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TRIP TO SWITZERLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA
- GENEVA

23 JUNE - 9 JULY 1987

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JH/acb
6 July 1987

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours from GMT</u>	<u>Airline & Flt. Number</u>	<u>Equipmt</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Wed. 8 July	LV: New York (JFK) ARR: Paris (CDG) (Hotel Sofitel)	1300 2245	-4 +2	AF 002	SSC	0
Thurs. 9 July	LV: Paris (CDG) ARR: Geneva (Hotel Intercontinental)	0915 1015	+2 +2	SR 721	DC9	0
Fri. 10 July	LV: Geneva ARR: Zagreb (Hotel Esplanade)	1600 1730	+2 +2	Yugoslav Govt. Aircraft		
Sat. 11 July	Zagreb					
Sun. 12 July	LV: Zagreb ARR: Zurich LV: Zurich ARR: Paris (CDG) (Hotel Sofitel)	1705 1825 1920 2035	+2 +2 +2 +2	SR 457 SR 708	DC9 DC9	0 0
Mon. 13 July	LV: Paris (CDG) ARR: New York (JFK)	1100 0845	+2 -4	AF 1	SSC	0

COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY

(Geneva/Yugoslavia)

The Secretary-General

- * Mr. Issa Diallo
Principal Officer
- ** Mr. Giandomenico Picco
Principal Officer
- Mr. John Hrusovsky
Chief Operations Officer
- ** Ms. Françoise Lettelier
Secretary to the Secretary-General
- ** Mr. Nicholas Panzarino
Operations Officer

-
- * Mr. Diallo will join the Secretary-General in Geneva and will remain with the party until the conclusion of his visit to Geneva
 - ** Messrs. Picco and Panzarino and Ms. Letellier will join the Secretary-General in Geneva

Confidential

SG
✓ Trip File: Geneva
2 Israel

NOTE ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONVERSATION
WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL

held in Geneva on 9 July 1987

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Marrack Goulding
Mr. Giandomenico Picco

Mr. Shimon Peres
Mr. Avraham Tamir
Mr. Pinhas Eliav

Middle East Peace Conference

1. Mr. Peres asked about the Secretary-General's conversation with General-Secretary Gorbachev. The Secretary-General said that Mr. Gorbachev had made it clear that the Soviet Union was very interested in an international conference in which it would participate and which would seek a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the Russians also wanted the plenary to play an active role, for instance in dealing with problems of a multilateral nature, such as guarantees. They also thought that they and other non-regional participants should use their good offices in resolving difficulties in the bilateral talks. They accepted that the plenary should not be able to veto agreements reached bilaterally.
2. Mr. Peres asked whether the Secretary-General had detected any differences of approach between Mr. Gorbachev and his other interlocutors. The Secretary-General replied that Mr. Gorbachev had been less specific than the others. Mr. Peres asked whether Mr. Gorbachev had accepted that the plenary should not only not veto but would also not have the right to impose. The Secretary-General confirmed that this was so and said that the Soviet Ambassador in New York had told him the same.
3. Mr. Gorbachev had made it clear that the Russians wanted the Palestinians to play a role in the conference but he did not mention the PLO specifically, though Mr. Shevardnadze had. It was not clear whether there was an important difference here or whether it was simply that Mr. Gorbachev had not gone into as much detail as the Foreign Minister. The Secretary-General had asked his interlocutors to exert helpful influence on both Syria and the PLO. Mr. Gorbachev had indicated that he did not think there would be a great problem with Syria, which had supported an international conference. But the Secretary-General felt that this remark posed the question of what precisely the Syrians meant by an international conference. Indeed, he had been struck by how widely different were the various parties' concepts of an international conference.
4. To sum up, the Russians had left him with the strong impression that they would accept any formula which would give them a role; their overriding wish was to be included in the process. As regards Israel's conditions for Soviet

participation, Mr. Gorbachev had nodded assent when the Secretary-General said that he assumed that the Russians would take a decision on diplomatic relations once there was firm agreement on the convening of the conference.

5. Mr. Peres asked whether the Russians had been specific about what they meant by an "active role" for the plenary. The Americans had told him that in their latest contacts with the Russians the latter had talked about an "authoritative" role for the plenary. Mr. Goulding said that in all the conversations in Moscow the Russians had avoided giving specific answers to questions about the role of the plenary and had replied that they were ready to discuss this question with all the parties, including Israel. Mr. Peres said that it was necessary to be very cautious on this question. The Secretary-General pointed out that all the Western permanent members were now more or less in favour of a conference and agreed that the plenary should not have mandatory powers. The Soviet idea of a preparatory committee was moribund.

6. Mr. Peres asked what the Chinese had said to the Secretary-General about opening diplomatic relations with Israel. The Secretary-General said that the Chinese had admitted in public that they were in touch with the Israeli Government about an international conference. He had the impression that they would be ready to accept diplomatic relations once a serious decision had been taken to convene the conference, though they had not stated this explicitly in public. Mr. Peres said that the number two in the Chinese Embassy in Paris had said as much to the Israelis.

7. The Secretary-General said that Israel held the key to progress (Mr. Peres said that he was "looking for the key-hole"). International developments in Israel were of critical importance. All those who supported an international conference hoped that Mr. Peres' position would prevail. Mr. Peres said that he was trying his best. In theory it would be better for all parties in Israel to adopt a common position; only if this turned out to be impossible would it be necessary to ask the people to decide. (In a separate meeting with Mr. Goulding the following day, Mr. Tamir explained that what Mr. Peres meant was that it would be better if the two main parties in Israel were to agree on launching a conference; Mr. Peres had no illusions about the possibility of Labour and Likud agreeing on the outcome of the conference; peace could only be achieved after a major split in Israel - and in the PLO). Mr. Peres continued that the whole situation in the Middle East had improved. There were signs of movement in Damascus. He had just had a candid and constructive talk with President Mubarak. The Secretary-General agreed that there were positive developments but said it was necessary to avoid excessive optimism. He would continue his efforts. His duty as Secretary-General was to explore all possible avenues.

8. Prompted by Mr. Eliav, Mr. Peres asked whether the Secretary-General had raised the question of emigration in Moscow. The Secretary-General said that unfortunately he had not, though he had left with Minister Petrovsky a long list of individual cases. He would revert to the matter with Mr. Petrovsky in August.

9. After a brief discussion of the prospects for the draft Security Council resolution on Iran-Iraq, the Secretary-General raised the Syrian attitude to

an international conference. Syria had insisted on General Assembly resolution 38/58C but the Russians had made it clear that they thought they could exert some influence in Damascus. Mr. Peres said that according to the Americans, the Russians thought they could do more with Syria than with the PLO.

10. The Secretary-General said that he would continue to make every effort to take advantage of the momentum which Mr. Peres' policies had created. Mr. Peres said that he was waiting to see what would happen between the USA and the USSR. The meeting on 6 July between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Poliakov had not closed any doors and had introduced some Soviet "maybes" into areas which had previously seemed to be closed, e.g. the question of Palestinian representation. The Russians had insisted that the plenary should have "authority" but had agreed that it could not impose solutions. Mr. Peres had been advising his Arab friends to be very careful about the "referral issue", lest the temptation be created to refer every least difference to the plenary. He had pointed out that opinion in Israel was still strongly in favour of direct negotiations; the international conference proposal was thus already a heavy political burden for him; he would not have a chance if it was believed that the conference would be in continuous session.

