

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Gen. MacEoin
From : Mr. Bunche, New York
Date : 24 May 1961
No. : 3681

PRIORITY

SL

Re ONUC 2751 and our 3514.

United States has agreed to rotate the remaining Nigerians by air. However, because of type of aircraft available, USAF cannot use Entebbe as airfield of departure. U.N. aircraft should therefore, as suggested by you, lift remaining Nigerians from Goma to Leo for onward lift to Lagos by USAF. Four C-124 aircraft will take part in lift. Schedules as follows:

First aircraft ETD Leo 0415Z 29 May. ETA Lagos 0915Z 29 May ETD Lagos 1315Z 29 May, ETA Leo 1815Z 29 May ETD Leo for France 0915 30 May.

Second will follow with one hour interval.

Third aircraft ETD Leo 0615Z 29 May ETA Lagos 1115Z 29 May ETD Lagos for France 0215Z 30 May.

Fourth aircraft will follow aircraft Three with an hour interval.

Call Sign is New Tape.

Please keep us informed about progress of Nigerian rotation.

cc: Mr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SL

To : Gen. MacEoin, Gen. Rikhye
From : Secretary-General, New York
Date : 24 May 1961
No. : 3678

PRIORITY

Following message received from President of Ghana. Rikhye should undertake suggested further talks with Michel. Text reads:

"I take note of the contents of your message transmitted to me through Quaison-Sackey. Colonel Breese, the acting Brigade Commander in Luluabourg, has recently visited Leopoldville to discuss the reduction of the Ghana contingent.

I believe that a satisfactory arrangement has been reached but suggest General Rikhye, whom I know is shortly visiting the Congo, should have further discussions with Brigadier Michel if he thinks this necessary. Michel left for the Congo on 20th May. Am afraid that there is no question that the size of my contingent will have to be reduced over the next two months, but will accept adjustments to timings of withdrawals if these make the task of United Nations any easier.

I take note of your other observations and thank you for your assurances on the first two points. On the last point, I will get Michel to study the directives carefully as also will my Chief of Defense staff when he next visits the Congo."

Dist.: Gen. Rikhye
cc : Mr. S. Linner

M. Fabry
Col Egge

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ETATPRIORITE)

TO : MR. LINNER *SL*
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 24 May 61
NO : 3668

A-1315

Commission of investigation on Lumumba desires Russell-Cargill remain available for interrogation by commission in Leopoldville. Date of commission's arrival uncertain since commission has received no reply to its ~~sk~~ May 12 Letter to Kasavubu. If Russell-Cargill declines to agree to await commission's arrival, commission will send questionnaire with request that Kanakarathne conduct interrogation on basis of commission's questionnaire.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : ROSSBOROUGH
FROM : MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 24 MAY 1961
NUMBER 3663

82

Your ONUC 2903

Angola refugees . Agree you may supply food from relief stocks but in view of our responsibility to donors as trustees these supplies should be made as a loan not a gift.

Since, according to your ONUC 2829 paragraph 6, you are unable to supervise distribution, supplies should be handed over to responsible agencies who will assure feeding of right people.

cc : Linner

copy to Mr. Rossborough

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER *h*
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 23 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3662

Reference A-1264 and third letter from Bomboko addressed to
Special Representative quoted therein. Presume you will obtain
Dumontet's comments thereon and reply on basis of those comments to
ministry of Foreign Affairs. Please send us text of such reply in
due course.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : AHMED
FROM : VAUGHAN
DATE : 23 May 1961
NUMBER : 3661

82

ONUC-2957

For your information following unsigned letter received by
Secretary-General dated 15 May :

"Nous venons très respectueusement par la présente vous
signaler ce qui suit. Monsieur le salaire qui nous a été donné
n'est pas suffisant. Nous vous demandons respectueusement de nous
donner un salaire suffisant. Nous vous prions de bien vouloir
accepter notre demande. Dans l'attente de votre réponse, nous vous saluons
d'avance; nous espérons recevoir votre réponse avant 10 jours, sinon,
nous prendrons les mesures conséquence . Les chauffeurs bien vous aime,
ONUC Léopoldville. Le salaire des 3.470 frs, n'est pas suffisant
pour nous."

cc : Linner

N.Y. 3647

ONUC-2948

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 23 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3641

SL

Reur A-1291.

I agree with your suggestion and would expect that personalities involved would indeed use their influence to keep matters in as low a key as possible. I am sure that you have talked to Kasa-Vubu in the same vein when you met him.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Mr. Linner, Esq.
From : Secretary General, New York.
Date : 23 May 1961.
No. : 3640

Reur A-1289 and A-1290. I have noted content of A-1289 with greatest regret. I entirely agree with your approach contained in A-1290 and hope that you will discuss this matter urgently with Kasavubu who should request you to arrange immediately for a panel of three doctors of the ICRC. With the approval of Kasavubu, the senior ICRC representative in the Congo should be approached by you in order to proceed with greatest speed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER MACEOIN
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 23 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3636

52

Your A-1287 regarding rotation of Ethiopian contingent. We agree that it is most desirable that the Ethiopian contingent in Coq be repatriated on 24 as part of present US airlift. This is necessary not only from the point of view of using USAF airlift and morale of contingent in coq, but also from point of view of meeting legitimate wishes, repeatedly expressed to us, of the Ethiopian Ambassador here. In view of the decisions conveyed to you in our 3612 and 3613 I hope you will be able to take up at your meeting with Kasa-Vubu tomorrow the proposal to fly out the Ethiopian contingent at present in Coq as planned and fly in an equal number by way of replacement . You should press for this and then give instructions on spot for rotation to proceed on replacement basis. Please report in due course final outcome.

