

UNAMIR

MINUTES OF MEETINGS AND NOTES FOR
THE FILE

1 SEPT 1994 - 14 JAN 1995

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

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SERIES	<u>S-1120</u>
BOX	<u>45</u>
FILE	<u>7</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0278</u>

NOTE FOR THE FILE

TO: AMBASSADOR KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR

FROM: SIDIQUE DAO, OIC HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

I visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 12th and 13th of December and had meetings with the ECA Executive Secretary, Layashi Yaker and the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim. Following are the salient points of my meetings:

OPERATION RETOUR AND RETURN OF REFUGEES.

Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applauded the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking on operation Homeward and now on operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes hitherto committed during operation Homeward.

The OAU Secretary-General observed that a new phenomenon is slowly creeping into the refugee crisis as a number of host countries, including Tanzania and Zaire, are fed-up with and in fact overtly hostile to refugees staying in their countries. In view of this xenophobia, it is vital that immediate steps are taken to accelerate/facilitate refugee return.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the welcome camps distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) would serve as an incentive for the refugees to repatriate voluntarily; barring the continued intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma.

The decision by the Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps was welcomed by the OAU S-G. He deems refugee return as the necessary first step in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.

ON UN ACTION IN THE CAMPS

The OAU S-G considered the option of deploying an international force in the refugee camps as impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

Note for the file

At the meeting that the SRSG had with the Foreign Minister and The Minister of Defence of Ethiopia on Tuesday, 13th December, 1994, the following observations are significant:

1. That the Ethiopian military contingent serving with UNAMIR in Sector 4 inside Rwanda as formed troops were deployed by the Ethiopian government with their own equipment and other relevant logistic support in anticipation being reimbursed by the UN. To date, the government is complaining that no refund has been effected.
2. Since these troops still carry Ethiopian Registration plates, the cost of running and maintaining these vehicles on UNAMIR errands is borne by the Ethiopians themselves.
3. The spare parts which the Ethiopian government provided to their troops have been exhausted and it is the responsibility of UNAMIR to procure these spare parts. Should UNAMIR be constrained in view of the special character of these vehicles (i.e. East European), Then the Ethiopian government will be ready to provide these spare parts if UNAMIR is willing to refund the cost of such spares.
4. The APCs that the Ethiopians brought in with them are of limited usefulness; given the terrain and landscape of their area of operation here in Rwanda. The contingent does not have enough patrolling jeeps; and this is causing hardship for their troops.
5. The Defence Minister also lamented the living\shelter conditions of the Ethiopian troops in Cyangugu with insufficient and inappropriate tents and appealed to the SRSG to look into this.

Ag. Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Henry Anyidoho
UNAMIR

Your comments please.

A. B. Sidique Dao
Ag. Personal Assistant to The SRSG
& OIC Humanitarian Affairs



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA


UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSG/NV/56/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise, se réfère à sa note verbale No. SRSG/NV/50/94 du 3 novembre 1994 et a l'honneur de l'informer que le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, S.E. M. l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan est rentré ce jour 12 novembre 1994 à Kigali et a repris ses fonctions à la tête de la Mission.

La MINUAR se réjouit de la coopération du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 12 novembre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/07/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments à la Nonciature Apostolique, aux Missions diplomatiques et consulaires, aux Organisations Internationales et Agences Spécialisées accréditées auprès de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de les informer que le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour le Rwanda, Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan est, à partir du 14 janvier absent de Kigali pour une mission officielle à Genève et Paris.

Durant son absence, l'intérim sera assuré par le Commandant de la Force de la Mission, le Général-Major Guy C. Tousignant.

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda se rejouit de la coopération de la Nonciature Apostolique, de toutes les Missions diplomatiques et consulaires, les Organisations Internationales précitées et saisit cette occasion pour leur renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 14 janvier 1995

- Nonciature Apostolique
- Missions diplomatiques et consulaires
- Organisations Internationales et Spécialisées des Nations Unies

KIGALI - RWANDA



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSG/NV/06/95

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Fait à Kigali, le 14 janvier 1995

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

D R A F T

To: THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

FROM: AMBASSADOR KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR

*This should be made into
a note for the file. I have
attached a telegram based on this
note.
By Day.*

I visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 12th and 13th of December and had meetings with the ECA Executive Secretary, Layashi Yaker and the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr Salim Ahmed Salim. Following is a brief report on my meetings:

On the return of the refugees

Operation Retour and return of refugees
Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applauded the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking ~~previously~~ on operation Homeward and now on operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes hitherto committed during Operation Homeward.

The OAU Secretary-General observed that a new phenomenon is slowly creeping into the refugee crisis as a number of host countries, including Tanzania and Zaire, are fed-up with and infact overtly hostile to refugees staying in their countries. In view of this xenophobia, it is vital that immediate steps are taken to accelerate/facilitate refugee return.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the **welcome camps** distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) would serve as an incentive for the refugees to repatriate voluntarily; barring the continued intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma.

The decision by the Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps was welcomed by the OAU S-G. He deems **refugee return as the necessary first step** in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.

On UN Action in the camps

The OAU S-G considered the option of deploying an international force in the refugee camps as impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

In his view, the most attractive action/solution rests with the deployment of (some of) the crack troops of the national security forces in Zaire and Tanzania provided that these countries are assisted with the required logistics.

Tanzania has always been willing and ready to co-operate with the efforts of the international community in this regard as they have a field-force (paramilitary police) unit to take care of any foreseen intimidation in the refugee camps inside Tanzania without provoking the hue and cry of UNHCR and other Agencies and NGOs.

The OAU S-G is of the opinion that President Mobutu is now on board with the rest of the international community in its bid to settle this intimidation problem once and for all. He further suggested that we could even field a team of observers in Zaire particularly to monitor what the crack force would be doing.

On the need for more effective rapproachment and reconciliation effort by the government of Rwanda

The S-G of the OAU emphasized that the present government of Rwanda should be seen to be sincere in its efforts at national reconciliation; although he was conscious of the limitations and handicaps faced by the government in the light of much-needed international development support and assistance in Rwanda.

The OAU S-G in particular stressed that the continued disappearance of people within Rwanda is indefensible as the Kigali government can no longer continue to deny ultimate responsibility for such continued atrocities; over five months after the war.

The Rwandese government should adopt a friendly diplomatic initiative vis-a-vis its neighbours including Zaire; otherwise their real intention would be misunderstood. In particular, Rwanda should be discouraged from escalating rhetoric like its avowed policy of hot pursuit into Zairean territory; particularly now that the political endorsement of The President of Zaire is an absolute necessity in resolving the refugee crisis.

The OAU S-G observed that the authorities in Rwanda should also endeavour to work with other Rwandese who do not necessarily share their ideology; observing that since the ex-MRND top brass do not appear to have any remorse for the massacres, other Rwandese technocrats, bankers, economists, lawyers scattered all over the globe could well fill this gap.

On the need for the donor community to target real problems\issues

Both the OAU and ECA chiefs appear to be disappointed that the donor community has spent well over US \$700 million in humanitarian\relief assistance and hardly anything on development aid. Indeed, for sustainable peace and stability, the state of Rwanda has to be assisted to function by first resuscitating\rehabilitating its state institutions. This is a sine qua non for reconciliation and good governance in Rwanda.

In this connection, the ECA Executive Secretary expressed willingness to cooperate with UNAMIR in soliciting and coordinating donor assistance for Rwanda in this atmosphere of competing initiatives for donor funding which is already being seriously undermined by incipient donor fatigue.

On the Regional Conference

Agreeing fully with the urgent need for a Regional Conference under the auspices of the UN Secretary General (and co-chaired perhaps with The OAU), the OAU S-G suggested that a Preparatory Conference could be held in January to precede the main Conference in February, 1995 to discuss principally the problem of refugees of Rwanda and The Great Lakes within a regional context. He further stated that perhaps UNHCR should to be reminded that politics and refugee work are necessarily strange bed-fellows.

On the International Tribunal

The OAU S-G considered it unfortunate that Rwanda voted **No** at The Security Council on the Resolution setting up The Tribunal. However, he felt it was vital to commence the Tribunal without undue delay to cleanse the ghost of genocide in Rwanda.

The OAU Secretary General promised to make available African magistrates, judges and other legal luminaries that are particularly conversant with the French/Rwandese law.



SRSR/NV/52/94

NOTE VERBALE

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda presents its compliments to the Ministry of Information of the Rwandese Republic and has the honour to bring to its attention the arrangements made so far with regard to the operation of a radio broadcasting station by UNAMIR.

Following previous discussions with your Government on this issue, UNAMIR has received and installed the appropriate equipment at its Headquarters in Kigali for the operation of a radio broadcasting station. This facility is to be expanded in future with the installation of repeater stations at selected sites in Rwanda. UNAMIR now intends to commence periodic test broadcasts from its installation in Kigali, pending the granting of a radio frequency by your Government.

UNAMIR avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Government of Rwanda the assurances of its highest consideration. *AK*



Kigali, 8 November 1994

Ministry of Information
Kigali
Rwanda



SRS6/NV/53/94

NOTE VERBALE

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic and has the honour to refer to its letter dated 5 October 1994 regarding the proposed exchange of letters on the Status of Mission Agreement signed in New York on 5 November 1993. May we respectfully remind your Ministry that we still await the response of your Government to enable us to advise the Secretary-General accordingly for the purpose of expediting such exchange of letters. We would be most grateful if we could be informed of your Government's position on this matter as soon as possible. *AM*

We take this opportunity to renew our sincere collaboration.



Kigali, 8 November 1994

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Cooperation
Kigali
Rwanda



UNAMIR/AMIR/AR

SRSG/NV/54/94

NOTE VERBALE

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zaire and has the honour to refer to the proposed exchange of letters between the United Nations and Zaire for the purpose of facilitating the operations of UNAMIR in providing logistic support for humanitarian operations in the refugee camps for Rwandese nationals in Zaire. Another copy of the letter proposed by the Secretary-General is attached.

May we respectfully remind your Ministry that UNAMIR still awaits the response of your Government to enable us to advise the Secretary-General for the purpose of expediting such exchange of letters. We would be most grateful if we could be informed of your Government's position on this matter as soon as possible.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of our highest consideration. *MM*



His Excellency
The Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Zaire
Kinshasa
Zaire

CNR 551 P5/7

1 September 1994

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to resolution 872 (1993) of 25 October 1993 by which the United Nations Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission for Assistance to Rwanda (UNAMIR) and resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 by which the Council authorized an expansion of the mission.

In this respect and taking into consideration the state of the infrastructure currently existing in Rwanda, the tasks entrusted to UNAMIR by the Security Council require, in order to be more efficiently carried out, the continued co-operation of your Government, in view in particular of the frequency of the movement of ~~the~~ personnel, logistical supplies and equipment of UNAMIR between Zaire and Rwanda.

For this purpose, and in accordance with international law and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations, UNAMIR, as an organ of the United Nations, shall enjoy, together with its property, funds, assets and its personnel, the privileges and immunities, rights and facilities necessary for the fulfillment of its tasks.

His Excellency LUNDA BULULU
The Honorable ~~Minister of Foreign Affairs~~
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Zaire
Kinshasa
Zaire

CNR 551 P6/7

- 2 -

Accordingly, I propose that your Government in implementation of its obligations under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the "Convention") to which Zaire acceded, on 8 December 1964 extend to:

- the Special Representative, the Force Commander, the Liaison Officer and such high ranking members of UNAMIR whose names shall be communicated to your Government, the status specified in Sections 19 and 27 of the Convention, provided that the privileges and immunities therein referred to shall be those accorded to diplomatic envoys by international law;
- the officials of the United Nations assigned to serve with UNAMIR the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled to under Articles V and VII of the Convention;
- the personnel assigned to serve with UNAMIR other than United Nations officials, such as civilian personnel contributed by Member States, the privileges and immunities accorded to experts performing missions for the United Nations under Article VI of the Convention.

The privileges and immunities necessary to facilitate the tasks of UNAMIR shall also include:

- (i) freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment spare parts and means of transport, including expeditious issuance of entry and exit visas except that such visas shall be dispensed with in the case of personnel furnished with a United Nations laissez-passer or certificate indicating that they are performing functions in connection with Security Council resolutions 872 (1993) and 918 (1994);
- (ii) exemption from all direct taxes, import and export duties, registration fees and charge on its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport and their expeditious customs clearance;
- (iii) freedom of movement on land, sea and air for its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and means of transport;

CNR 551 P7/7

- 3 -

- (iv) right to fly the United Nations flag on premises and observation posts, vehicles and aircraft and vessels;
- (v) acceptance of United Nations registration of means of transport on land, sea and in the air and United Nations licensing of the operators thereof and;
- (vi) the right to unrestricted communication by radio, satellite or any other forms of communication including coded messages and to connect with the United Nations radio and satellite network, as well as by telephone, telegraph or any other means.

It is understood that all land and premises which shall be used by UNAMIR for the conduct of its operational and administrative activities shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the United Nations.

It is also expected that the Government of Zaire shall assist, to the extent possible, in providing UNAMIR and its members with the support and co-operation ^{necessary} for their safety and security. | x

If the above provisions meet with our approval, I would propose that this letter and the written confirmation of your acceptance of its provisions constitute an agreement between the United Nations and Zaire to take effect immediately.

I take this opportunity to express ^{my} gratitude to the Government of Zaire for the support provided to UNAMIR in facilitating its tasks. | x

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

NOTE FOR THE FILE

**MISSION OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA
Monday, 14th Nov. to Saturday, 20th Nov. 1994**

Members of The Mission

Ambassador Robert Dillon	Leader
Serge Telle	DHA
A. B. Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

Countries Visited

Zaire: Held discussions with The President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. Also had meetings with The UNDP Res Rep and The Charge D'Affairs of The US Embassy.

Burundi: Held discussions with The President and the Minister of National Rehabilitation and Social Re-integration. Also had meetings with The SRSG to Burundi, Mr. Abdallah and The CAO, Mr. Abdel Aziz.

Tanzania: Held discussions with The President in Dar es Salam; and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Dodoma. Also had meetings with Representatives /Ambassadors of The donor Community and The UNDP Res Rep, Mr. Victor Angelo.

Observations of the Zairean Authorities on the Refugee crisis

1. That repatriation is the only lasting solution.
2. That Zaire has suffered tremendous physical, social, economic, ecological and environmental degradation as a result of the massive refugee influx; particularly in the North and South Kivu Regions.
3. That the concentration of a large Hutu refugee population is distorting the tribal make-up of Zaire.
4. That the main obstacle to repatriation is not just due to insecurity in the camps; but also due to political considerations inside Rwanda as well.
5. That the authorities in Rwanda are not ready and willing to receive the refugees.
6. That the International Community should adopt measures to ensure that Kigali makes positive moves, including respect for the main features of the Arusha Accords, to encourage voluntary repatriation of the Rwandese refugees.
7. That the local population is fed up with the refugees pillaging their territory.

8. That the International Community should assist in the expeditious settlement of this crisis since Zaire is not ready to accept another "Palestine" on their territory.

9. That the return of the assets and other financial resources (belonging to Rwanda) that were brought into Zaire by the refugees depends entirely on the willingness of the government of Rwanda to create the conditions that would facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the refugees.

10. That the International Community is not helping Zaire to meet the cost of absorbing the impact of sheltering a total of two (2) million Rwandese.

That the ex-RGF are in a peculiar position since they receive no assistance from neither ICRC nor UNHCR or any other humanitarian assistance agency/NGO for that matter.

11. That the UN should assist both the country of assylum/refuge (Zaire) and the country of origin (Rwanda).

12. That Zaire is fully supportive of the idea of separating the militant elements and ex-RGF from the rest of the refugees (commonfolk).

13. That the Zairean authorities are ready and willing to have the refugees relocate westward to sites that have already been identified by the government and that Zaire expects the United Nations to assist with logistic capability in this respect.

14. That the UN/Zaire Joint Technical Mission (Sept.-Oct.1994) Report is still outstanding; and as such, UNAMIR is expected to take appropriate action to give this outstanding matter a logical conclusion.

15. That the government of Zaire is equally concerned about violence in the camps and would be ready, as such, to deploy Zairean troops/security forces with the support and assistance of the United Nations.

16. That Zaire will not support any attempt by the refugees to invade Rwanda from Zairean territory since President Mobutu has already signed a Communique with President Bizimungu in Mauritius to the effect.

17. That the Rwandese government be strongly advised not to carry out hostile military action (ostensibly against the refugees) inside Zairean territory as this would constitute a serious breach of the peace. At the moment, The RPA have allegedly deployed a battallion and dug trenches in the Cyangugu area, facing Bukavu into Zairean territory.

18. That Zaire wants the Rwandese refugees out of Zairean territory before the General elections that are due to take place in Zaire in the third quarter of 1995 latest.

Finally, President Mobutu mentioned that it should not be forgotten that the late President Habyarimana was his friend. That was why he personally chose to bury him temporarily in Gbadolite, awaiting to finally give him a fitting funeral like a Head of State when conditions permit in Rwanda. President Mobutu asked that it should be conveyed to the government in Kigali that "the late President was a good man and should be treated as such."

Observations of the Authorities in Burundi on the Refugee situation

1. That the refugee situation is potentially explosive and could destabilise the entire sub-region.
2. That repatriation efforts be given utmost priority by both the home countries and the international community as the #1 item on the agenda to establish a lasting peace in the sub-region.
3. That the composition and character of the refugee stock should invite the attention of The United Nations in the affairs of Burundi which is like a powder-keg, ready to explode.
4. That the International Community should assist both Burundi and Rwanda to create and maintain stable institutions that would enable Hutus and Tutsis to co-exist in an atmosphere of relative tranquility.
5. That the countries of origin should give physical and material security to repatriating refugees and also respect for their proprietary rights in order to facilitate refugee return.
6. That a political initiative under the aegis of a neutral body like the OAU and/or The UN be adopted for the frank exchange of views on issues of the sub-region.

Observations of the Tanzanian Authorities on the Refugee situation

1. That the Rwandese Government is not doing enough to attract or encourage the refugees to repatriate.
2. That the refugee problem is the most important and pressing issue facing the region at this material point in time. Consequently, the Rwandan government should be prevailed upon by the International Community to be seen to give top priority to the repatriation of the refugees since, inter alia, humanitarian aid is ultimately limited in scope and time.

3. That the cost of this refugee invasion is infact politically explosive and phenomenally prohibitive in all aspects of the socio-economic make-up of Tanzania.

4. That the International Community should also consider giving material and logistic assistance to Tanzania in view of the fact that over 563,445 refugees have infested the Kagera Region alone viz:

Ngara District	403,534
Karagwe District	155,411
Muleba District	4500

5. That the United Nations (and UNHCR in particular) is giving the impression of perpetuating the refugees' stay in Tanzanian territory and this is absolutely unacceptable as they appear to be slow in taking concrete steps both within and outside Rwanda for a wholesome settlement of the crisis.

6. That Tanzania is "fed up" with hosting such large numbers of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi since Tanzania has neither the land nor the resources to continue acting as good host to refugees who are wrecking so much havoc to the local population and pillaging their resources.

7. That the Tanzanian security forces can provide adequate security for refugee camps situated inside Tanzania with, perhaps, some technical assistance.

8. That the security considerations of the refugees would be more effectively and efficiently served if the UN decides to give logistic support- i.e. vehichles (and bikes), radios, etc.- to the Tanzanian police/security forces instead of contemplating the deployment of a multinational force. For example, whereas a Japanese Security Officer might cost approximately US \$10,000 monthly, the UN would be expected to spend an average of US \$250 to deploy a Tanzanian for the same exercise.

9. That UNAMIR should deploy many more Blue Berets in Eastern Rwanda to give them conspicuous visibility which would further magnetise the refugees to repatriate through the Kubongo and Akagera regions.

10. That plans should be made by the UN to transfer the refugee camps in Tanzania into Rwandan territory if arrangements are not facilitated for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees by mid- 1995.


11. That since Tanzania is not going to allow these refugees to continue staying indefinitely, the authorities suggested that they might be forced to do what President Musseveni did with the Rwandese refugees in Uganda.

12. That some militant refugees have invaded a Tanzanian Island off the Kagera River and are performing military exercises there. This has forced the resident Tanzanians formerly living there to

flee; much to the discomfiture of the Tanzanian authorities who intend taking appropriate steps to throw these refugees out. So, there is a real need for the International Community to strengthen the Tanzanian Security forces so that any attempt by "the refugees" to invade or further destabilise Rwanda could be forstalled.

13. That the earlier suggestion of transferring the refugees into southern Tanzania is still an option; should everything else fail.

14. That Tanzania would be ready to host and even finance an International Conference to discuss refugee and other security matters affecting the sub-region since Tanzania is on record as having a whole lot of experience on regional conferences.


Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao
Humanitarian Assistance Officer

NOTE FOR THE FILE

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TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA
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7. That the local population is fed up with the refugees pillaging their territory.

Analyze

1. #s of orphans not in orphanages & those in orphanages.
2. Age group
 - Break down
 - Total in group
3. Examine what they would normally be doing at that age.
4. Give indication of facilities available
 - crèches, feeding places, schools, playgrounds, medical facilities etc.
5. Resources available so far.
6.

a) UNICEF	b) Church
How	To Give

VIEWS/COMMENTS ON MEMO OF 15 OCTOBER 1994 FROM MR. M. NCUBE, CHIEF,
BOARD OF INQUIRY UNIT TO MR. P. HORNSBY, REGARDING A FUND TO HELP
RWANDESE CHILDREN

The idea to create a fund to help the Rwandese children, under the auspices of OCHA, is a excellent one. UNAMIR could start this BENEVOLENT FUND with other UN Agencies. No fixed amount should be set; those who are willing to participate should contribute whatever amount they can. A Comittee should also be constituted to manage the Fund.

As Christmas is approaching some of the money collected could be used to buy toys for children in hospitals and orphanages. Other items that could be bought could include school items such as pencils, exercise books, coloured pencils, etc.

At this stage, I do not think UNAMIR should be involved in health care, distribution of food, etc. as this is being taken care of by WFP, UNHCR, and NGOs. Some UNAMIR staff and also those of other UN agencies have mentioned that they would like to give some of their clothing to some charitable organisation. A collection of such items could also be organised.

Another area where UNAMIR could help would be adult literacy. Evening classes could be organised for women, to teach them how to sew, crochet, knit or even to read or understand French/English. Since French is taught only at the primary school level, we could arrange for classes to be held for children who have not reached this level.

To see this project through, there should not only be goodwill and willingness, but also careful planning and team work.

Felixtina Forster
OCHA
UNAMIR

20 October 1994

cc: SRSG
ED
HAC
OIC/ADM
OIC/OCHA

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Date: 15 October 1994

To: Mr. Peter J. A. Hornsby
OIC Administration i.a.From: Mtshana M. Ncube
Chief, Boards of Inquiry Unit
Administrative/Legal OfficerSubject: "Give a person a fish, he will be hungry afterwards.
But teach him/her how to fish, he/she will never go
hungry" (A Paraphrase): A Fund to Help Rwandese
ChildrenPl. C. Hornsby
18/10

The most apparent physical consequences of war in Rwanda today are in the destroyed and damaged buildings in Kigali and throughout Rwanda. What is not immediately apparent are the mass graves which are the products of genocide and revenge killings.