11. The Americans had told him that differences remained between the Russians and the Americans about what the multilateral committee of the conference would do. The Russians wanted it to handle the Palestinian problem, whereas the Americans said that this must be dealt with bilaterally in the Israel/Jordan-Palestinian committee. Guarantees were another subject proposed for multilateral discussion, though he himself was not convinced that guarantees would be necessary. Another proposal, from Jordan, was that water should be discussed multilaterally. The Americans had said that the Soviet conclusion was "il faut réfléchir". The Russians had given the impression that they would handle their clients if the Americans would handle theirs.

12. As regards the problem of Palestinian representation, President Mubarak had just told him that the PLO accepted that an independent delegation was not on, even if the Russians were still pressing for one. (The Secretary-General said that Mr. Arafat had admitted as much to Mr. Goulding).

13. Turning to the internal debate in Israel, Mr. Peres repeated that it would be better for all the parties to move together but there was no point in togetherness if that simply meant immobilism. The question of early elections should be resolved within a month or so. President Mubarak had agreed to his request that Foreign Minister Meguid should pay an early visit to Israel, which would help to convince the Israeli people that an international conference was the right way forward.

14. In conclusion, Mr. Peres said that the Secretary-General had a vital role to play in maintaining momentum. Mr. Goulding's visit to Israel had been welcome. Mr. Peres had been extremely interested to receive the account of the Secretary-General's conversation with Mr. Gorbachev. It confirmed his own impression that the Soviet position was positive but not very specific. There was a long road ahead but it was essential to make things happen by the beginning of 1988 at the latest.

15. The Secretary-General agreed and said that he was ready to visit the region if that would help. Mr. Peres added that it would be very helpful if the Secretary-General could get the Chinese to be a little more forthcoming

about relations with Israel. He then described his efforts, behind the scenes, to put together an informal group to plan for an economic conference which would take place "in the wake of" the political conference but not necessarily with the same participants. Many of those best placed to make a financial contribution to the region's economic reconstruction would not be represented at the conference. It was important not to give the impression that such a conference could be a substitute for a peace conference. He therefore saw advantage in starting, at the private level, the preparation of plans to cope with the numerous economic problems which would concern Israel and her neighbours during the next thirty years (cf. the Monnet plan). The Secretary-General said this was a very interesting approach.


Original: The Secretary-General ✓
cc: Mr. Dayal
Mr. Picco
Ms. Buttenheim

ConfidentialNOTE ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONVERSATION
WITH THE PRESIDENT OF EGYPT

held in Geneva on 9 July 1987

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Marrack Goulding
Mr. Giandomenico Picco



President Hosni Mubarak
Dr. Ismat Abdel Meguid
Mr. Abdul Halim Badawi
Mr. Saad Alfarargi

Iran/Iraq

1. The Secretary-General said that there was some movement in New York with prospects for the early tabling and adoption of a Security Council resolution. He thought that, apart from some small amendments, the present draft would be approved, though some members of the Council, e.g. Japan and some of the non-aligned, wanted to include a reference to chemical weapons in order to give something to Iran. President Mubarak asked why this was necessary. The Secretary-General replied that it would be to balance the text, which already included three points favourable to Iran: an impartial body to establish responsibility for the war, regional security and reconstruction. A reference to chemical weapons could make it easier for Iran to avoid a negative reaction to the resolution. The draft's first operative paragraph called for a cease-fire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers; if that was not accepted then the resolution would fall apart. He had always asked what would happen if Iran refused to accept the resolution. He was of course always ready to continue his own efforts. President Mubarak asked whether there were any indications that Iran would reject the resolution or "freeze it". The Secretary-General agreed that there was a risk that Iran would reject the cease-fire; they were opposed even to a temporary cease-fire. The best outcome might be for Iran not to reject the resolution totally, thus allowing the Secretary-General to work out some ideas and visit the area. President Mubarak asked what would happen if the resolution was not implemented? The Secretary-General said that in that case the members of the Council would have to decide. They would expect the Secretary-General to present a report and on the basis of that report they would focus on a second resolution, which the U.S. would like to include sanctions.

2. President Mubarak said that great care should be exercised about sanctions. The sanctions declared by the United States against Libya were not implemented even by American firms. It was necessary to be realistic. The Council should focus only on what was possible. Was it realistic, for

instance, to talk of an arms embargo? He had himself asked the Chinese why they were selling missiles to Iran and had been told that the missiles must have reached Iran through some third country. The whole Irangate affair undermined the credibility of the U.S. position: if they were pushing for sanctions, the world would not believe them.

3. The Secretary-General said that he thought it important that the Council adopt a unanimous resolution. Only this would send a clear message to Iran that she was isolated. It was necessary therefore that the non-aligned and all the other members should vote in favour. President Mubarak repeated that it was important to think about what would be done next. Iran was unpredictable. Ending the war would be the first step towards ending the power of the present group of Ayatollahs. The Secretary-General thought that a struggle for the succession had probably already begun. President Mubarak agreed and said that it was not to be excluded that in the end the Shah's son would return, though without his father's powers. Summing up this part of the discussions, the Secretary-General said that there were two positive elements: first, Iran must be beginning to sense how isolated she was; secondly, his invitation to the Five to work together had been accepted.

Middle East Peace Conference

4. At the Secretary-General's invitation, Mr. Goulding described his meeting with Chairman Arafat. President Mubarak said, with reference to Mr. Arafat's preference for a single Arab delegation, that this was a Syrian plan designed to give Syria a veto.

5. The Secretary-General then described his meetings in Moscow with the Soviet leadership. They were extremely interested in an international conference provided that it was not purely ceremonial. They thought the plenary should have an important role, though without having the power to impose or to veto. Its role could be to help resolve deadlocks in the bilateral talks. There were also a number of subjects which required multilateral discussion, e.g. guarantees, borders and Jerusalem. On the last point, the Secretary-General agreed with the Soviet position. He had asked the Russians to co-operate in obtaining some flexibility from Syria and the PLO. They had made it clear that they did not think Syria would be a problem. President Mubarak said that there were important contacts between King Hussein and President Assad. King Hussein had told him that Assad had become more flexible and would be ready to take part in a conference. President Mubarak himself had been asking the Russians to put pressure on Syria and the PLO. The Secretary-General said that the Russians had also been optimistic about the PLO. They had expressed support for an independent PLO delegation, though Mr. Gorbachov had not been specific on this point and had indicated that he would accept whatever was thought to be appropriate. President Mubarak said, with great emphasis, that the PLO would never succeed in obtaining agreement to an independent delegation. Even the Russians would not press for this. It was important however to remember that Mr. Arafat was the only figure around whom the PLO could unite. If he were to disappear, the PLO would break up into different factions and there would be a revival of terrorism. It was therefore important to support Mr. Arafat. The Secretary-General said that he thought that in the end the Russians would accept any formula which gave them a role. President Mubarak agreed and added that once they were in the conference they would control Syria and the PLO.

6. Turning to Israel, the Secretary-General described the problems arising from the division in the Israeli Government. President Mubarak said that at the Alexandria Summit in 1986 Mr. Peres had agreed to the international conference. President Mubarak did not believe that Mr. Shamir was against it, but Mr. Shamir was manoeuvring in order to obtain some concessions from the USSR. The Secretary-General said that he had the impression that once the conference was a reality the Russians would resume diplomatic relations with Israel. As for Jewish emigration, they had said that they could not oblige their Jews to settle in Israel. President Mubarak said it was very difficult to predict what was going to happen in Israel. Mr. Peres was flexible; Mr. Shamir was tough and gave no evidence that he was working for peace. President Mubarak had sent him a message a month before in which he had made the point that unless Mr. Shamir supported the International Conference the only conclusion would be that he did not want peace. It was to be hoped that the situation would be clearer by October.

