MDR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - SECURITY

26 DEC 1994 - 30 MAR 1995

LEASE RETAIN
IGINAL ORDER

[10 CONFIDENTIAL]
RH/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S1002
BOX 121
FILE 8
ACC. 1998/0783

From : **DCOS OPS** **File No: 3000.12 OPS**

To : **List D less Serials 51 & 52**

Date : **30 Mar 95**

Subject : **CAMP SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS**

1. In order to adhere to the Force Commander's guidance at his conference of 28 Mar 95, an enhance of security of all military camps and an increase in control of unauthorised movement of troops is required. Unit Commanders must ensure that the following measures are effected :

a. Sentry posts are to be manned by a minimum of 2 soldiers who should be rotated and supervised from a central guardroom.

b. Duty Officers and guard/sentry commanders must inspect/visit all guard post on a frequent but irregular basis.

c. Written orders should be placed at all sentry posts, and sentries should be thoroughly briefed on these orders before they take up their duties. The brief among others, should cover the UNAMIR ROE, state of weapon readiness and orders for opening fire.

d. All soldiers should be conversant with the challenging/warning procedure in KINYARWANDA, ENGLISH and FRENCH, ie they should be taught to say STOP-HANDS UP and STOP OR I WILL SHOOT in **FRENCH** and **KINYARWANDA**.

e. A log book or ledger for recording the activities of Duty Officers should be maintained.

f. A control register for booking soldiers in and out is to be established to monitor their activities and movements when off duty.

g. Unit Commanders are to ensure that all gaps in perimeter fences are closed as a matter of priority to prevent illicit travel through them.

2. For your compliance.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION N° 011/95

DATE: 27 March 1995

TO: All UNAMIR Personnel
Civilian, Military, CIVPOL and MILOBs

FROM: Ally H. Golo, Officer-in-Charge
Administration

SUBJECT: **Security of UNAMIR Vehicles**

1. Further to the previous Administrative Instructions issued on this subject, please be advised that effective 27 March 1995, all personnel to whom UNAMIR vehicles are assigned will be required to park their vehicles in the compound of the Amahoro Hotel, in the parking area of premises where UNAMIR provides security such as the Belgian Village, the Chez Lando, Trafipro or in areas where security is provided by the establishment such as the Meridien, in the absence of their being able to provide secure overnight parking at their residences. For those in a position to secure overnight parking at their residences, a statement to this effect should be sent to the CTO with copy to the Chief of Security and Safety Unit, attesting to and describing such an arrangement. These parking areas mush be utilized during the hours from the cessation of official duties in the evening (including a reasonable time for shopping and meals) to resumption of duties on the following morning.

2. To assist the personnel affected by this instruction, a shuttle bus each will be available at Trafipro and Amahoro Hotel to take staff to their residences. Those buses will depart Trafipro and Amahoro Hotel every hour on the hour between 18:00 hours and 21:00 hours. Owing to the prevailing security situation in Rwanda all UNAMIR vehicles must be parked at 21:00 hours, except whe . exigencies of work or operational needs require that a vehicle be driven beyond that hour.

3. Not under any circumstances should UNAMIR vehicles be parked unattended, on streets or outside discos or night clubs during the hours of darkness or for prolonged periods during daytime, unless securely guarded. Loss of or damage to UNAMIR vehicles, while parked unattended in areas other than those outlined in paragraph 1 above will be regarded as being the direct responsibility of the driver or custodian of the vehicle, who will be requested to make financial restitution to the United Nations for such loss or damage.

4. When leaving the car unattended the driver must ensure that all doors, windows and trunk lids are securely locked. During overnight parking, the vehicle must be parked in a safe place such as a garage, or in a well lighted guarded area. Overnight parking at the airport will under no circumstances be permitted. The keys should never be left in an unattended vehicle.

5. All incidents of theft from/or damage to UNAMIR vehicles must be reported immediately to the Transport Section and Security Office.

6. In instances where staff to whom vehicles are assigned depart the immediate area of their assignment, their vehicles must be handed over with their keys to their immediate successor within the same section, should he/she not already have a vehicle. In the event that this is not necessary, the vehicle with its keys should be delivered to the Chief Transport Section. This will allow an opportunity for maintenance and utilization of the vehicle as may be deemed necessary.

7. Failure to observe the foregoing simple requirements, resulting from which vehicles are damaged or from which items are stolen, may cause the personnel to whom the vehicles were assigned, to have to make financial restitution to the United Nations, should subsequent Survey Board actions result in the determination that they have been negligent.

8. Your strict adherence to this Administrative Instruction will be much appreciated.

FROM : DCOS (OPS) FILE : 5000.1 (Plans)

TO : TAC HQ (OPS OFFR)
COMD SECTOR 1
COMD SECTOR 2
COMD SECTOR 3
COMD SECTOR 4A
COMD SECTOR 4B
COMD SECTOR 4C
COMD SECTOR 5
COMD SECTOR 6
OC MALAWI COY
OC MALICOY
CO AUSMED
CO 95 FLSG
G 3 OPS
G 3 ENGRS
G 3 AIR
DCMO, MIL OB GP HQ
CHIEF SECURITY OFFR, UNAMIR
UNDP FSO
B & R, SECURITY MANAGER

cc
Pse give a copy to the Camp Comdt.
27/3

INFO : MA TO FC
DFC
COS
DCOS (Sp)

cc
Treated.
27/3

DATE : 27 MAR 95

SUBJECT : SEMINAR ON SECURITY PLANS

1. The DCOS Ops will host the above seminar on 31 Mar 95 (Friday) at the conference room, UNAMIR HQ from 1000 hrs to 1200 hrs.

2. All the Sector Commanders, Unit COs or OCs and their ops officers are requested to attend.

3. Heli arrangements for the seminar in as follows;

	LOC	ETA	ETD
a.	Kigali	-----	0715 hrs
b.	Mutura	0750 hrs	0755 hrs
c.	Kibuye	0810 hrs	0815 hrs
d.	Cyangugu	0840 hrs	0845 hrs
e.	Gikongoro	0905 hrs	0910 hrs
f.	Kigali	0930 hrs	1200 hrs (Departure)

27/3

27/3

② G3 Ops / Note to File 3000.12

* Mtg 29 1000 Mar 94 with CFO
CSO
G3 Ops
A/PM
Ops O Indbatt

30 Mar pick up (KIA → NIA → KIA)
2x MP in uni / w wpns
1x Civ CSO " " (sign for dip bag)
1x CFO (once only)

at KIA
1x CSO
1x CFO Rep
} meet AC - others (above) thru immigr'n

2x Indbatt escorts meet at KIA barrier
1 veh front & back.

*

Seen
Please file

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Post Office Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
Voice (250) 84265
Fax (250) 86877

TO: COLONEL SIVAKUMAR KASEYAP, CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: ALLY GOLO, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

COPY: PAUL MCNEILL, CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER
PAUL ISCHLIKA, CHIEF SECURITY SERVICES SECTION

DATE: 25 MARCH 1995

SUBJECT: SECURITY FOR FINANCE SECTION

This memorandum will confirm the conversation and you, Colonel Tutt, and Paul McNeill have had regarding providing security services to the Finance Section.

We request your assistance in several areas:

(1) Collection and transportation of currency from the Nairobi airport to the Kigali airport

(2) Transportation of that currency from the Kigali airport to the Cashier's office in the Amahoro Hotel

(3) Overnight protection of the Cashier's office until the disbursement of staff officer allowances, troop allowances, MSA, and salaries has been completed

(4) Transportation of Finance Officers to selected sectors to disburse MSA and salaries

These services would first be needed for the monthly payroll cycle which begins at the end of next week. I understand that a reconnaissance trip has already been taken to Nairobi by a member of your staff for this purpose.

Would you please assign an officer to work directly with Paul McNeill and Paul Ischlika on this matter?

Thank you for your cooperation.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: CISS through CC LOG O

Info: DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
CSO

From: Force PM

Date: 25 Mar 95

Subject: CIVILIAN SECURITY GUARDS

1. Thank you for inviting my comments on the suggested scale of security guards at assorted UNAMIR premises. This is not really my field but immediate thoughts are that the contract should provide for:

a. A specified number of guards by day and by night - say, 0800 to 1800 hrs and 1800 hrs to 0800 hrs, as in the HRFOR contract - at each site. Some of the CSO's figures seem very generous (I would have suggested 2 for each MILOB site, for example, rather than 6) but I do not know the basis of his calculation or whether he has budgeted for the shift cycle. Despite what we discussed earlier, closer reading of his minute suggests to me that he has not. The length of shifts is not however, to my mind, of any consequence provided it does not exceed the point at which exhaustion degrades the guards' performance; what matters is to have an adequate number available to meet prevailing conditions.

b. The contractor to provide (and, therefore, to assume responsibility for) flashlights, uniforms, boots, foul-weather clothing, whistles and batons.

c. A job description specifying the standard to be met. One possibility is to prevent intrusion but this requires a higher level of manning than if the requirement is to deter intrusion, to report it and assist the RRF in apprehending intruders. Additional considerations are:

(1) Static or patrolling guards? Or a mixture, depending on the site?

(2) Guards to check the credentials of visitors?

(3) Be armed or not? (I suggest not!)

(4) Guards to log the movements of visitors and/or vehicles?

d. Supervision - although we might also stipulate that guards will be visited by INDBATT troops, and others.

30/3

e. The avenues through which complaints can be discussed and/or rectified.

f. Who provides indemnity against accident and injury caused to the guard whilst on the site or patrolling around it, perhaps by intruders.

g. The liability of the guard company if property is damaged/lost through its failure to perform its duties or if its guards prove to be the culprits.

2. A radio net could be provided by the company or by UNAMIR but the latter would, provided adequate training is given, facilitate the fastest callout of the RRF. If we provide the radios, however, we stand to lose them and to increase the risk of eavesdropping.

3. Some sites might require the provision of sentry boxes, some basic furniture (a chair or 2 and a desk?) and lighting; perhaps these items should come from the security company - and be specified in the contract?

4. I am sure that this is not complete but, in the short time available, think it might help; I hope it does.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Seen DCOS OPS 30.3

TO: TO ALL UNAMIR/ AGENCIES PERSONNEL

DATE: 24 March, 1995
Ref.: UNAMIR/SO/058

FROM: PAUL ISCHLIKA
CSO/ASC

SUBJECT: SECURITY AWARENESS BULLETIN OF CURRENT SITUATION VOL. 3

The current security situation has necessitated the production of this news bulletin in order to appraise staff members of the over all security situation in Kigali, and Rwanda in general. It is hoped that UNAMIR personnel will take this information to heart and adjust their movements accordingly.

1. **GENERAL:**

The overall security situation in Rwanda although is relatively calm, but is still of serious concern, particularly with the rising tension experienced over the last two of weeks. Incidents of hostility in the Refugee camps still continue unabated, and UNAMIR military positions in some of the sectors have come under grenade attacks resulting in serious injuries to UNAMIR military personnel.

Aid Agencies are also undergoing searches at RPA check points as they travel to the sectors. UN personnel are regularly stopped and searched at these check points without consideration for their status as United Nations personnel. UN Laissez-passers, UNAMIR ID cards, and United Nations marked vehicles do not exempt them from these searches. Vehicles, bags, personal belongings, official documents, and even diplomatic bags are all subjected to these searches. The frequency and degree of search is now far beyond the search for weapons. The most common areas are between Gisenyi and Cyangugu, and Kibungo and Rusumo.

Arriving and departing perssangers at the Kigali International Airport are also equally subjected to similar searches, and most often, asked to pay custom duties on personal effects.

The office of the SRSG is fully aware of the situation and "NOTE VERBALES" on the issue have been sent to the Foreign Ministry as letters of protest, but to no avail.

31/3

2. **KIGALI:**

The security situation in Kigali and its environs had remained calm for quite sometime. However it seems to have deteriorated in the last two weeks with threats against UN personnel and hijacking of UNAMIR vehicles being reported. The following are highlights of some of the incidents.

(a) There has recently been an increase in the number of road blocks and check points mounted by the RPA around the city, particularly at night, sometimes starting at 1900 hrs. As usual, these road blocks are put up in most cases with empty crates and are not lit to be seen from afar. Again, UN vehicles do not escape the searches at these check points. Intensified routine foot, and mobile patrols around the city however continue at night as well.

(b) In sector 5, Tunbatt HQ. in Ruhengeri came under grenade attack from unidentified gunmen, and 8 military personnel were injured, 4 seriously.

(c) On the night of Sunday March 5, Nibatt HQ in Byumba also came under grenade attack by unknown persons in which 2 Nigerian military personnel sustained minor injuries. The cause for the attack is unknown.

(d) On Sunday 26, February 1995 at about 5.15 pm, 3 UNAMIR International Civilian staff driving in a UNAMIR vehicle were fired upon with an automatic weapon by an unknown person, on the Ruhengeri/Kigali road, less than 10 km from Kigali. The front tire exploded as the bullet pierced through it, but the staff members never stopped. The gunman in desperation continued shooting at the vehicle as they sped away. Fortunately there were no injuries.

(e) On Wednesday March 8, one Nigerian Civpol Officer was physically attacked by three unidentified armed men at his residence between 1900 and 1930 hrs. The location was Kiyovu Rugenge in Kigali. His vehicle UNAMIR # 1144 was taken away with his motorola radio, a wrist watch and US$300 in cash.

