

UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS

6-9 DEC 1994

OPERATION OVERTURE AND OPERATION RETOUR

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 135

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283

SECRET

Copy No....of....

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

3000.15 (OPS)

08th Dec 94

See Distribution

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO 21

Reference:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000

1. SITUATION.

a. Both KIBEHO and NDAGO camps have Threat Force elements (Interahamwe/FRGF/Bandits) amongst the population. They have been responsible for acts of harassment, intimidation, theft and murder both within the camps and in the areas surrounding the camps.

b. Threat Forces have also been responsible for the spreading of false RPA propaganda within the camps and actively dissuading refugees from returning to their home communes. It is possible that they have a significant following as a result of this propaganda.

c. It is considered likely that the Threat Force elements have access to small arms and grenades in addition to traditional wpns such as machetes and similar implements.

d. The Rwandese government authorities have been subjected to mob violence in the past when they have entered refugee camps.

e. Recent reported incidents affecting the KIBEHO and NDAGO area include:

(1) Ghanbatt found 3 hand grenades during a search of KIBEHO camp on 20 Nov.

(2) It is alleged that a suspected FRGF soldier was shot dead by the RPA in the KIBEHO area on 25 Nov.

(3) On 28 Nov at 1130 am, DP's killed two bandits at NDAGO, apparently for stealing food.

1 of 13

SECRET

SECRET

(4) Two bandits were killed in NDAGO camp on the night of 28/29 Nov.

(5) On 3 Dec unidentified bandits threw a grenade and attacked DP's in KIBEHO with machetes, seriously injuring 7 people.

(6) Over 50 killings have been allegedly attributed to bandits, criminals or Militia in a 15 km radius of these camps.

2. **MSN.** To clear the criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps in order to establish a secure environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. **GENERAL OUTLINE.** UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at KIBEHO. A single UNAMIR Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A two pl support/reserve element will be loc at KIBEHO. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be completed by 12 Dec 94.

b. **Gp and Tasks.**

(1). **Tunbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In Sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In Sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 1, 3 and 11 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

SECRET

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objectives onto each cleared obj with inf section each.

(2) **Ethiobatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release point (Green Route) with one pl.

(ii) Clear objectives nos 4 and 6 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iii) Arrest criminals.

(iv) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs onto each cleared obj with inf sect each.

(3) **Ghanbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Establish preliminary presence in the camps in conjunction with MILOBS forthwith.

SECRET

(ii) Provide a blocking force of one infantry coy in general area NDAGO/MUNINI.

(iii) Clear objectives nos 2 and 8 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iv) Arrest criminals.

(v) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(vi) Maintain post op presence in the camps with coy less a pl until relieved by ZAMBATT.

(4) **Frafbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 5 and 9 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(5) **Zambatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team each.

SECRET

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 7 and 10 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(6) Nicoy.

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep Coy less two pls.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release Point on Red Route.

(ii) Act as force reserve/security element under command Tac HQ.

(iii) Act as force RRF with one pl.

(iv) Construct and provide security for detainee cage at area of church building on obj 2.

(v) Be prepared to on order:

(aa) Clear objectives of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ab) Arrest criminals.

(ac) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

SECRET

(7) **MILOB HQ.**

- (a) Gp - Provide up to 20 MILOB teams.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Establish preliminary presence in Camps forthwith.
 - (ii) Conduct liaison between Tac HQ, UN Agencies, NGOs, local authorities and monitor proceedings.
 - (iii) Maintain post operation presence in the Camps with 5 MILOB teams.
 - (iv) Estb MILOB Coord HQ coloc with Tac HQ.

(8) **AUSMED.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb cas clearing post at KIBEHO.
 - (ii) Estb/mov cas clearing post at NDAGO on order.
 - (iii) Arrange treatment and evacuation of cas.
 - (iv) Conduct medical screening of detainees.
 - (v) Provide internal security.

(9) **CANSIGS.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb and man Tac HQ.
 - (ii) Provide comd, con, security and max tpt resources for Op Homeward originating at Kibeho camps.
 - (iii) Prepare comm plan to include allotment of frequencies, codewords, nicknames and allocation of eqpt.

SECRET

(10) **MP COY(-)**.

- (a) Gp - Provide 15 dets.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Route marking (To be completed by 132000B Dec 94.
 - (ii) Traffic control.
 - (iii) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facilities by 140600B Dec 94 in church area on obj 2.
 - (iv) Provide guides at assy area.

(11) **CIVPOL**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Monitor detainee screening procedure.
 - (ii) Establish liaison with Government judicial authorities.

(12) **CLO**.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Maintain constant liaison with RPA.
 - (ii) Provide one interpreter to each pl size elm and all unit and subunit HQs.
 - (iii) Supervise the execution of the Liaison Plan.

(13) **G4** - Augment first line tpt resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water.

(14) **HAC**.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Coord efforts of NGOs in affected camps.

SECRET

- (ii) Determine destination communes of IDPs.
- (iii) Coord Op Homeward with UN agencies and NGOs.
- (iv) Coord UNHCR and Human Rights monitoring of screening / holding facilities.

(15) **RPA**.

(a) Gp.

- (i) Two RPA Bns.
- (ii) RPA liaison teams to each pl size elm and all levels of HQ.
- (iii) 60 security pers (alloc 2 per LO).

(b) Tasks.

- (i) Provide outer cordon at camps at KIBEHO and NDAGO.
- (ii) Arrest and disarm escapees and escort same to UNAMIR cage for screening.
- (iii) Provide liaison and security teams.
- (iv) Identify criminals/wanted persons.
- (v) Conduct screening process under UN supervision.
- (vi) Escort detainees from cage to designated detention facility under UN supervision in the company of Human Right monitors.
- (vii) Provide post ops security in the area.

C. **COORD INSTR**

(1) **TIMINGS**

- (a) D-2 (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area.
- (b) Ni D-1/D Day (Ni 13/14 Dec 94) - Move to blocking/cordon positions/secure Force Release Points.

SECRET

(c) **D Day - 14 Dec 94.**

(i) H-3hrs (0130 hrs) - Outer cordon and blocking force at NDAGO in position.

(ii) H-2 hrs (0230 hrs) - Secure Force Release Points.

(iii) H-1 hr (0330 hrs) - Occupy Force Release points.

(iv) H hr (0430 hrs). Troops to move in tpt to respective objectives and start the search at the earliest under Bn/ coy HQ control.

(v) H+1 hr - Holding/Screening facility established.

(d) D+2(16 Dec 94) - Operation complete.

(e) D+3(17 Dec 94) - Commence redeployment.

(2) **Tfc Control.** Units will ensure that troop carrying vehicles are parked in the objective areas clear of the main axis(KIBEHO - NDAGO road)

(3) **Special Instrs.**

(a) Milob and Ghanbatt continue to increase visibility and presence forthwith to establish mounted and dismounted patrols consisting of 10 teams and coy str, respectively, by 12 Dec 94.

(b) All units to minimize vehs, HQ pers, sp pers and eqpt.

(c) **Safety.**

(i) Outer cordon not to fire toward inner cordon.

(ii) Arrest if possible or necessary. All persons arrested will processed through laid-down procedures.

(iii) Use small arms only outwards and only as last resort under extreme circumstances.

(d) **ROE.** State Yellow.

(i) Rule No 1 (status B). Authority granted to carry weapons.