7. Finally, the Secretary-General asked whether President Mubarak foresaw a rapprochement between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat. President Mubarak said that he had received Mr. Arafat's political advisor, Mr. Hani al-Hassan, on 6 July and had urged that the PLO begin talking again to King Hussein. Mr. al-Hassan had said that he was ready to meet the Jordanians and indeed keen to do so. President Mubarak had immediately telephoned King Hussein with the result that Mr. al-Hassan had been received by the Jordanian Prime Minister. President Mubarak repeated that nobody could replace Mr. Arafat, who was held in high esteem on the West Bank, not as Chairman of the PLO, but as Arafat himself. As for Syria, all it did was to export trouble. President Assad could not withdraw his troops from Lebanon because of the money he received from the Arabs.

8. In conclusion, President Mubarak said that he would shortly be seeing Mr. Peres and would let the Secretary-General know the outcome. He hoped that the Secretary-General would soon visit Egypt.

cc: The Secretary-General ✓
Mr. Dayal
Mr. Picco
Ms. Bутtenheim

Confidential

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Original: The Secretary-General ✓
cc: Mr. Dayal
Mr. Picco
Ms. Buttenheim

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
FOR HIS MEETING WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP

1. Recently certain fears have been expressed that UNCTAD VII would focus on the problems of only one Regional Group (namely Africa) among the Group of 77, and that the major concerns of other regional groups would neither be properly addressed nor be concretely dealt with at the Conference.
2. This has been a recurrent concern over the years. It was recently revived in particular by the perceived slippage in the consultation processes within the Group of 77 during the General Assembly Special Session on Africa, and thereafter by the feeling that international attention was concentrating on Africa to the exclusion of the other two groups.
3. The G-77 was born out of the events that were associated with the creation of UNCTAD as an institution. The unity of the G-77 sprang from a common perception of the development process, a perception that has gained strength from the harsh realities of today.
4. Latin American countries have traditionally been at the vanguard of UNCTAD. Indeed, the theoretical foundations of the organization were first laid by a talented group of economists working under Raul Prebisch in CEPAL. Latin America's solidarity with the other groups not only strengthened mutual confidence within the G-77 over the years, but lent credibility to the institution.
5. The interdependence of the developing countries and their deep-rooted sense of common interests goes much further than the rhetoric of solidarity - it is today a fact of international economic relations.
6. The G-77 has drawn up a platform at Havana which represents a balance of interests among all regional groups of the G-77. Similarly, negotiations in UNCTAD often lead to gains in a specific area which can be of more importance to one group of countries, but which do not necessarily translate themselves into a loss for other groups. In short, the process

is not to be seen as a zero-sum game.

7. The elements of common interest within the Group of 77 generally and in relation to the Conference far outweigh elements of diversity and differences of emphasis. Furthermore, all the issues before the Conference (namely resources for development, commodities, trade and the least developed countries) will be dealt with in an inter-related fashion, which in itself calls for the exercise of solidarity by the G-77.

8. The UNCTAD Secretariat and indeed the UN Secretariat as a whole, has sought to approach issues of concern to the G-77 in a balanced and judicious manner. Examples are the UNCTAD Trade and Development Reports and the Reports submitted for UNCTAD VII, including the sections on debt, commodities and trade.

9. It is true that certain recent initiatives by developed market economy countries (particularly as reflected in recent Paris Club pronouncements and the Venice Summit) address problems such as the official debt of the poorer countries. This does not imply that in the UNCTAD global framework critical issues related to the debt and related problems of development which are of primary concern to other countries will not be addressed. The UNCTAD Secretariat's view on the need for an across-the-board strengthening of the international debt strategy illustrates this point.

10. The slippages that seem to have occurred in the consultative process in the past should of course be avoided in the future and the G-77 as a whole needs to address the problem. But there is nothing to be gained by any Group of countries in drawing conclusions which would undermine the unity of the Group of 77.

AIDE MEMOIRE

United States participation in UNCTAD VII

1. All member States look forward to active participation in UNCTAD VII by the United States delegation, at a suitably high level. In general, other delegations are to be headed by ministers. In some cases heads of State or Government will also address the Conference.
2. Without the involvement of the United States as the world's major economy, any consensus reached at UNCTAD VII will lack its full weight.
3. Moreover, the absence of effective United States participation would tend to inhibit a constructive role by other major OECD countries.
4. The decision to hold UNCTAD VII in Geneva, rather than Havana, manifests the interest of all members of UNCTAD in an effective United States presence.
5. The formulation of the Conference agenda and the accompanying understandings go a long way to meeting United States concerns, for example with respect to:
 - (i) the importance of a common assessment as a prelude to action,
 - (ii) the need to address global structural change,
 - (iii) the need to pay attention to the national dimension of development policy, including the role of the private sector in development.
6. UNCTAD VII gives the United States an opportunity to deepen the entire world community's understanding of its position on the major issues of international economic policy and in particular to obtain wide international support for its own stand regarding the need for balanced growth in the world economy and adjustment of payments imbalances (two issues on which the UNCTAD secretariat itself has also focused).
7. UNCTAD VII can also contribute to a broad consensus on trade and debt strategy which would facilitate a constructive outcome of the Uruguay Round, as well as action on debt in the Bretton Woods institutions and by Governments.

../.

8. In the last year or so there has been a marked tendency towards realism and pragmatism on the part of the developing countries members of the Group of 77. This is exemplified in the proposals adopted by the Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting in Havana.

9. The United States has acknowledged significant improvement in the work and management of UNCTAD over the past two years. Constructive United States participation in UNCTAD VII would encourage the continuation of these positive trends.

10. I put these points to General Walters in a conversation this afternoon. He expressed sympathy and promised he would do what he could. He asked whether I thought the level of Mr. Armocost would constitute adequate U.S. representation at UNCTAD VII. I responded that that level was certainly higher than that of Mr. Goodman who is apparently to be nominated to head the U.S. delegation. I also suggested, with apologies for my impertinence, that if he himself (General Walters) were able to come this would meet our concerns and would be a great honour to UNCTAD VII. He was non-committal on this score but said he would think about it.

K. DADZIE

23 June 1987

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AUBERT OF SWITZERLAND
held in Geneva on 9 July 1987 at 17.00 hours

Present:

The Secretary-General

The Director-General of UNOG

Mr. Giandomenico Picco

Mr. Michael Stopford

Mr. Pierre Aubert, President of
Switzerland

Mr. Franz Blankaert, Secretary of State
for Foreign & Economic Affairs

Ambassador Franz Muheim, Head of
International Organisations Department

Ambassador Ernst Andres, Permanent
Observer of Switzerland to the U.N.

