan seeks setting up such a zone in areas where "refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger," to protect them from the ongoing civil war and assist in their repatriation. Possibly most importantly in Washington's eyes, according to a U.S. communique on the topic, is the point that "this mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed."

Council President Ibrahim Gambari of Nigeria asserted that the two plans could be merged into one approach so that the Council could vote on it as early as Friday. But observers here openly doubted whether the different approaches could be resolved so quickly.

2

with many predicting a vote later next week. At the heart of the dispute is Washington's growing doubt that the United Nations is capable of addressing ongoing warfare — such as that which occurred last year in Somalia — simply by dispatching more troops under a forceful mandate. U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright argued Wednesday, "Neither the United Nations nor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have demonstrated a capability to mount large-scale peace enforcement missions with success."

The U.S. mission, in its Wednesday communique, also said that it would support a "viable" mission for a protective zone and might also contribute funds if African nations decide on their own regional peacekeepers. But it added, "we would have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission." Washington also has raised worries that Rwanda's warring parties — the remnants of a right-wing Hutu majority government and the rebel, multi-ethnic Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) — would agree to the larger mission backed by the non-aligned members. Since the death last October of 18 U.S. soldiers working with the troubled U.N. mission in Somalia, Washington has been notably gun-shy about peace enforcement in countries where conflicts still rage — a position which increasingly pits it at odds with Third World nations.

The non-aligned draft, in addition to seeking for an expanded UNAMIR to be present in the capital, Kigali, and other embattled cities, also

calls for an arms embargo on Rwanda and "possible options for international prosecution of persons responsible for genocide" and other human rights violations. African and other U.N. member states have pushed for stronger action to address Rwanda's resurgent war ever since the Security Council cut UNAMIR's troop strength from 2,500 to just 270 three weeks ago as fighting worsened. U.N. soldiers largely remained in barracks as Hutu extremist groups went on a rampage following the Apr 6 death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, sparking renewed fighting with the RPF in which some 200,000 people have been killed. Human rights groups charge that the nation's Tutsi minority has been especially targeted for attacks.

At the same time that the Council continued to debate how to deal with the atrocities in Rwanda, two leaders of the self-appointed Hutu government arrived here to meet with African delegations. The men, Jerome Bicomumpaka and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, were named by Amnesty International as key figures in the anti-Tutsi campaign. Although U.N. spokesman Joe Sills said the two men were not expected to meet with U.N. officials, diplomats at the African Caucus met with them Thursday. One African delegate, speaking on condition of anonymity, expressed dismay that individuals suspected of involvement in genocide could hold audience with the African Caucus. But he added, "Has anyone suggested Rwanda is not a member of the African Caucus or that there is no government in Rwanda? No. So we cannot bar (Bicomumpaka and Barayagwiza) from appearing." Claude Dusaidi, the RPF representative to the United Nations, countered that if the United Nations were to try Rwandans for war crimes over the past month, "these men would be arrested." ■

MAY-13-1994 08:56 FROM NEWS DISTRIBUTION/CSSG

TO

BRIIL P.02/24

13 May 1994, Bulletin #1

- 2 -

Sarajevo - A UN military observer killed at the edge of the Sarajevo exclusion zone was a Malaysian, UNPROFOR spokesman Eric Chaperon said Friday, adding that the shell which hit his vehicle was "not an accident." Another UN observer injured in the same incident Thursday was an Egyptian but his life was not in danger, Major Chaperon said. (AFP)

MIDDLE EAST

Gaza City - The Palestinian police were in control of the southern Gaza Strip on Friday as about 300 more reinforcements arrived and the Israelis pulled out of their last bastion. "Everything south of the river is in the hands of the Palestinian police," a senior Israeli military official said. Israeli forces, however, remain in charge of security of the 4,000 settlers, most of whom live in the south of Gaza.

Israeli security forces handed over security installations at Khan Yunes in the night, the army spokesman said. Before dawn the army handed over the military administration, border police and military command buildings in Khan Yunes to 30 policemen who had just entered the Strip from Egypt. The army said there was a small ceremony and the local commander, whose name was not revealed, wished the Palestinians "every success." Meanwhile, in Jericho the Israelis handed over five buildings to 60 Palestinian officers in the early hours of Friday as a small crowd of residents who had stayed up all night cheered on. (AFP, REUTERS)

Vienna - Israeli parliamentarians and PLO officials began informal talks on Friday on the final status of Israeli-occupied territories after interim Palestinian self-rule, Austrian officials said. The two-day "private" meeting in Vienna sponsored by the Bruno Kreisky Forum is being held with the knowledge of top Israeli and PLO officials, Palestinian sources said on Thursday. (REUTERS, AFP)

Barlattan - A roadside bomb ripped through an Israeli-backed militia patrol in south Lebanon Friday, killing one militiaman and wounding two, security sources said. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack against the South Lebanon Army militia patrol near the village of Kfar Bounah in territory under Israeli occupation. (REUTERS, AFP)

RWANDA

Brussels - Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes appealed to the US on Friday to play a more active role in trying to resolve the bloody war in Rwanda. He said in a

(MORE)

MAY-13-1994 08:57 FROM NEWS DISTRIBUTION/CSG

TO

BARIL P.03/94

13 May 1994, Bulletin #1

- 3 -

radio interview that the UN had not succeeded in resolving the Rwandan conflict and that France and Belgium were not seen as neutral in the ex-Belgian protectorate. He said that the US was in the best position to try to broker a ceasefire between rebels of the RPF and forces of the interim government in Rwanda. (REUTERS)

Nairobi - At least 88 Rwandan students were massacred in the government-held southern town of Gikongoro and seven other people were hacked to death with machetes in Kigali, Abdul Kabie, executive director of UNAMIR, said Friday. "We do not know the ethnic composition of the victims, but this is an area controlled by government forces," he said from Kigali, where fighting continued unabated between rebel and government forces Friday. He said UNAMIR had also received reports that seven people were hacked to death by machete-wielding militia men outside the ICRC building in Kigali on Thursday. (REUTERS, AFP)

YEMEN

Cairo - An Arab League mission sent to Yemen to try to arrange a ceasefire met government officials in the capital Sanaa Friday, a league official said in Cairo. The mission, led by assistant secretary-general Mohamed Said al-Bereqdar, was later meeting President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the official told reporters. (REUTERS, AFP)

CAMBODIA

Canberra - Australia is seriously considering a request by Cambodia for arms and training to help it counter the recent surge in Khmer Rouge guerrilla attacks, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said on Friday. A spokeswoman for Evans said that Cambodia had also appealed to the US, France and several ASEAN countries. Evans said such a request was legitimate under the Cambodian peace accords signed in October 1991. (REUTERS, AFP)

OTHER NEWS

Africa

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on Friday blamed rebel leader John Garang and "foreign intervention" for the country's lingering civil war, and said Garang never kept promises made during peace talks. Bashir was addressing reporters here ahead of a new round of talks to open Monday in Nairobi. (AFP - Nairobi)

(MORE)

13 May 1994, Bulletin #2

- 2 -

Cairo - Egypt's Foreign Minister Amr Mousa will meet US Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Saturday in Geneva to discuss the Middle East peace process, sources at the foreign ministry said. Their talks would focus on the Israeli-Syrian track of the peace talks. Christopher, in Geneva to attend a conference on Bosnia, is to travel Sunday to Syria and the next day on to Israel, on a peace shuttle. Mousa, currently in London, was also to meet Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic in Geneva. (AFP)

RWANDA

Geneva - The UN said on Friday that it hoped to hold an emergency human rights session on the massacres in Rwanda. Dozens of mutilated bodies continue to float each hour down the Kagera river dividing Rwanda and Tanzania, according to the UNHCR. Top officials said that they hoped a special session of the UN Human Rights Commission could take place in Geneva from 23-24 May to launch an investigation into the massive violence. Meanwhile, a spokesman said the UNHCR was registering 1,500 refugees a day from Rwanda at its makashit camp in Ngara, in northwestern Tanzania, now crammed with more than 250,000 refugees. About 500 people were turning up daily further north at Karagwe. (REUTERS)

Kwana, Tanzania - Giant US "Starlifter" planes swooped into a remote airfield on the shores of Lake Victoria on Friday, bringing relief to thousands of Rwandan refugees in the first American military venture in Africa since the ill-fated Somalia operation.

The UN's WFP said on Friday 900,000 people were relying on relief handouts in Burundi as a result of the violence in Rwanda. (REUTERS)

SOUTH AFRICA

Pretoria - South Africa's new national defence force said on Friday that any decision about its participation in foreign peacekeeping in Rwanda or elsewhere was political. A South African National Defence Force statement said that the new constitution made provision for South African peacekeeping operations but added "involvement beyond the borders of South Africa is ... a political decision." Force spokesman Colonel John Rolt said there had been a number of queries from the press about possible South African participation in foreign peacekeeping operations, specifically in Rwanda. (REUTERS)

(MORE)

13 May 1994, Bulletin #3

- 2 -

noting "the threat of certain countries to withdraw their peacekeeping contingents."
(AFP)

RWANDA

Paris - The priority of the UN in war-ravaged Rwanda is to reach a ceasefire between rebels and government soldiers before undertaking any political negotiations, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, the UN special representative to Rwanda, said following a meeting with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. (AFP)

SOUTH AFRICA

Pretoria - Winnie Mandela, estranged wife of South Africa's new president, did not turn up Friday to be sworn in as deputy minister of arts, culture, science and technology in his new government, officials said. They said she missed the ceremony due to "an urgent meeting in Pondoland" in Transkei. The military ruler of the former black homeland of Transkei, Bantu Holomisa, was also absent from the ceremony at which five of the seven deputy ministers in the ANC-dominated national unity government were sworn in. (REUTERS)

KOREAN PENINSULA

Washington - The United States said Friday it held another round of working-level talks with North Korea after Pyongyang agreed to let international monitors resume inspections of its nuclear facilities. State Department spokesman David Johnson said the talks took place Thursday in New York. A major topic of the discussions concerned a date for a third round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea but Johnson refused to discuss it. (REUTERS)

YEMEN

Aden - Southern Yemeni forces reported a 10th day of fighting with northern civil war foes as Arab League officials tried to broker a cease-fire in the capital Sanaa. A southern military statement said that the south was countering northern attacks in the mountainous Dhalea region which lies on a key road to the southern bastion of Aden. A northern military spokesman said on Thursday that northern forces had captured the province and city of Dhalea, 50 miles north of Aden. Fighting was also raging at Anad, 37 miles north of Aden, and in Abyan province, east of the southern port, he added. (REUTERS)

TOTAL P.02

CRN 176
MIR 955

- 1 -

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dmb
A/ma
14/5/94

1/2

UNAMIR

194 MAY 13 13 35

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 13 MAY 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION IN RWANDA

REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE CRN 247 OF 12 MAY 94

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE REFERENCE AND OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. THESE COMMENTS ARE FOR THE PARAGRAPHS INDICATED.