This arrangement about replacement of an equal number of Ethiopians in Coq is of course purely temporary and is being agreed to without prejudice to the stationing of a full Ethiopian battalion in coq at earliest practicable date .

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 22 MAI 1961
NUMBER : 3635

Reur A-1273.

The following letter should be transmitted by Poujoulat to Kasavubu:

" J'ai l'honneur de me référer à votre lettre du 17 Mai 1961 (Ref 12/48 CAB/COO) par laquelle vous faites état de certains chargements d'armes qui devraient être ultérieurement acheminés vers Stanleyville. Vous citez à cet égard le texte de la résolution 1600 (.V) du 15 Avril 1961 qui " estime indispensable que les mesures nécessaires et efficaces soient immédiatement prises par le Secrétaire-Général pour empêcher les envois d'armes de matériel et des fournitures militaires au Congo si ce n'est en conformité avec les résolutions des Nations Unies." Je suis entièrement d'accord avec vous sur l'applicabilité de ces dispositions au cas où les informations que vous avez recues se confirmeraient. Je tiens à porter à votre connaissance qu'en application de cette résolution, toutes les Unités des Nations Unies au Congo ont reçu pour instruction d'observer si la résolution en question est effectivement appliquée et de faire immédiatement rapport sur tout manquement qui pourrait avoir lieu en un point quelconque du territoire de la République. Vous ne manquerez pas néanmoins de penser avec moi que la résolution que vous citez s'applique à tout l'ensemble du territoire Congolais et non seulement à une partie quelconque du Congo.

Haute considération ".

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 23 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3634

Your A-1282.

Dumontet may be permitted to leave on 27 May and Fabry may relieve him and hold charge ad interim. If Kanakaratne returns in time he may be associated with Fabry in discussions with Foreign Office regarding status agreement. Otherwise for few days Gardiner may have to attend to this also. Dumontet's successor should be in position by end first week June or thereabouts. Arrangements for his being introduced on arrival to local authorities are noted. Perhaps if Dumontet's home leave plans are known it may be possible for his successor to meet him en route and be fully briefed.

2. Osorio-Tafall definitely not proceeding Congo. We hope to have suitable replacements for Gilpin and others as they fall due.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER MACEOIN
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 23 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3633

SL

Your A-1284. We feel that proposals in your A-803 of 26 March specially paragraphs 1 and 2, form a satisfactory basis for training of officer cadre which is now especially urgent in respect of North Katanga Gendarmerie. You should therefore consider possibility of establishing an emergency training scheme at a place most acceptable to Leo, Elisabethville and Stanleyville authorities, without prejudice to more comprehensive scheme of reorganisation of ANC. In prevailing atmosphere in Congo, it seems to us that Kamina would be best. You should therefore consider the question of starting consultations with all concerned including Lundula and Munungo.

Please bear in mind the fact that our efforts to find a Swedish General to prepare country-wide plan for reorganization of armed forces have not met with success. You may give serious thought to finding a suitable officer for this purpose from units under your command or if that proves impossible, to suggest new names

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Mr. Linner. *SL*
From : Secretary General.
Date : 23 May 61.
No. : 3632

Your A-1283 agreed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. Linner *EL*
From : Sec-Gen
Date : 23 May 1961
No. : 3631

1. Reur A-1275 Fabri may begin preliminary discussions but it is essential to hold firm on all matters of principle cma though stating as to details not affecting principles that he will report in full to HQs. ONUC obviously cannot operate with legal status less than that considered necessary for UNEF, nor would Secretary-General have authority to accept terms less favourable than any which General Assembly, as exemplified in convention, deemed necessary in application of Charter article 105.

2. Reur para 2 A failure to exempt immigration restriction would conflict with mandate provision for exclusive UN decision on composition of military elements to be sent to country as stated in first report of Secretary-General to Security Council.

3. Similarly retention of criminal jurisdiction by states contributing troops is an essential principle as indicated in para 163 of A-3943 summary study of UNEF. Pursuant to Secretary-General statement at 873rd meeting of Security Council the concluding principles in this study became basic document on interpretation of ONUC mandate. Obviously, maintenance of this principle is a fortiori required in country which lacks judiciary.

4. As cited in para 2 above basic mandate already states manner in which Secretary-General takes fully into account best government views on composition. There is no objection to restating this point in the agreement provided the provision strictly conforms to the mandate language approved by Security Council. As to designating special representative, however, provision for most government advice in bilateral agreement would endanger principle of charter article 101 and cannot be included.

(Continuation of No.3631)

5. Freedom of movement accorded by basic agreement on 27 July was absolute, as required in mandate, and should not now be cut back. Moreover, restriction on national security grounds would contradict basic law and order purposes of ONUC and introduce unilateral powers over its presence.

6. Likewise our draft para 9 in no way qualified congolese sovereignty but its elimination would hinder force in maintaining law and order.