Apart from the direct victims of the mass killings, others became indirect victims. Thousands of children were orphaned and many of them have neither shelter nor food. Some of the children have taken to begging on the streets, in front of hotels, and residences of UN and NGO personnel in Rwanda. I am sure many UN and expatriate personnel have been moved by the plight of these children. And sometimes reacting out of pity, if not a sense of unexplained guilt in some cases, we have given to the little ones small amounts of change.

The desire to help alleviate the suffering of the little children is honourable. But, unless it is properly and constructively channelled the intended help can be destructive where it engenders in the children a begging, and therefore dependency, syndrome manifested in other parts of the world by the so-called street kids/children. Experience elsewhere has shown that rather than help the children, hand-outs to individual begging children outside a social framework can be even more destructive than not giving at all. We should be conscious not to tear the children from the social fabric, fragile as the Rwandese one might be following the cruel events of the past months.

It is with the foregoing in mind that I make a humble proposal to UNAMIR and to those who would wish to help the orphans of Rwanda in a constructive way. Let there be a Special Fund set up under the auspices of the Humanitarian Assistance Office. In coordination with the appropriate Ministry, collective feeding, clothing, health, school projects, existing orphanages, could be financed, at least in part, from the Special Fund. UNAMIR staff and expatriates would be invited to make donations to the Fund.

②
SRSG
→

Maybe this will be an opportunity for UNAMIR staff to teach the Rwandese children how to fish so that they can help themselves in the future.

There are no legal impediments that I know of to such a scheme. I request your consideration of the idea and, if it is acceptable to you, to initiate the appropriate further consultation and the possible creation of such a Fund.

② SRSG.

This seems to me to be an excellent suggestion. You may wish to pass this on to the Humanitarian Cell for further investigation

ACSS
17/10

Ms Forster
Dr. views +
comments pt.

DJ
19.10.94

DRAFT

Mr. Stanislaus Nkwain
Deputy Resident Representative
U N D P
Zaire

Dear Mr. Nkwain

C I am pleased to acknowledge the invaluable role that you have played both in your personal and official capacity as Deputy Resident Representative of The United Nations Development Programme in Zaire in complementing UNAMIR's efforts in bringing some measure of an enduring peace and stability in Rwanda. In particular, your outstanding contribution in co-ordinating the programme and activities of the recently completed United Nations Technical Mission on the security situation in the Rwandese refugee camps in Zaire has been acknowledged by that Technical Mission leader, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho, Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR.

We have found The Technical Report to be very useful and I wish to thank you and all the other members of The Mission warmly for your cooperation and support.

Best wishes.

C Yours Sincerely

Shaharyar M. Khan
S R S G, UNAMIR

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BT

35362-08 COTTA INFO GOLO FROM WENGERT/DA COSTA. ABU BAKARR DAG
SELECTED FOR APPOINTMENT TO UNAMIR. AAA) APPRECIATE YOU
ARRANGE TVL ONE WAY FREETOWN/NAIROBI ASAP REFERRING TO PT. 8
NO. 4-06-39823 AND ALLOTACCOUNT RNA-30200-151 AT COST NOT EXCEEDING:
USD 1218 (ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN) (C)
(FNA/ABJ/NBO)

BBB) IN ADDITION TO NORMAL BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE UNDER (ST/AI/229)
RECRUIT ENTITLED TO 10 KGS ACCOMPANIED EXCESS BAGGAGE IN LIEU
OF 100 KGS UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE. CCC) PLS HAVE RECRUIT
COMPLETE AND RETURN P1, P2, PT. 65 FORM WITH 4 PHOTOS AND
SALARY DISTRIBUTION FORM TO FOD. PLS PROVIDE RECRUIT UNAMIR
NOTES. DDD) RECRUIT MAY TRAVEL ON VALID NATIONAL PASSPORT AND
UNLP WILL BE SENT TO MISSION. EEE) KINDLY ADVISE FLT DETAILS
TO FOD (FAX: 212-963-0664) COPY TO UNAMIR, NAIROBI (GOLO, FAX:
254-2-622668) TO ENABLE RECRUIT BE MET AND ACCOMMODATION
ARRANGED UPON ARRIVAL.

IF POSSIBLE PLS MAKE TVL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RECRUIT TO ARRIVE
NAIROBI DURING DAY TIME. IF NOT MET AT THE AIRPORT CHECK IN AT
THE SIX EIGHTY HOTEL. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE
HOTEL TO RECEIVE UNAMIR PERSONNEL WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATION.
THE HOTEL TEL NO. 332600, UNAMIR OFFICE TEL NO. 624061 AND
AFTER WORKING HOURS TEL NO. 720022. PLS REPLY WITHIN 2 DAYS.
REGARDS. (WENGERT/OPPBA)

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/50JEMEO UNDP SL

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United Nations House, 43 Sika Stevens Street, Freetown Sierra Leone
Tel: 22311, Telex 3585, Fax 1203327, Cable: UNDPFRO Freetown

info: HAO



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/29/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments aux Missions diplomatiques et consulaires, aux Organisations Internationales et Agences Spécialisées du Système des Nations Unies accréditées auprès de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de porter à leur connaissance que le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour le Rwanda, S.E. M. l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan, précédemment en mission est rentré ce jour 03 octobre 1994 à Kigali et a repris ses fonctions à la tête de la mission.

La MINUAR se réjouit de la coopération soutenue entre les Missions diplomatiques et consulaires, les Organisations Internationales et Agences Spécialisées du Système des Nations Unies accréditées à Kigali. Elle saisit cette occasion pour leur renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 03 octobre 1994

- Missions diplomatiques et consulaires
- Organisations Internationales et Agences Spécialisées du Système des Nations Unies

KIGALI - RWANDA



Fiche d'accompagnement - Routing slip

A To	He Dao		For action
Pour suite à donner			For approval
Pour approbation			For signature
Pour signature			Prepare draft
Projet à rédiger			For comments
Pour observations			May we discuss?
Pourrions-nous en parler?			Your attention
Votre attention			As discussed
Comme convenu		X	As requested
Suite à votre demande			Note and file
Noter et classer			Note and return
Noter et retourner			For information
Pour information			

Date

2/11/94

De/From

Johnston & Foster

NOTE FOR THE FILE

As requested, I went to both UNREO and CARE International this morning to regarding the attached note from Isel Rivero.

UNREO had no idea of the problem and promised to contact their team in Kibungo.

I proceeded to CARE International where I had a brief meeting with Mr. Jack SOLDATE, the Acting Director and Mr. Jeff SEED. Mr. Seed who is responsible for Kibungo and Muhazi, confirmed that the tools in question were indeed small they but these were the only ones available at that time for agricultural purposes, they were substitutes for the normal ones usually used. The tools were not meant to be used as weapons - they were distributed so that planting could be effected on time and for the deadline/goal to be met. It was confirmed that 4,000 of these tools were distributed. They promised that these tools would no longer be distributed and were even prepared to talk to the Prefet, if necessary. They also mentioned that the Prefet is well known to them as they had had some problems with him sometime ago. They thought he might be trying to 'get even' with them.

Felixtina FORSTER
OCHA/UNAMIR

2 November 1994

cc: ED
Ms. Rivero

24 OCTOBER 1994

KRISTEN,

IN LOOKING THROUGH MY NOTES ON THE TRIP TO KIBUNGO, I NOTICED THAT THE PREFECT HAD COMPLAINED THAT 'CARE' WAS DISTRIBUTING SMALL AGRICULTURAL TOOLS WHICH SERVED BETTER AS WEAPONS THAN FOR BREAKING THE SOIL.

HE SHOWED THE SRSG A SAMPLE PIECE AND REALLY IT IS TOO SMALL TO TOIL THE GROUND WITH.

COULD YOU BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR CONTACTS RATHER THAN US WRITING A FORMAL PIECE OF PAPER.

ISEL

UC

(4)

Frosty (AA)

take urgent
mission with CARE / UNREO &
submit a Report.

Dao

31.10

Alt Dao
+

(2)

I sel

Should Mr. Dao
be handling this?

Kristen

26-10

(3) OK - I thought you
learned with UNREO +
CARE - implement being
given are under UNREO

28/10/94

To: THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

FROM: AMBASSADOR KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR

I visited Addis Ababa and had meetings with the ECA Executive Secretary, Layashi Yaker and the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr Salim Ahmed Salim. Herebelow are my findings:

On the return of the refugees

Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applaud the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking previously on operation Homeward and now on operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes hitherto committed during Operation Homeward.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the welcome camps distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) would, in the not too distant future, also serve as an incentive continued intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma.

The decision by New York Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps is welcome news since refugee return is deemed as the necessary first step in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.

On UN Action in the camps

The option of deploying an international force is considered impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

It is the considered view of my interlocutors that obviously the most attractive action/solution rests with the deployment of (some of) the crack troops of the national security forces in Zaire and Tanzania provided that these countries are assisted with the required logistics.

Tanzania has always been willing and ready to co-operate with the efforts of the international community in this regard as they have a field-force (paramilitary police) unit to take care of any foreseen intimidation in the refugee camps inside Tanzania without provoking the hue and cry of UNHCR and other Agencies and NGOs.

President Mobutu is now considered to be on board with the rest of the international community in our bid to settle this intimidation once and for all. It is further suggested that we could even field a team of observers in Zaire particularly to monitor what the crack force would be doing.

On the need for more effective rapprochement and reconciliation effort by the government of Rwanda

The present government of Rwanda should be deemed to be seen as very sincere in its efforts at national reconciliation; conscious though the OAU S-G and the ECA Executive Secretary are about the limitations and handicaps faced by them in the absence of much-needed international development support and assistance in Rwanda. The OAU S-G in particular stressed that the continued disappearance of people within Rwanda is indefensible as the Kigali government can no longer continue to deny ultimate responsibility for such continued atrocities.

To: UN-SCHILLTON
From: SRSG, UNAMIR

GUEST
STATIONERY

I visited Addis Ababa and
had meetings with The WCA
Executive ~~Director~~ Secretary,
Layachi Yabe and The
Sec-General of The OAU,
Mr. Ahmed Salim Salim.
Herebelow are my findings:

On The Return of Refugees

To: S.A.O. (Gorresen), UNAMIR, Nairobi
From: E.D., UNAMIR, ~~Rwanda~~
Subject: Visit of The SRSG to
Nairobi

C The SRSG, Ambassador
Khan, ~~will~~ is scheduled to
~~visit~~ make an official visit
to Nairobi, Kenya ~~on~~ ^{Wed} Wednesday
21st Dec, 1994. Details of his
programme schedule is as

Dec 21, 1994 follows:

International Airport

1. Arrival at Nairobi (via UN flight)
~~at~~

2. Accommodation at The Grand
Regency Hotel

Thursday,
Dec 22, 1994

9 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Dow (ex
Director of UN HABITAT)
(confirmed)

NOTE TO THE FILE

MEETING ON PROPOSED EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UN RADIO IN RWANDA

A meeting was held on 22 December 1994 to discuss creation of an editorial board for the proposed UN Radio Station in Rwanda. The participants at this meeting were: Mr. Dessande, Mr. Conde, Mr. Dao, Mr. Minta, Ms. Rafii, Mr. Vergara, and Mr. Hundley.

Discussion began on the draft organizational chart for an editorial board for UN Radio/Rwanda (Radio UNAMIR). The draft plan calls for the SRSG to chair the board, with the remainder comprised of three members from the station, three members from other UN agencies, one member from the International Tribunal, and one member from the Center for Human Rights. In addition the plan calls for two or three observers from the NGO community.

Ms. Rafii commented that the idea of having an international criminal tribunal represented on the editorial board for a radio station was a novel concept. Mr. Minta pointed out that the Tribunal is another UN agency and its work may need to be explained through the radio, hence it is logical that it should have a place on the board.

Mr. Dao posed the question of whether other UN agencies or NGOs have expressed interest in serving on such a board. There was general agreement that there is a need for consultation with all the agencies which may be involved before the board is created.

Mr. Hundley asked whether the board was to serve merely in an advisory capacity with UNAMIR, as the station licensee, having final responsibility for editorial control or whether the board would have final control. Mr. Conde pointed out that all the board-members were UN agencies and that the role of the board would be to oversee the gathering of accurate, up-to-date information and the coordination of its presentation. He added that editorial review is essential before programs are broadcast. It was suggested that an operational committee comprised of UNAMIR legal and political officers and representatives from the station may be needed to make day-to-day editorial decisions.

Mr. Minta said this was a matter to be taken up by the board once it was formed. Mr. Conde added that a means of arbitration was needed in the event of editorial disputes. Ms. Rafii pointed out that the SRSG is the final editor or arbiter and that the role of the board is one of editorial control and not management as in the case of a board of directors.

Mr. Dao said that UNAMIR should not be dogmatic. He pointed to the recent controversy between UNAMIR and UNHCR over refugee repatriation policy and said all points of view should be represented on the radio. Mr. Hundley added that such diversity was healthy and would add to the station's credibility among listeners. Mr. Minta said the role of the editorial board was to resolve this kind of dispute.

Mr. Conde asked if there was any plan for international news coverage on the station. Mr. Vergara explained that such coverage was very time and labor intensive and therefore probably not feasible at current or projected staffing levels.

Mr. Dao asked if all UN agencies should be represented on the board. Mr. Conde argued in favor of this, saying they all had important but specialized roles to play. Thus for example on economic matters the most important and knowledgeable agency would be UNDP, while for children it would be UNICEF. All agencies would have to be represented to insure that the information broadcast is up-to-date.

Mr. Minta added that all UN agencies should be invited to serve on the board. Mr. Conde stated that in the event of a problem arising with regard to a specific agency, UNAMIR would later be able to argue that the agency had been invited to join the board, but had instead opted to decline.

Allen Hundley
Radio Project Manager
22 December 1994

NOTE TO USERS OF THIS BOOK

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Unit 7

DIALOGUE

Prenons rendez-vous

prendre (prenons)
rendez-vous (m)

Deux jeunes étudiants, Pierre et Roger, doivent dîner avec leur amie Christiane. Roger va lui téléphoner pour savoir à quelle heure la rencontrer.

PIERRE

Où retrouvons-nous
Christiane,
ce soir?

retrouver

ROGER

Je ne sais pas.
Si je
lui téléphonais?

lui
téléphoner
(je téléphonais)

PIERRE

C'est ça.
Et pendant que vous l'appellez,
je vais à la poste.

pendant
poste (f)

ROGER

Vous avez
son numéro?

numéro (m)

PIERRE

Je vais regarder.
C'est Danton
79-
67.

regarder

Let's make a date

to take (let's take)
date, appointment

Two young students, Pierre and Roger, are to have dinner with their friend Christiane. Roger is going to phone her to find out what time to meet her.

Where are we meeting Christiane this evening?

to find again

I don't know. Suppose I phone her?

to her, to him
to telephone
(I telephoned)

Fine. And while you call her, I'm going to the post office.

while, during
post office

You have her number?

number

I'll go look. It's Danton 79-67.

to look

(Pierre s'en va)

s'en aller (s'en

ROGER

Allô?
Je voudrais
parler à
Mademoiselle Mercier

LA BONNE

Bien, Monsieur.
C'est de la part de
part (f)

ROGER

Roger Dumont.

LA BONNE

Ne quittez pas,
Monsieur.
Je vais voir
si elle est là.

quitter

CHRISTIANE

Allô, Roger?

ROGER

Bonjour, Christiane.
J'avais peur de
ne pas vous trou-

peur (f)
avoir peur

Où

nous retrouvons-
ce soir?

se retrouv
(nous retr

CHRISTIANE

Voulez-vous ve-
me chercher
vers sept heur
venir

and Roger, are
friend
to phone her
at her.

ane this

ne her?

, I'm going

-67. C

(Pierre s'en va)
s'en aller (s'en va)

ROGER

Allô?
Je voudrais
parler à
Mademoiselle Mercier.

LA BONNE

Bien, Monsieur.
C'est de la part de qui?

part (f)

ROGER

Roger Dumont.

LA BONNE

Ne quittez pas,
Monsieur.
Je vais voir
si elle est là.

quitter

CHRISTIANE

Allô, Roger?

ROGER

Bonjour, Christiane.
J'avais peur de
ne pas vous trouver.

peur (f)
avoir peur (j'avais peur)

Où
nous retrouvons-nous
ce soir?

se retrouver
(nous retrouvons-nous)

CHRISTIANE

Voulez-vous venir
me chercher
vers sept heures?

venir

(Pierre leaves)
to leave (leaves)

Hello. I'd like to talk to Miss Mercier.

THE MAID

Yes, Sir. Who's calling?

behalf

Roger Dumont.

Hold the line, Sir. I'll go see if she's
here.

to leave

Hello. Roger?

Hi, Christiane. I was afraid I wouldn't
reach you.

fear
to be afraid (I was afraid)

Where are we meeting this evening?

to meet one another
(do we meet)

Would you come by and pick me up around
seven?

to come

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

December 19, 1994

To: Ambassador Shaharyar Khan
SRSG

From: Manasse Mugabo *Mugabo*
Broadcast Journalist
UN Radio/ Rwanda

Referring to your note of 16 December 1994, If I well understood the question, I would like to mention that ICRC has been broadcasting communiques on Radio Rwanda during the last two weeks, saying that it assists people in contacting family members who are in prison and tracing and re-uniting family members. I never heard on Radio Rwanda ICRC programmes saying that all those prisoners registered with them have been regularly contacted and are alive.

can we request
ICRC for their
written data sheet

Seeh -
19.12

Th Dao

NOTE FOR THE FILE

**MISSION OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA
Monday, 14th Nov. to Saturday, 20th Nov. 1994**

Members of The Mission

Ambassador Robert Dillon	Leader
Serge Telle	DHA
A. B. Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

Countries Visited

Zaire: Held discussions with The President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. Also had meetings with The UNDP Res Rep and The Charge D'Affaires of The US Embassy.

Burundi: Held discussions with The President and the Minister of National Rehabilitation and Social Re-integration. Also had meetings with The SRSG to Burundi, Mr. Abdallah and The CAO, Mr. Abdel Aziz.

Tanzania: Held discussions with The President in Dar es Salam; and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Dodoma. Also had meetings with Representatives /Ambassadors of The Donor Community and The UNDP Resident Representative, Mr. Victor Angelo.

Following are the observations of the Zairean Authorities on the Refugee crisis

- ✓ 1. That repatriation is the only lasting solution; and that:
2. Zaire has suffered tremendous physical, social, economic, ecological and environmental degradation as a result of the massive refugee influx; particularly in the North and South Kivu Regions.
3. The concentration of a large Hutu refugee population is distorting the tribal make-up of Zaire.
- ✓ 4. The main obstacle to repatriation is not just due to insecurity in the camps; but also due to political considerations inside Rwanda as well.
- ? 5. The authorities in Rwanda are not ready and willing to receive the refugees.
- ? 6. The International Community should adopt measures to ensure that Kigali makes positive moves, including respect for the main features of the Arusha Accords, to encourage voluntary repatriation of the Rwandese refugees.
7. The local population is fed up with the refugees pillaging their territory.

8. The International Community should assist in the expeditious settlement of this crisis since Zaire is not ready to accept another "Palestine" on their territory. ✓

9. The return of the assets and other financial resources (belonging to Rwanda) that were brought into Zaire by the refugees depends entirely on the willingness of the government of Rwanda to create the conditions that would facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the refugees. ✓

10. The International Community is not helping Zaire to meet the cost of absorbing the impact of sheltering a total of two (2) million Rwandese.

11. The ex-RGF are in a peculiar position since they receive no assistance from neither ICRC nor UNHCR or any other humanitarian assistance agency/NGO for that matter. ✓

12. The UN should assist both the country of assylum/refuge (Zaire) and the country of origin (Rwanda). ✓

13. Zaire is fully supportive of the idea of separating the militant elements and ex-RGF from the rest of the refugees (commonfolk). ✓

14. The Zairean authorities are ready and willing to have the refugees relocate westward to sites that have already been identified by the government and that Zaire expects the United Nations to assist with logistic capability in this respect. *Too expensive*

15. The UN/Zaire Joint Technical Mission (Sept.-Oct.1994) Report is still outstanding; and as such, UNAMIR is expected to take appropriate action to give this outstanding matter a logical conclusion. *Ans. must go again*

16. The government of Zaire is equally concerned about violence in the camps and would be ready, as such, to deploy Zairean troops/security forces with the support and assistance of the United Nations. ✓

17. Zaire will not support any attempt by the refugees to invade Rwanda from Zairean territory since President Mobutu has already signed a Communique with President Bizimungu in Mauritius to the effect. ✓

18. The Rwandese government be strongly advised not to carry out hostile military action (ostensibly against the refugees) inside Zairean territory as this would constitute a serious breach of the peace. At the moment, The RPA have allegedly deployed a battallion and dug trenches in the Cyangugu area, facing Bukavu into Zairean territory. ✓

19. Zaire wants the Rwandese refugees out of Zairean territory before the General elections that are due to take place in Zaire in the third quarter of 1995 latest. ✓

Finally, President Mobutu mentioned that it should not be forgotten that the late President Habyarimana was his friend. That was why he personally chose to bury him temporarily in Gbadolite, awaiting to finally give him a fitting funeral like a Head of State when conditions permit in Rwanda. President Mobutu asked that it should be conveyed to the government in Kigali that "the late President was a good man and should be treated as such."

Observations of the Authorities in Burundi

1. That the refugee situation is potentially explosive and could destabilise the entire sub-region; and that
2. Repatriation efforts be given utmost priority by both the home countries and the international community as the #1 item on the agenda to establish a lasting peace in the sub-region.
3. The composition and character of the refugee stock should invite the attention of The United Nations in the affairs of Burundi which is like a powder-keg, ready to explode.
4. The International Community should assist both Burundi and Rwanda to create and maintain stable institutions that would enable Hutus and Tutsis to co-exist in an atmosphere of relative tranquility. } How?
5. The countries of origin should give physical and material security to repatriating refugees and also respect for their proprietary rights in order to facilitate refugee return.
6. A political initiative under the aegis of a neutral body like the OAU and/or The UN be adopted for the frank exchange of views on issues of the sub-region.

Following are the observations of the Tanzanian Authorities

1. That the Rwandese Government is not doing enough to attract or encourage the refugees to repatriate and that:
2. The refugee problem is the most important and pressing issue facing the region at this material point in time. Consequently, the Rwandan government should be prevailed upon by the International Community to be seen to give top priority to the repatriation of the refugees since, inter alia, humanitarian aid is ultimately limited in scope and time.

3. The cost of this refugee invasion is in fact politically explosive and phenomenally prohibitive in all aspects of the socio-economic make-up of Tanzania.

4. The International Community should also consider giving material and logistic assistance to Tanzania in view of the fact that over 563,445 refugees have infested the Kagera Region alone viz:

Ngara District	403,534
Karagwe District	155,411
Muleba District	4500

5. The United Nations (and UNHCR in particular) is giving the impression of perpetuating the refugees' stay in Tanzanian territory and this is absolutely unacceptable as they appear to be slow in taking concrete steps both within and outside Rwanda for a wholesome settlement of the crisis. ✓

6. Tanzania is "fed up" with hosting such large numbers of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi since Tanzania has neither the land nor the resources to continue acting as good host to refugees who are wrecking so much havoc to the local population and pillaging their resources.

7. The Tanzanian security forces can provide adequate security for refugee camps situated inside Tanzania with, perhaps, some technical assistance.