- A. PARA 4. ADD AT LAST LINE, AFTER ...CEASE FIRE IS ACHIEVED "DUE TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION".
- B. PARA 9. THE RPF HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO THESE PRINCIPLES.
- C. PARA 12. RECOMMEND PARA TO READ AS FOLLOWS, WITH CHANGES UNDERLINED. UNAMIR II WILL PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN THEIR PROGRAMS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. UNAMIR II WOULD ESTABLISH ACCESS AREAS WHERE DISPLACED AND OTHER AFFECTED PERSONS ARE CONCENTRATED AND ASSURE THEIR PROTECTION. SUCH PROTECTED SITES MAY INCLUDE AREAS INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH NEIGHBORING STATES WHERE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS ARE ALREADY OR WHERE THEY COULD BE CONCENTRATED. ALL PROTECTED SITES ...
- D. PARA 14. IN THE SECOND TO LAST LINE, CHANGE THE LAST WORD TO READ "SITES" VICE "ZONES".
- E. PARA 15. IN THE SECOND TO LAST LINE, CHANGE ...THREATEN THE PROTECTED SITES...
- F. PARA 21. ...THE TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS WOULD BE DEPLOYED PRINCIPALLY TO INITIATE AND REINFORCE OPERATIONS NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN CERTAIN SPECIFIC SECTIONS DUE TO LACK OF TROOPS.
- G. ...WHILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS PUT IN PLACE BY THE UNITED NATIONS. SHOULD THIS INHERENT SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE

MA
Put on appropriate
file. I feel we must
open a fresh file for
this new force UNAMIR
II

JL
14/5
DFC/LWS

UNITS NOT BE POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY THE INFANTRY UNITS, THEIR SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE CONTRIBUTING NATION AND IMMEDIATE ACQUISITION MUST BE DONE THROUGH A GENEROUS THIRD PARTY. THE CONCEPT...

H. PARA 24. ...IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT MEMBER STATES AGREE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY THE TROOPS, BUT JUST AS CRITICALLY, THE ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, WEAPONS, RADIOS AND LOGISTIC ASSETS FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY. A FORMAL COMMITMENT BY A DONOR NATION TO MEET THESE CRITICAL STORES SHOULD THEY NOT BE AVAILABLE BY A TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY BE IMPLEMENTED/IDENTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT REQUIRED FOR THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION.

I. PARA 25. LAST LINE, CHANGE THE WORD "SITES" FOR "UNITS".

J. PARA 28. TO THIS END...CALL ON THE PARTIES TO ENTER INTO DETAILED CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNAMIR II FORCE COMMANDER IMMEDIATELY. IT IS EVIDENT...SUPPLIES FOR ALL CONCERNED, BE THEY THE RECIPIENTS, THE DISTRIBUTORS AND THE MISSION MEMBER.

2. I FOUND THIS TO BE AN EXCELLENT DOCUMENT AND I FEEL CONFIDENT TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION WITH IT. HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THE SIXTH BATTALION MUST BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO GIVE THE FORCE THE DEPTH IT NEEDS FOR A DEDICATED QUICK REACTION FORCE TO HANDLE THE VOLATILE/UNEXPECTED THAT HAS CONTINUED TO BE NOTED IN THIS COUNTRY.

3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

OUT GOING CABLE

TO: *Booth* ANNAN, UN NEW YORK
FROM: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 11 MAY 1994
NUMBER:

NON-PAPER ON POSSIBLE UNAMIR FUTURE MANDATE

OBSERVATION

1. WHILST CONSIDERING THE LATEST WRITE-UP ON THE NON-PAPER FOR RWANDA, A NUMBER OF POINTS CAME UP. SPECIFICALLY ARE THE FOLLOWING WHICH ARE RELATED TO THE ASSUMPTIONS AT PARAGRAPH SIX.

2. THE LAST TWO SENTENCES IN PARAGRAPH ONE UNDER THE HEADING RWANDA SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT THE FIRST STEP IN RESTORING PEACE IS TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND HOPE TO ACHIEVE CEASE-FIRE IN THE PROCESS. AS MUCH AS THE WHOLE WORLD IS TOUCHED AND MOVED BY THE SUFFERINGS OF THE RWANDESE PEOPLE, THERE IS NO WAY A CEASE-FIRE CAN BE RELEGATED TO A SECOND POSITION. FROM WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED SO FAR IN RWANDA, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHEN THE FIGHTING IS CONTINUING. HELP WILL GET TO THE NEEDY PEOPLE TOO LATE. THEY WOULD HAVE DIED. THOSE LAST TWO SENTENCES SHOULD THEREFORE BE COMBINED TO READ "IN ORDER TO BRING THE PARTIES BACK TO THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS, ALL EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO OBTAIN A CEASE FIRE FROM BOTH PARTIES WHICH WILL ESTABLISH A STABLE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COUNTRY TO ALLOW A POSITIVE PURSUANCE OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME"

PARA 6b. THE ASSUMPTION THAT AT THE TIME OF DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR A AN AGREED CEASE FIRE WOULD NOT BE IN PLACE DOES SEEM TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE FACT THAT UNAMIR HAS ACCEPTED DE FACTO THE HARDENED POSITION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS AND AS SUCH HAS AGREED THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE FIGHTING BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE MOVING THROUGH THE FIRE AS WE ARE DOING PRESENTLY TO CHANNEL THE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE NEEDY PEOPLE. THIS POSITION IS OF COURSE NOT CORRECT. THE PARAGRAPH SHOULD THEREFORE CHANGE TO READ "A CEASE FIRE WILL CONTINUE TO BE

PURSUED AS THE FORCE IS BEING PUT IN PLACE. INDEED THE CEASE FIRE WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMMENSURABLY TO AN EFFECTIVE AND SECURE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RELIEF ITEMS".

PARA 6e. THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH ALSO NEEDS A LITTLE ADDITION AT THE END. IT SHOULD READ KIGALI AIRPORT WHICH CRITICAL TO THE DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE MISSION, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS A "NEUTRAL ZONE" UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILD-UP OF THE FORCE.

PARA 6g. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE A PERIOD OF FOUR MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE AS CONNECTED WITH THE CEASE-FIRE. THE BELLIGERENT ARE LIKELY TO INTERPRET THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH AS A LICENSE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING FOR THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS SINCE THEY KNOW THAT WHETHER THEY STOP HOSTILITIES OR NOT THE FORCE WILL CONTINUE OPERATING UNDER THE PRECARIOUS CONDITIONS THAT EXIST WITH FIGHTING. PARA 6G SHOULD THEREFORE READ "THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL EXPECT AND INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AT THE LATEST FOLLOWING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE IN ORDER TO ENABLE IT TO FULLY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE WITH SUCCESS."

NEWS REPORTS BY DIAT'L RADI

RAD STATION = RTLN.

①

J-T. G (1) : 0947H30 Day 94

RTLN aired a communiqué of the 'National Committee of INTERAITE' in French and KINYARWANDA at 17H30 signed by the National President and other officials:

Some important points of the communiqué:

1. Support the Government
 2. Based on the directive of the 24th APR and the meeting with the Chief of STAFF on April 30, 1994, calls on the members to strictly observe the following guidelines:
 - a. help the authorities to eradicate all acts of crimes and vandalism
 - b. The population is called upon to facilitate UNAMIR its humanitarian mission and the other international agencies ICRC - Rwandese Red Cross - HCR alike.
- The Interamites acknowledge the unprecedented neutrality of UNAMIR.




② Dr Kabisa

we are infiltrating them. Please speak and return this by hand

to
IC
9/5

Number 4 Sy' Gp ADR



③ Returned
as requested.
BWA
14/5

NEWS REPORTS BY NAT'L RADIO

on Rwanda

Radio ~~Station~~ : Radio Rwanda

J-T-G : 091315 MAY 90

②
D. Kabia
There are many participants. Please return.

1 Despite the cease-fire the military situation continues to worsen:

- Shelling of the Center town where the atmosphere remains tense

- Fightings in the BUGESERA (South East) between RPF and

RPF elements attacking from GASHORU.

- Heavy fightings in MASAKA (South East) and GASHANGA

2- RPF accused of having shelled the refugee camp of RUHINGO - 05 dead, 10 wounded

3- TANZANIAN Commander-in-chief warns the two parties not to destroy the RUSOMU bridge or violate the integrity of the Tanzanian territory. Any of these violations will be considered as a declaration of WAR.

The Commander-in-chief met with high RPF officials and Burundi's authorities.

4- The KENYA's President ruled out any participation of troops of his country to an African Force for Rwanda.

5- THE Rwanda's Interim President is scheduled to leave today to attend the Investiture ceremony in South Africa.

6- In a Communiqué released today, the CND (Rwandese Parliament) called for the consultation of the two parties on the composition and mission of a future UN force.

7. In a statement released today the National Interahamwe Committee acknowledge the neutrality of UNAMIR and call on the population to assist UNAMIR in its humanitarian actions, ICAC and HCR alike.

Annulment of G. Ash. fr.

③
Referring
as requested
4/9/90

This is a
serious
concern



file.

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE OPERATION IN RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

FROM:

William
FC

TO:

DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATE:

8 MAY 94

SUBJECT:

MEMO FROM MR KOFI A. ANNAN, SECRETARY-general
FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, NY, 6 MAY 94

*Seen
11/5
JFC/WS*

-
1. Find attached a self explanatory Memo which deals with the methods we must deal and conduct ourselves with members of the press.
 2. As you can see, UNNY and more specifically the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, Mr Annan is concerned with that aspect of the Mission.
 3. As I have stated numerous times, the world, through the news media, is watching us now. Your cooperation is important and expected.
 4. Please ensure that the guidelines provided in the Ref in addition to my own are strictly adhered to. For additional information do not hesitate to contact Maj Plante.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

External

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OC TUN Coy
Meridian Hotel, Comdt
HQ Camp Comdt
Chief RGF LO, Mille Collines Hotel

Internal

DFC/COS
COO
CMO
HAC
C Log O
CMPO
UNAMIR Mil Spokesperson and Press Coord (Maj Plante).

Information

External

Executive Director to SRSG
CAO

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO:
A:

Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire
Force Commander, UNAMIR

DATE: 6 May 1994

REFERENCE: _____

THROUGH:
S/C DE

FROM:
DE:

Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations

SUBJECT:
OBJET:

Press relations

1. You urgently requested guidance on how to deal with the press. There are no established guidelines, despite efforts by this department to get guidelines approved.

2. In the absence of specific guidelines, press policy in the field should be defined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

3. The guiding principles of such policy should be:

- a) The mission and the UN itself are always well-served when the press and the public have a full and accurate understanding of what we are doing and trying to do;
- b) Openness and transparency are desirable so long as security and the objectives of the mission are not compromised;
- c) While information must sometimes be withheld for security reasons, or to protect delicate diplomatic initiatives, one must never lie or attempt to mislead.

4. Your work in Rwanda is admired here. You and your people are taking considerable risks to protect human lives to the extent that you can. Many in the media are saying that the UN is abandoning Rwanda; your brave stand tells a different story. That story should get out to the world media.

5. In my view therefore, you should, to the extent possible, make time for the media to describe your daily actions while avoiding political questions. You might identify those who are authorized to speak to the press, asking all those designated to try to stick to the facts as far as possible, leaving interpretation to the Chief of Mission.