7. Many details in your para 3 will bear further discussion though most seem less suitable for freezing into this text than for working out through later understandings in application of this agreement. Thus foreign ministry is our traditional formal channel but agreement cannot properly cut off direct military liaison or consultants ministerial contacts. Some points concerning flag procedures may also merit discussion but your ^{reference} indicates probable conflict with flag code. Moreover, it is clear that in quasi-military operations UN troops must be authorized to fly UN flag in many circumstances congolese draft would seem to exclude.

8. Reur para 5 agree draft para 36 should now say "Subject to resolutions of Security Council and General Assembly". Would likewise make 37 b read " UN may not have recourse to force except in the last resort and within the restrictions imposed by its mandate and the resolution of the Security Council and General Assembly".

INCOMING CODE

To : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 23 May 1961
No : 3630

Continuation of 3629.

"Mr. President,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your three letters dated 13 May 1961, which were conveyed to me by my Acting Special Representative in the Congo. In these letters you request

(1) that the United Nations should undertake to disarm Congolese troops under the command of foreign military personnel or of mercenaries, and prevent the dispersal of such troops, so as to avoid the creation of armed bands that would endanger security;

(2) that the United Nations disarm illegal armed groups with a view to preventing the danger of civil war or other disturbances;

(3) that the United Nations should clarify the distinction to be drawn between the Chief of State's authority (pouvoir) in maintaining public order and security, and activities that may be considered as falling within the realm of civil war.

You are of course aware that United Nations action in the Congo must remain strictly within the limits of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The position which the United Nations has taken throughout its consideration of the Congo problem is stated in General Assembly resolution 1600 (XV) which 'calls upon the Congolese authorities concerned to desist from attempting a military solution of their problems and to resolve them by peaceful means'. The resolution indicates that the solution of the important problems which you raise should chiefly be sought by way of political reconciliation, a task to which the United Nations Operation in the Congo is fundamentally dedicated. It may be anticipated, moreover, that once such an approach has come to fruition, the problems raised by the

existence of what you call rebel units or dissident groups will largely fall away of their own accord.

It is the obligation of ONUC, under paragraph A-1 of the resolution of 21 February 1961, to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. Therefore it is obviously the task of the United Nations to ensure that controversies between authorities in the various parts of the Congo do not grow into civil war. Any military initiative being in contradiction to the stand taken by the United Nations would have to be resisted by UN forces in the Congo.

Under paragraph A-2, the United Nations responsibilities relate to the 'immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries.' United Nations action in this regard is likewise covered by the agreement of general principles between the President of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 17 April 1961, under which the United Nations is bound and has agreed to render full assistance to the President of the Republic in implementing paragraphs A-2 and B-2 which of course are mandatory throughout the territory of the Republic.

Under paragraph B-2, the United Nations has responsibilities with regard to Congolese armed units and personnel which 'should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo'.

I note in this connexion your letter of 5 March and your message of 3 May 1961. The former, in particular, specifies your position that while 'the reorganization must embrace the entire country', and while 'the Government is prepared to initiate the operation at once in the units under General Mobutu's command', this, in your words, 'is subject to the

condition that a satisfactory agreement is reached on the matter with the military leaders at Stanleyville, Bakwanga and Elisabethville¹. I can only endorse the clear acknowledgement contained in your letter of 5 March that the United Nations Force cannot, for purposes of reorganization, be expected to subdue organized armed forces regarded as dissident by any authorities in the Congo.

In conclusion, I wish to express the hope that Parliament will be called into session at an early date and that the problems of the Congo will thereby be solved by democratic means and without any further recourse to actions which are likely to lead to bloodshed."

INCOMING CODE

To : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE *h*

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 23 May 1961

No : 3629

Please transmit soonest following to Kasa-Vubu from me in reply to his three letters of 13 May 1961. French and English texts follow:

"Le 22 mai 1961

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de vos trois lettres du 13 mai 1961, qui m'ont été transmises par mon Représentant spécial par intérim au Congo. Dans ces lettres, vous demandez:

- 1) que l'ONU entreprenne de désarmer les troupes congolaises commandées par du personnel militaire étranger ou des mercenaires et de les mettre dans l'impossibilité de se disperser, de façon à éviter la création de bandes armées qui mettraient en danger la sécurité;
- 2) que l'ONU désarme les groupes armés illégaux en vue d'empêcher le danger de guerre civile ou d'autres troubles;
- 3) que l'ONU précise la distinction à faire entre les pouvoirs que possède le Chef de l'Etat pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publics et les activités qui peuvent être considérées comme tombant dans le domaine de la guerre civile.

Vous savez, bien entendu, que l'action de l'ONU au Congo doit demeurer strictement dans les limites des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale. La position que l'ONU a constamment adoptée à propos du problème du Congo est énoncée dans la résolution 1600 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale, qui 'prie les autorités congolaises intéressées de renoncer à chercher une solution militaire à leurs problèmes et de résoudre ces problèmes par des moyens pacifiques". La résolution indique que la solution des problèmes importants que vous évoquez doit être recherchée

principalement par le moyen d'une réconciliation politique, tâche qui est l'objet essentiel de l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo. De plus, on peut prévoir qu'une fois que cette conception aura donné ses fruits, les problèmes soulevés par l'existence de ce que vous appelez les unités rebelles ou les groupes dissidents se trouveront, dans une large mesure, résolus d'eux-mêmes.