(f) Another UNAMIR International Civilian staff of the Transport Section was attacked by 3 RPA soldiers at his residence in Remera, at about 1930 hrs on 14 March, 1995.

At gunpoint, he was blindfolded and all his personal belongings taken away. For some strange reason, they did not take his vehicle. Losses were estimated at US$4885. The matter is being investigated by the military police.

(g) Another UNAMIR International civilian staff was chased a few days ago by 4 unidentified men in a small red jeep all around Kigali at night. The chase started from the foot of the hill at Chez Lando Hotel and continued through the city. The staff member made a series of evasive moves and confirmed. He however decided to make his way back to Chez Lando hotel, and as soon as he entered the car park, his assailants drove off.

(h) On Saturday 18 March Human Rights Land Cruiser # 1926HR was reported stolen outside a UN house in Kimihurura.

(i) On Sunday evening, 19 March, 3 armed men attempted to steal Human Rights vehicle # 1907HR from the Human Rights house at Rugenge in Kigali. The attempt was foiled when the vehicle broke down. The incedent was witnessed by the local guard.

(j) The latest incident was in Byumba in the early hours of Monday 20 March 1995, between 0100 and 0130 hrs, when a Nigerian Guard on sentry duty shot and killed an attacker, while the second one was arrested by the duty officer. Both were later identified to be local staff members of Brown & Root working in Byumba.

3. **ARREST OF UNITED NATIONS LOCAL STAFF MEMBERS:**

There has been an increase in arrests of UN local staff members by the RPA, all held on charges of genocide. The number has increased from 4 in February in Kigali central prisons to 6, with 3 more held in the gendarmerie stations in the city. In addition to the above, a UNAMIR translator was arrested and finally released.

4. **KANOMBE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - KIGALI:**

The Rwandese airport authorities have expressed their growing concern over the number of UNAMIR staff members attempting to enter the airport. Airport rules and regulations must be followed, and no unauthorised vehicles are allowed inside the airport.

Entering the airport without the appropriate ID cards, and vehicles passes, driving on the ramp to meet aircraft, driving across the runway without permission from the control tower, as well as receiving VIPs and baggage are to cease immediately.

Searching of personal effects of UN staff members with valid UN Laissez-passer, to the airport authorities, is a routine exercise, though its a violation of the status mission agreement between the UN and the Rwandese Government.

5. ROAD ACCIDENTS:

Vehicle accidents are on the increase. UNAMIR personnel should drive with extreme caution at all times.

The RPA drivers are contributing factors who have little or no regard for traffic rules. Nearly all road accidents that involve UN vehicles, the UN staff member is always held responsible even where he/she is not at fault. The investigations and findings are always one-sided, and in which case the staff member has no redress. All staff members are advised to be very careful on the roads, obey all road signs, and have due concern for all road blocks and the officers manning them; and above all, to observe speed limits. Remember the MPs are on the roads, and have been empowered to impound vehicles flaunting the rules. **PLEASE ALSO REMEMBER THAT IF YOU DRINK, DON'T DRIVE.**

6. THE ISSUE OF UNAMIR ID CARDS

The issue of UNAMIR ID cards has come under serious criticisms by the Rwandese authorities hence the curtailing of our privileges and immunities by them. In order to streamline the issuing of ID cards, the SRSG has decided that the following action be taken;

(a) That UNAMIR will cease issuing ID cards to the following:

(i) All UN Agencies except for the Human Rights and members of the International Tribune;

(ii) All Foreign Embassies in Kigali

(iii) All Registered Contractors with UNAMIR, except for the International Contract staff in the interim.

(b) That all the existing UNAMIR cards will be withdrawn by the respective Agencies/Contract Companies as soon as they have devised their own system, and return them to the ID card section at UNAMIR HQ.

7. STANDARDS OF CONDUCTS:

In order not to lose sight of our moral code of conduct as International civil servants, all staff are reminded of the Administrative Instructions issued in August 1994, and recently reproduced by the Chief of Administration on 9 March, 1995 including the following headlines;

Local Laws, Regulations and Customs
Currency Regulations
Photography
Privately Owned Weapons
War Souvenirs
Hunting and Shooting
Contact with Local Population
Handling of Information
Consumption and disposal of Drugs
Consumption of Alcohol
Driving

8. **SECURITY:**

Having gone at length to remind staff members of the deteriorating security situation that is currently prevailing in Rwanda as a whole, I would like to conclude by strictly warning all members of staff to restrict their movements particularly at night, to keep off the streets, and to be at their residences not later 8 pm.

For the benefit of our new staff members I would like to reproduce our Security Guidelines recalled from our earlier edition of the Security Awareness bulletin, most of which is also found in the Security Pamphlet issued to you on your arrival;

SECURITY GUIDELINES:

(i) Carry your ID card with you at all times. If you are issued with a Motorola Radio, you are advised to carry it with you as well.

(ii) Avoid going out on your own and staying out too late at night. It is advisable that you go out in groups of two or more and where possible, go in convoys of two or more vehicles.

(iii) Avoid driving at night in remote and isolated areas in the city. Know safe streets and routes.

(iv) Avoid using local taxis and privately owned cars particularly at night, except if you know the private car owner. Should you be forced to use a local taxi, you must always be in the company of somebody you know and trust too well. Relying on Registration number plates of taxis is not enough.

(v) Should you be attacked, you should always try to be calm and firm, and courteous. Never show signs of stress and intimidation, even though you may feel intimidated.

(vi) It is always in your best interest to yield to the demands of your attackers and where possible establish some kind of rapport with them.

(vii) Stop only at established road blocks/check points, and avoid giving lifts to non UN personnel. Do not stop at hand signals of any kind at night, especially in suspicious circumstances and areas.

(viii) Should you be trailed at night, avoid heading for your residence especially if it is a distance away from you. You should always try to head for Public houses especially where there is crowd and call for help on your radio describing your exact location.

(ix) Above all, please do not discard **"COMMON SENSE"** as it will assist you to appreciate the situation on the ground, make sensible deductions and take decisions in your best interest. **REMEMBER YOUR LIFE COMES FIRST.**

You can call for help on the following channels and callsigns:-

Civilian Security

(i) Channel 11
Callsign " Sierra Oscar 1 through 9 "
between 0830 and 1800 hrs.
Monday -Saturday.
Telephone # 84268 Exts. 11130/11135/11073

Military

(ii) Military Duty Officer
UNAMIR HQ - Amahoro
Channel 4, or 8 after 1800 hrs.
Callsign " Zero "
Telephone # 84268 Ext 11150

(iii) Indian Battalion (Indbatt)
Channel 4
Callsign 6
Telephone # 84268 Exts. 11217/11218
Rwandatel: # 76803

(iv) Military Police Duty Officer
Channel 4
Callsign " Escort Zero "
Telephone # 84268 Ext.86855/86856

(v) Force Provost Marshal
Channel 4
Callsign " Papa Mike "
Telephone # 84268 Ext. 11108

UNAMIR MILITARY RAPID REACTION FORCE (RRF):

For the general information of all staff members, there is also the Rapid Reaction Force specially tasked to react to all emergency situations within a short timeframe, and is on standby 24 hourly. The **RRF** can be contacted through the **UNAMIR duty officer at UNAMIR HQ Amahoro on channel 4, or channel 8 after 1800 hrs.** or through Indbatt on **channel 4, callsign 6, or call Sierra Oscar between 0830 and 1800 hours.** The callsign for the Rapid Reaction Force is **Romeo Romeo Foxtrot.**

SECURITY PLAN
SECTOR 4-A

24/3

Refs:

A. FHQ 5000.46(Plans) of 26 Dec 94, Contingency Plans.

B. FHQ 5000.46(Plans) of 28 Dec 94, Contingency Plans.

Situation

1. General. The general situation in Gikongoro Prefecture continues to remain calm. However of late the RPA presence has increased, and number of arrests are on the rise. Presence of some former RGF soldiers in the IDP camps has been confirmed as few of them have been apprehended. There has been a spurt in banditry activities involving killings, robbery and extortion. The ever swelling IDP camps in the South, like Kibeho and Ndago are a potential "flash point". The proximity of Burundi border on the South, and the adjacent Sector 4-C on the West, makes our sector conducive for any insurgency activity.

2. Threat. The following types of threat are envisaged in this sector:

A. Laying of mines on the un-metalled roads by former RGF/Interhamwe, with the intention of blowing up RPA vehicles. The milob vehicles may be the unfortunate ones to be affected.

B. Ambush on UNAMIR or RPA vehicles.

C. Kidnapping of milobs to make them hostages, for ulterior motives or subsequent bargaining.

D. Looting of milob houses, and UNAMIR property in the sector HQ office.

E. Full scale War, resulting in anarchy and confusion.

Preventive Measures

3. Against Land Mines.

A. Follow the tyre marks of a vehicle which could be taking the same route. Wherever the tyre marks are not visible, the vehicle should be stopped and the area to be searched. Any signs of fresh dug up earth, indicates the presence of a possible land mine. The area should be cordoned off and the HQ to be informed about the same on the radio. Monitor the sight till the arrival of Engineer team for further action.

Avoid the pot holes with water as a mine could be placed in it.

4. Against Being Ambushed.

A. It is advisable to group with other vehicles, such as those of NGOs and other UN agencies. However grouping with RPA vehicles should be avoided, as they would be the targets.

B. Night driving is forbidden, until the situation demands. Permission for movement of any vehicle in the night has to be obtained from the Sector-Commander.

C. Any vehicle will always have minimum two milobs. Regular communication will be maintained with the Sector HQ.

D. Always avoid set timings and routine.

5. Against Being Kidnapped.

A. Besides the above mentioned precautions, NEVER give lift to un-authorised persons. The keys of the vehicle should never be handed over to the RPA or strangers in any road-block.

B. Avoid driving at night in remote and isolated areas.

C. Stop only at authorised road blocks/check points. Do not stop at any hand signals.

6. Against House Robbery.

A. Before hiring a local servant, ensure proper verification.

B. Keep your belongings always locked. Never display valuable items in front of the servants. When proceeding on CTO, it is advisable to keep valuable items with another milob or with the local UNAMIR battalion.

C. Always keep your passport and money in your possession.

D. Any door knocks in the night should arouse suspicion. Open the door after proper confirmation.

E. The senior of each Milob House, has been provided with a Motorala. Daily Radio check will be carried out with Zambatt Duty Officer, call-sign "Zulu" and with Sector HQ Duty officer,"CR-0". The timings for the radio check are listed at Appendix.

ity Plan : Various Contingencies.

Contingency 1 - Attack/Raid on Any Milob House.

A. Immediate contact to be made on radio with Sector HQ, Duty Officer, (CR-0) and Zambatt Duty Officer (Zulu). The list of all call-signs of the sector and Zambatt are listed at Appendix.

B. Transmit the situation in brief, and indicate the type of assistance required.

C. If there is requirement of formed troops, Zambatt will immediately rush the RRF to the concerned spot.

D. During the night it is the endeavour of the Sector to provide a vehicle to each house. However, because of the acute shortage of the vehicles it may not be possible to provide a vehicle to each house. Whenever the situation demands, and the vehicle is available, the team will immediately use the vehicle for a quick get-away to the Zambatt Tac HQ.

8. Contingency 2 - War Scenario.

A. Adopt plan " OP JASON ", issued by the UNAMIR HQ. This plan entails threatened Sectors falling back to Kigali, for final evacuation from Rwanda or alternately being evacuated to neighbouring countries.

B. Op Jason - Jason Yellow "Evacuation Process".

1. All Milobs to concentrate at Zambatt Tac HQ, in the available vehicles. Zambatt to provide formed troops, for escorting milobs from their houses to the Zambatt Tac HQ.

2. Each milob to be in possession of his Iden card, passport, money and only 15 Kgs of baggage.

3. The LOGO will be responsible to carry all essential stores. The non-essential stores will be destroyed in-situ.

4. At Zambatt, the Pers officer will prepare the flight manifest.

C. Modes of Evacuation to Kigali.

1. By Helicopter. The helipad is located within the premises of the Zambatt Tac HQ, which caters for security. The milobs will embark the helicopter based on the flight manifest. The number of sorties would depend on the capacity of the heptr, and the number of milobs.

2. By Road. The milob vehicles will move as a convoy from the Zambatt Tac HQ. The milobs may form part of the Zambatt convoy. This would depend on the instructions from the UNAMIR HQ. Alternately the milob convoy may be tasked to move separately. In this case the protection will be provided by the Zambatt.

Coordinating Instructions.

9. The Zambatt HQ will be provided with a sketch, showing the location of the milob houses. (Refer to Annexure P). Zambatt will detail some officers and troops, to see these locations on ground, so that they are conversant with all the routes for evacuation.

10. Daily radio check wil be carried out with Zambatt Tac HQ and the Sector HQ. For details of timing , refer to Appendix.

11. Zambatt will continue to provide the guard at the Sector HQ.

12. The Pers Officer should ensure that all the officers have filled up the following forms:

A. Information / Security Plan Listing.

B. Inventory of Personal Effects.

13. A copy of all these forms will be forwarded to the Milob Group HQ by 30 Mar 95.

14. Rehearsals will be conducted, once every month. The modalities of this will be worked out by the Sector Commander and CO Zambatt. The RPA will be informed about the move of the RRF, so as to avoid any confusion/clash.