6. Good luck.

cc: Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh
Alvaro de Soto

UNAMIR

UNAMIR *Set OK.**KMF 702* 94 MAY -8 21

OUTGOING FASCIMILE

UNAMIR

94 MAY -8 16 15

TO: LINO DODILI UNAMIR/NAIROBI KENYA	FROM: LT-COL PK NYAAKU SLOGO/UNAMIR/KIGALI
PREFIX NO <i>MISC 512</i>	DATE: 08 MAY 1994
ATTN:	PHONE: 3-3091
FAX NO: 254-622508 (CAO)	FAX NO 3-3090
INFO: PHILIP MITNICK	
INFO: FAX NO:	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, <i>DFC</i> , CAO, MO (BYUBAT)	
SUBJECT: PREVIOUSLY REQUISITIONED MEDICAL SUPPLIES	
NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES: 2	

REFERENCE:

A. MIR/MISC-209 DATED 6 MAY 1994.

1. PURCHASE ORDERED REVIEWED BY MEDICAL OFFICER OF BYUBAT AND HE INDICATES THAT EXCEPT FOR ITEMS 4, 5, 6 AND 12, THE REST OF THE ITEMS ARE REQUIRED.

2. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND ALSO A LIST OF OTHER MEDICAL SUPPLIES REQUIRED FOR THE MISSION.

3. IT WILL BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED IF THEY ARE PROCURED ASP AND DESPATCHED TO UNAMIR KIGALI.

4. BEST REGARDS.

①
②
MA
SRL 8
11/5
MA
③
Seen
T84 11/5
MA

SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR UNAMIR

1.	SUTURES - PLAIN AND CHROMIC CAGUT, SILK	- 10 DOZENS EA.
2.	PETHIDINE	- 1,000.
3.	LIDOCAINE/XYLOCAINE WITH ADREMALINE	- 200.
4.	BANDAGES (4", 3", 2")	- 240 ROLLS EA.
5.	HALFAN	- 6,000.
6.	LINIMENT	- 150 BOXES.
7.	TETANOL	- 1000.
8.	CONDOMS	- 15,000.
9.	SPLINT (UPPER&LOWER LIMBS)	- 20 EA.
10.	STRETCHERS	- 6.
11.	DULCOLAX	- 2,000.
12.	VENTOLIN INHALER	- 20.
13.	CAP INDOCID	- 5,000.
14.	SOFRADEX EYE OINTMENT OR ANY ANTIBIOTIC AND STERIOD EYE OINTMENT	- 50 TUBES.
15.	CHLORAMPHENICOL EYE OINTMENT	- 50 TUBES.
16.	HYDROCORTISONE	- 600.
17.	TABS MEPHAQUINE	- 1,200.
18.	PLASTER.	- 30 ROLLS.
19.	GAUZE	- 30 ROLLS.
20.	ACTINA SEPTIC TANK ACTIVATOR	- 20 LTRS.
21.	LYSOL	- 20 LTRS.
22.	GENTIAN VIOLET	- 5 LTRS.
23.	IODINE	- 20 LTRS.
24.	MOSQUITOE SPRAY	- 40 DOZENS.
25.	INSECT REPELLANT	- 40 DOZENS.
26.	NASAL DROPS	- 200.
27.	MOSQUITOE NET	- 40 DOZENS.

Is there?
any woman?
left in Kigali?

NOTES/COMMENTS TO
NON-PAPER ON RWANDA
08 MAY 94

1. Herewith are comments on the reference "Non-Document". The "Non-paper" is truly excellent and a most perspicacious presentation of the situation and the needs that will hopefully solve the problem.

2. FC has met on three occasions with RPF Chairman of High Command (Maj Gen P Kagame) and some of the political staffs and on four occasions with the leadership of the RGF (The Chiefs of Staff Army, at least twice, Gendarmerie, Minister of Defence and Minister of Works and Social Affairs who is responsible for Humanitarian dossiers). Their responses vary:

a. RPF. Consistent about force not having an intervention task, nor be so strong as to be able to have such a mandate thrust upon it. In agreement with the Humanitarian security tasks although convinced we are at least three weeks too late. Very specific in stating that our forces must not place themselves in any situation that may obstruct the operational and tactical aims of the RPF, unless we are involved in cease fire mode.

b. RGF. The COS of the Army has noted the overall concept and deployment plan but does not seem to have fully grasped the details of it all. He stated however that no force should come in to impose a cease fire nor to divide the country in two. The option of Humanitarian security assistance tasks behind the lines seemed reasonable to him as he did not have the forces to do it himself unless there was a cease fire. Both ministers were concerned that the Security Council might create a mandate and a force without full consultation/support from the Rwandese. They both, although the meetings were held separately on different days did not feel that such strong security measures were needed as the situation really calmed down, that Kigali was not the reflection of the whole country, that pacification of the militia and self-defence units was on its way. We discussed the fact that their credibility in this area was weak and that even recent incidents did not fully support the statement. The Minister of Social Affairs stressed that they needed aid now and that the troops deployment and new mandate approval process in New York should not, must not slow down nor prevent the immediate distribution of aid.

c. UNAMIR must continue particularly on the RGF side, to sell the mandate and force structure to them, and they to their public, as fast as possible so as to avoid confrontation and serious implementation complications. FC has meetings set up for tomorrow 09 May 94 with COS Army and Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior.

3. The following are specific comments to the "Non- paper":

a. Para 1. We suggest that the last sentence should read "The First Step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. This hopefully will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a cease fire.

b. Para 2. Paragraph to now read: " At present, the situation in Rwanda has not improved to any significant extent with some massacres still being reported indirectly slaughter with the displacement of nearly 2 million civilians as well as combat between Rwandese Government Forces RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)..Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate although in lesser numbers than at the outbreak of the conflict, killing and ...

c. Para 3 Line 5. It states: "their safety assured on an urgent basis". The word assured is too strong for the task in question. We cannot assure the safety of about 2 million displaced persons. The words "significantly enhanced" would be more appropriate unless we wish to speak of those minorities who are held up in churches etc and are at risk of being massacred, then we can say "assured" as it will be one of our primary tasks anyway.

d. Para 4. Line 1. The word "support" does not reflect the true nature of the mission. The change should read "assist in the provision of security and support to the displaced".....and to "cooperate with the Humanitarian Agencies in the provision of aid".

e. Para 5. b. To read: an agreed cease fire will, "most likely" not...

f. Para 5. d. To read the need to "assist in stabilizing the security situation" in Rwanda.....

g. Para 5. e. The threat of imposing Kigali Airport as a neutral zone in the second part of the phase is very much out of character with the rest of the document. The sub-para should read: the mission "will be established... parties. Should consent not be given by both parties the force will consider possible alternate airheads such as Goma Zaire or

Entebbe Uganda".

h. Para 6. Line 1 Should read: would be "to assist in the provision of support".

j. Para 6. b. Line 5 Should read: will be "patrolled and monitored by UNAMIRA in conjunction with authorized security forces".

k. Para 8. d. Line 1 Should read: approx "219 which includes" a supporting ...

l. Para 8. f. Should read: group of "320" officers.

m. Para 9. Phase 2. Last sentence should read: "be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in surrounding Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where we have the highest concentration of displaced persons".

n. Para 9. Phase 3. Should add: The rest of the support battalion will establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two new battalions will be deployed principally in the Western and Northern portions of the country where in the first case significant security / extremist pockets could spontaneously come back to life and cause serious problems and in the latter case where intensive de-mining and of refugees moving back into Rwanda after over 30 years may be a cause of serious friction due to a lack of living space.

o. Para 11. Line 4. Please add "GABIRO".

p. Para 12 Line 5. Please change Area Commanders to "Sector Commanders".

q. Para 12. Last phase. Please eliminate this phrase as the rear link with UN HQ is already established by our civilian communications branch.

r. Para 15. You may wish to amend this para according to the points raised in para 2 of this cable.

4. May I say once again that FC can achieve the aim with the mandate and the force structure described in this non-paper if, and only if, the force made at his disposal will demonstrate the desire the determination and the courage to implement the clear rules of engagement that have been proposed for these tasks.

5. Lastly the proposed name of the Mission "UNAMIR-A" seems rather cumbersome. Simply UNAMIRA is phonetically most acceptable in the local parlance, and it would stand for "United Nations



UNAMIR - MINUAR

2000.1/CMPO/WEL

7 May 1994

See Distribution

UNAMIR MAIL SERVICE

1. UNAMIR personnel have been granted the use of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) mail and pouch facilities and/or the Kenya Post Office, located within the UN compound (Gigiri), next to Kenya Commercial Bank.

2. The following addresses are applicable as the case may be:

Via Kenya Post Office

Name of Staff Member
(Branch, Section, Unit)
UNAMIR
c/o UNEP
P. O. Box 30552
NAIROBI
Kenya

Via New York

Name of Staff Member
(Branch, Section, Unit)
UNAMIR
c/o UNEP, Nairobi
Grand Central Station
P.O. Box 5745
NEW YORK, NY 10017

3. All personnel are advised that only the following may be sent in the diplomatic pouch:

- a. Official correspondence, documents and printed matter, of which individual packages must not exceed 16 kg or 35 lbs.
- b. Personal letters, post cards, newspapers and films.
- c. Urgently needed health supplies, including medicines, spectacles and hearing aids prescribed by a physician for the use of UN staff members, when such items are not available locally and are requested in reasonable quantities.

4. Outgoing pouches to New York close on Wednesdays and Fridays at 1200 hrs. Incoming pouches are normally received on Wednesdays.

5. Arrangements are being made to procure postage stamps from Kenya for sale to personnel. Meanwhile the possibility of restoring the previous mail system in operation for contingents is being explored. The outcome will be communicated when arrangements have been finalised.

Handwritten:
A-DE
N/A for our use
10/5

6. In the mean time, all personal mail ready to be despatched can be delivered to the office of the DCMPO by 1900 hours daily. The DCMPO will ensure the mail is delivered on time to the airport for despatch on the daily UN flight.

M. Bussiere
M BUSSIERE
Maj
CMPO

Distribution:

Action:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Byubat HQ
Tun PL (+) HQ

Information:

CAO

Internal:

Ops Sec MA to FC
Log Sec MA to DFC/COS
Plans Sec
HA Cell

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
AMAHORO

6 May 94

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: ROAD MOVEMENT AT NIGHT IN THE CITY

1. It has been noticed of late that UNAMIR vehicles travelling from the East to the North of the city (specifically from Force HQ direction to Hotel Meridien/King Faisal Hospital) through the KIMIHIRURA Round About have been fired upon, from somewhere in the Round About after last light.
2. It will be recalled that the ADC to the FC was a victim of this in the evening of 30 Apr 94. Other vehicles have suffered similar sates in the recent past.
3. In reply to a protest letter sent to the RGF HQ, the RGF has stated that they cannot guarantee the safety of UNAMIR personnel in the areas of the no mans land stretches on the roads.
4. In view of this situation and the inherent dangers, all are requested to avoid movements on the road CND Complex to Meridien Hotel/King Faisal Hospital. No road movement should be undertaken between last light and first light unless absolutely necessary especially on the stretch from the CND Complex to Meridien/King Faisal Hospital.
5. Please bring this to the notice of all personnel under command for compliance.



MOEEN UDDIN AHMED
Colonel
For Force Commander


Distribution:
External:
Action:

MILOB GP HQ
BYUBAT
Tun Pl (+)
Force Sp Coy

Internal:

Ops Branch
Humanitarian Assistance Cell
Mil Pers Sec
Plans
SRSG
CAO
FC
[REDACTED]

MA/ADC/DVR
I have already cautioned you on this. You must comply
Jh
10/5
DFC/CS



John D. Carr

UNAMIR
UNION DES NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. KMF 688

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: GOLO/UNAMIR/NAIROBI	FROM: DALLADRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR MISC 504	DATE: 7 MAY 94
ATTN:	PHONE: 3-3092
FAX NO: 254 2 622668	FAX NO: 3-3090
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BUSSIÈRE
Internal Dist. DFC, CMPO, MAJ PLANTE	
SUBJECT: PRIORITY USAGE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	
REFERENCE: TELECON LAMBO/BUSSIÈRE 7 MAY 94	

1. UNTIL SUCH A TIME AS THE SITUATION STABILIZES, I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE FLIGHT SHOULD BE PROCEEDING TO KIGALI:

- A. HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES;
- B. MEDICAL EVACUATION;
- C. MEDICAL SUPPLIES/RESUPPLY FOR THE MISSION;
- D. PERSONNEL; AND
- E. WELFARE ITEMS ON A SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS.

