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Nigeria's Struggle For SURVIVAL

*Statement at a press conference in the Connaught Rooms,
Kingsway, London, on Monday July 17, 1967*

by
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NIGERIA'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

Before dealing with the subject of our meeting, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the British Press and, through you, the British people for the support which they generously gave me four years ago in my extradition case. I am emboldened to meet you today by the memory of that support and by the knowledge it gave me that once the British Press and people are given the facts, there can be no doubt as to where their sympathies would lie in the Nigerian crisis.

Britain and Nigeria are fellow members of the Commonwealth, with all that this implies in friendly interchange in various fields and at many levels. The British created Nigeria and together we have built it. Britain has substantial commercial and industrial interests in Nigeria; the annual turnover of British trade with Nigeria, for example, is of the order of \$510 million a year. Some 20,000 United Kingdom subjects live and work in Nigeria. Nigeria supplies 10% of Britain's oil requirements. For these and other reasons, the Nigerian crisis must be of some concern to people in Britain.

The Oil Question

Clearly, from what I have said, there is much else besides oil between our two countries, although oil has come very much to the fore lately because of events in the Middle-East.

Let me say at once that Britain's interest in Nigerian oil is the same as ours—to keep it flowing. I do not doubt that as soon as circumstances permit, the flow will be resumed and will grow.

The Oil Industry in Nigeria is relatively young and its contribution to Federal Government Revenues is, at this date, by no means overwhelming. It is however, a rapidly growing industry which should, in the future, provide a decisive source of Foreign Exchange for Nigeria and a basis for important industries.

The Federal Government has therefore, given special attention to the development of the Oil Industry and, by special Agreement, has provided incentives to the Companies engaged in the exploration and production of crude petroleum in Nigeria. By this Agreement, the Federal Government receives some royalties from the Oil Companies.

It is now being suggested in some quarters that the rebel administration in Enugu has de facto control of the area in which most of the oil installations occur and that the Oil Companies might therefore make their payments to Enugu treasury. I need hardly say that such payment would be contrary to the Agreement and would be totally unacceptable to the Federal Government.

As is well known, a Government which has no control of territorial waters and external trade can hardly claim sovereignty over its territory. The effective blockade by the Nigerian Navy has shown that the Enugu Regime does not have control of territorial waters or external trade. Therefore, though Ojukwu may be able to take some action which may temporarily affect oil production, only the Federal Government of Nigeria is in a position to take the more significant action of preventing the off-take and marketing of oil.

The oil question is bound up with many others. I should like therefore to bring to your attention certain vital facts which may assist you in reaching some understanding and appreciation of recent events in Nigeria. In doing so, I hope you will permit me to start on a personal note.

You will receive copies of my biographical notes*, from which you will observe that for over twenty years, during which I have been a Newspaper Editor, a Businessman, a Member of Parliament, a Minister, and of course a Political Prisoner, I have been personally involved in the task of nation-building in Nigeria, I present myself to you therefore not merely as an agent or official spokesman of the Federal Government of Nigeria, obliged to repeat what he is instructed to say, but as a passionate believer in a United Nigeria and as one who has made some sacrifice for its cause.

States In Nigeria

Historically, what is now Nigeria consisted of a large number of ethnic groups brought together in the first instance by British enterprise and kept together after Britain's departure by our own will and consent. What were until recently Northern, Eastern, Western and Midwestern Nigeria consisted not only of Hausas, Ibos, Yorubas, but of other kingdoms and tribal units. *None of these ethnic groups had a centralized political and administrative authority.*

*Please see pp: 10 and 11

And none of the former regions constituted a political entity which entered into a union with the other regions to form a nation. On the contrary, the records show that the concept of regionalism was introduced by British colonial administrators partly "to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs," but mainly to ease the task of the administrators. By this device, advisory councils were set up for the Northern, Western and Eastern groups of provinces.

In Eastern Nigeria, for instance, there are 12 administrative divisions or provinces. Seven of these divisions are non-Ibo (Anang, Calabar, Degema, Ogoja, Port Harcourt, Uyo and Yenagoa). The Ibo speaking provinces are Abakaliki, Enugu, Onitsha, Owerri and Umuahia. The non-Ibo areas cover 16,938 square miles of the regions total area of 29,484 square miles. The non-Ibos number some five million in population (i.e. two-fifths of the region's population).