(E CASTRO)
LT COL
SECTOR COMMANDER

001/OPS/SEC
23 MAR 95

Distribution:

MILOB GROUP HQ
ZAMBATT
HUMAN RIGHTS
UNREO

SECTOR 4 - A
RADIO CALL-SIGNS
CHANNEL 12

HQ

SECTOR-COMMANDER	CR-9
OPS OFFICER	CR-3
LOGISTICS OFFICER	CR-4
PERSONNEL OFFICER	CR-1
DUTY OFFICER	CR-0

TEAMS		REMARKS
TEAM 1	RM-1	THESE CALL SIGNS ARE OF
TEAM 2	RM-2	THE TEAM LEADERS. TEAM
TEAM 3	RM-3	MEMBER HAS LETTER "A"
TEAM 4	RM-4	SUFFIXED, EXAMPLE RM-
TEAM 5	RM-5	1A.
TEAM 6	RM-6	

MILOB HOUSES

HOUSE 1	MH-1	GHANA HOUSE
HOUSE 2	MH-2	OFFICE HOUSE
HOUSE 3	MH-3	FRANCO HOUSE
HOUSE 4	MH-4	INDO-BANGLA HOUSE
HOUSE 5	MH-5	KIGEME HOUSE

ZAMBATT CHANNEL-12 CALL SIGNS

CONTROL/DUTY OFFICER	ZULU
CO	ZULU-9
21C	ZULU-BRAVO
OPS OFFICER	ZULU-CHARLIE
OC A COY (RUNYOMBYI)	ZULU-1
OC B COY (RURAMBA)	ZULU-2
PL CDR (KIBEHO)	ZULU-ONE TWO

NOTE

ALL HOUSES TO CARRY OUT DAILY RADIO CHECK WITH ZULU AT 0600, 2000 AND 2200 HRS.

G-3 OPS

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

URAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: COS

To: List A, B, C, D and E.

Date: 23 March 95

Subject: **RUMOURS IN UNAMIR AOR**

1. It will soon be a year since the commencement of the genocide and the civil war in Rwanda. Rumours of all kinds are therefore expected to be abound within the country in anticipation of the impending anniversary on 7 April. It should be noted that this is not the first time that rumours of imminent attacks and revenge killing have been circulated in the country. Although 7 April has been designated by the Rwanda government a day of remembrance to recollect the atrocities committed during the war, there is no evidence to support the rumours.

2. It is therefore imperative that UN personnel and international staff and organizations in the country should continue to report facts and not be seen to be contributing to the spread of these rumours through misinterpretation and analysis of events that may not be connected to justify preconceived ideas and notions.

3. UN personnel are however, strongly encouraged to reassure the local population that UNAMIR troops, in conjunction with security agencies of Rwanda, are doing everything possible to maintain a favourable security environment in the country during this period.

4. For your necessary attention and action please.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

From: DCOS Ops

To: DCMO

Info: COS
PM
CSO

Date: 23 March 95

Subject: SECURITY AT MILOB GP HQ

1. Neither INDBATT nor the UN MP Coy will be able to provide guards at MILOB GP HQ as requested due to manpower constraints.

2. Plans are however well under way to employ local civilians as security guards for all UN installations in Kigali which are currently not being provided security by formed troops.

3. Until the above mentioned arrangements are in place, it is requested that two Duty Officers are detailed at night at MILOB GP HQ. In addition, Duty Officers should be instructed to call out the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) promptly to deal with intrusions by unauthorized persons.

4. Submitted for your necessary attention.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM: DCOS OPS

3000.12(Ops)

TO: GHANBATT
SENBATT
ZAMBATT
ETHIOBATT
TUNBATT
FORCE ENGR COY

INFO: INDBATT
UNHCR
NIBATT
MALAWICOY
MALICOY

DATE: 23 MAR 95

SUBJECT: **PROVISION OF SECURITY TO UNHCR**

1. UNHCR has requested UNAMIR to provide security for its installations in Cyangugu, Gisenyi, Gikongoro, Butare, Kigali and Kibungo from 05 to 10 April 95.

2. In view of the above, formed troops will provide security to the UNHCR compounds within their sectors from 05 to 10 April 95 and are requested to liaise with UNHCR reps in their respective AORs.

3. **SENBATT Only.** As the UNHCR staff and office premises are located separately in Butare, you are requested to ensure that adequate security is provided to both places.

4. **Force Engr Coy.** You are requested to provide security to the UNHCR compound in Kigali during the above mentioned period.

5. Action addressees are to indicate action taken in their daily SITREPS as of 05 April 95.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM: DCOS OPS

3000.12(Ops)

TO: GHANBATT
SENBATT
ZAMBATT
ETHIOBATT
TUNBATT
FORCE ENGR COY

INFO: INDBATT
UNHCR
NIBATT
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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

From: SO2 OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

To: RPA LO

Date: 22 Mar 95

Subject: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO MOUNT KARONGI

1. Due to change over of locations between SENBATT and MALAWICOY, there is need to re-configure communication resources in order to maintain effective operational control.

2. Inview of the above, permission is sought from you for our Force Signals officer with his technicians to install a repeater at Mount Karongi on 28 Mar 95.

3. For your consideration.

(1) DCOS (OPS)

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: List A, B, C and D

DATE: 21 Mar 95

SUBJECT: SEARCHING OF UNAMIR VEHICLES BY RPA

1. Under SOMA, all UNAMIR vehicles are exempted from being searched by RPA.

2. UNAMIR vehicles will only be searched by RPA in very exceptional circumstances when security agencies have reason to believe that a UNAMIR vehicle is being used to carry illegal cargo, which is likely to cause insecurity in the country.

3. For your information.

(2) G3 Ops

CLO

Pls ensure that RPA LO is aware that they must have strong & reasonable grounds prior to commencing a search of UNAMIR vehicles.

DCOS OPS
21-3

(4) CC

Confirm you have sent a copy to the RPA LO

22/3

(3) CC

Treated

22/3

NATIONS UNIES
HAUT COMMISSARIAT
POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS

UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

Télégrammes : HICOMREF
Télex : 415740 UNHCR CH
Téléphone : 739 81 11
Téléfax : 731 95 46

Case postale 2500
CH-1211 Genève 2 Dépôt

② We need to give protection. Grateful if FC could co-ordinate through his staff with UNHCR.
FC. Scaling D. Khan 22.3

HCRRWA/REP/95/0262

CONFIDENTIAL

21 March 1995

Seen by FC
23/3

Dear Ambassador Khan,

With reference to earlier discussions, in particular the meeting of 13 March 1995 in your Office, I should like to request a 24-hour UNAMIR presence at all UNHCR compounds in Rwanda, between 5 and 10 April next.

The compounds are located in Cyangugu, Gisenyi, Gikongoro, Butare, Kigali and Kibungo. Except in Butare, staff and office premises are co-located in the same compound.

We realize that many rumors, which are currently circulating, may be unfounded, or even deliberately spread. However, we have sufficient reason to remain concerned, especially in Kigali and Butare but also elsewhere.

We would therefore appreciate receiving UNAMIR's assistance, through a discreet presence of UNAMIR soldiers inside our compounds, which would however be able to provide adequate security in case of difficulties.

Thanking you for your understanding in this matter, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

W. van Hovell
Representative a.i.

UNITED NATIONS * HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES *

H.E. Ambassador Khan
SRSG
UNAMIR

cc: General M. Tousignant
Force Commander
Kigali

SRSG Ops 2
Pls write to all Sectors tasking formed troops accordingly [illegible] 23/3

④ G3 Ops
Send msg tasking units in accordance with dir at min ③.
DCOS Ops
22.3

24/3

From: UNAMIR HQ OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

To: List A, B, C and D

Date: 21 Mar 95

Subject: **SECURITY OF UNAMIR VEHICLES**

1. Of late, a number of UNAMIR vehicles have been reported stolen from UNAMIR personnel.

2. To ensure security of UNAMIR vehicles, the following measures have been effected.

a. Vehicles will be locked at all times when individuals leave them.

b. Vehicles will only be parked at places considered safe during silent hours and will be parked at guarded places.

3. For your information and necessary action.

21/3

22/

G3 OPS

From: UNAMIR HQ OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

To: List A, B, C and D

Date: 21 Mar 95

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a. Vehicles will be locked at all times when individuals leave them.

b. Vehicles will only be parked at places considered safe during silent hours and will be parked at guarded places.

3. For your information and necessary action.

-QUE
361 KIGALI
: 8 2569
AX : 8 4172
RWANDA

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES

Kigali, le 17 mars 1995

Réf : 025/UE/ADMIN/VC/95

6600

Dear sirs,

Please find enclosed herewith an updated list of our expatriate staff in Kigali. The number of the houses are referring to a map sent with a letter on the 26th of september.

NAME	NATIONALITY	PASS N°	LOCATION
- Barbara Kerstiëns	Hollandaise	0409792	House 5
- Hervé Remiche	Belge	186805	House 5
- Sophie Maes	Belge	480881	House 5
- Sophie Moëckli	Suisse	7420143	House 3
- Valérie Oudar	Cannadienne	181676	House 4
- Valérie Callier	Belge	373428	House 3
- Stephane Ozun	Française	43977	House 1
- Florence Ozun	Tchadienne	017355	House 1
- Yvan Hildebrand	Belge	949110	House 1
- Albert Brizio	Italienne	3800719	House 3
- Karin De Jonge	Hollandaise	0194112	Butare
- Anne Balligand	Française	7203914965	Butare
- Jean-François Minet	Belge	391413	Butare
- Christiane Wietfeld	Allemande	1530066782	Butare
- Christine Von Linthoudt	Belge	527806	Butare
- Johan Van Schreeb	Suèdoise	167441	Butare
- Karin Vandebroek	Belge	503889	Butare
- Kirsty Sinervo	Suèdoise	144999	Butare
- Brigitte Gigot	Belge	225261	Gisenyi
- Gregory Peruch	Française	14458	Gisenyi
- Pierre-Olivier Pinguet	Française	89493	Gisenyi
- Isabelle Wolff	Belge	84555	Gisenyi
- Caroline Compper	Française		Gisenyi
- Marianne Peter	Danoise	001691750	Gisenyi
- Danny De Kuyper	Belge	623800	Gisenyi
- Martin Desmet	Belge	170619	Gisenyi
- Dorit Langergaard	Danoise	000095890	Gisenyi
- Xavier Grieken	Belge	071650	Gisenyi
- Etienne Van Steenberghe	Belge	641647	Gisenyi

Sincerely yours,

Valérie CALLIER

cc
Copy to duty officers
21/3

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES IS A PRIVATE, INTERNATIONAL, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATION
MEDICOS SIN FRONTERAS ES UNA ORGANIZATION HUMANITARIA, PRIVADA E INTERNATIONAL
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES EST UNE ORGANISATION HUMANITAIRE, PRIVEE ET INTERNATIONALE

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: CAO

Date: Kigali, 17/3/1995

Ref: CIVPOL/MEMO/248/95

FROM: CIVPOL Commissioner

Info: SRSG, OSRSG/CIVPOL Liaison Officer, DCOS (Ops)

Subject: REQUEST FOR SECURITY GUARDS

1. As you are aware the Indbatt Armed Guards providing security at CIVPOL HQ from 18.00 to 06.00 hrs have been withdrawn.

2. In view of this, a memo was sent to the Force Commander requesting for their continued services as the present strength of CIVPOL may not be possible to detail additional personnel to provide security. The need to request for six (6) hiring security guards to man CIVPOL HQ during the above-stated hours cannot be over-emphasized in order to guarantee the safety of equipments in the premises. (Attached are copies of correspondence on the issue.)

3. Your earliest response to this request would be highly appreciated.

4. Regards.

CC

Passed over to DCOS OPS

18/3

Seen 19.3

Seen 25/3

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: CIVPOL Commissioner

From: Force Commander

Info: SRSG, OSRSG/CIVPOL Liaison/DCOS(Ops)

Date: 16 March 1995

Subject: Withdrawal of Indbatt Armed Guards

Reference:

A: UNAMIR HQ OPS's Memo dated 14 Mar 95
B: CIVPOL/MEMO/236/95 dated 15 Mar 95

1. Indbatt which is responsible for Sector 6, and includes the city of Kigali, is composed of two rifle companies and a HQ company. With this only 18 Inf Sections worth of troops could be made available for a variety of duties. Presently, the Battalion is providing up to 21 Sections of troops, by pulling out manpower from HQ/administrative elements, which cannot go on for ever.

2. I would recommend that you organise the security of CIVPOL HQ by either positioning additional personnel or hiring security guards for which provisions exist.

3. Regards.

QL/st

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Force Commander
A:

Date: Kigali, 15 March 1995

Ref: CIVPOL/MEMO/236/95

FROM: CIVPOL Commissioner
DE:

INFO: SRSG, OSRSG/CIVPOL Liaison

Subject: Withdrawal of Indbatt Armed Guards
Objet:

1. As you are aware the security of CIVPOL HQ between the hours of 1800 and 0600 is ensured by the armed guards provided by Indbatt.