2. FURTHER ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR PERSONNEL IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. VIPs AND MILITARY/CIVILIAN MISSION PERSONNEL;
- B. HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS PERSONNEL INCLUDING ALL UN ORGANIZATIONS; AND
- C. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, AS LONG AS THEY SIGN THE NECESSARY WAIVER AND HAVE PROOF OF INSURANCE, AS DISCUSSED BETWEEN YOURSELF AND THE CMPO.

3. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT AIR OPS INTO KIGALI, THE CMPO WILL CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH MAJ OLIVER, THE CANADIAN COMMANDER OF THE C-130 CREW. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL DEAL WITH EITHER YOURSELF OR MR LAMBO, AS YOU SEE FIT.

FC (DFC) CMPO Maj Plante E/DIR

194 MAY -6 1994
 UNAMIR
 211
 Susan and others
 in Nairobi should
 understand this.
 They tried to
 but AOC
 for the
 to the
 let's
 let's

KMF688 P2/2

4. IN ORDER TO STREAMLINE THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION ON THIS
MATTER, PLEASE CONFIRM YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE ABOVE.

5. REGARDS.

1000./FC/BOI

6 May 1994

See Distribution

**TERMS OF REFERENCE -
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
SHOOTING INCIDENTS AT THE
KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA)**

GENERAL

1. Capt Ousseynou Ares and Capt Thierno Tall are to carry out a Summary Investigation into the live fire incidents at the KIA on 3, 4 and 5 May 1994. The investigation must be related to:

- a. the firing towards the Force Support Coy, which resulted in the injuries sustained by three Ghanaians soldiers on 3 May;
- b. the firing towards the Log Base Hangar which resulted in the injuries sustained by one Ghanaian soldier on 4 May; and
- c. the firing towards the C-130 HERCULES aircraft on 5 May as well as the firing towards the airport terminal in the evening of 5 May.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The investigating officers shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and in particular shall record evidence as to:

- a. the reactions of the BUYBAT force deployed at the airfield at each occasion.
- b. whether or not the BUYBAT forces could have/should have fired at the attacking forces.
- c. Force staff account of the incidents and related events of firings on the airfield since 3 May.

FINDINGS

3. The investigating officers shall make findings as to:

- a. The type of ammunition that was used in all cases.

- b. The location from where the ammunition was fired from;
- c. Whether the firing was intentionally directed at UNAMIR.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4. The investigating officers shall make recommendations on:
 - a. the measures to be instituted to prevent such occurrences in the future.

SUBMISSION OF REPORT

- 5. The report is to be submitted in one copy to the CMPO by 2000 hours 6 May 1994.

fr *Antoine Bussière Maj*
RA DALLAIRE
Major-General
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Byubut Rear

Internal:

Capt O. Ares
Capt T. Tall

Information:

CAO

FC
DFC
CMPO

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

194 MAY -6

08 47

OUTGOING FAX

TO: FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR, NAIROBI

SUBJECT: DRAFT ARUSHA CEASEFIRE COMMUNIQUE

DATE: 6 MAY 1994

1. ATTACHED IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT CEASEFIRE COMMUNIQUE THAT WAS EXPECTED TO HAVE BEEN SIGNED IN ARUSHA BY THE RPF DELEGATION.

2. THE RPF DECLINED IN THE ELEVENTH HOUR BECAUSE THE FACILITATOR AND THE OAU INTENDED HAVING THE SAME TEXT SIGNED BY THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT DELEGATION. THE RPF CONSIDERS THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL AND WOULD PREFER DEALING WITH THE RGF INSTEAD.

3. REGARDS.

Seen. 1 fwd to FC.
10/5
DFC

FC

F/DIR

②
D/C
RC
4/5

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR, THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE OAU AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RPF

1. A delegation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front led by the RPF Chairman, Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE met on 4th May, 1994 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, with the Representative of the Facilitator to the Arusha Peace Talks, Hon. John S. MALECELA, Prime Minister and First Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania and on 3rd May, 1994 with the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim.
2. The RPF Chairman and the Prime Minister and First Vice President of Tanzania as well as the Secretary General of the OAU held exhaustive and frank discussions on the grave situation obtaining in Rwanda and in particular, the continued massacres of civilians and the resumption of hostilities between the Rwandese Government forces and those of the RPF.
3. They expressed deep concern over the tragic humanitarian catastrophe prevailing in Rwanda and the suffering of the Rwandese civilian population.
4. The Prime Minister and First Vice President, the OAU Secretary General and the RPF Chairman recalled the tripartite meeting involving the Prime Minister, OAU Secretary General and the Secretary General of the RPF on 24th April, 1994 in Arusha, Tanzania aimed at bringing an end to the hostilities.
5. After the consultations it was agreed that there is an urgent need to end the massacres and to halt all hostilities. //*
6. At the end of the consultations on 4th May, 1994, the Chairman of the RPF, on behalf of the RPF, undertook and AGREED to the following:

- a) The RPF re-affirmed its commitment to a ceasefire as already stated in its declaration of 23 April, 1994.
- b) The RPF mandates its field Commanders to negotiate the modalities of a ceasefire with the field Commanders of the Rwanda Government forces.
- c) The RPF, on its part, mandates the UNAMIR Force Commander to convene within seven (7) days, a meeting of the respective Commanders in order to negotiate the modalities for the ceasefire;
- d) The UNAMIR Force, in its present form as reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 912 adopted on 21st April, 1994, shall monitor the said ceasefire which shall come into effect on a date and time to be agreed upon by the Commanders of the two forces; X
X
How?
- e) The OAU and African countries shall contribute to the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire. // They are added to us?
- f) The RPF commits itself to respect the ceasefire.

B. International Force

7. On the idea of an International force called for by the UN Security Council, the Chairman of the RPF submitted the position of the RPF as follows:

- i) The force should play a humanitarian role in terms of escorting humanitarian relief convoys to sites/camps or areas where displaced persons may be present as well as to other areas where the civilian population is in need of humanitarian assistance; ✓

ii) The force should assist in the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire, modalities of which are to be agreed upon by the field Commanders of the two forces. *So are can see there in ceasefire*

iii) It shall also assist in the protection of the civilian population. ✓

iv) The composition and terms of reference of the force shall be agreed upon and worked out by the field Commanders of the two forces. *Remain our concept with them including tasks.*

C. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

1. The Chairman of the RPF expressed the need to hold, as soon as possible, negotiations on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. In this regard, he expressed RPF's position that the massacres would have ended and the ceasefire would be holding in order to hold the said negotiations. ✓

2. The Chairman of the RPF suggested that the venue, date and agenda for such negotiations should be discussed and agreed upon by the field Commanders of the two forces in the course of the negotiations on the modalities for the ceasefire. ** where? + when?*

3. The Representative of the Facilitator, Hon. John S. Malecela Prime Minister and First Vice President expressed satisfaction at the renewed commitment of the Rwandese Patriotic Front to a ceasefire and to the Arusha Peace Process.

4. He urged the UNAMIR Commander to expedite action with regard to the convening of the meeting of the field Commanders of the two forces. *o/c*

5. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity for his part took note of the decisions taken by the RPF Chairman which

are likely to contribute to the improvement of the security and humanitarian situation in Rwanda.

6. He reaffirmed the support of the OAU for the Arusha Peace Process as well as the OAU's continued commitment to the restoration of peace in Rwanda.

7. Done at Arusha on 4th May, 1994.

Signed.....

Col. Alexis
Kanyarengwe,
Chairman of the
Rwandese Patriotic
Front

Signed.....

Hon. John S. Malecela
Representative of the
Facilitator

Signed.....

Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant Secretary
General
(Political)
for the Organization
of African Unity



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
CABINET DU MINISTRE
BP 23 KIGALI

KIGALI, le 03 Mai 1994

N° 06 /06.1.9/01

(3) Noted for nec action
7 6/5

Au Commandant de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR)
KIGALI.

(2) COO
RGI-LO (FQA) is to establish contact today and work out the details. Info HAc that this chap is also and that they have pass this to return to me ASAP. Also. Delalia for info and return to me ASAP.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Major NZABONIMPA Joseph est mis à la disposition de la MINUAR comme Officier de liaison avec le Gouvernement.

Il aura à vous faciliter le contact avec les membres du Gouvernement. Pour ce faire, il n'est point besoin d'installer l'équipe de la MINUAR à GITARAMA. Concernant les aides humanitaires, le même Officier, en collaboration avec l'équipe du Colonel MUNYENGANGO François mise à la disposition du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, vous appuiera dans les contacts utiles.

Encore une fois, nous vous assurons de notre entière disponibilité.

(3) drc
Plus info.
7/5

Le Ministre de la Défense
BIZIMANA Augustin



Copie pour information:

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre (Tous)
- Monsieur le Préfet de GITARAMA

Noted
7/5
10/5



1000.1/FC/BOI

> May 1994

See Distribution

TERMS OF REFERENCE

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
INVOLVING UNAMIR VEHICLE NUMBER 1289
DRIVEN BY CAPT IBOU SENE ON 01 MAY 1994**

GENERAL

1. Maj H Kirschner (591) is to carry out a Summary Investigation into a traffic accident on 1 May 1994 involving UNAMIR vehicle No 1289 driven by Capt Ibou Sene (UNID 561).

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The investigation officer shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and in particular shall record evidence as to:

- a. Circumstances under which the accident occurred.
- b. Whether the vehicle was on authorised route.
- c. Who authorised the journey.
- d. Whether the trip ticket was properly booked.
- e. Whether the driver holds a current UNAMIR driving permit.
- f. Whether the driver holds his country's current national driving license.
- g. Whether the driver holds his country's current military driving permit.
- h. Whether the driver was sober prior to and after and accident.
- i. Road and weather conditions at the time of the accident.
- j. The speed of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
- k. Defects on the vehicle prior to the accident.

*Seen
10/5
DTC/ws*

- l. Extent of damage to the vehicle as a result of the accident.
- m. Estimated cost of damage to the vehicle.
- n. Whether the accident could have been prevented.
- o. Whether proper procedures for reporting an accident were followed after the accident.

FINDINGS


3. The investigating officer will make findings as to:
 - a. Exact time, date and place of the accident.
 - b. The cause of the accident.
 - c. Who was responsible for the accident.
 - d. Whether there was any casualty after the accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. The investigating officer will make recommendations on:
 - a. Who is to blame for the accident.
 - b. Who should bear the cost of repairs for the accident vehicle.
 - c. Measures to prevent the recurrence of such accidents in future.