Mr. Jacques de Watteville, Assistant to
President Aubert

President Aubert expressed his own and his country's deep appreciation for the Secretary-General's consistent efforts in the cause of peace. The Secretary-General reiterated the United Nations thanks for the co-operation extended to the Organisation by its host country and host city, where an important UN conference was once again being held. He had also had a welcome opportunity to discuss questions of current concern, such as the Middle East and Western Sahara, during his stay in Geneva. As for the Iran-Iraq war, the draft resolution under consideration in the Security Council contained various useful elements. While the 5 permanent members had already agreed upon its contents, it was now the subject of discussions amongst the other 10 members. It was possible that the latter countries might wish to include a reference to chemical weapons, which might in fact be a useful element. It was of course possible that the resolution might be rejected by the Iranians, although it contained points that could be helpful for them. He himself was prepared to travel to the region to impress upon both sides the importance of accepting the resolution's provisions. President Aubert commented that the interest of the great powers in bringing an end to the war was at least a step in the right direction. He asked how a negative response by the Iranians might be prevented. The Secretary-General replied that there were two important points to remember: firstly, the rejection of a unanimous resolution by the Security Council would indicate complete isolation of the party concerned and, secondly, agreement by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council carried considerable weight. He recalled that both the United States and the Soviet Union had expressed much interest in the resolution.

To a question by President Aubert on Afghanistan, the Secretary-General referred to his recent discussions with Mr. Gorbachov. The latter had indicated that a bloodbath would ensue on an immediate Soviet withdrawal, so that it was necessary to leave behind a satisfactory government of national reconciliation. It was significant that Chairman Gorbachov had indicated his wish for an independent and neutral Afghanistan, albeit one "friendly" to the Soviet Union. President Aubert mentioned his recent visit to the refugee camps in Peshawar, where the attitude had been one of inflexible opposition to the Soviets. The Secretary-General emphasized that he wanted the next meeting in Geneva to be the last one. It was necessary to break the circle and arrive at a firm date for the withdrawal of troops. President Aubert expressed his scepticism as to the chances of a true government of national reconciliation.

On the question of Cyprus, President Aubert recalled that the Swedish contingent would be departing in December and enquired whether Switzerland could make any useful contribution. His country had doubled its contribution to UNFICYP for the 4 years from 1987. The Secretary-General mentioned the Swedish Government's dissatisfaction with the slow pace of negotiations which they had adduced as a reason for their withdrawal in addition to the financial

considerations. He expressed the view that it would be possible to secure a satisfactory replacement for the Swedish contingent, despite the difficulty of obtaining Security Council approval for the appropriate contributing country. Nevertheless, the withdrawal might be a salutary warning to the Greek Cypriots. The latter were still in favour of the Soviet proposal for a conference on the international aspects of the problem. However, the Turks, the Turkish Cypriots, the U.S. and the U.K. were against this suggestion. In this connection it was worth recalling that such international aspects had already been considered in past Security Council resolutions. President Aubert drew attention in the context of the Cyprus issue to Turkey's influence on the U.S. and the U.K.

On the Western Sahara, President Aubert referred to his meeting the previous month with Foreign Minister Abdellatif Filali of Morocco. The latter had indicated that the ball was now in the U.N. court in order to work out the modalities of a referendum. He had also expressed his dissatisfaction that North African problems had not been included in the CSCE process. The Secretary-General referred to his on-going indirect talks between Morocco, Algeria and Polisario, as well as with Mauritania, which he kept informed of the process. As King Hassan of Morocco had said he would accept a referendum organised and controlled by the United Nations, with the participation of the OAU, he had decided to send a UN mission to explore the possibilities. It was now the turn of Polisario to present new obstacles, since they were clearly worried about the outcome of a referendum.

Turning to the Middle East, President Aubert referred to his recent meetings with various leaders and to the divided attitude prevailing in Israel concerning the possibility of holding an international conference. In his view, Israel's current attitude towards the peace process was short-sighted and suicidal in the middle- or long-term. The Secretary-General agreed that the Israelis had a very different conception of the international conference. He stressed that an eventual conference would have to deal with certain multilateral issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the question of guarantees and the withdrawal of forces, which would have to be monitored.

On the situation in Lebanon, the Secretary-General pointed out that at least Israel accepted the current UN role. UNIFIL's financial problems, however, continued. The Secretary-General handed over a background note on the financing of UNIFIL to President Aubert (copy attached).

On the issue of the Falkland/Malvinas islands, President Aubert indicated that he knew of no new developments, apart from the U.S. wish to assist with the fisheries issue. The Secretary-General agreed that there was little movement currently underway.

On U.N./Swiss relations, President Aubert referred to his Government's intention, through FIPOI (Fondation des Immeubles pour les Organisations Internationales), to construct a new office building for UNHCR and UN offices currently housed in Petit Saconnex. A working group had already been established. The Secretary-General expressed his appreciation. He mentioned two other issues of concern to the United Nations: the importance to the Organisation of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Swissair and the interest of UN parents in the future of the International School.

In conclusion, President Aubert extended an invitation for the Secretary-General to pay an official visit to Switzerland during the following year. The Secretary-General expressed his appreciation and his acceptance in principle.

M. Stopford
20 July 1987

FINANCING OF UNIFIL

The annual net cost of maintaining UNIFIL amounts to approximately \$143 million and provides for operational expenses as well as reimbursement for troop costs to the troop-contributing governments.

UNIFIL has always encountered difficulty in meeting its expenses, particularly as regards the reimbursement of troop costs at the full rate set by the General Assembly. This has been due to a shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account resulting from the non-payment of assessed contribution, in whole or in part, by certain Member States. The shortfall is estimated to reach \$281 million by the end of July 1987.

The top six Member States with outstanding amounts are:

Soviet Union (\$151.6 million), United States (\$41 million), China (\$19.6 million, Ukrainian SSR (\$16.3 million), German Democratic Republic (\$15.9 million), Poland (\$13.3 million).

The United States Administration in late 1985 informed the Secretariat that the United States Congress had decided to withhold 50 per cent of the United States assessed contribution during United States fiscal 1986. A similar amount has been withheld in fiscal 1987. In early 1987 the Administration sought from Congress a supplemental appropriation of \$21.6 million to make up part of the United States arrears for fiscal 1986 and 1987. The request was not approved. From the latest proceedings in Congress, it would appear that the withholding of the United States contribution will continue through fiscal 1988 and 1989.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union announced that in early 1986 it would begin to participate in the financing of UNIFIL and payments have been received for the mandates since April 1986. Payments have also been received from Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. These Member States have not however paid any of their arrears.

Before April 1986 UNIFIL was able to reimburse the troop-contributing governments at a rate of \$750 per person per month (as compared with the \$950 per person per month set by the General Assembly). It was not able to pay the additional allowances due to the contributing governments for specialists and for personal clothing, gear and equipment.

Since April 1986, as a result of the withholding by the United States, the reimbursement to the troop-contributing governments had to be reduced from \$750 to \$600 per person per month, in spite of the fact that the USSR and some of its allies had begun paying their assessed contributions.