SECRET

- (ii) Rule No 2 (status B). Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.
- (iii) Rule No 3 (status C). Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
- (iv) Rule No 4 (status B). Authority granted to disarm Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians.
- (v) Rule No 5 (status A). Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- (vi) Rule No 6 (status A). Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.
- (e) **Search.** Search to be conducted only during hours of daylight.
- (f) **Curfew.** Curfew will be imposed in both camps during the search and at night (1800 - 0500 hrs) and Bns/Coys will ensure that no DPs are allowed to move out of their shelters during the search of their respective objs.
- (4) **Axis of Search.** Main road KIBEHO/NDAGO.
- (5) **Assy Area.** BUTARE stadium GR 049126.
- (6) **EOD.** All units to be prepared to carry out EOD tasks. Force Engr Offr will coord allocation of explosives and aval mine detectors.
- (7) **Recce.** Restricted to Coy R Gp level. Min vehs.
- (8) **Limit of Search.** Southern edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (9) **Objectives, Bdrys and Report Lines.** Annex A and Annex B.
- (10) **Admin Base.** BUTARE.
- (11) **Routes.**
 - (a) **Red Route.** BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
 - (b) **Green Route.** BUTARE - KIBEHO.

SECRET

(12) Order of March.

(a) Red Route. NICOY, GHANBATT, TUNBATT, TAC HQ, CANSIGS, MP Coy, CIVPOL Det, AUSMED, HAC and NGOs.

(b) Green Route. ZAMBATT, FRAFBATT and ETHIOBATT.

(13) Force Release Points.

(a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839095.

(b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.

(14) Air Plan. Annex C.

(15) Detainee Handling Procedures. Annex D.

(16) Liaison Plan. Annex E.

(17) Communication Plan. Annex F.

(18) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

(19) Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.
Annex H.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Admin instr will be issued separately by 10 Dec 94.

b. All tps will carry combat rations and water for 48 hrs.

c. Accn in personal shelters.

d. Dress.

(1) Helmets and Flak jackets for all tps involved in search, security and blocking ops to max extent possible.

(2) All ranks must be prepared to operate under all weather conditions.

e. Ammo. All units will carry first line scale of SA ammo.

f. Med.

(1) Cas Clearing Post will be loc in the AICF building on obj 2 for the duration of the op.

SECRET

(2) All troops to carry first field dressing.

5. **Command and Signals.**

a. **Loc of HQ.**

(1) TAC HQ - KIBEHO (Double storey building on obj 2). Tac HQ will open at 140200B Dec 94. MILOB HQ Det coloc with Tac HQ.

(2) Alternate - GIKONGORO (GHANBATT HQ loc).

b. **Control.** One C and C helo will be dedicated to TAC HQ.

c. **Communications.**

(1) Comm plan is attached as Annex F including allotment of frequencies, call signs, codewords and nicknames.

(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to RPA BHQ for the duration of the op.

(3) 1 x Loud hailer to be issued to each rifle pl.

d. **Press Information.** UNAMIR military Public Affairs Officer will maintain control and direct the press through the operation. All releases will be cleared with either Tac HQ (Overture) or SRSB before going out to the press.

e. OPSEC is paramount.

6. Acknowledge.



HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
Acting Force Commander

Annexes:

- A. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines at KIBEHO DP Camp.
- B. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines in NDAGO DP Camp.
- C. Air plan.

SECRET

- D. Detainee Handling Procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan.
- F. Communication Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan.
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.

Distribution:

External:

Action:	Copy No:
GHANBATT	1
ETHIOBATT	2
FRAFBATT	3
ZAMBATT	4
TUNBATT	5
NICOY	6
MILOB GP HQ	7
AUSMED	8
CANSIGS	9
CIVPOL	10
CLO	11
HRL	12
FMO	13
HAC	14
MP COY	15
G3 AIR OPS	16
G4	17
FSO	18
RPA LO	19

Internal:

FC	20
DFC	21
DCOS OPS	22
DCOS SP	23
G3 PLANS	24
G3 ENGRS	25
File	26
Spare	27 - 28

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C to
Op Order 21
Dated 08 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
 - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
 - B. Group.
 1. Canadian Helicopters.
 - A. Gp.
 - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
 - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
 - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
 - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
 - C. Tasks.
 - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

DATED 08 DEC 94

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR
PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:

a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.

b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.

c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.

d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.

e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.

2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:

a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR ~~Rules~~ ^{Rule} of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force ~~for~~ ^{for} self defence including the protection of detainees ~~but do not~~ extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).

b. Detainees are to be searched to:

(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

searched by a member of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and, preferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the searching. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an allegation of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

- a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.
- b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).
2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut /other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one: Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres) Approx Weight (kg): Male or female? Date of birth or approximate age: Other characteristics:	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer) incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:
Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.	Signature of MP officer: Date & time:	

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

ANNEX F
TO OPO 21
DATED 8 DEC 94

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)

SECRET

Copy No. of . . .

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

3000.15 (OPS)

23 Dec 94

See Distribution

SUBJECT: SECURITY INSTRUCTION-OP RETOUR.

References:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- C. Z723 Sheet 17 KIGALI, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- D. Z723 Sheet 23 GITARAMA Ed 1, 1:50,000
- E. Z723 Sheet 26 KIBUNGO Ed 1, 1:50000
- F. 3000.15/1/OPS dated 21 Dec 94.

1 GENERAL

a. The recent conflict in RWANDA has resulted in the displacement of approximately 3 million people from their homes. It is estimated that there are 1.1 million refugees in the areas of GOMA and BUKAVU in ZAIRE. The refugee camps in these areas are controlled by military/militia elements of the former Rwandan government which sees the continuing existence of these camps as a way of maintaining their political power base. There are an additional 1.9 million displaced persons within RWANDA. Most of these DPs are concentrated in camps in the South West of the country in Sector 4. DP camps have been used as operating bases for former government militia elements to carry out attacks within RWANDA.

b. The return of the refugees to their homes will help to break the hold that the former government has over the people in GOMA and BUKAVU, improve the security situation in the border areas and assist in the normalisation of RWANDA.

1 of 15

SECRET

c. The DPs need to be returned to their homes in order to reduce the power of the militia in the camps and to reduce the number of attacks that are carried out in the vicinity of the camps.

d. In order that both the refugees and DPs can return home there needs to be assurances that their home communes are safe to return to, the people need to be separated from the military and militia elements of the former regime to prevent intimidation.

e. Op RETOUR therefore is planned for the return of IDPs and refugees to their Home Communes. The initial effort of Op RETOUR will be concentrated on IDPs in the Prefecture of GIKONGORO to their Home Communes principally in the Prefectures of GITARAMA, BUTARE and South KIGALI.

2. **MSN.** UNAMIR to assist in provision of acceptable security environment in conjunction with resources of the RPA.

3. **EXECUTION.**

a. **General Outline.** UNAMIR will ensure provision of security in three phases supported by RPA/Officials of Government and NGOs.

(1) **Phase I.**

(a) The preparation of Home Communes.

(b) Information Campaign in target camps.

(c) The establishment of conditions in the camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

(2) **Phase II.**

(a) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and searching procedures in marshalling areas.

(b) The safe movement of IDPs to ORCs/Home Communes.

(3) **Phase III.** Establishment of IDPs in their Home Communes.

b. Gp and Tasks.

(1) Tac HQ.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Assist UNREO, UN Agencies and NGOs in coordination of Op RETOUR.

ab. Advice contributing organisations of the level of help that could be expected from formed tps.

ac. Liaise with Prefects and Bourgmestres to ensure adequate security coverage is being provided.

ad. Liaise with the RPA and work out modalities.

ae. Inform HQ UNAMIR of the progress of Open Relief Centres(ORCs).

