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with: Ambassador Goldberg**

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
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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR RELEASE AT 3:30 P.M., EDT  
JULY 30, 1965

Press Release 4610  
July 30, 1965

Following is the text of a letter on Viet-Nam from Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to the President of the Security Council:

"Dear Mr. President:

The President of the United States announced on July 28, 1965, certain steps being taken by my government to lend further assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam in resisting armed aggression.

At the same time the President reaffirmed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again invited all Members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about discussions in a negotiating forum. On July 29 the Secretary-General immediately sent a most welcome and appreciated reply, stating his determination to pursue his efforts to remove the dispute over Viet-Nam from the battle field to the negotiating table.

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace of Southeast Asia, has been kept informed of the policy of my government with respect to the dangerous course of events in that part of the world. For example, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, told the Council more than a year ago, on May 21, 1964:

'...the United States has no, repeat no, national military objective anywhere in Southeast Asia. United States policy for Southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.'

MORE

Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the United States Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes of Southeast Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva Accords of 1954. These efforts have included:

- Various approaches to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.
- Support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.
- Favorable reactions to proposals made by seventeen non-aligned nations, and later by the Government of India.
- Approval of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate peace talks.
- Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in Southeast Asia, including a UN mission of observers along the frontier between Viet-Nam and Cambodia, a UN mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Viet-Nam, and a UN invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.
- Major participation, directly and through the United Nations in economic and social development projects in Southeast Asia.
- A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.
- Repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least fifteen occasions in the past four-and-a-half years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in Southeast Asia by peaceful negotiations.

I am sure that the other Members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the regime in Hanoi, which, along with the Republic of Viet-Nam, is most directly involved in the conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council.

MORE

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations require us to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Viet-Nam. This responsibility -- to persist in the search for peace -- weighs especially upon the Members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and security affairs.

The purpose of this communication therefore is to reemphasize to the Members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in Southeast Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with Members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.

It is the hope of my government that the Members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in Southeast Asia.

I respectfully request that this communication be circulated to the Members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Arthur J. Goldberg"

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release No. 4731  
December 1, 1965

Transcript of a press conference held by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Representative to the United Nations.

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AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. If it is agreeable to you, we will proceed directly with questions.

Q Mr. Justice, would anything be gained by President Johnson appearing before this General Assembly and stating specifically what he would like the various members to do to try to help restore peace in Viet-Nam?

A You know, I have always hesitated to make announcements for the President who likes to make his own announcements.

And I think American policy at the United Nations, which the President heads as the head of our foreign policy, is being expressed here by the members of the American Delegation.

Of course, the President is always welcome by me and, I am sure, would be welcomed by the delegates.

But I believe that we are expressing his policy on Viet-Nam and on any other subject.

Q Are you saying there is no plan for him to come here before the Assembly?

A I cannot answer for the President. That question really ought to be put to him.

Q Have you any indication that Peking -- China would participate in the disarmament conference either at the preparatory level or in some other way?

A No, we have no such indication one way or the other.

Q They just said they will not, Justice.

A I saw a report from their foreign ministry. Whether that is their final position after they have approached and analyzed what

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this resolution means, I don't know. I did see the comment that just came over the wires.

Q You say in a hand-out I think most of us have, that you envisage a role for the United Nations in Viet-Nam after peace has been established. What sort of a role, as the guarantor of peace?

A I don't know what statement you have reference to, Mr. Middleton

Q "Constructive role in keeping the peace in Viet-Nam."

A The United Nations?

Q Yes.

A The United Nations. I misunderstood your question.

I would believe that one of the great efforts of the United Nations is, of course, to be available to the member states and to the world organization in any neutral objective effort to maintain peace in troubled situations where peace is agreed upon. And I would believe that the United Nations in Viet-Nam, and elsewhere, can play that constructive role.

This would, of course, depend upon agreement of all concerned because the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations, as distinguished from the enforcement provisions of the Charter, depend upon the consent of the countries concerned, governments concerned. For example, Cyprus would be a good example, where it is done by agreement. Kashmir was another good example. And this is what I have reference to.

Q Mr. Justice, in line with that, do you believe that the exemption of the permanent Security Council members from an obligation to pay peacekeeping costs at their discretion when imposed by the Assembly would have no effect on the rest of the countries' willingness to kick in?

A Well, we have believed throughout and still are of the same view that the very best solution to the peacekeeping problem is for all member states of the United Nations equally to share in all of the obligations of the United Nations. When I say "equally" I don't mean in the same amount; I mean equally to share the responsibility on a scaled schedule of assessments. That would be the best solution. We think that in principle that is the right solution.

That view, of course, was supported by a majority of the General Assembly, but it became apparent at this session that the General

Assembly was not willing to invoke the sanctions provided in the Charter. Therefore, we and the other delegations are trying to find a viable method of peacekeeping, taking into consideration the fact that some members of the United Nations -- a minority -- and some permanent members of the Security Council -- a minority -- do not share this point of view.

Q Mr. Justice, was there any indication in your speech last night that the United States is willing to go further than a preliminary conference which would include Communist China in a world disarmament conference?

A My speech last night was not intended to do anything but re-state the position that I stated before the First Committee of the General Assembly, and that is that we are ready to join in a preliminary planning group to which all the nuclear powers are invited and some other states which have nuclear capability to determine whether there is a sincere desire to plan a world disarmament conference that will not be a propaganda ploy but will edge the world on towards the disarmament that we all fervently hope for.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you have just reiterated now the willingness of the United States to sit in a preparatory committee on this world disarmament conference. What about the consultations to lead to the creation of such a committee? Has the United States got any idea about how to go about this very difficult --

A Yes, we do have ideas and we will discuss them here with our colleagues and we will discuss them further at Geneva.

The basic idea we have is a simple one: That there are two forms of a world disarmament conference. One is a working conference, adequately prepared, where constructive steps can be taken towards disarmament; and the other kind is a propaganda conference which is not so designed and so structured. And in that area we are prepared to talk here, in Geneva or anywhere with our colleagues to see that the proper type of disarmament conference could be convened.

Q Mr. Ambassador, in your speech which preceded the positive United States vote for this world disarmament conference idea, you said that all members of United Nations specialized agencies must be invited but a decision has to be made as to the rest. Would you perhaps be able to apply this to the issue of Germany, or of the two Germanys?

A Well, we have said that part of the problem is for all countries to consider the proper invitations to this world conference. And we  
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do not believe that it would be helpful for a preparatory committee or anybody else to create more problems than it would solve.

The desire would be to have a meeting that would be a constructive meeting and not to create additional political problems. When we deal with partitioned countries, we deal with many grave political problems which would exacerbate rather than move us on towards disarmament.

Q Sir, in the last six months, has the President ever had any response, officially or unofficially, to his appeal to the United Nations for help in getting the Viet-Nam situation to the negotiating table?

A We have had conversations on a number of occasions with the Secretary General of the United Nations to whom the first appeal was addressed. You will recall when I came down here we addressed two appeals. One, we invited the Secretary General to pursue his efforts in this area and, secondly, we filed a letter with the President of the Security Council, which we asked to be distributed as a Security Council document.

We have had conversations with the Secretary General. I have said repeatedly that I regard those conversations to be privileged conversations, unless he is willing to disclose their contents.

Q I meant had any of the member countries, sir, come up with any suggestions at all for you?

A We have had conversations with member countries since I have ✓  
down here on this subject. But, to be very candid and specific in what is implicit in your question, we have had no indications since I have been here from any member country, or from the Secretary General, that Hanoi is willing to sit down at Geneva or elsewhere and participate in unconditional negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Viet-Nam.