7 July 1987

22.6.87

J. RIPERT

J. RIPERT

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Son Excellence, LE COLONEL DENIS SASSOU-NGUESSO
PRESIDENT DU COMITE CENTRAL DU PARTI CONGOLAIS DU TRAVAIL
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO
CHEF DE L'ETAT
PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL DES MINISTRES
PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
BRAZZAVILLE
LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO

J'AI ETE INFORME PAR DIRECTEUR GENERAL RIPERT DE SON ENTRETIEN
AVEC VOTRE EXCELLENCE. JE ME REJOUIS VOTRE INTENTION VENIR A GENEVE
POUR ADRESSER SEPTIEME CONFERENCE CRUCED 9/10 JUILLET PROCHAIN.
SERAI HEUREUX VOUS RENCONTRER A CETTE OCCASION. SERAIS HEUREUX VOUS
ACCEPTIEZ PRENDRE PART A DEJEUNER QUE J'OFFRIRAI 10 JUILLET EN
L'HONNEUR PRINCIPALES PERSONNALITES PRESENTES EN PARTICULIER
PRESIDENT MITTERAND, PRESIDENT MOJSOV, YUGOSLAVIE, PREMIER MINISTRE BRUNDTLAND,
NORVEGE A GENEVE CE JOUR LA ET CERTAINS MINISTRES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.
SECRETAIRE GENERAL CRUCED PROPOSE VOTRE INTERVENTION DEVANT CONFERENCE
POURRAIT PRENDRE PLACE VENDREDI 10 JUILLET APRES-MIDI, PRESIDENT MITTERAND
INTERVENANT AVANT DEJEUNER. JOURNEE 9 JUILLET IMPRATICABLE CAR RESERVEE
A CEREMONIE INAUGURALE. DEBAT COMMENCANT VENDREDI. VEUILLEZ ACCEPTER
ASSURANCE MA HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR
SECRETAIRE GENERAL
NATIONS UNIES

UNCTAD
*Dialogue + international policies
+ measures -*

BRIEFING NOTE ON UNCTAD VII FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(for Press Conference on 19 June 1987)

1. UNCTAD VII will take place at the Palais des Nations from 9-31 July 1987. The main theme of the Conference is "Revitalizing development, growth and international trade, in a more predictable and supportive environment, through multilateral co-operation". The areas identified for consideration under the theme are: (a) Resources for development; (b) Commodities; (c) International Trade; and (d) Problems of the Least Developed Countries.
2. This theme enables the Conference to address issues of concern to all groups of countries, including the problems caused by slow growth in the world economy and the specific policies and measures needed to give new vigour to the development process.
3. The Conference agenda reflects the varying concerns and approaches of different groups of countries. For example, it reflects interest: in justice and equity in international economic relations [Group of 77]; in security, dependability and confidence-building in the world economic environment [Group D]; and in the potential of the private sector to contribute to development [Group B]. It also provides for appropriate consideration of the national dimension of the development problematique, as well as for international policies and measures.
4. [The problem of slow growth] is at the centre of the hesitant economic performance of most countries in the 1980's. It is a problem which permeates the world economy through the mechanisms of interdependence. It obstructs the efforts of governments of developed and developing countries to adjust external imbalances, to effect desired structural changes, and to liberalize trade. It depresses primary commodity prices and makes it difficult for indebted countries to earn resources in order to service their debts.
5. [The scarcity of financial and human resources for development] is at present the most serious obstacle to a revitalized development process. Developing countries must mobilize all resources at their disposal and use them effectively. [On the financial side, international action is needed to enable developing countries to increase their export earnings, to tailor their

debt burden to their economic potential, and to provide adequate external support for their domestic efforts at policy reform.

6. All countries are responsible for improving the environment for accelerated development, through national and international action. The major developed market-economy countries, on account of their predominant economic weight, have the major responsibility for restoring non-inflationary growth to the world economy.

(7.) All countries have a common interest in a healthy, secure and equitable world economy, in which developing countries can accelerate their progress towards their own development objectives. This must be the aim of multilateral co-operation for development. UNCTAD VII can be an important step towards that aim.

8. Policy approaches and concrete measures on which a consensus may be worked out at UNCTAD VII could be followed up and implemented in other institutions as well as in UNCTAD. In this regard, Member States should take advantage of the universality of the Conference and the breadth of its concerns.

9. While action at UNCTAD VII will be taken within a global framework and will address many different aspects of the development problematique, it will surely touch upon issues of priority concern to the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa and could thus make a substantial contribution to achieving the objectives of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development.

** ** **

10. The attached note entitled "Some points of assessment for consideration" could be used to supplement the above points.

11. The following notes refer to some matters of detail which might be the subject of questions by correspondents.

(i) Inaugural Ceremony

This will take place on the afternoon of 9 July. Statements will be made by the Secretary-General and by the President of the Swiss

Confederation. The President of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mojsov, who was President of UNCTAD VI, will be in attendance.

(ii) Opening of the Conference

The Conference will be opened by President Mojsov, immediately after the Inaugural Ceremony. It is expected to elect as its President for its seventh session the Hon. B.T.G. Chidzero, Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development of Zimbabwe. Statements at the opening of the Conference will be made by President Mojsov, Mr. Chidzero and the Secretary-General of UNCTAD.

(iii) Addresses by Heads of State or Government

On Friday, 10 July, in the context of the opening of the General Debate, the Conference will be addressed by the President of France, Mr. Francois Mitterand, and the Prime Minister of Norway, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, in her capacity as Chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development. It is possible, though not yet confirmed, that the President of the Republic of Congo, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, will also address the Conference that day. Other Heads of State or Government may address the Conference later in its proceedings.

(iv) The Common Fund for Commodities

The entry into force of the Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities would be an event of high political importance, symbolizing the willingness of governments to co-operate in searching for solutions to the problems of the commodity economy. Less than 8% of the directly contributed capital of the Fund remains to be subscribed in order for the Agreement to enter into force */. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD has urged Member States who have not ratified the Agreement to do so at an early date, and to inform the Conference of steps they may have taken.

Annex.

*/ The USSR, whose share (with UKSSR and BSSR) amounts to 6.2%, is understood to be considering the question of ratification, and may inform the Conference of its definitive position. The combined share of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe (Group D) is about 10%. The USA, whose share amounts to 15.71%, has stated that it will not ratify.

Mr. Dadzie's visit to the USSR (CMEA), 26-28 May 1987
(Messrs. Krasnov and Zammit Cutajar in attendance)

1. CMEA Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Trade

The meeting was chaired by the USSR (Minister Aristov) and included Ministers or Deputy Ministers from Group D countries plus Cuba (Minister Cabrisas), Mongolia, Romania and Vietnam (list attached).

The Chairman presented a joint position on UNCTAD VII issues, which will be reflected in the Group D document to be tabled for UNCTAD VII. Ministers made brief statements, including some interesting nuances (e.g. insistence of some Group D countries on GATT disciplines; Romania NIEO-tendency; support for work on "TRADSOC" by Bulgaria; Polish concern with "global" solution to debt problem and for new money from creditor countries).

Mr. Dadzie was given the floor to conclude the tour de table. His remarks centred on:

- (a) the political opportunity of UNCTAD VII, inter alia, as an occasion to deepen and give content to the concept of international economic security;
- (b) the need to set a tone at UNCTAD VII which will help to revitalize the dialogue (NB. mutual interest in growth and development, equitably-shared responsibilities, respect for diversity);
- (c) organizational aspects of UNCTAD VII, including the pre-Conference assessment exercise;
- (d) issues and policy options in the four agenda areas including the following:

- on resources/LDCs:

possibility of Group D general policy statement on debt relief for LDCs and other low-income countries, as framework for bilateral action.

- on commodities:

- .. importance of harmonization of diversification programmes;
- .. commodity consultations to include petroleum, as part of a sustainable global energy policy;
- .. political significance of Group D ratification of Common Fund Agreement.

- on international trade:

- .. integration of inter-systems trade within overall trade problématique;
- .. consensus-building in support of Uruguay Round;

- .. need to reinforce GATT disciplines and to strengthen and adapt trading system (cf. "blueprint");
- .. need for national mechanisms on PSA in DMEs;
- .. co-operation in services;
- .. new impetus to intergovernmental and secretariat work on inter-systems trade (basic elements to be agreed at UNCTAD VII, also East-South multilateral consultations/negotiations and policy-oriented analysis of interdependence of East-West-South trade flows).