As in the former Eastern region, there are also in the former Western and Northern regions of Nigeria, non-Yoruba and non-Hausa provinces respectively. Unfortunately, at the dawn of independence in 1960, the Nigerian Constitution failed to recognize the strong desires of these other kingdoms and communities for self-determination and local government.

Causes of instability

The arbitrary grouping of these other communities around the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo) was a major cause of instability in the Nigerian Federation.

There were other causes, such as rivalries for leadership among the three major ethnic groups, each of them with its own small empire as a Region; corruption, tribalism and nepotism which debased parliamentary institutions and rendered them ineffective; interference with the judiciary; the quality of executive leadership; the problem of some young, well-educated, politically conscious but largely idle Army officers; and of course, sheer inexperience on our part.

Only by seeing this picture as a whole can one appreciate that secession by any part of Nigeria does not and cannot provide an answer to our problems. Even if Nigeria were to break into two parts, each would still be subject to the weaknesses, the deficiencies and the instability which have resulted in the present crisis. Separation would not of itself promote the chances of either faction surviving our common difficulties.

In this connection, it is necessary to stress that the movement for the creation of many states in Nigeria has a long history.

In 1945, Dr. Azikiwe, himself an Ibo, advocated the division of Nigeria into 8 states. In 1947, Chief Awolowo, a Yoruba, suggested the division of Nigeria into 10 states. In the late 40's and early 50's a political movement urged a Nigerian federation of 8 or 9 states. In 1958, the British Government appointed a Commission to examine the matter. At the end of their exercise, the British Government said that if they were to create more states in Nigeria, the new states must be given time to settle down and Independence for Nigeria would be delayed for about two years. I must admit now that we would have been far wiser to accept this course. In the 1959 Federal Election, a political party which campaigned for the creation of more states won unexpected victories in the minority areas of the North and East. In 1963, the Mid-West Region was created out of Western Nigeria. Towards the end of 1965, the grumblings in Kano, the heart of the Hausa North, and the demand for the creation of a Kano State became louder. In the Constitutional Meetings held last year, the creation of new states as an essential basis for stability in a new Nigeria was suggested by various delegations.

It must be understood therefore that the recent creation of 12 States in Nigeria is not a punitive measure against the Ibos. On the contrary, it is a condition of further political progress. It is a new basis for national reconstruction and it allows for the development of a stable order based on equality of the States and a common expectation of justice among the tribes. These are the underlying thoughts in the States Programme of the Federal Government.

The Two Lines of the first Coup

The situation in Nigeria less than three years after the attainment of independence was disturbing. There were loud murmurings against what was regarded as Northern domination. Of the three main political parties, two, *the Northern Peoples Congress and the Ibo-led National Council of Nigerian citizens*, formed the Government and the leaders of the third, *the Action Group*, were in prison. There was increasing agitation in certain areas for self-determination, leading for example, to the creation of a Mid-West State carved out of the Western region in 1963 and the imprisonment of a large number of people in parts of the North *especially in the Tiv and Plateau areas*. The Government and Parliament of one Region, the West, had been suspended by Federal action. There was general dissatisfaction about corruption in public life. There were census disputes. Due to population pressure and shortage of arable land in the Central part of the East, many of its people, the Ibos, had moved out and settled in large numbers among other communities, but they did not become integrated with the host communities. Elections had become a farce. Tribal jingoism increased. Parliaments met infrequently, public meetings were banned, the press was under siege. By the end of 1965, these and other factors combined had produced an explosive situation little short of a breakdown of law and order. It became increasingly clear that sooner or later there might be a violent political change.

There were only two forces capable of effecting such a change—the Trade Unions and the Armed Forces.

In the event, the change came from the Armed Forces. In the operations, two separate strands emerged. There were among the leaders of the coup of January 1966 those who appeared to be genuinely concerned for the welfare of the country, but there were others among them who saw in the desire for change an opportunity to pursue tribal rivalries. The two lines crossed each other in the coup of January, 1966. The Army itself was divided.