SUBMISSION OF REPORT

5. The report is to be submitted in three (3) copies to the CMPO by 12 May 1994 or earlier.


RA DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution

Action:

Information:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Maj H Kirschner

CAO
CTO
Legal

Internal:

CHAO
Capt Ibou Sene

DFC/COS
CMPO

UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

92 MAY -4 20 - 523

YKF 799

UNAMIR

MSF 3037-04

194 MAY -5 04 19

FACSIMILE

19795

TO: BOOH-BOOH UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
DATE: 4 May 1994	Fax No. (212) 963-9222
SUBJECT: Press clipping	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 2	

... Please find attached today's New York Times article on Rwanda. Regards. ①

②
Coo / 6/95
HAC / 7/5

③
FC
5/5

③
Seen
Hw
11/5
DFC

SRSG

(FC)

CAO

MSF 3037-04

U.N. Chief Asks Rights Aide To Take On a Role in Rwanda

By PAUL LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, May 3 — The United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has asked the newly appointed High Commissioner for Human Rights to play a major role in trying to investigate and stop the massacres in Rwanda, United Nations officials said today.

The Secretary General met with the new High Commissioner, José Ayala Lasso, in Geneva today for several hours to discuss his mandate. They will meet again on Wednesday to decide how he will go about the assignment.

Mr. Lasso, a former Ecuadorean diplomat whose post was created by the General Assembly at the end of last year, has the authority to intervene personally in particularly difficult situations.

Heavy Shelling in the Capital

In the Rwandan capital, Kigali, the small United Nations contingent of several hundred soldiers that remains there reported heavy shelling today, The Associated Press said.

Also reported was a new surge of fighting between the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who back the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Hutu forces loyal to the provisional government.

The United Nations forces in Rwanda are guarding some 20,000 people who have fled for their safety into a hospital, a soccer stadium, United Nations buildings and several churches.

They also tried unsuccessfully to move some 300 Rwandans, mainly Tutsis, who took shelter in the Milles Collines Hotel in the capital to safer locations after getting permission from the local army commander. But militiamen stopped them.

The Red Cross reported the slaying of 21 orphaned children between the ages of 3 and 12 in the southwestern town of Butare, along with 13 Rwandan Red Cross workers who tried to protect them. The agency said the children had been "selected on an ethnic basis" by militiamen from a group of 500 orphans who had been evacuated from Kigali.

Call for an All-African Force

During a visit to Oslo today, Mr. Boutros-Ghali also repeated his call for African countries to contribute troops to an all-African peacekeeping force to end the brutal killings in Rwanda. On Monday he wrote to all the heads of state of African countries that have contributed peacekeeping troops in the past, asking them to help set up the new force.

He said such a force was necessary to "defuse the conflict, to stop the genocide." If the countries of West Africa can get together and send a regional force to help bring peace to Liberia, the Secretary General said, he believes that the countries of East and central Africa ought to do the same for Rwanda.

American officials said today that the Clinton Administration favored involving the new High Commissioner for Human Rights in Rwanda, arguing that the more the international community was seen to be scrutinizing developments in that country, the better the chance of stopping the killings.

These officials say the Administration is also considering a plan under which the United Nations might send some kind of guards to protect Rwandan refugees who have fled the country as well as internally displaced people still inside Rwanda before there is a general cease-fire and a peacekeeping force can be deployed.

Precedent in Iraq

A precedent of sorts for such a force exists in Iraq, where the United Nations has sent some 300 guards who protect aid workers and convoys and generally monitor conditions in the countryside.

High-level delegations from the Rwandan provisional government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front showed up in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha today for an open-ended round of peace talks brokered by Tanzania. An earlier effort to get peace talks started in Arusha last week came to nothing.

The negotiating team from the provisional government is led by Transport Minister André Ntagerura and includes the Ministers of the Interior and of Community Development as well as an army brigadier general. The rebel delegation is led by the group's chairman, Alexis Kanyarengwe, and includes representatives of its political and military wings.

President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania will lead the mediation effort, assisted by the United Nations mediator in Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon, observers from the United States, Belgium, France, Germany, Kenya and Zimbabwe and the Secretary General of the Organization for African Unity, Salim Ahmed Salim.



The New York Times

Fighting between Tutsi and Hutu forces surged in Kigali.

Rwanda erupted into ethnic violence last month after President Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, died in a mysterious plane crash at Kigali airport and the presidential guard went on a rampage, killing supporters of the R.P.F. as well as provisional government members who might try to succeed the President.

This prompted the rebel forces, which were confined to the north of the country under a peace agreement signed last year ending several years of civil war, to invade the south, encircling Kigali and pushing down toward the Tanzanian border in the east around the town of Kibungu.

Reports reaching here from Rwanda say the Hutu forces are deliberately attacking the largely Tutsi professional classes, looking for doctors, lawyers and other trained people. The United Nations also reports indications of systematic Tutsi reprisals in areas they control, directed against Hutu members of the militia and other paramilitary forces.

04.05.1994

12:15
of RPF

News from Radio Muhabura: The Voice

1. Negotiations which should be held in ARUSHA yesterday did not take place. The Rwandese Government sent its representatives despite the RPF firm warning that it will never negotiate with the so called Government made of murderers. For RPF, the representatives of the Government were making a show to the International Community that it is ready for negotiations while it has violated the Arusha Peace Agreement by assigning ministries to people who said that the agreement was "a dung of a dead dog" and appointing the ex-president of CND knowing that the CND was dissolved by the Peace Agreement. The RPF cannot accept negotiations with them since it could be a way of recognizing it. And by recognizing it, the RPF could afford them a cue to renegotiate the Peace Agreement. The RPF declares that if the Government really wants peace, it will let it negotiate with the RGF they are fighting against. It announced that the Chairman only went to Tanzania to reaffirm the RPF position and how it considers the Rwandese case and not for any kind of negotiation with the Rwandese Government. The Chairman of the RPF said that there will not be any ARUSHA any more. He showed how the bloody Government killed the President in order to renegotiate the Agreement. For him, to accept another round table would be a violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The RPF Chairman explained that an international force is not needed in Rwanda now. He added that the ones who need them are the killers since they have eliminated whoever was opposed to them. He asked the International Community to identify the killers and the killed: the killed are tutsi and the MRND-CDR opponents. Since they have almost killed all of them, massacres are going to stop. He wondered whether the International Troops were coming to be involved in the Rwandese Conflict and to have a part in the fights. He said that the International Community should spend the money in helping the victims of this war instead of financing a project which is not needed at all. He stated that UNAMIR was an International Army, but when war broke out it did not do anything to save the civilians; instead, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw them. He affirmed that even some civilians were killed before UNAMIR passive eyes, and its own soldiers were killed.

2. Rwandese and International Community condemn the band of killers. After Professeur Hayson Bodge, Amnesty International asks UN to create an International Court to settle on massacres in Rwanda. The RPF reminded that the UN Security Council has decided to set an International Board of Inquiry to investigate on massacres in Rwanda.

1. The RPF continues shelling on innocent people and on non military infrastructures. The Ministry of Defence informed that on UNAMIR infrastructures are now targets of shells. Yesterday between 5:50 PM and 6:45 PM RPF shells landed to the airport and seriously injured 3 Ghanian soldiers. Today morning, RPF shelled the UN airplane but fortunately it was not hit and landed safely. The same Ministry affirmed that on the battlefield the RGF helped by the population succeeded in defending the sovereignty of the country.
2. Yesterday, the Government representatives went to NGORORERO Sub/prefecture to continue their security restoring action. The sub-prefect and the prefect of Gisenyi announced the participants that the situation is coming to normal. The Minister of the Family and Women sated that the RPF ask identity cards and the hutu the one who are killed. He affirmed that UNHCR and ICRC asked the RPF to stop killing people. He reaffirmed that if RPF does not stop the killings the population will get rid of the RPF sympathizers. The Minister of Primary Schools asked the RPF to stop fighting and accept negotiations. He decided that the Primary Schools resume 09.05.1994 where it is possible. One of the businessmen in Gisenyi informed that they have collected 7 millions of Rwandese francs to help in buying weapons. The participants in the meeting called on Museveni and the Belgian Government to stop their aid to the RPF. They urged the population to close their ears to the RPF seemingly words of salvation. They asked the Government to provide them with weapons for self-defence.
3. The prefect of Gitarama held a meeting with the members of the security council to see how shops in Gitarama could open. They condemned the bandits' acts and showed their determination to arrest such acts. They decide that from today all the shops, restaurants and bars will open to let the population by food mainly.

UNAMIR

194 MAY -4

08 47

OUTGOING FAX

KYF 762

P1/1

NO OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCL THIS ONE: 01

TO: BARIL FOR ANNAN UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: (212)-963-4879	FAX NO: 250-84265 PHONE : 250-84271
ROOM NO: 3650, EXT:3721	FILE NO: FAX19
INTERNAL DISTR:CMO, CMPO, CAO	DRAFTER: MAJ SHAHID
REF:	DATE: 03 MAY 94

SUBJ: UN MISSION IN BURUNDI

MIR-895

1. THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS MEMBERS OF THE TECHNICAL TEAM TO BURUNDI:

- a. BRIG GEN H ANYIDHO - TEAM LEADER
- b. COL I D TIKOCA
- c. MAJ SARR M
- d. LT CDR G ZOWONOO
- e. CAPT CHERIFF
- f. CAPT WKC BLEBOO
- g. CAPT A NSIAH

2. THE TEAM IS TO CONDUCT A DETAILED RECCE ON OPERATION AND LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCE PARTY. A TEAM OF 5(FIVE) MILOBS WILL BE DEPLOYED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RECCE BY THE TECHNICAL TEAM. THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a. MAJ SARR M, SENEGAL - TEAM LEADER
- b. MAJ KAMPILA M, ZIMBABWE
- c. MAJ MOFOBI M, NIGERIA
- d. CAPT MARIKO M, MALI
- e. CAPT MBAYE M, SENEGAL

THE SENIOR PERSON, ALTHOUGH A MAJOR, IS A VERY EXPERIENCED UNMO WITH CONSIDERABLE RESPECT FROM US ALL. HE IS MOST ABLY QUALIFIED TO HANDLE THIS TASK.

3. THE VEHICLES/RADIOS AND NECESSARY ACCOUTREMENTS WILL BE MOVED WITH THE TECHNICAL TEAM BY CANADIAN C-130 AND THIS EQUIPMENT WILL REMAIN FOR THE TEAM.

4. REGARDS.

180 60 4-14M 181

UNAMIR

Seen
11/5
DSC

③
They
could
go direct
from Nairobi.

W

②
FC

Was advised by DPKO
that an answer will follow

on 5/5/94
S/SF



UNAMIR - MINUAR

1000.1/FC/BOI

3 May 1994

See Distribution

**BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED
KILLINGS OF 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS BY
THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF)
AT CAMP KIGALI ON THU 7 APRIL 1994**

Reference:

A. 1000.1/FC/BOI dated 16 April 1994.

1. Please, find below the new composition of the BOI in Ref A:
 - a. President - Lt Col Dounkov (UNID 707) - Russia.
 - b. Member - Maj B Kone (UNID 616) - Mali.
 - c. Member - Maj Henry Ankabi (UNID 537) - Congo.
 - d. Member - Lt Cdr PJ Akpan (UNID 664) - Nigeria.
 - e. Member/Secretary- Capt M Mbaye (UNID 513) - Senegal.
2. Members of the board who are outside Kigali are expected to report immediately at UNAMIR Force Headquarters to proceed with the investigations.
3. All other details including the date for the submission of the report remain unchanged.
4. Attached for the guidance of the board members is a copy of Ref A.