Aux termes du paragraphe A-1 de la résolution du 21 février 1961, l'ONUC est tenue de prendre immédiatement toutes mesures appropriées pour empêcher le déclenchement d'une guerre civile au Congo, notamment des dispositions concernant des cessez-le-feu, la cessation de toutes opérations militaires, la prévention de combats et le recours à la force, si besoin est, en dernier ressort. Il appartient donc à l'ONU d'assurer que les controverses entre les autorités des différentes parties du Congo ne se transforment en guerre civile. Les troupes de l'ONU au Congo devraient résister à toute initiative militaire qui serait contraire à la position prise par les Nations Unies.

Aux termes du paragraphe A-2, les responsabilités de l'ONU concernent le 'retrait et l'évacuation immédiate du Congo de tous les personnels militaire et paramilitaire et conseillers politiques belges et d'autres nationalités ne relevant pas du Commandement des Nations Unies, ainsi que des mercenaires'. A cet égard, l'action de l'ONU est également régie par l'accord de principe général entre le Président de la République du Congo et le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, en date du 17 avril 1961, aux termes duquel l'ONU est convenue d'accorder toute assistance au Président de la République dans l'application des paragraphes A-2 et B-2, qui, bien entendu, ont force obligatoire sur tout le territoire de la République.

Aux termes du paragraphe B-2, l'ONU a des responsabilités concernant les unités et le personnel armés congolais, qui doivent être 'réorganisés et soumis à une discipline et à un contrôle,... des dispositions étant prises sur des bases impartiales et équitables à cette fin et en vue d'éliminer toute possibilité d'ingérence de ces unités et de ce personnel dans la vie politique du Congo'.

Je prends note, à ce sujet, de votre lettre du 5 mars et de votre message du 3 mai 1961. Dans votre lettre du 5 mars, en particulier, vous spécifiez que si 'la réorganisation doit s'étendre à tout le pays' et si 'le Gouvernement est prêt à faire commencer l'opération immédiatement dans les unités qui dépendent du Commandement du Général Mobutu', ceci, selon vos propres termes, 'est à la condition qu'un accord suffisant soit intervenu à ce sujet avec les chefs militaires de Stanleyville, de Bakwanga et d'Elisabethville'. Je ne puis qu'approuver le principe clairement énoncé dans votre lettre du 5 mars, selon lequel on ne peut attendre de la Force de l'ONU que, pour des buts de réorganisation, elle réduise des forces armées organisées considérées comme dissidentes par une autorité quelconque du Congo.

En conclusion, je tiens à exprimer l'espoir que le Parlement sera convoqué à une date rapprochée et que, de ce fait, les problèmes du Congo seront résolus par des moyens démocratiques et sans autre recours à des actes de nature à provoquer des effusions de sang."

English text follows in 3630.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : SecGen
No. : 3622
Date : 22 May 1961.

SL

Reference my 3612 and 3613 transmitting letter to President Kasavubu and my 3615 addressed to you.

I request you to hand over the letter personally to President Kasavubu and to indicate orally the reactions conveyed in 3615, tactfully and unmistakably. Please inform me after you have done so.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

SK

To : Mr. Linner.
From : Secretary-General.
Date : 22 May 61.
No. : 3615.

You receive separately letter to Kasavubu re. Dayal. You will observe that in impeccable form it states that it is we who found it practically impossible to work with people which over four months take such stands as those demonstrated in Friday meeting. We feel that not only attitude at Friday meeting but also Saturdays handling of contact with Dipolmats etc. goes beyond what one can accept although we have to accept it. I believe however that you may find a way to make it clear to them that their way of handling publicity of our reaction -- which anyway is our business and not theirs -- will have decisive influence on our judgment re. possibility to continue constructive operation. Kasavubu and Co. gladly talk about breaking agreements and relations as based on agreements. Have they realised that we are the giving party and that we may take their word seriously and break ourselves? Leaks with triumphant overtones and manifestations of a sense of superiority and strength from Congo side will be duly noted and proper conclusions drawn. For the moment we on our side do not intend to take initiative to publication of Dayal's resignation and it is not for them to do it.

36/3

Mr. President,

8

From Mr. Abbas I have received a full account of his conversation with you and your collaborators on the occasion of his farewell visit. I wish to give you an immediate reply to your reaction to my letter regarding Mr Dayals intended return.

Permit me to say that I must note with the deepest disappointment that your confidence in the United Nations and myself does not enable you to accept as a United Nations official in Leopoldville a man who enjoys my own full confidence. I am also disappointed that you still lend credence to accusations and allegations for which I have found no basis and on which I have repeatedly tried to give you clarification; the latest example being the reference to a report alleged official contacts between Mr Dayal and Mr Kanza and the alleged refusal by it to reply to the communication regarding the matter from Mr Bahizi, the facts in both respects being quite different from what was conveyed to Mr Abbas.

Be that as it may, I naturally communicated the substance of Mr Abbas report to Mr Dayal and his reaction was that in the circumstances indicated by the positions taken in the course of the conversation he no longer saw any possibility for him to make a constructive contribution to the United Nations assistance operation in the Congo in the spirit of the United Nations, which it was his hope to make and his duty as an official of the United Nations to carry out. He therefore informs me that he does not wish to continue with his assignment as my Special Representative in the Congo. It is with reluctance and great regret that I have to accept his conclusion, for it is my firm conviction that he has carried his United Nations responsibilities with an ability matched by his loyalty and integrity.

