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UNAMIR MINUAR

R W A N D A

BUREAU D'INFORMATION, D'EDUCATION ET DE PRESSE

(BIEP)

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Nº 32/94

RWANDA: TREVE DE 48 HEURES POUR PERMETTRE L'EVACUATION DES
RESSORTISSANTS ETRANGERS.

Kigali, (BIEP) le 13 Avril 1994

*LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (FPR) ET LES FORCES ARMEES
RWANDAISES (FAR) ONT ACCEPTE D'OBSERVER, A PARTIR D'AUJOURD'HUI, UNE
TREVE DE 48 HEURES, DANS LES ZONES SOUS LEURS CONTROLES RESPECTIFS,
AFIN DE FACILITER LA TACHE DES GOUVERNEMENTS ETRANGERS QUI ONT DECIDE
D'EVACUER LEURS RESSORTISSANTS DU RWANDA.*

*LES DEUX PARTIES AU CONFLIT RWANDAIS ONT SIGNE SEPAREMENT
CETTE ATTENTE AVEC LA MINUAR, NOTANT CHACUNE DES APPRECIATIONS
DIFFERENTES. AINSI, LORSQUE LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (FPR) PARLE
DE "REPRISE DES HOSTILITES ENTRE LE FPR ET LES ELEMENTS DE LA GARDE
PRESIDENTIELLE", LES FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR) PARLENT ELLES
D'"HOSTILITES ENTRE LE FPR ET LES FAR".*

*LE DOCUMENT SIGNE PAR LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (FPR)
NOTE QUE LES OBSERVATEURS DE LA MINUAR ACCOMPAGNERONT LES "CONVOIS
DES FORCES ETRANGERES QUI PROCEDENT AUX OPERATIONS D'EVACUATION".
CELUI SIGNE PAR LES FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR) PREVOIT QUE LES
"CONVOIS DES EXPATRIES SERONT ACCOMPAGNES PAR LES ESCORTES DE LA
GENDARMERIE ET DE LA MINUAR".*

Bureau d'Information, d'Education et de Presse (BIEP)

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA



UNAMIR MINUAR

R W A N D A

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 32/94

page 2

LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (FPR) ET LES FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR) DEMANDENT A LA MINUAR DE S'ENGAGER A NOTIFIER AUX FORCES ETRANGERES NE FAISANT PAS PARTIE DE LA MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES, LEUR DEPART DU TERRITOIRE RWANDAIS DOUZE (12) HEURES APRES L'ACCOMPLISSEMENT DES OPERATIONS D'EVACUATION.

"C'EST UN PAS IMPORTANT DANS LE LONG PROCESSUS ENTAME PAR LA MINUAR POUR AMENER LES PARTIES A ACCEPTER LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT DES ETRANGERS QUI SOUHAITENT QUITTER LE RWANDA", A DIT LE GENERAL ROMEO DALLAIRE, COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE, QUI A MENE, AU NOM DU REPRESENTANT SPECIAL DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA, M. JACQUES-ROGER BOOH, LES NEGOCIATIONS SEPARÉES AVEC LES DEUX PARTIES.

(END)

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

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UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES TELEGRAPH

PAGE 1 OF 7

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DATE: 11 April 94

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MSF 2182-04

F A C S I M I L E

TO: UNAMIR, Rwanda

ATT: Mr. Pierre Mehu, Spokesman

FAX NO: (250) 84-275

FROM: Larissa Sidorova, Chief
Dissemination Unit, ERS/PERD/DPISUBJECT: Daily Press Briefing of Spokesman for the SGAs requested, please find following the Daily Press Briefing
for today.

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Spokesman

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Uttam Rana, Chief
External Relations Service, PERD/DPI

DATE

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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

11 April 1994

MSF 2182.0

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING OF OFFICE OF SPOKESMAN FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL

Joe Sills, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, began today's noon briefing by informing correspondents that the Secretary-General was chairing a meeting of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) which was comprised of the heads of United Nations agencies and programmes and met twice annually, at the International Telecommunication Union Headquarters in Geneva.

At 12:30 p.m., the Secretary-General addressed the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II). The text of his remarks was available in Press Release SG/SM/5263-HAB/80 issued today.

The afternoon had been devoted to a continuation of the ACC meeting. Afterwards, the Secretary-General had met with Ibrahima Fall, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights. He then was expected to meet with Lansana Kouyate, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia.

Mr. Sills reminded correspondents that live feeds of press conferences and statements, as well as information on the activities of the Secretary-General, could be accessed through extension 3777.

The Secretary-General had made two statements regarding the situation in Gorazde which had been made available to the press, but which Mr. Sills wished to note for the record. On Sunday, Therese Gastaut, spokeswoman for the Secretary-General in Geneva, had noted that the Secretary-General had not hesitated to use air power in Gorazde, and that he "would like to make it very clear that he will not hesitate to use air power again to protect the United Nations designated safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

In a statement today to the press in Geneva, the Secretary-General had again mentioned the safe areas and the necessity of their remaining safe areas. The Secretary-General indicated that the United Nations had reacted in that fashion because he had received a request from the military forces on the ground that they needed air support. The Secretary-General had underlined his hope that "we can continue the negotiations between UNPROFOR and the different protagonists in this conflict to find a solution to this problem".

Mr. Sills stated that, as well known by now, yesterday at 1825 hours local time there had been close air support (CAS) used against Bosnian Serb military targets in the vicinity of Gorazde. Indications were that the mission against the command centre was successful. The targets were in a heavily wooded area. The close air support had been requested by Sir Michael Rose, Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who judged that the lives of United Nations personnel were in danger, as shells were landing close to the position of the military observers in the centre of Gorazde. The request was subsequently approved by the Force Commander, Bertrand de Sauvville de Lapresle and Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia.

(more)

4706B

Daily Press Briefing

- 2 -

11 April 1994

MSF 2182704

Continuing, Mr. Sills said that, in accord with the procedures in place, Mr. Akashi had confirmed that, given the first use of CAS which had taken place, General de Lapresle retained authority to employ CAS in self-defence as a continuation of last night's events. Approval by Mr. Akashi was not necessary for that continuation.

Mr. Sills said that on Friday one UNPROFOR military observer had been under fire and one interpreter had been injured by a mortar round. So there had definitely been threats to UNPROFOR personnel, he said. As a result of the use of CAS, shelling had stopped temporarily, but it resumed very quickly. After further contacts at the military level between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb commander in Pale, Bosnia, shelling had stopped as of 2200 hours local time. However, after a quiet night, in the morning the situation again deteriorated with artillery, and tank fire being directed into the city. Between 0845 and 1000 hours Gorazde time, 25 rounds had been counted in the vicinity of the city centre. Shells continued to come in and appeared to be targeted against the military observers, since rounds were landing very close to their building.

The city centre was then exposed to small arms and machine gunfire and the Bosnian Serb army tanks appeared to have moved into position for an attack on the city, Mr. Sills continued. Infantry elements had also taken position in the south of the city. Thus, at 1424 hours local time, at the request of UNPROFOR, two F18 fighter aircraft from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed one Bosnian Serb tank position and two armoured personnel carriers about one kilometre south of the city. A preliminary damage assessment suggests the attack was successful. There had been a number of unsuccessful efforts by UNPROFOR to talk with Bosnian leaders. The Special Envoy of the United States, Charles Redman, was seeking to set up negotiations. Also, Vitaliy Churkin, Special Envoy of the Russian Federation, was expected to travel to Pale later this afternoon to meet with the Bosnian Serb authorities. In addition, Mr. Akashi was expected back in Zagreb this evening.

Mr. Sills said that he had spoken to UNPROFOR in Zagreb five minutes before the briefing and had been told that in the last two hours there were no reports of shelling into the city centre. He also mentioned that prior to today's CAS, General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Serbian forces in Bosnia, was warned that if the shelling of Gorazde did not cease, action would be taken in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Turning to the situation in Rwanda, Mr. Sills first reviewed the United Nations efforts to evacuate its civilian staff and their dependents. Two ground convoys had left for Burundi, as well as an airlift yesterday to Nairobi and some had evacuated on a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) flight returning to Nairobi this morning. About 250 civilian staff and their dependents had been evacuated from Kigali; 18 remained, and further evacuation efforts were under way. Many representatives of non-governmental organizations had also been evacuated, he added.

(more)

4706B

Daily Press Briefing

- 3 -

11 April 1994

MSF 2182-04

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had unconfirmed reports that four UNICEF national staff and their families were killed in Kigali, Mr. Sills said. Of the UNICEF staff total of 48 there, 8 were international and these had now been evacuated.

Regarding the situation in Kigali, there were reports, not yet confirmed, of a major battle having broken out between the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) forces, moving into Kigali, and Government forces. Mr. Sills said he was able to confirm the movement from the north as well as the presence of the RPF forces on the outskirts of the city. The fighting and acts of violence which was continuing had caused a tremendous loss of life in both the city and elsewhere in the country. He could also confirm a report from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) that a hospital in Kigali, which housed military doctors from UNAMIR who treated both UNAMIR personnel and Rwandese, had been hit. Although no UNAMIR personnel had been wounded, 27 civilians had been killed and an unknown number of people wounded, Mr. Sills added.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, as well as the Force Commander, continued to make every effort to persuade the parties to resume the dialogue and come to a cease-fire and relaunch the peace process. Obviously, there had been no success yet, Mr. Sills said. An estimated 5,000 Rwandan citizens have sought UNAMIR's protection, he added.

What were the implications of the Bosnian Serbs suspending cooperation with the United Nations? a correspondent asked. Mr. Sills said the implications were serious. He said the United Nations hoped cooperation would be restored both in terms of the negotiations and the humanitarian convoys which had been suspended where they passed through Serb-controlled areas, and the Sarajevo air lift. However, he repeated that the Secretary-General had stated that the safe areas designated by the United Nations must remain safe areas. It was for that reason, and not as an attack on any one party, that the Secretary-General had stated he would not hesitate to use air power to protect the safe areas. It was clear that the attacks on Gorazde must stop, Mr. Sills said, and the United Nations expected them to stop.

In response to a question on Ejup Ganic, Vice-President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Sills said that the Security Council today, which had originally been scheduled to discuss Rwanda, Angola and Cyprus, had added Bosnia and Herzegovina to its agenda. Mr. Ganic was expected to meet with members of the Council at 3 p.m. Mr. Ganic and Mohamad Sacirbey, Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would hold a press conference at 3:45 p.m. in room 226.

In response to a question on Serb casualties, Mr. Sills said the only report available so far was on the first attack and there had been no observations of civilian casualties. He had no more information.

Mr. Sills told another correspondent that he had no figures in response to her comment that Serbian sources estimated the Bosnian Muslim army in Gorazde at 10,000 strong.

(more)

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Daily Press Briefing

- 4 -

11 April 1994

MSF 2182-04

Asked for further information on the whereabouts and extent of the injury to the UNPROFOR soldier, Mr. Sills said that the injury was not life-threatening and he believed he was still in Gorazde.

What was the official United Nations position on yesterday's events in Gorazde? a correspondent asked. Was the strike to protect the 65,000 people or the observers? Mr. Sills said the CAS was called in to protect the UNPROFOR personnel in Gorazde.

Another correspondent said that the President of the Security Council had said last week that it was the Muslims who had started the fighting around Gorazde, and yet the Serbs were bombed. Would that now give the impression that UNPROFOR had entered the war on the Muslim side? he asked. While cautioning that he did not want to speak for the President of the Council, Mr. Sills said he didn't think the statement made by the President had indicated that he thought the fighting had been started by the Muslims. He added that he was sure that it was not what Chinmaya Rajaninath Gharekhan, the Special Political Adviser, had said. The Secretary-General's statement about the situation stood by itself. The city was under siege. Its designation as a safe area was clearly not being honoured and that was the basis upon which United Nations action was taken.

To a further question as to whether the United Nations felt as though it had been manipulated, Mr. Sills said that was not the case at all. For another correspondent, Mr. Sills repeated that it would not be necessary for General de Lapresle to go back to to Mr. Akashi for approval of further requests for CAS in the situation in question.

Mr. Sills told another correspondent, in response to his question, that he knew of no plans to evacuate UNAMIR personnel who were at present holding close to their barracks. Efforts were focused on evacuating civilians and dependents. The UNAMIR could obviously not perform its mandated function of assisting the two sides in implementing a peace agreement. The Council would most likely be discussing UNAMIR's role in the next few days.

Asked if UNAMIR was assisting in the evacuation of foreign nationals, Mr. Sills said UNAMIR had forces at the airport when the French and Belgian forces had come in, and they had assisted and cooperated in the evacuations. He added that he did not know if UNAMIR forces were still at the airport.

Asked what Mr. Sills meant by a "UNAMIR flight", Mr. Sills said there had been a UNAMIR flight today, which had brought food and supplies to UNAMIR. Since the plane was departing empty, it had been used to transport some civilians to Nairobi.

A correspondent noted that complaint of the Russian Federation regarding the lack of consultation before "the NATO attack". What was the United Nations provision for prior consultation? he asked. The position of the Secretary-General was that the process followed in calling in CAS was consistent with the arrangements that had been made in the past with the approval of the Security Council, Mr. Sills said. No further consultations were necessary.

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Daily Press Briefing

- 5 -

11 April 1994

MSF 2182701

Was there any evidence of the use of chemical weapons by the Serbs? a correspondent asked. Although there had been a report of that charge, it had been found to be unsubstantiated, Mr. Sills said. There had been a type of shell used that contained a delayed smoke effect, but it was not deemed by UNPROFOR to be a chemical weapon.

Since UNAMIR now had access to the airport, was it assisting in the investigation of the plane wreckage in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed? a correspondent asked. Mr. Sills said he had no further information on that matter. He added that while some UNAMIR personnel had been stationed at the airport, he understood that the plane had crashed outside of the airport itself.

Mr. Sills told another correspondent that he had no information on how many Bosnian Serb soldiers might have been at the targeted sites.

A correspondent said that the Secretary-General had said in his report to the Security Council that Muslim forces were using safe havens for retraining troops and attacking Serbian forces. What was the United Nations doing to curb those activities? he asked. The United Nations was taking every action to ensure that the safe havens were honoured and the ground rules followed, Mr. Sills answered. In some areas, the Muslims had been disarmed and had put their heavy weaponry under United Nations control. The United Nations was aware of the problem.

A correspondent said he was confused because it had been stated that CAS had been called in strictly and solely to defend UNPROFOR personnel, yet the Secretary-General had stated that it was necessary to keep the safe areas safe, which implied that the action was taken on behalf of the civilians. Mr. Sills said the first point was the legal basis for the action; in other words, the basis upon which CAS had been set up. The reason UNPROFOR personnel were in Gorazde was for its protection as a safe area and the reason it needed protection was because it had been under attack. There had been a large number of casualties among the civilians. So, obviously, the action was also taken to protect the safe area and the people within. In his statement, the Secretary-General had said the action was also taken because it was requested by General Rose and the drill for CAS had been followed. The Security Council resolutions provided the legal justification for the action, Mr. Sills added. The CAS was predicated on threats to UNPROFOR personnel.