Q Mr. Justice, has anyone suggested in the course of these conversations that the atmosphere might change if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were halted?

A We have had discussions on this subject with member nations, and when we have queried the member nations as to whether there is willingness to enter into an equitable arrangement for a cease-fire that would call for a diminution of military activity on both sides, we get no response to that.

Q Mr. Justice, before you came here, did you know that the United States Government had rejected a peace feeler from Hanoi

transmitted by the Secretary General?

A I would say, first of all, I don't know that they did in those terms, in the terms that you meant.

Q But they did not accept it.

A We all heard what the Secretary of State said about that episode. I was not, of course, familiar with all of the past activities of our Government in this area. It would have taken more time than was available for me to research all of the records. I have, however, tried to inform myself of all that has happened, past and present.

Q Mr. Justice, do you see any breakthrough in the United States-Soviet Union position on the suspension of all nuclear tests?

A Well, of course, the General Assembly has voted a resolution and the Soviets have abstained in this area. We hope that the impact of the General Assembly resolution, which expresses the opinion of this world body, will have a constructive effect when we get to Geneva, resume in Geneva our discussion of this problem.

Q Mr. Justice, looking at the war itself, can you see these demonstrations and the statements by those two boys released yesterday, conditions of this kind complicating our prosecution of the war?

A No, I do not. I feel very emphatically that one of the strengths of the American system is that we are a free country and that the right to dissent exists. This is not a source of weakness to us in our Viet-Nameese conflict, nor in any aspect of American policy.

I recalled last night to the group in Washington what surely those of my generation among you remember, that the widespread Oxford oath matter in Great Britain which swept our American campuses and perhaps that was what Hitler did not understand, the basic vitality of British democracy and of our own. And later, of course, when we got into the conflict, the very boys who led that protest were our most valiant fighters in defense of freedom in the world.

And this is the same view I take of the Vietnamese protest. We are a free country. There is a right to dissent. Dissent is healthy. It is a sign of health. It is not the sign of dissension. There are differences of opinion. But the overwhelming body of American opinion supports the President's policies in Viet-Nam.

Q Do you go along with Secretary Rusk's suggestion, however, that the demonstrators might well address some of their appeals to North Viet-Nam?

A I saw that and, of course, we would always welcome constructive dissent, but we must live with all dissent whether it is constructive or not, because a free country has to live with all dissent.

Q Mr. Justice, do you detect any hardening of the Chinese Communist attitude in a general way in view of the fact that they have released several thousands of men to service this railroad which runs to Hanoi, thus freeing troops from Hanoi to go into the south?

A Well, it has been a matter steadily throughout this war that the Chinese have supported North Viet-Nam in many ways. And I do not interpret what you have said to be a hardening of the attitude, I interpret it to be a continuation of their support of the Hanoi regime.

Q Mr. Justice, when did you last discuss the Viet-Nam situation with the Secretary General?

A I think the last visit I had with him on this subject was about three weeks or four weeks ago.

Q Sir, have you been consulted by any of the officials at the White House about a possible Presidential visit to the United Nations before the end of the Assembly?

A I have not heard about such a possible visit.

Q Mr. Justice, are you going to vote for the revised French resolution in the Fifth Committee and have you reconciled yourself to postponing the solution of the financial crisis of the United Nations until next year, which is obviously the result of the French resolution?

A I indicated before the Fifth Committee in a statement that I made late yesterday afternoon that after the revisions which have been made in the French text we would support the French resolution, particularly in light of the statement made by Ambassador Seydoux in presenting the revised text.

I am not reconciled, nor does the text make it necessary to reconcile this position with the view that the financial crisis shall remain until the next Assembly because one of the revisions contemplates that the present balance sheet, which reflects the

present financial crisis shall be reported and distributed to the member states before the end of this Assembly.

Q Mr. Justice, in light of the Chinese rejection, assuming that it is a final statement, would you not say that the results of the vote on Chinese representation now are something of a setback for disarmament?

A Well, I would hope that we can proceed with sensible disarmament with or without Red Chinese participation. We have made great steps in this area in the past without their participation -- in the partial nuclear test ban treaty -- and I would hope that we would continue to make constructive steps in the field of disarmament.

Q Mr. Justice, in reply to a question on the world disarmament conference, you had some words to say about the divided countries. Could we interpret from that to mean that you are opposed to attending a conference where the two Germanys, North Korea, North Viet-Nam have been invited and, if so, considering that all these three are major military powers, how do you expect disarmament to have any significance without their participation?

A Well, I would first of all raise a question about what you call major military powers. And I would say this, that a world disarmament conference must take place in the posture of world political events, and it would not contribute to the cause of disarmament if under the guise of disarmament we precipitated other political crises which might cause greater problems. And I would think it would be broadly shared here at the United Nations that it is not the purpose of a disarmament conference to deal with political problems of very great and serious magnitude for all countries.

Q Mr. Justice, does acceptance of the French resolution probably mean that there will be a reconvened Assembly just on financing after Christmas?

A No, I don't think it does that -- with a sigh of relief.

Q On that same question, Mr. Ambassador, the tone of your statement in the Fifth Committee yesterday was very cordial to the French. I wonder whether that indicates some understanding on your part that France intends to make a contribution to the financial difficulties of the United Nations?

A I have no commitment from the French to make a contribution. I was cordial to the French. We welcome their initiative. We welcome the fact that Couve de Murville came to the General Assembly and indicated a great interest in the affairs of the United Nations. A long period had passed since that took place.

Very frankly, I was glad of an opportunity, providing we could get agreement on basic principles, to indicate that the United States does not, contrary to the views of some, automatically react against any initiatives that are taken by General De Gaulle or the French Government. Quite the contrary. We thought that this was a constructive proposal. We found in our French colleague here at the United Nations, acting on instructions from his government, a desire to accommodate their point of view to our point of view. And, I must say, this is not the first time since my experience at the United Nations. We found the French attitude in the debate on Kashmir to be a constructive attitude, and in several other matters that have appeared here at the General Assembly and before the Security Council.

Q Does this mean you have a suspicion they might pay up?

A I wouldn't ventilate my suspicions!

Q Justice Goldberg, I wish you would pursue the points you made earlier about contacts through others with Hanoi in this specific: Do you get the impression you are dealing with Hanoi itself or with Hanoi and Peking?

A First, I would like to elaborate, perhaps, to make myself clear. Continuously we will pursue any point of reference with respect to this matter. And there are many points of reference in this area. And there is much interest and concern throughout the world in this. And I have had numerous conversations on the subject.

I can only say that there is no doubt in my mind that Hanoi, the communist regime, maintains intimate points of contact with all elements in the communist world. That is Peiping; it is also the Soviet Union. And their attitudes reflect those points of reference.

When we have said, as I have said in the General Assembly and others have, too, that we don't hear a voice from Hanoi or Peiping, it is because there is a parallelism in the statements that are made from both, and that is that there is no willingness or desire to enter into constructive negotiations. That is the reference that I meant by my remarks.

Q Sir, in your remarks about the holding of the world disarmament conference, you suggested the establishment of a preliminary planning group restricted to the nuclear powers and a few more with nuclear capability. Since this excludes a number of pretty large countries with substantial military capacity, could you perhaps give us the reason why you wanted to exclude them from a world disarmament conference?

A We do not want to exclude them from participation. We said that the most logical group to prepare for a discussion would be the nuclear powers, since this is the most overwhelming form of armament that the world confronts, and we said that it would be advisable to invite others.

