


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FROM : DCOS OPS  5000.5(OPS)

TO : LISTS 'D'
MILOB GP HQ
UN CIVPOL

INFO : MA TO FC
MA TO DFC
COS

DATE : 4 Oct 95

SUBJECT : AWARENESS OF MINES/EODs FOUND IN RWANDA

1. In the recent past there have been a number of incidents of mine blasts in the UNAMIR AOR. As a result of these incidents a need has been felt to educate the troops, various UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities about mines/EODs. A team from Force Engr Coy will visit various sectors as per the programme given below to deliver lecture cum demonstration on mines and explosive ordnance devices found in Rwanda. All Sector Commanders are requested to earmark a place in their sector and invite representatives from various organisations in their sector for education in mine awareness:-

- (a) Sector 2 - 09 Oct 95 1000 Hrs
- (b) Sector 3 - 16 Oct 95 1000 Hrs
- (c) Sector 4 - 18 Oct 95 1000 hrs
- (d) Sector 5 - 20 Oct 95 1000 Hrs
- (e) Sector 1 - 23 Oct 95 1000 Hrs Location Force Engr Coy

2. Any query in this regard may be addressed to Force Engr Coy (Tele - 11262/11261).

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1/14
13/3
500

1 - Copy to All Sector Officers
- Division Head
2 - File - L.O.P.

MILOB GPHQ
[Signature]

UN RESTRICTED

TO : See Distribution
FROM : FC, MAJ GEN GC TOUSIGNANT
DATE : 12th September, 1995
SUBJECT : INFORMATION COLLECTION AND REPORTING

Reference:

A. FRAG ORDER 22 dated 14 August, 1995.

1. Attached are new Information requirements which reflect the change of mandate and Force reduction.

2. Components of the force (MILOB, Contingent and CIVPOL) have been given specific collection tasks and responsibilities for reporting in accordance with their tasks at the reference. This does not mean that any component of the Force is absolved from reporting information which comes to their attention. Rather the intent is to quickly and efficiently channel the information to the pertinent component for reporting so as to:

- a. Prevent duplication of collection and reporting efforts;
- b. avoid recycling reports of incidents and information; and
- c. coordinate analysis at the Sector Headquarters and above.

3. The questions posed under each of the indicators, are provided as guide to the type of information being sought and should not be considered as limiting collection to only these questions.

4. Reporting will continue using existing reports as follows:

a. Security information:

(1) Critical incidents are to be reported immediately as an Incident Report. Examples of events which are worthy of an Incident Report are

(a) death, injury or the threat of physical violence to a member of the UN or the International Community;

(b) weapon discharge by a UN member;

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(c) demonstrations or rallies against UNAMIR;


(d) military operations by the RPA or FRGF;

(2) all other incidents and events are to be reported in periodic and daily Situation Reports;

b. Reconciliation/Rehabilitation:

(1) requests by the civil authorities or urgent needs for relief and assistance are to be reported in the Situation Report; and

(2) summaries of reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts are to be reported in the appropriate weekly or monthly report.



GC TOUSIGNANT
Maj Gen
Force Commander

ANNEXES:

ANNEX A - MILOB Collection Tasks

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

List C

Information

DFC
CMO

INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN - SECURITY

CONCERNS	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
<u>EXTERNAL</u>					
A. What is the situation in neighbouring countries?	1) statements by officials concerning refugees, FRG and current Government 2) events which may result in civil unrest or war 3) action against those suspected of genocide	Intl Press SRSGs UN Agencies UNHQ Embassies NGO	G2 SRSG UN Agencies G2/SRSG SRSG/G2 MILOB	G2	FC/SRSG
B. What is the capability and readiness of the FGRF/ Militia for military operations?	1) incursions into Rwanda by FGRF/Militia/"Bandits" 2) acts of sabotage, killing of civil leaders 3) arms shipments 4) military training 5) move of troops or equipment close to border 6) rate and aim of cross-border incursions	NGO UN Agencies Refugees RPA	MILOB Un Agencies MILOB MILOB	G2 G2 G2	FC/SRSG
C. What is the situation of Refugees in the camps?	1) arrests by host nation authorities 2) criminal acts in camps 3) availability of food 4) mass movement away from camps	UNHCR Returnees Civil Auth Intl Press	UNHCR MILOB/UNHCR MILOB G2	G2/UNHCR G2	SRSG UNHCR/SRSG UNHCR/SRSG UNHCR/SRSG

CONCERNS	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
D. Is the prison system functioning properly?	1) overcrowding and living conditions	UNHCHR	UNHCHR	CIVPOL/HR	SRSG
	2) number detained without conviction	Min of Interior Local Authority	UNHCHR CIVPOL/UNHCHR		
	3) maintenance of records				
	4) legal period of custody at each level of facility				
	5) expedient investigation of accusations				
E. Are the citizens adjusting to the new situation?	1) complaints of locals	UNHCHR Local Authority	UNHCHR MILOB/UNHCHR	HAC/IOC	SRSG SRSG/FC
	2) incidents of harassment	Locals	MILOB/UNHCHR	HAC/IOC	SRSG/FC
	3) presence/absence of men/people in the community				
	4) problems of Local Authority				
F. Has the economy resumed?	1) cost of living/rate of exchange	Min of Rehab Local Authority	UNDP/UNREO MILOB	IOC HAC/IOC	SRSG SRSG/FC
	2) black market activity/goods	Locals	MILOB	HAC/IOC	SRSG/FC
	3) activity/presence of markets	NGOs	MILOB	HAC/IOC	SRSG/FC
	4) opening of new businesses				
	5) exports and imports				

CONCERNS	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
G. How close are utilities to their pre-war capacity?	1) non-operational facilities 2) capacity of operational facilities 3) problems and shortfalls	Local Auth Facility Op NGOs Min of Rehab	MILOB IOC	IOC/HAC	G2
H. What is the situation on housing and land ownership?	1) number and duration of people living in transit camps 2) percentage of people without homes 3) community plan for settlement of land disputes and shortages	Min of Rehab UNHCR NGOs Local Authority Locals	HAC/IOC UNHCR MILOB MILOB MILOB	HAC/IOC HAC/IOC HAC/IOC HAC/IOC	SRSG
I. What is the situation of food production?	1) percentage of land cultivated 2) anticipated harvest yield 3) availability and cost of food in markets 4) amount of food in community 5) absence of seed for planting	Min of Rehab WFP NGOs Local Authority Locals	HAC/IOC MILOB	HAC/IOC	SRSG

CONCERNS.	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
J. Is there a will for the Refugees to return home?	1) number of returning refugees	UNHCR	UNHCR	HAC/IOC	SRSG
	2) rumours in the camps	NGOs	MILOB/HAC		
	3) difficulties at border crossings	Returnees			
		Local Authority			
	4) method of return	Locals			
K. What is the commitment of the NGOs?	1) future plans	Min of Rehab	IOC/UNDP	IOC	SRSG
	2) level of activity	IOC	IOC		
		NGOs	HAC/MILOB	HAC/IOC	
	3) problems being encountered	Local Authority	MILOB	HAC/IOC	

INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN - RECONCILIATION

CONCERNS	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
A. Does the government promote reconciliation?	1) remarks made by government officials	Intl Press	G2	HAC/IOC	FC/SRSG
	2) rallies/parades and their message	Rwanda Media	SRSG		
	3) messages in national media	Local Authority	MILOB	HAC/IOC	SRSG/FC
		Govt Ministers	SRSG/UNDP/HAC		
B. How effective is the government at governing?	1) sufficient trained staff	Local Authority	MILOB	HAC/IOC	SRSG/FC/G2
	2) policies	Govt Ministers	SRSG/UNDP/HAC		
	3) means/ability to communicate				
	4) offices and equipment to work with				
C. Is the legal system functioning effectively?	1) sufficient trained staff	UNHCHR	UNHCHR		SRSG
	2) offices and equipment to work with	Min of Justice	UNHCHR		
	3) caseload	Local Authority	MILOB/UNHCHR	G2/UNHCHR	SRSG/FC

CONCERNS	INDICATORS	SOURCES	COLLECTED BY	ANALYSIS BY	REPORTED TO
<u>INTERNAL</u>					
A. How effective is the Gendarmerie?	1) number of police working 2) complaints against the police 3) number of crimes under investigation 4) means/limitations of communications 5) ability to respond to situations 6) relations with people	Gendarmerie Civil auth Locals	CIVPOL MILOB MILOB/CIVPOL	Commissoner G2	SRSG FC/SRSG
B. Is the RPA preparing for an attack?	1) increase troops along border 2) appearance of new weapons 3) preparation of defensive positions 4) rumours of RPA incursions outside Rwanda	MILOB	MILOB	G2	FC/SRSG
C. Are abuses to Human Rights occurring?	1) illegal/irregular arrests 2) instances of torture 3) deliberately inhumane conditions	UNHCHR Civil Auth Locals RPA	UNHCHR MILOB/CIVPOL MILOB MILOB	G2	SRSG FC/SRSG

TO: FC
DFC
SRSG
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
FORCE PM
MILOB GP HQ
INDBATT/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 1A/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 1B/CO/S2//
GHANBATT/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 2A/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 2B/CO/S2//
MALI COY/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 3A/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 3B/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 4/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 5A/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 5B/CO/S2//
MILOB SECTOR 5C/CO/S2//
NICOY/CO/S2//
95 FLSG/CO/OPS//
FORCE ENGINEERING/CO/OPS//
FORCE MP COY/CO//

FROM: UNAMIR HQ/G2 INFO//

21 AUG 95

SUBJECT: HQ UNAMIR WEEKLY INFOSUM

Reference: UNAMIR HQ/G2, SECTOR ROUTINE INFORMATION REPORTS,
12 MAY 95 (attached)

1. THE NEW INTELLIGENCE LINE UNIT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WILL PRODUCE A WEEKLY INFOSUM. AS A RESULT, THE REQUIREMENT AT REFERENCE FOR A BI-WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE FORECAST IS RESCINDED FORTHWITH. THE REMAINDER OF THE REPORTING PROCEDURES ARE TO REMAIN IN PLACE. THE REQUIREMENT FOR A UNIT WEEKLY ASSESSMENT HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

2. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND THE FIRST OF SUBJECT INFOSUMS.

ATTACHMENTS

ANNEX A: UNAMIR HQ/G2, SECTOR ROUTINE INFORMATION REPORTS,
12 MAY 95

ANNEX B: HQ UNAMIR WEEKLY INFOSUM 13 - 19 AUG 95

ANNEX A TO
BWIF 004
17 JUL 95

12 MAY 95

SECTOR ROUTINE
INFORMATION REPORTS

REFERENCE: INFORMATION OFFICERS' WORKING GROUP, 10/11 MAY

1. AS DISCUSSED AT YESTERDAY'S WORKING GROUP (REF) THIS MESSAGE IS HARD COPY OF THE SCHEDULE OF REPORTING EXPECTED FROM EACH UNIT/SECTOR MILOB INFORMATION OFFICER:

A. 15/30 OF EACH MONTH: INFORMATION SUMMARY (INFOSUM). THIS IS TO BE A QUICK OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN YOUR SECTOR DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. BREVITY AND ACCURACY ARE EXPECTED. YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, BASED UPON AVAILABLE INFORMATION, WILL BE HIGHLY VALUED. SPECULATION OR "GUT FEELING" IS USEFUL, BUT REMEMBER TO IDENTIFY IT AS SUCH. IF MORE THAN ONE POSSIBILITY EXIST, LIST EACH, IN ORDER OF PROBABILITY, USING WORDS SUCH AS "PROBABLE", "POSSIBLE", "UNLIKELY", ETC.

B. EVERY DAY: DAILY UNIT/SECTOR SITUATION REPORT (SITREP). TRY TO INCORPORATE ANY ANSWERS TO THE FORCE COMMANDER'S PIR/IRS YOU MAY HAVE DISCOVERED OR ASSESSED.

C. IMMEDIATELY UPON LEARNING OF A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT. INFORMATION REPORT (INFOREP). AS DISCUSSED AT REFERENCE, THIS IS THE IMMEDIATE "HEADS UP" TO UNAMIR HQ TO LET US KNOW THAT SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT MAY BE GOING ON. THE REPORT SHOULD TRY TO ANSWER THE "5WH" QUESTIONS (WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, WHY AND HOW) ALTHOUGH TIMELINESS IS MORE IMPORTANT IN THIS REPORT THAN COMPLETENESS. WHEN FURTHER DETAILS AND ANSWERS ARE LEARNED, TRANSMIT THOSE THROUGH A SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION REPORT. PLEASE USE A CONTROL NUMBER FOR EACH REPORT TO AVOID CONFUSION BETWEEN DIFFERENT OR SIMILAR EVENTS.

D. UPON LEARNING MORE ABOUT A SPECIFIC INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION REPORT. THIS REPORT WILL FOLLOW YOUR INFOREP WITH GREATER DETAIL AND AN ASSESSMENT, IF POSSIBLE. YOU MAY SUBMIT ANY NUMBER OF SUPINFOREPS FOR A GIVEN INFOREP. REMEMBER TO BALANCE TIMELINESS WITH COMPLETENESS.

E. ON ORDER. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PRODUCTION. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IS A PLANNING TOOL FOR YOUR UNIT/SECTOR USE AS THE FIRST STEP IN DIRECTION. YOU ARE

A1/2

CURRENTLY REQUIRED TO PRODUCE ONLY THE ONE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DISCUSSED AT REF FOR DISTRIBUTION TO UNAMIR HQ/G2. THEREAFTER, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTINUOUSLY REVIEW (FIRST PRINCIPLES).