Yet there was an atmosphere of general relief immediately after the coup, until the pattern of killings which emerged when the dust had cleared created the impression that this was a coup by one ethnic group. Whatever may have been the basic plan therefore, its effect was that civilian leaders and outstanding senior Military Officers from some areas were killed while those from a particular area were spared. From then on, as you might say, the fat was in the fire.

A Federal Military Government was established with General Ironsi as its Head. He promised to restore law and order, to put down what he described as a mutiny, to deal with corruption and to restore civilian rule "as soon as practicable."

What happened in the following months may help you to understand how matters came to be taken out of his hands.

January 15, 1966—Revolution or Mutiny?

First, there was January 15th, 1966, itself. What was it? Was it a revolution? If it was, then its leaders were heroes and should have been treated as such. Was it a mutiny which had failed? If it was, then its leaders should have been brought to trial, civilian rule quickly restored, and Nigeria placed on the road to legality. Unfortunately, the officers involved were detained in prison (which displeased their sympathisers) but they were paid salaries and allowances and were not brought to trial (which displeased the supporters of their victims). Both sides seethed with anger.

Secondly, affairs in the Public Service and the Armed Forces appeared to lend colour to the impression that the coup was designed to install a particular group in position of power, and General Ironsi unfortunately drew his principal advisers from that group.

Thirdly, although public enquiries were instituted into the conduct of certain public officers, some of these men remained in positions of power. Thus the public became disenchanted.

Fourth, incautious statements and public attitudes heightened tensions between native communities in the North and those who had come to seek a living among them.

Fifth, there were continued reports that January, 1966 was inconclusive and that plans were afoot to "complete the job" by the removal of more non-Eastern officers.

Sixth, the leaders of the Opposition in the suspended Federal Parliament remained in prison whereas it was freely said that some Yoruba officers had joined in the coup expressly for the purpose of securing their release.

Seventh, amidst all this, the economic situation rapidly deteriorated.

Conditions ripe for another coup!

In the result, it became clear after a few months that no section of the country now really had full satisfaction from the coup. Once again, conditions were ripe for a violent change.

In May there were disturbances in the North and in July, 1966, there was another coup, after which Major-General Gowon (or Lt. Col. Gowon as he then was) replaced General Ironsi as Head of Government.

July, 1966 was in a sense a reversal of January, 1966, with this vital difference, that it was now utterly impracticable to return to the status quo ante January, 15th. I think that if this all important fact had been recognized on all sides at an early stage, much of the misery which followed might have been avoided.

Instead, there were threats of a massive reprisal for July. There were bomb incidents in Lagos by the newly aggrieved. There was much talk of pulling the Regions apart or of a confederation of the Regions whereas the lesson of our experience was that the existing Regions had to go if Nigeria was to survive. Then there came the tragic explosion of violence in the North during which *a large number of Nigerians a majority of whom were Ibos lost their lives and which led to vast movements of population unprecedented in the history of our country.*

Could these heart-rending events be the effect of the wanton assassinations of the Prime Minister of Nigeria, the premiers of Northern Nigeria and Western Nigeria, and the Federal Minister of Finance by Ibo army officers? Could they be because of the selective pattern of the killings of army officers in January, 1966? Could they be because of the decrees which General Ironsi and some of his immediate Ibo advisers caused to be promulgated thereby substituting one form of political domination for another? Anyone familiar with race riots in the United States of America and elsewhere; anyone who observes seriously mob reactions of followers to the death of their leaders as it was in the case of Chief Adelabu of Ibadan; and anyone who knows anything at all about communal riots as it was in the case of the Kano riots in 1953 would appreciate that, in riots effects are not always commensurate with their casual situations.

The immediate effect of this tragic experience was to bring the exercise of Constitutional talks to nothing. All non-Easterners were then expelled from the East by the order of Mr. Ojukwu. Easterners were recalled from the rest of the country. I believe that at that stage, Mr. Ojukwu made up his mind to secede.

CONCILIATION EFFORTS

Reconciliation on the basis of the old Regions therefore became impossible.

It is necessary to emphasize that efforts at conciliation were made from October 1966, to May 1967.

The decision of the Federal Military Government to over-look the defiance of Federal Government Authority by Mr. Ojukwu even at a time when there was no military capacity in Eastern Nigeria was one of such efforts.