We did not restrict it to nations with nuclear capability. We said, obviously we would have to consider in a preparatory group not only those who possess nuclear weapons but also those who possess nuclear capability. That was not intended to exclude others. Obviously, however, if a preparatory meeting is to be of value, it cannot get to be so large that it is a world disarmament conference in itself.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you have referred to constructive negotiations. Would you specify what are the American objectives, political objectives to be reached in Viet-Nam?

A First of all, I want to make it very clear that when I said constructive negotiations, the only negotiations that are worthwhile are negotiations that are undertaken in a constructive spirit. I meant it in that way.

Now, we have said without conditions, which means that we are to negotiate their position, the four points, they are a subject of negotiation, we have not excluded those as a subject of negotiation. We do not agree with them. We have said that there must be also considered our own views, the views of the South Vietnamese Government, and all other views of participants in the negotiations.

Our objective has been a simple one. We believe that the people of South Viet-Nam have a right to carry out free from force and intimidation their own system of government, confirmed by principles of self-determination. And our objective is the objective of applying to the South Vietnamese the principles to which the United Nations repeatedly has passed resolutions, and that is that each group, each country has the right to determine its own destiny by principles of self-determination.

Q Would that mean something like a referendum or plebiscite or elections to be held in South Viet-Nam?

A Self-determination means that an appropriate method, under peaceful conditions, has to be devised to permit the people to affirm their views as to how the country shall be governed, by whom, and under principles where their consent is the important factor.

Q Sir, just what are the prospects for a change in American policy on the admission of Red China to the United Nations, and is



the United States under pressure from any of its allies to change its policy?

A We have had no pressure. We have taken the vote down here. We believe the position we took is a sound position. It is our position. It remains our position.

We, of course, are conscious of what took place down here. But we believe that again at the next General Assembly we will have a position and we see no reason in light of events, if they are accurately reported and I am sure they are from the report I had, which seems to be a foreign office statement, to change our view that I expressed that the Chinese were offering unacceptable conditions for consideration of their application.

Q Mr. Justice, in regard to your remark that you didn't see at the United Nations much support for bringing up the question of divided countries, wasn't this impression also created or borne out by the obvious disinterest of the communist speakers in the debate to bring up the question of divided countries?

A That is correct, because, after all, we have been the principal exponent of reunification, for example, of Germany and in Korea. And there is a disinclination. I have said that our views about disarmament are not to make political propaganda. Our views about disarmament are to try to proceed constructively towards disarmament and, therefore, we have felt that the divided countries' situation really should not enter into that area.

Q Thank you, Mr. Goldberg.

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release No. 4783  
January 10, 1966

The text of a letter from Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg,  
U. S. Representative to the United Nations, to Secretary  
General U Thant on Cambodia.

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Dear Mr. Secretary General:

The Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations recently requested the circulation of three statements from his government dated December 25, 26 and 28 concerning the situation along the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

I should like to recall to the members of the Security Council that on May 29, 1964, during the Council's consideration of the Cambodian Government's complaint, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson summarized my Government's policy toward Cambodia in these words:

"If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence -- and free from external alignment if they so choose -- then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way in peace and security."

Ambassador Stevenson added that Cambodia cannot be secure so long as the North Vietnamese Government continues to direct massive violence within the frontiers of Cambodia's neighbor, South Viet-Nam. The United States, he said, was prepared to discuss any practical and constructive steps to meet the problem of maintaining peace and order along the frontier between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

My Government's policy toward Cambodia and its people remains today as set forth by Mr. Stevenson in 1964. My Government remains ready to consider any constructive proposals to enable Cambodia to pursue its chosen path in peace.

His Excellency  
U Thant,  
Secretary General,  
United Nations.

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In this connection, the United States Government has noted with interest the proposal made by the Cambodian Chief of State that the International Control Commission assume an increased supervisory role in Cambodia. My Government sincerely hopes that this initiative on the part of Prince Norodom Sihanouk will be given close and careful attention by all countries concerned with peace and security in Southeast Asia and will lead to the development of effective measures to prevent any possible abuse of Cambodian territory.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated to all members as a Security Council document.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
APRIL 23, 1966

PRESS RELEASE NO. 4837  
APRIL 23, 1966

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in comment upon a press report quoting a Soviet informant as saying North Vietnam would be willing to enter peace negotiations with the United States if all bombing of North Vietnam is ended.

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The United States has received no such information as reported by news sources. Although we are in continuous contact with the USSR in Washington, Moscow, New York and elsewhere, no such position has been expressed to us, or to our knowledge, to any other diplomatic source.

The Soviet view as stated by Ambassador Fedorenko during the Security Council debate on inscription of Vietnam was that the United States must not only unilaterally stop any military action vis-a-vis North Vietnam but that we must also recognize and carry out all four points laid down by Hanoi, and he described the Communist front NLF as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. We have been given no reason to believe there has been any change in the thinking of Hanoi or Moscow.

The United States unilaterally suspended bombing of North Vietnam for 37 days in an effort to induce North Vietnam to negotiate. The result was a flat rejection by Hanoi and in fact a stiffening of its views. We have made it perfectly clear in our 14-point proposal that we would welcome unconditional negotiations and that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease fire might be the first order of business in any discussion or negotiation. To this date there has been no constructive response to these proposals which still stand.

\* \* \* \* \*

8/6/66

15 June 1966

According to the New York Times of 7 June, 1966, Ambassador Goldberg stated on 6 June in Washington that "the United States would be willing to have the International Control Commission observe the planned September elections for a Constituent Assembly in South Viet-Nam".

It would certainly not be possible for the I.C.C. to accept such a role without a change in its terms of reference that could only be authorized by the Geneva powers. However, had the United States confirmed officially this proposal it would have been a significant indication of support for a greater role for the Geneva machinery of control.

It has not been possible however to obtain an official text of Ambassador Goldberg's remarks from the United States Mission, although Ambassador Pedersen said that Vice President Humphrey made the same reference to I.C.C. in New York on 8 June.

The above remarks may not therefore have much significance, and, may simply suggest a great eagerness to have some sort of observation of the South Viet-Nam elections.

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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

PRESS BRIEFING BY ARTHUR GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES)

1 September 1966

Arthur Goldberg (United States) met with correspondents at 1:30 p.m. today. After reading out the text of the attached statement, he replied to questions. The replies, it was stressed, were for background only, not to be attributed to him personally, although the phrase "United States sources" could be used.

The first questioner said that the United States statement, which Mr. Goldberg had said was the statement of the United States Government, seemed to indicate a great deal of agreement with U Thant's views. Would the United States now accept U Thant's three points to bring the war in Viet-Nam to the conference table?

In reply, he said that the United States received any proposal by the Secretary-General with great seriousness. These proposals had always been spurned by Hanoi and Peking. The United States stood ready to discuss them in an affirmative, constructive manner if they were received similarly by the other side. Was United States acceptance of the three points conditional on their acceptance by Hanoi and Peking? To this, he said that every negotiation had to be two-sided. If there were indications of reciprocity by the other side, the United States would take steps to show that it was willing to bring about de-escalation. However, unilateral de-escalation would not bring an end to the war. There must be reciprocity, a mutual agreement to de-escalate.

Later, to another question about the three points and whether the United States considered that they had to be taken together, inasmuch as a cessation of bombing was listed first, Mr. Goldberg said that the United States wanted a cease-fire, it wanted a situation in which there would be no more bombing, no more violence, no more infiltration, no more terror, no more fighting. The basis for peace must be mutual de-escalation of the conflict. Bombing was only one aspect of the matter.