Mr. Dadzie met the Deputy Secretary of CMEA, Mr. Marinov, before the meeting. The meeting was followed by a luncheon including all delegation heads and deputy heads.

2. Meetings with USSR officials

Mr. Dadzie had meetings with:

- Deputy Prime Minister A.K. Antonov
- Mr. I.D. Ivanov, Deputy-Chairman of the USSR State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Mr. M.S. Pankine, Head of Section of the CPSU Central Committee
- Mr. E.E. Obminsky, Head of the Administration of International Economic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (+ Mr. G. Smirnov)
- Mr. V.N. Cheklin, Head, Department of International Economic Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Trade

Some points raised by the USSR side were:

- Support for mandate and role of UNCTAD, generally and with reference to international economic security.
- International economic security related to Brazilian 1960s concept of "collective economic security".
- UNCTAD VII should contribute to UN Conference on Disarmament and Development.
- USSR is still considering ratification of Common Fund, taking into account the political aspects, and will convey its decision before or during UNCTAD VII.
- USSR aims to join GATT and is adapting its trade mechanisms to enable it to participate in trade negotiations under GATT - this will take at least five years. New tariff will respect GSP.
- USSR aims to double the share of its trade with non-socialist developing countries.
- USSR is adjusting terms of commercial debt owed to it by developing countries.

- Stress on co-operation among enterprises in inter-system trade.

Some specific reactions by Mr. Dadzie (other than points also reflected in statement to CMEA Ministers) were:

- Secretariat ready to help assess implications for international trade of new policy trends in USSR and other Group D countries;
- Also ready to help elaborate concept and elements of international economic security;
- Strengthening of GATT disciplines would contribute to international economic security (cf. "blueprint").

mm

M. Zammit Cutajar
18 June 1987

C.C. Mr. K.K.S. Dadzie
Mr. A. McIntyre
Mr. Y. Berthelot
Directors/Chiefs of Programme
Mr. E. Adoboli
Mr. K. Kousari
Mr. C. Patel, NYO

Programme of meetings in Moscow
of Mr. K.K.S. Dadzie, Secretary-General of UNCTAD

Wednesday, 27 May

08.00 a.m. - Talks with Mr. A. Wojcik, Polish Minister of Foreign Trade.

09.00 a.m. - Talks with Mr. A.K. Antonov, Deputy-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

Other Soviet participants:

Messrs. V.L. Malkevich and V.N. Cheklin.

10.00 a.m. - Talks with Mr. M. Marinov, Deputy-Secretary of CMEA, Head of the CMEA delegation at UNCTAD VII.

Other Soviet participants:

Messrs. M.V. Utkin and A. Sarkissov.

11.00 a.m./
13.00 p.m. - Meeting with the Ministers of Foreign Trade of CMEA member countries and exchanges of views on the preparations for UNCTAD VII

Participants:

Mr. H. Hristov, Minister of Trade (Bulgaria)
Mr. P. Veress, Minister of Foreign Trade (Hungary)
Mr. Hoang Chong Dai, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade (Viet Nam)

Mr. K. Fenske, Secretary of State, First Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade (German Democratic Republic)

Mr. P. Cabrisas, Minister of Foreign Trade (Cuba)

Mr. Zh. Dulmaa, Minister of Foreign Trade (Mongolia)

Mr. A. Wojcik, Minister of Foreign Trade (Poland)

Mr. M. Andrej, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation (Romania)

Mr. B. Urban, Minister of Foreign Trade (Czechoslovakia)

Mr. B. I. Aristov, Minister of Foreign Trade (USSR)

Other Soviet participants:

Messrs. V.N. Cheklin, M.V. Utkin, N.V. Syomin,
A. Sarkissov (interpreter).

Thursday, 28 May

09.00 a.m.

- Talks with Mr. I.D. Ivanov, Deputy-Chairman of the USSR State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Mr. M. Pankine, Head of the Section of the CPSU Central Committee

Other Soviet participants:
Messrs. V.N. Cheklin and A. Sarkissov.

10.30 a.m.

- Talks with Mr. E.E. Obminsky, Head of the administration of international economic relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Other Soviet participants:
Messrs. V.N. Cheklin, M.V. Utkin and
A. Sarkissov.

Mr. Conable (President of WORLD BANK)
would like to have an appointment with
the Secretary-General on Tuesday,
9 July, in GENEVA, please.

Contacts in Geneva:

Mr. Wolfgang Siebeck (Res.Rep.)
or Mr. David Loos
tel. 33.21.20
(Sec. Barbara Webb)

Julienne Turner (36008)

Angeles
30-6-87

Note à l'intention de M. Giani Picco

Monsieur Guy-Olivier Segond, membre du Conseil administratif de Genève et prochain maire de Genève, aurait souhaité saluer le Secrétaire général. Il l'a manqué à la réception offerte par M. Martenson le 22 juin.

Pourrait-il avoir une entrevue de 10 minutes avec le Secrétaire général soit ce 23 juin soit le 9 juillet? L'objet serait notamment de lui parler de l'offre du Téléréseau de Genève de consacrer une chaîne aux Nations Unies.

Merci



Thérèse Gastaut

23 juin 1987

9 h

*Not possible
no time*

Note à l'intention de M. Giani Picco

Le Directeur de l'information de l'OMS m'a appelé pour demander si le Secrétaire général accepterait de donner une interview-vidéo pour le Bureau régional de l'OMS pour les Amériques sur les bienfaits de l'immunisation, notamment pour l'Amérique latine. L'interview se déroulera en espagnol pendant 30 minutes. L'OMS propose qu'il ait lieu à New York à une date entre le 1er juillet et le 7 juillet.

NO

Thérèse

Thérèse Gastaut

23 juin 1987

13h00

cc.: M. G. Levi

Future trip: Geneva

FP/pb

CC: SG

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Pomés

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URATIONS
GENEVA

STOPFORD FROM POMES. WISH DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO LETTER
I HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM RIBEIRO/VOLKOV OF UN STAFF
MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE EXPRESSING
DISAPPOINTMENT THEY COULD NOT OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH
SECGEN DURING HIS RECENT STAY IN GENEVA. THEY ARE NOW
ASKING FOR AN INTERVIEW WHEN SECGEN RETURNS TO GENEVA
FOR OPENING OF UNCTAD CONFERENCE. AS SECGEN SCHEDULE
WILL AS USUAL BE VERY TIGHT, WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR
ADVICE WHETHER HE SHOULD SEE THIS GROUP.

NNNN

F. Pomés, First Off., EOSG



MOUVEMENT POUR LE DESARMEMENT ET LA PAIX DES FONCTIONNAIRES DE L'ORGANISATION
DES NATIONS UNIES ET DES INSTITUTIONS QUI Y SONT RELIEES (MFDPU NU)

B. P. 106 - 1211 Genève 20 (Suisse)

UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES STAFF MOVEMENT
FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE (UN SMDP)

P.O.B. 106 - 1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Mme. Florence Pomés
Cabinet du Secrétaire Général
Nations Unies
Bureau 38028
New York, N.Y. 10017

Genève, 23 juin 1987

Chère Madame Pomés,

Vous aurez certainement reçu la copie du télex que nous avons envoyé à M. Pérez de Cuéllar lui demandant une brève interview pendant son séjour à Genève du 20 au 24 juin.