As the departure of Mr Abbas could not be postponed, and as Mr Dayal, in accordance with his own wishes, will not resume his functions, Mr Linner will for the time being, as the Senior official in Leopoldville, function as officer-in-charge. I hope, however to be able before long to inform you of the administrative arrangements envisaged for the coming phase in our assistance to the Congo on the basis of the memorandum recently handed to you.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dag Hammarskjöld Secretary General.

INCOMING CODE

To : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 22 May 1961

No : 3612

Please transmit following letter urgently to Kasa-Vubu. French and English texts follow:

"Monsieur le Président,

M. Abbas m'ayant rendu compte de la conversation qu'il a eue avec vous et vos collaborateurs lors de sa visite d'adieux, je tiens à revenir sans tarder sur votre réaction à la lettre que je vous ai adressée au sujet du retour prévu de M. Dayal.

Permettez-moi de vous dire que c'est avec une très profonde déception que j'ai noté que la confiance que vous avez dans les Nations Unies et en moi-même ne vous permet pas d'accepter comme représentant des Nations Unies à Léopoldville un homme qui a mon entière confiance. Je suis également déçu de constater que vous prêtez encore foi à des accusations et allégations auxquelles je n'ai trouvé aucun fondement et au sujet desquelles j'ai en plusieurs occasions tenté de vous donner des éclaircissements: les dernières en date étant la mention d'une information selon laquelle il y aurait eu des contacts officiels entre M. Dayal et M. Kanza et le refus que j'aurais opposé de répondre à la communication que m'a adressée à ce sujet M. Bahizi. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les faits sont très différents de ceux que l'on a rapportés à M. Abbas.

Quoi qu'il en soit, j'ai naturellement porté la teneur du rapport de M. Abbas à la connaissance de M. Dayal qui, étant donné la situation créée du fait des positions prises au cours de la conversation, a estimé qu'il ne lui était plus possible d'apporter à l'opération d'assistance des Nations Unies au Congo, dans l'esprit des Nations Unies, la contribution constructive qu'il espérait fournir et qu'il était de son

devoir de fournir en tant que représentant des Nations Unies. Il m'a donc fait savoir qu'il ne souhaite pas poursuivre son mandat de Représentant spécial au Congo. C'est à contrecœur et à regret que j'ai accepté sa décision, car je suis fermement persuadé qu'il s'est acquitté des responsabilités qui lui incombent en tant que Représentant des Nations Unies avec une compétence égale à sa loyauté et à son intégrité.

Comme le départ de M. Abbas n'a pas pu être retardé et comme M. Dayal, conformément au désir qu'il a exprimé, ne reprendra pas ses fonctions, c'est M. Linner qui en sa qualité de plus ancien fonctionnaire de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à Léopoldville assumera pour l'instant les responsabilités. J'espère toutefois pouvoir vous informer sans trop tarder des dispositions administratives envisagées pour la prochaine phase de notre assistance au Congo sur la base du mémoire qui vous a récemment été remis.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Le Secrétaire général,
Dag Hammarskjöld "

English text following in our 3613.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

ETAT PRIORITE

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE

3609 Immediate Linner and Famine Relief. Following is message for President Kasa-Vubu mentioned in my cable 3608. English text :

"In a message transmitted to your Excellency on thirty April, I drew attention to the stoppage of the Kasai Famine Relief Operation which followed events at Port Francqui. Although the United Nations had sufficient stocks of food and medicines in Luluabourg, it was unable to forward them to the areas where they were required owing to lack of cooperation from local authorities. I mentioned in that message that any interruption of supplies would lead to an immediate and severe increase in mortality.

I have not had any information from your Excellency as to the steps you have been able to take in support of the operation and in the meantime we have had to relocate the Famine Relief Unit at Lac Mukamba. The United Nations is most anxious to continue an operation which has saved so many Congolese lives and I therefore propose to ensure the delivery of supplies of food and medicines at the local distribution points by introducing regular surface convoys escorted by United Nations troops. The detailed movements required are being worked out and will be communicated to your Excellency.

May I again express the hope that I can count on your Excellency's active and practical support in this lifesaving project and particularly in your assuring the ready cooperation of all local authorities in Kasai Province.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my very high consideration,"

French text :

" Dans un message transmis à votre Excellence le 30 Avril, j'ai appelé votre attention sur l'interruption des opérations de secours pour la lutte contre la famine au Kasai à la suite des événements de Port Francqui. Bien que l'Organisation des Nations Unies ait eu à sa disposition des stocks suffisants de produits alimentaires et de médicaments à Luluabourg, elle n'a pu les envoyer dans les zones où ils étaient nécessaires par suite du manque de coopération des autorités locales. Dans le message susmentionné j'ai indiqué que toute interruption des livraisons provoquerait une augmentation grave et immédiate de la mortalité.

Je n'ai pas reçu de renseignements de votre Excellence sur les mesures qu'elle a pu prendre pour aider ces opérations et, entretemps, nous avons dû transférer au Lac Mukamba le groupe s'occupant des secours pour la lutte contre la famine. L'ONU souhaite vivement continuer les opérations qui ont sauvé tant de vies congolaises ; je propose donc d'assurer la livraison de produits alimentaires et de médicaments aux centres locaux de distribution en recourant à des convois qui emprunteraient les moyens de transport terrestres et seraient escortés par des troupes de l'ONU. Nous mettons au point les détails de l'opération et ils seront communiqués à votre Excellence.