Another correspondent, referring subsequently to this same point, said that the atmosphere today for peace was "terrible". Would it not be beneficial if the United States accepted the three points? In reply, Mr. Goldberg said that there was nothing in U Thant's letter about the three points. He had addressed himself to U Thant's letter. The United States had repeatedly said that it wanted

(more)

peace in Viet-Nam, an honourable settlement, negotiations without conditions. The United States had learned from bitter experience that suspension of the bombing alone would not bring an end to the war. There had been a 37-day pause, and a briefer one before that, and the war had not come to an end. As the United States had stated previously, a cease-fire could be the first order of business without a formal agreement. Mutual de-escalation would not have to be announced officially. The United States respected the Secretary-General's comments and was ready to discuss them.

Later, a correspondent said that the Secretary-General apparently felt he could not do anything more about Viet-Nam. Otherwise, he would not be "abandoning his post". How much more determined co-operation was the United States prepared to give him if he stayed on? In reply, Mr. Goldberg said that he did not read U Thant's letter that way. The letter said that many considerations had led to his decision and that, basically, he felt that no one should serve for more than one term. He had had many discussions with the Secretary-General. The United States considered that the United Nations and its organs, including the Secretary-General, could play an important role in bringing about peace in Viet-Nam. This was "a meaningful statement."

Regarding the Secretary-General's decision, Mr. Goldberg, replying to questions, said that the United States supported U Thant for another full term, or for an extension for a shorter period. "We urge him to stay as long as he wants to stay." Would the United States participate in a movement to draft him? Mr. Goldberg said that he was ready to participate in any group appeal to the Secretary-General to stay on. Had his conversations with Mr. Fedorenko indicated that the Soviet representative was of like mind? In reply, he said it was his feeling that all members of the United Nations wanted U Thant to stay on. He had no reason to believe that this was not so. He hoped that his own views would be re-echoed by all.

To questions about a Security Council meeting, he said that the United States would be responsive to a meeting at any time. Obviously, the Council would have to meet. "We feel that U Thant ought to be asked to reconsider his decision." The United States regretted that decision, and understood the motivations which had led to it, but did not agree that one term was enough. At a Council meeting,

(more)

the United States would urge that he stay on.

Did the United States interpret U Thant's statement as leaving open the possibility that he would do so? Mr. Goldberg said he would not want to interpret the statement. This was U Thant's statement, and U Thant was an honest man, who meant what he said. "Now the job is up to us, not him. We want him to reconsider." Whether he would or not, Mr. Goldberg did not know.

To other questions, Mr. Goldberg said that he had not had any advance knowledge of the Secretary-General's decision. In their conversations, the Secretary-General had always said he was carefully reviewing the matter. The United States regarded him as "a great international emissary of peace" and had made no contingency planning, as it still hoped he could be persuaded to remain.

A correspondent noted U Thant's references to the fact that two of the major parties in Viet-Nam were not members of the United Nations. Did the United States think U Thant would stay on if this situation were changed? In reply, Mr. Goldberg said he did not agree with this assessment of U Thant's letter. The Secretary-General had referred also to other considerations and this was only one aspect.

A question was asked about U Thant's reference to "...relying on force and military means in a deceptive pursuit of peace". Did Mr. Goldberg regard this as implied criticism of United States policy? "Not at all," said Mr. Goldberg. It was acceptance by the Secretary-General of the fact that peace must be pursued by all sides with equal vigour and dedication. The United States was prepared to do everything it could to pursue peace, and agreed that force and military means were not the way. An honourable settlement should be pursued by negotiations. No, he did not regard this as criticism of the United States. "You judge, from recent statements, who is not willing to pursue peace," he said.

On other points, Mr. Goldberg said that the United States shared the concern of the Secretary-General about the danger of World War III. On universality of membership, the United States had not changed its position that Red China must adhere to United Nations principles, and thus far had not been seen to do so. The United Nations was not "a reform club". The views of the United States on a troika were unchanged, he told another questioner.

The press conference ended at 2:05 p.m.



19 Dec. 1966

SG:

From Ramses:

"As we agreed, my only comment on  
Goldberg's letter is

The Secretary-General has this matter  
under very close study.

I will check with you after lunch in case  
you wish to add anything, but for the time being  
I am just saying the above.

*Q*  
*19/12*

UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRESS RELEASE NO. 5035  
DECEMBER 19, 1966

Text of the Letter Delivered by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg  
to the Secretary General, December 19, 1966

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December 19, 1966

My dear Mr. Secretary General:

Two world leaders who command the respect of the entire international community have recently voiced the desire for a ceasefire in Vietnam. On December 8, Pope Paul VI noted the temporary Christmas truce arranged in Vietnam and beseeched all concerned to transform this temporary truce into a cessation of hostilities which would become the occasion for sincere negotiations. And you, Mr. Secretary General, expressed the sincere hope on the same day that the parties directly concerned would heed the Pope's appeal.

In the fourteen points my Government has put forward as elements of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, you will recall, the United States has explicitly stated: A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions. I herewith reaffirm our commitment to that proposal -- a proposal which is in keeping with the appeal of the Pope as endorsed by you. Our objective remains the end of all fighting, of all hostilities and of all violence in Vietnam -- and an honorable and lasting settlement there, for which, as we have repeatedly said, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 would be a satisfactory basis.

President Johnson has time and again stressed his desire for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Other United States leaders have spoken in a similar vein. In speaking before the General Assembly on behalf of my Government on September 22, I noted there are differences between our aims as to the basis for such a settlement and the stated position of North Vietnam. I went on to say that: "... no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion or negotiations". This holds equally true with regard to arrangements for a mutual cessation of hostilities.

MORE

We turn to you, therefore, with the hope and the request that you will take whatever steps you consider necessary to bring about the necessary discussions which could lead to such a cease-fire. I can assure you that the Government of the United States will cooperate fully with you in getting such discussions started promptly and in bringing them to a successful completion.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

His Excellency  
U Thant,  
Secretary General of the United Nations,  
New York

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THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS

December 19, 1966

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His Excellency  
U Thant,

Secretary General of the United Nations,  
New York.

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I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release No. 5043  
December 21, 1966

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States  
Representative to the United Nations.

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As is evidenced by my letter to the Secretary General of  
December 19th, the United States is prepared to take all  
appropriate steps to achieve a peaceful solution of the Vietnam  
problem.

We welcome the appeal of the President of the General  
Assembly and affirm strongly the unconditional willingness of  
the United States to seek a peaceful solution and to engage in  
discussions to this end.

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/7658  
30 December 1966

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 DECEMBER 1966 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED  
TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I have very carefully studied your letter to me dated 19 December 1966 on the subject of Viet-Nam.<sup>1/</sup> May I say how appreciative I am of your Government's request that I might take whatever steps I "consider necessary to bring about the necessary discussions which could lead to such a cease-fire", and especially of the assurance that "the Government of the United States will co-operate fully... in getting such discussions started promptly and in bringing them to a successful completion".

You are, of course, aware of my preoccupation with the question of Viet-Nam during the last three years. This preoccupation stems not merely from my recognition of the serious risk that the continuation of this war poses to international peace and security. To a very large extent it is influenced even more by my deep sympathy, and indeed anguish, over the untold suffering of the people of Viet-Nam who have known no peace for a generation, the tragic loss of lives on all sides, the increasing number of civilian casualties, the appalling destruction of property and the vast and mounting sums being spent on the prosecution of the war.