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Continue the tasks of Phase 1.

ab. Assist all contributing organisations to achieve their tasks.

ac. In concert with UNREO, brief Prefects and Bourgmestres on recurring problems and seek Govt approved solutions.

ad. Increased liasion with the RPA for creation of required security environment.

(c) Phase III. No Change.

(2) ZAMBATT.

(a) Phase I.

- i. Gp - No Change
- ii Tasks.
 - aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within Sector.
 - ab. Enhance confidence amongst the camp population.
 - ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase II.

- i. Gp - 1 x Coy.
- ii. Tasks. On order:
 - aa. Provide security of Coy str at target camps in AOR during the period when they are to be vacated. This may include pre-registration. (see Annex A).
 - ab. Provide security at Marshalling area in target camps in AOR, in consultation with RPA and UNREO.
 - ac. Provide security to Overnight Way Stations(OWS) located within AOR (to be specified later).
 - ad. Provide escort of a half section str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination communes/Open Relief Centres(ORCs) < see Annex A>.
 - ae. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.
 - af. Assist UNHCR and other UN Agencies in organisation of Marshalling areas within AOR.
 - ag. Liaise with the RPA.

(c) Phase III. Gp and Tasks - No Change.

✓ (3) GHANBATT

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change.

ii Tasks.

aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within Sector.

ab. Enhance confidence amongst the camp population.

ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

ad. Provide security of a sect strength for Home Communes/ORCs located within AOR (see Annex A).

ae. Provide security at IDP camps loc at KIZI, MUGANO, KARAMBI, BUHORO, BUSANGE with a pl size force at each camp.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - 1x Coy.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Provide security of coy str at target camps (See Annex A).

ab. Provide security at Marshalling area in target camps within AOR.

ac. Provide security to OWS located within AOR (to be specified later).

ad. Provide escort of a half section str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination communes/ORCs (Annex A).

ae. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.

af. Provide security of sect str for Home

Commune/ORCs located within AOR in Sector 2.

ag. Maintain a presence in target camp within AOR during the period when they are being vacated.

ah. Assist UNHCR and other UN Agencies in the organisation of marshalling areas within sector.

ai. Liaise with the RPA.

(c) Phase III. Reduce the conditions for violence in Home Communes within sector during the community reintegration process.

✓ (4) SECTOR 3.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change

ii Tasks.

aa. Provide security in the Home Communes in AOR. (Annex A)

ab. Provide security to OWS loc at BUTARE.

ac. Provide escort of min half sect str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination Communes/ORCs in RUNYINYA, GESHAMVU, KIGEMBI, NIARIZU, NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, and KIGOMA.

ad. Provide an RRF of a pl str when any DP convoy is transiting through AOR.

(b) Phase II. No change.

(c) Phase III. Provide security of sect str for Home Commune/ORCs located within AOR (Annex A).

✓ (5) INDBATT.

(a) Phase I.Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

i. Provide security to OWS in KIGALI.

ii. Provide an RRF of a pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.

iii. Liaise with RPA for guarding KIGALI OWS.

(c) Phase III. Be prep to rft with pl size elm in sect 2 & 3 on order.

(6) FRAFBATT.

(a) Phase I.Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4,3 and 2 on order.

(c) Phase III. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4,3 and 2 on order.

(7) ETHIOBATT.

(a) Phase I.Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4A, 3, and 2 on order.

(c) Phase III. No Change (As per para (7b)).

(8) TUNBATT.

(a) Phase I.Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phases II and III.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 3, 4A , and 2 on order.

(9) NICOY.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change

ii Tasks - No Change.

(b) Phases II and III.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 2, 3, and 4A on order.

(10) MILOB GP HQ.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - As deemed necessary.

ii. Tasks - Motivate DP population in target camps to return to Home Communes / ORCs.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No Change

ii. Tasks.

aa. Monitor target camps during evacuation of DPs(Annex A and B)

ab. Escort IDP convoys from target camps to ORCs/ Home communes in conjunction with formed troops and RPA.

(c) Phase III.

i. Tasks.

aa. Assist in commune ptls.

ab. Monitor security situation of home
communes and resettled IDPs.

(11) Force Engr Coy.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - 1 Engr Coy

ii Tasks - Assist in the prep and repair of
BUSORO bridge GR 9547.

(b) Phases II and III. No change.

✓ (12) CIVPOL. - All phases.

(a) Gp - No change.

(b) Tasks - Assist in commune security.

(13) G3 AIR OPS. - Provide heli sp for ptl, recon, liaison
and AME.

(14) CLO. All phases.

(a) Gp. No change.

(b) Tasks.

i. Coord liaison especially with the RPA and
ensure all allotted tasks are carried out.

ii. Provide required no of interpreters to
units and HQ on order.

✓ (15) HAC. Brief and coord the activities of the NGOs.

✓ (16) PAFFO All phases.

(a) Gp. No Change.

(b) Tasks.

aa. Prepare proactive PR campaign aimed at
promoting sy climate in the communes
highlighting RPA and UNAMIR presence and
presence of NGOs.

ab. Prepare appropriate handouts to be
distributed in the various target camps and
Home Communes giving necessary details of the

op.

(17) RPA.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - As required.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in target camps by extremists (Annex A).

ab. Enhance confidence amongst target camp population.

ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

ad. Contribute to information campaign in target camps and Home Communes.

ae. Create confidence within camp and Home Commune populations.

af. Liaise with Bourgmestres, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in Home Communes to work out the modalities of the op.

(b) . Phase II.

i. Gp - As required.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Establish secure conditions in target camps prior to operation.

ab. Screen and search all IDPs prior to boarding of transport/foot columns.

ac. Escort convoys/foot columns in conjunction with UNAMIR tps from target camps to Home Communes (through OWS, where required).

ad. Ensure that IDPs are not required to submit to further searching and screening once under escort.

(c) Phase III.

i. Provide secure environment in Home Communes.

ii. Liaise with Bourgmestres, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in Home Communes.

iii. Provide route security for coys from target camps to ORCs/Home Communes.

c. COORD INSTRS.

(1) Timings.

(a) D-Day - 29 Dec 94.

(b) D-Day to D+14 (29 Dec to 12 Jan 95) - Move from CYANIKA camp (Sector 4AN).

(c) D+4 to D+19 (02 Jan 95 to 17 Jan 95) - Move from RUKONDO camp (Sector 4AN).

(d) D+14 to D+24 (12 Jan 95 to 23 Jan 95) - Move from KIZI, KINAZI, MUSANO, KANYINA, NYASISUYA, KARAMBI, BUHORO, GISUNZA and NYAMIRA camps.

(e) D+19 to D+34 (17 Jan 95 to 01 Feb 95). Move from KIBEHO camp (Sector 4AS).

(f) D+29 to D+39 (27 Jan 95 to 06 Feb 95) - Move from NDAGO camp (Sector 4AS).

(g) D+39 to D+43 (06 Feb to 10 Feb 95) - Move from MUNINI camp (Sector 4AS).

(h) D+43 to D+47 (10 Feb 95 to 14 Feb 95) - Move from KARANA camp.

(i) D+47 to D+49 (14 Feb 95 to 16 Feb 95) - Move from BUSANZE camp (Sector 3A).