Puis-je exprimer à nouveau l'espoir que je pourrai compter sur l'appui actif et positif de votre Excellence pour mettre en oeuvre ce projet destiné à sauver des vies humaines et en particulier pour assurer la coopération spontanée de toutes les autorités locales de la Province du Kasai.


Veuillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération. " SECRETARY-GENERAL.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ETATPRIORITE)

TO : MR. LINNER *SL*
 FROM : SEUGEN
 DATE : 22 May 61
 NO : 3608

Your ONUC 2794 and 2795 famine relief. To let the feeding of hungry and sick people depend on the varying fortunes of political factions in Kasai is unacceptable. Nor can Unations abandon the task in view of its general responsibilities in the Congo and the generous support received from world community. Further, we must have some assurance that supplies reach the people for whom they are intended. In these circumstances and in agreement with you that we cannot operate simply on assurances from Kalonji of safety of personnel, I consider that supplies must be delivered at established joints of distribution to assure their proper use and that for their safety civilian personnel should be escorted by Unations military convoy. Despite other important calls on his resources, the force commander will, I am sure, recognize the claims of this operation. It is understood that you can maintain an adequate flow of supplies to Luluabourg and also have enough surface transport to move forward fromthere under military escort.

Alive

 It is premature to determine how much, if any, relief will be required between small harvest in June and big harvest in December nor should we accept or disown "responsibility" in advance for additional refugees. Basic principles are that we make our own determination of who need relief and then give them all assistance which is within our resources and which local circumstances including politicians permit. Thus there would be no question of making our relief supplies available to Kalonji on payment. Either he makes it possible for us to do the job or he must take care of his starving people himself.

I agree that a message to President Kasavubu would be appropriate and it follows in clear cable. Unless you have any amendments to suggest it can be transmitted forthwith.

2. 3609

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. LINNER *h*
FROM : SECRETARY+GENERAL
DATE : 22 May 61
NO : 3606

CV-115

Your 1281.

Information might in suitable form be communicated to Kasavubu.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ETATPRIORITE)

TO : MR. LINNER
FROM : SECRETARYGENERAL
DATE : 22 May 61
NO : 3605

CV-114

Your ONUC 2855.

Please instruct Poujoulat to transmit to Kasavubu the following message from me;

" Secgen, in referring to message 12/52/CAB/AE/COQ, notes with greatest surprise its content which is obviously based on erroneous information transmitted to the President by Mr. Bahizi, his representative in New York. The Secgen wishes to state that if Mr. Dayal has, on the request of Mr. Kanza, received him, such a discussion can certainly not be regarded as in any sense as an official contact which would be considered as justifying a protest. I am certain that the President is aware that the present political situation in the Congo makes it unavoidable for UN personnel to have contacts 'officieux' with representatives of various regimes exercising de facto authority in Congo".

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SL

To : Mr. S. Linner

ROUTINE

From : Secretary-General, New York

Date : 20 May 1961

No. : 3602

Your 1265. Thank you for your words. We all know, trust and admire your unreserved dedication to your task. I am happy to know you carry the responsibilities which now for a while will be yours, with the formal presentation of your position which falls short of the fact, but, I am sure you agree, is wise in the circumstances. We all wish you the best of luck.

ROUTING SLIP

TO

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

3601

ONUC-3263

DATE

FROM

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SL

To : Messrs. S. Linner and Ahmed

ROUTINE

From : Mr. Bunche, New York

Date : 20 May 1961

No. : 3600

Despite serious efforts thus far unable to produce suitable qualified replacement for Hazou with Ruanda Urundi commission. Matter now extremely urgent as operation scheduled to begin early June and administrative arrangements must commence immediately. Must, therefore, ask you to re-examine your situation taking into account Lai and Grunzweig postings, and arrange Hazou release. Instructions for Hazou will follow shortly from Field Service.

Dist.: Mr. Ahmed

Fabry handle it

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. S. Linner *SL*

ROUTINE

From : Secretary-General, New York

Date : 20 May 1961

No. : 3594

Commission of investigation on Lumumba wishes Russel-Cargill held for interrogation by commission on their anticipated visit Leo. You may so inform British embassy. In view of Russel-Cargill's voluntary surrender and previous statement, he may agree to await commission's inquiry while under U.N. protection. If commission does not depart soon for Leo they may possibly decide to request written deposition from Russell-Cargill in response to their questions. In any event Russel-Cargill should not be released without instructions from Headquarters.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

TO : MR. LINNER
FROM : MR. MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 20 May 61
NO : 3593

ONUC-2870

Your ONUC 2831. We had been given to understand there might be shortage of cash in treasury to meet wage payments due 24th May or a few days later. Infer from your reply that we may be misinformed and that there is no difficulty. Please advise.