In this context may I also stress my strong feeling, publicly expressed more than once, that what is really at stake in Viet-Nam, unless an early end to the hostilities is brought about, is the independence, the identity and the survival of the country itself.

I have already referred to the serious risk to international peace and security that the continuance of the war in Viet-Nam poses. There is an ever present danger that the war in Viet-Nam may spread, and even spill over its

<sup>1/</sup> S/7641.



frontiers. Already the war has poisoned relations amongst States and has, as I said earlier, brought to a halt the great enterprise of co-operation and understanding between nations which had barely made a modest start in recent years.

This is how I see the over-all situation. It is a situation in which a powerful nation like the United States should take the initiative in the quest for peace and show an enlightened and humanitarian spirit. I believe that in the circumstances only action deliberately undertaken in such a spirit which, because of its power and position, the United States can afford to undertake, can halt the escalation and enlargement of this war, and thus bring about a turning of the tide towards peace.

Let me take this opportunity of reiterating my three-point programme, to which I still firmly adhere:

1. The cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam;
2. The scaling down of all military activities by all sides in South Viet-Nam;
3. The willingness to enter into discussions with those who are actually fighting.

I strongly believe that this three-point programme, of which the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam is the first and essential part, is necessary to create the possibility of fruitful discussions leading to a just and honourable settlement of the problem of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

I also wish to recall that in the course of the twenty-first session, in the debate of the General Assembly, the majority of the delegations have endorsed the three-point programme. Many more heads of delegations also specifically pleaded for the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It seems to me that this is a very clear indication of the public opinion of the world at large on this issue.

Leaders of religious faiths all over the world have also expressed their anxiety about the continuance and escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. Only a few days ago the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches expressed a similar concern.

/...

When His Holiness the Pope made his plea for an extended cease-fire, I endorsed it and I urged all parties to heed his appeal. In my statement of 2 December I said: "Is it too much to hope that what is made possible for just a couple of days by the occurrence of common holidays may soon prove feasible for a longer period by the new commitments that peace requires, so that an atmosphere may be created which is necessary for meaningful talks to be held in the quest for a peaceful solution?"<sup>2/</sup>

This is what I have in mind when I refer to the need for a humanitarian approach. If action in such a spirit could be undertaken, even without conditions, by the United States to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam, and if the New Year cease-fire could be extended by all the parties, I feel hopeful that thereafter some favourable developments may follow. I am reminded in this context that in 1954 negotiations for a peaceful settlement were conducted even without a formal cease-fire and while fighting was going on. Even though there may be sporadic breaches of the cease-fire on account of lack of control and communication, I believe that this would provide a welcome respite for private contacts and diplomatic explorations so that, in time, formal discussions can take place on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

I am writing this letter to you after long deliberation. I would like to close by assuring you and your Government that, in my personal and private capacity, I shall continue to exert my utmost efforts and to explore every avenue which may lead to a just, honourable and peaceful solution of the problem of Viet-Nam.

As your letter under reply was issued as a Security Council document, I am arranging for this reply also to be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) U THANT  
Secretary-General

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30 December 1966

My dear Ambassador,

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I have already referred to the serious risk to international peace and security that the continuance of the war in Viet Nam poses. There is an ever present danger that the war in Viet Nam may spread, and even spill over its frontiers.

His Excellency Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative of the United States  
of America to the United Nations  
799 United Nations Plaza  
New York, N. Y. 10017

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Leaders of religious faiths all over the world have also expressed their anxiety about the continuance and escalation of the war in Viet Nam. Only a few days ago the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches expressed a similar concern. [Earlier this month the General Assembly of the National Council of Churches, in the course of a statement adopted on 9 December, observed, "Our people and Government

must be open-minded to processes which might bring to bear the moral forces of the larger community of nations".

When his Holiness the Pope made his plea for an extended cease-fire, I endorsed it and I urged all parties to heed his appeal. In my statement of 2 December I said "Is it too much to hope that what is made possible for just a couple of days by the occurrence of common holidays may soon prove feasible for a longer period by the new commitments that peace requires, so that an atmosphere may be created which is necessary for meaningful talks to be held in the quest for a peaceful solution?"

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I am writing this letter to you after long deliberation. I would like to close by assuring you and your Government that, in my personal and private capacity, I shall continue to exert my utmost efforts and to explore every avenue which may lead to a just, honourable and peaceful solution of the problem of Viet Nam.

As your letter under reply was issued as a Security Council document, I am arranging for this reply also to be issued as a document of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant



THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS

31/12

December 31, 1966

My dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I appreciate your thoughtful reply to my letter of December 19 concerning Vietnam. The subject at issue -- peace in Vietnam -- is of such vital importance to my Government and to world peace that we have given your reply immediate attention and are sending you herewith our reply.

We share your deep concern about the development and effects of the conflict in Vietnam: the risk it poses to international peace, the ill effects upon relations between states, and -- more than anything else -- the tragic toll in death and destruction.

I can assure you without reservation that the pre-eminent desire of the United States Government is to bring all hostilities in Vietnam to a prompt and honorable end consistent with the United Nations Charter, which affirms for all peoples the right of self-determination, the right to decide their own destiny free of force.

We have carefully reflected on your ideas, expressed in your December 30 letter and on previous occasions, about the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. As you rightly point out, Mr. Secretary-General, our size and power impose special responsibilities upon us. And it is with these responsibilities in mind that I wish to assure you categorically that my Government is prepared to take the first step toward peace: specifically, we are ready to order a prior end to all bombing of North Vietnam the moment there is an assurance, private or otherwise, that there would be a reciprocal response toward peace from North Vietnam.

I am, thus, reaffirming herewith an offer made before the General Assembly -- on September 22 and again on October 18. We hope and trust that you will use every means at your disposal to determine what tangible response there would be from North Vietnam in the wake of such a prior step toward peace on our part.

While reaffirming our offer, I would also express our conviction that the goal which, I am sure, we both share -- an end to all fighting, to all hostilities, to all organized terror and violence -- cannot be attained by either appeals for or the exercise of restraint by only one side in the Vietnam conflict. We therefore welcome the idea in your letter that there be an extended cease-fire, which would obviously include a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as well as an end to all hostilities and organized violence in the south. We believe the temporary truces already arranged in Vietnam offer opportunities for initiatives in that direction -- though we cannot but regret that the other parties concerned have shown no interest so far in such a cease-fire.


We continue to believe that peace can come to Vietnam in one of two ways: through deeds, such as a mutual cessation or reduction of hostilities, or through discussions. We agree with you fully that the ultimate basis for a peaceful settlement could be the Geneva Accords. We are, however, entirely flexible in our approach to the discussions we have sought to promote, whether they be formal negotiations or informal contacts. In this connection we would be prepared, as President Johnson publicly stated this morning, to meet promptly with the Governments of North and South Vietnam as proposed by the United Kingdom on December 30. As my Government has stated before on many occasions, we are prepared to discuss all proposals and points which any interested party may wish to put forward. I am sure that your desire for a first step to bring about peace is accompanied by a strong interest on your part in what the subsequent step would be.

I would conclude, Mr. Secretary-General, by expressing our certainty that you -- as all men of good will -- agree it is the war in all its facets which must be

- 3 -

brought to an end. We are thus heartened -- and believe all who desire peace in Vietnam will share the feeling -- by your assurance that you will continue to exert your efforts and explore every avenue toward a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict.