8. The security considerations of the refugees would be more effectively and efficiently served if the UN decides to give logistic support- i.e. vehicles (and bikes), radios, etc.- to the Tanzanian police/security forces instead of contemplating the deployment of a multinational force. For example, whereas a Japanese Security Officer might cost approximately US \$10,000 monthly, the UN would be expected to spend an average of US \$250 to deploy a Tanzanian for the same exercise. ✓

9. UNAMIR should deploy many more Blue Berets in Eastern Rwanda to give them conspicuous visibility which would further magnetise the refugees to repatriate through the Kubongo and Akagera regions. ✓

10. Plans should be made by the UN to transfer the refugee camps in Tanzania into Rwandan territory if arrangements are not facilitated for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees by mid- 1995.


11. Since Tanzania is not going to allow these refugees to continue staying indefinitely, the authorities suggested that they might be forced to do what President Musseveni did with the Rwandese refugees in Uganda.


12. Some militant refugees have invaded a Tanzanian Island off the Kagera River and are performing military exercises there. This has forced the resident Tanzanians to flee; much to the

discomfiture of the Tanzanian authorities who intend taking appropriate steps to throw these refugees out. So, there is a real need for the International Community to strengthen the Tanzanian Security forces so that any attempt by "the refugees" to invade or further destabilise Rwanda could be forstalled.

13. The earlier suggestion of transferring the refugees into southern Tanzania is still an option; should everything else fail.

14. Tanzania would be ready to host and even finance an International Conference to discuss refugee and other security matters affecting the sub-region since Tanzania is on-record as having a whole lot of experience on regional conferences.


Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao
Humanitarian Assistance Officer

A good report. Well done Mr Dao.


E1)
Mr Dao

NOTE FOR THE FILE

04 DECEMBER 1994

MEETING CONVENED BY THE SRSG FOR 7TH DECEMBER

1. The following have confirmed today 5th December 1994 their participation to the above mentioned meeting:-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	-	H.E. Mr. David RAWSON (Arriving Kigali tonight)
CHINE	-	H.E. Mr. Huang SHEJIA
FRANCE	-	Mr. J. COURVIN, Chief of the Diplomatic Mission
GREAT BRITAIN	-	Dr. L. WONG, Representative of the British Government
GERMANY	-	H.E. Mr. A. HUMMEL
BELGIUM	-	H.E. Mr. N. DE CORNINCK

2. Absent from Kigali - H.E. Mr. A.T. SMIRNOV

3. TIME : 1500HRS

4. PLACE : UNAMIR HQ - SRSG's Conference Room No. 4045 in case the main Conference Room on the Ground Floor is not available.


B.P. DESSANDE
CHIEF PROTOCOL OFFICER

CC: ED
SPA
HAO

TO: The S R S G
Through: The E D *HW*
From: HAO

Subject: Tshala Mwana SHOW for UNAMIR

Further to your minutes, I contacted a Mr. Simba Manasse, the Rwandese businessman who hired the Group to perform in Rwanda and herebelow are my findings:

1. That Tshala Mwana is scheduled to leave the country on Wednesday, December 7, after the following scheduled performances:-

Friday, Dec. 2 Show at The Cadillac
(Entrance RF3,500)
Saturday, Dec. 3 Show & Dinner at The Meridien
(Entrance RF8,000)
Sunday, Dec. 4 Show at Nyamirambo Stadium
(Entrance RF1,000)

2. The Tshala Mwana Group will only be available to perform for UNAMIR on Monday and/or Tuesday; i. e. 5th and/or 6th December respectively.
3. For that, the businessman is asking for US \$10,000\00 per SHOW for Tshala Mwana to perform for UNAMIR.
4. In addition, UNAMIR is also expected to purchase all the **drinks** for that show from the businessman at a wholesale price of US \$1 per can\ bottle of beer or soft drink.

Submitted please.

17.3.88
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao

*we could go to one of the existing shows.
Shahmury? Leo*

Mr Dao



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KINSHASA

DAILY REPORT ON RADIO RWANDA PROGRAMMES

Kigali, 30 November 1994 - The newly sworn-in MP of the PL party, Nzigiyimana Louis Gilbert, on Monday resigned his seat in the Parliament after the news media accused him of being intoxicated during the swearing-in ceremony on last Friday. In a letter of resignation on Monday to the Speaker of the Parliament, former MP Nzigiyimana recognizes that his conduct was a shame on the Parliament, his party PL, and the country. The Speaker of the National Assembly welcomed his decision to resign as an act of courage.

- The Gisenyi prefecture officials on Tuesday denied reports by foreign media that the 37 Interahamwe extradited to Rwanda by Zairian authorities were being tortured by RPA soldiers. The Gisenyi authorities say that the extradited Interahamwe were accompanied by UNHCR workers, and will be brought to justice for their crimes just as any other Rwandan citizens.

-Rwandan Minister for Health, Dr. Karemera was invited by France to participate on December 1 in the Paris meeting on AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) which will gather 42 countries from over the world. In an interview with Radio Rwanda, Dr Karemera who will also hold talks with the French Minister of Cooperation, and the French Minister for Health, saw the invitation as a sign of a shift in French policy towards Rwanda.

Dr. Karemera also warned Rwandese population against the increasing danger of AIDS epidemic. He indicated that Rwanda needs foreign assistance to deal with the problem of AIDS, as AIDS centers in Rwanda were looted and destroyed, and the workers in those centers massacred. He underlined that AIDS is a more grave problem than before the last war, because AIDS was a weapon of genocide used by Interahamwe suffering from the disease who raped massively Tutsi women. AIDS is still used to ravage the population in refugee camps where rapes are a common place.

- The famous Zairian singer and dancer, Tshala Mwana, accompanied by her group of 12 dancers and musicians on Tuesday arrived in Kigali. She plans to hold a series of concerts in Kigali to show her solidarity with Rwandese people.

- Rwandan Minister for Agriculture and livestock development, Mr. Augustin Iyamuremye on Tuesday returned in Kigali from Rome where he took part in the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation)

Should she
not be asked
to give a
reference?
UNAMIR?

E)

for Dao
could you
please find
out if Tshala
Mwana can
would perform
for the
Assembly -
20/11/94
11/2

meeting. He announced to Radio Rwanda that FAO will finance agricultural projects in Rwanda, and especially in farming equipment and logistics.

Prepared by Manasse Mugabo
Broadcast Journalist
UN Radio / Rwanda



CC: SRSG
FC
ED
Spokesman
PA
SPAO
HAO
LA
PO
CSO/ASC
G2

TO: THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

FROM: AMBASSADOR KHAN, SRSG, KIGALI

On the return of the refugees

Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applaud the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking previously on Operation Homeward and now on Operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes hitherto committed during Operation Homeward.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the welcome camps distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) would, in the not too distant future, also serve as an incentive for the refugees to repatriate voluntarily; barring the continued intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma.

The decision by New York\Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps is welcome news since refugee return is deemed as the necessary first step in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.

On UN Action in the camps

The option of deploying an international force is considered impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

It is the considered view of my interlocutors that obviously the most attractive action\solution rests with the deployment of (some of) the crack troops of the national security forces in Zaire and Tanzania provided that these countries are assisted with the required logistics.

Tanzania has always been willing and ready to co-operate with the efforts of the international community in this regard as they have a field-force (paramilitary police) unit to take care of any foreseen intimidation in the refugee camps inside Tanzania without provoking the hue and cry of UNHCR and other Agencies and NGOs.

President Mobutu is now considered to be on board with the rest of the international community in our bid to settle this intimidation once and for all. It is further suggested that we could even field a team of observers in Zaire particularly to monitor what the crack force would be doing.

ON the need for more effective rapprochement and reconciliation

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effort by the government of Rwanda

The present government of Rwanda should be deemed to be seen as very sincere in its efforts at national reconciliation; conscious though the OAU S-G and the ECA Executive Secretary are about the limitations and handicaps faced by them in the absence of much-needed international development support and assistance Rwanda. The OAU S-G in particular stressed that the continued disappearance of people within Rwanda indefensible as the Kigali government can no longer continue to deny ultimate responsibility for such continued atrocities by RPA soldiers over _

D R A F T

To: THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

FROM: AMBASSADOR KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR

I visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 12th and 13th of December and had meetings with the ECA Executive Secretary, Layashi Yaker and the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr Salim Ahmed Salim. Following is a brief report on my meetings:

On the return of the refugees

Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applauded the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking previously on operation Homeward and now on operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes hitherto committed during Operation Homeward.

The OAU Secretary-General observed that a new phenomenon is slowly creeping into the refugee crisis as a number of host countries, including Tanzania and Zaire, are fed-up with and infact overtly hostile to refugees staying in their countries. In view of this xenophobia, it is vital that immediate steps are taken to accelerate\facilitate refugee return.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the welcome camps distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) would serve as an incentive continued intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma.

The decision by the Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps was welcomed by the OAU S-G. He deems refugee return as the necessary first step in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.

On UN Action in the camps

The OAU S-G considered the option of deploying an international force in the refugee camps as impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

In his view, the most attractive action\solution rests with the deployment of (some of) the crack troops of the national security forces in Zaire and Tanzania provided that these countries are assisted with the required logistics.

ON the need for more effective rapproachment and reconciliation effort by the government of Rwanda

The present government of Rwanda should be deemed to be seen as very sincere in its efforts at national reconciliation; conscious though the OAU S-G and the ECA Executive Secretary are about the limitations and handicaps faced by them in the absence of much-needed international development support and assistance Rwanda. The OAU S-G in particular stressed that the continued disappearance of people within Rwanda indefensible as the Kigali government can no longer continue to deny ultimate responsibility for such continued atrocities by RPA soldiers over _

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On the return of the refugees

Both the UNECA Executive Secretary and the OAU Secretary-General applaud the efforts of UNAMIR in embarking previously on operation Homeward and now on operation Retour which emphasizes a voluntary melt-down of the camps, with the support and co-operation of the government of Rwanda; thereby avoiding the mistakes ~~hitherto~~ committed during Operation Homeward.

The OAU Secretary-General observed that a ^{a much} sad phenomenon is slowly creeping into the refugee complex as ~~host country~~ ^{upon host country}, including Tanzania and Zaire, are fed-up with and in fact overtly hostile to refugees staying in their countries. In view of this xenophobia, it is vital that immediate steps are taken to accelerate/facilitate refugee return.

The existence of a unified operation like that of Operation Retour, with the welcome camps distributed in strategically located centres throughout Rwanda, to successfully address the key problems faced by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) would, ~~in the not too distant future, also~~ ^{by the own S.G.} serve as an incentive ~~continued~~ ^{to} to intimidation of the majority of these refugees in the camps, particularly in Goma ~~to return to Rwanda.~~

The decision by ~~New York~~ ^{the} Security Council to send a team to Rwanda and Zaire to study first-hand and recommend ways of removing the incidence of intimidation in the camps ~~is welcomed~~ ^{is} since ~~refugee return is deemed as the necessary first step in effecting the much-needed compromise and reconciliation in Rwanda.~~ ^{He}

On UN Action in the camps

The Security Council considered
The option of deploying an international force ~~is considered~~ impracticable and theoretical at best for obvious reasons.

In this
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the Secretary General is of the opinion that
President Mobutu is now considered to be on board with the rest of the international community in our bid to settle this intimidation *problem* once and for all. It is further suggested that we could even field a team of observers in Zaire particularly to monitor what the crack force would be doing.

On the need for more effective rapprochement and reconciliation effort by the government of Rwanda

Considers the Secretary General's emphasis on that is perceived by the Secretary General
The present government of Rwanda should be deemed to be seen as very sincere in its efforts at national reconciliation; conscious though the OAU S-G and the ECA Executive Secretary are about the limitations and handicaps faced by the former in the absence of much-needed international development support and assistance, in Rwanda is not

of these efforts in view of the fact that
The OAU S-G in particular stressed that the continued disappearance of people within Rwanda is indefensible as the Kigali government can no longer continue to deny ultimate responsibility for such continued atrocities; over five months after the war.

The Rwandese government should adopt a friendly diplomatic initiative vis-a-vis its neighbours including Zaire; otherwise their real intention would be misunderstood. In particular, Rwanda should be discouraged from escalating rhetoric like its avowed policy of hot pursuit into Zairean territory; particularly now that the political endorsement of The President of Zaire is an absolute necessity in resolving the refugee crisis.

The OAU S-G observed that the authorities in Rwanda should also endeavour to work with other Rwandese who do not necessarily share their ideology; observing that since the ex-MRND top brass do not appear to have any remorse for the massacres, other Rwandese technocrats, bankers, economists, lawyers scattered all over the globe could well fill this gap.

On the need for the donor community to target real problems\issues

Both the OAU and ECA chiefs appear to be disappointed that the donor community has spent well over US \$700 million in humanitarian\relief assistance and hardly anything on development aid. Indeed, for sustainable peace and stability, the state of Rwanda has to be assisted to function by first resuscitating\rehabilitating its state institutions. This is a sine qua non for reconciliation and good governance in Rwanda.

*In this connection,
E & S*

*involving
continues*

Here, the ECA expressed willingness to cooperate with UNAMIR as the need becomes more obvious for UNAMIR to streamline and coordinate donor assistance ^{into} Rwanda in this atmosphere of competing initiatives for donor funding, which is already ^{being} seriously undermined by incipient donor fatigue.

On the Regional Conference

These C.N. S.S.

Agreeing ^{completely} overwhelmingly on the urgent need for a Regional Conference under the auspices of the UN Secretary General (and co-chaired perhaps ^{by} The OAU), it is suggested that a Preparatory Conference be held in January to precede The main Conference in February, 1995 to discuss principally the problem of refugees of Rwanda and The Great Lakes within a regional context. *He stressed that*
Here, UNHCR perhaps would need to be reminded that politics and refugee work are necessarily strange bed-fellows.

On the International Tribunal

The S.C. considered it

Unfortunate though that Rwanda voted No at The Security Council, it is vital to commence the Tribunal without undue delay to cleanse the ghost of genocide in Rwanda.

The OAU Secretary General promised to make available African magistrates, judges and other legal luminaries that are particularly conversant with the French/Rwandese law.

UNHCR

could

*in the resolution
setting up the
Tribunal, however
he felt it was
voted*



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/1/95

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise, et a l'honneur de lui demander de bien vouloir obtenir du Gouvernement une autorisation en faveur de la MINUAR en vue de procéder à un levé de plans sur les mines et les endroits minés sur le territoire rwandais. Elle serait très reconnaissante au Ministère de transmettre à cet effet la présente note verbale au Département ministériel concerné.

La MINUAR se réjouit de la coopération du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



See

à Kigali, le 9 janvier 1995

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SIGNING CEREMONY OF AGREEMENT ON RADIO UNAMIR


A representative of the Rwandese Ministry of Information (MININFOR), Mr. Eugene Bitwayiki, who is the Secretary to the Minister of Information (MININFOR), met on Friday, 16 December 1994, with representatives of UNAMIR, including the Political Advisor and acting Spokesman, Mr. Sammy Buo, the Political Affairs Officer, Mr. Lamine Conde, and a Broadcast Journalist, Mr. Manasse Mugabo, to discuss the modalities of the public ceremony for the signing of the agreement on Radio UNAMIR. The event is tentatively envisaged for 24 December 1994.

It was agreed that the Rwandese Minister of Information and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) would make statements on the occasion.

UNAMIR and MININFOR would stay in permanent contact to discuss matters concerning the contents of the text to be signed as well as other related issues, including the allocation of frequencies.

The tentative list of Government officials to be invited to the ceremony is attached, as provided by Mr. Bitwayiki. It was agreed that the proposed ceremony would take place at UNAMIR's Amahoro Headquarters in Kigali and that the necessary logistical arrangements, including the sending out of invitations, would be done by UNAMIR.

CC: SRSG
ED
PA
SPAO
CPO
PAO
HAO
LA
RPM

Manasse Mugabo 
Broadcast Journalist
UN Radio/ Rwanda

16 December 1994

LIST OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO BE INVITED TO THE CEREMONY FOR
UNAMIR RADIO

Rwandese Minister of Transport and Communication, Madame Immaculee Kayumba

Rwandese Minister of Justice, Mr. Alphonse-Marie Nkubito

Rwandese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Anastase Gasana

Director of ORINFOR, Major Wilson Rutayisire

MININFOR OFFICIALS:

Rwandese Minister for Information, Jean Baptiste Nkuriyingoma

Director of Cabinet: Eugene Ndahayo

Director-General : Laurent Murindabigwi

Director for Private Press: Jean Pierre Kagubari

Director for Public Press : Claver Kayumba

Secretary for the Minister: Eugene Bitwayiki

Chief of Division on News Coverage: Benoit Ndirikiye

NOTE FOR THE FILE

**MISSION OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA
Monday, 14th Nov. to Saturday, 20th Nov. 1994**

Members of The Mission

Ambassador Robert Dillon	Leader
Serge Telle	DHA
A. B. Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

Countries Visited

Zaire: Held discussions with The President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. Also had meetings with The UNDP Res Rep and The Charge D'Affaires of The US Embassy.

Burundi: Held discussions with The President and the Minister of National Rehabilitation and Social Re-integration. Also had meetings with The SRSG to Burundi, Mr. Abdallah and The CAO, Mr. Abdel Aziz.

Tanzania: Held discussions with The President in Dar es Salam; and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Dodoma. Also had meetings with Representatives /Ambassadors of The Donor Community and The UNDP Resident Representative, Mr. Victor Angelo.

Following are the observations of the Zairean Authorities on the Refugee crisis

- ✓ 1. That repatriation is the only lasting solution; and that:
2. Zaire has suffered tremendous physical, social, economic, ecological and environmental degradation as a result of the massive refugee influx; particularly in the North and South Kivu Regions.
3. The concentration of a large Hutu refugee population is distorting the tribal make-up of Zaire.
- ✓ 4. The main obstacle to repatriation is not just due to insecurity in the camps; but also due to political considerations inside Rwanda as well.
- ? 5. The authorities in Rwanda are not ready and willing to receive the refugees.
- ? 6. The International Community should adopt measures to ensure that Kigali makes positive moves, including respect for the main features of the Arusha Accords, to encourage voluntary repatriation of the Rwandese refugees.
7. The local population is fed up with the refugees in their territory.

8. The International Community should assist in the expeditious settlement of this crisis since Zaire is not ready to accept another "Palestine" on their territory. ✓

9. The return of the assets and other financial resources (belonging to Rwanda) that were brought into Zaire by the refugees depends entirely on the willingness of the government of Rwanda to create the conditions that would facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the refugees. ✓

10. The International Community is not helping Zaire to meet the cost of absorbing the impact of sheltering a total of two (2) million Rwandese.

11. The ex-RGF are in a peculiar position since they receive no assistance from neither ICRC nor UNHCR or any other humanitarian assistance agency/NGO for that matter. ✓

12. The UN should assist both the country of assylum/refuge (Zaire) and the country of origin (Rwanda). ✓

13. Zaire is fully supportive of the idea of separating the militant elements and ex-RGF from the rest of the refugees (commonfolk). ✓

14. The Zairean authorities are ready and willing to have the refugees relocate westward to sites that have already been identified by the government and that Zaire expects the United Nations to assist with logistic capability in this respect. Too expen

15. The UN/Zaire Joint Technical Mission (Sept.-Oct.1994) Report is still outstanding; and as such, UNAMIR is expected to take appropriate action to give this outstanding matter a logical conclusion. Am must again

16. The government of Zaire is equally concerned about violence in the camps and would be ready, as such, to deploy Zairean troops/security forces with the support and assistance of the United Nations. ✓

17. Zaire will not support any attempt by the refugees to invade Rwanda from Zairean territory since President Mobutu has already signed a Communique with President Bizimungu in Mauritius to the effect. ✓

18. The Rwandese government be strongly advised not to carry out hostile military action (ostensibly against the refugees) inside Zairean territory as this would constitute a serious breach of the peace. At the moment, The RPA have allegedly deployed a battallion and dug trenches in the Cyangugu area, facing Bukavu into Zairean territory.

19. Zaire wants the Rwandese refugees out of Zairean territory before the General elections that are due to take place in Zaire in the third quarter of 1995 latest.

Finally, President Mobutu mentioned that it should not be forgotten that the late President Habyarimana was his friend. That was why he personally chose to bury him temporarily in Gbadolite, awaiting to finally give him a fitting funeral like a Head of State when conditions permit in Rwanda. President Mobutu asked that it should be conveyed to the government in Kigali that "the late President was a good man and should be treated as such."

Observations of the Authorities in Burundi

1. That the refugee situation is potentially explosive and could destabilise the entire sub-region; and that
2. Repatriation efforts be given utmost priority by both the home countries and the international community as the #1 item on the agenda to establish a lasting peace in the sub-region.
3. The composition and character of the refugee stock should invite the attention of The United Nations in the affairs of Burundi which is like a powder-keg, ready to explode.
4. The International Community should assist both Burundi and Rwanda to create and maintain stable institutions that would enable Hutus and Tutsis to co-exist in an atmosphere of relative tranquility. How
5. The countries of origin should give physical and material security to repatriating refugees and also respect for their proprietary rights in order to facilitate refugee return.
6. A political initiative under the aegis of a neutral body like the OAU and/or The UN be adopted for the frank exchange of views on issues of the sub-region.

Following are the observations of the Tanzanian Authorities

1. That the Rwandese Government is not doing enough to attract or encourage the refugees to repatriate and that:
2. The refugee problem is the most important and pressing issue facing the region at this material point in time. Consequently, the Rwandan government should be prevailed upon by the International Community to be seen to give top priority to the repatriation of the refugees since, inter alia, humanitarian aid is ultimately limited in scope and time.

3. The cost of this refugee invasion is infact politically explosive and phenomenally prohibitive in all aspects of the socio-economic make-up of Tanzania.

4. The International Community should also consider giving material and logistic assistance to Tanzania in view of the fact that over 563,445 refugees have infested the Kagera Region alone viz:

Ngara District	403,534
Karagwe District	155,411
Muleba District	4500

5. The United Nations (and UNHCR in particular) is giving the impression of perpetuating the refugees' stay in Tanzanian territory and this is absolutely unacceptable as they appear to be slow in taking concrete steps both within and outside Rwanda for a wholesome settlement of the crisis. ✓

6. Tanzania is "fed up" with hosting such large numbers of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi since Tanzania has neither the land nor the resources to continue acting as good host to refugees who are wrecking so much havoc to the local population and pillaging their resources.

7. The Tanzanian security forces can provide adequate security for refugee camps situated inside Tanzania with, perhaps, some technical assistance.

8. The security considerations of the refugees would be more effectively and efficiently served if the UN decides to give logistic support- i.e. vehicles (and bikes), radios, etc.- to the Tanzanian police/security forces instead of contemplating the deployment of a multinational force. For example, whereas a Japanese Security Officer might cost approximately US \$10,000 monthly, the UN would be expected to spend an average of US \$250 to deploy a Tanzanian for the same exercise. ✓

9. UNAMIR should deploy many more Blue Berets in Eastern Rwanda to give them conspicuous visibility which would further magnetise the refugees to repatriate through the Kubongo and Akagera regions. ✓

10. Plans should be made by the UN to transfer the refugee camps in Tanzania into Rwandan territory if arrangements are not facilitated for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees by mid- 1995.

11. Since Tanzania is not going to allow these refugees continue staying indefinitely, the authorities suggested that they might be forced to do what President Musseveni did with the Rwandese refugees in Uganda.

12. Some militant refugees have invaded a Tanzanian island on the Kagera River and are performing ... This has forced the ...

discomfiture of the Tanzanian authorities who intend taking appropriate steps to throw these refugees out. So, there is a real need for the International Community to strengthen the Tanzanian Security forces so that any attempt by "the refugees" to invade or further destabilise Rwanda could be forstalled.