.... 2. By a memo dated 14 March 1995 (Copy attached) UNAMIR HQ OPS informed me of the withdrawal of these guards with immediate effect.

3. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that due to the present strength of CIVPOL, only one officer mans the communication set at the CIVPOL HQ during the night and the presence of one unarmed observer is not enough to guarantee the safety of the furniture and other equipments in the premises.

4. I wish therefore to crave your intervention in this matter to permit the Indbatt Armed Guards to continue to maintain the security at CIVPOL HQ premises.

5. Regards.

Reg 377
14/3

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO : MILOB GP HQ
CIVPOL HQ
SECTOR 6 HQ

DATE: 14 MAR 95

INFO: INDBATT

SUBJECT: SECURITY

1. Due to shortage of manpower from INDBATT which provides troops for security to UN intallations; it has been decided that the guards providing security at your posts be withdrawn with immidiate effect.

2. Inview of the above, it is requested that all Duty Officers at your HQs be acquanted with the procedures for calling the RRF, in case of intrusion by unauthorised persons.

3. For your information and necessary action.

①

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

② Ops Ops
Sir. I trust this is what you're looking for. Pls call if you need further info from Capt Grenier.

INFORMATION CIRCULAR NO. 017/94
DATE: 15 NOVEMBER, 1994

TO: **ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL USING UNAMIR ISSUED FREQUENCIES ON MOTOROLA RADIO SETS**

FROM: **MR. A. H. GOLO**
OIC/ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: **USE OF RADIOS IN CASE OF EMERGENCY**

1. This circular is being distributed as a guideline to all personnel currently using frequencies on UNAMIR Motorola radio sets for use in case of any of the following emergency situations:

- Detention by the local authorities;
- The victim of a robbery of any kind, at home or elsewhere;
- The victim of an assault;
- Involvement in a vehicle accident and in need of assistance, an ambulance or a tow truck;
- Witness to a situation which would include any of the preceeding.

2. If you are involved in one of the aforementioned incidents, please note the following:

(i) For incidents occuring between 0830 and 1800: call callsign "Sierra Oscar 9" on channel 11. Sierra Oscar 9 is the headquarters Civilian Security Officer.

(ii) For incidents occuring after 1800 or on the weekend: switch your radio to channel 7 (if your radio is programmed with channel 7) or channel 8 and call callsign "Zero". Callsign Zero is the Military Duty Officer in the Headquarters' Operations Room. ***If your radio is not programmed for channel 8, contact the communications workshop to have it programmed immediately.***

(iii) In a calm, even voice:
   a. Clearly state your callsign.
   b. Use one of the phrases listed in paragraph 1 to describe the incident that has taken place.

c. Your location. This is the most important piece of information and could save vital minutes in the time it takes for assistance to reach you. All personnel should:

- Know the grid reference of their place of residence as well as that of homes or other places that are frequently visited.
- Know their location *-at all times-* in relation to a **VERY PROMINENT** reference location. The Meridien, Chez Lando, Mille Collines, The Parliament Buildings, are examples of such locations.
- Which way is north, south, east and west in Kigali.
- If the situation permits, the person calling for assistance should go to an easily identifiable rendez-vous point to meet the person(s) sent to provide assistance.

d. End the message with, "I need emergency assistance right away".

3. If no one responds to your call on the first attempt, remain calm and repeat your call.

4. The Civilian Security Officer and Military Duty Officer can also be reached by telephone by calling 84268 extension 11073 and 11150 respectively.

5. The duty officers responsible for monitoring the channels for emergencies have access to all the military and civilian information/assets that may be needed in case of emergency, including a rapid reaction force, civilian police, military police, tow trucks, ambulances, as well as medevac and casevac procedures.

6. Please be guided accordingly.

FROM : DCOS (Ops) 3000.12(Ops)

TO : CSO

INFO; STO

DATE: 16 MAR 95

SUBJECT: **SECURITY AWARENESS OF CURRENT SITUATION**

1. Please refer to the security instructions issued by you addressed to all UNAMIR/Agencies Personnel vide your letter no UNAMIR/SO/045 dated 21 November 94.

2. These very comprehensive and timely instructions have helped the UNAMIR civilian staff, NGOs and the various UN agencies that are operating in Rwanda, to be aware of the prevailing security situation within the country as also the procedure to be followed in an emergency situation.

3. However, it is suggested that in view of the recent spate of armed robberies directed against UNAMIR personnel/agencies and the large number of newly arrived personnel, these instructions need to be updated and re-issued to all concerned so that all UN personnel are made aware of the situation and procedures to be followed.

4. In view of the above, you are requested to consider re-issuing the above mentioned instructions to all UNAMIR civilian staff, UN Agencies and NGO's under intimation to this office. You are also requested to inform all concerned, that there is a UNAMIR Military Rapid Reaction Force specially earmarked, which is available 24 hrs to react to any situation within a short time-frame. This RRF can be contacted through the UNAMIR duty officer on channels 4 and 8.

5. Your continued cooperation and assistance is appreciated.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

DATE: 13 March 1995

Ref.: UNAMIR/SO/035

TO: **Brig Gen HK Anyidoho**
The Deputy Force Commander

FROM: Paul Ischlika
CSO/ASC

SUBJECT: **THE ISSUE OF UNAMIR ID CARDS**

Reference the grave concern expressed by the RPA on the above subject matter, I would like to give you an insight on the whole issue.

In the first place all UNAMIR ID cards are issued under my supervision and on my signature. When I joined the Mission in August 1994 during the time of my predecessor Mr.Bergeron, ID cards were issued to every International person arriving in Kigali - UNAMIR military and civilian components, Contractors, all UN Agencies, NGOs, Pressmen and members of the Diplomatic Missions in Kigali. We also issued IDs to UNAMIR local staff.

The ID cards issued then, were the white photocopy type which were temporary, with expiry date December 31, 1994. The reason for issuing temporary IDs was because the proper ones were on order.

The proper IDs arrived early in September with the following Color codes:

(a)	The Blue Stripe ID	-	For All UNAMIR staff military/civilian
(b)	The Light Blue	-	UNAMIR Local staff
(c)	The Green	-	For all UNAMIR Registered Contractors
(d)	The Yellow	-	For UN Agencies/Diplomats

With the arrival of the New IDs, the temporary ones were gradually replaced in respect of all, except for the NGOs and Pressmen. The reason for that was that in mid September, 1994 Mr. Golo the Chief of Administration gave directives that all NGOs and Pressmen should no longer be issued with ID cards as the Country was now at peace. Since that time, no NGO/Pressman has been issued any ID card.

In the case of the UN Agencies and Contractors, no special ID cards were ordered for their local staff, and therefore both locals and Internationals carry the same color code IDs. The Diplomatic Missions although they carry the same yellow stripe IDs as the UN Agencies, but their cards bear the letters in bold prints "LO" meaning "Liaison Officers". This is to distinguish between UN Agencies and members of the Diplomatic Missions.

As for the Contractors, it is common knowledge that the Brown & Root contract company has the largest number of local staff carrying the same Green stripe ID cards as the Internationals. Very recently, large scale impersonation by their local staff was discovered by the management of Brown & Root where the local staff were making undue demands for medical treatments, flight bookings and other unentitled privileges.

In order to avoid any further impersonation, I gave instructions that with immediate effect, all Brown & Root local staff will be issued with the white temporary cards since the number of local staff involved, was large and therefore, the cost to replace the green cards would be very high.

I have recently expressed my concern to Mr.Golo the Chief Administration Officer, over the high employment rate of local staff by Brown & Root and the frequency of dismissals. My concern was more over the megre materials meant for our Contingents, and the time and labor involved, as I have no control over their employment policy.

The other point of concern has been the rate at which UNAMIR staff, Contractors and Agencies were losing ID cards, as each ID lost ultimately falls into the wrong hands thereby given cause for more impersonation.

The validity of UNAMIR issuing all the Agencies and Contractors with IDs is due to the fact that either directly or indirectly, every international person in Rwanda becomes the ultimate responsibility of UNAMIR for their safety and security should an emergency arise; but more so, that these Agencies and Contractors cannot effectively carry out their coordinated operations with UNAMIR without UNAMIR ID cards, as they would not be allowed to enter UNAMIR premises without them.

Finally, the only distinguishing mark between UNAMIR staff - Military/Civilian, and the rest, is the Blue striped ID card while the other subsidiary agencies carry different color code IDs.

I trust that this will help to throw enough light on this issue, and in the meantime I shall be more than willing to clarify any further areas on the subject matter, in our collective effort to amicably resolve the issue with the RPA.

No.	Name/Nom
	Blood type/ Groupe Sanguin
	Designation Fonction
	Signature
Validity Validite	Certified by Certifie par

No.	Name/Nom
	Blood type/ Groupe Sanguin
	Designation Fonction
	Signature
Validity Validite	Certified by Certifie par

FROM: G3 OPS

TO : MILOB GP HQ
CIVPOL HQ
SECTOR 6 HQ
INDBATT

DATE: 14 MAR 95

INFO: DCOS OPS

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF UN INSTALLATIONS IN KIGALI

1. INDBATT currently is facing manpower problems due to increasing requirement for security at all UN installations. Until the manpower situation of INDBATT improves, only the most vulnerable installations would be provided guards/sentries on a permanent basis.

2. In view of the above, guards at MILOB GP HQ, CIVPOL HQ and Sector 6 MILOB HQ are to be withdrawn with immediate effect. Duty Officers in the mentioned UN installations are to ensure that entry points to their facilities are properly secured at night. They are also requested to acquaint themselves with the procedure for calling out the RRF through UNAMIR HQ in the event of intrusion by unauthorised persons.

3. For your information and necessary action.

510/Engr/15/A

14March 95

To : Maj Sanjay Agarwal
G3 Engrs/FEO
Force HQ, UNAMIR.

ERECTION OF SECURITY BARRIER AT THE UNAMIR FILLING STATION

1. Ref your memorandum No 1001.1 (FEO)/OPS/1 .

2. It is to inform you that the task of erection of two barriers at the entrance and the exit of the UNAMIR Filling Station has been completed by the INDBATT Engrs. The requirement of the stores was met with from the INDBATT.

(S K Chetty)
Engr Officer
INDBATT.

Copy to :

1. DCOS OPS
2. G3 OPS
3. Declan Corrigan, SO SUP

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO : MILOB GP HQ
CIVPOL HQ
SECTOR 6 HQ

DATE: 14 MAR 95

INFO: INDBATT

SUBJECT: SECURITY

1. Due to shortage of manpower from INDBATT which provides troops for security to UN intallations; it has been decided that the guards providing security at your posts be withdrawn with immidiate effect.

2. Inview of the above, it is requested that all Duty Officers at your HQs be acquanted with the procedures for calling the RRF, in case of intrusion by unauthorised persons.

3. For your information and necessary action.

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
DCMO, MILOBS GP HQ, KIGALI

FROM : SECTOR CDR, SECTOR 3, GITARAMA
SUBJECT : SECURITY OF INFORMATION
DATE : 09 MAR 95

1. Consequent upon the perceptibly increased tension in Rwanda, following the events of the last week, it is felt that UNAMIR needs to tighten up security measures, specially in the field of security of information. This is being suggested in the light of some noticeable occurrences in this sector which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

2. It has been revealed that most of the locally recruited low level UNAMIR staff such as cleaners and interpreters have links with interested parties and are being employed by them for the purpose of gaining sensitive information. The cleaners at this HQ, for instance, happen to be relatives of a number of local officials. It has also been revealed that they feign no knowledge of the English language while, in fact are proficient in it and some are even computer literate. Some of them have been noticeably attempting to enter open offices during temporary absence of the concerned appointments. Although, no tangible evidence is available, suitable instructions need to be given to all to increase their alert towards such attempts.

3. In one instance, an interpreter was heard advising a local military official to desist from giving too much information to MILOBS. This was clearly heard by a MILOB who has rudimentary knowledge of the local language but had not revealed the same to the interpreter.

4. Submitted for further necessary action please.

5. Best regards.

(S A Hasnain)
Colonel
Sector Cdr

G2

Pse write the appropriate instructions regarding security of documents. for the attention of all UNAMIR personnel.

10/3

10/3

10/3

10/3.

G3 OPS.

Actioned as directed 10/3

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: CO UNAMIR MP Coy

Info: CO INDBATT
G3 Ops
FEO
FSO
Brown & Root (Mr Scafide)
CILM through SO Sup (thank you for alerting us to the problems at the Filling Station.)

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

Date: 9 Mar 95

File: FPM/2

Subject: CRIME PREVENTION AT THE UNAMIR FILLING STATION

1. The minute of which I attach a copy is self-explanatory.

2. Security. The first issue - that of RPA types trying obtain fuel - might not be easily solved but I have declined to provide MP guard-type assistance as an inappropriate use of MPs. It will be tackled initially through the installation of barriers - to be arranged by the FEO but this might aid INDBATT soldiers keeping the problem off the forecourt. Any future attempt by RPA soldiers to draw fuel should be reported to the MP Company, however, so that statements may be recorded providing descriptions of the soldiers and their vehicle to the RPA liaison officer so that disciplinary action can be initiated on their side.