(j) D+49 to D + 53 (16 Feb 95 to 20 Feb 95) - Move from MUSABEYA camp.

(k) D+29 to D+59 (27 Jan 95 to 26 Feb 95 and beyond) - Move of refugees.

(l) Refugees. It is hoped to begin the move of refugees from D+30. Details of this part of Op RETOUR will be promulgated later.

(m) Modifications. The schedule is subject to modifications. If camp populations are greater than predicted or if the rate of vacation is constrained by other factors, additional days may be required to vacate the camps.

(n) Daily Timings. Daily timings for the schedule will be promulgated locally through meetings at Tac HQ as is currently the case for Op HOMEWARD. Tac HQ is responsible for informing units in the AORs concerned of the necessary adjustments to their timings.

(2) Schedule. See Annex B.

(3) ORCs. ORCs are listed at Annex A. This list will be updated as information becomes available. The first twelve ORCs to be established for the target camp at CYANIKA and which will be fully operational by D-3 are in the Communes of:

- (a) South KIGALI - NGENDA, GASHORA, KANSENZE.
- (b) BUTARE - RUNYINA, GESHMAVU, KIGEMBI, NAKIZU.
- (c) GITRAMA - NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, NIGOMA.
- (d) KIBUNGO - SAKE.

(4) MOVEMENT. Initial movement will be by vehicles. Earlier camps on the schedule have large populations beyond easy foot travelling distance and these will be transported by bus and trucks. At later stages of the move, as momentum increases and as camp populations have shorter distances to travel, much greater movement on foot will take place. Movement will be coordinated by WFP with IOM and UNAMIR transport support.

(5) Special Instrs.

- (a) Camps security to commence by 28 Dec 94.
- (b) OWS and ORCs will be secured by 28 Dec 94.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

a. Tpt. UNAMIR will provide tpt assets to support Op RETOUR as follows:

- (1). First Line Tpt. First Line tpt to be provided by

the following:

- (a). CANCON. 6 X TCVs.
- (b). ZAMBATT. 9 X TCVs.
- (c). GHANBATT. 5 X TCVs.
- (d). ETHIOBATT. 2 X TCVs.
- (e). TUNBATT. 4 X TCVs.
- (f). INDBATT. 5 X TCVs.
- (g). NICOY. 3 X TCVs.
- (h). AUSMED. 2 X TCVs.

(2). Reporting. First line tpt reporting are to be coordinated by Tac HQ.

(3). Agencies and NGOs. Agencies and NGOs will provide all available tpt to support Op RETOUR.

b. Feeding.

(1) Units. Units are to be self-contained for feeding.

(2). IDPs. The feeding of IDPs will be coordinated by UNREO at the Commune level. Food distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distribution.

c. Ammunition. As per SOPs.

d. ROE. State GREEN. See Annex E for other legal issues.

e. Dress. Normal.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Tac HQ. Tac HQ will be the coordinating UNAMIR HQ for Op RETOUR.

b. Convoy Escort. Escorting units are to provide radio communications with each convoy. FSO is to establish and issue procedure for escort communications through other AORs.

6. Ack.

OP RETOUR - ORC DESTINATIONS

CAMP	PREFECTURE	ORC/COMMUNE
CYANIKA	South Kigali	Open from D-3 (26 Dec) Ngenda ✓ Gashora ✓ Kanzenze ✓
	Butare	Runyinya ✓ Geshamvu ✓ Kigembi ✓ Niakazu -
	Gitarama	Ntongwe ✓ Masango - Murama ✓ <i>Same Same</i>
		Kigoma ✓
	Kibungo	Sake ✓
RUKHONDO	All of the above + Butare	Open from D + 2 (31 Dec) All of the above + Muyira ✓ Ntyazo ✓ Nyabisundu ✓
	Gikongoro	Musango ✓ Rukhondo (to be activated only when camp has closed)

This list will be updated as time progresses. Planning for subsequent camps on the Schedule, and their ORCs, is currently being carried out.

ANNEX B

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)									43			
MUNINI (12,000)									43	47		
KARANA (21,000)										47-9		
BUSANZE (9,000)										49	53	
MUSABEYA (14,000)												

Notes:

All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
 From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Stability, security and development are objectives of tantamount importance to the people of Rwanda, their Government and the international community. Fundamental to these objectives is the return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese who are displaced within their own nation. Towards this specific goal, the Government with the support of the international community will intensify its efforts to settle the displaced in an expeditious and humane manner. In pursuing this immediate goal, the Government and the international community are determined to ensure that the principles set out below will underpin all their efforts:

Immediate Objectives

1. The immediate objective of the Government and international community is to have the internally displaced people of Rwanda return home with dignity and in conditions of safety and security.
2. In ensuring that these immediate objectives are upheld, it is agreed that there be:
 - i. Total Political Endorsement. All plans established to support the IDP operation will have the full support and active cooperation of the Government of Rwanda;
 - ii. No Enforced Camp Closure. Camps will not be forcibly closed. That said, an environment in which the people are motivated to leave voluntarily will be created;
 - iii. Initial Operations to Create Confidence. It is essential to build confidence amongst the displaced population and momentum in the operation. Therefore from the very outset full attention must be given to ensuring success along these lines;
 - iv. Secure Environment. Conditions in the Home Communes will be established to create a secure environment and provide essential social services which attract people home from the camps;
 - v. Confidence Building. Confidence building measures, primarily concerning security and information dimensions, will be essential;

vi. Impartial Information. Information promulgated as part of confidence building measures must be impartial;

vii. Return in Safety. All effort must be made to ensure that people return in safety. While ensuring this principle, the Government maintains the right to bring to justice, consistent with the due process of law, those accused of perpetrating genocide;

viii. Cooperation. The success of the operation will require the full cooperation of all contributing organisations, within the scope of their mandates;

vi. Flexibility. All plans developed to support the settlement of IDPs must be flexible and lend themselves to modification. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure that any adjustments take place in a way that fulfills the aforementioned principles both at the policy and implementation levels.

OPEN RELIEF CENTRES

1. The concept of Open Relief Centres (ORC) has been established to address the fundamental concerns of Internally Displaced Persons and the recipient communities, ensuring the re-integration of IDPs while maintaining the security and dignity of both groups. The ORC is a temporary place where displaced persons on the move and other returnees as well as locals in vulnerable conditions can freely enter or leave and obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment.
2. Open Relief Centres will be set up in accordance and in phase with local conditions and requirements in Rwanda. The ORC, are transit points, in the home communes, for IDP's returning to their homes. They are to facilitate immediate re-integration, through the provision of basic food items, seeds and construction materials, and by increasing confidence in law and order in the home communes. At the same time Quick Impact Project will promote rehabilitation of the country, at the communal level.
3. Material assistance provided through the ORC's in the home communes is aimed at re-integration, and will be phased out; dependency must be avoided.
4. The actors in setting up Open Relief Centres will be UNHCR (set-up and protection), WFP (food), UNICEF (water and sanitation), WHO (health), UNAMIR (security), UNHCR (protection), NGOs and local authorities. Each ORC will be managed by a designated NGO or UN Agency. Information gathering and dissemination will come under the responsibility of UNREO. Overall coordination will take place in the context of the Integrated Humanitarian Operations Centre framework, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.

ORC components

a. Food distribution

Food needs are best covered by food (for work) programmes, distributions of food or rations at the commune level. Sustained direct distribution at the ORC-site should be avoided so as to not have concentration of foodstuffs at one location nor provide an incentive for people to stay at the ORCs. One-off distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distributions. (half rations/250grms/person/day).