13. The earlier suggestion of transferring the refugees into southern Tanzania is still an option; should everything else fail.

14. Tanzania would be ready to host and even finance an International Conference to discuss refugee and other security matters affecting the sub-region since Tanzania is on record as having a whole lot of experience on regional conferences.

~~173 SAN~~
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao
Humanitarian Assistance Officer

A good report. Well done Mr Dao.
Saeed

E1)
Mr Dao



UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

From: Brig HK Anyidoho psc(t)jdc

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
Rwanda

HKA/778/DO/99/94

17th December 1994

H E SHAHARYAR KHAN
SRSG
UNAMIR II
RWANDA

*Pl. Just a
response in
appreciation.
K. Das*

His Excellency Ambassador Khan,

LETTER OF APPRECIATION - OPERATION HOPE

1. I am writing to thank you for the approval, enthusiasm and encouragement you gave me in order that 'OPERATION HOPE' could go ahead.
2. As you are well aware 'OPERATION HOPE' was successfully executed with no casualties. The fact that this operation was executed so smoothly with support from DPKO, augurs well for our mission in Rwanda.
3. Should the need arise again to undertake such an operation, I believe I can count on your continued support.
4. Thank you sir.

*Yours faithfully
[Signature]*

HAO



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/28/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise, se réfère à sa note verbale N0 SRSR/NV/24/94 du 22 septembre 1994 et a l'honneur de l'informer que le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, S.E. M. l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan est rentré ce jour à Kigali et a repris ses fonctions à la tête de la Mission.

La MINUAR se réjouit de la coopération du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 03 octobre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

Info: HAO

NOTE VERBALE

SRSR/NV/18/94

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of the Rwandese Republic and has the honour to inform them that UNAMIR is in need of accommodation facilities for its Ethiopian Battalion in the Cyangungu Sector, and to request written permission from the authorities concerned to relocate the Ethiopian Battalion and other units from the Airfield to the former new hospital at Kemembe. The hospital consists of 14 brick structures.

The hospital buildings at Kemembe have been looted. Most doors, windows, electrical fittings, and plumbing fixtures have been taken or vandalised. Some of the main electric cables have been dug up. However, the damage sustained could be repaired in a short period of time, at reasonable cost. UNAMIR undertakes to do the repairs. In the meantime, the Ethiopian Battalion have offered to guard the site to prevent further vandalism, and would like to move there as soon as possible and use the site for their headquarters, barracks and logistics.

If authorization is granted, the Ethiopian Battalion will secure the site and premises while the premises are being repaired. UNAMIR would wish to use the site and premises for, at least, six months. Because the facility is large enough, it could be split and used for a clinic as well, which will benefit the local community. Once again, apart from the obvious need to house the soldiers, an early decision will assist in conserving the site and the buildings.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda requests the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of the Rwandese Republic to present this request to the appropriate Ministry.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of the Rwandese Republic the assurances of its highest consideration.



Kigali, 13 September 1994

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Co-operation of
the Rwandese Republic
Kigali, Rwanda.



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSG/NV/17/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de lui transmettre sous ce pli copies de deux notes verbales N0 0110/MAEC/CAB-CD du 8 septembre 1994 et N0 112/MAE/CAB-CD du 12 septembre 1994 émanant du Cabinet du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Gabonaise relatives à la très prochaine arrivée à Kigali, le 15 septembre 1994 d'une Délégation Gabonaise chargée d'acheminer la première partie de l'aide du Peuple et du Gouvernement Gabonais dans le cadre de l'assistance humanitaire au Peuple Rwandais.

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda saurait gré au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise de bien vouloir l'informer en temps opportun des dispositions que le Gouvernement Rwandais entend prendre pour accueillir la délégation précitée à son arrivée à Kigali, et par la même occasion recevoir l'aide humanitaire annoncée.

Elle souhaite par ailleurs indiquer à la bienveillante attention du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise que la Délégation Gabonaise se propose d'effectuer seulement un séjour de deux heures de temps à Kigali.

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda remercie d'avance le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise de la diligence qu'elle voudrait bien porter au point évoqué et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 14 septembre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Meeting of the SRSG with the Humanitarian Coordinator
UNREO at 9.30 am on Tuesday 22, November 1994 at the Office of
the SRSG

Present: Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan (SRSG)
 Mr. Randolph Kent (UNREO Coordinator)

In attendance: Charles Petrie (UNREO)
 A.B.Sidique Dao (UNAMIR)

The following issues were discussed:

1. The Displaced Persons' Task Force Plan
2. The Trust Fund

1. It was agreed that the Task Force Plan should of necessity, be developed with the assistance and collegiality of UN Agencies and UNREO under the auspices of UNAMIR.

The plan should include:

- (i) Welcome centers at various strategic spots within Rwanda.
- (ii) Phasing -in (incentive) Mechanism:
Gradually turning off the tap in the camps and turning-on (humanitarian assistance efforts) in resettlement areas within Rwanda to depict a necessary scaling down of activities within Displaced, Camps (DP's) in favour of resettlement cum normalisation of social and economic activities.

2. It was also observed that there is an absolute need to start disbursing the Trust Fund which now has US \$200,000 lodged with DHA. In appreciation of the fact that the SRSG epitomizes all UN activities in Rwanda and the Secretary-General in particular, it is bizarre that the SRSG's office does not have any resources to undertake humanitarian cum development assistance efforts even though over \$ 700 million has reportedly been spent on humanitarian activities within the country. In view of the necessity to support the Government in urgent rehabilitation/development efforts and requirements including power, water, telecoms, De-mining etc. and thereby consequently earning the confidence and cooperation of this government in all aspects of reconciliation and good governance efforts, The SRSG should, with the advice of the UNDP, UNREO, and other relevant institutions be in a position to determine the priority needs to be funded by the Trust Fund.

This is particularly important in view of the information received from UNDP that US \$ 5 million contributed from Netherlands with the Trust Fund is coming through. With regards to the establishment of an Inner Circle of the DP's Task Force, it was observed that the membership should be strategically small and not unwieldy;

taking care not to include some UN agencies (like UNHCR) whilst excluding others (like UNICEF, Human Rights etc....) who have an otherwise important role to play in the overall success of the implementation of the Plan.

AOB

Mr Kent invited the SRSG to dinner on Wednesday, 23 November at 7.30 pm.

A.B.SIDIQUE DAO
22 November 1994

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF THE SRSG WITH THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNICEF
ON FRIDAY, 9th SEPTEMBER, 1994 at 11:30 a.m.

Expressing a hearty welcome to The Executive Director of UNICEF Mr. James Grant, The SRSG, Mr Shaharyar M. Khan said that Mr. Grant's visit is an encouragement to UNAMIR while publicly acknowledging the cooperation of all UN agencies- including UNICEF- and the NGOs. Continuing his remarks, The SRSG said:

UNAMIR had been trying to find a political equilibrium in Rwanda until April 6 when hell went loose; and anarchy, mayhem, massacres, genocide and war gripped the country.

19 July 1994, The RPF took full control of all but part of South-west of Rwanda where the French established a Humanitarian Protection Zone until August 21, 1994. But the country was already a total wreck; in human, physical and material terms i.e. in everything conceivable.

Realising though that a military victory is by itself just a temporary solution, The RPF set up a government which reflects a national character. Moreover, they have been saying the right things; i.e. reconciliation, accomodation, pacification, rule of law, due process, etc. etc. Even RPF who fall out of line and are found guilty of felonies are severely punished; while old refugees\returnees are made to respect property and other rights of fellow Rwandese, irrespective of their political persuasion and\or circumstances.

The SRSG expressed regret though that all the effort of the international community- bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, UN Agencies and NGOs alike, would come to naught if critical elements and the real issues involved in resuscitating Rwanda are not addressed. These had already been compiled into a Rwanda Emergency Relief Programme (RENP) tabulated as follows:

SHORT TERM	MEDIUM TERM
1. Airport	Police Force & Prison System
2. Power & Electricity	Central Bank-- Currency
3. Water	Schools- Child Care
4. Radio	Administrative Cadres
5. Telecommunications	Repair of Govt. Buildings
6. Harvest	Municipal Services
7. Hospitals	De-mining
8. Security	Roads\Bridges & Transport

The SRSG observed that while some of the above - like the Airport, Radio Rwanda, Telecommunications and Hospitals are (begining to be) operational, key utilities like Power & Electricity, Money & Banking and Radio UNAMIR, which have a catalytic role on the operations of other vital areas (like Water and relief\rehabilitation services necessary for the creation of an enduring political and social environment in Rwanda have been largely ignored. Thus, lamented The SRSG, all the effort of the entire International Community, including UNICEF and UNAMIR, would be lost should these vital services remain unattended.

Emphasizing the need to jointly consider the Prevention Syndrome and the Cure Syndrome in addressing the Rwandese situation, The SRSG implored Executive Director Grant to use his good offices to assist in providing finance for the restoration of power\electricity and the establishment of Radio UNAMIR. Ambassador Khan suggested that the UN Agencies could each be encouraged to contribute a fraction towards meeting the cost of these essential services against the arrival of the World Bank team next week, September 14, 1994. The Rwandese problem, The SRSG concluded, is further compounded by The World Bank "which is asking a lifeless body i.e. Rwanda to give responses that it just cannot give."

THE FORCE COMMANDER

Giving the Troop(s) strength size, Gen. Tossignant emphasized the need for UNAMIR to show a true military presence all over Rwanda and stressed that the distribution of UNAMIR Forces to the various sectors of the country has largely accomplished the military objective of addressing on the ground, the perceived threat posed by the Rwandese phenomenon. The General further informed Director Grant that the RPA is gradually being made to assume its traditional role as The National Army with the responsibility of securing the four corners of all the sectors of Rwanda. The FC supported in full The SRSG and observed that there is no impending threat to the security of the country in the foreseeable future.

UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

In a traditional cold war situation, there are three ways to handle an emergency in a country that has been thoroughly incapacitated\decimated like Rwanda:

- 1) A Cash Advance
- 2) Bringing in missing commodities
- 3) Payment of Public Servants\Officials in kind as obtained in Cambodia where there was a major rice shortage.

In addressing the Rwandese phenomenon, Mr. Grant advised a holistic approach; innovative enough at a time like this when there is (a) general international sympathy for the government and people of Rwanda.

Executive Director Grant unequivocally endorsed The SRSG, H.E. Khan's request when he promised to provide through UNICEF, substantial financial resources (both from the World Bank allocation\grant and within UNICEF) to facilitate the implementation of the \$2 million Electricity Project and the \$600000 UNAMIR Radio Project within the earliest possible time.

The SRSG thanked the UNICEF Executive Director warmly for his cooperation and promised assistance before the meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao, OIC, Humanitarian Affairs/ O S R S G

LIST OF PERSONALITIES PRESENT

NAMES	INSTITUTION
H.E. Shaharyar M. Khan	SRSG UNAMIR
Mr. James Grant	UNICEF ED
Maj Gen J. G. Tuosignant	FC UNAMIR
Dr. A. H. Kabia	ED UNAMIR
Mr. N. Fisher	UNICEF REP
Mr. A. Roberfroid	UNICEF REP
Mr. D. Toole	UNICEF
Mr. A. Golo	UNAMIR
Mr. P. Mehu	UNAMIR
Mr. B. P. Dessande	UNAMIR
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao	UNAMIR



SRS6/NV/55/94

NOTE VERBALE

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) presents its compliments to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration of the Rwandese Republic and has the honour to refer to the circular of the Ministry dated 3 November 1994 addressed to all NGOs and other International Organizations on the flying of flags on their vehicles.

UNAMIR would like to point out that the flying of flags and, equally, the display of other insignia of identification by UNAMIR is addressed by the following provisions of the Status of Mission Agreement entered into between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda on 5 November 1993.

Article IV, para 8: "The Government recognizes the right of UNAMIR to display within Rwanda the United Nations flag on its Headquarters, camps or other premises, vehicles, vessels and otherwise as decided by the Special Representative. Other flags or pennants may be displayed only in exceptional cases. In these cases, UNAMIR shall give sympathetic consideration to observations or requests of the Government"

Para 9: "Vehicles, vessels and aircraft of UNAMIR shall carry a distinctive United Nations identification, which shall be notified to the Government".

The above provisions reflect the general practice of all United Nations Agencies in all countries. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if the Ministry could bring this to the attention of all relevant Government agencies.

We wish to take this opportunity to renew assurances of our continued cooperation. *HH*



H.E. Dr. Jacques BIHOZAGARA
Minister for Rehabilitation and Social Integration
Kigali
Rwanda

STATISTICS ON THE MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA BY
UNAMIR FORCES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

03 May 94 Unsuccessful attempt to evacuate 60 Rwandese from Milles Collines Hotel to Kigali Airport

27 May 94 Safe transfer of 480 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

28 May 94 Safe transfer of 695 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

29 May 94 Transfer operation stopped due to convoy being fired upon by machine gun

30 May 94 Safe transfer of 536 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

31 May 94 Transfer operation suspended due to shelling of the convoy route

3 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 339 displaced from Sainte Famille Church and Amahoro Stadium however operation was halted when the convoy was fired upon

13 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 550 displaced from Sainte Famille Church and King Faycal Hospital. Drunken and armed militiamen caused difficulties with the transfer from Sainte Famille

14 Jun 94 Militia force suspension of transfer of displaced

17 Jun 94 RPF conducted a night raid on the St Paul camp and were successful in liberating an unknown number of displaced persons

18 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 824 displaced from King Faycal Hospital and Milles Collines Hotel using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

20 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 480 displaced from King Faycal Hospital and Sainte Famille Church

22 Jun 94 Transfer operation suspended due to heavy fighting in the city

25 Jun 94 Transfer operation is aborted due to belief by RGF troops that French have intervened in operation on their behalf

04 Jul 94 RPF take control of Kigali City.

Throughout the fighting in the city of Kigali from 27 May to 20 Jun, UNAMIR successfully moved a total of 3,904 displaced persons. UNAMIR was successful in ensuring that the 60 Rwandese involved in the evacuation operation of the 03 May 94 were returned to the Milles Collines without loss of life.

11 Jul 94 Displaced persons have left most of the camps in Kigali

13 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 260 displaced persons from Byumba camp to Kigali at the request of the RPF

14 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 881 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali

15 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 831 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali

16 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 449 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali and 470 persons from Rutare to Kigali

18 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 771 displaced persons from Rutare to Kigali

21 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 941 displaced persons from Rutare to Kigali

22 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 42 displaced persons from Kigali to Byumba and returned with 72 Rwandese medical staff. In addition 62 orphans, 12 care workers and 23 family members were moved from the King Faycal Hospital to the SOS Children's Village

25 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 624 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali

28 Jul 94 UNAMIR transported 475 displaced persons from Ruhengeri to Kigali

31 Jul 94 WFP convoy moved 700 displaced persons from RUHENGARI to KIGALI

During the month of July, 6,499 displaced persons were moved to Kigali in support of the Rwandese Government.

01 Aug 94 WFP convoy returned from Ruhengeri with 400 displaced persons

02 Aug 94 Movement of displaced persons was temporarily suspended due to cholera threat

07 Aug 94 WFP convoy moved 450 displaced persons from Ruhengeri. 200 were dropped off en route to Kigali and 250 were dropped off in Kigali

12 AUG 94 IOM moved 980 displaced persons from Rutare. 830 were brought to Kigali and 150 to Rwamagana.

13 Aug 94 IOM transported approximately 200 displaced persons from Rutare to Kigali

14 Aug 94 UNHCR transported 400 displaced persons from Gisenyi to Kigali using 8 IOM vehicles

16 Aug 94 UNHCR transported 550 displaced persons from Gisenyi to Kigali. IOM transported 450 displaced persons from BYUMBA to Kigali. UNAMIR returned from delivering food to KIBUYE and transported 200 displaced persons to Kigali

18 Aug 94 IOM transferred 393 orphans from Byumba to St Paul orphanage in Kigali. IOM transferred approximately 200 persons from Ruhengeri to Kigali.

20 Aug 94 IOM transported 136 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali. Canadian C-130 brought 14 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali

21 Aug 94 Canadian C-130 brought 20 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali

22 Aug 94 UNHCR transported 118 displaced persons from Kibuye to Kigali using IOM vehicles

23 Aug 94 IOM transported 209 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali. Canadian C-130 transported 44 persons to Kigali from Bukavu

25 Aug 94 BRITCON transported 106 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali. IOM transported 85 displaced persons from Kisaro Camp in Byumba to Kigali

26 Aug 94 IOM transported 64 displaced persons from Kisaro Camp in Byumba to Kigali (Byumba Camps empty). BRITCON moved 500 displaced persons from Kibuye to Kigali (80 were dropped in Gitarama)

28 Aug 94 IOM transported 300 displaced persons from Cyangugu and Gisenyi to Kigali. BRITCON moved 400 displaced persons from Cyangugu and Kibuye. Three displaced persons from Kibuye were arrested by RPA at crossing point, one attempted to escape and was shot dead. WFP transported 250 persons from Kibuye to Kigali.

29 Aug 94 UNAMIR transported 60 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali.

30 Aug 94 Two UNHCR convoys carried 300 displaced persons to Kigali and 100 to Gitarama. BRITCON convoy returned 300 displaced from Cyangugu to Kigali.

During the month of Aug, 6,879 displaced persons were transported to Kigali in support of the Rwandese Government. In addition a further 350 were transported to other areas.

1 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Bugasera to Kigali - 50
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 354
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 265
- Kigali to Byumba - 24
- Cyangugu area - 36

ETHIOBAT transported 200 DPs from Cyangugu to Yawusisi
Total - 929

2 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 312
 - Cyangugu area - 127
 Total - 439

3 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 210
 - Gisenyi to Kigali - 300
 - Within Kigali - 23
 BRITCON transported 150 DPs from Cyangugu to Kigali
 Total - 683

4 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 232
 - Kigali to Gitarama - 62
 BRITCON transported 186 DPs from Cyangugu to Kigali
 Total - 480

5 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 232
 - Within Gisenyi - 254
 Total - 487

6 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 94
 - Within Gisenyi - 254
 Total - 348

7 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 140
 - Bugesera to Kigali - 33
 - Cyangugu to Kigali - 201
 - Kigali to Byumba - 32
 - Within Kigali - 49
 - Within Gisenyi - 868
 - Within Cyangugu - 106
 Total - 1429

8 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 50
 - Within Gisenyi - 610
 Total - 660

9 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 309
 - Within Gisenyi - 889
 Total - 1198

10 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 136
 - Bugesera to Kigali - 21
 - Kigali to Byumba - 56
 - Kigali to Bugesera - 63
 - Kigali to Butare - 33
 - Within Gisenyi - 307
 Total - 616

- 11 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 200
- Within Gisenyi - 976
- Within Cyangugu - 239
Total - 1415
- 12 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 155
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 192
- Within Gisenyi - 816
- Within Cyangugu - 259
ETHIOBAT transported 600 DPs from Zaire border to
Gishoma
Total - 2022
Note: BRITCON dispatched 3 trucks to Gisenyi to assist
UNHCR/IOM with transport of DPs from Gisenyi to
Ruhengeri
- 13 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 411
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 258
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 107
- Kigali to Byumba - 107
- Within Gisenyi - 1048 *
* includes 320 DPs transported by BRITCON
BRITCON transported 60 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
Total - 2003
- 14 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Kigali to Byumba - 36
- Kigali to Bugesera - 62
- Kigali to Ruhengeri - 124
- Within Gisenyi - 1131 *
* includes 360 DPs transported by BRITCON
- UNHCR transported 200 DPs from Cyangugu to Kigali
- UNHCR transported 200 DPs from Gisenyi to Kigali
Total - 1753
- 15 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 131
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 623
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 95
- Bugesera to Kigali - 26
- Within Cyangugu - 109
- Within Gisenyi - 1932 *
* includes 450 DPs transported by BRITCON
Total - 2916
- 16 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Kibungo to Kigali - 102
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 94
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 44
- Kigali to Bugesera - 22
- Within Gisenyi - 854 *
* includes 250 DPs transported by BRITCON
UNHCR transported 300 DPs Gisenyi to Kigali
Malawi Coy UNAMIR transported 68 DPs from Busoro to

Kanzege and 13 from Busaro to Gitarama
UNAMIR transported 223 DPs from Cyangugu to Kigali
UNAMIR transported 150 DPs from Gisenyi to Kigali
Total - 2622

17 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 59
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 298
- Kigali to Byumba - 57
- Kigali to Bugesera - 36
- Kigali to Ruhengeri - 26
- Within Cyangugu - 140
- Within Gisenyi - 298
BRITCON transported 223 DPs from Cyangugu to Kigali
Total - 1137

18 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Kibungo to Kigali - 174
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 207
- Kigali to Byumba - 189
- Kigali to Bugesera - 27
- Within Gisenyi - 582
UNHCR transported 40 DPs from Cyangugu to Kibuye
UNHCR transported 110 DPs from Cyangugu to Gishyta
MALAWI COY UNAMIR transported 52 DPs from
Rwamiko to Butare
Total - 1381

19 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Kibungo to Kigali - 52
- Kigali to Byumba - 7
- Kigali to Bugesera - 52
- Kigali to Gitarama - 27
- Kigali to Kibungo - 13
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 353
- Within Cyangugu - 143
- Within Gisenyi - 1541 *
* includes 300 DPs transported by BRITCON
BRITCON increased to six trucks in Gisenyi
UNHCR/IOM transported 200 DPs from Ruhengeri
to Kigali
Total - 2388

Note: 19 Sep FRAFBAT reported that RPA forced DPs in
NDABA camp to return home.