On vient de nous informer que, malheureusement, cette fois encore il n'a pas été possible de donner suite à notre demande du fait que le programme du Secrétaire général était trop chargé. Vous pouvez vous imaginer que nous sommes très déçus et pour cette raison nous nous permettons de vous écrire pour demander votre aide en ce qui concerne notre nouvelle demande pour obtenir quelques minutes du temps du Secrétaire général à l'occasion de son prochain séjour à Genève pour l'ouverture de la Conférence de la CNUCED le 3 juillet 1987. Nous sommes sûrs que vous comprendrez combien nous avons besoin des mots d'encouragement de la part du Secrétaire général après quatre ans d'activité difficile de notre Mouvement. Sans doute vous savez qu'il a été lancé en 1983, avec l'appui moral de Monsieur Pérez de Cuéllar, pour appuyer la Campagne mondiale pour le désarmement.

Certains d'être compris dans nos démarches et avec nos remerciements anticipés, nous vous prions d'agréer, Madame, nos salutations les meilleures.

Pour l'Exécutif,

J. Fraga Ribeiro
J. Fraga Ribeiro
Secrétaire

K.A. Volkov
K.A. Volkov
Vice-président



MOUVEMENT POUR LE DESARMEMENT ET LA PAIX DES FONCTIONNAIRES DE L'ORGANISATION
DES NATIONS UNIES ET DES INSTITUTIONS QUI Y SONT RELIEES (MFDP NU)

B. P. 106 - 1211 Genève 20 (Suisse)

UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES STAFF MOVEMENT
FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE (UN SMDP)

P.O.B. 106 - 1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Monsieur
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Secrétaire général
ONU
New York 10017, N.Y.

Genève, 23 juin 1987

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

Par un telex du 17 juin 1987 notre Exécutif vous a demandé un brief entretien à l'occasion de votre séjour à Genève, 20 - 24 juin. Or, nous avons été informés aujourd'hui de l'impossibilité de donner suite à notre démarche. Sachant que vous serez à Genève de nouveau pour l'ouverture de la CNUCED VII, nous nous permettons de vous prier instamment de nous concéder à cette occasion quelques minutes de votre temps.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, l'expression de nos sentiments très distingués.

Pour l'Exécutif,

J. Fraga Ribeiro
J. Fraga Ribeiro
Secrétaire

K.A. Volkov
K.A. Volkov
Vice-président

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17.6.1987

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

PERSONAL ATTENTION MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SECRETARY GENERAL COPY MR.
YASUSHI AKASHI COPY MS. FLORENCE POMES

AFTER FOUR YEARS OF ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF WORLD DISARMAMENT
CAMPAIGN, EXECUTIVE OF UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES STAFF
MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE, WHICH WAS LAUNCHED IN 1983 WITH
YOUR MOREL SUPPORT, WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE GRANTING OF A
SHORT INTERVIEW DURING YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO GENEVA IN JULY
RESPECTFULLY

MICHEL BACHELET, ERNA BENNETT, PATRICIA CHRISTENSEN, JOSEPHINA
FRAGA RIBEIRO, COLL HUNTER, SILVIA SALOMON, FELICITAS SHELLEY,
KONSTANTIN VOLKOV

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Pomés

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UNATIONS
GENEVA *

STOPFORD FROM POMES. YOU WILL RECALL EXCHANGE OF
CABLES I RECENTLY HAD WITH NEWMAN-BLACK OF UNICEF GENEVA
REGARDING PRESS RELEASE BY JACQUES FISHER, PRESIDENT OF
WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR ORPHANS AND ABANDONED CHILDREN,
COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO MARTENSON. ORIGINAL LETTER BY
FISHER TO SECGEN, DATED 26 MAY, REGARDING HIS PROPOSAL
TO HAVE 7 SEPTEMBER DESIGNATED AS INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR
DESTRUCTION OF ALL WAR TOYS BY CHILDREN WAS SENT TO
MARTENSON FOR APPROPRIATE REPLY. FISHER HAS NOW SENT AN
OTHER LETTER TO SECGEN, DATED 12 JUNE, WHICH DOES NOT
REFLECT CLARIFICATION GIVEN BY US, VIZ THAT SECGEN DID
NOT REPEAT NOT ENDORSE PROPOSAL SINCE DECISION
INTERNATIONAL DAYS REQUIRES CONSENSUS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
LETTER FURTHER REQUESTS BRIEF MEETING WITH SECGEN, IN
WHICH FISHER WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ALEXANDRE HAY, WHEN
SECGEN RETURNS TO GENEVA. NNNN

P. Pomés First Off., EOSG

29/06/87

Pomés

EOSG

3802

5032

SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD KINDLY CONTACT FISHER IN
ORDER ONE TO CLARIFY SEC GEN POSITION VIS-A-VIS PROPOSAL
AND TWO EXPLAIN THAT SEC GEN TIGHT SCHEDULE IN GENEVA
WILL NOT ALLOW MEETING. WOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR COPY
OF MARTENSON'S LETTER TO FISHER FOR OUR RECORDS.

NNNN



Dr. Jacques Fisher
President

**WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR ORPHANS
AND ABANDONED CHILDREN**

Rue Jean-Calvin 12 Tél. (022) 28 59 17 - Télex 421 187
1204 GENEVA (Switzerland)

RECEIVED

JUN 26 1987

K. L. ...

12 June 1987

Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar
Office of the Secretary-General
United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza
NEW YORK
NY 10017
USA

Dear Mr Secretary-General

Having just returned to Geneva, I would like to express my deepest gratitude for the warmth and for the encouragement you conveyed during our meeting in your office on 3rd June. Your enthusiasm for the project of symbolically burning the instruments of war at schools throughout the world on 7th September 1988 gives us renewed strength to carry it through to a successful conclusion.


The fact that you have permitted us to quote your enthusiastic endorsement of the plan is a cause for particular satisfaction.

We understand that you will be in Geneva towards the end of this month. Mr Alexandre Hay and myself, will be happy to have the opportunity of joining you for just a few minutes.

Until then, I remain,

Yours sincerely

Dr Jacques Fisher
PRESIDENT

UNITED NATIONS				NATIONS UNIES		TELEGRAPH		PAGE 1 OF 3	
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UNATIONS

MOST IMMEDIATE

GENEVA

FOR ULKUMEN COPY PICCO FROM DE SOTO: ATTACHED IS SEATING PLAN
FOR TOMORROW'S LUNCHEON, AS PROPOSED BY TEYMOUR.


(PLEASE SEND BY FACSIMILE)

NNNN

DO NOT TYPE
BEYOND THE
MARGINS -
SEE
INSTRUCTIONS
ON THE
REVERSE
SIDE
—
N'INSCRIVEZ
RIEN DANS
LES MARGES -
VOYEZ LES
INSTRUCTIONS.
AU VERSO

LAST LINE
OF TEXT /
DERNIERE
LIGNE DU
TEXTE
→

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Cleared by / Vise par	AUTHORIZED BY / AUTHORISE PAR	
	SIGNATURE: 	
	DATE:	
NAME AND TITLE (PLEASE TYPE) / NOM ET QUALITE (A DACTYLOGRAPHIER) Alvaro de Soto, Executive Asst. to SG		



POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE: UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE: UNATIONS NEWYORK

9 July 1987

REFERENCE

Dear Mr. De Soto:

Regarding the luncheon taking place in Geneva, here are a few points concerning the seating arrangement for your information:

1. We have followed the alphabetical order applied at the United Nations starting with ISRAEL because UNCTAD is a part of the United Nations and not a specialized agency. Therefore, that is why H.E. Mr. Mubarak is not placed on the left side of the Secretary-General.
2. H.E. Dr. Mageed is Deputy Prime Minister; he had to be placed higher than other Foreign Ministers.
3. Messrs. Dadzie and Ripert had to be placed after Foreign Ministers.
4. The countries represented by more than one cabinet minister had to make the sacrifice that the second minister be placed lower than the other.