Once IDPs leave the ORCs for their homes, they should be absorbed to the ongoing food, seeds and tools, distributions in the communes.

b. Temporary shelter

Ideally, ORCs would be considered a temporary solution limited in time (3-10 days), while the local authorities find an acceptable temporary, or preferably durable solution for those whose homes are either occupied or need repairs. It will be forbidden to build huts at the ORC's. Construction materials will be made judiciously available in the vicinity of the ORC to targeted populations in order for people to instantly work on rebuilding their houses. For planning purposes, plastic sheeting for one out of four families will be made available in each ORC.

c. Health

Ideally people in transit at the ORCs needing medical assistance should be referred to the health system in place at the commune level. Where such structures are inadequate NGOs or the appropriate UN Agency will be given the responsibility of supplying such services.

d. Water and sanitation

Access to a water source or water availability will be one of the criteria to determine the ORC location. These should be simple latrines; For planning purposes 1 pit latrines per 50 IDPs.

e. Transport

It is considered advisable to have transport facilities available at the ORCs, for people who cannot reach their secteur on foot (distance too big, disabled persons etc.).

f. Protection

Protection is one of the key issues of the ORCs. The protection role will be taken care of by UNHCR and UNHR in close collaboration with local authorities. It is considered important to register the IDPs on arrival to the centre, so as to monitor further events. UNHCR/UNHR or ICRC in principle will ensure presence in each of the ORCs.

Local residents as well as IDP's having returned to their homes, can contact the local authorities and the ORC in case of security problems in their home areas, including tensions over house occupation etc. In such cases admission and emergency shelter may be granted on a case by case basis. Solutions will then be found by, and in cooperation with the local authorities, including the gendarmerie or army as required.

The local authorities have at all times access to the ORC's in order to promote confidence etc.

The ORC's should not be a sanctuary for persons having committed crimes. Local law enforcement agents, including army personnel if duty authorized, can enter the ORC to arrest persons, if it can be demonstrated that substantiated suspicions against such persons exists. Arrests can in principle only be made in the presence of UN or ICRC official unless there is an emergency situation (risk of escape, genuine threat to the security of others, etc. The law enforcement agents will sign, at the ORC, for any arrest made. and family members, the ICRC and the UNHCHR will have access to the person concerned.

LEGAL ISSUES FOR OP RETOUR

References:

- A. Resolution 925 dated 8 Jun 94
- B. Operational Directive No 2: Rules of Engagement dated 6 Oct 94
- C. FC Directive on Legal Jurisdiction Applicable to UNAMIR and Rwandan Authorities dated 3 Nov 94

Introduction

1. UNAMIR troops will be required to provide security to displaced persons and NGOs taking part in OP Retour. It is therefore essential that soldiers be briefed by their commanders as to what their legal rights and obligations are during the OP.

Rules of Engagement

2. Reference A states that the mandate of UNAMIR is to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security and support to humanitarian relief operations. This mandate and its legal ramifications are reflected in Reference B. All UNAMIR troops are to follow the ROE as stated in Reference B.

3. To achieve the above mandate and to comply with the Rules of Engagement (ROE), soldiers should be aware that their orders allow them to protect themselves, other UNAMIR troops, displaced persons and other civilians at risk (including humanitarian aid workers and UN personnel) from a hostile intent and/or hostile act.

4. To afford this protection a soldier is entitled to use minimum force to stop a serious offence from being committed against any of the aforementioned categories of people. A serious offence is defined as murder, rape or serious bodily harm.

5. If extremist individual(s) are intimidating or harassing IDPs from leaving the camps, UNAMIR troops are to use minimum force to separate the extremist(s) from the general population of IDPs. The use of force is to be consistent with the constraints stated in Reference B.

Handling Detainees

6. Rwandan nationals should only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display a hostile intent or carry out any of the acts referred to in Reference B, paragraph 8. The detainee(s) and any relevant evidence is to be handed at the earliest opportunity to the Fce MP.

7. The Fce MP are to hand over any detainee at the earliest opportunity to the local Office of the Prosecutor in accordance with Reference C.

8. UNAMIR soldiers are reminded that all detainees are to be treated humanely, ensuring that they are provided with food, drinking water and that they are afforded safeguards in terms of health, hygiene and protection against the rigours of climate and dangers of armed conflict.

✓ Recce Plan

* Ghanbatt - bn obj (coy str) ✓

* HAC - info ✓

* G3 Engr - Green Rte. ✓

SECRET

Copy No. 22 of 28

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

08th Dec 94

3000.15 (OPS)

See Distribution

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO 21

Reference:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000

1. SITUATION.

a. Both KIBEHO and NDAGO camps have Threat Force elements (Interahamwe/FRGF/Bandits) amongst the population. They have been responsible for acts of harassment, intimidation, theft and murder both within the camps and in the areas surrounding the camps.

b. Threat Forces have also been responsible for the spreading of false RPA propaganda within the camps and actively dissuading refugees from returning to their home communes. It is possible that they have a significant following as a result of this propaganda.

c. It is considered likely that the Threat Force elements have access to small arms and grenades in addition to traditional wpns such as machetes and similar implements.

d. The Rwandese government authorities have been subjected to mob violence in the past when they have entered refugee camps.

e. Recent reported incidents affecting the KIBEHO and NDAGO area include:

(1) Ghanbatt found 3 hand grenades during a search of KIBEHO camp on 20 Nov.

(2) It is alleged that a suspected FRGF soldier was shot dead by the RPA in the KIBEHO area on 25 Nov.

(3) On 28 Nov at 1130 am, DP's killed two bandits at NDAGO, apparently for stealing food.

1 of 13

SECRET

SECRET

(4) Two bandits were killed in NDAGO camp on the night of 28/29 Nov.

(5) On 3 Dec unidentified bandits threw a grenade and attacked DP's in KIBEHO with machetes, seriously injuring 7 people.

(6) Over 50 killings have been allegedly attributed to bandits, criminals or Militia in a 15 km radius of these camps.

2. **MSN.** To clear the criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps in order to establish a secure environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. **GENERAL OUTLINE.** UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at KIBEHO. A single UNAMIR Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A two pl support/reserve element will be loc at KIBEHO. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be completed by 12 Dec 94.

b. **Gp and Tasks.**

(1). **Tunbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In Sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In Sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 1, 3 and 11 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

SECRET

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objectives onto each cleared obj with inf section each.

(2) **Ethiobatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release point (Green Route) with one pl.

(ii) Clear objectives nos 4 and 6 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iii) Arrest criminals.

(iv) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs onto each cleared obj with inf sect each.

(3) **Ghanbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Establish preliminary presence in the camps in conjunction with MILOBS forthwith.

SECRET

(ii) Provide a blocking force of one infantry coy in general area NDAGO/MUNINI.

(iii) Clear objectives nos 7 and 8 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iv) Arrest criminals.

(v) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(vi) Maintain post op presence in the camps with coy less a pl until relieved by ZAMBATT.

(4) Frafbatt.

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 5 and 9 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(5) Zambatt.

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team each.

SECRET

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 7 and 10 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(6) Nicoy.

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep Coy less two pls.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release Point on Red Route.

(ii) Act as force reserve/security element under command Tac HQ.

~~(iii) Act as force RRF with one pl.~~

(iv) Construct and provide security for detainee cage at area of church building on obj 2.