A correspondent said the implication was that the Secretary-General had changed his mind, yet it seemed to her that that President Clinton had been the one to change his mind and then he contacted the Secretary-General. What exactly had happened? she asked. The Secretary-General's statement was not based on a prior decision of the United States, Mr. Sills said. The seriousness of the situation in Gorazde had become clear. There had been a misreading of it earlier. General Rose had felt more and more strongly that the attacks were not ending. He had warned the Bosnian Serb military. Furthermore, United Nations personnel had been wounded. He made a recommendation to Mr. Akashi and it had been approved. The Secretary-General concurred that the action had to be taken. The NATO Council had already

(more)

4706B

7

Daily Press Briefing

- 6 -

11 April 1994

MSF 2182704

approved the NATO's Command responding to a request from the United Nations for CAS without referring it back to the NATO Council. So once the request had been made, it was handled very quickly by NATO.

In response to another question, Mr. Sills affirmed that the Secretary-General had delegated the decision on CAS to Mr. Akashi. However, Mr. Akashi had chosen to speak with the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General had concurred with Mr. Akashi's decision.

Was the possibility of further action now open-ended, as far as other Serbian positions? a correspondent asked. Also what goals did the United Nations hope to achieve? Mr. Sills said that the ground rules related to a specific situation and once the first approval had been given, it was in the Force Commander's hands. As far as goals to be achieved, Mr. Sills said he hoped the attacks on Gorazde would stop.

In response to a question, Mr. Sills said the while the 5,000 civilians in Rwanda were being given protection, there was concern over the long-term effect. A lot of attention was focused on evacuation of United Nations staff and foreign nationals. But, there was a tremendous tragedy occurring in Rwanda and it would evidently continue after the evacuations. A great deal of attention must be given to ending that tragic situation.

Mr. Sills told another correspondent that he had no further identification on the unidentified person apparently killed along with the 10 Belgian peace-keepers.

Asked how many Rwandans the United Nations could provide protection for, Mr. Sills said supplies were running low. The UNAMIR food stocks were being shared with the civilians who had taken refuge. That would quickly be a major problem.

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
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MOST IMMEDIATE

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE : 12 APRIL 1994



Attached, for your information, is a press release issued
this morning in New York by the Ambassador to the United Nations.

Regards.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



12 April 1994

PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front forces have now entered the Rwandan Capital, Kigali, and are engaging elements of Rwandan government forces, which we hope to neutralize very soon.

The so called Interim government, composed of Criminals who have masterminded the massacre of opposition politicians, human rights activists, United Nations peacekeepers and thousands of innocent Rwandan Civilians, particularly those of Tutsi ethnic origin, has now fled the Capital.

The evacuation of foreign nationals is almost complete and all foreign troops are expected to leave Rwanda within 24 hours.

Despite the fact that a systematic genocide of Tutsi and Hutu opposition politicians has been carried out by a gang of extremist Hutu elements, the media has unfairly treated this crisis as tribal conflict. We wish to make it clear that this is a political conflict and not a tribal conflict. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is not a Tutsi rebel group, but a national organisation that advocates national Unity, democracy and security for people and their property.

Our immediate objective is to stop the senseless killing of innocent people and to restore law and order in Rwanda. We call upon both the national and International Community to support this noble objective.

Claude Dusardi
Rwandese Patriotic Representative
at the United Nations

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OUT GOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 12 APR 94 APR 12 15 17

P1/1

TO : SITUATION CENTRE/DPKO/UNNY	FROM: BGEN ANYIDOHOR UNAMIR/KIGALI
FAX NO: 212 963 9053	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: CAS REPORT - UNAMIR PER	
TO : DUTY OFFR MIR-746	ORIGINATOR - LT COL J.A.CHOUDHURY CMPO EXT 1056
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : ONE	

1. UNAMIR I.D.NO 716 MAJ SOUVOROV (MILOB) OF RUSSIA IS SLIGHTLY INJURED BY SHELLING ON 121600 APR 94 WHILE COMING FROM HOTEL MERIDIEN TO FORCE HQ. VEH CARRYING THE ABOVE OFFR IS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED.
2. SENT FOR YOUR INFO PLEASE.
3. BEST REGARDS.

12 APR 12 15 41

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UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

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KYF 651 LMF 426 12 APRIL 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: J.-R. BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA <i>for J. J. J. J.</i>
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, DPKO, NEW YORK	
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 84265
<u>INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:</u> UNOMUR : FAX (256) 486-23186 DMZ SECTOR : FAX 64168 SEC KIGALI (3 x) MILOB GP HQ UNCIVPOL	
SUBJECT: SPECIAL SITREP 120800B APR TO 121900B APR 94.	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: 5	

DIRECT

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MISC-327

1. 12 APR 94 WAS A REASONABLE SUCCESSFUL DAY FOR THE RPF. THE GOVERNMENT HAS PACKED IN AND LEFT KIGALI TOWARDS SOUTH. RPF TROOPS FROM THE NORTH ENTERED KIGALI FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, ALSO FROM THE SOUTH. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO CUT OFF THE AIRPORT FROM THE CITY.
2. FC NEGOTIATED SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH RGF AND RPF REGARDING A 48 HRS TRUCE IN ORDER TO ALLOW SAFE PASSAGE OF THE EXPATRIATE CONVOYS. THE REALIZATION OF THIS AGREEMENTS IN THE TERRAIN WILL BE VERY, VERY DIFFICULT.
3. UNAMIR CASUALTIES: ON 121600 APR 94 AN ARTY SHELL EXPLODED BESIDE UNAMIR VEHICLE 1015 WHICH WAS ON HIS WAY TO KIGALI SEC HQ. THE VEHICLE ROLLED TWICE. THE DRIVER, MAJ SOUVORON FROM RUSSIA, HAD A MINOR INJURY OUT OF THIS ACCIDENT. SO FAR THIS IS THE ONLY UNAMIR CASUALTY FOR THIS DAY.
4. AS REQUESTED BY FC, FORCE HQ STAFF PERFORMS A STAFF CHECK FOR THE MOVE OF BYUBAT FROM DMZ TO KIGALI.
5. PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED THE UNAMIR FORCE HQ LOGBOOK.
6. REGARDS.

SRSG

94 APR 12 19 15

UNAMIR

2/5

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ - LOGBOOK
Period 111900 Apr 94 - 121900 Apr 94

1	111840	Situation at the airport may become worse between Belgian soldiers and the RGF. Because RGF are saying that Belgian are helping Tutsis to evacuate. RGF are getting very aggressive.
2	111850	No joint command has been established at the airport. The Belgian Bde Comd is in the Belgian Embassy, Kigali Sector Comd is with the French Comd at the airport. Report from PLO-2 that though the Belgian Bde Comd is not in the airport but that his staff is co-located with the French Comd.
3	111905	Belgian Bde Comd has just arrived with Belgian expatriates. Relation between RGF and Belgian is improving.
4	111950	Belgian troops are not evacuating Tutsis. Belgian troops have evacuated 550 expatriate.
5	112010	FC has left Hotel Diplomate for Force HQ,
6	112010	<p>Received summary of activities from DMZ:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Personnel Evacuated</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Force Engr Coy - 77 (Yet to be evacuated 121). Evacuated to Kigali. (2) BYUBAT - 288 (Yet to be evacuated -261). Evacuated to NKUMBA. b. <u>Yet to be Evacuated</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) MILOB Teams. (2) DMZ Sector HQ c. <u>Traffic Accident</u> Two vehs of Force Engr Coy involves in accident resulting in 5 injuries. Casualties treated at King Faisal Hospital. d. BYUBAT to complete evacuation by evening tomorrow. e. Sector HQ to be evacuated by evening tomorrow. f. Request RPF contacted to give enough time to enable complete evacuation of UN Forces. g. Clearance should also be sought from MULINDI from barriers to be opened during their evacuation.
7	112030	Sqn Ldr ANIS of Team 501, MILOB of RPF Sector. MR PRAX, ASP MUJIBUR and ASP SHARIF of CIVPOL from RUHENGARI left RWANDA and reached KABALE (UNOMUR) in UGANDA.

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ - LOGBOOK
Period 111900 Apr 94 - 121900 Apr 94

3/5

8	120630	RGF will not fire upon expatriate convoys.
9	120650	The 1st convoy of the day is expected to move at 0700 hrs.
10	120707	Element of Engrs Coy to move at 08.00 hrs to Kigali. The vehicles that proceeded from North West to Byumba was caught up in cross fire. Apparently gave book to coy location. Until the situation clarifies in the road Nkumba - Byumba movement will be delayed.
11	120800	RPF has intercepted from the radio conversation of RGF that RGF soldiers are instructed to shoot at any Belgian AC landing or taking off at KANOMBE airport.
12	120817	Left over elm of Force Engr Coy instr 123 pers preparing to move to KIGALI shortly convoy of vehs have been held up at KISARO moving towards BYUMBA due to factional cross fire. As soon as convoy reaches BYUBAT strength 123 pers will move to NKUMBA. Finally DMZ Sec HQ will evac and move to MULINDI.
13	120830	Last elms of Force Engrs Coy have left for Kigali now.
14	120830	Arty shell landed inside the AMAHARO Stadium. No casualties reported.
15	120900	Arty shelling is going on around King Faisal Hospital. Shelling is also going on around Kigali Sector HQ.
16	120900	a. 1 surgical team with 4 pallets of medicine and eqpt have arrived at the airport. 3 more med teams are expected with 24 ton of medicine. They should be sent to King Faisal Hospital. Today we are also expecting 30 ton of water. b. 50 expatriates at RWAMAGANA are awaiting to be Evac. Kigali sector to arrange evac immediately. c. 150 Africans are at MERIDIEN. C3 is checking their identity. Once cleared they can be sent to the airport.
17	120920	One shell landed inside Amahoro Stadium.
18	120925	Three refugees injured by this shell.
19	120930	Please inform Maj Beardsley that some doctors with medicine and equipment ready to move from airport.
20	120935	Please inform Mustache that one convoy is coming to airport. Once they reach the airport they will escort the medical team.
21	120942	Belgian commander at Airport ready to meet the Force Commander.

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ - LOGBOOK
Period 111900 Apr 94 - 121900 Apr 94

4/5

22	120945	After reaching the Force Engr Coy at Kigali, the veh convoy will be sent to BYUMBA for evac to NKUMBA.
23	120955	K-9 is moving to airport to meet French & Belgian commanders. F-9 advise K-9 to do his part of negotiating.
24	121030	Sporadic Arty shelling going on since morning at CND and all around.
25	121045	DMZ Sitrep (.) Firing started at 0530. Initially 3-5 KM East of BYUMBA and later an from the North by Mor and Arty. Mor shelling is getting close to BYUMBA and rate is reaching to intense. Place should be evac soon.
26	121100	RGF escort requested by KSHQ. Supposed to escort convoy to GITARAMA and another to RWAMAGANA and to AKAGERA. Convoy already gone to RWAMAGANA. Escort should go to RWAMAGANA to escort the convoy and back.
27	121103	One ILLUSION AC arrived at airport with 30 ton of stores. Request arrange to unload. Pilot wanted to know if he will carry any expatriate.
28	121118	Generator fact exhausted gen stopped.
29	121120	Engr Coy convoy stopped 20 miles short of Kigali. RGF letting them go but lot of cross fire along the road.
30	121125	Convoy held up at RWAMAGANA by RGF.
31	121205	Asked cfm regarding escorting UNICEF pers 70 UGANDA border and by RPF.
32	121210	Convoy of Engr Coy have reached Rwandex complex.
33	121230	Requested clearance for 14 UN vehicles which will proceed to BYUMBA for Force HQ.
34	121230	F-9A has talked to the RGF and Gendarmerie authority regarding the convoy which was stopped at Rwamagana.
35	121235	Burial of 28 local civ have been completed at 1230 hrs from King Faisal Hospital.
36	121240	POL of RUTBAT have been exhausted.
37	121245	Requested KSHQ and Log Coy to send the following report if we have to withdraw: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Any adjustment of the position from the present deployment. b. Any adjustment of the Dumping of POL and other logistic items. c. Prepare a list of the non essential personnel. d. Prepare a list of important personnel required till the last.

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ - LOGBOOK
Period 111900 Apr 94 - 121900 Apr 94

5/5

38	121305	RGF has given clearance for the convoy to proceed to BYUMBA but requested to note that a lot of firing activity is ongoing on this road.
39	121315	15 expatriate from Zaire, Russia and other countries are waiting in Hotel Mille Collines.
40	121325	Move Con personnel are proceeding to the airport.
41	121330	The UN aircraft is leaving Kigali with 84 pers including the Engr Coy patient (W/O MOTTALEB, Sgt MOKSUD and L/CPL SALIM injured during the wheel loader accident on 111345 Apr 84).
42	121345	4 Sisters from Kanombe girl school are evacuated and left Kigali.
43	121400	While returning from airport after collecting of water and others items the convoy of Log Coy consisting 1 x Jeep, 2 x Pickup, 1 x Amb, 2 x Bus, 8 x Trucks experienced a cross fire between RGF and RPF. At that time a RGF truck got inside the convoy for its own security but it was observed by RPF from 50 yds distance. While the RGF truck came nearer to RPF they opened fire with their auto GF Rifle and could partially damage the RGF truck with few cews and could reached to Log Coy loc. During this cross fire 2 busses and 2 trucks from UNAMIR got several bullet hit. But no casualties from UNAMIR side. Only one tire of each bus and one tire of one truck were puncture.
44	121500	DMZ Sec HQ closing down the station and ready to move. After reaching NKUMBA will try to establish communication.
45	121600	Request send a Gendarmerie escort to Rwamagana to bring back the convoy, which was stopped at that place.
46	121615	The last element of UNAMIR has left for NKUMBA from BYUMBA. Presently they are 5 KM away from BYUMBA. Expected time of arrival at NKUMBA is 1930 hrs. During this move D-9 will be in channel 11.
47	121625	Major SOUVORON (Russia) on his way to Hotel Meridien from Amahoro Stadium when crossed Hotel Schez Lando an Arty Shell exploded beside his jeep no UNAMIR-1015. The jeep rolled twice and the officer could come to Force HQ with minor injury with the help of RPF.
48	121900	End

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

19 APR 12 11 12
(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. KYF 647

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: ANNAN\UNATIONS\NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/ 743	DATE: 12 APRIL 94
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	PHONE: 250-84271
FAX NO: 212-963-4879	FAX NO: 250-84265
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BEARDSLEY FILE REF:
Internal Dist.:	
SUBJECT: WITHDRAWAL OF CIVILIAN ESSENTIAL	
REFERENCE:	

1. AT PRESENT THE ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN STAFF WITH UNAMIR ARE:

- A. CHRISTINE DE LISO A\CAO;
- B. NORMAN BEAUDIN CGSS\PROC (LOG);
- C. PER EINARSSON GENERATOR MECHANIC;
- D. NORRIS JORSLING TRANSPORT;
- E. PAUL MARTIN ELECTRICAL;
- F. RICHARD GREGOIRE RAD TACH;
- G. ~~SUCHI~~ ASHIMA RAD OP.
SHUJI

2. POSITIONS C, E, F, AND G ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL AND IF IN ANY CASE THESE PERSONS ARE WITHDRAWN, BEFORE THEY DEPART UNAMIR THEY MUST BE REPLACED BY CONTRACT OR MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH THOSE SKILLS. THESE SKILLS ARE CRITICAL IN MAINTAINING OUR HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WITH ELECTRICITY AND COMMUNICATIONS.