3. Drinking and Driving. Drinking and driving is not acceptable; it should be reported as quickly as possible to the MP Company so that disciplinary action can be initiated. I suggest that:

a. INDBATT and MP Coy Ops Officers liaise and work out a simple system, perhaps using a standard coded message, to provide a quick reaction. MP patrols should obviously pay attention to - and perhaps lie in wait at - the fuel station at the times mentioned.

b. The FSO ensures that the fuel station is provided with a Channel 7 radio.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

(1)

09 MARCH 1995

TO: Lt.Col. A.A.YELLA,
G-3 Ops.

THROUGH: MR GEOFF WORDLEY,
C.I.L.M.

FROM: DECLAN CORRIGAN,
SO Sup,

SUBJECT: SECURITY TEAMS RESPONSIBILITIES AT FUEL STATION.

It has been brought to my attention that the security arrangements at the fuel station in Kigali are not what they might be. On several occasions recently members of the RPA have gained access to the station and demanded fuel. It has also been brought to my attention that members of UNAMIR are driving vehicles under the influence.

In all of the instances of vehicles arriving on the forecourt of the fuel station, it has been left to the Brown & Root operatives at the station to handle the matter. The RPA are normally armed with several members in each vehicle. There has also been an occasion that a vehicle was parked across the exit of the station throughout the night. The Brown & Root operatives were then obliged to have a potential terrorist vehicle towed away.

Vehicles being driven by UNAMIR personnel are arriving at the fuel station for refuelling and the driver has been drinking heavily. In some instances with bottles between their knees while driving. This activity seems to be most prevalent after a holiday weekend and on Sunday afternoons.

It would be appreciated if all vehicles that enter the service area, that are not United Nations vehicles, be escorted off the premises by the security troops attached to the station. No vehicle is allowed access to the UNAMIR Headquarters, therefore it seems that the same rules should apply at all installations.

It would be appreciated that the guard commander be given the responsibility of determining how much under the influence the driver is, and preventing their departure, until after the Military Police have been brought to the scene.

(2) G3 Ops
1. Pls discuss: access control and preposn/comms ~~with~~ of MPs.

CC: CISS;
DCOS Ops;
CO MP Coy;
CMCO;
BRSC PM;
SO Log;
LSG;

(3) PM
Pse discuss

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MEMORANDUM

1001.1 (FEO)/OPS/1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

SUBJECT: ERECTION OF SECURITY BARRIER AT THE UNAMIR FILLING STATION

1. It has been observed that the security arrangements at the UNAMIR filling station at Kigali are not satisfactory.

2. There is a need to erect two barriers at the entrance and exit of the filling station to ensure controlled move of the vehicles.

3. You are required to erect these barriers at the earliest. The reqirement of stores may be projected to this office for further necessary action.

S Agrawal
Maj
G3 Engrs/FEO

10/3 18/3 10/3

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

INDBATT ENGRS

INFO

DCOS OPS
G3 OPS
Declan Corrigan, SO SUP

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MEMORANDUM

1001.1 (FEO)/OPS/1

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Maj
G3 Engrs/FEO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

INDBATT ENGRS

INFO

DCOS OPS
G3 OPS
Declan Corrigan, SO SUP

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: TAC HQ /BUTARE
ETHIOBATT
GHANBATT
NIBATT
INDBATT
TUNBATT
ZAMBATT
MALAWI COY
MALICOY
AUSMED
95 FLSG

DATE: 11 MAR 95

SUBJECT: SECURITY

1: The recent attacks on UNAMIR troops and installations calls urgent redress of our security system. TUNBATT and NIBATT have been the recent victims of these unprovoked attacks.

2. Inview of the above, all contingents are requested to increase their security vigilance in their locations.

3. For your necessary action.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

(1)

09 MARCH 1995

TO: **Lt.Col. A.A.YELLA, G-3 Ops.**

(4) FSO
Pse provide escort at filling Stn with a UNAMIR Handheld radio with channel 7 to be able to call UN MP when they encounter UN pers under influence alcohol.

THROUGH: **MR GEOFF WORDLEY, C.I.L.M.**

FROM: **DECLAN CORRIGAN, SO Sup,**

SUBJECT: **SECURITY TEAMS RESPONSIBILITIES AT FUEL STATION.**

It has been brought to my attention that the security arrangements at the fuel station in Kigali are not what they might be. On several occasions recently members of the RPA have gained access to the station and demanded fuel. It has also been brought to my attention that members of UNAMIR are driving vehicles under the influence.

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It would be appreciated if all vehicles that enter the service area, that are not United Nations vehicles, be escorted off the premises by the security troops attached to the station. No vehicle is allowed access to the UNAMIR Headquarters, therefore it seems that the same rules should apply at all installations.

It would be appreciated that the guard commander be given the responsibility of determining how much under the influence the driver is, and preventing their departure, until after the Military Police have been brought to the scene.

(5) file

(2) G3 Ops
1. Pls discuss: access control and preposn/comms ~~with~~ of MPs.

(3) PM
Pse discuss

9/3

CC: **CISS;**
DCOS Ops;
CO MP Coy;
CMCO;
BRSC PM;
SO Log;
LSG;

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

09 MARCH 1995

TO: **Lt.Col. A.A.YELLA, G-3 Ops.**

THROUGH: **MR GEOFF WORDLEY, C.I.L.M.**

FROM: **DECLAN CORRIGAN, SO Sup,**

SUBJECT: **SECURITY TEAMS RESPONSIBILITIES AT FUEL STATION.**

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It would be appreciated that the guard commander be given the responsibility of determining how much under the influence the driver is, and preventing their departure, until after the Military Police have been brought to the scene.

CC: **CISS;**
DCOS Ops;
CO MP Coy;
CMCO;
BRSC PM;
SO Log;
LSG;

3000.12

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: TAC HQ BUTARE

INFO: SECTOR 3A/3B
SECTOR 4A/ZAMBATT

DATE: 06 MARCH 95

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF SECURITY

1. A team of UNAMIR contractors will be visiting your locations on 8 Mar 95. The team will be using a bus as their ground transport from KIGALI up to GIKONGORO and back to KIGALI.

2. Timings are as follows:

a. ETA - BUTARE - 1130hrs.

b. ETA - GIKONGORO - 1315hrs.

3. In view of the prevailing hostile security situation in Sector 3, it is requested that TAC HQ provides armed escorts to the team from GITARAMA to BUTARE and back up to GITARAMA.

4. ZAMBATT is also requested to provide armed escort from BUTARE to GIKONGORO and back up to BUTARE.

5. Regards.

To : Chief of ~~plan~~
UNAMIR ~~HQ~~

27 February 1995

From: Liaison officer
Human Rights Field Operation

Subject: SECURITY CONCERNS IN GISENYI

It has been brought recently to our attention that the personnel from Human Rights Field Operation operating in the Gisenyi city area are experiencing some serious concerns in regard to the security situation that prevail at the moment. Following further verifications it appears that that feeling is shared by other UN agencies as well as by Non Governmental Organizations in that sector.

The threat according to them is caused by the presence in the immediate vicinity of 59/60 refugees that do not appreciate the fact that food convoys are proceeding to Goma to feed refugees that are considered as criminal. They see convoys, warehouses and expatriates houses as potential targets. It also appears that crimes are committed with facility in the Gisenyi area by elements coming from Zaire.

The security deployment from the RPA do not seem to be able to cope with that threat with a high degree of success. Regarding UN troops in the area it is estimate that because of limitations like availability of proper vehicles for patrolling, location of camps in the area and curfew rules defined by the RPA, the presence of UNAMIR in town is deficient as well as the potential reaction time.

Those points are therefore brought to your attention for the conduct of a possible threat assessment in that area as well as for a review of the security measures in place. The agencies and organizations in place should as well be brief by the UNAMIR unit in place on the existing security measures.

Maj JLA Racine
Liaison Officer
HRFO

G3 OPS

I think this may fall into your area. What can we do to help?

G3 PLANS
27/2

Returned
27/2

CO

CO Turnbull to provide required security

27/2

01/3

28/2

Department of Defence

Security Classification
UNCLAS

A.S.C. UNAMIR II
5331 1
Folio .....

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE -INFO	DATE - TIME GROUP	SIG/ORIG NO
ROUTINE	ROUTINE	271129Z FEB 95	E3L/I40 OPS
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: AUSMED		
	To: HQ UNAMIR		

HQ UNAMIR FOR OPS

Subj: SECURITY FOR KIBEHO IDP CAMP

A. HQ UNAMIR 3000.26(OPS) OF UNDATED FEB 95

1. ACK REF A.

01/3

28/2

01/3

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	REF FILE NO
1	SPIERS SO3 OPS-A	MATEL02	808-1-1

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	BRANCH/UNIT	SIGNATURE	DATE
1	AS ABOVE	HQ AS MSF		27 February 1995

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											UNCLAS

FROM : UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO : TUNBATT

INFO : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 27 FEB 95

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF SECURITY TO CARE WAYSTATION

1. Reports received indicate that there are plans to loot CARE Waystation in GISENYI on 28 Feb 95.

2. In view of this, you are requested to increase mobile/foot patrols in the area during the week.

3. Regards.

MEMORANDUM

1001.1 (FEO)/OPS/1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

SUBJECT: **SECURITY OF TRANSIT CAMP, KIGALI**

1. Reference letter of ADCOS SP on the subject dated 22 Feb 95.(Copy attached).

2. To provide security at the Transit Camp, the fencing requires to be repaired. A recce was done to assess the requirement of stores for this task. The following is the list of stores required:-

(a) Angle Iron Pickets 6' - Nos 300.

(b) Concertina Wire - 50 Coils.

(c) Binding Wire - 10 Kgs.

(d) Barbed Wire - 50 Coils (100 mtrs)

3. The items mentioned at Para 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) are required to be procured by CBMS as they are not available at 95 FLSG.

4. The item at Para 2(d) is to be issued by 95 FLSG.

5. An urgent action will be appreciated as very valuable equipment is likely to be stored at the Transit Camp immediately.

S Agrawal
Maj
G3 Engrs/ FEO
24 Feb.95

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION	INFO
CBMS	DCOS OPS
95 FLSG	ADCOS SP
INDBATT. For necessary collection and implementation.	

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO : G3 OPS

INFO : DCOS OPS

DCOS SP

CBES

FROM : ADCOS SP

SUBJECT : TRANSIT CAMP SECURITY

DATE : 22 FEB 1995

1- AS YOU ARE AWARE ,THE MISSION IS RECEIVING NOW SOME VEHICLES,FOR WHAT IT HAS WAITED A LONG TIME. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO SPACE WHERE TO KEEP THEM UNTIL ISSUING OTHER THAN THE TRANSIT CAMP.

2- WITH SUCH VALUABLE EQUIPMENT AND POOR FENCE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TRANSIT CAMP IS A SOFT TARGET AND OUR OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENTS ARE IN DANGER.

3- THEREFORE, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE CAMP BY ANY MEANS AVAILABLE (DEFENSE STORES..EXTINGUISHER, SOLDIER ETC...).WE CANNOT POINT OUT MORE THE IMPORTANCE WE GIVE TO THESE ASSETS.

4- FOR YOUR PROMPT ACTION AND CONSIDERATION.

5- REGARDS.

FEO

For your necessary attention discussed please

22/2

FROM : COS 3000.26(OPS)

TO : ZAMBATT
MILOB (SECTOR 4A)
G3 AIR
FMO
CIVPOL HQ
ICRC
HAC

DATE : FEB 95

SUBJECT: SECURITY FOR KIBEHO IDP CAMP

1. It has been reliably learnt, that the RPA is planning to increase its presence around KIBEHO Camp shortly with the possible motive of closing the camp forcibly.

2. In view of the above developments the following have been tasked as under.

a. **ZAMBATT.** Increase presence gradually in Kibeho camp to a coy strength by 1800 hrs on 27 Feb 95. Thinning out of tps to present strength will take place only on orders of this HQ.

b. **MILOBS.** Increase patrolling and monitoring activities in Kibeho camp with immediate effect.

c. **CIVPOL.** Increase presence gradually in Kibeho camp from present strength to 6 teams from 1800 hrs on 27 Feb 95 to 0800 hrs on 02 March 95.

d. **G3 AIR.** Provide two helis on 28 Feb 95, on standby with effect from 0600 hrs for AME and conveyance of offrs to Kibeho camp.

e. **FMO.** Earmark a AME team for cas evac and provision of first aid to any wounded at Kibeho camp.

f. **ICRC and HAC.** Monitor any Human Rights violation.

3. If any of our activities are objected by RPA, it will be ensured that no one gets into a direct confrontation or altercation with the RPA on any account. This HQ will be kept informed at all times of the developments taking place in Kibeho camp.

4. Please acknowledge.

Special Investigations Unit
Request for assistance

To: Major-General Guy C. Toussignant, UNAMIR FC

From: Andreas Schiess, Officer-in-Charge SIU

RE: Inquiries in Cyangugu Préfecutre

Date: 20 February 1995

The SIU is under pressure from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] to finalize broad information gathering concerning mass-grave / massacre sites throughout the country.

Due to lack of personnel on the side of SIU and Human Rights Field Officers, we cannot cope with needs. Especially Cyangugu is one the areas where info gathering is difficult.