The Enugu Regime seized more than one-third of the rolling stock of the Nigerian Railways, including 800 wagons and 115 oil tankers. It denied ports facilities to exports from the Northern Region. It obstructed the movement of oil products from the Refinery owned by all the Governments of Nigeria. It seized an aircraft of Nigeria Airways and hi-jacked another in the Mid-West Region. It confiscated property belonging to a foreign government—the Republic of Chad. It expelled all non-Easterners from the East. It impounded helicopters and aircraft belonging to British companies. It blew up the main bridge on the road between the Mid-West and Lagos.

It is to the credit of the other military leaders that they did not react to all this, believing that in time Mr. Ojukwu and his group might come round to discuss how best to begin to put the pieces of our broken fabric together again.

In the meantime, a Decree was introduced which completely decentralized the country even beyond the original demands of Mr. Ojukwu, but the Decree was unacceptable to him because it did not permit of secession. As each of his demands was met, he made others. Mr. Ojukwu stayed away from all meetings of the Military Council and the Federal Government.

More regretably, the long pause for conciliation and the funds provided by the Federal Government for rehabilitation purposes were used by the Enugu Regime for propaganda abroad, the importation of arms and preparation for war.

The turning point

For many months, the country was in suspense. Once again, people were expecting a violent change. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Military Council met and decided on a Political Programme which included the creation of states, immediate civilianization of the Federal and State Governments, and a phased return to full civilian rule. Mr. Ojukwu rejected the Programme.

The Federal Government now had no alternative but to take measures to bring down the Ojukwu Regime. Sanctions were introduced.

Yet, peace efforts continued. A final effort was made by a Peace Committee of Bishops, Judges and Political Leaders. On their behalf, Chief Awolowo visited Enugu. Their proposals for a settlement were promptly accepted by General Gowon who ordered that sanctions be lifted. They were rejected by Ojukwu. We were now at the crossroads.

On May 27, a State of Emergency was declared, 12 States were created, and sanctions were re-imposed.

On May 30, Ojukwu announced that Eastern Nigeria had seceded and formed the Republic of Biafra. It is possible that his calculation on early recognition by other States was wrong. A new flag was hoisted in public buildings in various towns in the area, the Police and the Army appeared in new uniforms and a National Anthem was broadcast. All these are obviously matters which, as you may appreciate, must have taken many months to arrange.

Even so, peace efforts continued. Ghana and other friendly countries, with the consent of the Federal Government, tried to negotiate a settlement. General Gowon stated Federal terms. The most important were:

1. Withdrawal of the purported secession of Eastern Nigeria;
2. Acknowledgment of Federal Government authority over Eastern Nigeria;
3. Acceptance of the new States;
4. Acceptance of civilians in the Federal and State Governments;
5. Agreement that constitutional talks on the future of Nigeria should be held at an early date by civilian representatives of the twelve States.

Ojukwu in reply insisted that Nigeria should recognize the breakaway state and conclude a peace treaty with him as Head of a Foreign State.

It must be clear that by accepting such a suggestion the Federal Government of Nigeria would have been the first Government to recognize the so-called Republic of Biafra which up till today has not been recognized by any Government or international Organization.

POLICE ACTION

On Friday, June 30, 1967, Ojukwu announced that he would wage total war against Nigeria. Terrorist activities in Lagos and other parts of Nigeria followed. Bridges were blown up and villages in the North attacked. There were more bomb outrages in Lagos. There were acts of terrorism and intimidation against the minority ethnic groups of the new Eastern States who support the Federal Government. These acts included pillage, arson and unlawful imprisonment.

At dawn on Friday 7th July, Ojukwu's forces attacked the Federal Army and General Gowon ordered Federal forces to march into the East and capture Ojukwu.

As you know, Federal Forces have already liberated a large part of the South Eastern State as well as parts of the Rivers state where they have been welcomed with joy by the people, and Federal authority has been re-established in parts of the East Central State. I must emphasize that this is not civil war. It is not an attempt to crush the Ibos. It is a police action restricted to the purpose of bringing down the Ojukwu Regime. But whatever it is called, it is a sad business and I hope it may soon be over either by a quick victory for Federal Forces or by revolt in Enugu against Ojukwu which would stop further bloodshed.

THE FUTURE

What now, about the future?