3. THE REMAINING POLITICAL STAFF ARE:

- A. MR BOOH-BOOH SRSG;
- B. DR KABIA;
- C. MAMADOU KANE;
- D. MOCTAR GUEYE;


KYF648 p2/2

E. MICHAEL BLUMERIS;


F. MARCELAIN (BODYGUARD).

4. THE POLITICAL STAFF ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL STAFF.

5. REGARDS.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



KIGALI Le 12-04-1994

U
②
PA
14/4

A Monsieur Jacques Roger Book Book
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire
Général des Nations Unies
KIGALI,

Monsieur Le Représentant Spécial,

Le F.P.R - INKOTANYI voudrait porter à votre attention un incident qui vient d'avoir lieu ce 12 avril 1994 à 11h30.

Alors qu'un convoi de la MINUAR évacuant des ressortissants étrangers vers l'aéroport de KANOMBE, une camionnette rouge de l'armée gouvernementale faisait partie du convoi et ses occupants ont grièvement blessé deux de nos soldats qui assuraient la consigne de cessation de toute opération de combat sur le passage des convois.

L'incident a eu lieu à la jonction de la route du Bugesera avec la route de l'Aéroport, non loin de la société SONATUBES.

Nous protestons vigoureusement en soulignant que les troupes qui effectuent des évacuations doivent s'assurer avec la MINUAR que de tels incidents ne se reproduiront plus. Nous espérons vivement que le contrôle des convois sera désormais strict et serré de façon à éviter que les véhicules des forces armées gouvernementales ne fassent partie des convois.

Dans l'attente d'une réponse rapide nous communiquant les résultats de vos investigations sur cet incident, nous vous prions de croire, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, en l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.

Ci Général R. Ndayize
Commandant de la MINUAR

Pour le FPR

SETH SENDASHONGA

Membre du Bureau Politique

UNAMIR

194 FEB 24 12 21

UNAMIR

OUT GOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 24 FEB 94

KMF 206

1/2

TO : CMO UNOMUR KABALE	FROM : BGEN DALLAIRE UNAMIR/KIGALI <i>[Signature]</i>
FAX NO: 250 486 23816	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: REPATRIATION OF MIL OBSERVER-UNOMUR	
TO : COL ASRARUL HAQUE	ORIGINATOR - MAJ SENCHIM A/CMPO
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : TWO	

MISC-149

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A SELF-EXPLANATORY FAX MSG DATED 18 FEB 94 FROM DPKO/UNNY FOR YOUR INFO AND FURTHER ACTION.
2. REGARDS.

FC A/CMPO

UNAMIR
194 FEB 24 15 02

360 10522
053 10502

UNAMIR

194 FEB 24 10:48

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

Kyf 355

24 FEB 94

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE, FORCE COMD, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, DPKO, NEW YORK	<i>[Handwritten signature]</i>
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: INCIDENT REPORT	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: ONE	

DIRECT

MIR 406

1. IN THE EVENING OF 22 FEB 94 A FIRING/GRENADE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE. UNAMIR ARMED ESCORT FELT IN AN AMBUSH WHEN RETURNING FROM A MISSION TO MULINDI/BYUMBA. THE CONVOY COMPOSED OF A BELGIAN ARMED ESCORT (TWO VEHICLES), AN UNMO TEAM (ONE VEHICLE) AND A RPF ARMED ESCORT (ONE VEHICLE) WAS STOPPED AT A ROAD BLOCK 1 KM NORTH OF THE KADHAFI CROSSING AT KIGALI (GRID 051872). THEY WERE FIRED UPON BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS. ALSO SEVERAL GRENADES WERE THROWN AT THEM.
2. OUT OF THE INCIDENT TWO RPF SOLDIERS AND ONE UNAMIR UNMO WERE INJURED. ONE OF THE RPF SOLDIERS DIED LATER IN THE UNAMIR FIELD HOSPITAL. THE INJURED UNAMIR UNMO WAS CAPT COOPER FROM URUGUAY. HE HAD A MINOR INJURY ON HIS LEFT EYE AND RECEIVED FIRST AID TREATMENT ON THE SPOT AND IN BYUBAT MEDICAL AID POST. FOR THE MOMENT FURTHER TREATMENT IS GIVEN IN THE UNAMIR FIELD HOSPITAL.
3. A BOARD OF INQUIRY WAS COMPOSED. THE RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN COMPLETED.
4. REGARDS.

fl

UNAMIR

194 FEB 23 18 52

KYF354

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: 212-963-9070 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: INCIDENT FILE - UNAMIR	
ATTN: MAJ MARTIN	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 14	

1. ATTACHED TO THIS FAX MESSAGE IS THE UNAMIR INCIDENT FILE FROM 31 DEC 93 TO THE PRESENT.
2. THIS FILE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE. PERIODICALLY IT WILL BE UPDATED AS REQUIRED.
3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

194 FEB 23 19 10

FC

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

194 FEB 23 10 12

Date : 23 Feb 94

KMF 204

TO: UNOMUR HQ, KABALE UGANDA	FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER
FAX NUMBER: 256-496-23816	FAX NUMBER: 250-84265
SUBJECT: COMPLAINT FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE	
INFO:	ORIGINATOR: LT COL BALIS
NUMBER OF PAGES: 01 including this one	

MISC 147

1. UNAMIR HQ has received a complaint from Minister of Defence of Rwanda stating that he has got information from different sources that the RPF keeps getting supplied by the NRA. Recently, 17 artillerists have been provided.

2. Please investigate on this matter and report any violation to UNAMIR HQ.

3. Regards.

FC

UNAMIR
194 FEB 24 15 02

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO, UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX: 256 486 23816	FAX: 250 - 84265
SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF INCOMING CMO - UNOMUR	
	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: MAJ PK SENCHIM/A CMPO/ 1050 EXT 1051
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: ONE	

1. COL ASRAUL HAQUE OF BANGLADESH, INCOMING CMO OF UNOMUR ARRIVES UGANDA ON 22 FEBRUARY 1994. HIS FLIGHT DETAILS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. DEP KIGALI - 0800 LT
- B. ETA ENTEBBE - 1015 LT
- C. FLIGHT - RY 601

2. ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION.

3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

KMF/93

P1/2

194 FEB 21

09 UNAMIR
OUT GOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 19 FEB 94

TO : A/CMO UNOMUR KABALE	FROM : BGEN DALLAIRE UNAMIR/KIGALI
FAX NO: 250 486 23816	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: MILITARY OBSERVERS - SENEGAL	
TO : COL MATIWAZA	ORIGINATOR - MAJ SENCHIM A/CMPO
MISC-140 TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : TWO	

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A SELF-EXPLANATORY NOTE DATED 10 FEB 94 FROM THE SENEGALESE MISSION FOR YOUR INFO AND FURTHER ACTION.
2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
194 FEB 21 09 42

FC CMPO

MSF 730 -02



005/160/MBS/ksd

FEB 14 1994
940317MISSION PERMANENTE DU SENEGAL
auprès des Nations Unies
238 East 68th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021Tel. (212) 517-9030
Fax. (212) 737-7461

15/2 10:00

HA/IR

LEN

La Mission permanente de la République du Sénégal auprès des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au Secrétariat Général des Nations Unies (Département des opérations de maintien de la paix) et, suite à Sa note No DPKO/10 du 16 Décembre 1993, a l'honneur de L'informer que les autorités sénégalaises compétentes ont décidé la relève des dix observateurs militaires sénégalais en service auprès de la Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies en Ouganda/Rwanda (MONUOR) et leur remplacement par dix autres officiers dont la liste Lui sera incessamment communiquée.

La Mission permanente du Sénégal saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Secrétariat Général des Nations Unies les assurances de sa haute considération. Q

New York, le 10 Février 1994

Secrétariat Général
des Nations Unies
New York, N.Y. 10017



TOTAL F.09

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR

UNAMIR

KMF192

194 FEB 21 09:31

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 19 February 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA, A/CMO, UNOMUR	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 256 41 23816	FAX NO: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: VISIT OF DEPUTY COMMANDER BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE (02 MARCH 1994 - 08 MARCH 1994)	
MISC-139	ROOM NO: 2035 TEL: 84271
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

REFERENCE YOUR FAX NO MKF 284 DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994. REQUEST PREPARE THE VISIT PROGRAMME, SINCE IT PERTAINS TO UNOMUR ONLY, AT YOUR END AND SEND IT ACROSS FOR APPROVAL. VISIT DURATION SEEMS TO BE LONGER THAN NECESSARY. CLEARANCE FOR THE VISIT WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN REQUEST IS RECEIVED FROM NEW YORK.

REGARDS.

FC

UNAMIR
194 FEB 21 09:42

YKF 341
DATE: 19 FEB 94

UNAMIR
OUT GOING FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

TO : DPKO\MA TO SECY GEN\UNNY	FROM : BGEN DALLA 19 FEB 21 13 UNAMIR KIGALI
INFO: DPKO \ DESK OFFR \ UNNY	
FAX NO: 1 212 963 4879 MIR 389	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: FILLING UP OF BLANK VACANCIES OF MILOBS - UNAMIR	
TO : MGEN BARIL	ORIGINATOR - MAJ SENCHIM A/CMPO
INFO: LCOL MARTIN	
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : ONE	

REF:

- A. DPKO, UNNY FAX MSG DATED 18 NOV 93 ON INDUCTION PLAN-UNAMIR.
- B. MGEN BARIL FOR ANNAN FAX MSG NO YKF 007 DATED 04 FEB 94 ON INDUCTION PLAN-UNAMIR.
1. ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE REFS FOLLOWING COUNTRIES WERE SUPPOSED TO CONTRIBUTE MILOBS TO UNAMIR.
 - A. ARGENTINA - 5
 - B. TANZANIA - 15
 - C. MALAWI - 5
2. PLEASE CONFIRM WHETHER MENTIONED COUNTRIES ARE JOINING UNAMIR. IF NOT, GRATEFUL INDICATE REPLACEMENTS FOR THEM TOGETHER WITH THEIR LIKELY ETA.
3. REGARDS.

192 91 12 FEB 21 16

UNAMIR

KyF 340

UNAMIR
OUT GOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 19 FEB 94

TO : DPKO\MA TO SECY GEN\UNNY	FROM : BCEN DALLAIRE UNAMIR\KIGALI
INFO: DPKO \ DESK OFFR \ UNNY	
FAX NO: 1 212 963 4879 MIR 388	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: E T A OF CHIEF LOG OFFR	
TO : MGEN BARIIL	ORIGINATOR - MAJ SENCHIM A/CMPO
INFO: LCOL MARTIN	
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : ONE	

REF: FAX MSG FROM ANNAN, UNNY, NO Y KF 270 DATED 16 FEB 1994.

1. PLEASE INTIMATE THE EXPECTED ETA OF CHIEF LOG OFFR FROM BELGIUM.
2. REGARDS.

19 FEB 21 16 261

AMIR

MSF 814 -02

2/2

UNITED NATIONS
COMM CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS



NATIONS UNIES
UNAMIR

94 FE 22 21 31 Z

94 FEB 23 03 45 1151

YKF 304

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR KIGALI	FROM: BARI FOR ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FAX NO: 250-76263 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: (212) 963-4879
SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF MILITARY OBSERVERS - UNOMUR	
ATTN:	ROOM NO.3650, EXT: 3721
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE:	

1. THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NOT APPROVED THE EXTENSION OF TOUR OF DUTY OF THE SENEGALESE CONTINGENT SERVING IN UNOMUR BEYOND 25 MARCH 1994. REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENT HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO THE PERMANENT MISSION AND THE MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL CONTINUE SERVING IN UNOMUR UNTIL THE REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL ARRIVE.

2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND FURTHER ACTION.

REGARDS.

②
CM/No
Action immediately
Info at players.



h
r/c
23/2

RECEIVED OFFICE OF FC	
Date	23/2/94
No	738
By	SR

FC

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 18 Février 1994

PAGE 1 OF 1

A: MISSION PERMANENTE DE TUNISIE AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES	DE: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NUMBER: 212-751-0569	FAX NUMBER: 250.84265/66
ATTN: INFO: MINISTERE DEFENSE NATIONALE TUNISIE - EMAT (S.OPS - BOR) FAX NO. 00216- 1-561-804	ORIGINE: - CDT DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA
OBJET: CALENDRIER DE RELEVÉ DU DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA	
NO. DE PAGES: 1	

NO 12 /DTR DU 18 FEVRIER 1994

EN VU ORGANISATION ET PREPARATION ADMINISTRATIVE DES ROTATIONS
AU SEIN DU DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA STOP HONNEUR VOUS
DEMANDE STOP COMMUNIQUER DANS LES PLUS BREFS DELAIS STOP
CALENDRIER DES RELEVÉS DU PERSONNEL DU DETACHEMENT POUR L'ANNEE
1994 STOP ADRESSE STOP COMMANDANT DU DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU
RWANDA STOP MINUAR FORCE HQ BP 749 - KIGALI - RWANDA FAX NO. 250
84265/66

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 18 Février 1994

PAGE 1 OF 2

A: MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE, TUNISIE	DE: DALLAYRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NUMBER: 00216-1-561-804	FAX NUMBER: 250.76263
ATTN: EMAT (BOR-SALLE OPS)	ORIGINE: - CDT DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA
OBJET: DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA	
NO. DE PAGES: 2	

NO 11 /DTR DU 18 FEVRIER 1994

OBJET : DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN AU RWANDA

HONNEUR VOUS COMMUNIQUE STOP

PRIMO STOP ALPHA STOP SANTE STOP PERSONNEL DU DETACHEMENT
STOP RIEN A SIGNALER STOP AUTRES STOP LTC HABIB BEL
MUFTI A ETE HOSPITALISE DU 2 AU 11 FEVRIER 1994 POUR
HYPERTENSION ESSENTIELLE ACCOMPAGNEE D'ASTHME
BRONCHIQUE ET ABCES ALVEOLAIRE STOP APRES REPRISE DU
TRAVAIL STOP IL EST HOSPITALISE DE NOUVEAU LE 17
FEVRIER 1994 POUR ASTHME BRONCHIQUE STOP
BRAVO STOP MORAL DE LA TROUPE STOP HAUT STOP