We would be most grateful to enjoy assistance through MILOBs in Cyangugu for approximately 10 days.

Thank you for your attention and consideration.

Actioned
22/2

21/2

Sem
23/2

22/2

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CHURCHILLPLEIN 1, P.O. BOX 13888
2501 EW THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS
TELEPHONE: 31 70 344-5347
FAX: 31 70 344-5278/5358

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
INVESTIGATION SECTION

TRIBUNAL PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL
POUR L' EX-YOUGOSLAVIE
CHURCHILLPLEIN 1, B.P. 13888
2501 EW LA HAYE, PAYS-BAS
TÉLÉPHONE: 31 70 344-5347
FAX: 31 70 344-5278/5358

BUREAU DU PROCUREUR
LA SECTION DES ENQUÊTES

February 8, 1995

Mr. A.H. Golo
OIC Administration
UNAMIR
Kigali, Rwanda

Attention: J. Lombardo

Dear Mr. Golo

Re: Pending Issues for ICTR

This is further to your fax of February 6, 1995 and Ms. Edgerton's conversation with Mr. Lombardo today, in which she articulated some security issues on my behalf.

First, some difficulties have arisen in the ICTR recruitment process, as the ACABQ has not yet issued our budget. As a result, our delegation for the coming mission should number no more than 8 people. We anticipate the first two will arrive on February 16, with the remainder to follow as soon as possible thereafter. We will fax flight details to you as soon as they are confirmed. We expect this team will be staying in Kigali approximately 4 weeks, to be replaced by up to 15 staff. You should be aware that as plans for the ICTR's operation take shape, it appears that the number of staff operating out of Kigali will, for the foreseeable future, number no more than 15. This may vary slightly according to the demand of work, but we expect no significant changes in this number to take place, especially not without substantial notice to you.

In respect to personal accommodations for this visit, we would be grateful for any advice or assistance you might have. Please continue to look into the Meridien Hotel as a possible short term site, but we understand we should be prepared to consider other options should the Meridien not be available. Of course, from a security point of view it would be most convenient if our delegation was housed together. This delegation will not require anything other than was provided on our first visit.

We've already indicated to Mr. Lombardo that during this set-up and to minimise disruption we intend on staying in the UNICEF building as our office space. Again

relating to the issue of office space, we only received Mr. Bender's report yesterday, and are considering his recommendations.

As regards staff security, I am aware of the request to reassess our potential security needs. I'm sure you appreciate that this is extremely difficult when sitting in The Hague. It would be of great help if you could give us some indication of how you perceive our needs, and how you assess the security situation at this time in Kigali, Rwanda itself, and from a regional perspective as well. Would that assessment be any different if we are considered as visitors, or members of the UN, or members of the ICTR?

Included in this, it would be extremely useful if you could indicate the likelihood of incursions from surrounding countries or IDP camps. Our information in that regard is limited to news reports, and you can appreciate how a more detailed update would help us in reassessing our security needs.

I appreciate this may be time consuming, but I'm sure you understand I need to brief Judge Goldstone on the ICTR and its needs as fully as possible,

In closing, I'd like to take the opportunity to thank you and your staff for the invaluable assistance you've given, and continue to provide. Please don't hesitate to contact me by phone or fax with any questions you might have.

Colin Port
Director of Investigations

CP/ce

FROM : GHANBATT HQ/GIKONGORO GH2/014/G(OPS)

TO : UNAMIR HQ - G3 OPS

INFO : D COS OPS

DATE : 25 JAN 95

SUBJECT : SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR

Reference:

A. 3000.12 (OPS) dated 23 Jan 95.

1. Attached find details of tps deployed in Tgt Camps, Tgt Communes, OWS and ORCs in GHANBATT AOR as follows:

a. Tgt Camps in Sector 4A (S).

b. Tgt Communes, and ORCs in Sector 2.

2. Please accept for action.

M ESSIEN
Lt
for Commanding Officer

cc

Compile and fwd as requested.

26/1

TGT CAMPS IN SECTOR 4A (S)

SRL	TGT CAMP	GR	TPS DEPLOYMEMT	REMARKS
1.	KIBEHO	5007	2 & 28	
2.	MUNINI	4800	0 & 26	
3.	KAMANA	5197	0 & 8	
4.	RUNYOMBYI	4893	1 & 26	
5.	NDAGO	5102	NIL	PTL ON 24 HR BASIS
6.	RURAMBA	3717	0 & 9	
7.	RWAMIKO	4913	1 & 20	
8.	BUHORO	4621	NIL	PTL ON 24 HR BASIS
9.	NYAMIGINA	4523	NIL	" "
10.	MUDASOMWA	4222	NIL	PTL ON 24 HR BASIS

TGT CAMPS, COMMUNES AND ORCs IN SECTOR 2

SRI.	TGT CAMP/COMMUNE OR ORC	GR	TPS DEPLOYED	REMARKS
1.	KANZENZE COMMUNE ORC	1062	1 & 25	
2.	NGENDA COMMUNE ORC	0644	1 & 29	
3.	GASHORA ORC	2656	1 PL	
4.	SAKE ORC	4454	1 PL	
5.	RILIMA ORC	2561	2 & 19	

FAX MESSAGE

FROM: 4A NORTH/ZAMBATT	TO: HQ UNAMIR/G3 OPS
DATE: 24 JAN 95	INFO. D COS OPS
FAX No. 11243	FILE NO: 3000/12
SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR	

REFERENCE:

A. YOUR FAX MESSAGE 3000.12 (OPS).

1. ZAMBATT PL IS DEPLOYED IN THE MIDST OF RUKONDO DPC AND IT PROVIDES A 24 HOURS PRESENCE. CYANIKA DPC IS PATROLLED 24/7 BY A COMPANY DEPLOYED BARELY 2 KM NORTH.

2. SATELLITE DPCs WHICH ARE NOT YET PLACED ON 24/7 DAY PRESENCE WILL BE ACTIVATED AS SOON AS THEY ARE DEEMED AN ISSUE FOR SUBJECT MATTER.

SY ARRANGEMENTS FOR

OP RETURN

1. Ghanbatt.
2. Zambatt
3. INBBATT
4. GHANBATT (Sector 2)

From: G3 OPS File No: 3000.12(ops)

To: SECTOR 2(GHANBATT)
SECTOR 3
ZAMBATT
SECTOR 4ASOUTH (GHANBATT)
INDBATT

INFO DCOS OPS

Date: 23 JAN 95

Subject **SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR**

1. You are requested to forward details of tps deployed in Tgt Camps, Tgt Communes, OWS, and ORCs in your AOR. Also indicate Tgt Camps and Communes which do not have tps but are patrolled on 24 hr basis.

2. Returns to reach this HQ not later than 0800 hrs on 25 Jan 95.

802 OPS
23/1

MEMORANDUM

From : Camp Commandant

To : All Offices UNAMIR HQs

File No : 1000-5

Dated : 27 Jan 95

AUTHORITY FOR COLLECTION OF KEYS FROM RECEPTION DESK

You are requested to fill up the form attached and return to the Camp Office at the earliest for our compliance.

Capt CS Dewgun
Camp Commandant
Phone : 11147

- -

AUTHORITY LETTER

The following persons are hereby authorised to collect keys from the Reception Desk on my behalf :-

SNo	Room No	Name	ID No
1.	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3.	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4.	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Date :

(Signature & Name of the Office In-charge)

cc
~~G02 OPS~~
for your action
completion

FAX MESSAGE

FROM: 4A NORTH/ZAMBATT	TO: HQ UNAMIR/G3 OPS
DATE: 24 JAN 95	INFO. D COS OPS
FAX No. 11243	FILE NO: 12/5/12
SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR	

REFERENCE:

A. YOUR FAX MESSAGE 3000.12 (OPS).

1. ZAMBATT PL IS DEPLOYED IN THE MIDST OF RUKONDO DPC AND IT PROVIDES A 24 HOURS PRESENCE. CYANIKA DPC IS PATROLLED 24/7 BY A COMPANY DEPLOYED BARELY 2 KM NORTH.

2. SATELLITE DPCs WHICH ARE NOT YET PLACED ON 24/7 DAY PRESENCE WILL BE ACTIVATED AS SOON AS THEY ARE DEEMED AN ISSUE FOR SUBJECT MATTER.

FAX MESSAGE

FROM: 4A NORTH/ZAMBATT	TO: HQ UNAMIR/G3 OPS
DATE: 24 JAN 95	INFO. D COS OPS
FAX No. 11243	FILE NO: 2015/2
SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR	

REFERENCE:

A. YOUR FAX MESSAGE 3000.12 (OPS).

1. ZAMBATT PL IS DEPLOYED IN THE MIDST OF RUKONDO DPC AND IT PROVIDES A 24 HOURS PRESENCE. CYANIKA DPC IS PATROLLED 24/7 BY A COMPANY DEPLOYED BARELY 2 KM NORTH.

2. SATELLITE DPCs WHICH ARE NOT YET PLACED ON 24/7 DAY PRESENCE WILL BE ACTIVATED AS SOON AS THEY ARE DEEMED AN ISSUE FOR SUBJECT MATTER.

(2) G3 Ops
For necessary follow up.
DCOS Ops
25-1

082/05/A

CC
For your compilation 25 January 95
and my action
26/1

From : INDBATT

TO : G3 OPS

Subject :- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OP RETOUR

1. Reference your letter Number 3000.12(Ops) dated 23 January 95.

2. There is one OWS at NDERA Camp in Sector 6 as part of OP RETOUR. The OWS is patrolled on a 24 hour basis.

(Rajbir Singh)
Major
Ops Officer
for CO INDBATT

MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

UNCLAS

DATE TIME GROUP
GROUPE DATE - HEURE
DATE - TIME
DATE - HEURE: 10 09 30Z
MONTH MOIS: FEB
YEAR ANNEE: 95

PRECEDENCE PRIORITE
ACTION
INFO

CLASS

SPEC INSTRUCTIONS

MF

CAT/CIC

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR

BOOK DOSSIER

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS / INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE

: UNAMIR HQ OPS

: SECTOR 3 COMD

INFO: OC MALAWI COY

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF SECURITY TO BUTARE WAY STATION

1. REQUEST THAT, SECURITY BE PROVIDED TO BUTARE WAY STATION WHEN IDPS ARE EXPECTED THERE.

2. FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION//

DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD OR SMUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, FRONCER OU MACULER

DISTRIBUTION

NAME: JK CHUMBU OPS 1118S

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION / CATEGORIE DE SECURITE: UNCLAS

FROM: DCOS OPS

File No: 3000.12(Ops)

TO: GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
INDBATT
MALAWICOY
MALICOY
NICOY
AUSMED

DATE: 4 FEB 95

SUBJECT: **WEARING OF FLAK JACKETS**

Reference:

A. Our letter 3000.12(Ops) dated 13 Nov 94.

1. As a result of the improved security situation in the DP Camps, the directive that all UNAMIR troops operating in DP Camps are to wear Flak Jackets and Helmets is no longer deemed necessary.

2. Henceforth only personnel dedicated to providing close protection to UNAMIR personnel, NGOs and IDPs are required to wear the protective equipment while working in the camps.

3. For your necessary action.

G OPS

1

FROM: SECTOR 4B HQ FRAFBATT

TO: UNAMIR HQ ADCOS SP
CLOGO
G3/OPS

INFO: DFC - CLO

95 FEB 10 00

Sorry

UNCLAS NR 037 /OPS/CDT 02 FEB 1995 09 26 00 B

SUBJECT: RETURN OF TENTAGE FROM RPA'S TROOPS.

1. ON THE 12TH JANUARY, FRAFBATT RECEIVED AN ORDER FROM UNAMIR HQ TO LEAVE MT KARONGI AND BE RELIEFED BY RPA'S TROOPS IN THAT SITE. WHEN FRAFBATT ELEMENT WERE ABOUT TO DISMONT FROM THERE, THEY LIFT TWO (02) TENTS FOR RPA'S.
2. THOSE TENTS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE RETURNED AFTER 03 DAYS.
3. SO FRAFBATT WILL ROTATE VERY SOON AND WILL BE OBLIGED TO RECUPERATE THE TWO TENTS IN WAY TO DO THE OUT-SURVEY.
4. SO IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY INCONVENIENCES, IT WOUD BE BETTER UNAMIR HQ PROVIDE THEM WHITH TWO TENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
5. REGARDS.

COLONEL OUSMANE GOUDIABY
COMMANDANT LE CONTINGENT
AFRICAIN FRANCOPHONE

FROM: G3 OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

TO: FRAFBATT

INFO: DCOS OPS
G3 AIR

DATE: 23 Jan 95

Subject: **SECURITY FOR THE HELICOPTER NIGHT LS AT KIBUYE**

1. UNAMIR is to undertake a night surveillance trial on Lake KIVU from 30 Jan to 05 Feb 95. A landing site for the operation has been chosen in the area of KIBUYE at GR 248729 and a Non Directional Beacon (NDB) will be installed at the site .

2. In view of the above, it is requested that you provide a 24 hour security, of a section strength at the site, with effect from 290800B Jan 95 to protect UN and Canadian Helicopters property.