Let me first correct some misconceptions which I have discovered here. It is said that the so-called Biafra is a gallant little nation fighting for self-determination, threatening nobody, wishing to live its own life, led by a young Rockefeller. Why then not let them go?

This is not the case. Biafra is not and never was a nation and there hasn't been much gallantry in our recent past. We have no Rockefellers, let alone a young one. The act of union which created Nigeria also created Eastern Nigeria and there was Nigeria long before there was an entity known as Eastern Nigeria.

If the union of Nigeria is dissolved, there are no legal bonds to tie together the Ibos and the coastal kingdoms and other tribes of Eastern Nigeria, who would be as fully entitled to self-determination as the Ibos are. What is more, they have shown that they would fight for it.

Secession will have grave repercussions on the history of Africa

If Secession by Ojukwu and his group is accomplished, Nigeria will most probably disintegrate. Once fractionalization starts, it certainly will result in the further disintegration of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria. Neighbouring states with ethnic and other problems similar to ours will in due course also disintegrate, and a chain reaction will be set up all over Africa. Africa would end up in petty little principalities. Each successor "mini-state" would be sovereign enough to acquire foreign protectors and purchase arms. Such a situation, with its inevitable dislocations and frictions over boundaries, trade and division of assets, would produce wars. Foreign countries would intervene on behalf of their "protectorates" and the conflagration would become bloodier and more permanently damaging to the interests of Nigeria, of Africa, and of foreign countries with stakes in the area.

It is said that Biafra would be self-sufficient economically. There would, of course be no Biafra for any length of time. Only some 5 per cent of Nigeria's oil is produced in the Ibo areas. 60% is mined in the Rivers area and all the pipelines at present run through the Rivers area and 35% is produced in Mid-West State. Of the total value of agricultural exports from the former Eastern Nigeria, the 7,000,000 Ibos produce \$25 million and the 5,000,000 non-Ibo peoples produce \$48 million. Further, the only "new lands" left in Eastern Nigeria for settlement is in the non-Ibo Ogoja and Calabar areas. Wiser heads in the Central East (i.e. Ibo) who are at present shut out of public affairs by Ojukwu appreciate therefore that the interests of the Ibos can be best secured in a Nigerian Federation where the industry of their people and the resources of others can be harnessed for the common good.

Religious factor is outdated conception

It is said that the present struggle is one between the largely Moslem North and the largely Christian East. This is an outdated conception of the crisis. The creation of States completely alters the picture. There is now no Northern entity and no Eastern Nigeria identity. Were this not the case, if States had not been created, and if this were a North versus East match, I, for my part, would have found it difficult to accept office at this time. Nigeria is very much a secular state and religion does not play any significant part in Nigerian politics. There is a large number of Moslems in Western Nigeria and Lagos. General Gowon is a Christian. So am I. What is now going on is a struggle for the very survival of our nation.

The Ibos have a future in Nigeria

It is suggested here that so much bitterness has been generated that there can be no future for the Ibos in Nigeria. This is not the case. Notwithstanding the tragic occurrences of the last 18 months, we realize that all Ibos cannot, must not, be held accountable for the actions of a few, and that it would be uncivilized and unjust to do so. I give you my assurance that in the Federal Government, there is no lack of feeling for the future of the Ibos as an integral part of Nigeria or of sympathy with their entitlement to special treatment when the present crisis has been overcome. In this connection, a Rehabilitation Fund is even now being built up, to which some British firms have contributed. I have tried to be as objective as possible and to give you a rational analysis of events in Nigeria in the last few years. I hope what I have said may help you to understand our difficulties and the problems attendant upon nation-building in Africa.

We were a welter of nationalities. Out of them, the British created Nigeria. The British gave us the foundation of a new nation and the beginnings of democratic government. Upon these foundations, we were supposed to construct a stable social order and a modern society based on the ideas and ideals of justice and public service which we learned from Britain. So far, we have not made a great job of it. But we have felt the stirrings of common nationality and the call of common enterprise. And so we have a deep desire to try again. We must try again. We will try again. We have begun by sweeping away the ability of one section to dominate the rest and the ability of subordinate authorities to challenge the Central authority, and by establishing an equitable basis of national reconstruction. In our endeavors, I hope and trust that we will have the understanding and sympathy of friends, among whom I count the British Press and the British people.