SECUNDO STOP ALPHA STOP SUITE ARRIVEE D'UNE CAMPAGNIE DE GENIE
DU BANGLADESH ET D'UN BATAILLON DU GHANA DANS LA ZONE
DEMILITARISEE (DMZ) STOP LE DETACHEMENT TUNISIEN A ETE
RELEVE LE 12 FEVRIER 1994 STOP REGROUPE DANS LA CAPITALE
KIGALI ET INSTALLE AU SEIN DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE
DEVELOPPEMENT (CND) ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE DU RWANDA STOP
AVEC LE BATAILLON DU FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (FPR)
TRANSFERE DEPUIS LE 28 DECEMBRE 1993 CONFORMEMENT A LA
RESOLUTION DES NATIONS UNIES NUMERO S/26488 DU 28
SEPTEMBRE 1993 STOP

BRAVO STOP MISSION STOP ASSURER LA SECURITE A
L'INTERIEUR DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT (CND),
LIEU D'IMPLANTATION DU BATAILLON FPR ET SES
PERSONNALITES POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES TRES IMPORTANTES
STOP

CHARLIE STOP EXECUTION DE LA MISSION STOP SURVEILLER LES
ABORDS DU CND ET PATROUILLER DANS SON PERIMETRE STOP
CONTROLLER L'ENTREE ET LA SORTIE DES PERSONNES AUTORISEES
A ACCEDER AU CND Y COMPRIS CELLES TRAVAILLANT DANS LA
PARTIE RESERVEE AU FPR ET S'ASSURER QU'IL N'Y A PAS
D'ACCES DE PERSONNES NON AUTORISEES OU DE MATERIELS

PROHIBES STOP ASSURER LA SECURITE AU DESSUS DES BATIMENTS
RESERVES AU FPR STOP ETABLIR LES CHECKS POINTS SUR LES
ACCES MENANT VERS LES LOCAUX RESERVES AU FPR ET
CONTROLLER TOUS LEURS MOUVEMENTS STOP

TERTIO STOP ALPHA STOP CONDITIONS DE VIE STOP TOUS LE
DETACHEMENT EST REGROUPE ENSEMBLE DANS TROIS CHAMBRES AU
SEIN DU CND STOP

BRAVO ALIMENTATION STOP TOUJOURS A LA CHARGE DE L'HOTEL
MERIDIEN STOP BONNE ET SATISFAISANTE STOP

QUARTO STOP MALGRE LE RETARD DANS L'INSTALLATION DU
GOUVERNEMENT TRANSITOIRE A BASE ELARGIE PREVUE LES 29/30
DECEMBRE 1993 STOP LA SITUATION SEMBLE CALME DEPUIS TROIS
SEMAINES STOP A PART QUELQUES ACTES ISOLEES DE VIOLENCES
ARMEES STOP CEPENDANT STOP LE CLIMAT D'INSECURITE REIGNE
TOUJOURS ET LA SITUATION STOP DEVENUE CONFUSE STOP
S'APPRETE A EXPLOSER A N'IMPORTE QUEL MOMENT STOP TOUTES
LES CONDITIONS SONT REUNIES POURQUE LA GUERRE CIVILE
REPRENNE STOP

QUINTO STOP SITUATION MATERIEL STOP RIEN A SIGNALER STOP

SIXTO STOP H.V.D. STOP POSSIBILITE DOTATION DU DETACHEMENT
TUNISIEN AU RWANDA D'UN POSTE TELVISEUR STOP D'UNE CHAINE
VIDEOSCOPE STOP ET D'UNE ANTENNE PARABOLIQUE AU COURS DE
LA PROCHAINE RELEVÉ STOP ET FIN.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: MGEN BARIL, DPKO, UN NY	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: (212) 963 4879	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJECT: DEFENCE OF UNAMIR VITAL GROUNDS	
	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO BGEN ANYIDHO/2028 EXT 1228
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING A SECURITY SCENARIO FOR THE POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF THE MISSION. THE MOST VULNERABLE AND ESSENTIAL POINT IN THE MISSION AREA, AND AS SUCH THE UNAMIR VITAL GROUND, IS KIGALI AIRPORT AND ITS INSTALLATIONS. KIBAT, CHARGED DIRECTLY WITH THIS SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES VARIOUS TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION TO BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THIS TASK. KIBAT UNFORTUNATELY ARRIVED IN THE AO WITHOUT THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF AMMUNITION WHICH ARE NORMALLY NOT CARRIED ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS.

<u>SRL</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UNIT PRICE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A.	ATK MMO MILIAN (19000AA)	60 RNDS	783,018 BF	46,981,080BF
B.	LIGHT ATK AMMO (150M)	150 RNDS	20,614	3,092,100
C.	0.50 INCH AMMO FOR MG	5,600 RNDS	242	1,355,200
D.	30MM AMMO FOR CURTS	2X90 RNDS	5,667	510,030
E.	60MM MORTAR AMMO (96 X 8MK) HE	396 RNDS	5,493	2,175,228
F.	60MM MORTAR AMMO (5 MK)	96 RNDS	8,926	856,896
G.	60MM MORTAR AMMO (ILL)	99 RNDS	14,448	1,143,352
				<u>56,953,396</u>

2. AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO PURCHASE THE AMMUNITION FOR KIBAT.

3. BEST REGARDS.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

17 FEB 1994

TO: THE COMMANDER COMBAT TRAINING CENTRE CANADIAN FORCES BASE GAGETOWN OROMOCTO, NEW BRUNSWICK	FROM: DALLAIRE, FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: (506) 422-2908	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: CRATER ANALYSIS	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 1	

1. WE HAVE HAD SOME CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS ALONG THE DMZ. AT ONE SUCH INCIDENT, 60MM, 81MM AND EVEN 82MM MORTARS WERE USED.
2. IN ORDER TO HELP IN THE INVESTIGATIONS, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU COULD FAX ME OUR "CRATER ANALYSIS" PROCEDURES FROM OUR REFERENCE BOOKS.
3. ALSO, IF YOU HAVE ANY DATA ON 60 MM, 81 MM AND 82 MM CRATER EFFECTS ON SOFT AND HARD GROUND, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.
4. THANK YOU AND REGARDS.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

17 FEB 1994

TO: J-3 PK, NDHQ OTTAWA, CANADA	FROM: DALLAIRE, FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FOR: MAJ BEARDSLEY	
FAX: 001 (613) 992 8812	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: AID TO CIVIL POWER	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: 1	

1. THIS MISSION HAS AMONG ITS TASKS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN AID TO CIVIL POWER ACTIONS SUCH AS CROWD CONTROL, CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS.
2. PLEASE PROVIDE MAJ BEARDSLEY (LEAVING OTTAWA ON **SUNDAY**) WITH COPIES OF OUR REFERENCE MANUALS ON THE SUBJECT IN ORDER TO ASSIST ME IN PROVIDING TRAINING/GUIDANCE TO MY FORCES ON THE SUBJECT.
3. THANK YOU AND REGARDS.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: DPRO, UNNV	FROM: BGEN DALLAMRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN: LT COL MARTIN	
FAX: (212) 963 4879	FAX: 250 - 84240
SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL STAFF FOR CONTINGENTS	
	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1056 EXT 1056
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

REFERENCE:

- A. FAX NO KYF 233 DATED 3 FEB 94 FROM HALLQUIST TO BEISSEL ON ESTABLISHMENT SITUATION - UNAMIR/UNOMUR.
1. REF A REQUESTED AUTHORITY FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF FIFTY-SIX (56) INTERPRETERS/TRANSLATORS FOR THE BANGLADESH AND GHANA CONTINGENTS AS WELL AS THE MEDICAL PLATOON.
2. IT IS GRATEFULLY REQUESTED THAT ACTION ON THE AUTHORITY FOR RECRUITMENT BE EXPEDITED TO ENABLE THE PERSONNEL WORK EFFECTIVELY.
3. YOUR TIMELY ACTION ON THIS WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED.
4. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO, UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: BGEN DALEMBRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX: 256 486 23816	FAX: 250 - 84265
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL VISIT TO UNOMUR BY DFC UNAMIR	
	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1056 EXT 1056
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

REFERENCES:

- A. FAX KMF 99 DATED 28 JAN 94 ON ABOVE SUBJECT.
- B. FAX DATED 9 FEB 94 ON ABOVE SUBJECT.
1. BE INFORMED THAT DFC UNAMIR AND HIS PERSONAL STAFF ARRIVED SAFELY IN KIGALI ON TUE 15 FEB 94.
2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

UNAMIR

1994 FEB 16 12:50

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

KYF 320

DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: MA TO SECY GEN/DPKO/UNNY INFO: DESK OFFR/UNNY	FROM: EGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 212 963 4879 INFO FAX NO: 001 212 963 4879	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: REPLACEMENT - SENIOR MED OFFR	
TO: MGEN BARIL INFO: LT COL MARTIN	ORIGINATOR: LT COL JAMIL.S. CMPO
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCL THIS ONE: ONE	

MIR-364

REF:

- A. FAX FROM BARIL FOR ANNAN, UNNY TO LELIO, ONUMUZ, MAPUTO DATED 12 OCT 93.
- B. FAX FROM BARIL FOR ANNAN, UNNY TO LELIO, UNUMUZ DATED 15 SEP 93.
- C. FAX FROM BARIL FOR ANNAN, UNNY TO DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI DATED 15 NOV 93.
1. AS PER REF A, MAJ MD ZAKIR HUSSAIN WAS REDEPLOYED FROM ONUMUZ TO UNAMIR AND REPORTED TO UNAMIR ON 31 OCT 93. AS PER REF B PARA 6 OFFR WAS SUPPOSED TO RETURN BACK TO ONUMUZ, AFTER COMPLETING INITIAL THREE MONTHS TENURE IN UNAMIR. AS PER REF C, ANNEX A, SL 38 SENIOR MED OFFR WAS SUPPOSED TO REPORT BY END OF JAN 94. COUNTRY OF THE RELIEVING SMO NOT YET RECEIVED.
2. REQUEST SPECIFY THE COUNTRY OF THE RELIEVING SMO AND ARRANGE REPLACEMENT ASP.
3. REGARDS.

1994 FEB 16 13:09
UNAMIR

FC CMPO

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: A/CMO UNOMUR	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 256 486 23816	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: ROTATION OF SENEGALESE AND ZAMBABWEAN MILITARY OBSERVERS IN UNOMUR	
TO: COL MATIWAZA	ORIGINATOR: LT COL JAMIL.S. CMPO
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCL THIS ONE: ONE	

REF:

A. DPKO/IO DATED 16 DEC 93 ON EXTENSION OF TOD FOR SENEGAL MILOBS.

B. FAX FROM BGEN DALLAIRE TO MGEN BARIL DATED 31 JAN 94 ON EXTENSION OF TOD OF ZIMBABWEAN MILOBS IN UNOMUR.

C. TELECON BETWEEN FC UNAMIR AND LT COL MARTIN, DPKO, UNNY ON 15 FEBRUARY 94.

D. FAX DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM LT COL SANGO TO DPKO ON DEPLOYMENT OF ZIMBABWEAN UNOMUR AND UNAMIR OBSERVER GROUPS.

1. AS PER REF C, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE HAS INTIMATED HER INABILITY TO EXTEND THE TOD FOR THE MILOBS. ROTATION OF ZIMBABWEAN MILOBS WILL THEREFORE PROCEED AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED. A/CMO UNOMUR IS HEREBY REQUESTED TO DISCUSS WITH FC UNAMIR DETAILS ABOUT HANDING OVER OF APPOINTMENT OF CMO UNOMUR SOONEST.

2. REF C ALSO INTIMATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL HAS GIVEN HER CONSENT FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE TOD OF SENEGALESE MILOBS FROM SIX (6) TO TWELVE (12) MONTHS. EXACT DETAILS OF THE EXTENSION WILL BE COMMUNICATED WHEN RECEIVED FROM UNNY.

3. REGARDS.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

11 FEB 1994

PAGE 1 OF 4

AU: MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE, BRAZZAVILLE, CONGO	DE: BRIG. GEN. DALLAIRE, COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE, MINUAR, KIGALI, RWANDA
PREFIX/NO: MIR/	DATE: 11 FEV 1994
ATTN: LT COL BOUITY	TELEPHONE: 250-82342
FAX: 242-835105 OU 832437	FAX: 250-84265
	REDIGE PAR: MAJ MOIGNY, COMMANDANT DU CONTINGENT CONGOLAIS
OBJET: NOTE D'INFORMATION	

1. PRIERE DE TROUVER CI-JOINT UNE NOTE D'INFORMATION DU
COMMANDANT DU CONTINGENT CONGOLAIS CONCERNANT L'EVOLUTION
DU PROCESSUS DE PAIX AU RWANDA ET LES PERSPECTIVES DE LA
MINUAR.
2. HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

FC.

107 1208652

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES / MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
Quartier Général des Observateurs Militaires - B.P. 749 KIGALI
Contingent Congolais

Kigali, le 07 février 1994

N° 007/ONU - MINUAR/CC

NOTE D'INFORMATION

A la Haute Attention du Général de Division,
Ministre de la Défense Nationale

Objet: De l'évolution du processus de paix au Rwanda
et des perspectives de la MINUAR

I. La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda a démarré son fonctionnement depuis le 1er novembre 1993. Ses tâches principales avaient été définies comme suit:

- poursuite de l'observation du cessez le feu conclu entre les deux parties belligérantes (les forces gouvernementales rwandaises et les forces du Front Patriotique rwandais);
- mise en place des institutions de transition à base élargie;
- poursuite de tout le processus devant conduire à des élections libres au terme de 24 mois au plus tard.

Sur la base de ces missions, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies avait adopté le timing proposé par le Directoire de la Mission et qui devrait s'étaler dans la période précitée suivant le calendrier suivant:

- a) Mise en place des institutions de la transition à base élargie dès la fin Décembre 1993.
- b) Préparation des conditions nécessaires au cantonnement des 2 forces par l'identification et la mise en place des points de rassemblement y relatifs. Cette opération aurait dû commencer dès le 1 janvier 1994 pour durer jusqu'au 30 avril 1994.
- c) Mise en avant du processus de rassemblement des forces, de leur formation commune, du désengagement et de la démobilisation des éléments non retenus pour servir dans la nouvelle armée nationale. Cette phase, d'une durée de (08) huit mois commencerait dès le 1er mai 1994.

- d) la quatrième et dernière phase consisterait à la mise en avant des conditions et du contrôle des opérations électorales.

II. Le bataillon de sécurité du Front Patriotique Rwandais composé de 600 hommes et ayant pour tâche l'assurance de la sécurité des autorités du FPR est arrivé à Kigali, le 26 décembre 1993 comme prévu. Le Président de la République a prêté serment, comme l'exigeaient l'esprit et la lettre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha, en date du 5 janvier 1994.