20 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
- Butare to Kigali - 107
- Kibungo to Kigali - 51
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 64
- Gikongoro to Kigali - 285
- Cyangugu to Kigali - 166
- Within Kibungo - 44
- Within Gisenyi - 1281 *
* Includes 280 DPs transported by BRITCON
BRITCON commenced Op PEGASUS RIDE and moved 764 DPs
from the Sector 4 area to towns and villages in
Sectors 2 and 3

Total - 2762

21 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Butare to Kigali - 153
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 144
 - Kigali to Byumba - 49
 - Kigali to Kibungo - 4
 - Within Gisenyi - 1101 *
 - * includes 300 DPs transported by BRITCON
- Total 1451

22 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Butare to Kigali - 192
 - Bugesera to Gitarama - 165
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 292
 - Kigali to Byumba - 11
 - Kigali to Bugesera - 28
 - Kigali to Ruhengeri - 91
 - Within Kibungo - 83
 - Within Gisenyi - 857 *
 - Includes 320 DPs transported by BRITCON
- Total - 1719

23 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Bugesera to Gitarama - 49
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 146
 - Gikongoro to Kigali - 143
 - Kigali to Byumba - 24
 - Kigali to Ruhengeri - 26
 - Within Kibungo - 84
 - Within Gisenyi - 1003
- Total - 1475

24 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Butare to Kigali - 1134 *
 - Kigali to Butare - 7
 - Within Butare - 144
 - Within Kibungo - 52
 - Within Gisenyi - 1077
 - * Includes 724 DPs transported by WFP
 - UNHCR transported 840 DPs from Cyangugu to Gitarama and Kigali
 - BRITCON transported 500 DPs from Sector 4 area to communes of Gashora and Ngenda as part of Op Pegasus
- Total - 3754

25 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Butare to Kigali - 21
 - Bugesera to Kigali - 86
 - Ruhengeri to Kigali - 271
 - Kigali to Byumba - 39
 - Kigali to Bugesera - 19
 - Kigali to Kibungo - 23
 - Kigali to Ruhengeri - 257
 - Within Kibungo - 48
 - Within Gisenyi - 1153
 - Command and Control element for UNAMIR Op HOMEWARD was dispatched to Butare
- Total - 1917

26 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Cyangugu - Bugesera to Kigali - 109
- Butare to Kigali - 104
- Kibungo to Kigali - 109
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 177
- Kigali to Byumba - 23
- Kigali to Bugesera - 24
- Kigali to Ruhengeri - 38
- Within Kibungo - 122
- Within Gisenyi - 1646 *

* Includes 450 DPs transported by BRITCON
BRITCON moved 393 DPs from Gikongoro to their home
communes as part of Op HOMEWARD
Total - 2745

27 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 161
- Kigali to Bugesera - 50
- Kigali to Butare - 26
- Kigali to Kibungo - 155
- Within Kibungo - 86
- Within Butare - 24
- Within Gisenyi - 1154 *

* Includes 200 DPs transported by BRITCON
BRITCON moved 27 DPs from Gikongoro to their home
communes as part of Op HOMEWARD
Total - 1683

28 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Butare to Kigali - 220
- Bugesera to Kigali - 55
- Kibungo to Kigali - 55
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 146
- Kigali to Bugesera - 16
- Kigali to Kibungo - 13
- Kigali to Ruhengeri - 9
- Within Butare - 38
- Within Kibungo - 104
- Within Gisenyi - 967 *

* Includes 200 DPs transported by BRITCON
Total - 1623

29 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Bugesera to Kigali - 135
- Kibungo to Kigali - 135
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 153
- Kigali to Bugesera - 23
- Kigali to Kibungo - 23
- Kigali to Ruhengeri - 121
- Within Butare - 173
- Within Kibungo - 85
- Within Gisenyi - 1002 *

* Includes 180 DPs transported by BRITCON
Total - 1850

30 Sep 94 IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:

- Gisenyi to Ruhengeri - 4795
- Butare to Kigali - 134
- Bugesera to Kigali - 147
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 133
- Within Butare - 28
- Within Kibungo - 20
- Within Gisenyi - 638 *
- * Includes 160 DPs transported by BRITCON
- Total - 5895

The total number of Displaced Persons transported in the month of Sep - 51,769

01 Oct 94 - IOM/UNHCR transported DPs as follows:
to

- 09 Oct 94 - Gisenyi to Ruhengeri - 3966
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 905
 - Cyangugu - 2180 *
 - Kigali area - 2056
 - Kibungo - 118
 - Other Movement - 961
 - Bugesera - 359
 - * 298 transported by WFP and 1163 transported by UNAMIR
- BRITCON transported 156 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri (03 Oct)
- BRITCON transported 214 DPs from Rukondo and Cyanika to Ntongwe, Tambue, Kisoma and Muhura as part of Op HOMEWARD (03 Oct)
- BRITCON transported 157 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri (04 Oct)
- BRITCON transported 614 DPs from the Sector 4 area as part of Op HOMEWARD (04 Oct) as follows:
- Kigali - 471
 - Gitarama - 124
 - Butare - 131
- BRITCON transported 209 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri (05 Oct)
- BRITCON transported 131 DPs from Butare to Kigali as part of Op HOMEWARD (05 Oct)
- BRITCON transported 298 DPs as part of Op HOMEWARD (06 Oct) as follows:
- 99 from Gisenyi to Bigogwe
 - 86 from Bigogwe to Mykamira
 - 51 from Kibeho to Butare
 - 62 from Kibeho to Kigali
- BRITCON transported 330 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri (07 Oct)

TOTAL - 12,654

10 Oct - UNHCR/IOM transported DPs as follows:
to

16 Oct - Gisenyi to Ruhengeri - 4601
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 38
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 843
- Cyangugu - 1305 *
- Kigali area - 2767
- Kibungo - 273
- Kibuye - 292
- Other movement - 2752
- Bugesera - 235
* UNAMIR transported 381 DPs
BRITCON transported 338 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(10 Oct)
BRITCON transported 201 DPs to their home communes in
Sector 4 as part of Op HOMEWARD (10 Oct)
BRITCON transported 468 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(11 Oct)
BRITCON transported 266 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to
Butare as part of Op HOMEWARD (11 Oct)
BRITCON transported 293 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to
Kigali as part of Op HOMEWARD (11 Oct)
BRITCON transported 337 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(12 Oct)
BRITCON transported 266 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to
Butare as part of Op HOMEWARD (12 Oct)
BRITCON transported 349 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(13 Oct)
BRITCON transported 371 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to
Butare as part of Op HOMEWARD (13 Oct)
BRITCON transported 313 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(14 Oct)
BRITCON transported 310 DPs from Kigali to communes in
the Sector 2 area as part of Op HOMEWARD (14 Oct)
BRITCON transported 204 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
(15 Oct)

TOTAL: 16,822

17 Oct - UNHCR/IOM transported DPs as follows:
to

23 Oct - Butare/Cyangugu to Kigali - 2224
- Gisenyi to Ruhengeri - 5757
- Kibungo to Kigali - 320
- Kibuye to Kigali - 234
- Within Kigali - 1073
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 881
- Kigali to various destinations - 4162
- Bugesera to Kigali - 794
- Gikongoro to Kigali - 341
- Within Bugesera/Butare/ Kibungo/Cyangugu - 5811
- UNAMIR transported 916 DPs in the Bugesera area
BRITCON transported 829 DPs from Gisenyi to Ruhengeri
BRITCON transported 745 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to
communes in Sector 3 and to way stations in Butare and
Kigali (17 Oct).
BRITCON transported 745 DPs from Way Station Kigali to
Ngenda as part of Op HOMEWARD (18 Oct)

BRITCON transported 813 DPs from camps in Sector 4 to Ngenda as part of Op HOMEWARD (19 - 20 Oct)
BRITCON transported 592 DPs from IDP camp in Kaduha to Ngenda as part of Op HOMEWARD (21 - 22 Oct)

TOTAL: 26,237

24 Oct- UNHCR/IOM transported DPs as follows:
30 Oct - Butare/Cyangugu to Kigali - 833
- Gikongoro to Kigali - 1356 *
- Gisenyi to Ruhengeri - 3857
- Gisenyi to Kigali - 172
- Ruhengeri to Kigali - 669
- Kibungo to Kigali - 491
- Within Kigali - 1810
- Kigali to various destinations - 2956
- Within Bugesera/Butare/Kibungo/Cyangugu - 8485
* UNAMIR transported 1202 DPs from Gikongoro to Kigali
BRITCON transported 831 DPs from Kigali to Ngenda as part of Op HOMEWARD (26 Oct)
BRITCON transported 656 DPs from camps in Kibeho and Ndago and delivered 250 to Butare and 406 to Kigali way station (27 Oct)

TOTAL: 22,116

THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DPS TRANSPORTED TO DATE FROM MAY TO END OF OCT IS 146,880



Field Personnel Management and Support Service FALD/DPKO

Briefing Note

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1 September 1994

*The art of progress is to preserve order amid change,
and to preserve change amid order.*

Alfred North Whitehead

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
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I.

C

ABSTRACT

C



to. United Nations field operations during their critical stages. The idea of stand-by arrangements originated with the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace", and has been developed into a working system for the military by a special team, since incorporated into the Planning Division. Civilian stand-by arrangements are designed to complement this system. The Section consists of a conceptual paper, outlining the objective, context, basic assumptions, concept of operation and proposed system for such arrangements. The proposal, inclusive of a course of action, has been approved recently by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

Section VII centres on the development of a training programme for vital support personnel in peacekeeping and related field operations. In the past, immediate operational needs often precluded the allotment of time for necessary training. This programme, initiated by the Field Personnel Management and Support Services, and conducted in concert with the Training Service/OHRM, hopes to overcome the barriers of time by implementing a rolling three-months training programme initially directed at key administrative personnel in the areas of: procurement, finance, personnel, legal services and general services. The section consists of a recent progress report on this programme.

Section VIII concludes this briefing note with an itemized list of systemic objectives, **additional** to those discussed in the preceding Sections, which the Service has set up for completion during the coming year.

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II.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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1. **MISSION STATEMENT OF FIELD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES**

The Field Personnel Management and Support Services' mission is to anticipate and identify the civilian personnel requirements of field missions, and then to subsequently ensure that these requirements are met in the most efficient and effective manner possible.


2. **CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF FIELD MISSIONS**

There are currently 27 field missions in operation, with an authorized strength of over 10,000 civilian staff. These missions vary in size, structure, and complexity of tasks. The multitude of civilian personnel requirements faced by field missions includes:

- 2.1. **Staffing** - The determination of civilian personnel structures for field missions, which are responsive to the mandate of the missions, yet are sensitive to budgetary and political constraints; and, the subsequent identification and selection of the best qualified available personnel to fill the posts determined by the staffing structures, and reflected in the authorized staffing tables.
- 2.2. **Mission Information and Orientation** - Coordination with various offices, to ensure that personnel are properly briefed and given orientation to their assigned mission objectives and surroundings, both prior to departure and upon arrival in the mission area.
- 2.3. **Travel** - Arrangements for selected personnel's deployment and repatriation to and from the mission area. These arrangements include issuance of UNLPs and/or required visas, MSA advances, shipment of personal effects, booking of air flights, and verification of medical clearance.
- 2.4. **Administration** - The processing and administering of entitlements, allowances, benefits, leave requests, extensions and terminations of appointments, performance appraisals, and numerous other personnel matters.
- 2.5. **Records Management** - The compilation, maintenance, and updating of data for the thousands of civilian personnel serving in field missions, in an accurate, reliable and timely fashion.
- 2.6. **Policy Development, Review, and Analysis** - The review and analysis of the processes, procedures, rules and regulations relevant to the letter and spirit of the mission statement; and, the subsequent proposal of policy and initiative to promote efficiency and effectiveness.

3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FPMSS

FPMSS is organizationally structured to respond, in coordination with OHRM and other offices in DPKO and DAM, to the requirements identified in item 2 above. The following is a depiction of the current organizational structure:



4. CONSTRAINING ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

The Service does not yet possess the sufficient numbers of personnel, nor has it been delegated the adequate level of authority to properly undertake the required tasks. These limitations and constraints are addressed in the following sections.


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III.

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SYNERGY IN ACTION

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1. GENERAL

The organizational structure of the Field Personnel Management and Support Services, outlined in the Executive Summary in Section 2, has been designed with a view of creating the minimum effective "critical mass" of specialized staff, the individual qualifications and experience of each complementing the other into a coherent team which is uniquely field-minded.

2. FUNCTIONAL PROFILE

The 54 individual professional, general service and Government provided personnel¹ bring to the Service a diversity of backgrounds, interests and approaches. In functional terms, some possess vast experience in the United Nations system in general, and in matters related to personnel administration in particular; quite a few enrich the Service with their field perspective, so essential for the proper functioning and orientation of the Service. Others yet fortify the Service with broad managerial experience, extensive academic credentials and relevant military and Government experience.

While individuals are assigned to tasks that best fit their professional and personal characteristics, this variety of professional skills and aptitudes has provided an opportunity to create synergy in action, as team work is multiplicative, rather than simply additive, of individual members contribution.

3. A TEAM APPROACH

The staff on board did not all come over on the same ship, but they are in the same boat, in as much as they work together for a shared goal in a manner that benefits, and is perceived to benefit, everyone. The team approach characterizes the work of the Service both vertically, or functionally, and horizontally, or cross-functionally. In the latter case, it has made it possible for the Service to initiate and undertake special projects that it could not have otherwise tackled. The clearest example of such an endeavour is the redrafting of the Field Administration Handbook, which by its mere definition requires the combined expertise and contribution of all staff members. This major undertaking is further discussed in Section VIII below.

¹ This number consists of 11 professionals, 39 general-service, and 4 Government-provided personnel. The number is slightly less than the authorized number, and is due to redeployment of posts within FA/23.

4. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The ratio of staff to field personnel serviced (1:260) taken in light of the volume and diversity of the services provided on a global scale needs no further elaboration insofar as commitment, competence and cost-effectiveness are concerned. We nevertheless feel that in order to better service the personnel in the field, continue to initiate - and implement - improvement measures and respond effectively to critical situations as they arise, the human resources of the Service need to be strengthened quantitatively and qualitatively. In qualitative terms, our work requires top-level system-analysis and policy-analysis professionals to form a truly effective policy and analysis unit, of which the records management unit will be part. In quantitative terms, there is thus a need for two professionals and two additional support staff in the same areas.

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IV.

**DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES**



1. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY-PERSONNEL ISSUES: BASIC PRINCIPLES

1.1. **Cohesiveness** - Efficiency and effectiveness in planning, mounting, sustaining and liquidating field operations are largely predetermined by a cohesive institutional environment that links support requirements to operational necessity to political and related substantive considerations. This cohesiveness, in turn, implies an orchestrated inter-departmental effort conducted on behalf of the Secretary-General by DPKO as the designated "lead Department".

1.2. The successful implementation of the above described effort rests on two complementary principles:

1.2.1 **Operational Authority** - a delegation of maximum operational authority to units directly responsible for work programs;

1.2.2 **Full Responsibility** - a delineation of clear lines of accountability reaching from the working operational level to the locus of full responsibility.

The following is an application of these principles to the area of field personnel.

2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

The Field Management and Support functions of DPKO constitute a cohesive unit (FPMSS) which is entirely field-oriented. In managerial terms it has a unique service line designed to respond to operational requirements. These requirements are, naturally, quite distinct from those pertaining to the management of human resources at Headquarters.

The FPMSS functions form part of the operational management of the United Nations field operations. In this capacity it carries out functions pertinent to the planning, deployment, sustainment and dispersion of primarily -- though not exclusively -- the civilian personnel component of field operations. These functions are carried out in close relation to the overall strategic planning of any specific operation, undertaken by the relevant units within DPKO and the relevant substantive Departments, which the FPMSS is to support.

The operational management of field personnel thus involves the following service-areas: policy research and analysis¹; staffing²; briefing³; travel⁴; staff administration⁵; and record

¹ In addition to the management of the civilian component, this Service further manages personnel issues pertaining to military units.

² Provides overall direction to the operational units of FPMSS, studies, evaluates and proposes policy issues, advises with the relevant units.

³ Identification and selection of mission personnel.

⁴ Collection and provision of administrative guidelines and other information relevant to the mission.

⁵ Management of air travel, shipment, accommodation, etc.

⁶ Management of personnel records, including personnel files.

management⁷, discussed in the Executive Summary in Section I.

The volume of personnel thus serviced presently consist of some 10,000 civilian staff and some 2,718 military observers and 2,733 civilian police monitors⁸. The sources of the civilian component of this personnel are diversified and broadly fall into the following categories: United Nations staff (Secretariat; system; Government provided; individual recruits) contributing some 35%; United Nations Volunteers Programme contributing some 1%; international contractual personnel contributing some 10% and, the largest source comprising 54% of the total civilian personnel, the local staff. It should further be noted in this context, that, as the Secretary-General stated in his latest report on civilian personnel⁹, depleted sources in the Secretariat, coupled with an anticipation of additional requirements, indicate that the share of both United Nations Volunteers and international contractual personnel is likely to grow substantially in relation to United Nations staff. OHRM/DAM is involved in this process only in relation to this latter category of personnel¹⁰. It follows that the majority of field personnel are serviced exclusively by the administration *in situ* and by FPMSS without any input from and impact on DAM/OHRM and that the volume of this majority is likely to grow.

3. ISSUES IMPACTING EFFICIENCY OF FIELD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

There are certain issues that impact the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of field personnel. These issues, the manner in which they relate to the current locus of operational authority and recommendations as to improvement that may result from a change in the locus of authority are depicted in a graphic form in the enclosed chart, and are briefly discussed below.

3.1. With respect to staffing and travel functions, giving full operational authority to DPKO to identify, deploy and rotate field personnel will quicken personnel deployment by virtue of integrated planning and streamlined procedures. It will also facilitate DPKO to further explore diversified sources of field personnel, such as contractual personnel, UN Volunteers, government-provided personnel and the Civilian Stand-by arrangements, whom DAM does not currently administer.

3.2. The current structure of performing--much of staff administration functions at headquarters, as well as an incomplete delegation of authority from DAM to DPKO on a wide range of those functions, contribute to delays in simple actions, such as processing of

⁷ Organization and management of operational data; development of tools of analysis of data

⁸ Data provided by the Budget and Finance Service, FAID as of 31 May, 1994. Staffing service is not provided to the latter two categories

⁹ A/48/707

¹⁰ Issues impacting efficiency and relating to lines of accountability in this context are depicted in the enclosed chart below and summarized in the following comments

entitlement. Delegating authority to field offices, and giving DPKO full monitoring authority would ensure speedy action.

3.3. As far as briefing and debriefing functions are concerned, there is an opportunity to develop and sustain combined programs for civilian and military personnel within DPKO, and in this regard, efforts have already been made in FPMSS and the Military Advisor's Office. These programmes will be better executed under single operational authority of DPKO, rather than an inter-departmental exercise with separate reporting lines.

3.4. As both policy development and records management functions have UN Secretariat-wide implications, authority should continue to rest with both DPKO and DAM: DPKO providing the operational insight necessary to formulate applicable policy and to configure suitable systems, and DAM ensuring their compatibility to Secretariat norms.

4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The application of the above-referred to basic principles to the management of field personnel as it relates to the volume and diversity of the services performed suggests the following reallocation of operational authority and commensurate accountability and responsibility:

4.1. Complete operational authority with respect to field personnel should reside with DPKO in view of the unique line of field-minded support service performed by FPMSS which is closely integrated with the operational requirements of any and all specific field missions.

4.2. In the interest of making the day to day operation of FPMSS as prompt and effective as necessary, DAM/OHRM should delegate operational authority to DPKO/FPMSS with respect to those administrative, staffing and briefing issues pertaining to field personnel management.

4.3. In the interest of streamlining the administration of field personnel, authority for certain actions relating to the processing of payroll, entitlement and claims should be delegated to the field.

4.4. In all matters where authority is delegated, clear lines of accountability should be established.

4.5. In all matters pertaining to policy development and records management, ultimate authority should reside with DAM, as such issues may have Secretariat-wide implications.

These issues are summarized graphically in the enclosed chart.

* *

Issues Impacting Efficiency of Field Personnel Management


Issues	Function	Recommendation	Authority		Impact
			Current	Proposed	
1 Delayed deployment of personnel due to lack of planning and shortage of qualified and available personnel	Staffing/Travel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrate Staffing and Travel with DPKO planning and give it full authority to identify, deploy and rotate field personnel Diversify candidate source (e.g., contractual, UNVs, government provided) Continue current close coordination with Military Advisor's Office 	DPKO/DAM	DPKO	Quick deployment of personnel through integrated planning, streamlined procedures, and larger pool of candidates
2 Coordinated communication with Member States on movements of government provided personnel (e.g., MilObs, CivPols)	Travel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delegate more authority to field administration DPKO to have full authority to monitor all staff admin. matters except for pre-stipulated "special" cases (e.g., disciplinary action) Develop and sustain combined training programme for military and civilian personnel Establish briefing/training counterpart in the field 	DPKO/DAM/Field Offices	Field Offices/DPKO	Unified voice to Member States on movement of their personnel
3 Delayed processing of payroll, entitlements and claims	Staff Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPKO to have full authority to monitor all staff admin. matters except for pre-stipulated "special" cases (e.g., disciplinary action) Develop and sustain combined training programme for military and civilian personnel Establish briefing/training counterpart in the field 	DPKO/DAM	DPKO	Speedy and effective action resulting from decentralized structure and streamlined process
4 Ad hoc briefing/debriefing of field personnel	Briefing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPKO to have full authority to monitor all staff admin. matters except for pre-stipulated "special" cases (e.g., disciplinary action) Develop and sustain combined training programme for military and civilian personnel Establish briefing/training counterpart in the field 	DPKO/DAM	DPKO	Well-informed and well-trained field personnel resulting in high morale and increased efficiency
5 Personnel needs of field operations, frustrated by personnel policy of Headquarters	Policy Research & Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPKO to have full authority to monitor all staff admin. matters except for pre-stipulated "special" cases (e.g., disciplinary action) Develop and sustain combined training programme for military and civilian personnel Establish briefing/training counterpart in the field 	DPKO/DAM	DPKO	Policy compatible to operational reality
6 Absence of management tools due to lack of organized data, resources, as well as incompatibility of IMIS system to field operations	Records Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPKO to have full authority to monitor all staff admin. matters except for pre-stipulated "special" cases (e.g., disciplinary action) Develop and sustain combined training programme for military and civilian personnel Establish briefing/training counterpart in the field 	DPKO/DAM	DPKO	Enhanced electronic data interchange between DPKO and DAM, as well as between Headquarters and field administration

V.

c

MISSION TEMPLATES

c



1. PURPOSE

During the planning phase of each mission, FPMSS, in coordination with the relevant substantive offices, proposes an organizational structure and staffing table which is responsive to the mandate of the mission, yet sensitive to budgetary and political constraints.

Thus far, organizational structures have been developed intuitively, and on a case by case basis. This process has often been time consuming, and has led to inconsistencies between the organizational structure of one mission and another. In order to simplify and standardize the process, as well as to lend consistency to the organizational structures of all peacekeeping missions, staffing templates are currently being designed.

2. DEVELOPMENT

2.1. Standardized structure for Administrative Division of missions

The first phase of the staffing templates focuses upon the establishment of a standardized "core" administrative structure for all peacekeeping missions. The attached draft structure for the Administrative Division of missions, developed in cooperation with officers from FLCs, is divided according to certifying offices (Administrative Services) and requiring offices (Logistics Services). Wherever possible and relevant, the same terminology as employed in FALD/DPKO is applied to the mission structures. The proposed structure does not significantly deviate from previous structures, but does include certain adjustments and refinements.

2.2 Establishment of Models

For planning purposes, peacekeeping missions have thus far been characterized as either small, medium, or large. The staffing templates currently being designed will be modeled according to a number of factors in addition to size, which include: complexity of tasks, level of military vs. civilian participation, level of logistical support required.

3. IMPLEMENTATION


Efforts are currently being directed at applying the proposed standardized administrative structure to the anticipated mission in Haiti. The proposal will soon be circulated for comments to the relevant offices in both DPKO and in the field. Completed development of the models is expected by the end of September 1994.

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
PMSS STAFFING
MISSION TEMPLATES

FIELD ADMINISTRATION
AND LOGISTICS
DIVISION



VI.

**CIVILIAN STAND-BY
ARRANGEMENTS**



i. Objective

The immediate objective of stand-by civilian arrangements is to enhance the planning capabilities and response time of, and provide timely and cost-effective deployment of highly qualified civilian personnel to, United-Nations field operations during their critical (initial and/or emergency) phases. In the long run, such arrangements could contribute to the process of accentuating the essence of the United Nations as an indispensable global organization.

This document proposes a conceptual framework and a projected system for the development of United Nations stand-by civilian arrangements. Drawing on the experience of relevant specialized agencies and subsidiary organs of the United Nations with similar provisions, it is further congruent with, though not identical to, the concept and system developed for the military stand-by arrangements.