Sincerely yours,

  
Arthur J. Goldberg

His Excellency  
U Thant,  
Secretary-General of the United Nations,  
New York



22 September 1967  
ALD/ksn

Notes on Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's discussion of Viet-Nam in his  
speech before the General Assembly on 21 September 1967

One may wonder whether new elements of rigidity have not appeared in Ambassador Goldberg's discussion of the Viet-Nam question in his speech before the General Assembly on 21 September 1967. Apparently as a result of the recent elections, some new clarifications are now made concerning the type of settlement which is being contemplated for South Viet-Nam. The legal situation which emerges has reduced the margin for manoeuvre: "free" elections having supposedly taken place, the United States is no longer at ease to speak of them and of the right of self-determination as part of a peaceful settlement.

A year ago, Ambassador Goldberg said, "We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination - to decide their own political destiny, free of force - that the United Nations Charter affirms for all." This year, a small nuance is introduced: "The people of South Viet-Nam should have the right to work out their own political future ... in accordance with the principle of self-determination."

Although it was already clear in the Manila communiqué of 25 October 1966 that, for the United States, a settlement involved the elimination in South Viet-Nam of "all military and subversive forces", it is now explained in detail that "only those forces under the control of the respective governments" will be maintained in North and South Viet-Nam. Other forces will have to be either withdrawn or demobilized. With the Liberation army thus removed, the only future left to the supporters of the National Liberation Front (called North Viet-Nam's "adherents") would be "an equal chance as first class citizens ... to participate peacefully in the political life of South Viet-Nam. "Appropriate assurances" on this matter could be "considered" in connexion with a political settlement. One may submit that, apart from this last "assurance", the terms thus offered to the Viet Cong are not really better than those they would get if they surrendered immediately.

While these views may have been implicit in Ambassador Goldberg's speech of last year, the generalities he used at that time may have left the impression of a certain flexibility. However, this year Ambassador Goldberg has added a new warning, namely that the fighting may end "without negotiations or an agreed settlement" because "one side will find the burden of war too exhausting and too costly". Since North Viet-Nam and the NLF SVN proclaim that they are ready to fight indefinitely, this warning has, in effect, been rejected in advance by them.

Against this background, the price asked of North Viet-Nam in exchange for cessation of the bombing is now expressed in more ambiguous terms than last year. On 22 September 1966, Ambassador Goldberg demanded "a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation"; this year, he spoke of "mutual military restraint", "the scaling down of the conflict with or without a formal cease-fire". There is, in addition, an obscure question directed to North Viet-Nam: "Does North Viet-Nam conceive that the cessation of bombing would or should lead to any other results than meaningful negotiations or discussions under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side?" This may be read as a challenge to North Viet-Nam's good faith, and yet the United States does not seem ready to risk taking the first step. Finally, in searching for guarantees that a cessation of the bombing would not be used to upset the military situation, the United States addresses itself to "governments supporting Hanoi", and asks them "what would they do or refrain from doing" if the United States ceased bombing? In strategic terms and in the perspective of an increased use by both sides of the most modern armaments that can only be made available by the USSR and the United States, it is understandable that this question appears legitimate from the United States point of view. It reflects the embarrassing situation in which the United States finds itself.

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Whether the United States and the USSR can or should discuss the new armaments introduced in the Viet-Nam war by them with or without a cessation of the bombing is a matter for speculation. As for North Viet-Nam itself, it can be expected to reject the new speech as firmly as previous ones. On

the question of a political settlement for South Viet-Nam, the positions of the two sides remain as distant as ever. While the United States denies the NFLSVN any representative character, the NFLSVN adheres to its claim of exclusive representative for South Viet-Nam - a claim which has been given a new emphasis in the recent platform of the NFLSVN.

2  
8/11

Response made by U. S. spokesman in press briefing, Friday, November 3, to question concerning Ambassador Goldberg's views on the possible participation of the NLF in a Security Council Meeting or a Geneva-type conference:

"I will confine my response to making clear exactly what Ambassador Goldberg said.

"First, in response to a question as to what our position would be on participation by the National Liberation Front in any Security Council consideration of the Vietnam question, he replied that Rule 39 of the Security Council provided for the representation of groups or even individuals. He noted that the NLF was not a government. If the issue arose, the United States Government would not stand in the way of an invitation to the NLF and other groups or individuals under this rule. He added that the United States vote would be available if this were necessary to provide for full discussion by the Security Council. All of his references in this respect were in terms of Rule 39 and Security Council consideration.

"Second, also in response to a question, Ambassador Goldberg noted that if a conference of the Geneva type were convened, the members of that conference could and would make the necessary decisions as to participation of the NLF and the form that that participation might take. He indicated that the United States Government would accept the judgment of the members of the conference.

"Third, Ambassador Goldberg made clear that both his responses were in the context of the basic United States Government position stated over a long period of time by the President, the Secretary of State, and others. This reference was of course primarily to the President's statement of July 28, 1965, that 'the Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides he wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all.'

"I have no further comment to add."

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Statement of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States  
Representative to the United Nations, before the Committee on  
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.,  
Thursday, November 2, 1967.

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Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate your invitation to appear before this Committee and give testimony on the important subject of the responsibility of the United Nations in the search for peace in Vietnam. This is the gravamen of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced by Senator Morse, and of Senate Resolution 180, introduced by Senator Mansfield and other Senators.

At the very outset let me say that I agree completely with the concept of the responsibility of the United Nations which underlies both resolutions.

In preparing my testimony I have taken note of Senator Morse's comment in the hearings before this Committee on October 26, referring to the Mansfield resolution: "I think it probably would be the most appropriate type of resolution to send to the President, for, after all, this ought to be a teamwork play."

It is my considered view as the United States Representative to the United Nations that the adoption of Senator Mansfield's resolution at this time will support the efforts I have been making at the United Nations at the direction of the President to enlist the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam.

UN Responsibility Under the Charter

Any analysis of the problem of UN involvement in Vietnam must start with the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, the United Nations and its members have a specific obligation to cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security. This obligation is clearly set forth in the provisions of the Charter, including specifically the following:

Article 1, paragraph 1, which states the first purpose of the United Nations as:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of

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justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

Article 2, paragraph 3, which includes among the principles binding upon all members the following:

"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Article 24, paragraph 1:

"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."

Article 25:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

And to these provisions should be added all of Chapters VI and VII which confer broad powers on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Moreover, it is obvious that these powers and obligations of the United Nations apply to the situation in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular.

In saying this I am mindful of the argument that is sometimes made, both in and out of the United Nations, that several of the principal parties - the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China - are not in the United Nations and that it is therefore not a suitable place to deal with the Vietnam question. The premise is, of course, a fact, but the conclusion is incorrect. The Charter explicitly provides for the responsibility and participation of non-members; for example:

Article 2, paragraph 6, provides: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."

And Article 32 provides in part that "any state which is not a member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute."

It is clear, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nations has a duty to act for peace in Vietnam, and that the involvement of

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non-members is no obstacle to such action. The question therefore arises: Why has such action not taken place?

I believe it would be useful to the Committee if I review briefly the record of our endeavors in the Security Council to obtain such action.

#### Cambodian Complaint, 1964

In May 1964 Cambodia brought to the Security Council a complaint over incidents on its border with South Vietnam. After extended debate the Council decided by a vote of 9 in favor (Bolivia, Brazil, China, France, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway, United Kingdom, United States), none against, and two abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the USSR) to send three of its members as a mission to the scene of the trouble. As the tally shows, the Soviet Union abstained on this step. Its representative contended that the existing machinery set up under the Geneva Agreements was sufficient and a Security Council mission was therefore "not justified".