Thank you.

CHIEF ANTHONY ENAHORO

*Commissioner for The Ministries of Information and Labor of The
Federal Government of Nigeria*

Chief Anthony Enahoro was born 44 years ago in Onewa, Uromi, Benin Province, Mid-Western Nigeria. At 13 he entered King's College where he studied for six years and later took courses in English and Economics.

While still at College, Chief Enahoro's interests and talents in journalism were so apparent as to have been a source of fear to officials of Britain's Crown Colony Government in Lagos.

The following are landmarks of his career in journalism and politics:—

- 1943 - He became Editor of the "Defender" an influential paper published in Lagos, Nigeria.
- 1944 - Editor of the "Comet".
- 1945 - He threw his weight and influence with Nigeria's Labour Force in their general strike which paralysed the essential services of the British Government in Nigeria.
- 1946 - He was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment after having been found guilty of "seditious publications".
- 1947 - He returned from prison to resume Editorship of the "Comet".
- 1948 - Again he was sentenced to another term of imprisonment for some "seditious statements" attributed to him. This time his imprisonment was for 18 months.
- 1949 - He became the Founder and Editor of the "Star".
- 1949 - He earned a third term in prison for "sedition". This time Anthony Enahoro was behind the bars for only six months.
- 1950 - 51 - Chief Anthony Enahoro began to address himself earnestly to the business of political participation which was still at its budding stage in Nigeria.
- 1952 - 54 - He was elected a Member of the Western House of Assembly: appointed Director of the Nigerian Coal Corporation; and also became Chairman of two local government councils.
- 1952 - He undertook a study of the systems of parliamentary government in the United Kingdom and Ireland for one year.
- 1953 - Chief Enahoro moved the historic self-government for Nigeria motion in Parliament.
- 1954 - He was re-elected into the Western House of Assembly.
- 1954 - 59 - He was made Minister of Home Affairs, Mid-West Affairs, Information; and he was also Leader of the House in the Western Nigerian House of Assembly.

IMPORTANT OVERSEAS VISITS

- 1953 - He attended the London Constitutional Conference on the Nigerian Constitution.
- 1954 - Chief Enahoro was Nigeria's Representative at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.
Also, Nigeria's Representative at the World Association of Parliamentarians in Paris.
- 1955 - He was Nigeria's Representative at the World Association of Parliamentarians and Scientists in London.
- 1957 - He participated in the Conference of Representatives of Governments of West Africa on a programme designed to bring colonial rule in Africa to an end.
- 1958 - 59 - Chief Enahoro studied thoroughly the British Cabinet System and also the Police and Prison Systems of the United Kingdom.
He also studied Police Systems in the United States of America and Canada.
He also represented Nigeria at the Hansard Conference and Parliamentary Government in Oxford.
He was Leader of the Action Group Delegation to the All Africa Peoples Conference in Accra Ghana.
- 1960 - He was leader of the Action Group to the all Africa Peoples Conference in Tunis.
- 1960 - He represented Nigeria on the Conference on African Unity, held in Philadelphia, U.S.A.
- 1959 - 60 - He was the Nigerian Member on the Steering Committee of the All Africa Peoples Conference.
- 1959 - He voluntarily relinquished his position as Regional Minister to go to the Centre.
He was elected into the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos.
- 1960 - 63 - He was Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs and Legislative Matters in the House of Representatives, Lagos.
- 1960 - 63 - He established a firm of "investment and business consultants" of which he was Director.
- 1962 - He left Nigeria as a result of the emergency that had been declared and took refuge in Accra, Ghana.
- 1963 - While still continuing his efforts in London to "bring an end to man's inhumanity to man," Chief Enahoro was arrested as "a fugitive offender" was deported to Lagos, and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for treason.
- 1966 (August) He was released after the second army take-over. Thereafter he became leader of the Mid-West State Delegation to the Constitutional Talks on the future of Nigeria.
- 1967 (June) He was appointed Member of the Federal Executive Council and charged with the departmental responsibility for the Ministries of Information and Labour.
He is also leader of the Nigerian delegation to the current emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Chief Enahoro is married and has 3 children.

His main hobby is playing golf.

PUBLICATIONS

Author of "Fugitive Offender," an autobiography.