3. For your necessary compliance.

Thank
802 OPS
24/1

MEMORANDUM

3350-1 (95 FLSG CO)

21 Jan 95

Distribution List

SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR VEH COMPOUND

1. There is a compound located across from 3 CSG holding many vehs which are scrap/non-servicable etc. This has been guarded at night by a 1 CDHSR D+S sect to ensure that valuable spares are not robbed- in fact they apprehend approx three thiefs per week in that compound. The CDHSR will stop this task on 25 Jan 95 because of their rotation and a replacement security element is required.

2. 95 FLSG will be located at TRAFIPRO with only min elements at the 3 CSG loc and will not be able to carry out this security task.

3. Please advise.

R.J. Powell, LCol
Commanding Officer
95 FLSG

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

HQ UNAMIR, G3 Ops

Info

INDBATT, Commanding Officer

G2 OPS

Pse include on list of UN installations requiring Security

22/1

01/2

Actioned
G2 OPS
30/1

Roger Sir
G2 OPS

G3 Ops

From: **COS**

File No: 3000.12(OpS)

To: **ALL COMDS/SECTOR COMDS**

Date: **31 JAN 95**

Subject: **MOVEMENT OF CONTINGENT COMDS**

1. With immediate effect all Comds including Officiating incumbents will take permission from COS/DFC before moving out of their AOR for all purposes. Movement will only be effected once request cleared.

2. Acknowledge.

3000.12 (OPS)

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: OC MALI COY

DATE: 30 JAN 95

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF SECURITY TO ES1 A2

Reference:

A. Diocese of Kabgayi letter dated 24 Jan 95. .

1. In Reference A above, the Apostolic Administrator of Kabgayi Diocese, Bishop Andrew SIBOMANA, had requested for provision of security to the School of Female Nursing.

2. You are thereby, requested to provide security to the same Institution. You should use your prerogative as to whether the place requires a static detachment to be deployed there, or conduct mobile patrols on 24 hrs basis.

3. Please proceed to action accordingly.

JK CHUMBU
Maj
SO2 OPS

Diocese of Kabgayi
POBOX. 66 GITARAMA

Kabgayi, 24/01/1995

To Major Hamidou KEITA
Mali Contigent Commander
UNAMIR Detachment at GITARAMA

Subject: Assistance to
ESI A2

We have the honor to appeal to your kind authority to request UNAMIR assistance for l'Ecole des Sciences Infirmières (School for Female Nurses) of Kabgayi.

As you are going to move your troops from ESI A2 to Séminaire des Aînés (Senior Seminary) and as the courses will resume soon, we would like to ask you to kindly continue ensuring security for the said school.

We seize upon this opportunity to reiterate our thanks for your entire dedication to security maintaining for the Rwandese population in general and for our zone in particular.

Yours Sincerely,

Apostolic Administrator
of Kabgayi Diocese
Bishop Andrew SIBOMANA

CC.:
- UNAMIR Force Commander
KIGALI

01/2

Actioned. Ltr sent to the OC MALICOY for the provision of Security to the Institution.
GOR OPS
30/1

DIOCESE DE KABGAYI
B.P. 66 GITARAMA

Kabgayi, le 24/1/1995

Au Major Hamidou KEITA
Commandant du Contingent Malien
Détachement de la MINUAR à GITARAMA

(1)

Objet: Assistance
à l'ESI A2

Nous avons l'honneur de recourir à votre bienveillante autorité pour demander une assistance de la MINUAR à l'Ecole des Sciences Infirmières (ESI A2) de Kabgayi.

En effet, comme vous allez déménager vos troupes de l'ESI A2 au Séminaire des Aînés et vu que les cours vont reprendre bientôt, nous nous adressons à votre autorité et vous prions de bien vouloir continuer à assurer la sécurité à ladite école.

Nous saisissons cette occasion pour vous réitérer nos remerciements pour votre entier dévouement au maintien de la sécurité du peuple rwandais en général et de notre zone en particulier.

Veuillez reconnaître, commandant, l'expression de notre sincère gratitude et notre franche collaboration.

(2) COS
Please note
29.1.95

Administrateur Apostolique
du Diocèse de Kabgayi
Mgr André SIBOMANA

- EARLIER LETTER

30/1

C.P.I:

- Général Commandant
de la MINUAR KIGALI

DIOCESE DE KABGAYI
EVECHE
RWANDA

(3) DCOS (OPS)
For necessary action.
30/1

(4) G3 Ops
Pls cfm Mali's intention for leaving troops at the ESI A2 bldg complex and see if they can assist in this req for Sy.
DCOS OPS 30.1

5. Pse translate and action.
30/1

FROM: G3 OPS

FILE NO. 3000.5(OPS)

TO: MILOB GP HQ
SECTOR 1
SECTOR 5
SECTOR 6
G3 AIR

INFO: DCOS OPS
G3 PLANS
G3 ENGRS
MAJ MACZA

DATE: 23 Jan 95

SUBJECT: **INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECURITY/UNAMIR SUPPORT FOR US DEMINING ASSESSMENT TEAM**

GENERAL

1. The above mentioned team is to visit Rwanda from 23 Jan 95 to 02 Feb 95. The purpose of the visit is to identify the extent of the demining requirement in the country and to assess the training need. UNAMIR is to provide support to the following activities:

a. 25 Jan(0900-1200hrs) - Consultations with UNAMIR EOD personnel.

b. 27 Jan(0800-1600hrs) - Visit to Sector 5.

c. 28 Jan(0800-1600hrs) - Visit to Sector 1.

d. 29 Jan(0900-1200hrs) - Tour Kigali.

TASKS

2. TUNBATT

a. Provide a protection party of not less than half a section and two vehs with dvrs to convey the team from Ruhengeri to designated mine sites in Sector 5.

b. Protection party and Sector MILOB will RV with heli at landing site at RUHENGERI at 0830hrs on 27 Jan 95.

3. NICOY

a. Provide a protection party of not less than half a section and two vehs with dvrs to convey the team from BYUMBA to designated mine sites in Sector 1.

b. Protection party and MILOB will RV with the heli at landing site at BYUMBA at 0830hrs on 28 Jan 95.

4. INDBATT.

a. Provide a protection party and two vehs with drivers to convey the team from UNAMIR HQ to designated mine sites in sector 6.

b. Protection party and MILOB will RV with team at HQ UNAMIR at 0900hrs on 29 Jan 95.

5 MILOB GP HQ.

a. Sector MILOBs to detail a team each to escort and advice the demining team on mine locations in respective Sectors(1, 5 and 6).

b. Detail Major J Macza, the former G3 Engr to accompany team throughout the exercise.

6. Acknowledge.

FROM: G3 OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

TO: FRAFBATT

INFO: DCOS OPS
G3 AIR

DATE: 23 Jan 95

Subject: **SECURITY FOR THE HELICOPTER NIGHT LS AT KIBUYE**

1. UNAMIR is to undertake a night surveillance trial on Lake KIVU from 30 Jan to 05 Feb 95. A landing site for the operation has been chosen in the area of KIBUYE at GR 248729 and a Non Directional Beacon (NDB) will be installed at the site .

2. In view of the above, it is requested that you provide a 24 hour security, of a section strength at the site, with effect from 290800B Jan 95 to protect UN and Canadian Helicopters property.

3. For your necessary compliance.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(1)

21 January 1995

TO: Mr J. Owens/ BRSC PGM

INFO: Mr P. Hornsby/ CSS
Mr G. Wordley/ CC Log O
Col J. Arp/ DCOS Ops
Mr J. Albert/ CA

FROM: Mr G. Brière/ CMCO

REF: A. BRSC memo dated 26 Dec 94 (copy attached)
B. CSS memo dated 16 Jan 95 (copy attached)

SUBJECT: **SECURITY AT BRSC FACILITIES**

1. The issue of security to be provided at your facilities has been discussed on several occasions during the past few weeks.

2. Col Arp has notified Mr Hornsby this morning that the Indians Contingent could not provide the personnel to do the security at your new facilities because all their troops were commited at the present time.

3. DCOS Ops indicated to CSS that additional soldiers have been requested. When these soldiers arrive they should then be able to provide security at your facilities.

4. Considering this situation you are authorized to hire personnel from a private security firm until UNAMIR military forces can provide this service.

5. Please send to this office, for approval, a material request with an NTE for this service for an initial period of one month.

Seen 21/1

DATA\BRSC\WBS\10_00\1\SECURITY.001

(2) COS
For your info I have collated a brief package on latest reqs for secur in Kigali.

29/1

(3) DCOS/OPS
Thanks

DCOS OPS 24.1

Thank SO2 OPS 28/1

24/01

From: DCOS OPS File No: 3000.12(Ops)

To: FRAFBATT 21 Jan 95

Subject: **SECURITY AT MOUNT KARONGI**

Reference:

A. 3000.12(Ops) dated 14 Jan 95.

1. In view of the importance of the UN repeaters deployed on Mount Karongi, you are requested to deploy troops in the vicinity of the mentioned feature to control and monitor access to our eqpt.

2. For your compliance.

MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

DATE: 211200 01 95

FM FRAFRATT
TO: UM HQ KIGALI

Subj: MT KARONGI 's Repeater.

Since the 18th there are some problems with the repeater at MT KARONGI.
It would be wise to send there the lecce team from KIGALI in order to try to find out the solution #

Thurnt
SO2OPS
21/1

COS

DRAFTER — REDACTEUR
NAME - NOM
OFFICE - BUREAU
TEL - TEL
Capt SAR

RELEASING OFFICER L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR
NAME - NOM
OFFICE - BUREAU
TEL - TEL

SIGNATURE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS - DIRECTIVES SPECIALES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SECURITE

DND 1507 (10-89) 7530-21-903-4274

FROM G3 OPS

TO DCOS OPS

DATE 19 JAN 95

BRIEF ON PROVISION OF SECURITY TO UNAMIR SITES IN KIGALI

1. The underlisted installations in KIGALI are provided security as indicated. INDBATT has exceeded the 18 rifle sections available for security and escort duties by 3 sections. According to INDBATT ops officer, some logistic/admin elements of the battalion have been deployed in the infantry role in order to meet the ever increasing security requirements of UNAMIR in KIGALI until the two remaining INDBATT rifle companies are deployed in the theatre.

a.	Belgian Village	-	2 sections.
b.	FC's Residence	-	1/2 section.
c.	INVECO	-	1 section.
d.	RRF	-	3 sections(one section each at Academy,Soaltee and Birpur.In addtion Birpur also has a coy HQ and one inf section.)
e.	UNAMIR HQ	-	2 1/2 section.
f.	Helipad (Presidential Hanger).	-	1 section.
g.	Communication Compound	-	1 section.
h.	UN Service Station	-	1 section.
i.	MILOBS GP HQ	-	1/2 section.
j.	CIV POL HQ	-	1/2 section.
k.	Transit Camp	-	1 section.
l.	Ndera OWS patrols	-	1 section.
m.	B and R convey escorts	-	1/2 to 1 section.
n.	UN Wksp	-	1 section.

o. Human Rights Building - 1 section.

p. UNICEF building - 1/2 section.

q. Patrols within Sector 6 - 1 to 2 sections.

r. UN Sector HQ Building - 1 section.

s. Trafipro - 2 sections.

2. Other security tasks that are yet to be undertaken are as follows:

a. B and R Trucks compound - 1/2 section.

b. Chez Lando Hotel - 1 section.

c. B and R additional office building - 1/2 section.

d. B and R carpentry shop - 1/2 section.

e. Village Urugwiro(yet to be recced).

f. Nzirorera Francis(yet to be recced).

g. Maniragula Village(yet to be recced).

h. N'sabako Yves(yet to be recced).

i. Meridien Hotel(RPA providing security.Problem of colocation).

j. Dihatsu Dealership(yet to be recced).

k. Ground transportation Eqpt Parking lot - ½ Sect.

l. Administration Office Building - ½ Sect.

m. Carpentery/Electrical workshop and bulk materials laydown yard - ½ Sect.

3. To take on additional security tasks as indicated in para 2, there is the need to either reduce the strength of troops at installations already being provided security or drawing up a priority list of installations for which security is neccesary and must be provided immediately and those installations that also require security but could to be looked at when the full strength of INDBATT is in the theatre. The CAO has a major role to play regarding which option to adopt.

G3 ops

MEMORANDUM (1)

File No : 1000-5

Dated : Jan 95

See distribution list

SUBJECT : DEPOSITING OF OFFICE KEYS AT THE RECEPTION

1. As you are aware, a key board is being maintained at the reception office which is supposed to hold duplicate keys to all offices in the Headquarters complex. Besides, all original keys being utilized by the OIC/Staff are also required to be deposited at the reception on close of office hours and collected the next day after signing for the same. However, this practice is not being followed by all.

2. What is of a grave concern from the point of view of security and safety is that some of the offices are in possession of all three keys and as a result no key is the available at the reception for use in emergencies eg. in case of outbreak of fire, loss of an original key etc.

3. It has also been noticed in the past that some offices have altered their office locks without any intimation to the Camp Office/Reception.

4. Keeping in view the security and safety aspect the following is requested :-

(a) All Offices to ensure that at least one key is available at the reception for use in case of an emergency.

(b) Loss of any key is reported immediately to the Camp Office/Reception so that appropriate action is taken for replacing the lock at the earliest.