2. THIS BRANCH WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE FOLLOWING ROUTINE REPORTS:

A. DAILY INFOSUM: WHICH IS INCORPORATED IN THE DAILY UNAMIR HQ INFOSUM, DISTRIBUTED TO ALL UNITS AND MILOBS ON A DAILY BASIS (PROBLEMS WITH MILOB DISTRIBUTION DISCUSSED AT REF WILL BE REMEDIED);

B. BI-WEEKLY INFOSUM: 17 AND 02 OF EACH MONTH AND WILL BE BASED UPON ALL UNIT/SECTOR INFOSUMS.

C. INTREP/SUPINTREP: AS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF INFORMATION VALUE ARE IDENTIFIED. DISTRIBUTION MIGHT BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE UNITS AFFECTED/NEED TO KNOW.

D. COLLECTION TASKS: ALTHOUGH NOT REALLY A REPORT, THESE TASKS WILL BE INFORMATION REQUIREMENT DIRECTION TO YOUR UNIT/SECTOR. THE TIME INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY IS A BALANCE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED TO GIVE YOU ENOUGH TIME TO COLLECT THE INFORMATION. YOUR REPORTS MUST ARRIVE AT UNAMIR HQ/G2 NO LATER THAN THE TIME/DATE SPECIFIED. IT IS MORE ACCEPTABLE THAT YOU SUBMIT AN INCOMPLETE REPORT ON TIME THAN A COMPLETE REPORT LATE.

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20 AUG 95

DISTRIBUTION LIST

HQ UNAMIR WEEKLY INFOSUM 13 - 19 AUG 95

(THIS PRODUCT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY 95 CMSG INFO CELL, IN KEEPING WITH IT'S MISSION TO PROVIDE A FORCE-LEVEL OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, COLLATION, AND DISSEMINATION SERVICE.)

GENERAL SITUATION

1. (R) THE OVERALL SITUATION IS STABLE. DESPITE A LOW LEVEL OF ONGOING INSURGENT/BANDIT ACTIVITY IN WESTERN RWANDA, THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS FIRMLY IN CONTROL. RPA SOLDIERS AT SOME CHECKPOINTS ARE INSISTING ON SEARCHING UN VEHICLES AND PERSONAL BAGGAGE. THE MASS EXODUS OF UP TO 50,000 RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, WHICH HAD BEEN PREDICTED BY SOME AID AGENCIES FOR 15 AUG 95, FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. THE PRESIDENT OF UGANDA ARRIVED FOR A STATE VISIT FROM 14 TO 16 AUG 95. HE IMPORED RWANDANS TO BURY THE PAST AND FACE THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE. ON 16 AUG 95, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED TO SUSPEND THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. THE EMBARGO WILL BE LIFTED IN IT'S ENTIRETY ON 1 SEP 96. FEARING INCURSIONS INTO ITS TERRITORY BY RPA FORCES INTENT ON NEUTRALIZING THE INSURGENT EX-FAR THREAT, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE HAS REACTED STRONGLY TO THE DECISION, THREATENING TO FORCIBLY REPATRIATE RWANDAN REFUGEES.

POLITICAL

2. (R) THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE EVENT OF THIS PAST WEEK WAS THE UNSC DECISION TO SUSPEND THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA. COMMENT. THIS DECISION SHOULD STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. THE EX-FAR WILL BE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO INVADE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE, AS ANY DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE RPA ON RWANDAN SOIL WILL LIKELY ONLY LEAD TO THEIR DEFEAT IN DETAIL. THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR), WILL BE RELUCTANT TO INVADE ZAIRE TO PUSH BACK THE REFUGEE CAMPS AS IT IS AWARE THAT THE ARMS EMBARGO COULD BE EASILY REIMPOSED, AND IT HAS MUCH WORK TO DO TO BRING THE RPA UP TO THE

1

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STANDARD OF A NATIONAL ARMY.

3. (R) THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO WILL HAVE OTHER TANGIBLE BENEFITS. BETTER TRAINING WILL LEAD TO BETTER DISCIPLINE, AND HOPEFULLY THE INSTANCES OF BANDITRY AND MURDER WILL DECREASE. IN MANY AREAS THE RPA BEHAVES LIKE AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION, AND THEY WILL NEVER BE A NATIONAL ARMY AS LONG AS THE POPULATION THEY SERVE FEARS THEM.

4. (R) THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE, REACTING TO THE SUSPENSION OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, HAS THREATENED TO FORCIBLY REPATRIATE THE RWANDAN REFUGEES. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS STATE THAT YESTERDAY THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY EXPELLED 200 REFUGEES INTO THE FRONTIER BETWEEN ZAIRE AND RWANDA. COMMENT. IF SUCCESSFUL, WE MAY SEE A REPETITION OF YESTERDAY'S INCIDENT, BUT THESE ARE SMALL BITES OF A VERY BIG PROBLEM - THERE ARE 700,000 REFUGEES IN THE GOMA AREA ALONE.

MILITARY

5. (R) THE MOST TENSE SECTORS CONTINUE TO BE SECTORS 1B AND 5. SECTOR 1B HAS RECENTLY UNDERGONE A NUMBER OF KILLINGS, AND THE LOCAL RPA BRIGADE COMMANDER HIMSELF DESCRIBED THE PREFECTURE AS 'SMOLDERING', SAYING THAT THE KILLINGS WERE A RESULT OF ETHNIC TENSIONS. HE ALSO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF CASES OF SABOTAGE COMMITTED IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS BY THE EX-FAR, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMERS, THE BURNING OF EUCALYPTUS FORESTS (IMPORTANT AS A CHARCOAL SOURCE), THE BURNING OF GENOCIDE SURVIVORS' HOUSES AND PLANTATIONS, AND THE MOVEMENT OF INTERHAMWE THROUGH THE AREA. COMMENT. SOME LOCALS IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE HAVE LIKENED THE RECENT MOOD TO THAT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE WAR. AS A FOOTNOTE, THE TRANSFORMERS WERE DESTROYED BY DRAINING THE COOLING OIL FROM THEM, THEN TURNING THEM ON. THE SABOTEURS APPEAR TO HAVE STOLEN THE OIL, AS THERE WAS NONE FOUND ON THE SCENE. ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER OIL IS LACED WITH POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS, POPULARLY KNOWN AS PCB. PCBs ARE STRONGLY LINKED TO CANCER.