Cependant, depuis lors, aucune autre institution de la transition n'a pu voir le jour: les membres du gouvernement ainsi que ceux de l'Assemblée Nationale, n'ont pas pu jusqu'alors prêter serment ce qui ne permet donc pas leur entrée en fonction.

Ce blocage est né, en gros termes, d'une rude lutte intestine à certains partis politiques, où se dessine très nettement la division ethnique Hutu-Tutsi (voir notre rapport n° 001/OUA-GOMN/Sept.93). Certains de ces partis ont éclaté nettement en deux tendances dont l'une est favorable aux institutions actuelles en place et l'autre plus favorable au FPR. C'est le cas des partis PL (Parti Libéral) et MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain). Ce dernier parti est sans doute le cas le plus sensible puisque le Premier Ministre désigné de la transition à base élargie en est le Président. Contesté à la base par une partie de son mouvement qui a ouvert une autre tendance plus favorable au pouvoir en place et qui lui reproche des accointances avec le FPR, le Premier Ministre désigné ne dispose pas, à l'heure actuelle, de coudées franches pour piloter la transition et surtout pour mettre en place son gouvernement.

III. A la lumière de ce petit éclairage, il va sans dire que c'est tout le processus de paix au Rwanda qui est en situation dangereuse de sursis:

- Les institutions actuelles ne siègent plus et ne décident plus.
- De nombreux problèmes sociaux se posent à travers tout le pays et ne trouvent pas leur solution, faute d'institution politique.
- En un mot, on dirait que le pays n'est plus commandé car la seule institution valable en place est "le Président de la République".

La MINUAR a tenté en vain plusieurs actions de conciliation entre les diverses tendances opposées pour espérer trouver un juste milieu, favorable à la mise en place des institutions de la transition. De guerre lasse, elle s'est résignée à rechercher l'arbitrage personnel du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et à proposer un certain nombre de démarches. L'une des plus radicales propositions consiste au retrait pur et simple de la MINUAR du Rwanda.

Cette dernière proposition, qui a déjà acquis l'accord de principe du Conseil de Sécurité, est présentement à l'étude au sein de cette instance quant à la recherche des voies et moyens capables de permettre son application.

Comme on peut le deviner, la mise en application d'une pareille décision entraînera des conséquences catastrophiques pour le Rwanda avec en première ligne l'éventualité pas trop plausible de la reprise des hostilités armées entre les deux parties en conflit.

Cette issue est à peu près vérifiable au regard du climat très tendu qui règne actuellement dans le pays. La sécurité dans le pays en général et dans la ville de Kigali en particulier est un véritable nid d'abeilles avec de nombreux cas d'attentats à la grenade, des scènes de violence répétées, des assassinats...etc.


La guerre des communiqués à la radio entre les diverses fractions rivales vient compléter ce décor déjà pompeux.

IV. En somme, la situation que nous vivons actuellement apparaît comme une sorte d'expectative où la MINUAR tente toujours bon an mal an de jouer les bons offices entre les parties d'une part, et sur le terrain des opérations, essaie de gérer des affaires courantes de basse intensité d'autre part, sans pouvoir donner tout le poids de la mesure.

Toutefois une maigre lueur se dessine à l'horizon, puisque certaines rumeurs affirment déjà qu'un compromis est en voie d'être trouvé afin que les institutions de la transition à base élargie puissent voir le jour avant l'expiration du délai fatidique prescrit par les Nations Unies. Mais rien n'est encore joué dans cet univers politique rwandais où l'irrationnel semble avoir plus d'emprise qu'il ne faut sur le terrain.

Comme quoi si aucun progrès significatif n'est affiché d'ici à là, le Haut Commandement des Forces Armées Congolaises devrait s'attendre à ce que son contingent au Rwanda rentre définitivement au pays dans les tout prochains mois.

Le Cdt. Paul Victor MOIGNY
 Chef du
 Contingent
 congolais
 Cdt le Contingent Congolais.



UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR
KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 7

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/	DATE: 11 FEB 1994
ATTN: LT COL MARTIN	PHONE: 250-84271
FAX NO: (1 212) 963-9070	FAX NO: 250-84265
SUBJECT: PROPOSED CHANGES IN MILOBS STRUCTURE	
REFERENCES: A. SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT ON RWANDA 24 SEPT 93 B. SRSG UNAMIR REPORT ON RWANDA 16 DEC 93	

1. THIS MISSION HAS HAD TO REVIEW IN DEPTH ITS ALLOCATION OF UNMOS TO TASKS DUE TO THE GENERAL CHANGING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND TO THE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF THE 272,000 ETHNIC BURUNDI REFUGEES THAT COVER THE WHOLE OF THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY.

2. THE MISSION NOW HAS 296 OF THE 331 UNMOS THAT WERE IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE A TO DO THE MONITORING AND ESCORTING TASKS OF THIS MISSION. AT REFERENCE B, THE SRSG INFORMED THE SG THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE BURUNDI AFFAIR REQUIRED A REVIEW OF THE UNMOS STRUCTURE AND WILL CALL FOR MORE OF THESE OFFICERS TO COVER THE TASKS AT HAND. THE SG REPORT TO THE SC NOTED THAT A POSSIBLE NEED FOR INCREASED UNMOS WOULD BE ASSESSED AND APPROPRIATE ACTION WOULD BE INITIATED TO MEET THIS POSSIBLE DEMAND ONCE JUSTIFIED.

3. CURRENT SITUATION. DUE TO THE ESSENTIALITY FOR GETTING ON WITH DEPLOYMENTS OF UNMOS ASAP IN RPF AND RGF SECTORS, AND THE NEW REQUIREMENT FOR THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, PLUS THE INCREASED DEMAND FOR MORE MONITORING OF PREVIOUSLY UNACCOUNTED FOR RGF POSITIONS AND DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY OF 24/7 DETAILED VERIFICATION OF COMINGS AND GOINGS FROM THE RPF BN AND VIP COMPOUND AT THE CND COMPLEX, AND LASTLY SOME ESSENTIAL DEMANDS FOR HELP IN THE FORCE HQ DUE TO THE LACK OF STAFF OFFICERS, WE ARE THANKFUL FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ALL OF THE 331 UNMOS TO RWANDA BY THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THEIR DISTRIBUTION WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. MILOB GP HQ -- 20 (INCLUDES AN ESCORT TEAM OF 6)
- B. KIGALI SECTOR -- 95 (13 DEDICATED TO THE CND CONTROL)
- C. DMZ SECTOR -- 32 (COORD STAFF OF 2 AND 5 TEAMS OF 6)

- D. RGF SECTOR -- 32 (A HQ/LIAISON OF 7 AND 5 TEAMS OF 5)
- E. RPF SECTOR -- 32 (SAME AS RGF SECTOR)
- F. SOUTH SECTOR -- 33 (A HQ OF 3 AND 5 TEAMS OF 6)
- G. UNOMUR SECTOR -- 78
- H. FORCE HQ -- 9 (TEMPORARY FOR SPECIFIC TASKS)

4. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE ABOVE DISTRIBUTION OF UNMO ASSETS, WE HAVE NEW DEMANDS IN KIGALI AND SOUTHERN SECTORS THAT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE MONITORING OF THE ASSEMBLY POINTS ON BOTH THE RGF AND RPF SECTORS ONCE PHASE 3 COMMENCES. DUE TO THE DELAYS IN GETTING THE BBTG IN PLACE, OF COURSE PHASE 3 IS BEING ACCORDINGLY DELAYED. WE ESTIMATE THAT PHASE 3 COULD COMMENCE AT MOST 3 MONTHS AFTER THE BBTG IS IN PLACE. SO IF WE PLAN OPTIMISTICALLY THAT IT COME INTO PLAY BY 15 FEB 94, THEN PHASE 3 COULD COMMENCE BY EARLY MAY 94 DUE TO OUR CONSTANT WORK AT THE MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS TO SOLVE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS OF THE DEMOBILIZATION DEMANDS.

5. PHASE 2. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 331 UNMOS COULD CONTINUE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF PHASE 2. HOWEVER THIS SEVERELY RESTRICTS OUR ESSENTIAL MONITORING PRESENCE AND INVESTIGATION CAPABILITY IN THE RPF AND RGF SECTORS BEFORE THE DEMOBILIZATION COMMENCES. WE HAVE REASSESSED OUR ESSENTIAL NEEDS AND FEEL THAT FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF UNMOS MUST GO UP TO 379. THE ATTACHED CHART AT ANNEX A PORTRAYS THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNMOS BY SECTOR/TASK AND BY MONTH.

6. PHASE 3. IT IS EXPECTED THAT, ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL, PHASE 3 WILL COMMENCE IN MAY 94. THIS MEANS THE RGF AND RPF SECTORS UNMOS CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS TO MONITORING THE NEW ASSEMBLY POINTS AND CANTONMENT POINTS THAT ARE PLANNED TO OPEN AT THAT TIME. ALSO PHASE 3 SEES THE ON-GOING MONITORING OF THE DMZ, THE KIGALI SECTOR, THE SOUTHERN SECTOR AND THE UNOMUR SECTOR FOR A WHILE.

7. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PLANNED NEEDS OF UNMOS PER MONTH FOR THE 9 MONTHS OF PHASE 3. PLEASE REFER TO THE ATTACHED CHART AT ANNEX A FOR CROSS-REFERENCING.

A. MAY 94. THE TROOPS OF BOTH SIDES ARE MOVING INTO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS FOR A MONTH OF INDOCTRINATION TRAINING. WE EXPECT 10 POINTS IN RPF ZONE AND ABOUT 15 IN RGF ZONE OF WHICH 5 ARE IN THE KWSA. THE DISTRIBUTION OF 58 UNMOS TO RGF AND RPF SECTORS, COUPLED WITH THE UNMOS IN MONITORING TASKS IN THE KIGALI SECTOR WILL MEET THE REQUIREMENT. BUT THIS CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AS THE UNMO TEAMS WILL BE AT 5 MEN VERSUS THE PREFERRED LEVEL OF 6 PER TEAM.

B. JUNE/JULY 94. DURING THESE MONTHS, APPROXIMATELY 8,000 TROOPS ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE THE ASSEMBLY POINTS FOR INDIVIDUAL IMMEDIATE REINTEGRATION IN SOCIETY. THIS WILL CLOSE

AT LEAST 4 ASSEMBLY POINTS. THE FIRST BATCH OF CHOSEN TROOPS FOR THE NEW RWANDAN ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WILL BE GOING THROUGH THE TWO MONTH INTEGRATION TRAINING. ALSO, THE MONITORING NEEDS IN KIGALI WILL BE REDUCED BY CONCENTRATING TROOPS OUT OF THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND INTO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS AS THESE LAST UNITS WILL BE A LITTLE SLOWER IN DISENGAGING DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SECURITY OF THE CAPITAL AND THE PRESENCE OF THE RPF SECURITY BATTALION STILL IN THE CITY. HOPEFULLY THE ESCORT DEMANDS WILL ALSO START TO REDUCE AS VIPS BECOME MORE CONFIDENT IN THE SECURITY SITUATION. WE ARE KEEPING MORE THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED UNMOS IN THE DMZ NOT ONLY FOR THE INTEGRATED TRAINING CENTRES, BUT ALSO FOR MONITORING THE ACTIVIST/EXTREMIST GROUPS THAT HAVE ACCESS TO WEAPONS. THE CHART REFLECTS THESE REDISTRIBUTIONS OF UNMO TEAMS.

C. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 94. APPROXIMATELY 6,400 TROOPS AND GENDARMES WILL ENTER THE INTEGRATED TRAINING CENTRES (SECOND BATCH) THUS CLOSE AT LEAST 3 MORE ASSEMBLY POINTS. THE TROOPS BEING DEMOBILIZED FOR REINTEGRATION TRAINING INTO SOCIETY WILL STILL BE WAITING FOR THE UNDP/GOVERNMENT LEAD PROGRAMS TO START. THE KIGALI SECURITY SITUATION SHOULD BE SUCH THAT THE RPF BATTALION CAN BE DISBANDED AND REPLACED BY THE NEW INTEGRATED REPUBLICAN GUARD. MONITORING IN KIGALI WILL REMAIN BUT ESCORTS WILL BE ELIMINATED EXCEPT FOR SOME SPORADIC MONITORING.

D. OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 94. THE LAST BATCH OF TROOPS MOVES TO THE INTEGRATED TRAINING CENTRES WHICH CLOSES AT LEAST THREE MORE ASSEMBLY POINTS. THE BULK OF THE DEMOBILIZED TROOPS MOVE TO ALL THE VARIOUS EDUCATION/VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTRES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, LEAVING ABOUT 8,500 TROOPS STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS UNTIL THEIR TURN FOR THE TRAINING WHICH WILL BE IN SIX MONTHS, OR APRIL 95. KIGALI MONITORING AND ESCORTS ARE AT THEIR ANTICIPATED MINIMUM OF 6 TEAMS OF SIX UNMOS WITH A SMALL COORD CENTRE OF 3 UNMOS.

E. DEC 94 JAN/FEB/MAR 95. DURING THIS PERIOD, WE SEE THE END OF PHASE 3 WHICH NORMALLY WOULD BE IN JAN 95 BUT DUE TO THE FACT THAT 8,500 TROOPS WILL STILL BE WAITING FOR INTEGRATION TRAINING INTO SOCIETY, THE PHASE WILL TRULY BE OVER IN MAR 95. THE MONITORING OF KIGALI AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY WILL BE RATIONALIZED AND CONSOLIDATED UNDER THE CMO AT MILOB GROUP HQ. WE EXPECT TO KEEP AT LEAST 7 TEAMS OF 6 UNMOS WITH A SMALL HQ OF 7 UNMOS. THE MONITORING OF THE SOUTHERN SECTOR CAN BE STOPPED BY US AT THIS TIME DUE TO THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF THE NEW INTEGRATED GENDARMERIE THAT WILL REQUIRE SPORADIC MONITORING FROM MILOB GROUP HQ ASSETS.

F. APRIL TO NOV 95. DURING THIS PHASE 4, THE STRICTEST MINIMUM OF MONITORING CAPABILITY BY UNMOS WILL REMAIN FOR THE COUNTRY. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE 60 UNCIVPOLS AND THE LARGE INFANTRY BATTALION.

8. USING THE ABOVE DEMANDS FOR UNMOS, A COSTING REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BELOW IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THESE CHANGES OF UNMO DEMANDS FROM THE PLANNED UNMO ALLOCATION AS PER

REFERENCE A. A COMPARISON CHART IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX B FOR EASE OF CROSS-REFERENCE.

A. UNOMUR. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT MANDATE OF THAT MISSION HAS BEEN EXTENDED FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS ENDING IN JUNE, IT IS THE FC'S ASSESSMENT THAT SHOULD WE SEE THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASES COME BACK ON LINE, WE SEE UNOMUR ENDING ITS OPERATIONS BY OCT 94, THUS AT THE END OF THE INTEGRATION PORTION OF THE PHASE 3 DISENGAGEMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION (DDI) PROCESS. THUS 78 UNMO POSITIONS CAN BE ELIMINATED, WHICH MEANS ONE MONTH BEFORE REFERENCE A PLANNED DATE, THUS A SAVING OF 78 UNMO/MONTHS OF COSTS.