2. Context

The idea of stand-by forces was initiated by the Secretary-General and incorporated into the "Agenda for Peace". This idea was conceived in an operational context characterized by a quantitative increase and a qualitative expansion in United Nations field operations: as field operations become more numerous and more complex, and are deployed in fast moving situations, the United Nations reaction time is no longer adequate. Stand-by arrangements, allowing for personnel to be deployed on short notice, thus offer a logical solution. The major thrust of this idea concerned the provision of military troops by Governments which would agree to contribute such troops on a stand-by basis. Accordingly, a special team, the stand-by forces management personnel, presently incorporated into the Planning Division, Office of Planning and Support, DPKO, has developed a system for the translation of the idea into a working reality. At present, an MOU for the provision of stand-by military forces has been concluded with one contributing Government, the Netherlands, and negotiations with other Governments are underway. In the process of these negotiations, Governments' principled willingness to contribute civilian personnel on a stand-by basis was often expressed.

Indeed, as each field operation requires a diversity of substantive and supportive civilian functions to be performed within the operational context and constraints described above, it is perfectly sensible to develop an appropriate concept, system and processes of implementation, for the provision of a reserve-corps of civilian personnel. This rationale underlies the statement incorporated in document S/PV.3372 of May 3 1994, in which the Security Council welcomed the report S/26450, and further encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to include civilian personnel in this planning initiative. Further, delegations from various Member States have expressed a growing interest in the idea, and in a non-paper of the same date, entitled: "US views on UN peace-operations", it is stated that "the United States urges the UN Secretariat to establish a trained civilian reserve corps as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management and execution of UN peace-operations". Finally, the ACABQ, in its report A/48/955, called for the further exploration and discussion of the stand-by arrangement for civilian personnel, "with a view to further streamlining the organization".

arrangement". The present paper responds to these expressions of interest.

3. Concept

The essence of the stand-by civilian arrangements is to ensure that an adequate number of qualified civilian personnel is available for deployment according to the demands of the situation and that a mechanism is in place for the very rapid deployment of these pre-identified, pre-selected, medically cleared and otherwise ready for deployment, personnel.

4. Basic Assumptions

The civilian stand-by arrangements are predicated on the following basic assumptions:

4.1. The time and human resources available to organize and deploy field operations are limited due to the increase in the number and complexities of such operations. As a result, it is necessary to complement internal human resources, who possess core experience and are capable of effectively establishing or re-directing an operation, with personnel obtained from external sources and capable of assisting the internal cadre. The implication is that the stand-by system is to consist of two elements: internal and external.

4.2. A reserve civilian corps is required to respond to situations where it is necessary to deploy civilian resources to a new operation or reinforce an existing one under dire time constraints. The implication is that personnel on stand-by status are not to be deployed as mere substitution for civilian personnel, and that vacancies of personnel in situations which cannot be defined as critical should be filled from other sources.

4.3. Critical phases of field operations require, in addition to ensuring deliverance of the substantive mandate, that operational systems and administrative structures be established. It follows that the reserve cadre should consist of the best qualified and most experienced of personnel, capable of meeting this objective.

4.4. The critical phases in which the stand-by civilian cadre may be called upon implies availability for rapid deployment on the one hand, and limited duration of deployment on the other. It follows that the system has to be modular so as to allow for smooth transition from one phase to the next, and from the stand-by cadre to a longer-term team.

4.5. In order to be able to establish in a short time and under and all conditions of hardship a fully operational centre and the foundation for the substantive tasks to be performed, the stand-by cadre should allow for the deployment of a well-balanced team in terms of required functional expertise and numbers, which may differ from mission to mission, as well as in terms of pertinent personal qualifications.

4.6. Stand-by arrangements are costly to establish and require enthusiasm and commitment to maintain. It follows that they should be set out only if there is strong likelihood of activation, and that there is no need to proliferate such arrangements.

4.7. Civilian stand-by arrangements, unlike military stand-by arrangements, do not necessarily require the direct provision of personnel by their respective Governments, and may well be based on agreements capable of immediate implementation on an "as needed" basis, rather than on conditional agreements to consider implementation when the need arises.

The joint reading of the objective, concept and basic assumptions, generates the delineation of a system of stand-by civilian arrangements along the lines suggested in the following section.

5. System

The standby system consists of two elements: internal and external. Both elements reflect pre-arrangements to provide agreed-upon civilian personnel to duly mandated United Nations field operations during their critical phases. These agreed-upon resources remain on standby in their parent location, where necessary training is conducted to fulfil specific tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. When necessary, they are requested by the Secretary General, and are deployed to the mission area within the pre-arranged response time and for the agreed-upon deployment period. The internal and external elements of the stand-by system differ, however, in the identity of the parties to their constitutive agreements and in the ensuing procedure for implementation.

5.1. The internal stand-by cadre - Staff-members in the category of field service constitute, in effect, such a partial pool. It has to be complemented with staff members from other categories possessing complementary qualifications in terms of functional expertise and managerial experience.

All staff-members on the reserve-corps should be proficient in the needed areas (substantive and administrative) and expected to function with versatility and flexibility. They should all have both experience and updated training for the range of tasks to be performed.

The internal stand-by roster is to consist of two tiers :

(1) Within DPKO a Critical Preparedness and Response Unit, staffed with 10 officers (operational and administrative) will be established. The unit will be entrusted with:
(a) immediate deployment in critical situations, **leading** a Critical Response Team as described in (2) below; (b) leading survey mission teams prior to deployment of other sources; (c) emergency preparedness activities (e.g., monitoring of regional developments which may become critical, assisting in the development of contingency plans and operational tools relative to critical situations).

(2) The next layer will be a Critical Response Team, as a central pool of internal United Nations staff members drawn from various duty stations in the field and at headquarters to be on stand-by status for emergency deployment. These staff-members should

¹ Based on the model developed and implemented by the UNICEF.

constitute the resource base for experienced staff in required functional (support and substantive) areas, to be deployed in critical situations under the leadership of the Critical Preparations and Response Unit discussed in (1) above. The inclusion of these staff-members on the stand-by internal roster should be done in consultation with their releasing offices, establishing the extent of time for which they can be released and contingency back-up plans for the coverage of their normal work in case of deployment. This central pool should consist of approximately 50 staff members, though the exact number is yet to be rationalized and determined accordingly.

The precise quantitative and qualitative profile of the personnel of which the cadre is to be composed, is thus yet to be defined, and made congruent with both the specification of the (draft) Survey Mission Manual, operational analyses done by the planning Service, and a personnel analysis to be conducted in representative field operations.

5.2. The external stand-by cadre - external arrangements are to be used as a complement to, and in combination with, the internal cadre. Such arrangements can be concluded with Governmental agencies, with NGOs, and with intergovernmental programmes. It is further possible to cooperate with other international bodies, which already have similar arrangements, both because the personnel on such rosters may have already proven capabilities and because such arrangements have to be put to use to justify the expense generated by their creation and sustainment (please refer to basic assumption 4.6. above).

Indeed, the UNHCR has such arrangements with the following agencies ²:

(1) The Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils: providing pre-identified, screened and trained staff within 72 hours and up to a maximum of six months. The UNHCR has found this arrangement to be particularly effective in providing telecommunication experts, logistics officers, base-camp managers, field officers, protection and programme officers.

(2) Radda Barnen of Sweden: providing mainly social workers needed for coping with particularly vulnerable groups in critical situations. They are provided at no cost.

(3) The UNV programme: complements the nordic arrangements, *inter alia*, by offering a wide mix of nationalities. This is a small roster of 10 UNVs in technical areas, deployed within a week for a three to twelve months period, who thus may be used to fill relevant staffing gaps in the transition period from the start-up or critical phase to the longer-term operation. It should be noted that it is highly likely that the UNV programme would willingly offer the United Nations field operations a larger, more diversified roster, as the management of the programme has approached us for the development of a systemic approach.

² The information is drawn from a UNHCR report, I/C/1993/SC.2/CRF.21, of 15 September 1993. The report is available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b6b6b6b.html>

(4) The Swedish Rescue Service Board: provides support in an environment lacking any infrastructure. This resource provides, within 72 hours and for a period limited to six weeks - a team and equipment to establish housing facilities, sanitation, water supply, electricity, telecommunication, transport and nursing services. It further possesses flexibility, and can adjust its teams to varying requirements and conditions. The stand-by capacity is provided at no cost, but actual deployment is paid by the UNHCR.

(5) The Centre for Disease Control of the Public Health Department of the USA and the Civil Defence Agency of the Russian Federation (air and heavy transport capacity) are two additional agencies with which the UNHCR has been negotiating.

5.2.1. Framework of the arrangement - The stand-by arrangements with such agencies should essentially provide for the guaranteed availability of a specified number and categories of personnel from the agencies (both quantitative and qualitative requirements are yet to be defined); the deployment of thus identified personnel within an agreed upon time-frame (please refer to section 5.2.5. below) to any location in the world; for the establishment and maintenance by the agencies, of rosters to provide such readily available personnel; and for the briefing and training of the candidates on the roster (please refer to section 5.2.7. below). This framework is congruent with that used by organizations which maintain such arrangements, and could thus allow for fairly smooth cooperation agreements with such organizations and relevant agencies.

5.2.2. Preparation of roster - In order to meet the requirement of thus providing personnel, the agencies are to establish, in cooperation with the FPMSS/DPKO (with respect to administrative and logistics functions) and with relevant substantive units (e.g., election monitoring, human rights monitoring, humanitarian assistance, with respect to substantive functions) and maintain a sufficiently large roster of potential candidates (that number is yet to be determined) with appropriate skills profile, and to provide training for an appropriate number of candidates. The FPMSS, or the relevant substantive unit, should assist in the selection of specialists for the roster, by providing guidelines and specifications, and the agencies are to ensure that personnel is selected accordingly. When the stand-by capacity is activated, each agency shall select from the roster the individuals to be provided.

Candidates on the roster should have at all times a valid passport, medical clearance, vaccination documentation, valid driving license, passport photographs and completed United Nations relevant forms.

Should an agency find out at the time of activation that it is unable to respond, it should inform the FPMSS or the relevant substantive unit within 24 hours. Should the personnel provided skills be found unsuitable, the agency is to replace that person at its own expense.

5.2.3. Required resources - The determination of the required resources is both quantitative and qualitative. In quantitative terms, it is reasonable to follow the basic working hypothesis of DPKO, as it is articulated in the relevant UNHCR documents.

budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations" contained in document A/48/945. Accordingly, we should assume the starting-up and the ending--of 10 field operations, in addition to the current operations, in each of the coming two years. An internal classification of these operations further assumes the initiation of five small observers type of mission; three medium size multidimensional missions, and two large, fully integrated missions. The quantity - and qualitative functional characteristics - of the stand-by civilian cadre (both internal and external) that would be adequate in view of this hypothesis is yet to be determined, in cooperation with the Planning Service/DPKO and the relevant substantive units. In making this determination, account should be taken of the need to set a maximum number of personnel thus provided at any one point in time.

In terms of design, the structure of the composite roster (i.e., the total rosters to be obtained from a variety of agencies, thereby achieving both specialized expertise and a wide mix of nationalities), must be broken down according to pre-defined, standardized functions and tasks. This design should further allow for the provision of stand-by arrangements for services (e.g., camp-base management), teams (e.g., team of sanitation experts) and individuals. In the first two cases, the provision is of formed elements and they should be obtained at each time from the same source.

The profiles on the composite roster should reflect United Nations field operations requirements for deployment under the standby arrangement. The type of required profile should undergo an annual review. Such profiles should include functional skills and personal attributes.

In terms of functional skills, the basic classification should be made along substantive and support tasks. Support tasks should include the following categories:

1. Logistics (including Telecommunications, Base camp management, Transportation, Engineering, EDP, Supply, Warehousing, Property Control)
2. Security
3. Finance
4. Procurement
5. Personnel
6. Legal
7. Medical
8. Clerical and secretarial support

Substantive tasks should include the following categories:

1. Political analysis
2. Public information
3. Electoral assistance
4. Human rights monitoring
5. Humanitarian assistance
6. Special tasks (e.g., landmine clearance; demobilization)

In terms of general attributes, all personnel on the composite roster should have facility with at least one of the official languages of the Organization, and 30% should be proficient in two such languages. All should be between 25-55 years of age with at least five years of relevant work experience.

Personal attributes should include maturity, cultural sensitivity, ability to work in teams, ability to work under difficult conditions, adaptability and a high level of commitment.

It is the responsibility of FPMSS and of the substantive units, both in cooperation with the Planning Service, to determine the optimal number of required personnel, to develop generic job descriptions and profiles and to transmit such description to the agencies with which there is an arrangement. It should be further taken into account that the actual work may well deviate from the job description as there are responsibilities which it is difficult to foresee.

5.2.4. Participation in Survey Missions - Representatives of designated agencies shall normally participate in United Nations survey missions as observers. This is advisable for a variety of reasons, ranging from the development of a sense of commitment and belonging, to the building of cohesive working relations with the internal cadre, a tier of which participates in such missions, to the better preparedness of the stand-by staff.

5.2.5. Response time - The normal phasing of an operation using standby personnel consists of the following: standby phase; warning phase; mounting phase; reception and deployment phase; execution and sustainment phase; relief phase.

Response time is the time which elapses between the moment a formal request is received and the time when the resources are deployed to the mission area (i.e., reception and deployment phase). The preferred response time indicated below is given as a guideline to be negotiated individually with each agency.

Response time differs between individuals, teams and services. The optimal response time for individuals is 72 hours; for teams one week, and for services, 14 days.

5.2.6. Deployment Term - the Deployment period is subject to individual negotiations with each agency. As a general guideline, it should normally be for three months, and, when it is determined that continuity is important, can be extended to three additional months, altogether not exceeding six months. This is so because the resort to this source of personnel is justified only on the basis of critical needs (refer to basic assumption 4.2. above) and is not to be confused with either staff substitution (in which case resort may be had to international service agencies) or with recruitment.

Following redeployment (i.e., relief phase), resources return to their standby status but should not be called into action again before a few months have elapsed.

5.2.7. Training - Training should focus on potential tasks during deployment within United Nations context, and on code of conduct. It should further include

specific briefing relating to the socio-cultural and political context of the operation.

Responsibility for training resides with the contributors and is at their expense. To facilitate standardization, however, training guidelines pertaining to specific tasks, objectives and mission-specific briefings are to be developed and transmitted by the relevant units in the United Nations.

In addition to a training package that can be transmitted in a written form and implemented in any specific location, there may be a need for periodic training programmes, involving both the internal and the external cadre. Such programmes can be arranged with the agencies, individually or collectively, or as a joint venture with other international organizations which maintain stand-by arrangements and conduct training programmes.

5.2.8. Command and Control - Contributors retain responsibility of standby personnel until they physically leave the home country. During period of assignment, the personnel thus obtained come entirely under United Nations command and control.

Reporting lines and management responsibilities should be clearly defined and internal staff briefed on the use of external staff to ensure that the two components be integrated so that they function as one team.

5.2.9. Administration - The following presents the administrative underpinnings of the system, specific details remaining subject to negotiations.

Stand-by personnel deployed to a mission area are to be administered, in terms of employment benefits and entitlements by their parent agencies and in accordance with the agencies' personnel policies. In certain operations, a liaison officer of the agency may be deployed to assist in personnel administration.

The United Nations is responsible for obtaining visas and other documents as required from the local authorities, until and unless it is determined that it is more expeditious that the agency shall obtain necessary documents.

The United Nations shall ensure the same protection and physical security measures are in place for the stand-by personnel as they are for its own staff.

The United Nations shall not be liable to indemnify any third party in respect of any claim, debt, damage, or demand arising out of the implementation of the arrangement.

The United Nations shall not accept liability for compensation for death, disability or other hazards which may be suffered by the stand-by personnel as a result of their participation in United Nations field operations. The agencies shall ensure that their personnel are properly insured, inclusive of war risk insurance.

Stand-by personnel will follow whatever system of Compensatory Time Off (CTO) established in the mission area, i.e., enjoy the same system of rest and recuperation.

which United Nations staff members are entitled.

5.2.10. Financing - The stand-by capacity is established by the agencies at their expense, and made available to United Nations field operations. In general, so long as the personnel are on stand-by status, they remain the financial responsibility of their respective agencies. When the stand-by capacity is activated, a sub-agreement shall be signed, under which funds will be provided by the United Nations to cover costs related to the actual use of the stand-by arrangement. Generally still, and subject to further negotiations, reimbursement of Governmental agencies with which a stand-by arrangement is concluded should be done according to existing guidelines for Government provided personnel, as articulated in the report contained in document A/45/502. In other words, the United Nations will not pay for any cost incurred by the agencies for establishing the standby arrangements, but will pay, according to different formulations to be agreed upon with specific agencies, for deployment costs.

Stand-by personnel are considered employees of their respective agencies and are thus compensated in accordance with their respective personnel regulations. The United Nations shall provide such personnel with a special contract without remuneration and a United Nations ID stipulating their status within the field operation.

Agencies are to be responsible for all travel arrangements of the provided personnel, except for internal travel which would be the responsibility of the United Nations. Travel costs incurred by the agencies are to be reimbursed on the basis of a MOU to be negotiated individually with each agency, or, in case of cooperation with existing arrangement, according to the governing MOU.

Agencies shall provide personnel with advance **per diem** at least for the first 28 days, in accordance to their regulations. They shall also be responsible for cash transfer concerning personnel DSA replenishment.

5.2.11. Legal Framework - Standby arrangements can be in the form of MOU specifying the resources provided, response time, conditions of deployment and like issues discussed hereinabove. Such MOUs are to be updated annually.

In addition to the substantive provisions, the MOU should include as an integral part thereof a preamble specifying that the signatories recognize the need to expedite provision of civilian personnel to assist in the administration, substantive conduct and maintenance, and execution of field operations in general and the advantage of earmarking resources to enhance planning capability, flexibility and cost-effectiveness in particular.

The MOU should further include standard provisions regarding modification and termination procedure as well as a dispute resolution mechanism. A model such agreement should be prepared by the OLA, according to guidelines provided by DPKO.

Each MOU should have an annex providing detailed description of the resources provided as specified in 5.2.3. above.

It may well be worthwhile and cost-effective to become a party to existing such agreements.

6. Future Development

The very concept of reserve corps, whether military or civilian, implies willingness, ability and readiness to be of service, when the need arises, and regardless of each and every competing demand. It follows that the people of which such corps consist--should be those most committed to the values and principles of the Organization in general and of peace-keeping in particular. Such people, in fact, may well be considered an elite corps, not only because of the level of competence required, but due to an expectation that they will set-up standards for others to follow.

The logical implication is that such personnel should be staff-members of the Organization, insofar as that status reflects the primary allegiance required as well as the willingness to perform, in effect, global humanitarian rescue service, a service reflecting the major public expectation from the United Nations. The present international society of states is reluctant to translate this idea into reality and commit troops for unpredictable conflicts. A civilian reserve corps (capable of performing some military functions as well), however, need not be thus affected and may well present an opportunity for reshaping the future by introducing elements constitutive of an international community of peoples.

There is, quite obviously, nothing earth-shattering in the dialectics alluded to above. Indeed, it is advanced in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. What is suggested, however, is the gradual development of a mechanism that may contribute to the existence of a fruitful dialogue between the state and the international system of which it is part and to the configuration of an international Organization which is more than the sum of its parts.

The above-described system of stand-by civilian forces falls short of a comprehensive reserve corps integral to the Organization, but can be envisaged and effected as a first step in this direction.


7. Approved course of action

Type of action	Centre of responsibility
<i>Internal review, development, coordination</i>	<i>Task force headed by FALD Director, comprising representatives of the Office of the Military Adviser, the Policy and Analysis Unit, the Mission Planning Service and the Personnel Management and Support Service.</i>
<i>Development of requirements profile</i>	<i>PMSS, coordinating with field, substantive units, planning service</i>
<i>Establishment of internal cadre</i>	<i>PMSS coordinating with OHRM</i>
<i>Negotiation with external sources (limited, at this point, to support functions).</i>	<i>PMSS</i>

The implementation process of this proposal requires additional human resources. An analysis of these requirements would be submitted subsequent to the internal review.

VII.

TRAINING



1. PURPOSE

This note is to serve as a chronological review of the events leading to the inception and implementation of the above mentioned training programme. As Messrs. Annan and Connor have attached a high priority to this programme, we are making every effort to ensure that the programme is effectively, creatively and professionally administered. The classroom schedule developed for the Procurement Pilot Programme is attached as an example.

2. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 2.1. **Inception** - In the first half of 1994, attention was formally called to the acute crisis in identifying qualified officers for five key support functions in field missions: finance, general services, personnel, procurement, and legal. A proposal was formulated to address this crisis, tailored to officers selected for mission assignment in the above mentioned areas. The programme was proposed to last three months, consisting of structured class-room and on-the-job training in UNHQ-New York, followed by deployment to the mission area. The cost of training was proposed to be incurred by the respective missions to which the officers would be deployed.
- 2.2. **Implementation** - In June 1994, Mr. Annan formally sought DAM's cooperation and support in the implementation of this programme. In response to Mr. Annan's request, Mr. Connor immediately initiated the process to appoint focal points within DAM who would help design and identify presenters for the substantive part of the classroom and on-the-job training in each of the five areas.
- 2.3. **Procurement One Month Pilot Programme** - On 2 August 1994, 5 procurement officers commenced a one-month pilot training programme, which consisted of one week of classroom instruction and three weeks of on-the-job training. The program was jointly developed by FPMSS/OHRM-Training Service/PTS/FLCS. The cooperative spirit of the various elements led to the successful completion of the program on 26 August 1994.
- 2.4. **Finance Pilot Programme** - On 12 September 1994, 4 finance officers selected for mission assignment will formally commence a six-seven week pilot training programme. Arrangements are currently being made for the officers to spend two to three weeks for on-the-job training in UNPROFOR upon completion of their one month in UNHQ. Certain administrative personnel being informally trained at the time (but not identified to participate in the programme due to the urgent need for their deployment to the field), will be invited to attend relevant portions of the structured classroom sessions, during the period of 12 September to 27 September 1994. The curriculum for this programme is expected to be finalized during the coming week.

- 2.5. **Full Three Month Programme** - On 26 September 1994, the 3 month training programme will commence, with participation from approximately 5 officers selected for mission service from each of the areas of personnel, procurement, general services, and legal services. This programme will consist of: one week of classroom instruction on UN/Peacekeeping orientation; one week of classroom instruction on their specific areas of expertise; approximately three days of general briefings (i.e. briefings on Personnel for non-Personnel officers; Procurement for non-Procurement officers). This two and one half weeks of classroom instruction will be followed by approximately two and one half months of on-the-job training. Draft curricula for the classroom instructions are currently being finalized.

3. FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAMMES

- 3.1. **Standardization of Curricula** - Resources and efforts are currently being dedicated to the development of these curricula so that they may be standardized for future programmes. We are encouraging that the curricula be sequentially logical and self-explanatory, to allow for different presenters to be assigned topics at short notice.
- 3.2. **Uniform Commencement** - In the future, all areas will commence at the same time. The separation of procurement and finance for the pilot programmes was in response to urgent operational requirements, and should not serve as a precedent.
- 3.3. **Long-term Proposal** - Before completion of the three month programme, we intend to conduct, in concert with the training service, an assessment of all components of the training programmes. We will accordingly issue a long-term proposal on training, designed to reflect FPMSS's strong commitment to the comprehensive and effective training of all personnel who serve in peacekeeping operations.