Nevertheless, the mission was sent. Its recommendations included sending a group of United Nations observers to Cambodia. Both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Government supported this proposal. But at that point the Cambodian Government termed the proposal "unacceptable to Cambodia" and asked that its complaint "should be placed on file." The matter was thereupon dropped at the request of Cambodia, the original complainant.

#### Tonkin Gulf Incident

In August 1964 the United States took the initiative in requesting a Security Council meeting to consider the Tonkin Gulf incident. The Soviet Union proposed that North Vietnam be invited to take part in the discussion. The United States made no objection to such an invitation, but further proposed that South Vietnam also be invited. The President of the Council thereupon consulted with the members and reported to the Council that his consultations had resulted in agreement among the members on the participation of both North and South Vietnam in the proceedings. He made clear that under this agreement the North and South Vietnamese Government would both be welcome to give information to the Council either by taking part in the discussions or in such form as they might prefer. It should be added that the question of participation by Peking was not raised.

In response to this invitation, the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam replied to the Council in a long letter on August 15, giving his Government's side of the dispute and placing the South Vietnamese Permanent Observer to the United Nations at the Council's disposal.

The response from Hanoi was a flat rejection of the competence of the United Nations to deal with the matter at all. I quote from the North Vietnamese telegram to the President of the Security Council, dated August 19, 1964:

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"The consideration of the problem of the acts of war by the United States Government against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the problem of the United States war of aggression in South Vietnam lies within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and not of the Security Council;

"Should the Council take an illegal decision on the basis of the United States 'complaint', the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would regretfully find itself obliged to consider that decision null and void."

In view of this attitude of Hanoi, the members of the Council determined that it would be useless to proceed further.

#### Efforts in Summer 1965

On June 25, 1965, President Johnson invited members of the United Nations "to use all their influence individually and collectively to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war."

On my appointment as United States Representative in July 1965, in the spirit of this statement by the President and at his direction, I made the Vietnam question my first order of business. On July 30, I sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, summarizing previous United States efforts to open a path to peace in Vietnam and expressing our willingness "to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world." And I added in conclusion: "It is the hope of my Government that the members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in Southeast Asia."

I then initiated an intensive personal canvass of members of the Security Council, with a view to gaining their support for a move by the Council on Vietnam. This canvass disclosed a broad consensus among the members, regardless of their views on the substance of the Vietnam issue, that any effort to have the matter considered in the Council at that time would be unproductive.

#### Efforts in Connection with the 1965-66 Bombing Pause

In December 1965, as the Committee will recall, the United States suspended the bombing of North Vietnam, and accompanied this step with an intensive diplomatic effort for peace in Vietnam. The bombing pause lasted 37 days, during which, at the direction of the President, I went to Europe to consult with the heads of government of several countries. Upon my return, in January 1966, while the pause was still in effect, I again consulted with members of the Security Council to determine whether action by the Council would, in their view be appropriate and helpful in the cause of peace. My canvass disclosed a general view that a meeting of the Council at that point would jeopardize diplomatic efforts which were then under way.

These diplomatic efforts failed late in January, and the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed. On January 31, I requested a meeting of

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the Security Council on Vietnam. The Council convened the next day February 1. We laid before it a United States draft resolution, the text of which is as follows:

"The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Vietnam,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict in Vietnam,

Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Vietnam, to self-determination,

1. Calls for immediate discussions without preconditions at on date, among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia;

2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision;

3. Offers to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators;

4. Calls on all concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution."

The Security Council discussed the matter for two days, on February 1 and 2, 1966. The position of the Soviet Union with respect to United Nations competence to deal with the Vietnam conflict was stated by its representative, Ambassador Fedorenko, during the debate in these words:

"The Soviet delegation deems it essential to state that it objects to the convening of the Security Council for the discussion of the question of Vietnam and declares itself to be against the inclusion of the present item in the agenda of the Security Council."

And at a later point in the debate Ambassador Fedorenko went on to say:

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"I should like to quote a message stating the position of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. This organization today published a statement in reply to the decision of the United States of America to bring the problem of Vietnam to the Security Council. In that statement it is pointed out that the Security Council has no right to take any decisions on questions involving South Vietnam and that all resolutions of the Security Council on the question of Vietnam will be null and void as far as the National Liberation Front is concerned."

It is also pertinent to note the observations of the Representative of France, Ambassador Seydoux, on this question:

"My Government does not believe that the United Nations constitutes the proper framework for achieving a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict . . . . A debate before the Security Council might run the risk of resulting ultimately - as has happened in the past - only in a vain confrontation and in demonstrations of purely formal character."

I submit to the Committee the verbatim records of the three Council meetings which took place on those dates.

As the Committee knows, the inscription of an item on the agenda of the Security Council is, under the Council's rules, a procedural question. It is therefore not subject to the veto under Article 27 of the Charter, but can be accomplished by any nine affirmative votes. On the afternoon of February 2 we proceeded to a vote. The result was:

For inscription, 9: Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay

Opposed, 2: Bulgaria, Soviet Union

Abstentions, 4: France, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda

Let me point out that a number of the favorable votes on inscription were cast on the understanding that the Council would not proceed forthwith to consider the matter substantively, but that instead informal consultations would be held as to the future course of action. Only on this basis was it possible to obtain the necessary nine votes for inscription.

Accordingly, immediately after the vote the President of the Council, Ambassador Matsui of Japan, adjourned the Council with the consent of the members so that the agreed-upon consultations could be held. Intensive consultations were then held by Ambassador Matsui over the three weeks that followed. He summed up the results of these consultations in a letter to the members of the Council dated February 26. He reported that he had found differences of view among the members, principally on "the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Vietnam at this particular juncture." He added that these differences had "given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time."

Ambassador Matsui's entire letter is pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and I therefore submit it for your records, Mr. Chairman.

It is important to note also that the Soviet Union and Bulgaria refused throughout to join in the consultations which Ambassador Matsui held among the Council members. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Fedorenko, sent a letter to the President of the Council stating his "strong objections" to the letter of Ambassador Matsui and charging him with "steps which go beyond the limit of his competence and violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and established practice." A similar letter was also sent by the Bulgarian representative.

My own canvass, taken independently of that of Ambassador Matsui, confirmed his assessment that the members of the Council were generally unwilling to proceed with a substantive discussion despite the strong and express preference of the United States that we get on with the debate. Indeed, this unwillingness was found even among those members who had voted affirmatively on inscription in the hope that such a vote might sway the negative attitude of the Soviet Union and France.

#### Recent Efforts

Since that time, a year and a half ago, my associates and I at the United States Mission have periodically reviewed the possibility of renewed consideration of Vietnam by the Security Council. We made a particular point of this during the Tet bombing pause at the beginning of 1967. This also happened to be the time when several of the non-permanent seats on the Council changed hands, and we engaged in detailed consultations with the members just coming on the Council as well as with those remaining on the Council. But the results of this canvass were no more encouraging than those that had preceded it.

Then, as recently as September of this year, scarcely two months ago, at the request of the President I once again conducted an intensive canvass of the members of the Security Council. In these informal consultations we discussed the possibility of Council action either on the resolution we had offered in January 1966, or on a new formulation. This new draft was as follows:

"The Security Council,

Having considered the problem of Vietnam,

Deeply concerned at the situation in Vietnam and the threat it poses to international peace and security,

Believing in the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states,

Convinced that a solution to this problem is to be found through political and not military means, and that a peaceful solution should be found through negotiations,

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Considering, that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 constitute a workable basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

1. Reaffirms, on the basis of the Geneva Agreements, the following principles:

(a) That there should be a complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel throughout North and South Vietnam at an agreed upon date.