MA
Do we still have all those
Ghanaians soldiers in the mission?
HJ
11/5
DFC/cas

[Signature]
RA DALLAIRE
Major-General
Force Commander

Distribution

Action:

Information:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Byubat HQ
Lt Col S Dounkov
Maj Kone
Maj H Ankabi
Lt Cdr PJ Akpan
Capt M Mbaye

SRSG's Office
CAO
Legal

Internal:

DFC/COS
CMPO



1000.1/FC/BOI

16 April 1994

See Distribution

CONVENING ORDER

BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED KILLINGS
OF 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS BY THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT
FORCES (RGF) AT CAMP KIGALI ON THU 7 APRIL 1994

GENERAL

1. A board of inquiry, composed as hereunder, shall assemble at a time and place to be determined by the president, but not later than 17 April 1994, to investigate the circumstances leading to the alleged killings of 10 Belgian soldiers on 7 April 1994 by RGF soldiers at Camp Kigali.

- | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|---|---------------------|---|-------------|
| a. | President | - | Lt Col S Dounkov | - | Milob Gp HQ |
| b. | Member | - | Maj M Pazik | - | Force HQ |
| c. | Member | - | Sqn Ldr MA Adelakun | - | Milob Gp HQ |
| d. | Member | - | Maj Karim (EME) | - | Rutbat |
| e. | Member/Secretary-Capt NOK Danqua# | - | | - | Milob Gp HQ |

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The board shall obtain statements from the under-listed personalities and any other available witnesses:

- | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---|------------------|
| a. | Commanding Officer | - | RGF, Camp Kigali |
| b. | Maj Bernard Ntuyahaga | - | RGF, Camp Kigali |
| c. | Capt Kodjo Apedo | - | Milob Gp HQ |
| d. | Sgt Bortey Ernest | - | Byubat Gulf |
| e. | Cpl Doe E | - | " " |
| f. | Cpl Banchi | - | " " |
| g. | Cpl Anyevi P | - | " " |
| h. | L/S Morcher | - | Byubat Gulf |

3. The board shall record evidence as to:

- a. The mission of the soldiers at the time they were captured.

- b. Whether it was an authorised mission.
- c. The circumstances under which they were captured by the RGF.
- d. The circumstances under which the killings took place.
- e. The persons responsible for the killings.
- f. The motive behind the killings.
- g. Whether there was any way of preventing the killings.

FINDINGS


- 4. The board will make findings as to:
 - a. Time, date, place of the killings and exact numbers involved.
 - b. Reasons/causes for the killings.
 - c. Who is responsible for the killings.
 - d. Any material loss resulting from the killings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5. The board will make recommendations on:
 - a. Who is responsible for the killings.
 - b. Whether any compensation is due in terms of human and material resources lost/damaged and to whom.
 - c. What type of punishment to be meted out to those responsible.
 - d. Steps to be taken to avert such incidents in future.
 - e. Any other recommendations that would help to improve on the security of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda and to improve relations with security agencies.

SUBMISSION OF REPORT

- 6. The board will submit three (3) copies of the record of proceedings to the CMPO by Tuesday 10 May 1994.


RA DALLAIRE
Major-General
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Kigali Sector HQ
Rutbat HQ
Byubat HQ
Lt Col S Dounkov - Milob Gp HQ
Maj Karim (EME) - Rutbat
Sqn Ldr MA Adelakun - Milob Gp HQ
Capt NOK Danguah - Milob Gp HQ

Internal:

Log Sec
Maj M Pazik - Force HQ

Information:

SRSg's Office
OIC Administration
Legal

DFC/COS



UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

2000.1/CMPO/SR

To: See Distribution

From: CMPO

Date: 2 May 1994

Subject: WEEKLY MILITARY PERSONNEL STATE

Reference:

A. CMPO's Memo dated 25 April 1994 on above subject.

1. Enclosed for your information is the UNAMIR/UNOMUR Weekly Personnel State as at 2 May 94. As you will notice, the strength given in Ref A above excluded UNMOS who were outside Rwanda totalling 174. This figure has now been included and there was a downward revision on the figure for Byubut, which now brings the total strength of the force to 708.

2. Any queries/comments can be addressed to the under signed.

M. Bussiere
M BUSSIERE
Maj
CMPO
1056

Distribution

FC
DFC/COS
COO
CHAO
C Log O
CAO
CO Byubut
OC Tunisian Coy

UNAMIR

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

DATE: 02 MAY 1994

SRL	COUNTRY	TROOPS			M I L O B			GRAND TOTAL
		INF	STAFF	TOTAL	RWANDA	UGANDA	KENYA	
1.	AUSTRIA				4	(1)	10	15
2.	BANGLADESH		4	4	5	20 (6)	23	58
3.	BOTSWANA					9		9
4.	BRAZIL	3		3		10		13
5.	CANADA		6	6	1			7
6.	CONGO				7	(1)	18	26
7.	EGYPT						10	10
8.	FIJI				1			1
9.	GHANA	318	13	331	11		13	355
10.	HUNGARY					4		4
11.	MALAWI						5	5
12.	MALI				4		6	10
13.	NETHERLANDS					10		10
14.	NIGERIA				6	(3)	6	15
15.	POLAND				3		1	4
16.	RUSSIA						15	15
17.	SENEGAL				20	10	9	39
18.	SLOVAKIA					5		5
19.	TOGO				1		14	15
20.	TUNISIA	40		40				40
21.	URUGUAY					(7)	16	23
22.	ZIMBABWE				9	10	10	29
	TOTAL	361	23	384	72	78 (18)	156	708

NOTES

- Figures in brackets show UNAMIR UNMOS in Uganda.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

U R G E N T

OUTGOING FAX NO. KYF 748

①

PAGE 1 OF 1

MIR NO. 881

MISC NO. _____

UNAMIR
194 MAY -2 14 51

TO: Mr. Denis Beissel, Acting Director, FOD/DPKO/UNHQ New York	From: A. H. Golo, OIC UNAMIR, Kigali
ATTN: Mr. Amir A. Dossal INFO:	DATE: 2 May 1994
FAX NO: 212-963-0642	PHONE : 212-963-3091 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ORIGINATOR: Golo/Dodici <i>[Signature]</i>	SECTION: Administration
SUBJECT: PAYMENT OF DAILY ALLOWANCE TO TROOPS.	

THE DAILY ALLOWANCE FOR INCIDENTAL PERSONAL EXPENSES PAYABLE AT THE RATE OF \$1.28 PER PERSON PER DAY HAS NEVER BEEN PAID TO THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ENTITLED TO IT, OWING TO REASONS PRESUMABLY ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO HQRS. MOREOVER, THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBER OF THE FORCE HAS LEFT RWANDA, COMPLICATING SOMEWHAT THE PROCESS. WE ARE OBTAINING NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL OF EACH CONTINGENT CONCERNED, INCLUDING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS ENTITLED TO SUCH A PAYMENT ON BASIS OF DAYS SPENT IN MISSION AREA, FOR WHICH A REQUEST FOR PAYMENT WILL BE FORWARDED TO FOD TO EFFECT PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. MEANWHILE APPRECIATE RECEIVING AUTHORITY TO PAY TROOPS REMAINING IN RWANDA IN US DOLLARS IN VIEW OF PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THIS CONNECTION PLEASE NOTE THAT SITUATION IN THE WHOLE OF RWANDA REMAINS THAT OF A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER, WITH NO STORE/BANK/MARKET OPENED OR FUNCTIONING. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING GRATEFUL YOUR FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION AND ADVICE.

REGARDS.

cc: SRSG

(FC)
ED

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
Dici
2/5

194 MAY -2 14 55

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KIGALI

MAY -2

02154647
12-341OUTGOING FAX NO 235

PAGE 1 OF 1

MIR NO _____

MISC NO 143

TO: MAJ. GEN. R. DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA	FROM: S. SANDSTROM SAO UNAMIR-OFFICE NAIROBI, KENYA
ATTN: INFO:	DATE: 2 MAY 1994
FAX NO: 3-3090	PHONE: 62-2508 FAX: 62-2668
ORIGINATOR:	SECTION: CAO'S OFFICE
SUBJECT: P.O. HALLQUIST	

FOR FC ONLY:

AAA. I HAVE RECENTLY BEEN IN TELEPHONE AND FAX CONTACT WITH MR. HALLQUIST, EX-CAO OF UNAMIR. HE IS SENDING YOU HIS PERSONAL BEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE.

BBB. FOR YOUR INFO HE IS PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT AS CAO WITH CSCE FOR OBSERVER MISSION IN NAGORNO-KARABAGH; MEANWHILE ENJOYING SWEDISH SPRING AND PEACE!

CCC. BEST REGARDS.

② DEC
[Signature]

A CAO again?
Seen Jhi
11/5
DFC

FC

CAO

E/DIR

MPH
H/S



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

2 May 1994

To: HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
Deputy Force Commander
UNAMIR-Kigali

From: Ally H. Golo, *[Signature]*
Officer in Charge of Administration
UNAMIR-Kigali

Subject: Daily Allowance

1. Thank you for your letter 1000.7(DFC) /A/1 and previous correspondence on the form and modalities of payment with regard to the daily allowance for incidental personal expenses payable to contingent personnel at a rate of \$ 1.28 per person per day.
2. It is my intention to finalize the issue soonest and to find a way that will satisfy the need and interests of the military personnel involved. I intend to recommend to FOD New York that authority be given to UNAMIR to settle these claims locally and in US dollar, while the situation remains unstable.
3. In order to comply with existing United Nations Financial Rules and Regulations, the UNAMIR Finance Section will require a detailed personnel list indicating, inter alia, names and duration of tour of duty with UNAMIR. Therefore, I should be grateful if you would please direct the Office of the Chief Military Personnel to prepare such list and forward it to me as soon as convenient.
4. I will revert the moment I receive confirmation from FOD.

①

②

CMPO

Please for action as
indicated in Para 3.

984 02/05
MA TO DFC

MA

Has the CMPO done that?
Maj Sechen should assist
in this since the CMPO is
new in the mission.

[Signature]

11/5

DFC/CO

MSF 2954-04

UNAMIR

YKF 788

1/8

94 MAY -3

04 47

FACSIMILE

19413

94 MAY -3 01 02Z

TO: BOOH-BOOH UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
DATE: 2 May 1994	Fax No. (212) 963-9222
SUBJECT: Press clippings	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 8	

... Please find attached this evening's press clippings.

Regards.

①

②

DFC

COO

HAC

6/15

+ 3/5

Some good
articles.

DFC
3/5

③ Please return to
DFC after reading
84/03/05
mH

SRSG

FC

CAO

Fz/OIR

MSF 2054-04 2

NEWS DISTRIBUTION
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POLITICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #3
NEWS AGENCIES ON CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES

2 May 1994

12 Noon to 4 p.m.

Major news stories in the period covered:

- Rose says Brcko safe haven would need more troops; Germany backs extending NATO protection in Bosnia.
- X - Rwanda rebels want UN envoy recalled; UN official doubts OAU could intervene in Rwanda.
- De Klerk concedes ANC victory in South Africa election.
- IAEA visit called off after Pyongyang rejects conditions.