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Tuesday, 2 August 1994

9:30 a.m.	Welcome Ms. Momoyo Ise, Chief Training Service, OHRM Mr. Marcel Savard, Officer-in-Charge Logistics and Communications Section, FOD	DC2-1149
10:00 a.m.	Overview of Training Programme Mr. James Bradley, Training Officer Training Service, OHRM Mr. Salman Ahmed, Administrative Officer Field Personnel Section, FOD	DC2-1149
10:30 a.m.	Orientation to the United Nations Mr. Bradley	DC2-1149
12:30 p.m.	Lunch	
1:30 p.m.	Tour of United Nations Headquarters	General Assembly Bldg. Lobby
2:30 p.m.	Orientation to United Nations Peace-keeping Video: "The Agenda is Peace"	DC2-1149
3:00 p.m.	Discussion on United Nations Peace-keeping Mr. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General Department of Peace-keeping Operations	DC2-1149
3:45 p.m.	Break	
4:00 p.m.	Critical Incident Stress Management for Field Personnel Mr. Jim Mills, Special Project Officer Office of the Staff Counsellor	DC2-1149
5:00 p.m.	Orientation Closure, Q & A, Assignments Mr. Bradley Mr. Ahmed	DC2-1149

Wednesday, 3 August 1994

9:30 a.m.	Welcome & Introduction Mr. Karsten Herrel, Officer-in-Charge Purchase & Transportation Service Mr. Mauro Baradi, Officer-in-Charge Field Missions Procurement Section, PTS	DC2-1149
10:00 a.m.	Session I: Functions of the Purchase & Transportation Service Mr. Harbachan Singh, Chief Headquarters & Regional Offices Procurement Section, PTS ▶ Mandate & responsibilities of PTS ▶ Organization of PTS ▶ Overview of relevant financial rules ▶ Introduction to procurement practices & procedures	DC2-1149
11:00 a.m.	Break	
11:15 a.m.	Session II (A): Procurement Practices & Procedures Mr. Singh ▶ Documentation, reports and forms ▶ Overview of REALITY procurement system ▶ Overview of IAPSO	DC2-1149
12:45 p.m.	Lunch	
2:00 p.m.	Session II (B): Procurement Practices & Procedures Mr. Singh ▶ Local Committees on Contracts ▶ Headquarters Committee on Contracts ▶ Receipt of bids, openings & recording	DC2-1149
3:00 p.m.	Session III (A): Peace-keeping Procurement Mr. John Mullen, Procurement Officer Field Missions Procurement Section, PTS ▶ Delegation of authority ▶ Role of mission Procurement Officer	DC2-1149
4:00 p.m.	Session III (B): Peace-keeping Procurement Mr. Mullen ▶ Air & sea charters for troops and cargo ▶ Movement control ▶ Communications and EDP ▶ Petrol, oil and lubricants	DC2-1149

Thursday, 4 August 1994

9:15 a.m.	Weekly Meeting: Department of Peace-keeping Operations ► Overview of current developments in peace-keeping operations	Conference Room 6
9:45 a.m.	Break	
10:15 a.m.	Session IV: Overview of the Field Operations Division/DPKO Mr. Clemens Adams Logistics and Communications Section, FOD ► Overview of organization, tasks and responsibilities ► Special focus on activities of the Logistics and Communications Service/FOD	DC2-1149
11:00 a.m.	Session V: Logistics Operations Mr. David Highett, Officer-in-Charge Logistic Operations Section, LCS/FOD ► Overview of tasks and activities	DC2-1149
12:00 noon	Lunch	
2:00 p.m.	Session VI: Engineering Section Mr. Anatoly Gavrilov, Chief Engineering Section, LCS/FOD ► Overview of activities	DC2-1149
3:00 p.m.	Break	
3:30 p.m.	Session VII: The Role of Internal Audit Mr. Nicanor Guerra, Chief Field Section Audit and Management Control Division Office of Inspections and Investigations	DC2-1149

Friday, 5 August 1994

9:30 a.m.	Session VIII: Transport Section, FOD Mr. Alexander Waldrum, Chief Transport Section, LCS/FOD ► Overview of activities	DC2-1149
10:15 a.m.	Break	
10:30 a.m.	Session IX: Supply Section, FOD Mr. Ian Divers, Chief Supply Section, LCS/FOD ► Overview of activities	DC2-1149
11:15 a.m.	Break	
11:30 a.m.	Session X: Electronic Services Section Mr. Rudy Sanchez, Chief Electronic Services Section, LCS/FOD ► Overview of activities	DC2-1149
12:15 p.m.	Lunch	
2:00 p.m.	Session XI: REALITY in Field Missions Mr. A. Shumikhin, EDP Officer Logistics and Communications Section, FOD ► Overview of status of implementation of REALITY in field missions	DC2-1149
3:00 p.m.	Break	
3:30 p.m.	Session XII: Field Mission Procurement Mr. Chris Fathers, Officer-in-Charge Field Missions Procurement Unit I Field Missions Procurement Section, PTS ► Procurement for field missions ► Food supplies for field missions ► Logistics and contracting ► Vehicles and mobile plant ► Direct provisioning of spares ► Engineering works	DC2-1149
4:30 p.m.	Break	
4:45 p.m.	Closure and Preparation for On-the-Job Training Mr. Baradi	DC2-1149

Monday, 8 August 1994

9:30 a.m.	On-the-Job Training Purchase and Transport	noa B101 one L11 P 11 L101 A-00417-1011
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VIII.

•OTHER OBJECTIVES 1994/95

C



1. GENERAL

The Field Personnel Management and Support Service has determined a list of primary objectives to be achieved between September 1994 and June 1995. This list, itemized below, contains projects that are additional to both the operational work of the Service and to the special initiatives discussed in the preceding Sections (i.e., the establishment of mission templates; the further development and implementation of the civilian stand-by arrangements; and the training programmes). At the same time, the objectives itemized and explained briefly below, are tightly linked with the principal, operational work of the service, and share a common denominator: the rendering of the operational work more efficient and effective.

2. OBJECTIVES

2.1. The Draft Field Administration Handbook (FAH) - Review, Revision, Issuance

The latest version of an official FAH was published in the 1970's. The irrelevance of that version to current field operations is self evident. In 1992, the then Field Operations Division initiated the drafting of a revised FAH, designed to reflect the changed realities of field operations. That draft has been found lacking and was never issued formally.

A proper FAH is an immensely useful tool for the management and administration of field operations. The articulation of clearly defined policies and the procedures that should be followed to effect them will facilitate the work in the field, prevent contradictory decisions, minimize ad-hoc solutions and will enable a greater delegation of authority to the field.

With these objectives in mind, the Field Personnel Management and Support Service has begun work on a revised FAH. Recognizing that it is competent to deal solely with personnel aspects, it proposes the modular revision of the FAH (to consist of 5 modules: General; Logistics; Finance; Personnel; and General Services) and concentrates on the personnel module.

The revisit to the draft FAH is not done for stylistic purposes alone. Our experience over the past few years has indicated that the time has come to recommend substantive changes in some of the policies and procedures addressed therein.

A focal point within the Service is responsible for the structure of the module, and for coordinating the drafting of the substantive chapters, assigned to the various professional officers, each in its area of expertise. We expect to present a draft for review by the relevant offices within DAM by the OLA, by the end of 1994.

2.2. Automation of Human Resources Management Systems

The Staffing Templates discussed in Section V above are an example of a human resources management system issue that has been accorded priority in the previous working period, and is presently nearing completion. It is, however, not the only such issue that is in need of enhancement. We have identified the following system issues the enhancement and standardization of which is a priority:

2.2.1. **Building a field personnel selection/travel status reporting system** - the objective is to generate status reports of candidates selected to mission assignment.

2.2.2. **Building staffing tables and vacancy management systems** - The objective is to facilitate mission personnel management.

2.2.3. **Interface with OHRM systems** - The objective is to speed up travel procedures and tighten coordination.

2.2.4. **Institutionalize briefing/debriefing material** - The objective is to develop standardized "lessons learned" questionnaires, and to maximize electronic transmission and set up distribution network, in lieu of the ad-hoc manner in which such material is collected and distributed to-date.

The Service has already begun work on all these projects. Their completion, however, will require the services of a top-rate system analyst, capable of determining needs, design, coordination and supervising implementation.

2.3. Empowerment of the Personnel Sections in the Field - Greater Delegation of Authority

This issue is connected to both the delegation of authority issue discussed in Section IV above, and to the completion of the personnel module of the FAH as discussed in 2.1. above. Once it is legally and substantively feasible to delegate such authority, the result is likely to be empowered personnel sections in the field, streamlined processes and greater ability on the part of Headquarters to monitor and evaluate relevant administrative policies, procedures and processes.

2.4. Evaluate the New Field Personnel Performance Appraisal (FOPA)

In the spring of 1994, the Field Personnel Management and Support Services has developed a new performance appraisal form, designed specifically for mission service. The new form, eagerly awaited in the field, further takes account of the new appraisal system being developed.

for Headquarters, in that it too substitutes an emphasis on performance, for the previous emphasis on traits. The OHRM has approved the new form on a trial basis, and it was recently distributed to all our operations. During 1994/95 we plan to evaluate this exercise.

2.5. Compile Fatalities Data in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations

The Secretary-General has decided that a memorial, bearing the name of all military troops and civilian United Nations staff members who have lost their lives serving in United Nations peace-keeping operations under United Nations command, be constructed to form part of the United Nations Fiftieth Anniversary.

FPMSS has been entrusted with the task of preparing a comprehensive list of such fatalities as defined above. The target day for completion has been set at 1 January, 1995. The establishment of a complete and accurate accounting of all fatalities incurred in all United Nations peace-keeping operations requires, as a first step, extensive research into existing databases, archive files, mission files and Government records. Once this phase is completed, the fatalities will need to be substantiated and corroborated by the Office of the Military Advisor with respect to troops and by the OHRM with respect to civilians.

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Fiche d'accompagnement - Routing slip

A
To *Dr. Kabia*

Pour suite à donner		For action
Pour approbation		For approval
Pour signature		For signature
Projet à rédiger		Prepare draft
Pour observations		For comments
Pourrions-nous en parler?		May we discuss?
Votre attention		Your attention
Comme convenu		As discussed
Suite à votre demande	X	As requested
Noter et classer		Note and file
Noter et retourner		Note and return
Pour information		For information



Mr Dao

J

Date
19/10/94

De/From
Tina

NOTE FOR THE FILE

VISIT TO THE PREMISES OF THE 'ECOLE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE ET DE LA METEOROLOGIE' (ENAM)

On Monday, 17 October 1994 at 1500 hrs, accompanied by the Director of the ENAM, I visited the offices of the above-mentioned school, situated on the grounds of the Amahoro Stadium.

C The glass doors and windows of the offices were completely destroyed. Items of furniture, office/school equipment and material were missing, except for two big white-painted shelves. We were unable to enter the offices as the doors were locked. The Director mentioned that his first visit to the premises after the war, was on 28 August 1994. A copy of his 'note' to the Director General of Coordination at the Ministry of Transport is attached. He made allegations that since UNAMIR troops had occupied the premises during and after the war, then they must have removed all the items from the offices.

Were these offices looted or did someone remove the furniture etc from the offices/school? One interesting observation was that the doors were locked, and one wonders how the offices were emptied. Were they emptied by someone who had access to them? It seems unlikely that the office furniture mentioned in his 'inventory' could have been removed from the premises through the small window/door openings.

C As UNAMIR Force Headquarters has sent a memo to BRITCON and CANCON asking them to shed some light on this matter, I would suggest we wait for their replies before taking a decision.

Felixtina FORSTER
OCHA
UNAMIR

19 October 1994



From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 42

See Distribution

14 Oct 94


RETURN OF PROPERTY OF ECOLE NATIONALE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE ETC

Reference:

A. Ministere des Transports et des Communications letter 16.06.03
dated 10 Oct 94

1. A copy of Reference A is attached for information. It is self explanatory.

2. It is believed that UNAMIR troops have never occupied the piece of ground in question but that it may have been used for stores. I would be grateful if you could advise as to whether the area has been used in any way by UNAMIR and whether you can offer any light which might explain the fate of the property involved.


K P O'KELLY
Col
DCOS (Sp)

Distribution:

Action:

BRITCON
CANCON

Information:

Office of SRSG - Attention ED - with original of Reference A
MA to FC

Encl

No 16.06.03/μo



DIRECTION DE L'AERONAUTIQUE
B. P. 720 KIGALI

KIGALI

Objet :

1. I have spoken to DCos Ops who believes that we have never deployed troops into that 'stand alone' area outside the Stadium.
2. It may be thought that it was used for stores.
3. Please advise

MA to KC
Pl. advise. Shows
RMC 80 12/10

Note à M. le Directeur Général de Coordina-
tion au MINITRANSCO.

Suite à notre entretien de ce matin, je vous
présente ci-joint la remise-reprise du matériel
de l'ENAM effectué le 19/11/1993.

Rien ne se trouve plus dans les bureaux de
l'Ecole que j'ai visitée en inspection dans
la matinée d'hier. Les bâtiments sont occupés
par la MINUAR et les portes ont dû être défoncées.


Peut-on demander au chef de la mission
les archives et le matériel qui y étaient?

J'en profite pour vous rappeler que l'équipe-
ment, trois vanboxen, qui est mentionné à la
fin de la remise-reprise (NOTA) se trouve in-
diqué sur les listings se trouvant certaine-
ment au PNUD. Cet équipement, à mon sens,
a été détourné.

J'ai été affecté à l'ENAM le 13/10/1993
alors que l'école ne fonctionnait plus depuis
mars 1993. Elle fonctionnait généralement par
sessions successives.

Kigali le 29/08/1994

YADUSOMBEYE Ansochaire





MINISTRE DES TRANSPORTS ET DES
COMMUNICATIONS

Direction de l'Aéronautique
B. P. 898 KIGALI

Réf. No :

Annexe :

Objet : remise-reprise
à l'ENAM.

✓ Monsieur le Directeur
de l'Aéronautique
B.P. 898 KIGALI.

Monsieur le Directeur,

Par suite à mon affectation
n°16.02.01/897 du 13 Octobre 1993 à l'ENAM, j'ai l'honneur de vous
envoyer la remise-reprise dressant l'inventaire du matériel et des
instruments appartenant à l'ENAM. La présente énumère les objets
présents à l'Ecole et le matériel manquant, prêté aux tiers avant
mon affectation.

A mon sens, je pense que tous
ces équipements doivent revenir à l'ENAM par le biais du Directeur
de l'Aéronautique qui doit être en possession d'une correspondance
à ce sujet.


Je vous en souhaite bonne réception

Le Directeur de l'ENAM.

YADUSOMBEYE Anschaire.

Copie pour information à:

- Monsieur le Ministre des
Transports et des Communications
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Directeur Général
chargé de la Coordination Technique
au MINITRANSCO
KIGALI.



REMISE - REPRISE: du matériel de l'Ecole
Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
et de la Météorologie (ENAM)
entre Mme MUKAMUDENGE Domitille
Secrétaire de l'Ecole et M.
YADUSONEYE Anschaire, Directeur
de l'Ecole récemment nommé à ce
Etablissement.

Il s'agit en fait de dresser un inventaire des objets et instruments se
trouvant à l'ENAM, actuellement à Remera, dans l'enceinte du Stade
AMAHORO.

1. MOBILIER:

- 13 tables rectangulaires de la Régie des Aéroports du Rwanda (R.A.)
prêtées à l'ENAM.
- 1 bureau
- 1 fauteuil en bois
- 3 chaises
- 4 tables dont 2 vétustes

2. MATERIEL TECHNIQUE ET DIDACTIQUE:

- . Quelques instruments qui ont servi au cours: "Instruments et Méthod
d'observation", démontrés par le titulaire du cours IYAKAREMYE J.B.
 - Hygrographe n°385 (J. Richard)
 - Thermographe n°311 (J. Richard)
 - Hygro-thermographe n°27640 (Casella)
 - 1 éprouvette pour pluvio (Lambrecht)
 - 1 thermomètre Mini (R. Fuess) n°8214207
 - 1 thermomètre Maxi (Negretti & Zambra) n°47/173
 - 1 tube pour psychromètre + 8 mousselines
 - 1 tube à eau (incomplet)
 - mèche de cheveux
- . 1 machine à écrire HERMES 9S n°BY 6296
- . 1 ordinateur graphique solide
- . 1 globe terrestre
- . 1 carte climatique de la Terre
- . 1 compas, 1 latte, 1 équerre pour instructeurs
- . 1 carte du Monde

3. OBJETS OU MATERIELS PRETES ET NON ENCORE RENDUS:

a) Sous la Direction de KAMANZI Gérard:

- 1 Rétroprojecteur et 1 table de rétroprojection pris par
MUKAGATARE Cécile du PNUD.
- 1 autre Rétroprojecteur emprunté par la Régie des Aéroports
du Rwanda (UWAMUNGU Polycarpe et MURASANDONYI Vénuste).
- 1 Rétroviser au PNUD.
- 1 autre Rétroviser à la R.A.R.
- 1 poste téléviser à la R.A.R.
- 1 photocopieuse donnée à la Direction Générale de l'Aéronautique
pour réparation.

.../...

b) Sous la Direction de MURABUKIRWA Léonard:

- 1 Magnétoscope prêté à Mr COBBLAN T. du PNUD qui l'a ramené et remis à la Direction Générale de l'Aéronautique avant son départ définitif.
- 1 paperboard à Mr Jean FERRAT de la R.A.R.
- 3 cassettes VHS à Mr CARDINAL " " "
- 2 livres d'Anglais prêtés à BYANDAGARA Théophile.
- 1 manuel de rétroprojection emprunté par BIZIMANA Athanase.

4. DOSSIERS EXISTANTS:

- 4 classeurs (Correspondances, Horaires des cours, Fournitures, Listes de paie des Veilleurs).
- Dossiers en rapport avec le PNUD.
- Copies des Déclarations de créance des Instructeurs de l'ENAM.
- Registre du Courrier reçu et du Courrier transmis.
- Registre des Prestations horaires.
- Registre des Notes obtenues par les Elèves.
- Carnet d'appel des Elèves et des Veilleurs.
- Compositions et Examens de deux dernières sessions (au Stade).

5. BIBLIOTHEQUE:

Celle-ci est restée à l'Aéroport (ENAM) lors du déménagement. Seul le Dictionnaire "Petit Larousse Illustré" a été ramené au Stade AMAHORO.


6. AUTRES OBJETS DIVERS:

1 perforateur, 1 agrafeuse, 1 balai, 1 seau.


NOTA: Le matériel d'équipement de l'ENAM souligné sur le document PROJET RWA /87/006 du 07/09/1988 et 14/10/1988 ne se trouve pas à l'Ecole. Toutefois, les noms des détenteurs de certains instruments sont mis en exergue.


Fait à Remera, le 19/11/1993

La Secrétaire de l'ENAM
MUKAMUDENGE Domitille.



Le DIRECTEUR de l'ENAM
YADUSONEYE Anschaire.





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Name	Institution
Steve Logginick	CRS
M.P. CHOPIN	WHO
Mr. GEORGIS - D	DAA. (under)
J. Remick	IOM
Paul Howard	IOM
TREVOR FEENEY	UNREO
RHAZAOUM Ahmed	UNDP
Jean. Paul MENU	WHO
Don Norrington	Sammaritan's Puse
COL CB Yaache	UNAMIR
DANIEL TOOLE	UNICEF
Joel Epp	Sammaritan's Puse.
Techeste ZERGABER	WFP - C.D.
W. R. URAGA	UNHCR
Zanvier de Riedmatten	UNHCR
Eric Rousseau	M.R.I.S.

NOTE TO ED, SRSG
FROM KRISTEN
SUMMARY OF MEETINGS OF 17 OCTOBER 1994

1. As you will remember from our previous conversation, Mr. Rhazaoui lent UNAMIR one of his staffmembers during the spring. Now, since he is short-staffed, he would like to have this person back in his office. The staff member is Marius DIGNY, who is now working in UNAMIR Personnel section. A memo will have to be written to Mr. Golo to release the staffmember to Mr. Rhazaoui, Acting Res Rep of UNDP. (I have attached a draft memo).

2. Humanitarian meetings at UNDP are regularly held as follows:

UN Agency Heads: Monday, Wednesday, Friday: 8 am
(Friday, the Min. of Rehab attends)

Agency Heads/NGO Plenaries: Tuesday, Friday: 5 pm

Land Tenure/Private Property: Thursday: 5 pm (Min. of Rehab)

Agricultural Inputs/Seeds: Saturday

(The distribution of seeds and tools has been a success since FAO reports that 3,885 tons of seed were distributed as of 1 October in time for the planting season.

3. Mr. Rhazaoui said that, in addition to the \$384 million raised through the Consolidated Appeal, another \$378 million in bilateral emergency aid has been received, bringing the total to \$762 million.

4. Mr. Rhazaoui will convene a donor's meeting in Nairobi this Friday the 21st to sensitize donors to the Round Table.

5. He said that the donors will not give any bilateral aid until the Government satisfies the conditions that they spelled out (that Mr. Baker gave you). [You told me yesterday that Amb. Rawson said the contrary and that you thought Mr. Rhazaoui was being untruthful.] If that is true and we cannot trust anyone in this RoundTable process, then the best strategy is not to count on or trust intermediaries (UNDP/Rhazaoui) (I don't know how you feel about the World Bank) and, instead, to go right to the source (one-on-one meetings with donors as you have been doing). If Amb. Rawson and the US are on board and ready to help (due to your efforts), as well as the Canadians and the Germans, then we really don't need UNDP, do we? (We do our own legwork and just go through the formalities).

6. The secretary to the FC came here today to say that the Swiss Embassy would like our weekly sitrep. I told her that it is a confidential document, but I gave her a copy of RENP and my card. She said that the Swiss would like to know what we are doing (that is why they wanted the SITREP). I said that they need only ask for an appointment and we would be happy to brief them.

Compte rendu de la réunion des bailleurs de fonds
tenue au PNUD le 14 octobre 1994

Une réunion a été organisée par le PNUD pour discuter la nature et les modalités de préparation de la Conférence de Table Ronde que le gouvernement du Rwanda souhaite organiser avec l'appui du PNUD.

Les représentants des missions diplomatiques et/ou de coopération des pays suivants étaient présents: Allemagne, Belgique, Etats Unis d'Amérique, France, Grande Bretagne et Suisse.

Présentation de la Conférence

Le Représentant du PNUD, M. Rhazaoui, a fait un rappel des Tables Rondes tenues ou planifiées pour le Rwanda avant la guerre, notamment la Table Ronde qui était prévue pour avril 1994. Il a ensuite expliqué la nature de la Table Ronde souhaitée par le gouvernement en la qualifiant de forum de concertation, réunissant le gouvernement Rwandais et ses partenaires (biltéraux, multilatéraux et ONG) et permettant au gouvernement de présenter son projet de société et sa position par rapport à un certain nombre de questions considérées importantes par les bailleurs de fonds. Une fois un consensus se dégage entre le gouvernement et ses partenaires, ceux-ci auront l'occasion à travers la Table Ronde d'indiquer leur intention d'assister le gouvernement à mettre en oeuvre son programme de réhabilitation et de reconstruction du Rwanda.