(c) Any change of locks of the office door is intimated to the Camp Office/Reception and duplicate key of the new lock is made available at the reception immediately on occurrence.

(2) CC

Pse action accordingly

Sir (3)
I have not noticed any door keys since I took over. Para 4(a) not violated since Ops Room and G3 ops offices are 24 hrs manned. However, Pts noted.
18/1

1/2

5. Submitted for your information and necessary action please. Regards.

CS Dewgun
Captain
Camp Commandant
Phone : 11137

Distribution list

All Offices (UNAMIR Headquarters)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

(1)

17 January 1995

TO: Sammy Kum Buo
Acting Spokesman

cc: General Guy Tousignant
Acting Chief of Mission

Colonel Alan Brimelow
G3 Plans

FROM: Allen Hundley
Radio Broadcast Project Manager

SUBJECT: UN Military presence on Mt. Karongi

I am informed by Col. Alan Brimelow of Military Operations that the telecommunications site on top of Mt. Karongi in Sector 4 is no longer occuppied by Frafbatt. Instead it is guarded by the RPA with Frafbatt making patrols around the site twice daily.

Besides putting a critically important part of the UNAMIR VHF communications system at risk it also means that an alternative site must be found for the Radio UNAMIR transmitter that was to be placed on Mt. Karongi.

Unless a permanent UN military presence is re-established on Mt. Karongi I recommend that Radio UNAMIR place transmitters near Gisenyi at the Tunbatt Sector HQ and at the Sector HQ in Cyangugu. As pointed out in previous memos since we have only five transmitters this will necessitate moving a transmitter from one of the other outlying sites (Byumba, Kibungo, or Gikongoro) if we are to cover all of the refugee camps in Zaire. Further, especially in the case of the transmitter near Gisenyi and perhaps for the transmitter in Cyangugu, satellite equipment will be required to relay the programming from Kigali because of the high mountains between the two locations.

(In principle some form of VHF repeater system might be used to relay the programming but the Communications Section has advised me that suitable equipment and channels are not available. Even if they were, such a system would suffer from the same vulnerablity problems as Mt. Karongi because at least some of the repeater sites would not be under UN military control).

(2) G3 Ops
1. Pls cfm G3 Plans' recce and discussion with CO Frafbatt.
2. Pls issue msg telling Frafbatt to occ "lower ledge" near summit to con and monitor access and ovr egpt.

DCOSOPS
19.1

(3)
Actioned

Colonel Brimelow advises me that the situation will be re-examined to determine whether UNAMIR will re-establish a permanent military presence on Mt. Karongi. If such a presence is not re-established UNAMIR will need to modify its license application with the Government to reflect the change in sites.

3000 - 12

MEMORANDUM

TO: SECTOR 4A HQ, GIKONGORO

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ, GITARAMA

INFO: [redacted] KIGALI, G3OPS
MILOB GP HQ KIGALI, OPSO
TAC HQ BUTARE

DATE: 16 JAN 95

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ARMED ESCORT, OP RETOUR ACTIVITY

1. AS PART OF OP RETOUR, THE BOURGEMESTRES OF MASANGO AND MURAMA HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS AT RUKONDO CAMP. THEY INTEND TO DO THIS ON THURS 19 JAN ACCOMPANIED BY UP TO THREE FORMER DISPLACED PERSONS FROM EACH COMMUNE, BY A UNREO REP AND BY MILOBS FROM SECTOR 3. THE BOURGEMESTRES ARE QUITE WORRIED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY WHILE IN THE CAMP.

2. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO ARRANGE FOR AN ARMED ESCORT FOR THIS VISIT. THE GROUP PLANS TO ARRIVE AT RUKONDO AT 1130 HOURS AND WILL BE IN LOC FOR UP TO FOUR HOURS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A SECTION SIZED GUARD WOULD BE ADEQUATE. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU CAN MEET THESE TIMINGS.

P.C.LANCASTER
MAJ
OPSO

Seen
18/1

082/06/A

16 Jan 95

From : INDBATT

To : G3 Ops

Subject : SECURITY OF UN INSTALLATIONS IN KIGALI

1. Refer to your letter No 3000.12 dated 14 Jan 95.

2. Details as asked for are forwarded herewith as appendix attached.

(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT

802 Ops
18/1

Avel - 18
Regr. 24

Appendix

(Refer to INDBATT letter No 082/06/A dt 16 Jan 95)

SECURITY DUTIES BEING PROVIDED

Mil	1.	Belgian Village	- 2 Sections
Mil	2.	FC's Residence	- ½ Section
	3.	IVECO	- 1 Section
Mil	4.	RRF	- 3 Sections
Mil	5.	UNAMIR HQ	- 2½ Sections
Mil	6.	Helipad (Presidential Hangar)	- 1 Section
	7.	Communication Compound	- 1 Section
	8.	UN Service Station	- 1 Section
Mil	9.	Milob Gp HQ	- ½ Section ?
	10.	Civ Pol HQ	- ½ Section ?
Mil	11.	Transit Camp	- 1 Section
	12.	Ndera OWS Patrols	- 1 Section
	13.	B & R Convoy Escorts	- ½ to 1 Section
	14.	UN Wksp	- 1 Section
	15.	Butare (Op RETOUR)	- 1½ Sections
± Mar	16.	Human Rights Building	- 1 Section (Not occupied yet)
	17.	UNICEF Building	- ½ Section
Mil	18.	Patrols in Sector 6	- 1 to 2 Sections

17
3½

YET TO BE UNDERTAKEN

1.	Trafipro	- 2 Sections
2.	Chez Lando	- 1 Section !
3.	B & R Trucks Compound	- ½ Section
4.	B & R Additional Office Building	- ½ Section
5.	B & R Carpenter Shop	- ½ Section

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

1ST BATTALION

UNAMIR - MINUAR

082/06/A

16 Jan 95

From : INDBATT

To : G3 Ops

Subject : SECURITY OF UN INSTALLATIONS IN KIGALI

1. Refer to your letter No 3000.12 dated 14 Jan 95.

2. Details as asked for are forwarded herewith as appendix attached.

(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT

Actioned
SO2 OPS
18/1

Appendix

(Refer to INDBATT letter No 082/06/A dt 16 Jan 95)

SECURITY DUTIES BEING PROVIDED

1.	Belgian Village	-	2 Sections
2.	FC's Residence	-	½ Section
3.	IVECO	-	1 Section
4.	RRF	-	3 Sections
5.	UNAMIR HQ	-	2½ Sections
6.	Helipad (Presidential Hangar)	-	1 Section
7.	Communication Compound	-	1 Section
8.	UN Service Station	-	1 Section
9.	Milob Gp HQ	-	½ Section
10.	Civ Pol HQ	-	½ Section
11.	Transit Camp	-	1 Section
12.	Ndera OWS Patrols	-	1 Section
13.	B & R Convoy Escorts	-	½ to 1 Section
14.	UN Wksp	-	1 Section
15.	Butare (Op RETOUR)	-	1½ Sections
16.	Human Rights Building	-	1 Section
17.	UNICEF Building	-	½ Section
18.	Patrols in Sector 6	-	1 to 2 Sections

20½ Sections

YET TO BE UNDERTAKEN

1.	Trafipro	-	2 Sections
2.	Chez Lando	-	1 Section
3.	B & R Trucks Compound	-	½ Section
4.	B & R Additional Office Building	-	½ Section
5.	B & R Carpenter Shop	-	½ Section

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

(1)

16 January 1995

TO: Col. J. Arp
COS Operations

FROM: Peter Hornsby
Chief Support Service

SUBJECT: **Provision of Security at UNAMIR Sites in Kigali**

1. Several requests to have security elements placed at UNAMIR facilities have not yet been actioned. We are informed that security elements will not be placed at a number of sites until suitable accommodation facilities have been installed for the troops involved. We further understand this to mean sleeping, ablution and dining facilities. Please be informed it is not now, nor has it ever been, the intention to provide these facilities at individual sites around Kigali.

2. At sites where an already existing facility can be improved to provide full accommodation, and its conversion to this does not take away its use for office or other function, this can be done, at a low level of priority, more than likely on a self-help basis. Where such a possibility does not exist, no facility will be installed for the purpose. In these latter cases, access will be provided to toilet facilities and, if necessary, a small guard facility will be provided as shelter from the elements, as now exists at the Amahoro complex.

3. The Indian Battalion is now accommodated at the Pharmalab facility on the Airport Road, at the Namdhari Furniture

(2) G3 Ops
Pls incl as part of the brief to address this sit.
DCOS Ops
17.1

2/.....

Actioned
Thurs
Ops
17/1

Works in the Industrial complex, and 35 soldiers are quartered in the Maniraguha Villa, across from the Hotel Meridien. From these three facilities, suggest that virtually all sites requiring security elements are within, at most, a ten to fifteen minute truck trip away and some are indeed within a few hundred metres only. The situation is such that it is suggested that troops could be very easily rotated from home base to their guard site.

4. The provision of living facilities at all sites brings with it the attendant problems of feeding, janitorial services, provision of additional water and power generation to support ablutions, not to mention the initial cost of installation of these facilities, none of which have ever been factored into the budget.

5. Three specific sites for which security has been requested are:

   a) The carpenter/electrical workshop and bulk material laydown yard, located behind the IVECO compound, perhaps 500-700 metres from Namdhari Furniture Works;

   b) The Ground Transportation Parking Lot, also located behind IVECO and close to Namdhari Furniture.

   c) The BRSC temporary administrative building, located behind the Urugwiro Village, within less than a kilometre from Maniraguha Villa. This is a temporary facility, pending the move of BRSC to more permanent facilities, expected within three months.

6. UNAMIR has no intention of installing permanent living facilities at any of these or other sites, yet we are informed that no security will be provided until those facilities are in place. The facilities are now in use for the purposes, for which they have been leased, and UNAMIR personnel (including BRSC) and equipment are now located there. Security was requested for 1 January in the two cases and 8 January in the case of the office building and as of date of writing this letter is not yet in place.

7. I solicit your assistance in this regard.

cc: FC
CMCO

Brown & Root Services Corporation
Kigali, Rwanda

==========

MEMORANDUM

Date: 26 DEC 94

To: LTCOL Apogan Yella, G3 OPS

From: Tommy D. Woods

SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Brown & Root Services Corporation (BRSC), in support of UNAMIR, will be occupying several more locations in the immediate future. Your assistance is requested in providing 24 hr. security at these locations to include:

- Carpenter/ electrical workshop and bulk material laydown yard NLT 1 JAN 95
- Ground Transportation Equipment Parking Lot NLT 1 JAN 95
- Administrative Office Building NLT 8 JAN 95

I would like to meet with you at your earliest opportunity to visit these locations and discuss this matter in further details. I can be reached at the Iveco Facility office, tel. 72803 or at the UNAMIR HQ office, tel. 11095.

Thank you for your assistance in this administrative manner.

Regards,

Tommy D. Woods
BRSC Site Manager

cc:
Security file
Gilles Briere, CMC CO
COL N. K. Singh, CO INDIBATT

SO2 OPS

Pse. go with Brown & Root and Indibatt Ops ~~OPS~~ officer on a preliminary recce of the mentioned areas and advise.

27/12

Actioned

Brown & Root Services Corporation
Kigali, Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

Date: 26 DEC 94 (1)

To: LTCOL Apogan Yella, G3 OPS

From: Tommy D. Woods

SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Brown & Root Services Corporation (BRSC), in support of UNAMIR, will be occupying several more locations in the immediate future. Your assistance is requested in providing 24 hr. security at these locations to include:

"Iveco" 24/hrs ✓ • Carpenter/ electrical workshop and bulk material laydown yard NLT 1 JAN 95
TBA • Ground Transportation Equipment Parking Lot NLT 1 JAN 95
NI ✓ • Administrative Office Building NLT 8 JAN 95

I would like to meet with you at your earliest opportunity to visit these locations and discuss this matter in further details. I can be reached at the Iveco Facility office, tel. 72803 or at the UNAMIR HQ office, tel. 11095.

Thank you for your assistance in this administrative manner.

Regards,

Tommy D. Woods
BRSC Site Manager

(2) CA
Please coord with Ops & BRSC to make this happens
CMCO
27/12/94

cc:
Security file
Gilles Briere, CMC COI
COL N. K. Singh, CO INDIBATT

(3)

3000.37 (OPS)

FROM: DCOS OPS

TO: CO ETHIOBATT

DATE: 18 JAN 95

SUBJECT: UNAMIR AND RPA DEPLOYMENT

References:

A. 3000.12(OPS) dated 13 Jan 95.

B. OPS 191 dated 13 Jan 95.

1. Your prompt response to Ref A is very much appreciated. However the comment that " it is not our duty to send the deployment of RPA" as requested by the above mentioned reference was rather unfortunate. Ref B refers.

2. Be informed that among other restricted areas, the RPA has warned UNAMIR to desist from flying UN helis over RPA military installations. It was therefore imperative that info about known RPA installations are compiled for the info of UN heli pilots for the safety of both UN helis and crew.

3. This HQ also believes that it is in the interest of future UN heli ops that this info is compiled and forwarded by all UNAMIR contingents, including ETHIOBATT, to Force HQ.

4. Your fullest cooperation in matters of this nature is anticipated in the future.