YUGOSLAVIA

United Nations - Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has told his special envoy in the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, that criticism of US policy by senior UN officials there was "completely unacceptable" and called for a full inquiry. He was responding, in a letter dated Saturday, to one he received the same day from US Ambassador Madeleine Albright protesting "in the strongest possible terms" the comments of the unnamed UN officials. Boutros-Ghali said: "I share your profound concern at the fact that press reports have quoted criticisms by high-ranking UNPROFOR officials of United States policy in the former Yugoslavia. I have sent a cable to Mr. Akashi informing him that I find such comments completely unacceptable and asking for a full inquiry. I have requested him to take every measure to ensure that there are no recurrences." (REUTERS)

Korner, Denmark - Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, commander of UN troops in Bosnia, said on Monday the United Nations would need more troops if it were to extend its security guarantee to the northern Bosnian town of Brcko. But he told a news conference: "It is very difficult to get more troops on the ground. We don't want to be in a position where we designate a safe area but are unable to defend it."

Earlier, while addressing a Nordic defence ministers' meeting here, Rose said that Nordic troops under his ultimate command had used what he called minimum force in a weekend clash with Bosnian Serb forces.

(MORE)

L05

2 May 1994, Bulletin #3

- 3 -

3

countries to attend the signing ceremony scheduled for 11:00 a.m. (0800 GMT) on Wednesday in a Chinese-built conference centre in a northeast suburb, the Egyptian press said. Syria will boycott the signing ceremony, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa said. (AFP)

Jerusalem - Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin tried to rally his party and people behind peace with Syria and the Palestinians, on the eve of his meeting with PLO chief Yasser Arafat. "The peace process marks the end of the price ... If people want to rule over a foreign nation they must know it is going to cost them in blood," Rabin told a meeting of his parliamentary Labour party. He took the unusual step of opening the meeting to the media. (REUTERS)

Jerusalem - A top aide to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat complained to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that Israel was obstructing a peace accord with the PLO two days before it was to be signed. Faisal al-Husseini, a top West Bank leader in Arafat's Fatah movement, told reporters that an Israeli ban on Palestinians entering Jerusalem and one-sided marking of the boundaries of the West Bank area of Jericho could kill the peace accord. (REUTERS, AFP)

RWANDA

United Nations - The rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front said that it will not take part in any UN efforts to resolve the Rwanda crisis until the UN special representative has been withdrawn from the country. A statement issued by the Front's political bureau said that the time was long past for UN intervention, adding: "The genocide is almost completed. Most of the potential victims of the regime have either been killed or have since fled." The statement said that the UN special envoy, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon, "has throughout his stay in our country behaved in a very partisan manner and is not up to the task entrusted to him. The RPF will not participate in any future UN effort to resolve the Rwanda conflict unless and until the said special representative and his assistant are recalled." (REUTERS)

Washington - The United Nations peacekeeping chief said that he doubted whether the Organization of African Unity was capable of mounting a peacekeeping operation in strife-torn Rwanda. Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the Senate Foreign Relations African subcommittee that the rapid movement of military units that could make a difference was needed in the Rwanda crisis. "Given the limitations of the OAU,

(MORE)

MSF 2954-04

2 May 1994, Bulletin #3

- 4 -

if we want urgent and immediate action, I'm not sure that is the organization to turn to," he said, although the OAU could help in getting warring parties back to the negotiating table. In a statement, Annan said that fratricidal war was destroying entire societies in Africa and traditional peacekeeping was proving inadequate. (REUTERS)

Nairobi - The rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front said that it will send a delegation to Arusha, Tanzania, on Tuesday to explain its stand on the Rwandan conflict to the Tanzanian president -- but not to meet Rwandan government representatives. In an interview with the BBC, monitored here, RPF's military spokesman Emmanuel Idahire said that RPF could not negotiate with a "government of criminals," but its commanders were willing to meet government forces' commanders to discuss peace. Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi said on Sunday that his country would host peace talks between the RPF and the interim government in the northern town of Arusha. (AFP)

Paris - France defended its decision to receive representatives of Rwanda's government and dispatched an envoy to neighbouring countries of the central African state to explore a peace plan. Last week, the foreign minister of Rwanda's government, Jerome Biryahumwe, met officials of the Foreign Ministry and President Francois Mitterrand's office in Paris. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said that French officials met Biryahumwe as part of a bid to mediate between warring factions. "As long as the international community does not want to intervene (in Rwanda), the only path is diplomatic discussion," Juppe told the Anglo-American Press Association on Monday. French ambassador to Rwanda Jean-Michel Marlaud has been sent on a mission to the region to explore peace plans with Rwanda's neighbours, Juppe said. (REUTERS)

SOUTH AFRICA

Pretoria - Africa's last white president F.W. de Klerk conceded victory to Nelson Mandela and his ANC on Monday in South Africa's historic first all-race elections. "There can be no doubt that the ANC nationally got the most votes and the National Party was second placed," de Klerk told a televised news conference at party headquarters in Pretoria. "Next Tuesday I shall lay down my responsibilities as president secure in the knowledge that we secured what we set out to achieve four years and three months ago," he said, referring to his 1990 decision to scrap apartheid. "I shall be handing over the presidency to Mr. Mandela but I shall not be leaving government," he added. (REUTERS, AFP)

(Editorial)

2954-04

5

It is not too late for Rwanda

AS South Africans have been crowding to the polls, the people of Rwanda have been heading anywhere they can to escape the worst massacre that even their benighted country has known.

It is a tragedy which shames the world and disgraces the United Nations. Friday's call by the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for intervention has not only come too late: it also flies in the face of the decision of his own organisation not to increase the UN presence but to reduce the number of troops from an inadequate 2,500 to a derisory 270 — not enough to count the bodies, never mind to save lives.

Of course, it is easy for those in the West to cry outrage and shout 'something must be done' in an unspecified manner. But it isn't that easy. It is especially not that easy for the UN, which is asked to do everything, but given nothing except brickbats for its efforts.

The United Nations is no more than its constituent members, with the obscene irony, in this case, that one of the members of the 15-strong Security Council is none other than the interim government of Rwanda which has let loose the inter-tribal carnage. Needless to say, it has used its veto to water down even the council's mildest pronouncements on Rwandan affairs.

Yet one should be clear just how great is the dereliction of duty, never mind moral obligation, of the international community in this case. Rwanda may share many of the same problems for the UN as Bosnia and Somalia. But it is also different.

The UN forces were sent there as peace-keepers once a truce had been reached in the civil war. When that truce was rudely shattered by the assassination of the presidents of Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi on 6 April, the blue berets stood idly

by as the ruling Hutus went on a killing spree, citing their terms of reference as sanction for their inaction. The less they did, the more the slaughter developed until the UN itself started to leave, taking the aid agencies with it. A world that might have cared was treated to the grim sight of whites scrambling aboard aircraft, leaving their local staff to rape and mutilation.

This is not responsible behaviour by an international institution. It is certainly not necessary. Had the UN forces shown some teeth at the beginning, it might well have been avoided. The blue berets were armed with guns: most of the rampaging gangs had only staves and machetes. Instead of the criminals being frightened by the first whiff of grapeshot, it was the UN itself which bolted. Once out of control, the massacres took on the form not so much of civil war as complete anarchy, in which gangs could take charge of the streets unchallenged. The fleeing civilians, mainly from the minority Tutsi tribe, have been hampered not only by outside indifference, but by the refusal of neighbouring Burundi to take them in.

Nobody knows how many have been killed. Aid agencies put the figure as high as 200,000. Even if it is only a quarter of that, it is a horrendous tally of murder and mayhem in barely more than three weeks. In the meantime, the UN refugee agency reported this weekend that some 250,000 Rwandans had flooded into neighbouring Tanzania on Friday alone — the largest and fastest exodus it had ever seen. Tanzania is in no condition to take them. International agencies have provisions in the area to cope with barely more than 50,000.

If nothing else, an emergency rescue operation has to be mounted to provide food and accommodation in camps to handle the two million refugees who are crowding the roads and overwhelming the neighbouring states. At the same time, the UN should reverse its decision to pull out of the capital and increase its numbers.

Boutros-Ghali's call for sufficient forces to impose a peace throughout the country is almost certainly impractical and too late. But it is not too late to send a show of force sufficient at least to make its presence felt in the capital and provide some safe havens for civilians.

Not for the first time, the UN Secretary-General has got it wrong, misjudging his timing, out of tune with his council and unable to steer a clear path amid the conflicting pressures that make up the UN. His position may become untenable. But his organisation's should not.

The lesson of Rwanda is not that we don't need an international aid and peace-keeping organisation. We do. But we must learn to do it better, with a more effective structure — and now. Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi, which is now threatened by the same descent into tribal madness, may well be beyond a simple political solution. Only re-partition may provide the home that the Hutus and the Tutsis need. But the people are not beyond help. Nor is the continent.

To think or act otherwise is to confirm the worst fears of the Third World — that when it comes to blacks the white-dominated world doesn't want to know.

02 MAY 1994

Escape of the living dead

Mark Hubbard
Byumba, Rwanda
Ed Vulliamy
Washington
and agencies

NOBODY remembers the girl with no name. There is nobody left to remember her. She sits — in silence — on the floor of the hilltop schoolhouse in Byumba.

Other survivors can at least speak of their nightmares. Each is different, but also the same: they have seen the carnage of Rwanda and somehow escaped becoming one of its estimated 100,000 victims. Now they are on the move — creating a tidal wave of human misery the likes of which the world has never seen. Yesterday the line advancing towards the eastern border with Tanzania stretched for more than five miles.

On Friday, more than 250,000 refugees fled into Tanzania. The largest exodus of people ever recorded in 24 hours came after two weeks in which more than a million displaced people were effectively trapped within their own borders.

Many have been massacred by government troops and extremist Hutu militias. Most of the victims, and the refugees, are Tutsis — the minority tribe in Rwanda's long history of tribal hatred. Most members of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front are Tutsis. Yesterday UN officials said the Rwanda army troops had abandoned the border ahead of the advancing rebels and the flood of

refugees. 'We estimate another 400,000 are near the border, very near to crossing. We are talking about a total of about 600,000 people,' UN spokesman Abdul Kabis said by telephone from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda which exploded in violence.

Aid agencies rushed staff and emergency supplies to the wet, cold and muddy northwestern Tanzanian district of Ngara. 'This mass exodus is a burden to top off everything, with hundreds of thousands of people on the move with babies on their backs and minimal belongings,' said a senior aid-agency official. 'Some are sick, some are wounded, some are near starvation. They are still arriving. They will require massive international aid in the next few weeks to keep them alive.'

The border chaos and reports of continuing murderous violence in Kigali and the countryside prompted a belated, desperate call by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali for more blue-helmet troops to be mobilised.

The council met yesterday only to refuse to endorse Boutros-Ghali's plea, signalling yet another ignominious performance by the UN which could further erode its credibility.

Boutros-Ghali's appeal caught the Security Council by surprise 10 days after it had voted unanimously to pull almost all its 2,500 troops out of Rwanda.

Ghali said there was 'strong evidence of preparations for fur-

ther massacres of civilians' in the city of Kigali. 'This humanitarian catastrophe demands urgent action by the international community,' he urged.

'I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leave the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.'

Sources in New York yesterday said the Security Council was doubtful about finding member States willing to contribute to such a mission, and that if there were any increase in troops, it would probably be limited to countries belonging to the Organisation of African Unity. The Security Council met yesterday to blunt the edges of the Secretary General's appeal. The Council issued a long statement condemning the latest 'slaughter of innocent civilians' and called for an arms ban on the warring factions. It appealed to neighbouring African States to try to accommodate refugees, and launched an appeal for a major aid programme.