6. (R) THERE WERE TWO MINE INCIDENTS IN SECTOR 5C. ONE OCCURED AT BWIZA (GR 386 923) ON 12 AUG. A TOYOTA PICK-UP TRUCK WITH EIGHT PERS ON

2

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BOARD (INCLUDING 3 RPA) STRUCK A MINE AND WAS BADLY DAMAGED. THREE PEOPLE WERE ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES IN THIS INCIDENT. THE OTHER INCIDENT OCCURED ON 17 AUGUST, ON THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN KAYOVE COMMUNE AND KIBUYE. AN NGO VEHICLE BELONGING TO MEMISA STRUCK A LARGE ANTI-TANK MINE, KILLING TWO LOCAL EMPLOYEES, AND CRITICALLY INJURING A THIRD PERSON. THE VEHICLE WAS THROWN 15 METERS BY THE BLAST. THE INJURED WOMAN, EIGHT MONTHS PREGNANT, WAS AIR-EVACUATED BY A UN HELICOPTER, BUT DIED ENROUTE TO KIGALI. IT APPEARS THAT THE MINE WAS LAID JUST PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION, AND DELIBERATELY TARGETTED THE NGO. THREE NGO WORKERS WERE EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER FROM GISENYI THIS AFTERNOON, AFTER THEIR LIVES WERE THREATENED, APPARENTLY IN RELATION TO THE MINE INCIDENT. ONE THING REMAINS CLEAR - THE AREA BETWEEN KIBUYE AND THE GISENYI IS TENSE, AND UNAMIR PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE MUCH CAUTION WHEN IN THERE.

CONCLUSION

7. (R) THE RPA AND THE EX-FAR ARE IN A RELATIVE STALEMATE FOR NOW. THE EX-FAR CANNOT ATTACK RWANDA BECAUSE IT LACKS THE STRENGTH. THE RPA WOULD PREFER NOT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND ATTACK THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, AND A DESIRE TO AVOID ANOTHER ARMS EMBARGO. THE EX-FAR WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOR THROUGH A LOW-INTENSITY INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, FED WITH WEAPONS AND MANPOWER FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THIS IS A DIFFICULT BALANCE - IF THEY PUSH TOO HARD, THE GOR MAY BE FORCED TO ACT DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY IN THIS REGION IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS SO CLOSE TO THE BORDER OF RWANDA.

8. (R) THE PRESENT SITUATION COULD POSE A THREAT TO UNAMIR TROOPS, PARTICULARLY THROUGH MINING OF ROADS. FURTHERMORE, THE RPA MAY BECOME MORE ANXIOUS, WHICH COULD CAUSE DELAYS AT CHECKPOINTS. THE DELIBERATE TARGETTING OF UNAMIR TROOPS BY EITHER RPA OR EX-FAR IS ASSESSED AS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME.

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KIGALI

KMS / 1301 / OPS

KIGALI, 21 AUG 95

TO : MILOB GR HQ (OPS BR)

FROM: SECTOR 1A HQ

SUBJECT: SITREP NO 452 PERIOD COVERED 200600 - 211800

1. GENERAL SITUATION: CALM AND QUIET BUT WITH TENSE SECURITY SITUATION FOR UNAMIR STAFF IN KIGALI AT NIGHT.
2. POLITICAL ACTIVITY: NTR
3. FACTIONAL ACTIVITY: NTR
 - a. RPA: PERFORMS RANDOM PTLs AND ROADBLOCKS AT THE USUAL EXTEND.
 - b. FRGF: NTR
 - c. MILITIA: NTR
4. OWN MILITARY ACTIVITY:
 - a. KM-2 PERFORMED A ROUTINE PTL IN MUSASA COMMUNE. THEY FOUND THE AREA CALM AND QUIET. PATROL TOGETHER WITH ASSISTANT BOURGHEMESTRE OF MUSASA COMMUNE VISITED BRIDGE WHICH WAS REPORTED DESTROYED BY RAINS AT GR 8795 AND HE REQUESTED IF UNAMIR COULD ASSIST IN REPAIRING THE BRIDGE.
5. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY: NTR
6. CIVILIAN AFFAIRS: 4 RETURNERS FROM ZAIRE JOINED THE COMMUNE.
7. LOGISTIC:

VEHICLE STATUS

 - a. On Strength : 9
 - b. Off Road : 5 UNAMIR 1060,1040; ACCIDENT BEFORE JAN 95

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UNAMIR 1254, 080495 ROBBED
UNAMIR 1121, 100695, ACCIDENT


c. Maintenance : 0
d. On Road : 4

8. MILOB STATE:

PERSONNEL STATE:

a. Posted Strength	- 31
b. Attached Strength	- 0
c. Detached Strength	- 0
d. Leave/CTO	- 6
e. Total Absent	- 6
e. Total Present Strength	- 25

9. MISC: NTR


D P MPANDA
MAJOR
FOR SEC COMDR

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KMS / 1299 / OPS

KIGALI, 19 AUG 95

TO : MILOB GR HQ (OPS BR)

FROM: SECTOR 1A HQ

SUBJECT: SITREP NO 450 PERIOD COVERED 180600 - 191800

1. **GENERAL SITUATION:** CALM AND QUIET BUT WITH TENSE SECURITY SITUATION FOR UNAMIR STAFF IN KIGALI AT NIGHT.

2. **POLITICAL ACTIVITY:** NTR

3. **FACTIONAL ACTIVITY:** NTR

a. RPA: PERFORMS RANDOM PTLs AND ROADBLOCKS AT THE USUAL EXTEND.

b. FRGF: NTR

c. MILITIA: NTR

4. **OWN MILITARY ACTIVITY:**

a. SECTOR HQ TODAY MOVED TO TRAFIPRO AND STILL CONTINUES TO SETTLE DOWN IN NEW LOCATION. BASE STATION NOT YET INSTALLED UNTIL TOMORROW BUT ALL OTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS ARE OPERATIONAL. OTHERWISE NO PATROLS WERE CONDUCTED DUE TO THE MOVE.

5. **HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY:** NTR

6. **CIVILIAN AFFAIRS:** NTR

7. **LOGISTIC:**

VEHICLE STATUS

a. On Strength : 9

b. Off Road : 5 UNAMIR 1060,1040; ACCIDENT BEFORE JAN 95
UNAMIR 1254, 080495 ROBBED
UNAMIR 1121, 100695, ACCIDENT

c. Maintenance : 0

d. On Road : 4

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
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8. MILOB STATE:

PERSONNEL STATE:

a. Posted Strength	- 26
b. Attached Strength	- 0
c. Detached Strength	- 0
d. Leave/CTO	- 8
e. Total Absent	- 8
e. Total Present Strength	- 18

9. MISC: NTR


D. P. MPANDA
MAJOR
FOR SEC COMDR

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KMS / 1296 / OPS

KIGALI, 16 AUG 95

TO : MILOB GR HQ (OPS BR)

FROM: SECTOR 6 HQ

SUBJECT: SITREP NO 447 PERIOD COVERED 150600 - 161800

1. **GENERAL SITUATION:** CALM AND QUIET BUT WITH TENSE SECURITY SITUATION FOR UNAMIR STAFF IN KIGALI AT NIGHT.