B. RPF SECTOR. THE URGENCY OF GETTING A MONITORING CAPABILITY IN THE RPF SECTOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENT OF THE MISSION. WE PROPOSE TO MOVE ONLY 56 UNMOS TO THIS SECTOR WITH ITS HQ IN MULINDI STARTING IN MAR 94. THIS SECTOR WILL COST 522 UNMO/MONTHS VERSUS THE 807 UNMO/MONTHS PLANNED AT REF A. THIS WILL PRODUCE SAVINGS OF 285 UNMO/MONTHS FOR THIS SECTOR. HOWEVER IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT NEEDS AND PROPOSED TASKS BOTH IN THIS SECTOR AND OTHER SIMILAR SECTORS, UNMO TEAMS HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN SIZE FROM 6 TO 5 UNMOS PER TEAM.

C. DMZ SECTOR. TO OUR CONSTERNATION, TWO MAJOR MASSACRES IN THE DMZ IN NOV 93, COUPLED WITH POLITICAL LOCAL ELECTION MONITORING AS CALLED FOR IN THE KINIHIRA ACCORD ON DMZ AFFAIRS, AND THE CONSTANT ACCUSATIONS BY BOTH SIDES OF INFILTRATION AND ARMS DISTRIBUTION AND THREATS TO THE LOCALS, HAVE REQUIRED US TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE IN THE DMZ AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED. THE STRICT MINIMUM MONITORING TEAMS TO DO THE JOB HAS CALLED FOR A TOTAL OF 32 UNMOS TO STAY ON POST UNTIL THE END OF THE INTEGRATION PERIOD OR TILL NOV 94 VERSUS THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED 18 UNMOS. THIS MEANS 320 UNMO/MONTHS VERSUS THE PLANNED 324 UNMO/MONTHS. SO A SLIGHT SAVINGS OF 4 UNMO/MONTHS.

D. RGF SECTOR. THIS SECTOR HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACTIVATED, DUE TO THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF HUTU ACTIVISM AND ELITE RGF UNITS NOW IN THE NORTH-WEST AREA AND THE OVERALL SECURITY CONCERNS OF ARMS MOVEMENT FROM ZAIRE AND ARMS DISTRIBUTION IN THAT AREA. THE RGF MILOB HQ HAS BEEN ACTIVATED IN RUHENGERI VERSUS GITARAMA FOR THIS REASON. THE REASSESSED DEMAND OF UNMO/MONTHS FOR THIS SECTOR IS 600 UNMO/MONTHS VERSUS 777 UNMO/MONTHS. THIS MEANS A SAVING OF 177 UNMO/MONTHS.

E. KIGALI SECTOR. THE NUMBER OF ESCORTS HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN EXPECTED DUE TO THE ACUTE SENSE OF INSECURITY OF NO BBTG. ALSO, WE DISCOVERED MORE RGF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN THE KWSA THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED THAT ALL REQUIRE MONITORING. LASTLY, THE LARGE NUMBER OF UNMOS IN THIS SECTOR AND THE VARIETY OF TASKS ON A 24/7 BASIS HAS REQUIRED US TO GO FROM 78 TO 95 UNMOS. COUPLED WITH THIS IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT WE CANNOT EXPECT THE ESCORT DUTIES TO DISAPPEAR AS EARLY AS EXPECTED AND OF COURSE THE MONITORING OF

THE EXTRA RGF CAMPS MUST BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE NEAR END OF THE INTEGRATION PERIOD OF PHASE 3, THUS NOV 94. THIS WILL CALL FOR 694 UNMO/MONTHS VERSUS 621 UNMO/MONTHS PLANNED. THIS IS AN INCREASED COST OF 73 UNMO/MONTHS.

F. SOUTHERN SECTOR. THIS IS A COMPLETELY NEW REQUIREMENT THAT HAS ARISEN SINCE THE COUP IN BURUNDI ON 21 OCT 93. THERE ARE 272,000 BURUNDI REFUGEES, DIVIDED IN NO LESS THAN 12 CAMPS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY, AND SEGREGATED ALONG ETHNIC LINES. THE TENSION DUE TO MANIPULATION OF THESE GROUPS BY BOTH ETHNIC GROUPS, EXACERBATED BY THE EBB AND FLOW OF THINGS POLITICAL IN BURUNDI AND BY PRESSURE FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION THAT ARE SUFFERING FROM FAMINE AND MEDICAL DEPRIVATION, ALL HAVE CONSPIRED FOR OUR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF AN UNMO HQ AND TEAMS IN THE SOUTH IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN ELEMENT OF SECURITY AND MONITORING IN THIS TIMBER BOX OF STRIFE. THUS, A SMALL MILOB HQ IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN BUTARE WITH 5 UNMO TEAMS FROM TOTAL OF 34 UNMOS. THIS SECTOR WILL REMAIN UNTIL THE REFUGEE PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED OR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW INTEGRATED GENDARMERIE IS READY TO DO THE JOB AS OF DEC 94. WE HAVE ESTIMATED THE COST AT 337 UNMO/MONTHS. THIS IS A NET INCREASE IN COSTS.

G. MILOB GROUP HQ. THIS HQ HAS BEEN RESTRUCTURED TO MEET THE INCREASED DEMANDS OF UNMOS FOR ESCORT TASKS OUTSIDE THE KWSA AND TO STREAMLINE ITS OPERATIONS. SO ALTHOUGH THE HQ WILL REMAIN AT 20 UNMOS, 6 UNMOS WILL BE PERMANENTLY TASKED AS ESCORTS. IN THE LONG TERM, THIS HQ WILL HANDLE ALL UNMO REQUIREMENTS. THE COST IS ESTIMATED AT 837 UNMO/MONTHS TILL DEC 95 ELECTIONS, VERSUS THE PLANNED 1160 UNMO/MONTHS. THIS IS A SAVING OF 323 UNMO/MONTHS.

H. FORCE HQ. DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC STAFFS IN THE FORCE HQ, SOME UNMOS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE CALLED IN FOR VARIOUS SPECIALIST TASKS OVER THE LENGTH OF THE MISSION. ALTHOUGH NO COSTING WAS PLANNED, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 81 UNMO/MONTHS WILL BE REQUIRED.

9. TANGIBLY, THE OVERALL READJUSTMENT OF UNMOS REQUIRES A NET INCREASE OF 48 UNMOS AS OF MAR 94 TO THE CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT OF 331, THUS, 379 FOR MARCH/APRIL/MAY/JUNE/JULY ONLY. REDUCTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ATTACHED CHART WILL THEN COMMENCE IN AUGUST.

10. THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES TO MEET THE OPERATIONAL NEEDS OF THE MISSION IS A DECREASE OF 376 UNMO/MONTHS, OR 31.3 UNMO/YEARS, OR 15.6 UNMOS LESS A YEAR.

11. YOUR APPROVAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION IS REQUIRED URGENTLY IN ORDER TO GET THE INCREASED NUMBER OF UNMOS (48) ON THE GROUND BY EARLY MARCH 94.


12. REGARDS.

UNMO DISTRIBUTION

Annex A

	Current Sit	MAR 94	APR 94	MAY 94	JUN 94	JUL 94	AUG 94	SEP 94	OCT 94	NOV 94	DEC 94	JAN 95	FEB 95	MAR 95	APR 95	MAY 95
MILOB GP HQ	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	49	49	49	49	49	49
KIGALI SECTOR	95	95	95	95	75	75	43	43	39	39	0	0	0	0	0	0
DMZ SECTOR	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	0	0	0	0	0	0
RGF SECTOR	32	56	56	58	68	68	56	56	25	25	25	25	25	25	0	0
RPF SECTOR	32	56	56	58	68	68	62	62	10	10	10	10	10	10	0	0
SOUTH SECTOR	33	33	33	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNOMUR SECTOR	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	0	0	0	0	0	0
FORCE HQ	9	9	9	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2
TOTAL	331	379	379	379	379	379	329	329	242	242	86	86	86	86	51	51
		PHASE II									PHASE III (NO DMZ)			PHASE IV		
		PHASE III (INTEGRATION)														

PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO UNAMIR MILOB STRENGTH
(STRENGTH TO TASK)



NOTE :
THE INCREASE OF ADDITIONAL 48
WILL BE EFFECTIVE ON MONTHS OF
MAR, APR, MAY, JUN, & JUL, THEN A
GRADUAL DECREASE AS SHOWN ABOVE

INDEX	UNNY CEILING
	PROPOSED
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	4 X GOOD STAFFS
	43 MT
	30 ET
	1 X SLO (OND)
	12 MT OND
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4879 13162

UNAMIR

10 FEB 1994

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

KYF 277

DATE: 10 FEBRUARY 1994

00 44 81 342 8566

TO: GHANA HIGH COMMISSION, DEFENCE, LONDON	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: (081) 342 - 8566 <i>ZEN</i>	FAX NO: 250 - 84265
SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF ADVANCE PARTY OF GHANA BATTALION IN UNAMIR	
INFO: HEAD OF MISSION, GHANA, UN NY 212 963 4879 GHQ(OPS), MA TO CDS, COS, ARMY HQ <i>ZEN</i>	ORIGINATOR: GHANA NATIONAL SENIOR OFFICER, UNAMIR, KIGALI
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

MIR315

1. THE ADVANCE PARTY OF GHANA BATTALION OF UNAMIR, COMPRISING 225 ALL RANKS, ARRIVED SAFELY IN KIGALI ON WED 9 FEBRUARY 1994.
2. GRATEFUL RELAY SAME TO HEAD OF MISSION, GHANA, UN NY, GHQ (OPS) AND INFO MA TO CDS, COS AND ARMY HQ.
3. PLEASE, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND FURTHER ACTION.
4. REGARDS.

(Z)

12572

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

10 FEB 1994

1/4

DATE: 10 FEBRUARY 1994

KMF 160

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO, UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX: 256 486 23816	FAX: 250 - 84265
SUBJECT: ROTATION AND EXTENSION OF TOD FOR UNOMUR MILOBS	
MISC 117	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1056 EXT 1056
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 4	

1. ATTACHED, PLEASE, FIND FOLLOWING ANNEXES FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ACTION:

- A. ANNEX A - REPLACEMENT OF NETHERLANDS MILOBS.
- B. ANNEX B - EXTENSION OF TOD FOR BANGLADESH MILOBS.
- C. ANNEX C - EXTENSION OF TOD FOR BRAZIL MILOBS AND MEDICAL TEAM.

2. REGARDS.



Permanent Mission of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands to
the United Nations at New York

ANNEX A

Office of the Military Adviser

Phone : 1-212 697 5547 (ext 620)
1 917 270 0576 (mobile)

Fax: 1-212 338 9760 (unclas)
1-212-661 2066 (secure)

2/4

②
CMPC
Info UNOMUR
1-2
10/2

TELECOPIER/FACSIMILE/TELEFAX MESSAGE

DTG: 060816 LT jan, 1994

SUBJECT: UNOMUR/REPLACEMENT NL MILOBS

FOR/ATTN: DPKO
DESK OFFICER UNOMUR
ATTN: MAJOR MARTIN

CONTENTS:

1. REF: OUR FAX 051645 LT JAN, 1994;
2. THIS IS TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING DEPARTURE DATES:
 - DEPARTURE LTCOL NOORDSIJ (1 PAX): 01 MARCH 1994;
 - DEPARTURE REST OF REPLACING PERSONNEL (9 PAX): 06 MARCH 1994;
 - DEPARTURE REPATRIATING PERSONNEL (10 PAX): 10 MARCH 1994.
3. REGARDS.

FROM: Deputy MILAD/PVVN
NL Mission to the UN
711 Third Ave, 9th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10017

Ed A.W. Koestel
Major

PAGES: 1 (incl. frontpage)

File ..
FOD
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PERMANENT MISSION OF BANGLADESH
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ANNEX 6

21 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

TEL (212) 607-3434/7
FAX (212) 972-4038

3/4

No. Pol-25/93

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York and with reference to the esteemed Office's note No.DPKO/5 dated 16 December, 1993 has the honour to state that the Government of Bangladesh is pleased to extend the tenure of the 18 Bangladeshi military observers as requested by the esteemed Office upto August, 1994 for service with UNOMUR (Uganda-Rwanda).

6/4/94
The Government of Bangladesh have also decided to send fresh 18 replacements in place of the 18 Bangladeshi military observers in UNOMUR in the month of August, 1994 to ensure timely rotation.


7/2/94
The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.



Office of the Secretary General
of the United Nations
UN Secretariat
New York.
(Atten: Major Miguel Martin, Room No.3650G)

File
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Permanent Mission of Brazil
to the United Nations
New York



EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY

ANNEX C

No. 014


3
4/10
UNCLASSIFIED

The Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in reply to the latter's note DPKO/7, dated 16 December 1993, has the honour to inform him that the Brazilian Government agrees with the extension of the tour of duty of the ten military observers and that of the three-man medical unit presently serving with the United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda, for an additional period of six months.

The Permanent Representative of Brazil is also pleased to inform the Secretary-General that the Brazilian Government will designate, as requested, replacements for the military observers and the members of the medical unit when they complete one year of duty with the United Nations.

The Permanent Representative of Brazil avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 14 January 1994



UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 9 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: GEN DAHAIRE/FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 256 486 - 23816	FAX NO: 250 - 84265
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL VISIT TO UNOMUR BY DFC, UNAMIR	
ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1056 EXT 1056	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

REFERENCE:

- A. FAX KMF 99 DATED 28 JAN 94 ON ABOVE SUBJECT.
1. MOVEMENT DETAILS OF SUBJECT VISIT ARE AS GIVEN BELOW:
- A. KIGALI - ENTEBBE
- (1) DATE: FRIDAY 11 FEBRUARY 1994.
 - (2) FLIGHT: AIR RWANDA FLIGHT RY 603.
 - (3) ETD KIGALI: 1000 HRS (LT).
 - (4) ETA ENTEBBE: 1215 HRS.
- B. ENTEBBE - KIGALI
- (1) DATE: TUESDAY 15 FEBRUARY 1994.
 - (2) ETD ENTEBBE: 1115 HRS.
 - (3) ETA KIGALI: 1130 HRS (LT).
2. GRATEFUL ARRANGE RECEPTION AS PER REF A.
3. REGARDS.