(v) Be prepared to on order:

(aa) Clear objectives of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ab) Arrest criminals.

(ac) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

Indbatt

Provide - 2 pl. Res/RRF

- On 0 other tasks

SECRET

(7) **MILOB HQ.**

- (a) Gp - Provide up to 20 MILOB teams.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Establish preliminary presence in Camps forthwith.
 - (ii) Conduct liaison between Tac HQ, UN Agencies, NGOs, local authorities and monitor proceedings.
 - (iii) Maintain post operation presence in the Camps with 5 MILOB teams.
 - (iv) Estb MILOB Coord HQ coloc with Tac HQ.

(8) **AUSMED.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb cas clearing post at KIBEHO.
 - (ii) Estb/mov cas clearing post at NDAGO on order.
 - (iii) Arrange treatment and evacuation of cas.
 - (iv) Conduct medical screening of detainees.
 - (v) Provide internal security.

(9) **CANSIGS.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb and man Tac HQ.
 - (ii) Provide comd, con, security and max tpt resources for Op Homeward originating at Kibeho camps.
 - (iii) Prepare comm plan to include allotment of frequencies, codewords, nicknames and allocation of eqpt.

SECRET

(10) MP COY(-).

- (a) Gp - Provide 15 dets.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Route marking (To be completed by 132000B Dec 94.
 - (ii) Traffic control.
 - (iii) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facilities by 140600B Dec 94 in church area on obj 2.
 - (iv) Provide guides at assy area.

*

(11) CIVPOL

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Monitor detainee screening procedure.
 - (ii) Establish liaison with Government judicial authorities.

(12) CLO.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Maintain constant liaison with RPA.
 - (ii) Provide one interpreter to each pl size elm and all unit and subunit HQs.
 - (iii) Supervise the execution of the Liaison Plan.

(13) G4 - Augment first line tpt resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water.

*

(14) HAC.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Coord efforts of NGOs in affected camps.

SECRET

- (ii) Determine destination communes of IDPs.
- (iii) Coord Op Homeward with UN agencies and NGOs.
- (iv) Coord UNHCR and Human Rights monitoring of screening / holding facilities.

(15) **RPA.**

(a) Gp.

- (i) Two RPA Bns.
- (ii) RPA liaison teams to each pl size elm and all levels of HQ.
- (iii) 60 security pers (alloc 2 per LO).

(b) Tasks.

- (i) Provide outer cordon at camps at KIBEHO and NDAGO.
- (ii) Arrest and disarm escapees and escort same to UNAMIR cage for screening.
- (iii) Provide liaison and security teams.
- (iv) Identify criminals/wanted persons.
- (v) Conduct screening process under UN supervision.
- (vi) Escort detainees from cage to designated detention facility under UN supervision in the company of Human Right monitors.
- (vii) Provide post ops security in the area.

C. **COORD INSTR**

(1) **TIMINGS**

- (a) D-2 (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area.
- (b) Ni D-1/D Day (Ni 13/14 Dec 94) - Move to blocking/cordon positions/secure Force Release Points.

SECRET

(c) **D Day - 14 Dec 94..**

(i) H-3hrs (0130 hrs) - Outer cordon and blocking force at NDAGO in position.

(ii) H-2 hrs (0230 hrs) - Secure Force Release Points.

(iii) H-1 hr (0330 hrs) - Occupy Force Release points.

(iv) H hr (0430 hrs). Troops to move in tpt to respective objectives and start the search at the earliest under Bn/ coy HQ control.

(v) H+1 hr - Holding/Screening facility established.

(d) D+2(16 Dec 94) - Operation complete.

(e) D+3(17 Dec 94) - Commence redeployment.

(2) **Tfc Control.** Units will ensure that troop carrying vehicles are parked in the objective areas clear of the main axis(KIBEHO - NDAGO road)

(3) **Special Instrs.**

(a) Milob and Ghanbatt continue to increase visibility and presence forthwith to establish mounted and dismounted patrols consisting of 10 teams and coy str, respectively, by 12 Dec 94.

(b) All units to minimize vehs, HQ pers, sp pers and eqpt.

(c) **Safety.**

(i) Outer cordon not to fire toward inner cordon.

(ii) Arrest if possible or necessary. All persons arrested will processed through laid-down procedures.

(iii) Use small arms only outwards and only as last resort under extreme circumstances.

(d) **ROE.** State Yellow.

(i) Rule No 1 (status B). Authority granted to carry weapons.

SECRET

- (ii) Rule No 2 (status B). Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.
- (iii) Rule No 3 (status C). Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
- (iv) Rule No 4 (status B). Authority granted to disarm Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians.
- (v) Rule No 5 (status A). Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- (vi) Rule No 6 (status A). Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.
- (e) **Search.** Search to be conducted only during hours of daylight.
- (f) **Curfew.** Curfew will be imposed in both camps during the search and at night (1800 - 0500 hrs) and Bns/Coys will ensure that no DPs are allowed to move out of their shelters during the search of their respective objs.
- (4) **Axis of Search.** Main road KIBEHO/NDAGO.
- (5) **Assy Area.** BUTARE stadium GR 049126.
- (6) **EOD.** All units to be prepared to carry out EOD tasks. Force Engr Offr will coord allocation of explosives and aval mine detectors.
- (7) **Recce.** Restricted to Coy R Gp level. Min vehs.
- (8) **Limit of Search.** Southern edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (9) **Objectives, Bdrys and Report Lines.** Annex A and Annex B.
- (10) **Admin Base.** BUTARE.
- (11) **Routes.**
 - (a) **Red Route.** BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
 - (b) **Green Route.** BUTARE - KIBEHO.

SECRET

(12) Order of March.

(a) Red Route. NICOY, GHANBATT, TUNBATT, TAC HQ, CANSIGS, MP Coy, CIVPOL Det, AUSMED, HAC and NGOs.

(b) Green Route. ZAMBATT, FRAFBATT and ETHIOBATT.

(13) Force Release Points.

(a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839095.

(b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.

(14) Air Plan. Annex C.

(15) Detainee Handling Procedures. Annex D.

(16) Liaison Plan. Annex E.

(17) Communication Plan. Annex F.

(18) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

(19) Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.
Annex H.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Admin instr will be issued separately by 10 Dec 94.

b. All tps will carry combat rations and water for 48 hrs.

c. Accn in personal shelters.

d. Dress.

(1) Helmets and Flak jackets for all tps involved in search, security and blocking ops to max extent possible.

(2) All ranks must be prepared to operate under all weather conditions.

e. Ammo. All units will carry first line scale of SA ammo.

f. Med.

(1) Cas Clearing Post will be loc in the AICF building on obj 2 for the duration of the op.

SECRET

(2) All troops to carry first field dressing.

5. **Command and Signals.**

a. **Loc of HQ.**

(1) TAC HQ - KIBEHO (Double storey building on obj 2). Tac HQ will open at 140200B Dec 94. MILOB HQ Det coloc with Tac HQ.

(2) Alternate - GIKONGORO (GHANBATT HQ loc).

b. **Control.** One C and C helo will be dedicated to TAC HQ.

c. **Communications.**

(1) Comm plan is attached as Annex F including allotment of frequencies, call signs, codewords and nicknames.

(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to RPA BHQ for the duration of the op.

(3) 1 x Loud hailer to be issued to each rifle pl.

d. **Press Information.** UNAMIR military Public Affairs Officer will maintain control and direct the press through the operation. All releases will be cleared with either Tac HQ (Overture) or SRSG before going out to the press.

e. OPSEC is paramount.