Hope Frasca has by now had Ndeles cable. We believe it suggested in case of need further advances by monetary council to government with- in margin reserved for parastatal agencies, secondly an issue of short term treasury bonds, and thirdly repayment by Cadeso of some of its debt to government.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

82
MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Mr. S. Linner

From : Secretary-General, New York

Date : 20 May 1961

No. : 3590

CV-110

Please inform Bomboko most urgently that we have received Abbas' report on his conversation with President Kasavubu, Mr. Bomboko and others regarding Mr. Dayal's return. The observations made of which we were informed in the course of the night will be taken up for our most urgent consideration Saturday and we hope to communicate our reaction in course of day. While matter is under discussion we take for granted that nothing will be done or said publicly which could in any way complicate matter or risk fruitful cooperation which has developed on basis of 17 April agreement.

*Answered via
Miss Livingstone*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : LINNER *SL*
FROM : MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 20 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3587

DNUC-2831

Ndele has cabled Frasca suggesting measures to tide over payment days since Deseynes mission must await return of central authorities from Coquilhatville. We hope this can be done without unations cash advance. Would like to have your assesment of situation.

cc : Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : ABBAS
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 20 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3585

SL

A-1358

For Gardiner. Your A-1258,

1. We will make suitable approaches here.

3. It is suggested that draft letter be held until the reply to the three letters will be transmitted, probably following Monday's meeting of the advisory Committee.

(Copy given To Mr. Gardiner)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : ABBAS
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 20 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3584

SL

Reference 3256 and 3432 .

Swedish mission informs that government has advised that neither Tamm nor Ohlin can be made available. Tamm is in poor health while Ohlin must be kept in Sweden to perform his duties as inspector of armored troops. We will now make approaches in new directions to be determined .

(Mr. Tamm
Gen. MacEwan
informed)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TC : MACEOIN
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 20 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3583

Reference ONUC 2827. We are not very clear as to what an Irish company is expected to do in Mwene Ditu, detached from its parent battalion. We therefore suggest no such action be taken pending discussion with Rikhye, who is informed of our views .

cc : Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : ABBAS
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 19 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3555

A-1266

Commission of inquiry on Lumumba requests soonest
original french texts of quoted statements in cablegrams
D-351 , D-352 , D-381 , D-414 and D-415 .

INCOMING CODE CABLE

5.6.
✓
ROUTINE

TO : MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 19 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3554

1. A US Air Force survey team is leaving Washington 20 May to visit ONUC . They will study our air transport requirements with particular reference to need for large-sized air transport aircraft and maintenance of C119s . Rikhye will give you further details.

2. Since team leaves on short notice, they will need assistance on arrival on matters pertaining to passports and visas . US embassy in Leopoldville has been advised of this; however, your assistance would be appreciated . They will arrive 23 May . Exact ETA, flight number etc... , will be informed later.

3. Names of Officers on team as follows : Colonel Howard E Kreidler, Lt. Col. Bernard A Neuman, Lt Col. Richard D Stevens.

cc : Abbas.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Gen. MacEoin

ROUTINE

From : Mr. Bunche, New York

Date : 19 May 1961

No. : 3548

Reference ONUC 2766 and my 3480.

Canadian representative emphasizes that position of his government is that Canadian signals personnel must not repeat not be sent to Matadi without personal arms. No objection to these being in weapons chests.

cc: Mr. M. Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE,

M.A.

To : General MacEoin, Ahmed.
From : Rikhye.
Date : 18 May 61.
No. : 3543

Reference our 3461 and ONUC 2764.

As later suitable Air connections not available, am arriving Brazzaville 8⁵⁵ Sunday morning, 21 May, on Air France flight 403. Please arrange Helicopter lift to Leo. Have accepted Dayals kind offer to stay in his guest room.

c.c. Mr. Ahmed
c.c. Mr. Abbas.

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : SECGEN, NEW YORK
DATE : 18 May 1961
No. : 3542

On the eve of your return to Addis after your most arduous assignment in Leo, extending in time and in responsibilities far beyond anything I anticipated, I wish to send you my warmest thanks for what you have done for the Organization in this mutual undertaking. You have indeed lived up to the very great confidence I and all with me have in you and you have shown the fine personal qualities which make you such a support in all our works. Certainly, as a good African, you can also derive satisfaction from the feeling that you have served the best interests of the continent and newly independent states, whatever disappointments you have met, whatever misunderstandings you have had to accept and whatever distance we still may have to cover before having achieved our aims. To these words of gratitude I add, with an even more personal accent, my warm thanks for your understanding and your unfailing loyalty to me in a common cause.

INCOMING CODE

To : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 19 May 1961

No : 3532

Prière transmettre message suivant Président Kasa-Vubu:

"J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de vos trois lettres du 13 mai 1961 qui m'ont été transmises par mon Représentant spécial par intérim au Congo. Etant donné l'importance des questions qu'elles soulèvent, je crois nécessaire d'étudier leur contenu avec la plus grande attention et d'en entretenir le Comité consultatif pour le Congo. J'espère être en mesure d'ici quelques jours de vous adresser une réponse circonstanciée.

Très haute considération."

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Mr. Abbas, MacEoin
From : Bunche.
Date : 18 May 61.
No : 3531.