Information:
MA to DFC

UNAMIR - FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

08 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: MATIWAZA, A/CMO, UNOMUR, KABALE	FROM: DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX: (256) 486 23816	FAX: (07) 84266
SUBJECT: AERIAL RECCE ALONG RWANDAN/UGANDAN BORDER ON 04 FEB 94	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: ONE	

DIRECT

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR FAX DATED 06 FEB 94 (UNOMUR INFOSUM/07)
2. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 4.
 - A. PLEASE NOTE THAT FORCE COMD CONDUCTED AN AERIAL RECCE ON 04 FEB 94 PM ALONG THE UGANDAN/RWANDAN BORDER AND SLIGHTLY IN NO MAN'S LAND IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE BRIDGE PROBLEM AT GATUNA FOR FUTURE OPENING OF THE GATUNA/KIGALI CORRIDOR FOR COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC.
 - B. THE FLIGHT WAS IN DAYLIGHT AND UN SIGNS WERE CLEARLY SHOWN.
 - C. UNOMUR WILL HAVE HELICOPTERS SOON AT KABALE. USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SORT THE PROBLEM OUT WITH NRA AND INFORM UNAMIR ABOUT THE RESULT OF ACTION TAKEN VERSUS THE NCO WHO DECLARED TO SHOOT UPON THE UN HELICOPTER.
3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

KMF 137

1/4

080950Z

DATE: 8 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: <i>[Signature]</i> BGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 256 486 23816	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR ROTATION/REPATRIATION/EXTENSION	
MISC-96	SENDER'S NAME/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1051 EXT 1056
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 04	

REF:

A. GUIDELINE SOP FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, SECTION 4 ON ROTATION/REPATRIATION/EXTENSION.

1. PLANNING OF ROTATION, REPATRIATION AND EXTENSION IS A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT GOES THROUGH SEVERAL STAGES BEFORE FINAL APPROVAL. IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPERATIVE THAT THE PROCESS MUST START WELL IN ADVANCE FOR THE PROPOSED PLAN TO BE FORWARDED TO UN NY WELL BEFORE TIME TO AVOID ANY UNNECESSARY DELAYS IN THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE PLAN.

2. YOU ARE THEREFORE REQUESTED TO SEND TO THIS HQ ON MONTHLY BASIS, SEPARATE ROTATION PLANS BY COUNTRY, IN RESPECT OF STAFF OFFICERS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS BY THE SECOND (2) DAY OF EVERY MONTH.

3. AS A GUIDELINE, FOR NORMAL ROTATION, THE PLANNING SHOULD BE AT LEAST 3 MONTHS IN ADVANCE AND FOR EXTENSION OF TOUR OF DUTIES OF STAFF OFFERS AND MIL OBSERVERS, THE PLANNING SHOULD BE AT LEAST FOUR (4) MONTHS IN ADVANCE.

4. IN ADDITION, FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING EXTENSION OF TOUR OF DUTY SHOULD BE ADHERED TO AS SPECIFIED IN THE REF QUOTED ABOVE.

(FC) Cmpc

Tel 10 202

5. SAMPLE FORMATS FOR THE PLANNING OF ROTATIONS AND EXTENSIONS ARE AT ANNEXES A AND B FOR YOUR GUIDANCE.

6. PLEASE, FORWARD RETURNS FOR CURRENT MONTH TO THIS HQ BY 10 FEBRUARY, 1994.

7. ACCEPT FOR YC R INFO AND GUIDANCE, PLEASE.

8. REGARDS.

[illegible]

* COUNTRIES LISTED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

HYF255

080950Z

8 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX: 00 1 212 963 9070	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPORT FROM UNOMUR	
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER: 2	

MIR-288

1. THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL REPORT WAS RECEIVED FROM COL. MATIWAZA, ACTING CMO UNOMUR, KABALE. IT IS A MOST POSITIVE PIECE OF INFORMATION ON THE RELATION WITH THE NRA. THE POINTS ON THE SPONTANEOUS REFUGEES IS TO BE NOTED.

"2. THE 170KM DRIVE TO MBARARA FOR A PREARRANGED MEETING WITH COL. PETER KARIM, COMMANDER 2NFD DIVISION (NRA) AT MBARARA WAS A WORTHWHILE EFFORT.

3. THE A/CMO ACCOMPANIED BY THE MIO RECEIVED AN UNUSUALLY WARM WELCOME FROM THE HOST. THE DIV HQ IS LOCATED ABOUT 6KM OUT OF MBARARA ALONG THE MBARARA/KAMPALA ROAD, WAS BUILT BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE SEVENTIES AND IT HAS SURVIVED A NUMBER OF CIVIL WARS AS A RESULT, IT IS IN AN UNPLEASANT STATE BUT USABLE. 2ND DIV IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION ENCOMPASSING THE WHOLE OF OUR OPERATIONAL AREA.

4. THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER, IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, STATED THAT HE WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE COOPERATION BETWEEN UNOMUR AND THE NRA AND LIKEWISE, HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES TO GIVE ALL THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE WHERE POSSIBLE TO THE UNOMUR, AS THAT WOULD HELP CLEAR THE ALLEGATIONS OF RPF SUPPORT, IN THE FACE OF WORLD AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH THE PRESENCE OF UNOMUR. HE ALSO RAISED THE LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS HIS ARMY WAS FACING AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY BY THE NRA TO MEET ITS OBLIGATION FOR UNOMUR SUPPORT.

5. IN REACTION TO THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF RWANDESE REFUGEES, THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER SAID THAT WHEN NEWS FELL ON THE EARS OF THE REFUGEES THAT THE RPF BATTALION AND THE LEADERSHIP HAD MOVED TO KIGALI, AS PER TERMS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT, THE REFUGEES THOUGHT THAT THE WAR WAS OVER AND THAT THEY COULD FOLLOW SUIT. THE GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HAPHAZARD MOMENT OF THE SAME, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF KAMWEZI AND ELSWHERE. THE DIV COMD ALSO SAID THE

PAGE 1 OF 2

FC

080950Z

REFUGEES HAD BECOME IMPATIENT OVER LONG WAITS FOR THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN RWANDA AND OTHERS PROBABLY WANTED TO GET GOOD LAND BEFORE THE REST AS THERE IS SERIOUS LAND SHORTAGES IN RWANDA AND THEY THOUGHT THAT THE EARLY BIRD CATCHES WORM PRINCIPLE WOULD BE BEST. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED CONTROLLED MOVEMENTS OF REFUGEES, ORGANIZED BY THE UN AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, AND THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THE ISSUE WERE IN PROGRESS AT HIGH LEVEL FOR A CONCLUSIVE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND MEANWHILE THE NRA IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO STOP THE RANDOM REFUGEES MOVEMENT ACROSS THE BORDER TO RWANDA FOR THE TIME BEING. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, THE RWANDESE REFUGEES ARE LOCATED IN TWO MAIN CAMPS, AT NTIVALE (SOUTH EAST OF MBARARA A FEW KMS) THAT HE COULD TAKE US FOR A VISIT TO THE CAMPS AT A LATER DATE IF WE WISHED.

6. THE DIV COMD ALSO INFORMED US THAT AS A RESULT OF FIGHTING BETWEEN ZAIRESE FORCES AND REBELS IN THE AREAS WEST OF FORT PROTAL (WEST UGANDA) A LARGE NUMBER OF ZAIRESE REFUGEES HAD CROSSED INTO UGANDA.

7. IN GENERAL, THE ATTITUDE OF THE NRA SENIOR OFFICERS IS VERY POSITIVE TO UNOMUR AND FURTHER CONTACTS WILL NO DOUBT GREATLY ENHANCE THE MUCH REQUIRED GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NRA AND UNOMUR."

8. BEST REGARDS.

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 04 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: COL MATIWAZA A/CMO UNOMUR KABALE	FROM: BOEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NO: 256 486 23816	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJECT: REPLACEMENTS FOR REDEPLOYED PERSONNEL	
	SENDER'S NAME/ROOM NO: LT COL JAMIL/1056 EXT 1056
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

REF:

A. FAX NO 142 DATED 29 JAN 94 ON ABOVE SUBJECT.

1. AS DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY YOU ARE EXPECTED TO CARRY OUT OPS IN YOUR SECTOR WITH CURRENT MANPOWER. REQUEST RESTRUCTURE YOUR MISSION BASED ON TEN (10) TEAMS. IN CASE OF SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER, YOU MAY DISCARD SECTOR EAST HQ.

2. GRATEFUL FORWARD RESTRUCTURED PLAN TO THIS HQ SOONEST.

3. REGARDS.

TOT
07302

07062
4 FEB 1994

UN RESTRICTED

K4F 238

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 03 FEB 94

TO : MA TO SECY GEN DPKO/UNNY	FROM : BGEN DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR
FAX NUMBER : 212 963 4879	FAX NUMBER : 250 84265
SUBJECT: SUBMISSION OF MCSLR - UNAMIR AND UNOMUR	
TO : MGEN BARIL <i>MIR 269</i>	ORIGINATOR: LCOL JAMIL. S. CMPO
NUMBER OF PAGES: 11 INCL COVER SHEET	

1. FOLLOWING RETURNS ARE ENCLOSED IN RESPECT OF UNAMIR AND UNOMUR AS ANNEX A AND ANNEX B RESPECTIVELY.

- A. MONTHLY CONSOLIDATED STR AND LOC RETURN (MCSLR).
- B. SUMMARY STR REPORT OF MILOBS.
- C. SUMMARY STR REPORT OF MIL SP UNIT.

2. BEST REGARDS.

R.

Radio Room has retained only

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UN RESTRICTED

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07432

UNAMIR FORCE HQ

07052
4 FEB 1994

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

Kyf 237
DATE: 03 FEB 94

TO: MA TO SECY GEN DPKO/UNNY	FROM : BGEN DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR
FAX NUMBER : 212 963 4897	FAX NUMBER: 250 84265
SUBJECT: SUBMISSION OF 'G' FORMS	
TO: MGEN BARIL MIR 168	ORIGINATOR: LCOL JAMIL. S. CMPO
NUMBER OF PAGES : 29 INCL COVER SHEET	

1. THE FOLLOWING 'G' FORMS ARE SUBMITTED
 - AA. UNAMIR MONTHLY MIL STAFF OFFRS LIST 'G' FORM I.
 - BB. UNAMIR MONTHLY PERS LIST, 'G' FORM II BROKEN DOWN BY NATIONALITY.
 - CC. UNAMIR MONTHLY STATE OF FORMED UNITS BY NATIONALITY.
 - DD. UNOMUR MONTHLY MIL STAFF OFFRS LIST 'G' FORM I.
 - EE. UNOMUR MONTHLY PERS LIST 'G' FORM II BROKEN DOWN BY NATIONALITY.
2. BEST REGARDS.

fl.

Radio Room Retained first page
only BP.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 2 FEBRUARY 1994

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:212-963-9070 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT:VISIT OF MR DJ BENNET AND STAFF TO UNAMIR	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 3	

1. MR DJ BENNET, US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS AND HIS STAFF WHILE ON VISIT TO RWANDA RECEIVED UNAMIR BRIEFINGS AND TOUR.

2. MEETINGS, BRIEFINGS AND VISITS WERE VERY POSITIVE. MR BENNET AND HIS STAFF WERE VERY INTERESTED IN LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE MISSION.

3. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND FC'S CONCLUDING REMARKS FROM THE UNAMIR BRIEFING HE RECEIVED. FC HOPES THESE POINTS DO NOT ARRIVE AT THE WRONG TIME. INFO TO THE FIELD COMMANDERS OF SITUATION IN MILADV/DPKO COULD HELP US IN GETTING OUR CONTENT AND TIMING RIGHT.

4. REGARDS.

NOTES FOR VISIT OF US UNDER-SECRETARY

1. THIS IS A CLASSICAL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION THAT HAS ALL THE RIGHT INGREDIENTS: A PEACE AGREEMENT, JOINT DELEGATION TO UNHQ, THE CEASE-FIRE IS HOLDING, JOINT COMMISSIONS ARE WORKING ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS SUCH AS REFUGEES, DEMOBILIZATION, INTEGRATION PROGRAMMES.
2. THE SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE FACTOR THAT STILL REMAINS STRONGLY IN PLACE EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE HAD THIS POLITICAL IMPASSE IS THE WILL BY THE PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE PROCESS AND JUST AS IMPORTANTLY THEY ARE STILL WHOLLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS PRESENCE AND THEIR WORK.
3. THE TECHNICAL REPORT PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER, AND THE SECRETARY GENERALS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 24 SEPTEMBER STRESSED THE ESSENTIALITY OF AN URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE PROCESS MOMENTUM RESULTING FROM THE 4 AUGUST AGREEMENT IN ARUSHA. THIS SENSE OF URGENCY WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE SECURITY COUNCILS DELIBERATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION. THE CONCERN ALL THAT TIME WAS THE FACT THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN ESTABLISHING THE MISSION, WOULD OPEN A PERIOD OF POLITICAL VACUUM THAT WOULD PERMIT POSTURING BY THOSE WHO WERE NOT FULLY COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS SENSE OF URGENCY WAS REPEATED CONSTANTLY THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER.
4. WELL THE UN CANNOT DEPLOY FORCES WITHIN WEEKS, EVEN AFTER A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION THAT IN ITSELF TAKES AT LEAST ONE TO TWO MONTHS. THE UN DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED FORCES IN A POSITION OF RAPID REACTION. THE UN HAS NO DEDICATED STRATEGIC LIFT AND SO IS DEPENDANT ON NATIONAL CARRIERS AND PUNCTUAL CONTRACTS. THE UN ALSO HAS NO OPERATIONAL STOCKS AND AS SUCH CANNOT PROVIDE THE ESTABLISHMENT NOR IMMEDIATE SUSTAINMENT OF A MISSION ON SHORT NOTICE.
5. ALL THESE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON FORCE DEPLOYMENTS HAVE COME INTO PLAY WITH THIS MISSION. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THINGS HERE IN WEEKS WHERE IN NORMAL MISSIONS IT TAKES MONTHS, AS AN EXAMPLE WE TOOK OVER RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DMZ 10 DAYS AFTER THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT AND ALSO INTEGRATED THE OAU FORCE, WE STILL REQUIRED NEARLY THREE MONTHS TO BE REASONABLY ESTABLISHED ON THE GROUND FOR THE PHASE ONE OBJECTIVE OF THE BBTG. THIS DELAY HAS PERMITTED THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION TO CHANGE AND AS SUCH HAS OPENED THE DOOR FOR A MORE COMPLEX OPERATION THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED.
6. THUS WE HAVE A MISSION PLANED FOR A CERTAIN LEVEL OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS BUT BY THE TIME WE ARE DEPLOYED ON THE GROUND, DUE TO THE UN AND NATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES, DUE TO THE LOGISTICS

LIMITATIONS AND ALSO DUE TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE STAFFS STARTING UP FROM SCRATCH. (PEOPLE FROM MANY NATIONS WITH CULTURAL AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES), WE TEND TO ARRIVE ON THE SCENE A LITTLE LATE AT A TIME WHEN URGENCY IS CRITICAL FOR BOTH THE INITIAL AND THE OVERALL SUCCESS OF THE MISSION.