2. **POLITICAL ACTIVITY:** NTR

3. **FACTIONAL ACTIVITY:** NTR

a. RPA: PERFORMS RANDOM PTLs AND ROADBLOCKS AT THE USUAL EXTEND.

b. FRGF: NTR

c. MILITIA: NTR

4. **OWN MILITARY ACTIVITY:**

a. KM-4 COVERED A MASS RALLY THAT WAS ADDRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF UGANDA MR YOWERI MUSEVENI AT AMAHORO STADIUM FROM 0900 HRS TO 1030 HRS LT. IN HIS SPEECH THE PRESIDENT COVERED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(i) AGRICULTURE: THE PRESIDENT ENCOURAGED RWANDEES PEOPLE TO JOIN HANDS AND WORK HARD IN THE FIELD TO IMPROVE THEIR ECONOMY AND TO START SPECIALISING THEMSELVES IN ALL ASPECTS TO FURTHER IMPROVE THE ECONOMY OF RWANDA.

(ii) POLITICAL: IN HIS ADDRESS THE PRESIDENT ALSO REMINDED THE GATHERING THAT THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA TUTSIS AND HUTUS WAS CAUSED AND ORIGINATED BY WHO HE CALLED EXPLOITERS WITH THE IDEA OF MAKING A DIVIDE AND RULE SYSTEM TO FULFIL THEIR INTERESTS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHO WERE AFRAID TO COME BACK AFTER THE RWANDEES GOVERNMENT HAD OPEN ITS DOORS FOR THEM TO COME BACK. HE THANKED THE GOVERNMENT FOR ACCEPTING THOSE PEOPLE OUTSIDE TO COME BACK AND WORK TOGETHER WITH THE MAJORITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

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(iii) THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED HIS SPEECH BY URGING ALL RWANDEES TO BE VIGILANT AND CREATE A GOOD SECURITY SYSTEM NETWORK AGAINST ANY OUTSIDE INVASION.

- b. KM-6 PERFORMED A ROUTINE PTL IN KANZENZE, GASHORA AND NGENDA COMMUNE. THEY FOUND THE AREA CALM AND QUIET. PTL WAS INFORMED BY UNHCR REP THAT ON MONDAY 14 AUG 95, 453 REFUGEES ENTERED RWANDA FROM BURUNDI. AT 1100 HRS UNHCR REP FROM BURUNDI CAME WITH 9 RETURNERS 6 MALES, 3 FEMALES AND 1 CHILD WHO CAME TO VISIT THEIR HOMES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF UNHCR AT NGENDA COMMUNE. TEAM WAS ALSO INFORMED BY UNHCR REP THAT A CONVOY OF REFUGEES WILL BE COMING TOMORROW 17 AUG 95.

5. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY: NTR

6. CIVILIAN AFFAIRS: NTR

7. LOGISTIC:

VEHICLE STATUS

- a. On Strength : 9
b. Off Road : 5 UNAMIR 1060, 1040; ACCIDENT BEFORE JAN 95
UNAMIR 1254, 080495 ROBBED
UNAMIR 1121, 100695, ACCIDENT
c. Maintenance : 0
d. On Road : 4

8. MILOB STATE:


PERSONNEL STATE:

- a. Posted Strength - 26
b. Attached Strength - 0
c. Detached Strength - 0
d. Leave/CTO - 8 (INCLUDING MILOBS UNDER REPATRIATION)
e. Total Absent - 8
e. Total Present Strength - 18

9. MISC: NTR

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D P MPANDA
MAJOR
FOR SEC COMDR

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File No 5000.7 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: G3 PLANS

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. Am...'.

Date: 1 Apr 95

Subject: UNAMIR FORCE SOPs

1. Please find enclosed amendments to the UNAMIR Force SOP.
2. Please ensure that amendments are made to your copy(ies) of the UNAMIR SOP.

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List: Page 2

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SECTOR 4A	4	62-65
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AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET

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
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MILITARY PERSONNEL BRANCH	15-17
LOGISTICS BRANCH	18-21
PLANS BRANCH	22-27
CAMP COMMANDANT	28
MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP HEADQUARTERS	29-45
SECTOR 1	46-49
SECTOR 2	50-53
SECTOR 3A	54-57
SECTOR 3B	58-61
SECTOR 4A	62-65
SECTOR 4B	66-69
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SPARES	89-94
EXTERNAL	95-98
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/965 (1994)
30 November 1994

RESOLUTION 965 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3473rd meeting,
on 30 November 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 4 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 25 November 1994 (S/1994/1344),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on security in the Rwandese refugee camps of 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1308),

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting the deployment of human rights officers to Rwanda by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to monitor the ongoing human rights situation, to help redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring, to help foster a climate of confidence and the establishment of a more secure environment and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons, and to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice,

Noting also that the widespread dispersal of landmines is causing hardship to the civilian population and is hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons and other humanitarian relief efforts,

94-47584 (E)



/...

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust Fund pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 June 1995;
2. Reaffirms that UNAMIR will:
 - (a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
 - (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
 - (c) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:
 - (a) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;
 - (b) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;
4. Strongly urges the Government of Rwanda to continue its cooperation with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas of Rwanda by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and human rights officers;
5. Welcomes UNAMIR's efforts to increase its radio broadcasting capabilities so as to reach the refugee camps in neighbouring countries and expresses the hope that it will soon be possible for the Government of Rwanda to conclude appropriate arrangements with UNAMIR in this regard, including the allocation of a radio frequency;
6. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, and encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, particularly in Rwanda;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible steps that could be taken by the United Nations to promote the establishment of an effective mine clearance programme in Rwanda;
8. Calls upon the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda directly or through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994;

/...

9. Requests the Secretary-General, following the usual consultations, to inform the Council should he consider that the additional tasks in paragraph 3 require consideration of an adjustment in the logistic and personnel requirements of UNAMIR;

10. Decides to keep under review the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 February 1995 and 9 April 1995, on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

11. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and his Special Humanitarian Envoy to coordinate the United Nations response to the various aspects of the crisis in Rwanda;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

SECTION 20 - INSTRUCTIONS ON USE OF RAPID REACTION FORCE

GENERAL

1. UNAMIR and NGO installations in KIGALI are vulnerable to trespass by unauthorized armed and unarmed locals. In response to the encroachments by locals into UNAMIR/NGO installations, the Rapid Reaction Force(RRF) has been constituted to react quickly and decisively to protect threatened UNAMIR and NGO installations in KIGALI city.

AIM

2. To provide guidelines on the use of the RRF.

COMPOSITION

3. The RRF is a motorised platoon capable of responding to an immediate threat at section level while maintaining the capacity to deploy the whole platoon if necessary.

4. Sector 6 Commander is responsible for providing the RRF.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

5. The RRF will be at 10 minutes NTM and reinforcement of troops as follows:

- a. First reinforcement section at 30 min NTM.
- b. Reinforcement section 2 at 45 min NTM.
- c. Assy area - RRF location.