SV-336

Reference A-1230. Yugoslav mission informed us on 14 May that their Government intends to send an aircraft to Stanleyville under the auspices of their Red Cross to pick up 70 congolese children to be taken to yugoslavia. Aircraft will arrive Stanleyville between 25 and 30 May and will stay maximum of 48 hours. Aircraft is a DC-6 with markings YU-AFB. Aircraft carries double crew, a total of 12 men. Name of pilot is Commander Milrsav Semiz, Co-pilot is Branivoj Majcen. Aircraft will fly via United Arab Republic and Sudan and we are making necessary arrangements with Sudan for air clearance. Exact ETA and ETD will be forwarded to you when available. Please inform Congolese authorities in Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Since this flight has now been officially announced, a formal inspection, as suggested by you, would probably be impractical. We assume but cannot confirm that these are children, some or all of whom may be orphans, whose fathers have been involved in political activity on Lumumbas side.

c.c. General MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. ABBAS, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : ~~3519~~ 18 May 61
NO : 3519

H.A.

Reference ONUC 2757. As indicated in earlier messages our complaint about daily sitreps has been due to occasional experience in past of getting our first knowledge of an important item in a routine reference in a sitrep, the disparities sometimes occurring between separate reports and sitrep reference, and the frequent passages on purely political matters in a military report (see sitrep 268 for latest example of this).

If these faults cannot be corrected we would agree with your proposal to discontinue the daily daily sitreps in favor of separate reports and possibly weekly round-ups. But before a final decision is taken, suggest that it be one of items for discussion with Rikhye in context of entire problem of reporting.

cc. Abbas, Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

H.A.

TO : GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 May 61
NO : 3518

Reference ONUC 2765. Accept proposal concerning Col Kjellgren.

cc. Mr. Abbast

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. ABBAS
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 18 May 61
NO : 3517

*Copy given Col. Lytle
who should return it to you
H.A.
18/5*

Your 1244.

1. We should like you to proceed immediately with interrogation of Captain Russel Cargill.

2. We shall inform commission of investigation concerning his detention. It will have to decide whether it wants to have him held. We assume that commission will, in first instance, wish to transmit questionnaire which then could be handled by your interrogators.

3. It will be necessary to determine in light of these interrogations whether he should be held for interrogation by commission itself.

4. It would be advisable to notify British embassy regarding various reasons for a perhaps prolonged detention. Clearance for repatriation will be given at appropriate time.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

7.A

TO : GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3514

Ref ONUC 2751

Question raised in your 2751 has immediately been taken up with US authorities. It is impossible to make detailed changes in the schedule from this end. Therefore, the United States Air Force, Washington, has authorized their local representative in Leopoldville to make on-the-spot arrangements with you, concerning the Nigerian rotation only, in order to meet your request to the fullest possible extent. Our general observations about the way in which this particular airlift has been handled will be cabled separately later. endit

cc. Mr. abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : GEN. MACBOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3513

H.A.

Ref our 3374 and 3416.

Ethiopian representative confirms today, 17 May, that Asmara and Addis ababa, referred to in our 3374, were the places where the new Ethiopian troops are to be picked up. He is not sure, however, that these same places are the destinations of the home going troops, although this is the arrangement made with USAF on basis of earlier discussions with the representative. We find it very difficult at this late stage of the operation to obtain reliable information from Addis Ababa through the representative here. Therefore, please consult urgently General Iyassu as to the exact destination of the home going forces and inform us. We hope that no changes will be made in the schedule, but, if Ethiopians insist, advise us immediately and also take contact with the local USAF representative.

cc. Mr. Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

H.A.

TO : GEN. MACBOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3512

Ref ONUC 2353.

UK has informed that they are unable to assist in airlift of Ferret Scout cars for time being. US has therefore been requested to airlift seven Ghanian Ferret Scout cars from Accra to Leopoldville and also the Ten Malayan Ferrets from Lagos to Entebbe. endit.

cc. Mr. Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

97, A.

TO : MR. ABBAS, MR. AHMED
FROM : MR. CORDIER
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3503

Your A-1227 Liarommatis. We have to accept your verdict and terminate him as per regulation 91 (B) on grounds of redundancy. This involves 30 days notice or payment in lieu plus 30 days indemnity pay.

You will recall publicity in greek press when Liarommatis arrived vide your cable B-1392 of 10 November. His untimely return is unlikely to pass unnoticed. Please draft short statement we can use in case of need.

cc Mr. Abbas, Mr. Ahmed

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

MA

TO : GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3502

Reference ONUC 2512 and 13. Matters mentioned have been given intensive consideration by all concerned here. We are asking Rikhye on his forthcoming trip to discuss subject fully with you and Ahmed, giving you the full benefit of our thinking with a view toward reaching an agreed solution

cc Maceoin, Abbas

INCOMING CODE CABLE

H.A.

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. AHMED
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 May 61
NO : 3500

Reference ONUC 2481 and 2514.

Questions posed these messages will be discussed with you by Rikhye during his forthcoming visit to Congo. He will give you benefit of our thinking after careful consideration of the problems.

cc. Mr. Abbas

N.Y. 3490

ONUC-2787

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. M. Abbas

ROUTINE

From : Secretary-General, New York

I gave a copy to Mr. Gardiner

Date : 17 May 1961

*R.A.
17/5*

No. : 3489

Your A-1240. We must maintain a clear distinction between ONUC liaison functions and those of political adviser to Congolese officials. The need for U.N. liaison officer to foreign office is one which Poujoulat could fill and which we therefore may meet immediately. Subsequently, and if specific request received, we could consider placing political advisers with Congolese officials, perhaps of the OPEX type, who will be responsible to them. Any confusion of functions, particularly at this stage, might cause embarrassment.