7. THUS MY CONCERN AS THE FORCE COMMANDER, HAVING DONE THE TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE, HAVING PREPARED AND PRESENTED THE REPORT TO THE UN STRUCTURE, AND HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE BACK ROOM DELIBERATIONS IN UN HEADQUARTERS TO GET THE MISSION ON THE ROAD, IS THAT IF WE WANT UN MISSIONS TO BE AND REMAIN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, IF WE WANT THEM TO BE FINITE IN TIME AND PARTICULARLY IN COSTS, IF WE WANT THEM TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE RESULTS RAPIDLY IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER PROBLEM AREAS, THEN WE MUST ABSOLUTELY GET ON THE GROUND WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE DELAY, WE MUST STRIKE WHEN THE IRON IS HOT, WE MUST MAXIMISE THE GOOD WILL THAT IS CREATED WHEN THE PARTIES HAVE JUST FINISHED THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE SIGNED THE PEACE AGREEMENT, WE MUST BE EFFECTIVE IN THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE OPPOSITION FORCES, BE THEY POLITICAL OR MILITARY, HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET ORGANISED TO DELAY FOR EVEN SCUTTLE THE PROCESS AT BIRTH.

8. A BABY IS MOST VULNERABLE AT BIRTH, SPECIAL CARE AND PROTECTION IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO GIVE IT FAIR START IN LIFE. SIR, A PEACE PROCESS IS JUST AS VULNERABLE AND REQUIRES IMMEDIATE, URGENT REACTION AND ATTENTION. THE UN NEEDS DEDICATED FORCES AND RESOURCES TO BE EFFECTIVE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. IT MUST BE ABLE TO GRASP A FAVOURABLE SITUATION AND BUILD RAPIDLY ON IT. WE MUST NOT LET THOSE WHO HAVE JUST FINISHED NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT THE TIME TO CATCH THEIR BREATH. WE MUST ENTER INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE IMMEDIATELY, AND AS SUCH, WE, THE UN MUST BE ABLE TO INTERVENE THROUGH THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EARMARKED FORCES, THROUGH THE USE OF READILY AVAILABLE CIVILIAN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT STAFFS, THROUGH THE USE OF OFF THE SHELF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT, AND THROUGH THE USE OF READILY ACCESSIBLE OPERATIONAL STOCKS.

9. SUCH A FORCE COULD COME IN, SET UP SHOP RAPIDLY, AND HOLD THE FORT FOR THE TWO TO MAXIMUM THREE MONTHS NEEDED TO GET THOSE FORCES AND STRUCTURES IN PLACE WHO WILL STAY FOR THE NORMAL YEAR TOUR OF DUTY.

10. SIR, THIS MISSION IS STILL A WINNER AND IT WILL REMAIN A WINNER AS LONG AS THE SECURITY SITUATION DOES NOT DETERIORATE DUE TO IMPATIENCE AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE. YOUR SUPPORT IS MOST APPRECIATED.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: *FC*

A:

FROM: *MA*

DE:

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

1. We Requested for a final copy of ~~our~~ *our* US Embassy on receipt of our suggested programme. *Higali Sec E' COO has been informed.*
2. I will ~~do~~ *do* the needful coordination on receipt of that. Dr. Kabia has been given a copy of our reply.

COM.6 (2-78)

*MA
24/1/94.*

②
K/A
Get up to this point
all could have?
[Signature]

No. 81

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda, and has the honor to inform the Ministry of the visit to Rwanda January 31 to February 3 of Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Mr. Douglas J. Bennet.

While in Rwanda, Assistant Secretary Bennet will discuss with Rwandan officials issues of mutual concern that will come before the United Nations Security Council. He will also talk with Rwandan and UNAMIR officials about the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Rwanda. Assistant Secretary Bennet plans to observe UNAMIR operations both in Kigali and on the field.

The Embassy also advises the Ministry that David E. Jensen, the Officer responsible for Rwanda in the Office of Peace-keeping Affairs, will visit Rwanda January 31 to February 5. He will also meet with Rwandan and UNAMIR officials to discuss peace-keeping operations and observe UNAMIR operations both in Kigali and the field.

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda, the assurances of its highest consideration.

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Date	24/1/84
No	498
By	S.P.



TRADUCTION OFFICIEUSE

No. 81

L'Ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de l'informer de la visite au Rwanda, du 31 janvier au 3 février 1994, du Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les affaires des Organisations Internationales, M. Douglas J. Bennet.

Durant son séjour au Rwanda, le Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint Bennet s'entretiendra avec les officiels rwandais des questions d'intérêt mutuel qui seront portées devant le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. Il va s'entretenir également avec les officiels rwandais et de la MINUAR au sujet de l'opération de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies au Rwanda. Le Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint Bennet a l'intention d'observer les opérations de la MINUAR tant à Kigali que sur le terrain.

L'Ambassade informe, en outre, le Ministère que M. David E. Jensen, le fonctionnaire chargé du Rwanda au Bureau des Affaires de Maintien de la Paix, visitera le Rwanda du 31 janvier au 5 février 1994.

Il va lui aussi rencontrer les officiels rwandais et de la MINUAR pour discuter les opérations de maintien de la paix et observer les opérations de la MINUAR tant à Kigali que sur le terrain.

L'Ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
Kigali, le 14 janvier 1994.

DECLARATION CONJOINTE

A la suite de leur rencontre ce jour, jeudi 13 janvier 1994 à Kigali, la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), représentée par le Général de Brigade, Commandant de la Force et le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise, représenté par le Préfet de la Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali et le Chef d'Etat-Major de la Gendarmerie Nationale ont adopté la déclaration suivante:

Les deux parties,

Rappelant l'Accord de paix d'Arusha entre le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise et le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) signé le 4 août 1993,

Rendant hommage aux efforts continus de la communauté internationale pour la promotion du processus de paix au Rwanda et pour l'assistance à la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha,

Rappelant les résolutions 872 (1993) et 893 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité sur la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha,

1. Soulignent la nécessité de maintenir un environnement pacifique pour la mise en place des institutions de la transition, tel que stipulé dans l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;
2. Soulignent en outre que la création de la Zone de Consignation d'Armes de Kigali (KNEA) est un élément important dans l'exécution de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;
3. Rappellent que le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publics est du domaine exclusif des autorités administratives et des forces de sécurité de l'Etat Rwandais.
4. Réaffirment que la MINUAR aide à l'établissement d'une atmosphère propice à la sécurité dans la ville de Kigali, en collaboration avec les parties signataires de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;
5. Rappellent également que les autorités rwandaises sont seules habilitées à délivrer les autorisations requises pour toute manifestation publique et à en informer la MINUAR, et décident, dans ce contexte, d'interdire ce genre de manifestation dans un rayon de 1,5 km autour du Conseil National de Développement (CND) à Kigali;
6. Conviennent de se rencontrer le plus souvent possible pour un échange d'informations en vue d'harmoniser leurs actions de maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publics dans la ville de Kigali.
7. Réaffirment à nouveau la neutralité de la MINUAR dans l'exécution de son mandat;
8. Appellent tous les Rwandais à soutenir le processus de paix et à coopérer avec la MINUAR dans la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha.

FAIT A KIGALI LE 13 JANVIER 1994

Général de Brigade Robert R. RUTAGANDA
Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR

Préfet de la Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali
Chef d'Etat-Major de la Gendarmerie Nationale

ITANGAZO RUSANGE

Nyuma y'imibonano yahuje uyu munsu, tariki ya 13 Mutarama 1994 Umugaba w'Ingabo za MINUAR, Général de Brigade ari nawa wari uhagarariye MINUAR, na Perezwa wa Perezagitura y'Umugi wa Kigali wari uhagarariye Leta y'u Rwanda hamwe n'Umukuru wa Jandarumori y'Igihugu, hafashwe ibyemero bikurikira:

Impande zombi,

Zishingiye ku masezerano ya Arusha yashyizweho umukono na Repubulika y'u Rwanda n'umutwe wa FPR tariki ya 4 Kanama 1993,

Bamaze kuzirikana ukuntu ibihugu n'imixyango mpuzamahanga bitanze kugirango amahoro agaruke mu Rwanda no kugirango Amasezerano ya Arusha ashirwe mu bikorwa;

Bashingiye ku mwanzuro wa 872 (1993) n'uwa 893 (1993) y'Inama y'Umuryango w'Abibumbye ishinze amahoro ku isi yerekeye ishyirwa mu bikorwa ry'Amasezerano ya Arusha,

1. Bamaze ko gushyigikira umutekano ari igikorwa cya ngombwa kugirango inzego z'ubutegetsi bw'inzi bacyuho zishobore gushyirwaho nk'uko biteganijwe mu masezerano ya Arusha;
2. Bamaze kandi gushyiraho ahantu n'ukuntu intwari zagenturwa muri Kigali (KWSA) ari igikorwa cy'ingenzi mu gushyira mu bikorwa Amasezerano ya Arusha;
3. Baributsa ko kubumbatira umutekano mu gihugu bireba inzego z'ubutegetsi hamwe n'abashinzwe kubumbatira umutekano muri Leta y'u Rwanda;
4. Bashyigikiye ko MINUAR igoboka u Rwanda mu gushimangira umutekano mu mugwi wa Kigali ibifashijwemo n'abashyize umukono ku masezerano y'amahoro ya Arusha;
5. Baributsa nanone ko abategetsi b'u Rwanda ari bo bonyine bafite uburenganzira bwo gutanga impushya ku bifuza gukora imyigaragambyo ariko bakabimenyeshya MINUAR; muri urwo rwego bamaze ko bibujijwe gukoreza imyigaragambyo kuri kilometero imwe n'igice (1,5) mu mpande z'Ingoro y'Inama y'Igihugu Ihagarariye Amajyambere (CND), i Kigali;
6. Bamaze kuzajya bahura kenshi bakungurana ibitekerezo kugirango basenyere umugozi umwe mu kubahiriza amahoro n'umutekano mu mugwi wa Kigali.
7. Bashyigikiye nanone ukutabogama kwa MINUAR mu gusohozza imirimo ishinze;
8. Bamaze Abanyarwanda bose gushyigikira ibikorwa bigamije kugarura amahoro mu Rwanda, bagashyigikira kandi MINUAR mu ishyirwa mu bikorwa ry'Amasezerano ya Arusha.

Kigali, tariki ya 13 Mutarama 1994

Général de Brigade des Forces armées rwandaises
Umugaba w'Ingabo za MINUAR

Président du Conseil National
Perezwa wa Perezagitura y'Umugi wa Kigali

Président du Comité National
Umukuru wa Jandarumori y'Igihugu

Page 1:

Graphique:

Sigle ONU à gauche.

Pistolet avec NOI au niveau des quatre doigts.

Mention:

LA ZONE DE CONSIGNATION D'ARMES DE KIGALI (KWSA)

Dans le cadre du mandat qui lui a été confié par le Conseil de sécurité, le MINUAR doit assurer, entre autres, la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de la capitale relative aux armes, en particulier la Zone de Consignation d'Armes (KWSA) située à l'ouest de Kigali. Pour ce faire, le Chef de la MINUAR doit avoir l'assistance de la Police et de la Gendarmerie rwandaise, les unités armées des forces armées rwandaises et du bataillon du Front Progressiste Rwandais (FPR) à Kigali.

Cette zone de consignation d'armes doit être placée sous la supervision de l'Accord de la capitale relative aux armes dans un environnement sécurisé de la Zone de Consignation d'Armes de la ville de Kigali. Avec le soutien technique du MINUAR, le Gouvernement rwandais doit assurer la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de la capitale relative aux armes, en particulier la Zone de Consignation d'Armes (KWSA) située à l'ouest de Kigali. Pour ce faire, le Chef de la MINUAR doit avoir l'assistance de la Police et de la Gendarmerie rwandaise, les unités armées des forces armées rwandaises et du bataillon du Front Progressiste Rwandais (FPR) à Kigali.

Le Gouvernement rwandais doit collaborer avec le MINUAR pour la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de la capitale relative aux armes, en particulier la Zone de Consignation d'Armes (KWSA) située à l'ouest de Kigali. Pour ce faire, le Chef de la MINUAR doit avoir l'assistance de la Police et de la Gendarmerie rwandaise, les unités armées des forces armées rwandaises et du bataillon du Front Progressiste Rwandais (FPR) à Kigali.

Mention:

DES MANIFESTATIONS A CARACTERE POLITIQUE ET DE LA MINUAR

Manifestation est un acte politique reconnu par tout citoyen qui agit en faveur de la République de Rwanda.

Mais ceux qui utilisent la violence pour atteindre leurs objectifs politiques doivent être punis, sans exception, dans le respect des principes de la République.

Les manifestations politiques doivent être organisées dans le respect de la compétence du Ministère de l'Intérieur de la République de Rwanda qui délivre les autorisations nécessaires pour organiser des manifestations politiques. Les manifestations politiques doivent être organisées dans le respect des principes de la République.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[illegible][illegible]

MISSION RESERVATION WIFE TOUR ASSISTANCE A DEMANDA

AKARERE KAZAKUSANYIRIZWAMO INIWAFO MURI KIGALI
 Nubona kandi imurabwira INYA INYINZA AMAMURU KURI Yajya AMURU, muri
 [REDACTED]
 AMURU KURI AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU AMURU
 AMURU (KIGALI WEAPONS VENTURE AREA) KIGALI

Ako karere katoranjwe n'impande zombi zasinye amasezerano ya Arusha kari mu birometero cumi na bitanu uvuye mu nkengero z'umugi wa Kigali. Ifatanyije n'impande zombi, MINUAR yemeje kandi amategako ntarengwa aganga umutekano w'abaturege. Bityo, iyo ingabo z'impande zombi zigize aho zijya zibimenyesha MINUAR. Kwitwaza intwara biragenzurwa cyane kandi kuzikoroshe biba ngombwa iyo umuntu yitabara.

MINUAR ifatanywa na Gendarmerie y'igihugu kugirango harangwe umutekano. Ariko rero, umutwe w'ingabo cyangwa se ikipe y'abantu barenze icumi (10), bahererekazwa kandi bakagenzurwa n'abasirikare ba l'ONU bashinzwe kureba iyubahirizwa ry'amasezerano (UNMO). Byaba ngombwa bagahererekazwa n'ingabo za MINUAR.

IBYESA MINUAR N'IBYEREKEYE INYIGARAMBO YO MU RWEGO RWA POLITIKI

[illegible]

mykanganibya ya mshwaga rwa pami ahitawe gusa Mjibiti ya bulungo
bw'ibwira.

Kona, Hawaii, U.S.A. and John J. Korman, Department of
 Applied Mathematics (J.K.)

Imbitikano, ingabona MINUAR mibalekanesa na imvaho zambura ibyago z'u Rwanda zafatirwa imbitikano. Aho zashyuye kumubwira igihe ari ngombwa.

Organizacja: Amalano, Amalano

BIRP HINDAR KEMAH, TEL. 04 27830110/27830115 FAX 04 27830115