6. Acknowledge.



HK ANYIDOH0
Brig Gen
Acting Force Commander

Annexes:

- A. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines at KIBEHO DP Camp.
- B. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines in NDAGO DP Camp.
- C. Air plan.

SECRET

- D. Detainee Handling Procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan.
- F. Communication Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan.
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.

Distribution:

External:

Action: Copy No:


GHANBATT	1
ETHIOBATT	2
FRAFBATT	3
ZAMBATT	4
TUNBATT	5
NICOY	6
MILOB GP HQ	7
AUSMED	8
CANSIGS	9
CIVPOL	10
CLO	11
HRL	12
FMO	13
HAC	14
MP COY	15
G3 AIR OPS	16
G4	17
FSO	18
RPA LO	19

Internal:

FC	20
DFC	21
SECRET	22
DCOS SP	23
G3 PLANS	24
G3 ENGRS	25
File	26
Spare	27 - 28


10
SKETCH SHOWING OBJS, BUIYS AND REPORT LINES
AT KIBEHO CAMP

to Op Ord
 21 Dated
 29 Dec 64



04 SKETCH SHOWING OBJ'S, BDYS AND REPORT LINES AT NDAHO CAMP

Op Ord 21
Dated 08 Dec 9



Annex C to
Op Order 21
Dated 08 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
 - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
 - B. Group.
 1. Canadian Helicopters.
 - A. Gp.
 - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
 - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
 - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
 - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
 - C. Tasks.
 - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

DATED 08 DEC 94

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR
PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:
 - a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.
 - b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.
 - c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.
 - d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.
 - e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.
2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:
 - a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR ~~Rules~~ ^{Rules} of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force ~~for~~ ^{for} self defence including the protection of detainees ~~but do not~~ ^{but do not} extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).
 - b. Detainees are to be searched to:

(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

searched by a member of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and, preferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the searching. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an allegation of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

- a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.
- b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).
2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut /other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one: Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres) Approx Weight (kg): Male or female? Date of birth or approximate age: Other characteristics:	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer) incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:
Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.	Signature of MP officer: Date & time:	

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

ANNEX F
TO OPO 21
DATED 8 DEC 94

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)



UNAMIR
MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - INFO	DATE - TIME GROUP	SIC/ORIG NO
IMMEDIATE	ROUTINE	091500Z DEC 94	/
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: HQ UNAMIR II LOG COORD		
	To: GHANBATT ETHIOBATT FRAFATT ZAMBATT TUNBATT NICOY MILOB HQ AUSMED CANSIG 3 CSG CIVPOL CLO HRL FMO HAC MP COY G3 OPS G3 AIR OPS FSO INFO: RPA LO		

G4
How do we move the troops from the Army Bcs to the Two Force Release points
10/12

SUBJ: UNAMIR ADMIN0 01 OPERATION OVERTURE FRAGO

A. UNAMIR ADMIN0 01 OPERATION OVERTURE DATED 8 DEC 94

1. THIS IS A FRAGO TO THE REF.

2. INSERT IN THE REF AT PARA 4a(3) THE FOLLOWING:

(d) 3 CSG TO DELIVER 10 DRUMS JET A1 FROM PRESIDENTIAL HANGER TO SUP PL BUTARE FOR POSITIONING AT HELIPAD BUTARE.

3. INSERT IN THE REF AT PARA 4b THE FOLLOWING:

(1) G4 TPT. G4 TPT IS TO;

PAGE NO		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE				PHONE		REF FILE NO	
1		COL K O'KELLY (DCSO SP)				1/110-9			
NO OF PAGES		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE		BRANCH/UNIT		SIGNATURE		DATE	
2		AS ABOVE		HQ UNAMIR		<i>[Signature]</i>		9 December 1994	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM
									OPERATOR
									SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
									SECRET

UNAMIR
MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

- (a) PROVIDE ONE POTABLE WATER TANKER TO BE LOCATED AT SUP PL BUTARE FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION
- (2) 3 CSG. 3 CSG IS TO;
- (a) DELIVER THE STORES AND EQUIPMENT DETAILED AT PARAGRAPH 4a. TO SUP PL BUTARE
- (b) RETURN UNUSED STORES AND EQUIPMENT FROM SUP PL BUTARE AT END OPERATION.
- (3) ZAMBATT. ZAMBATT IS TO;
- (a) PROVIDE THE G4 TPT CELL FOR THE OPERATION TAC HQ.
- (b) PROVIDE 15 MDM VEH FOR TPT TASKING IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION.
- (c) TPT TUNBATT ELEMENTS AND THEIR STORES AND EQUIPMENT FROM BUSOGO TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE.
- (d) REDEPLOY TUNBATT ELEMENTS AND THEIR STORES AND EQUIPMENT TO BUSOGO AT END OPERATION.
- (e) TPT GHANBATT ELEMENTS AND THEIR STORES AND EQUIPMENT FROM GIKONGORO TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE.
- (f) REDEPLOY GHANBATT ELEMENTS AND THEIR STORES AND EQUIPMENT TO GIKONGORO AT END OPERATION.
- (g) COORDINATE AND TRANSPORT STORES, EQUIPMENT, WATER AND RATIONS FORWARD OF SUP PL BUTARE AS REQUIRED.
- (4) ALL UNITS LESS TUNBATT AND GHANBATT. DEPLOY AND REDEPLOY UNIT PERSONNEL, STORES AND EQUIPMENT TO AND FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE.

4. ACK

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE COL K O'KELLY (DCSO SP)				PHONE 1110-9		REF FILE NO			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				BRANCH/UNIT HQ UNAMIR		SIGNATURE		DATE 9 December 1994	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

UNAMIR
MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UN CONFIDENTIAL

- b. HOW MANY TROOPS CAN BE MOVED BY THEIR UNIT FIRST LINE TRANSPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE.
 - c. HOW MANY TROOPS REQUIRE TO BE MOVED BY OTHER THAN THEIR UNIT FIRST LINE TRANSPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING DATES;
 - (1) EARLIEST DATE AVAILABLE FOR UPLIFT, AND
 - (2) LATEST DATE REQUIRED IN LOCATION.
 - d. HOW MANY UNIT FIRST LINE MEDIUM VEHICLES (FOR EXAMPLE, FOUR TONNE TRUCKS) THEIR UNIT CAN AFFORD TO PROVIDE, IF REQUIRED, TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION.
 - e. HOW MANY UNIT VEHICLES WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.
- STORES, EQUIPMENT, RATIONS AND WATER REQUIRED BY THEIR UNIT ELEMENT FOR THE OPERATION.
3. TO DATE ACTION ADDRESSEES HAVE PROVIDED NO RETURNS AND, AS A RESULT ARE JEOPARDISING THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE TO PROVIDE THE RETURN BY 081600B DEC 94. SUPPORT PLANNING HAS BEEN UNNECESSARILY DELAYED.

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE BRIG ANYIDOHO (DFC)				PHONE 11111		REF FILE NO			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				BRANCH/UNIT HQ UNAMIR		SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 8 December 1994	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET

To : See distribution

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 07 Dec 94

Sub : WARNING ORDER

1. SITUATION. There have been increase in acts of banditry, intimidation and criminal activities especially in certain DP camps. The most affected camps are those of KIBEHO (5007) stretching to NDAHO (5201). Both the DP camps are located in sector 4A. It is imperative that firm action is taken to restore security in accordance with UNAMIR mandate. UNAMIR forces will undertake operations in cooperation with 2 RPA battalions to get rid of criminal elements from the mentioned camps/area.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP will conduct operations in conjunction with formed troops to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

b. MILOB Sect 1

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO NICOY effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Detach 2 MILOB teams under ops command of MILOB Tac HQ with effect from 11 Dec 94. Teams to report to sec 3 by 111600 Dec 94.