(b) That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North and South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective governments, and all other troops and armed personnel should be withdrawn or demobilized, and all other military bases abolished as quickly as possible and in accordance with an agreed time schedule, during which introductions of additional armed personnel should be prohibited.

(c) That the international frontiers of the states bordering on North and South Vietnam and the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam should be fully respected.

(d) That the question of reunification of Vietnam should be settled peacefully by the Vietnamese people in both North and South Vietnam, without any foreign interference.

(e) That there should be international supervision of the foregoing through such machinery as may be agreed upon.

2. Calls for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace in Southeast Asia based upon the principles of the Geneva Agreements."

I regret to report that this recent canvass shows a general unwillingness for the Security Council either to resume its consideration of the agenda item and draft resolution which we proposed in early 1966, or to consider this new draft, or to take any other action on the matter.

#### Attitudes of Hanoi, NLF and Peking to UN Involvement

It is relevant at this point to note the attitudes of Hanoi and Peking, as well as the National Liberation Front, toward United Nations involvement in the search for peace in Vietnam. All of these have made known their views on the subject many times. I shall cite only a few representative examples.

In late January 1966, the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry declared:

"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reaffirms once again that on the international plane, the consideration of the United States war acts in Vietnam falls within the competence of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and not the United Nations Security Council. Any resolution by the United Nations Security Council intervening in the Vietnam question will be null and void."

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In June 1966 the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said:

"The United Nations has absolutely no competence in the Vietnam problem. The fact that the Saigon puppet administration, at U.S. bidding, proposed that the United Nations send its observers to supervise the election farce in South Vietnam is completely illegal and runs counter to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and international law."

Then in September 1966, the Premier of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, said in a speech:

"On the occasion of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, they are trying again to use the United Nations as an instrument for their aggressive policy in Vietnam. But the United Nations has absolutely no right whatsoever to intervene in the Vietnam issue."

And recently, when I was conducting soundings in late August and early September of this year among members of the Security Council, and this fact became known, Hanoi's major daily, Nhan Dan, which reflects the official view, said:

"The United States ruling circles are actively trying to get the United Nations to interfere in the Vietnam problem on the occasion of the forthcoming 22nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. United States delegate to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg has met a number of representatives of various countries . . . .

"The Vietnamese people have many times clearly stated that the United Nations has no right whatsoever to interfere in Vietnam. The Vietnam question can only be settled on the basis of the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the five-point statement of the NFLSV."

The position of the National Liberation Front has been identical with that of Hanoi, as illustrated by the following statement by the central committee of the Front on February 2, 1966:

"The NFLSV is determined to expose before the public the United States imperialists' perfidious plot to hide behind the United Nations flag to accelerate the aggressive war in South Vietnam and the war of destruction against North Vietnam. The NFLSV solemnly declares: the United Nations has no right to make decisions concerning the affairs of the South Vietnamese people."

A similar attitude has been expressed by the Peking Government, as can be seen in the following examples.

In April 1965, the People's Daily in Peking ran an editorial which stated:

"The Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations. The 1954 Geneva agreements were reached outside the United Nations and the latter has no right whatsoever to interfere in the affairs

of Vietnam and Indochina. It is the duty of the countries participating in the Geneva conference to safeguard the Geneva agreements and no meddling by the United Nations is called for, nor will it be tolerated. This is the case today as it was in the past, and so will it remain in the future."

Then, on August 7, 1965 - just as I was holding my first consultations with members of the Security Council - the People's Daily said in an editorial:

"It is . . . . clear to everyone that the United Nations has no right whatever to meddle in the Vietnam question, nor can it solve the issue. The Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations."

We have many other statements from Peking to the same effect, including some of quite recent date.

### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, this is the record of the Administration's efforts to enlist the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, in the search for peace in Vietnam.

I must confess that the failure of these efforts has been my keenest disappointment and my greatest frustration during my service for our Government at the United Nations. But in spite of these rebuffs, I do not intend, as long as I occupy my present post, to diminish my efforts in this cause.

I repeat my conviction that the Mansfield resolution will support the efforts I am making at the United Nations at the President's direction. The resolution, as I understand it, is intended to express the sense of the Senate and appropriately leaves the timing and circumstances of action in the Security Council for Presidential determination.

For my part, I promise, in keeping with the spirit of that resolution, to persevere with all the resources at my command to the end that the Security Council may carry out its clear responsibilities under the Charter with respect to Vietnam. I shall do so in the conviction that if there is any contribution that diplomacy - in or out of the United Nations - can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none of us can in good conscience spare any effort or any labor to make that contribution - no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required. The admirable courage and perseverance of our men on the battlefield must be fully matched by our perseverance in seeking, through diplomacy, to find the common ground on which a fair and honorable political settlement can be built.

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*John*  
*8/11/67*

6 November 1967  
ALD/ksn

Note on Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg's statement and answers before the  
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, on  
2 November 1967

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The statement by Ambassador Goldberg on 2 November 1967 before the Committee on Foreign Relations is only an account of United States efforts to bring the question of Indochina before the Security Council from the time of the Cambodian complaint of 1964 up to a recent canvass of Security Council members in September 1967. While these efforts were known, the new draft resolution offered as an alternative to the draft already before the Council since February 1966 is now made public for the first time.

This new draft which, going beyond the cease-fire appeal contained in the previous one, deals with the substance of a settlement, confirms the evolution in the American position which has taken place in the past two years. While in 1965 (see, for example, President Johnson's speech of 29 July 1965: "We will always insist that the people of South Viet-Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in the South or throughout all Viet-Nam under international supervision ...") and until the Manila Conference of October 1966, the emphasis was placed on the right of self-determination for South Viet-Nam, the question of the political future of South Viet-Nam has been removed from the subjects to be discussed at a future conference. In the present draft, the right of free choice of the South Vietnamese is not even mentioned. On the other hand, it is explicitly reaffirmed that the United States troops will stay in South Viet-Nam as long as the Liberation Army has not been completely disarmed (see operative paragraph 1 (b) of the draft resolution: "There should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North and South Viet-Nam other than those under the control of the respective Governments, all other troops and armed personnel should be withdrawn or demobilized ..."). As a result of the emergence of a "legal" government in Saigon, it appears that a new rigidity is tinting the United States position. More and more, the Geneva Accords of 1954 are interpreted in the sense of a Korean settlement.

Against this background, it is submitted that what has been presented and commented upon as an easing of the Administration's stand on the subject of the NFLSVN's participation in future talks is more an apparent than a real concession. According to the American position, the Front would not be invited to participate in discussions concerning the future of South Viet-Nam but only in discussions concerning the disarming of its troops, leaving, in the end, its fate in the hands of the Government's forces. Such an offer is most unlikely to be attractive for a party which does not consider itself defeated and still claims to be the only legitimate voice for the people of South Viet-Nam.

Nevertheless, Ambassador Goldberg's answer to the question of NFLSVN participation is an interesting one. It is an indication of the desire of the President to make certain concessions to those among his advisers (or his critics) who would like the Administration to pursue a more liberal line in Viet-Nam. It has been reported that such discussions now centre on the advantages and disadvantages of a bombing pause. Even if such a pause were decided upon, it is difficult to see how, in the present conditions of distrust and rigidity, this could lead to a fruitful process of negotiation in the near future.