6. The use of force will be as per UNAMIR Rules of Engagement.

TASKS

7. The RRF WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED FOR MORE THAN 12 HRS. The force may act as a stop gap and should be withdrawn as soon as the threat for which they were deployed no longer exists to free them for other RRF tasks. The RRF may be deployed to undertake the following at short notice:

- a. Provide sentries when unmanned UN property/NGO facilities are threatened by locals/bandits (see Annex L).
- b. Escort unauthorized persons out of UN property and installations.

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- c. Arrest and handover trespassers to the local authorities with the assistance of UNAMIR Military Police.
- d. Protect personnel belonging to UNAMIR, UN agencies, NGOs and local Rwandan citizens (if assessed that local authorities are unable to respond appropriately).

REPORTING

6. When UNAMIR assistance is required at the site of an incident, UNAMIR HQ OPS will be contacted on Channel 4 or 8 and the following information will be passed to the Force Duty Officer to facilitate decision making regarding deployment of the RRF.

- a. Brief description of incident.
- b. Location of incident (Grid Ref necessary).
- c. Suggested loc for RV with RRF.
- d. Strength of trespassers/intruders, whether armed or unarmed. If armed, type of weapons and dispositions at incident site.
- e. Possible routes to incident site.
- f. Comms arrangements if different from CH 4 or 8.
- g. Any cas to UN/NGO personnel.

RESPONSIBILITIES

7. DUTY OFFICER. The Force Duty Officer will be responsible for deploying the RRF. He will ensure that the following are carried out. Paras (a to e) will be carried out before deploying the RRF.

- a. Determine strength of RRF required.
- b. Identify location of incident site.
- c. Identify possible routes.
- d. Brief the RRF comd by radio/telephone on the nature of the impending task including action of RRF at RPA CHPs/Road Blocks.
- e. Inform G3 OPS/G3 PLANS.
- f. Inform RPA LO and Gendamarie HQ of incident and RRF tasks.
- g. Submit detailed After Action Report to DCOS OPS as soon as possible.

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SECTION 20 - INSTRUCTIONS ON USE OF RAPID REACTION FORCEGENERAL

1. UNAMIR and NGO installations in K. vulnerable to trespass by unauthorized locals. In response to the encroachment UNAMIR/NGO installations, the Rapid Reaction Force has been constituted to react quickly protect threatened UNAMIR and NGO installations.

Ops off
All should know
what chn to use
and procedure for
call out.
Set Cdr

AIM

2. To provide guidelines on the use of

COMPOSITION

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- f. **Inform RPA LO and Gendarmerie HQ of incident and RRF tasks.**
- g. **Submit detailed After Action Report to DCOS OPS as soon as possible.**

**GUIDELINES FOR INITIATING AND REVIEWING
UNAMIR CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS**

	PERSONNEL REPORTED UPON	INITIATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1.	For all UNMOS	Team Leader/Sect Comd	CMO
2.	UNMO Team Leaders	Sect Comd/Sect Snr Coord	DFC
3.	Sect Comd UNMOS	CMO	DFC
4.	Sec Heads - Milob HQ	CMO	DFC
5.	Sect Comd/Contingent Comds	DFC	FC
6.	Branch Heads (DCOS OPS/SP)	COS/DFC	FC
7.	Section Heads(Staff- G level)	DCOS/COS	COS/DFC
8.	Remainder force HQ Staff	DCOS	COS
9.	Tac HQ Staff	COS/OC TAC	COS/DFC
10.	<u>Contingent Members:</u> a. 2ICs and all offr b. Infantry Coy (Indep) Cdrs, other offr incl Force HQ Sigs/Engr	Contingent Comd/Bn Cdr COS/DFC	- FC
11.	<u>Force HQ Troops</u> a. 2IC and all officers of Log, Engr & Med element. b. Log, Engr & Med Element Commanders	Element Comd DFC	DFC FC
12.	COS	DFC	FC
13.	CMO	FC	-
14.	DFC	FC	-

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ANNEX B TO
UNAMIR SOPs
PART 9 SECTION 5

(To be issued)

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ANNEX F TO
UNAMIR SOPs
PART 9 SECTION 6

(To be issued)

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

KMS / 4002 / OPS

17 FEB 95

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)

FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ

SUBJECT : VACANT DWELLING IN THE SECTOR'S COMMUNES.

1. ON RECEIVING YOUR LETTER DATED 10 FEB 95 THIS SECTOR HQ HAS CARRIED OUT A RESEARCH ON THE SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE VACANT DWELLING IN THE AOR.

2. THE RESULT OF RESEARCH CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY TO DEPLOY ANY MORE PEOPLE FROM OTHER PLACES BOTH IN CITY AND RURAL COMMUNES BELONGED TO THE AOR OF THE SECTOR. THE REASONS OF THE SITUATION ARE AS FOLLOWS :

a. AFTER THE WAR ALL THREE COMMUNES OF KIGALI CITY HAVE BEEN VOLUNTARILY POPULATED BY BOTH ORIGINAL INHABITANTS AND SO CALLED "RETURNEES" WHO OCCUPIED THE MAJOR NUMBER OF VACANT BUILDINGS IN THE CITY. AS A RESULT OF SUCH OCCUPATION IN SOME SECTORS OF THE AOR THE ORIGINAL OWNERS OF THE HOUSES AND THEIR NEW OWNERS ARE SHARING THE SAME ACCOMMODATION. SOME TIMES THIS LEAD TO TENSION AS THE NEW OWNERS DO NOT WANT TO LEAVE OCCUPIED HOUSES WHAT THEY ARE OBLIGED TO DO IN CASE OF DEMAND FROM THE ORIGINAL OWNERS.

b. THE PERCENTAGE OF THE NEW COMERS FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN SOME AREAS OF THE CITY AMOUNTS TO 70 % OF THE TOTAL POPULATION. MANY OF THEM ARE AS POOR AS ORIGINAL INHABITANTS. DUE TO THAT REASON THERE ARE MANY HOMELESS AND JOBLESS PEOPLE WHO NOW STARTED USING EVERY FREE LOT OF LAND FOR AGRICULTURE.

c. THOSE OF THE NEW COMERS WHO HAVE POWER AND SPECIFIC TIES OCCUPIED SEMICONSTRUCTED HOUSES AND EVEN LOT OF LAND SUITABLE FOR CONSTRUCTING OF A HOUSE. NOW THOSE OF THEM WHO HAVE ENOUGH MONEY STARTED ERECTING HOUSES.

d. THE POPULATION IN SOME OF THE SECTORS OF THE CITY CONSIDERABLY REDUCED DURING THE WAR, BUT THERE IS NO FREE HOUSES IN SUCH AREAS AS THEY MOSTLY POPULATED BY WIDOWS WITH THE CHILDREN AND ORPHANS WHO NEED TO BE SUPPORTED BY DIFFERENT UN AGENCIES AND NGOS AS THE MOST AFFECTED PART OF THE SOCIETY..