Aly Teymour

Mr. Martenson
Director General UNOG

H.E. Mr. P-Souchlaty
Min. Commerce (Congo)

Card. Etchegaray
(Holy See)

H.E. Mr. Elleman-Jensen
MFA (Denmark)

H.E. Dr. Meneses
Min. of Finance (Venezuela)

H.E. Mr. Shearer
MFA - (Jamaica)

H.E. Col. NGUESSO
President - Congo

SECRETARY-GENERAL

H.E. Mr. MITTERAND
President - France

H.E. Mrs. Brundtland
PM - (Norway)

H.E. Mr. Haq
Min. of Comm. (Pakistan)

H.E. Mr. Moussa
Min. Plan & Econ (Congo)

H.E. Mr. Shankar
Min. Comm. (India)

Mr. Dadzie, S-G, UNCTAD

H.E. Mr. Pisani
Former Minister (France)

Mr. Ducret, Prés., Conseil
d'Etat, Geneva

H.E. Dr. Moustaffa
Min. Econ. (Egypt)

H.E. Mr. Blankart
(Switzerland)

H.E. Mr. Ruiz
Min. Trade (Cuba)

H.E. Mr. Wojcik
Min. Trade (Poland)

H.E. Dr. Mageed
DPM - (Egypt)

H.E. Mr. MOJSOV
President - Yugoslavia

H.E. Mr. CHIDZERO
Pres. of the Conf.

H.E. Mr. MUBARAK
President - Egypt

H.E. Mr. Martinez
MFA. - (Nicaragua)

H.E. Mr. Christov
Min. of Trade (Bulgaria)

H.E. Mr. Raimond
MFA - (France)

Mr. Ripert
Director-General

Mr. Haegi
Mayor

Mr. Berthelot
Deputy SG, UNCTAD

Future trip: Geneva

FP/pb

CC: SG ✓
M. Stopford

File:
Xref:
b/f : VD/AS/ID/GP/JPK

Le 1er juillet 1987

Chers Collègues,

Au nom et en l'absence du Secrétaire général qui est en déplacement à l'étranger, je tiens à vous remercier de votre lettre du 23 juin lui demandant s'il lui serait possible de vous rencontrer à Genève à l'occasion de l'ouverture de la Septième Conférence de la CNUCED.

Il est regrettable que l'emploi du temps du Secrétaire général, lors de son dernier séjour à Genève, ne lui ait pas permis de s'entretenir avec vous, comme vous en aviez exprimé le désir. Je crains cependant que lors de son prochain passage pour l'ouverture de la CNUCED la situation ne soit encore moins favorable car il ne restera à Genève qu'un jour et demi et son calendrier, comme vous pouvez aisément l'imaginer, est déjà extrêmement chargé. Dans ces circonstances, j'aimerais vous suggérer de solliciter un entretien avec M. Martenson. Comme vous le savez sans doute, M. Martenson tient le Secrétaire général au courant des activités de votre Mouvement et il ne manquera donc pas de porter à sa connaissance la teneur de votre entretien avec lui.

En espérant que cette solution d'attente vous conviendra, je vous prie de croire, chers Collègues, en l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Florence Pomés
Administratrice de 1ère classe

Madame J. Fraga Ribeiro, Secrétaire
Monsieur Konstantin A. Volkov, Vice-Président
Mouvement pour le désarmement et la paix
des fonctionnaires de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies et des institutions qui y
sont reliées (MEDP NU)
Genève



MOUVEMENT POUR LE DESARMEMENT ET LA PAIX DES FONDatrices DE L'ORGANISATION
DES NATIONS UNIES ET DES INSTITUTIONS QUI Y SONT RELIEES (MFDPU)

B. P. 106 - 1211 Genève 20 (Suisse)

UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES STAFF MOVEMENT
FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE (UN SMDP)

P.O.B. 106 - 1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

VED

Monsieur
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Secrétaire général
ONU
New York 10017, N.Y.

Genève, 23 juin 1987

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

Par un telex du 17 juin 1987 notre Exécutif vous a demandé un brief entretien à l'occasion de votre séjour à Genève, 20 - 24 juin. Or, nous avons été informés aujourd'hui de l'impossibilité de donner suite à notre démarche. Sachant que vous serez à Genève de nouveau pour l'ouverture de la CNUCED VII, nous nous permettons de vous prier instamment de nous concéder à cette occasion quelques minutes de votre temps.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, l'expression de nos sentiments très distingués.

Pour l'Exécutif,

J. Fraga Ribeiro
J. Fraga Ribeiro
Secrétaire

K.A. Volkov
K.A. Volkov
Vice-président

R7304

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. GENEVA (UNGVA) 30 1552

GVA02283 PONES (EOSG) FROM STOPFORD REFERENCE YOUR CABLE 29 JUNE CONCERNING UN STAFF MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE. WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT SECGEN RECEIVE THEM WHEN HE RETURNS TO GENEVA FOR OPENING OF UNCTAD. AS YOU POINT OUT, HIS SCHEDULE WILL BE VERY TIGHT AS HE WILL ONLY BE HERE FOR ONE AND A HALF DAYS AND THERE WILL NO DOUBT BE NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS WITH HEADS OF STATE, PRIME MINISTERS AND OTHER MINISTERS ATTENDING UNCTAD. SUGGEST THAT YOU MIGHT WISH TO REPLY ALONG THESE LINES, PROPOSING THAT THEY MEET WITH MR. MARTENSON INSTEAD FOR THE TIME BEING. REGARDS.

COL 02283 29

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NNNN

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TEXT
FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL
AS INSTRUCTED I HAVE MET WITH CO-ORDINATORS OF AFRICAN, ASIAN AND LATIN
AMERICAN GROUPS, WHO WERE IN EACH CASE ACCOMPANIED BY CROSS-SECTION OF
DELEGATIONS, AND CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING NEED FOR STRENGTHENED
SOLIDARITY IN GROUP OF 77, IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DIFFICULTIES WITHIN
THE GROUP AND YOUR APPRECIATION OF EFFORTS THUS FAR UNDERTAKEN IN THAT
REGARD. ALL CO-ORDINATORS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF YOUR CONCERN AND
ASKED ME TO REASSURE YOU OF THEIR CONTINUING READINESS TO WORK TOGETHER
IN FRAMEWORK OF COMMON POSITION DEFINED AT HAVANA MINISTERIAL MEETING. ALL
CONSIDERED THAT JOINT APPROACH EMBODIED IN HAVANA DOCUMENTS WAS FULLY
COMPATIBLE WITH MEASURES TAILORED TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS THOSE
OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OR MAJOR DEBTORS. THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT
IN SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY, MUTUAL BENEFIT WOULD BE GARNERED OVER TIME.
WARM REGARDS.
K.K.S. DADZIE

UNCTAD REGISTRY
1987-06-29 16 05

K.K.S. Dadzie/jj

K.K.S. Dadzie *KKW*

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Date 29 June 1987

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K.K.S. DADZIE