La Conférence se tiendra soit à Genève, soit à New York vers mi-décembre 1994. Le lieux et la date précise seront déterminés d'un commun accord entre le gouvernement et le PNUD. Le PNUD s'engage à assister le gouvernement dans la préparation des documents qui seront présentés pendant la Conférence et à jouer le rôle de " facilitateur " entre le gouvernement et les bailleurs de fonds. A ce propos, le Représentant du PNUD a demandé aux bailleurs de fonds d'indiquer les principaux sujets de préoccupations sur lesquels ils souhaiteraient que le gouvernement précise ses intentions et sa politique dans le cadre de la Conférence.

Après avoir brossé un tableau général de l'assistance fournie actuellement par chaque pays donateur au Rwanda, les représentants de ces pays ont proposé les sujets suivants:

Sujets proposés par les bailleurs de fonds

i) Politique économique

Les bailleurs de fonds souhaiteraient connaître la stratégie du gouvernement par rapport à la relance de l'économie, la réhabilitation et la reconstruction du pays. Cette stratégie devrait naturellement tenir compte des besoins découlant du rapatriement et réintégration des réfugiés et de réinstallations des personnes déplacées .

ii) Sécurité publique

De nombreuses questions ont été soulevées concernant l'apparence de mesures arbitraires dans le système de justice en cours, les arrestations multiples des citoyens, l'occupation illégale de maisons et autres bâtiments privés, le rôle prépondérant de l'armée et le climat d'insécurité qui semble prévaloir. Les bailleurs de fonds souhaitent voir s'instaurer un climat de sécurité pour tous les citoyens Rwandais. Ils souhaitent également savoir le rôle que devra jouer la gendarmerie et la police ainsi que les structures institutionnelles de ces deux corps.

Les bailleurs ont également exprimé leur inquiétude quant à l'apparente désorganisation du système de justice et son manque de moyens face à l'ampleur de sa tâche. A ce propos, ils se disent prêts à appuyer le gouvernement ainsi que la Commission des Droits de l'Homme des Nations Unies dans la mise en place d'un système de justice efficace et transparent.

iii) Droit de propriété privée

Des questions ont été soulevées concernant l'occupation illégale des propriétés d'autrui et le besoin de trouver des solutions urgentes , notamment par la mise à la disposition des "returnees" et citoyens spoliés de leurs biens des terres agricoles et des terrains de construction.

iv) Accords d'Arusha

Dans la mesure où le gouvernement fait souvent allusion aux Accords d'Arusha et déclare son intention d'en respecter l'esprit général de partage du pouvoir, les bailleurs de fonds souhaiteraient voir le gouvernement énoncer une politique claire concernant sa position sur les Accords en général ainsi les différents protocoles et articles qu'il entend respecter et mettre en oeuvre.

v) Représentativité du gouvernement

Les bailleurs de fonds ont exprimé leur souhait de voir le gouvernement refléter autant que possible toutes les composantes de la société rwandaise et forces politiques en conformité avec l'esprit des Accords d'Arusha.

vi) Démobilisation de l'armée

Des préoccupations ont été exprimées à propos des intentions du gouvernement concernant les effectifs futurs prévues pour l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise. Les bailleurs de fonds ont émis le souhait de voir le gouvernement prendre des mesures pour réduire ces effectifs, réintégrer les soldats démobilisés dans la société civile et cantonner les militaires aux casernes.

vii) Etat de Droit

Les bailleurs de fonds ont exprimé le souhait de voir s'instaurer au Rwanda une culture politique démocratique, notamment le respect des droits de l'homme, la liberté d'expression, le pluralisme politique, la constitution d'une Assemblée Nationale qui représente l'ensemble des forces politiques de la société rwandaise. Les bailleurs souhaiteraient connaître le calendrier de sa mise en place, ses pouvoirs, son rôle et ses prérogatives ainsi que sa composition.

viii) Rôle de l'Etat dans l'économie

Des précisions sont souhaitées sur le rôle prévu pour l'Etat dans l'économie. Un désengagement de l'Etat des activités productives seraient hautement souhaitable et aurait l'adhésion de tous les bailleurs présents.

Le Représentant du PNUD a pris note de ces préoccupations et a indiqué qu'il les transmettra au gouvernement dès le lundi 17 octobre. Il a également précisé qu'il compte convenir dans les jours qui suivent des réunions de travail avec le comité interministériel chargé de préparer la Table Ronde, les ONG et les bailleurs de fonds représentés à Nairobi. Les résultats de ces réunions seront communiqués aux participants à la prochaine réunion de coordination.

NOTE FOR THE FILE

OSRSG STAFF MEETING - WEDNESDAY 12 OCTOBER 1994 AT 1500HRS

The meeting was attended by all staff of the OSRSG - both international and local.

The Executive Director, Dr. Kabia, welcomed the staff of OSRSG to the Meeting and said that he hoped that this was the first of many meetings. He introduced the staff individually, by sections, according to the organizational chart:

Political
Information
Humanitarian
Legal and
Protocol

He emphasised the importance of team work, confidentiality of information and mutual respect. He hoped that the staff in OSRSG will work in harmony for the good of UNAMIR.

Mr. Harman - Information - said that he would welcome ideas for radio programmes.

Mr. Dessande - Protocol - asked when the new staff member for his Section was expected. He also said that he hoped interpretation facilities would be available at the next meeting for the benefit of non-English speaking colleagues.

Mr. Buo - Political - raised the question of circulation of information between Sections. He wanted to know how he or any other staff member of OSRSG could obtain information pertaining to other sections.

In reply to Mr. Buo's question, Dr. Kabia said that modalities would have to be established for circulation of information, such as SITREPS and PRESS RELEASES. He went on to explain the meaning and use of CODED CABLES and how important it was for information contained in such cables remain confidential. In closing, he thanked all present for attending the meeting.

Felixtina FORSTER
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNAMIR



THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA:

THE EVOLUTION OF ITS MANDATE AND PROPOSALS FOR A FUTURE MANDATE

Introduction

The purpose and the rationality for the creation of UNAMIR, which is essentially to bring a durable peace and stability to Rwanda, remains relevant, indeed vital, at the present time. The need for a solution to the Rwandan problem is more urgent and more critical than ever.

In order to determine what the current mandate of UNAMIR should be, it is necessary first to: (a) analyze the present situation in Rwanda in terms of the reality on the ground; and (b) study the evolution of the mandate up to the present time and determine the relevance and applicability of its various components in view of the current realities on the ground. Within this framework, two of the essential components of UNAMIR's mandate, repatriation and political reconciliation, must be analyzed.

The Current Situation in Rwanda

Repatriation

The Security Council, in paragraph 2 of its Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, decided to establish a peace-keeping operation under the name "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR). In paragraph 3 of the same resolution, UNAMIR was assigned as part of its mandate, inter alia, to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.

Although UNAMIR is fulfilling its mandate of facilitating refugee repatriation in coordination with UNHCR and IOM, at the present time, there are obstacles which are impeding the process of spontaneous repatriation, namely: (a) Rwandans who had repatriated to Rwanda are returning to Zaire with reports of RPA reprisals; (b) Rwandans who repatriate to Rwanda are finding their private property (residences and businesses) occupied; and (c) Interahamwe and other militia and hardline elements continue to intimidate refugees to prevent repatriation.

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A recent example of this intimidation occurred in Katale camp near Goma on 28 September when the UNHCR was attempting to move refugees out of school rooms and into camps. Reportedly, interahamwe spread the word that UNHCR was attempting to force people to return to Rwanda. The "boyscouts", a local gang which was assisting the UNHCR with the move, entered into combat with "Sagesse" (interahamwe), resulting in six to twelve casualties. ICRC was reportedly informed of a "hit-list" which included several NGO's. NGO's subsequently evacuated this camp.

Political Reconciliation

Though the Government of Rwanda has made attempts at reconciliation, specifically in offering ministerial posts to members of MRND, it appears that the RGF and the RPF have very different and divergent views of the current situation and of the manner in which the international community should proceed in Rwanda. The Hutu population view themselves as victims of RPF aggression dating back to 1990, and, consequently, downplay the gravity and significance of the violent events that followed the downing of the President's plane on 6 April 1994. In the eyes of the RGF, the RPF have been committing atrocities since 1990 and continue to do so with impunity. The RGF has withdrawn from Mugungu camp, possibly south towards Bukavu, where it is reported they are rearming and training for a possible invasion or incursion into Rwanda. It is possible that the refugee community will be used as a human cover for the preparation and execution of this plan.

The DFC of UNAMIR reports that the prefects in the Goma area have stated the following:

- UNAMIR, especially General Dallaire, is responsible for the overthrow of the former legitimate government;
- UNAMIR is pro-RPF;
- the United Nations should place an embargo on the present Government; and
- the United Nations should pursue the implementation of the Arusha Accord;

The DFC, in addition, reported that General Bizimungu, the former RGF Chief of Staff, is taking a hard line, declaring that the war is not over and that the RGF is not defeated.

The Government, for its part, feels that neither the international community nor the United Nations has taken effective action to apprehend the perpetrators of the April and May massacres. The Government feels that, in the absence of such legal action, reprisals initiated individually are inevitable and even understandable. The Government has been calling for action in this regard since its installation on 19 July, and now feels particularly disappointed since the release of the "Gersony Report" which they feel was an example of an unbalanced and unfair approach to the human rights situation in Rwanda.

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In view of these divergent points of view and incidents of conflict, every effort should be made, parallel to UNAMIR's ongoing efforts, to facilitate a return to negotiations and the signing of a new agreement between the current Government and individuals who are true representatives of the Hutu community. This will require a comprehensive review and revision of the Arusha Accords, followed by a return to Arusha to negotiate issues based on the new realities on the ground in Rwanda.

UNAMIR's mandate initially evolved out of the Arusha Accords, and a new agreement will not only contribute to laying a framework for peace in Rwanda, but also will provide a framework for UNAMIR's future role and mandate.

Future Negotiating Points/Possible Political Solutions

The Zairean-based Rwandan refugees' stated preconditions for return to Rwanda reportedly are:

- (1) general amnesty;
- (2) judgment of leaders and organizers of both RPF and RGF;
- (3) a return of the properties seized by Tutsis since April; and
- (4) recognition of the government in exile as a legitimate political institution.

These points, among others, represent possible subjects for negotiation and a potential initial framework for discussions of issues which must be addressed and resolved.

One possible solution is the establishment of a decentralized government comprised of a Hutu region and a Tutsi region. The central government would be in Kigali, but both the Tutsi and the Hutu regions would have a good deal of autonomy. The above-referenced points would be negotiated with a view to establishing this type of government.

UNAMIR's facilitation of and assistance in the establishment of such a government, as well as with issues regarding the recuperation of private property and land tenure, will be an important part of its new mandate. The definition of UNAMIR's mandate in this regard, however, will depend on the outcome of negotiations concerning repatriation and reconciliation (amnesty, limited amnesty, international tribunal).

There is also debate about which of the following options would be more likely to lead to reconciliation in Rwanda: (a) the granting of a general amnesty to all in Rwanda; or (b) attempting to try several leading individuals for crimes. This question should be studied carefully by UNAMIR, as well as by both concerned parties, before a decision is made. It should be made a subject of the overall negotiations and general agreement; if it is not negotiated and agreed upon, it could become the subject of conflict, and it could create even

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more division and bitterness. The international community, and the UN, in particular, must keep in mind that the objective of the UNAMIR mission is to view the Rwandan situation from a broad historical perspective and to try to promote peace and reconciliation.

**The Evolution of UNAMIR's Mandate
and Proposals for a Future Mandate**

Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993

-outlined UNAMIR's mandate regarding the maintenance of security in Kigali and the observance of the cease-fire agreement. These are, of course, no longer relevant. Resolution 872 also called for UNAMIR to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to the elections.

It should be noted that the Broad-Based Government of National Unity, at the time of its installation, granted itself a mandate of 5 years, instead of the 22 months which had been envisioned in Arusha.

-Also, in paragraph 6 of Resolution 872, it states that UNAMIR's mandate, if extended, is expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which are scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995.

UNAMIR should monitor the security situation up until national elections, however, a new time frame will have to be negotiated as part of the overall agreement.

-Resolution 872 calls for UNAMIR to assist in mine clearance.

DHA and DPKO are currently working together on a plan of action, however, the issue of mine clearance may have to be negotiated by the two parties as part of the overall agreement.

-The Resolution calls for UNAMIR to investigate allegations of non-compliance with Arusha relating to the integration of armed forces.

UNAMIR could have a role in this in the future, however, Arusha would have to be reviewed and revised before UNAMIR's mandate in this regard could be determined.

-Monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandan refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.

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UNAMIR should continue in this mandate, however, the two parties should discuss the conditions for repatriation and reconciliation in the context of the overall agreement (revision of Arusha).

-UNAMIR should assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

UNAMIR should continue to coordinate relief operations, especially development projects as part of RENP.

-UNAMIR is called upon to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and the police.

This mandate should be continued, however, UNAMIR's role has already been expanded to that of training and advising the gendarmerie. This should be reflected in a new mandate.

Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994

-UNAMIR's role to act as an intermediary between parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire is no longer relevant.

-UNAMIR is to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible.

UNAMIR should continue to carry out this mandate, though the focus will probably be on development and land tenure issues.

-UNAMIR is to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. This is no longer relevant.

Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994

Expanded UNAMIR's mandate to:

-contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment of and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.

UNAMIR should continue in this mandate, however, ideally, there should be no need for secure humanitarian areas.

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-provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief.

This component of the mandate should be continued, though again, the focus will be on rehabilitation and development.

-Paragraph 5 urges all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring its freedom of movement and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

There have been several incidents in which the RPA has refused access to UNAMIR in Rwanda. These incidents seem to be becoming more frequent. This request, then, should be reiterated as part of the Government's overall request for assistance from the United Nations.

-Paragraph 13: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts.

This embargo should be maintained as part of any future mandate.

Resolution 925 of 8 June 1994

-Notes that UNAMIR's expanded military component will continue only as long as and to the extent that it is needed to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations.

The role and the configuration of the military component will be determined more effectively once discussions regarding national reconciliation and repatriation begin and once a new agreement is in place. The capacity of the military component to play an effective role in the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda will depend on what type of agreements result from negotiations on repatriation and reconciliation.

-UNAMIR's mandate was extended to 9 December 1994 at which time it will be reviewed.

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Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 3 August 1994

The report states that UNAMIR's principle tasks are now:

-to ensure the stability and security in the Northwest and Southeast regions of Rwanda;

These regions are still tenuous in terms of security, however, the entire country is reporting instances of banditry, human rights violations and, seizure of private property and extra-judicial reprisals. UNAMIR must cover the entire country.

-to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and displaced populations.

UNAMIR's visibility can contribute somewhat to stability, however, in order to encourage the return of refugees, the Government should engage in discussions with representatives of the Hutu leadership to negotiate the conditions for their repatriation.

-to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

This should be the primary focus, in a parallel manner with the other on-going efforts, of UNAMIR. UNAMIR should attempt to encourage and facilitate the identification of representatives of the Hutu community (both those in exile and within Rwanda), as well as the initiation of a dialogue between these representatives and the current Government.



Kristen Scott
Political Affairs Officer
3 October 1994

OUTLINE PLAN

GENERAL

5.7 The joint UN/Zairian Commission undertook a thorough reconnaissance of refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaïre. The commission also visited sites proposed by the Zairian Government in Kongolo (Shaba Province), Lokando (Maniema Province), Irebu (Equator Province). During all the visits the commission met and held discussions with Zairian government and military authorities and representatives by UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs, Refugee Leaders and Military Leaders of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF). At the end of the visits and discussions, it was possible to arrive at various courses opened to the commission or option plans with specific aim on the mission assigned to us. The various factors bearing on the situation having been very carefully considered. What ever plan is proposed here also takes cognizance of the fact that the current Rwandese Government positively and transparently pursues reconciliation with a guarantee security and return of property to rightful owners whilst the trial of those that committed the genocide one brought is speedy trial.

AIM

5.8 THE AIM OF THE COMMISSION IS TO CAREFULLY STUDY THE RWANDESE REFUGEE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU PROVINCES OF ZAÏRE WITH THE VIEW TO IDENTIFYING THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND FAMILIES FOR RELOCATION BEARING IN MIND THE COSTS AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS.

TASKS

- 5.9 In order to accomplish the AIM the following tasks must be undertaken.
- a) Identification of the various categories in the camps ie Political Leaders, Military Personnel, militias to include especially INTERAHIMWE.
 - b) Security of Refugees in the existing camps
 - c) Security of RGF in the new camps to be created
 - d) Security for Humanitarian Aid Workers
 - e) Recovery of arms from the Militia in the existing camps;

- f) Movement of the RGF elements and their families from the camps and providing security for their movement.
- g) Demobilization of the RGF
- h) Provision of spiritual material and Health needs of the people in the camps.
- i) Sanitation in the Camps
- j) Capital cost of creating the new camps
- l) Assess the possibility of integration the former RGF into the national Army of Rwanda.
- m) What type and size of force will be required.
- n) Support and sustainment of the force both military and civilian personnel.

STRUCTURE

6.0 The mission after all deliberations assessed that in order to achieve its good there are minimum requirements that must be put in place.

- a) A multinational Force/A coalition force led by a country with credible Armed Forces + resources.
- b) A credible National/International Police compment capable of policing the camps.
- c) Civil/military Engineering compment.
- d) Adequate Health Component.

CAPABILITIES OF THE FORCE

6.1 To be able to conduct the above stated tasks, the force must have the following capabilities.

- a) Command and control The force must come under a strong multinational or a coalition lead force commander who can take decision and influence the situation free from beurocratic tendecies.

- b) Deterrence The force should be aggressive to deter any aggression from RGF or militia
- d) Speed in deployment When a decision is taken, the force must deploy with minimum delay in order to achieve its objectives in the shortest possible time.
- e) Engineering capability Because of the amount of work involved, the force should have a strong engineering component.

6.2. PHASES OF OPERATION The operation will be carried out in four phases.

- a) Phase one Improvement of the existing camps to accommodate the RGF and their families. This phase requires total cooperation of the local authorities and UNHCR in particular because of the agencies experience in other places.
- b) Phase two The existing camps must be secured in order to carry out identification of the various groups. This phase will be perhaps dangerous and needs very careful planning. As stated in the report if the RGF has a voluntary attitude towards the relocation, there should be very little to worry about. If however, they offer resistance, then force must be applied.
- c) Phase three The actual movement of the people to the new sites. This phase will be sub-divided in such a way to avoid confusion and ensure maximum security. Care must be exercised to ensure family cohesiveness.
- d) Phase four The actual running of the camps which includes security, resources to support the ex soldiers and their families, motivating them to return home whilst teaching them to undertake Agriculture Ventures to help themselves.

6.3. OPTIONS Rather than listing a list of options only to shoot them down, the commission considered only two options that it considered credible.

A. OPTION ONE : A United Nations Force operating under Chapter VII and under different mandate from that of UNAMIR.

(1) Advantages The advantages of this option are :

- a✧ It will have a mandate that will enable it face any eventualities.
- b✧ A Force under UN banner will be considered neutral and therefore acceptable.

(2) Disadvantages The disadvantages are

- a⊗ Owing to its very nature, the UN force will take sometime to assemble and vital time will be lost.
- b⊗ Owing to national directives, even though such a force will operate under Chapter VII, there is bound to be hesitation when action has to be taken.
- c⊗ It is not certain whether the Zarian government will accept Chapter VII in this operation.

B. OPTION TWO A multinational coalition force led by a country with strong armed Forces and credible resources.

(1) Advantages The advantages are :

- a⊗ Speed in deployment
- b⊗ Decisive in nature
- c⊗ Total commitment


(2) Disadvantages The disadvantages of this option are

- a⊗ if the operation should go wrong the blame is shared is should be by only that country that leads the coalition forces.
- b⊗ the difficulty in getting a nation to head such a force.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS ON OPTIONS The two options presented could achieve the aim. However option two (2) is most likely to achieve the desired goal with minimum delay in order to get the refugee problem sorted out as quickly as possible.

6.5 RECOMMENDATION The commission assessed OPTION TWO as the one that has a greater degree of success and has the capabilities of bringing the situation under control with a minimum delay.

6.6 FORCE LEVEL Judging from the threat analysis in the existing camps, a force level of a commando brigade group will be required to undertake the task. This force will have in addition Zarian security forces to undertake some police duties, the structure of such a force will be such that it has control over the existing and the new camp sites with emphasis on security of the refugees.



- 6.7. **CONCEPT OF OPERATION** The concept of the coalition led force will be that of deployment of commando units in the existing camps the new sites in such a manner as to isolate the RGF, Political and militia elements from the ordinary refugees and ensure security by undertaking the tasks detailed in the outline plan
- 6.8 **THREAT** The main threat in the existing camps as stated in the analysis of the various groups is that of the militia and to some extent the militant elements of the RGF.
- 6.9 **EMPLOYMENT** The commando battalions should be organized into Battalion Headquarters and three commando tasks organized companies. Which will sort out the RGF for relocation in the new camps and the militia to be put under control in police concentration centres or under Zairian military authority.
- 6.10 **ENGINEER SQUADRON** This unit should be organised into squadron Headquarters and should have two construction troops a plant troops and a technical unit. This squadron must be capable within its own organisation to undertake the following task.
- a) Repair and maintenance of existing air fields
 - b) Expansion of existing camp sites
 - c) Repairing and constructing bridges up to medium and heavy class
 - d) Repairing existing roads
 - e) Providing potable water to the force and the refugees even though UNHCR may be in position to undertake this task.
 - f) Repairing existing buildings and construction of new ones
 - g) Efficient in river transportation and watermanship.
 - h) Explosive ordinance disposal in the existing refugee camps.
- 7.1 **AIR TRANSPORT SQUADRON** The transport squadron attached to the force many must be military with its own inherent capabilities of transport, air recce and air traffic control. The ground forces could provide air field security. Failure to get a typical air transport squadron, a civilian constructor may be assigned but this second option may result in inefficiency as experienced elsewhere it must be borne in mind that speed of execution is of essence, the Air squadron will undertake the following tasks
- a✳ Transportation of the refugees
 - b✳ Resupply of troupes and refugees
 - c✳ Air reconnaissance
 - d✳ Casualty evacuation
 - e✳ Transportation of reserve or rapid reaction teams
 - f✳ Liaison between zairian government and other agencies.

7.2 MEDICAL SUPPORT UNIT The Medical Support Unit should be of an expanded Field medical Company with the capability of surgery and trandling of tropical discases. Among other health needs the medical company will undertake the following.

- a⚙ Co-ordination aero-medical evacuation
- b⚙ Supervision of Sanitation in the camps
- c⚙ Minor and major sugery to the troops and refugees
- d⚙ medical support to the local population
- e⚙ Ambulance service
- f⚙ Put in place a forty-bed ward facility.

7.3 LOGISTICS COMPANY This must be equiped to carry out the following tasks :

- a⚙ overland transportation resupply items from airfields and river banks to the troops and refugees at the various camp sites.
- b⚙ stockpiling of ration, petrol oil and Lubricants (POL) Ad Spare parts.
- c⚙ distribution of POL to Unit locations
- d⚙ Transportation of refugees over-land
- e⚙ Repair and recovery - 2nd and 3rd Line.

7.4 COMMUNICATION TROOP There is virtually no existing telecommunication system in the areas where the new camps are to be sited therefore the need for the force to have its own inherent communication system to undertake the following.

- a⚙ VHF and HF communication network within and outside the camps
- b⚙ Facsimile
- c⚙ Telephone - IMASAT + CELLULAR
- d⚙ Air dispatch services
- e⚙ Postal Services to troops + refugees
- f⚙ Radio Broadcast facility.