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e. MANY OF THE SECTORS OF THE CITY (WITHOUT MENTIONING THE RURAL AREAS) DO NOT HAVE ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY. SANITARY CONDITIONS ALL OVER THE AREA ARE GENERALLY VERY LOW. LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE IS ALSO VERY LOW THAT IS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS OF MALARIA AND DYSENTERY OUTBREAKS IN SOME AREAS.

f. THE SITUATION IN THE RURAL COMMUNES OF THE SECTOR'S AOR IS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT WHAT DESCRIBED ABOVE.

g. IN ADDITION TO ALL MENTIONED IT IS NECESSARY TO OUTLINE THAT THE PROCESS OF RETURN IS NOT OVER AND PEOPLE ARE STILL COMING BACK TO THEIR PLACES OF ORIGIN.

3. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL FACTORS COMPOSING THE SITUATION WITH THE ACCOMMODATION IN THE SECTOR IT SEEMS TO BE MORE FRUITFUL TO CHANGE OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF NUMEROUS UN AGENCIES AND NGOS, HAVING THEIR GENERAL OFFICES IN KIGALI, TO THE SOLUTION OF THE ACUTE PROBLEMS AND SATISFACTION OF VITAL NEEDS OF THE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA, INSTEAD OF CONDENSING THE POPULATION AND THUS MULTIPLYING SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE CAPITAL.



PETROUNOVSKI A
MAJOR
FOR SECTOR COMD

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

KMS / 4001 / OPS

REF : 64001 / OPS

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)

DATE : 17 FEB 95


FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ (OPS BR)

SUBJECT : ASSIGNMENT OF SECTOR PATROL TEAMS TO AOR.

1. IN REPLY TO YOUR LETTER DATED 15 FEB 95 ATTACHED PLEASE FIND SCHEMES WITH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AORS ALLOTTED TO THE PATROL TEAMS OF THIS SECTOR.

2. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE MAP SENT BY YOUR HQ DOESN'T REFLECT THE STRUCTURE OF KIGALI CITY WHICH COMPOSED OF 3 COMMUNES, THE DIVISION OF THE CITY AREA BETWEEN MILOB TEAMS IS SHOWN ON THE SCHEME PROVIDED BY KIGALI CITY PREFECTURE AND USED AS REFERENCE BY THIS SECTOR HQ.


3. THE ASSIGNMENT OF 4 RURAL COMMUNES OF KIGALI PROVINCE INCLUDED IN THE SECTOR'S AOR IS SHOWN ON THE MAP PROVIDED BY YOUR HQ.



PETROUNOVSKI A
MAJOR
FOR SECTOR COMD

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SECTOR 6



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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KMS / 1303 / OPS

24 JAN 95

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)
FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ
SUBJECT : NIGHT PATROLS OF THE AOR.

IN REPLY TO YOUR REQUEST DATED 23 JAN 95 BELOW, PLEASE FIND THE PROPOSALS OF THIS SECTOR HQ REGARDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXECUTING PATROLS OF THE AOR AT NIGHT.

1. a. LOOKING THROUGH THE BACKGROUND OF THE HISTORY OF KIGALI MILOB SECTOR ONE CAN REALIZE THAT SUCH KIND PATROLS HAVE BEEN NEVER EXECUTED BY THE MILOBS EVEN BEFORE THE WAR WHEN THE SITUATION WAS MORE CALM AND SAFE AND ALL WEAPONS WERE LOCKED IN THE STORES.

b. EVEN THAT TIME THERE WERE CASES OF INSTALLING CURFEW HOURS WHICH LASTED FROM 2100 HRS TILL 0500 HRS AND SUCH A REGIME WAS PRESERVED FOR WEEKS.

2. a. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT PATROLS ARE TO BE EXECUTED TO ANSWER A CERTAIN NUMBER OF QUESTIONS COVERING THE SITUATION IN THE AOR.

b. ACCORDING TO THE INFO COLLECTED BY THE MILOBS OF THIS SECTOR DURING THEIR PATROLS OF THE AOR LOCAL PEOPLE DO NOT FEEL SAFE DURING THE NIGHT HOURS DUE TO BANDITRY AND VIOLATION WHICH HAPPENS AT THAT TIME. LOCAL RESIDENTS REPEATEDLY REPORTED TO THE MILOBS THAT THEY RUSH TO THEIR HOUSES BETWEEN 1900 AND 2000 HRS AS THERE IS NO SECURITY FOR THEM IN THE OUTSIDE.

c. IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF KIGALI SECURITY SITUATION IS EVEN WORTH DUE TO THE REASON THAT IN THOSE AREAS THE NUMBER OF GENDARMERIE PERSONNEL AND RPA SOLDIERS IS INSIGNIFICANT AND DOESN'T MEET REQUIREMENTS.

d. IT IS ALSO NOT A SECRET THAT ALL OFFICES OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ARE CLOSED AFTER 1700 HRS.

3. a. AFTER THE WAR RPA STARTED INSTALLING DAY AND NIGHT CHECK POINTS AND ROAD BLOCKS WITH DIFFERENT PURPOSES. IT ALSO HAS A PRACTICE OF CARRYING OUT NIGHT PATROLS IN GROUPS UP TO A SECTION.

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THESE BLOCKS AND PATROLS ARE ARMED AND CHANGE THEIR LOCATION ALL THE TIME, SO THAT ONE CAN NEVER KNOW WHERE HE WILL BE STOPPED EVEN DURING THE DAY.

b. THIS SECTOR HQ INVESTIGATED SOME CASES OF FIRING BY RPA AT VEHICLES WHICH PASSED A CERTAIN BLOCK WITHOUT NOTICING IT. AS A RESULT OF SUCH INCIDENTS SOME PEOPLE WERE KILLED.


c. THERE WERE ALSO SOME CASES OF TAKING UNAMIR VEHICLES AT A GUN-POINT AFTER WHICH THERE WERE RELEASED SOME REGULATIONS THAT MOVEMENT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED AT NIGHT HOURS.

4. IN VIEW OF ALL MENTIONED ABOVE THIS SECTOR HQ CAN NOT RECOMMEND EXECUTION OF NIGHT PATROLS AS :

- SUCH PATROLS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THEIR MAIN TASK, I.E. TO MONITOR AND OBSERVE THE SITUATION,

- SENDING SUCH PATROLS IN THE SITUATION WHEN RPA SOLDIERS CARRYING OUT THEIR NIGHT DUTIES AND IN SOME CASES BEING DRUNK, AND WHEN THERE ARE SO MANY WEAPONS KEPT BY THE LOCAL POPULATION MEANS RISKING LIVES OF UNARMED OBSERVERS WHO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST DUE TO THEIR STATUS IF VIOLATED BY THE OPPOSITE SIDE.