But it declined to endorse increased military numbers under the UN flag.

Instead, its president Colin Keating of New Zealand, said he wanted to see Boutros-Ghali 'flesh out his proposal and provide some concept of operation' before his members could make a decision.

The secretary-general of the Organisation of African Unity at-

tacked the UN Security Council for its inaction. 'It is absolutely incomprehensible for Africa that the UN should withdraw the majority of its troops from Rwanda and refuse to change its decision at the very time when its presence is required to end the massacre of innocent people', he said. 'The Security Council must recognise it is the responsibility of the international community to end the large-scale killings and genocide being perpetrated in Rwanda.'

The Security Council's condemnation of the massacres was careful to avoid the word 'genocide', even though the statement acknowledged that 'the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such group in whole or part constitutes a crime punishable by international law'.

Much of the violence in Rwanda in the past three weeks, sparked by the death of the president in a mysterious plane crash on 6 April, has not been between the rebel army and the government soldiers, but by the government's civilian death squads. The president had trained the squads.

Thousands of people have been too frightened to take to the roads and leave their home areas because to have done so would have further exposed them. The Red Cross believes thousands are hiding in the hillside forests that run the length of the country. Byumba is a ghost town — the UNHCR estimates that 72,000 residents have fled — but for the incoming 14,000 people who

have made their way through swamps and hills from Kigali. They have been escorted by the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front, which has sent lorries, pick-ups and troops to transport and escort refugees from all Rwanda's tribes to camps in the north now being supplied by Red Cross, the UNHCR and Médecins Sans Frontières. The ICRC says it now has enough food in the Byumba to last for 10 days.

In the hilltop schoolhouse, a little girl called Celia is telling her

story. 'Six people in my family were killed. In front of me,' she says, 'in front of my eyes.'

'I was only able to run because the soldiers were killing the others, so they didn't see me run.'

She pauses, thinking of the family whose deaths allowed her to escape to Byumba. 'And when I left the house, I hid among the dead bodies of my neighbours to pretend I was dead.' She then falls silent, looking at the young girl whom nobody knows.

West snubs UN plea for action

8/8

IN RESPONSE to the catastrophic events in Rwanda, the United States is preparing a new humanitarian aid package - but there were no signs this weekend that other countries were willing to respond in any more direct manner to the appeal by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for the Security Council to take "forceful action to restore law and order".

The UN now estimates 250,000 refugees are streaming into neighbouring Tanzania in the "largest and fastest exodus" the UN has ever seen, and Mr Boutros-Ghali has asked the Security Council to consider sending an extensive force to end the killings.

But neither the United States nor any of the other Western powers favour such action. They recall the political and military mess that resulted in intervention in Somalia, and they believe any UN effort to end the violence between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi tribes in Rwanda could be even more disastrous.

Earlier this month Mr Boutros-Ghali gave the Security Council three options on its peace-keeping mission in Rwanda: send in a large force, leave a token force to distribute the humanitarian aid, or pull out altogether. Lately, the Clinton administration fa-

From Peter Pirngie
in New York

voured a complete withdrawal, but was persuaded by its UN ambassador, Madeleine Albright, to back the token force. A contingent of 270 troops remains in the country.

Privately, Western diplomats say the idea of sending a larger force is simply unrealistic. Nor even the non-aligned countries have been prepared to provide troops for such a risky mission. Mr Boutros-Ghali's report made the member states even more nervous. He told the Security Council that "a new conception" is that both the Tutsi rebels and the Hutu government forces have grown suspicious of the impartiality of the UN peace-keeping mission and are refusing to co-operate.

In his letter, the Secretary-General added that there is "strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but enjoy little effective protection. Massacres continue on a large scale in the countryside".

UN officials here said they had received reports from neighbouring Burundi of massacres in the north of that country, suggesting the tribal

fighting may be spreading into Burundi, which also has a long history of conflict between its own Hutus and Tutsis.

This weekend, the US has sent a State Department official from Tanzania to the Rwandan border to evaluate the situation. In Washington, officials are preparing a renewed humanitarian effort to cope with the flow of refugees - C-130 transport aircraft are ready to fly relief supplies into Tanzania. Whether the US effort direct aid depends on the report from the border, officials said.

The number of refugees was expected by the Red Cross to swell to half a million. The UN refugee agency in Geneva reported columns more than five miles long at the border with Tanzania. The agency said it had food and medical supplies, including blankets and tents, sufficient for 50,000.

Through their subdued response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the Western powers again face the charge of considering white lives - as in Bosnia - more precious than black. But the UN troops were sent to Rwanda as part of an effort by the former colonial power, Belgium, to resolve the crisis. Even if the Security Council had voted to enlarge the blue helmet force, the UN would not have been able to move fast enough to prevent the violence.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

1994 MAY 3 06 15
MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. KMF643

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: LGEN ABOO, FC, UNOSOM MOGADISHU	FROM: MGEN DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: <u>MIR/ MISC 478</u>	DATE: <u>2 MAY 94</u>
ATTN:	PHONE: 2-3092
FAX NO: 873-151-2473 <u>3-3082</u>	FAX NO: 212-963-6666/3090
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BUSSIERE/CMPO FILE REF:
Internal Dist.: DFC	
SUBJECT: REST AND RECUPERATION IN NAIROBI FOR UNAMIR TROOPS	
REFERENCE:	

1. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT UNOSOM HAS ESTABLISHED A R AND R CENTRE IN NAIROBI. UNAMIR HAS A STRENGTH OF 459 TROOPS, INCLUDING SOME 246 MIL OBSERVERS. I WOULD APPRECIATE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAMIR SHARING YOUR ESTABLISHED R AND R CENTRE IN NAIROBI, STARTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MILOBS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUP, IT WOULD BE ONLY FOR THE STAFF AND TROOPS OF UNAMIR.

2. IF YOU AGREE, I WILL ASK MY CMPO TO DEAL WITH YOURS TO SORT OUT DETAILS. I AM LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A SMALL NUMBER OF PERS PER WEEK, FOR A MAXIMUM OF THREE DAYS/TWO NIGHTS PER PERS. MY CMPO CAN BE REACHED IN KIGALI VIA THE UNOSOM SWITCHBOARD BY DIALING 2-3092.

3. YOUR EARLY ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

Seen
JG
11/5
DFC/COS

FL (DFC) F/DIR

UNAMIR
1994 MAY - 3 06 18



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

2 May 1994

To: HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
Deputy Force Commander
UNAMIR-Kigali

From: Ally H. Golo,
Officer in Charge of Administration
UNAMIR-Kigali

Subject: Daily Allowance

1. Thank you for your letter 1000.7(DFC) /A/1 and previous correspondence on the form and modalities of payment with regard to the daily allowance for incidental personal expenses payable to contingent personnel at a rate of \$ 1.28 per person per day.
2. It is my intention to finalize the issue soonest and to find a way that will satisfy the need and interests of the military personnel involved. I intend to recommend to FOD New York that authority be given to UNAMIR to settle these claims locally and in US dollar, while the situation remains unstable.
3. In order to comply with existing United Nations Financial Rules and Regulations, the UNAMIR Finance Section will require a detailed personnel list indicating, inter alia, names and duration of tour of duty with UNAMIR. Therefore, I should be grateful if you would please direct the Office of the Chief Military Personnel to prepare such list and forward it to me as soon as convenient.
4. I will revert the moment I receive confirmation from FOD.

①
②
CMPC
Use for action as
indicated in para 3.
GSC 02/05
MA to DFC

MA
Seen - Get a copy of this and
the CMPC's action letter
to the National seniors
HJ
11/5
DFC/cos

UNAMIR

KMF629

1/2

UNAMIR

94 MAY -2 07:19

OUTGOING FASCIMILE

TO: PHILIP MITNICK CCLOGO/UNAMIR/NAIROBI KENYA	FROM: LT-COL PK NYAAKU CLOGO/UNAMIR/KIGALI
PREFIX NO MISC-469	DATE: 02 MAY 1994
ATTN:	PHONE: 3-3092
FAX NO	FAX NO 3-3090
INFO: ALLY GOLO OIC ADMIN/UNAMIR NAIROBI/KENYA	
INFO: FAX NO 254-622508	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, DFC, CAO	
SUBJECT: UTILIZATION OF FLIGHTS TO KIGALI	
NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES: 2	

REFERENCE:

A. MIR/NAI-X1 DATED 29 APRIL 1994.

1. REFERENCE PARA 2 OF REF A ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY FOR AIRLIFTING OF ITEMS TO UNAMIR KIGALI IS REQUESTED.

A. PRIORITY ONE

- (1) CLEANING MATERIALS
- (2) STATIONERY
- (3) FRESH RATION (TO INCLUDE RICE, POTATOES, CORNED BEEF, TINNED FISH ETC) LESS FROZEN ITEMS.
- (4) NIGHT VISION GOGGLES FOR INDIVIDUAL TROOPS SHORT RANGE OBSERVATION AND PATROLLING - QTY 50
- (5) LONG RANGE OBSERVATION DEVICE - QTY 20

FC

DFC

CAO

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11/5
DFC/COS

94 MAY -2 08 00

UNAMIR

2/2

B. PRIORITY TWO

- (1) COMPO RATION
- (2) DRINKING WATER
- (3) DEFENCE STORES
- (4) GASOLINE
- (5) MEDICAL SUPPLIES

2. ONLY ONE CONTAINER FREEZER (POWERED BY DIESEL ENGINE) IS WORKING AT THE MOMENT. REST ARE NOT FUNCTIONING DUE TO DAMAGED FUSE AND CONTROL BOX TO THE MAINS SUPPLYING ELECTRICITY TO THE FREEZERS. SUGGEST YOU SUSPEND SENDING FROZEN ITEMS UNTIL DAMAGED ELECTRICAL ITEMS RECTIFIED.

3. IT WILL BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED IF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE ALSO DESPATCHED TO US:

- | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|
| A. MATTRESSES | - | QTY 50 |
| B. SLEEPING BAGS | - | QTY 15 |
| C. TEA CUPS & SAUCERS | - | QTY 3 DOZENS |
| D. CANNED BEER | - | QTY 600 CARTONS/CRATES |
| E. ELECTRIC KETTLE (PHILIPS) | - | QTY 15 |
| F. LEATHER GLOVES | - | QTY 50 PAIRS (FOR HANDLING CONCERTINA & BARBED WIRES) |
| G. BLANKETS | - | QTY 50 |
| H. PILLOWS | - | QTY 50 |
| I. BEDSHEET | - | QTY 100 |
| J. PILLOW CASES | - | QTY 100 |
| K. MALARIA PREVENTIVE TABS | - | QTY 3000 TABS |
| L. BUCKETS (PLASTIC) | - | QTY 100 |

4. STANDING BY. BEST REGARDS.



INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

File.

To: See Distribution


File Ref:

From: FC

Date: 7 May 1994

Subject: EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL

1. It has been noted with concern that some UNAMIR personnel have been evacuating civilians (mostly Rwandans) using the existing UNAMIR flights on personal initiatives.
2. This practice is prejudicial to the credibility, impartiality and security of the mission and should cease immediately.
3. All are reminded that the authorized agency through which all humanitarian actions are carried out is the Humanitarian Affairs Cell (HAC) at this HQ.
4. All humanitarian requests are therefore to be passed on to this cell for action as appropriate. There is to be no initiatives or promises given unless staffed through HAC. Our security is dependent on it.


RA DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

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