5. IT IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR FURTHER CONSIDERATION PLEASE.


PETROUNOVSKI A
MAJOR
FOR SECTOR COMD

UN RESTRICTED



UNITED NATIONS
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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

TO : BMES, FORCE HQ

DATE : 29 DEC 94

ATTN : MR. MICHAEL SOBEC


FROM : KIGALI SECTOR MILOB HQ (OPS BR)

SUBJECT : OFFICE REPAIRS' NEEDS.

1. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND THE REQUEST FOR THE NECESSARY REPAIR WORKS IN KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ'S OFFICE.

2. YOUR COOPERATION IN THE MATTER WILL BE HIGHLY APPRECIATED.

THANKS IN ADVANCE.


PETROUNOVSKI A.
MAJOR
OPS OFFR

UN RESTRICTED



WORK ORDER REQUEST

CMC# _____

DATE OF REQUEST: 29 DEC 94 WORK LOCATION: KIGALI CITY

Description of work (attach sheet if necessary):

1. electricity system of the house should be checked as in some places power is not coming to the bulbs and sockets
2. shower tub sewer on the first floor to be repaired (water leaks into the ground floor bathroom)
3. toilet flush tank flushing mechanism is to be fixed both in the toilets on the ground and first floors
4. glasses need to be installed into some windows on both floors
5. protective lattice should be repaired and welded on some windows
6. sewage ditch cover is to be repaired (or replaced).
7. on the downspouts hall roof it is necessary to make a peak to protect the generator from the rain water coming inside.
8. some tiles to be replaced and installed on the roof of the house.

Point of Contact: Kigali MINUS Sec HQ Phone/Call sign: CH-1

Priority of Work: ☐ Flash; ☐ Immediate; ☒ Urgent; ☐ Routine

Requested Completion Date: _____

SUBTASK MANAGER (only)

Subtask WO number: _____

Comments:

Subtask Order Manager: _____ Date: _____

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CELL (only)

Work Order Number: 10. . .0-

Cost estimate:

☐ Need Detailed cost estimate. Provide estimate in ____ day(s)

☐ Need Rough order cost estimate. Provide estimate in ____ day(s)

☐ No cost estimate required

Action:

☐ Do Not begin work until directed by the Contract Administrator.

☐ Begin work immediately

Comments:

AUTHORIZED BY: _____ Date: _____

CERTIFIED AUTHORITY: _____ Date: _____

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

KMS / 1301 / OPS

28 NOV 94

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)

FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ (OPS BR)

SUBJECT : CANCELLATION OF TWO MSNS BY IOM ON SUNDAY, 27 NOV 94.

ON 26 NOV 94 AT 1426 HRS THE DUTY OFFR OF THIS SECTOR RECEIVED TWO TASKS FROM THE DUTY OFFR OF MILOB GP HQ FOR 27 NOV 94. THE MESSAGE SAID THAT TWO MILOB TEAMS WERE TO REPORT AT UNHCR RECEPTION CENTRE TO ESCORT IOM CONVOYS WITH DISPLACED PEOPLE TO KANZENZE. THE FIRST CONVOY WAS TO START FROM NDERA AT 0900 HRS AND THE SECOND AT 1130 HRS WAS TO BE MET BY THE TEAM IN AOU BOULEVARD IN KIGALI AND TO PROCEED TO KANZENZE.

TWO MILOB TEAMS KM 2 AND KM 3 WERE DETAILED FOR THE TASKS.

ON 27 NOV 94 AT 0907 HRS KM 2 REPORTED FROM UNHCR RECEPTION CENTRE THAT THERE WAS NEITHER TRANSPORT NO PEOPLE TO BE ESCORTED. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IOM INFORMED THE MILOBS THAT FOR THE DAY ALL MSNS WERE CANCELLED. THE MILOBS RETURNED TO THE BASE.

THERE IS A REQUEST FROM THIS SECTOR HQ TO MILOB GP HQ TO FIND OUT THE EXACT WORKING DAYS AND WORKING HOURS OF UN/NGOS OPERATING IN KIGALI AS WELL AS OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND TO GIVE THE MSNS TO THE SECTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEM.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS SECTOR MILOBS SHOWS THAT MOST OF UN/NGOS AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS CEASE THEIR ACTIVITIES ON WEEKENDS.


PETROUNOVSKI A.
MAJOR
OPS OFFR

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KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

Seen
29/11

KMS / 1300 / OPS

28 NOV 94

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)


FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ

SUBJECT : HANDING OVER UNAMIR VEH TO RPA

ON 27 NOV 94 AT 1315 HRS THIS SECTOR HQ RECEIVED THE MSN FROM CLOGO OF MILOB GP HQ TO DETAIL ONE MILOB TEAM OF 4 UNMOS TO TAKE A VEH FROM UNAMIR GARAGE AND TO HAND IT OVER TO AN NGO IN KIBUYE. THERE WAS NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VEH No, ITS TYPE AND THE NAME OF NGO TO WHICH THE VEH WAS TO BE HANDED OVER. KM 4 WAS DETAILED FOR THE MSN AND ARRIVED TO THE GARAGE AT 1430 HRS AS IT WAS ORDERED.

CHIEF OF THE GARAGE INFORMED THE MILOBS THAT IT WAS UNAMIR VEH No. 1085 AND THE TASK WAS TO HAND IT OVER TO RPA IN KIBUYE. BUT HE REFUSED TO RELEASE THE VEH WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF CTO. KM 4 ALONG WITH CHIEF OF THE GARAGE WENT TO FHQ TO MEET CTO. WHEN THE MATTER WAS EXPLAINED TO CTO HE SAID THAT TO HAND OVER THE VEH TO RPA HE NEEDS AN OFFICIAL LETTER FROM DFC AUTHORIZING THIS ACT.

KM 4 REPORTED TO DUTY OFFR OF THE SECTOR THAT CTO WANTS TO HAND OVER THE VEH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL PROCEDURE AND THAT HE NEEDS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT FOR THIS. THE DUTY OFFR CONVEYED THE MESSAGE TO THE DUTY OFFR OF MILOB GP HQ AND OPS OFFR OF THIS SECTOR. OPS OFFR OF THE SECTOR INFORMED CLOGO THAT CTO AND THE GARAGE PERSONNEL REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS SAYING THAT THEY CAN NOT HAND OVER THE VEH WITHOUT THEM. OPS OFFR ALSO ASKED FOR A DECISION OR A SOLUTION ON THIS TASK FROM CLOGO. THE MSN WASN'T CANCELLED BY ANYBODY BUT THE VEH WAS NOT RELEASED DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS. THE TEAM WAS KEPT IN STAND-BY TILL EVENING.


PETROUNOVSKI A.
MAJOR
OPS OFFR

UN RESTRICTED