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

1
UN SECRET

Seen
FHB
10/12

UN SECRET

- (3) Conduct MILOB operations in conjunction with formed troops.

c. MILOB Sect 2

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO ZAMBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

d. MILOB Sect 3

- (1) Receive two teams from sec 1 by 111600 Dec 94.
- (2) Deploy two MILOB teams by 09 Dec 94 to the camps. Be prepared to deploy three additional teams by 12 Dec 94.
- (3) Monitor and report on 24 hours basis the situation at the camps.
- (4) Sect comd (Lt Col Hasnain) will be the assistant MILOB commander; to be co-located with MILOB Tac HQ.

e. MILOB Sect 4A

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO GHANBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

f. MILOB Sect 4B

- (1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO FRAFBATT effective 10 Dec 94
- (2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

g. MILOB Sect 4C

- (1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

UN SECRET

ETHIOBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

- (2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

h. MILOB Sector 5.

- (1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO TUNBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

- (2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

i. MILOB Sect 6.

- (1) Provide one MILOB team to MILOB Tac HQ.

- (2) Keep two MILOB teams on 1 hr NTM to move to operational area.

- (2) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB sectors, on orders from DCMO/TAC HQ.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

- (a) D - 2 (12 Dec 94) Move to assembly area commence.

- (b) D - 1 (13 Dec 94) Move to assembly area complete.

- (c) D Day 14 Dec 94

- (d) H - Hour First Light D Day

- (e) H + 2 Operation complete (16 Dec 94).

- (f) D + 3 Commence redeployment

- (2) FCs ops orders at 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ. All

UN SECRET


MILOB Sector Comds to attend. DCMOs coord conference on 091400 Dec 94. All Sect Comds to attend.

(3) Assembly area -- BUTARE

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. MILOBs to be self sufficient on Water/Food throughout the operations (48 Hrs). Sleeping bags, Flak Jackets and Helmets be worn during cordon and search operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

(a) <u>Loc of MILOB Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO (5007) -- Time later
(b) <u>MILOB HO (Rear)</u>	Present Loc
(c) <u>Force Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO
(d) <u>Alternate</u>	BUTARE
(e) <u>Communication</u>	Instructions to follow.


MOHEN U AHMED
COL
For CMO

Distr :

Action :

- All MILOB Sectors

SLOGO

S PLAN/TRG O

SMPO

Info :

FHQ

DFC/COS/CMO


4
UN SECRET

(500) 244-1111

UNAMIR
MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UN CONFIDENTIAL

- c. HOW MANY TROOPS REQUIRE TO BE MOVED BY OTHER THAN THEIR UNIT FIRST LINE TRANSPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA AT BUTARE, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING DATES;
- (1) EARLIEST DATE AVAILABLE FOR UPLIFT, AND
- (2) LATEST DATE REQUIRED IN LOCATION.
- d. HOW MANY UNIT FIRST LINE MEDIUM VEHICLES (FOR EXAMPLE, FOUR TONNE TRUCKS) THEIR UNIT CAN AFFORD TO PROVIDE, IF REQUIRED, TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION.
- e. HOW MANY UNIT VEHICLES WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.
- f. STORES, EQUIPMENT, RATIONS AND WATER REQUIRED BY THEIR UNIT ELEMENT FOR THE OPERATION.
- THE ABOVE SHOULD BE PROVIDED SO TPT HQ UNAMIR NO LATER THAN 071600B DEC 94. THIS INFORMATION WILL FORM THE BASIS FOR CALCULATING STORES, FUEL, RATION, WATER, RECOVERY, MAINTENANCE AND TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION.
3. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL ADDRESSEES PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION PROMPTLY TO ENABLE ACCURATE LOGISTIC PLANNING.

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE MAJ S.W. MOORE (SO TPT)				PHONE 11117		REF FILE NO			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				BRANCH/UNIT HQ UNAMIR LOG COORD CELL		SIGNATURE 		DATE 6 December 1994	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UN CONFIDENTIAL

① ~~Notes~~ ~~OPS~~
1. $F = 6.12$

2. FyA

2. Leaps to FMO (med
aps) and G4
recommended

TO: ~~G3 Plans~~ 6/12
FROM: G3 Air Ops
DATE: 6 December 94

① Please make copies for the necessary action of G4 and for the at Para 3

(2) Also make a copy to

2.3 PLANS
6/12

SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE HELIOPS RECCE

FMO

93 cps

1. Helicopter Landing Site. The preferred HLS for Op OVERTURE is at (4)4935(97)1050, on a flat spur, adjacent to the road running north out of KIBEHO. It is line of sight to KIBEHO but offers a safe approach and overshoot. There are trees to the east and a cluster of shelters to the north east. An alternative HLS is on the hill to the north at 49551095, this is smaller and is more awkward to access by vehicle.

2. Night Operations. Canadian Helicopters can provide 2 helicopters at this HLS for day operations only. The HLS would be awkward at night and contravenes the ICAO regulations for night operations. In the circumstances of a very high priority casevac coupled with high moon and high levels of ambient light it may be possible to fly an approach to the HLS. This can not be incorporated into the plan as it is a best option.

3. Forward Operating Base. To save transit time and enhance operational effectiveness it is proposed to mount a Forward Air Refuelling Point (FARP) at BUTARE strip. Fuel barrels and a pump can be provided and will have to be transported to the strip, this can be assigned to Logs. Access and guarding will have to be negotiated with the RPA. Emergency lighting for night approaches to BUTARE can be provided by crossed vehicle headlights. TAC HQ should be tasked to liaise with the RPA and ensure that suitable access, security and lighting be made available, including a storage area for up to 10 barrels of Jet-A1 fuel.

4. Night Casevac. Canadian Helicopters will not overnight at the HLS as there can be no guarantee of a suitable weather actual or forecast from KIGALI during darkness to ensure a guaranteed approach back there. As the medical team estimate a road journey of at least 1 hour 40 mins to BUTARE at night it is unnecessary to leave the aircraft at BUTARE overnight. The standby can include a dedicated medical team and be placed on an enhanced readiness. This will enable an aircraft to be at BUTARE with a full medical team within 1 hour 30 mins, provided

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL


UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

the weather is suitable. An accurate assessment of the weather will be required from BUTARE for all night sorties.

5. Full Capability. To ensure that a full capability is always met for this operation, should the AME aircraft be tasked during the day, the third standby aircraft will be tasked to the Op OVERTURE HLS to assume the AME role. This will ensure that day AME will always be available within the launch time plus 5 minutes within the AOR for a casevac.

6. Communications. The helicopters can communicate on Motorola channel 7 with ground agencies. When airborne they can speak to KIGALI FLIGHTWATCH on HF radio. Messages can be relayed through that flightwatch system to the HQ operations room or Air Ops. Note that the medical coordination will be through AUSMED at UNHQ KIGALI location via the OVERTURE TAC HQ.

7. Operation Order. I attach at Annex A the draft operation order Annex for the support helicopter element of Operation OVERTURE.


J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
G3 Air Ops
Ext 11161

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A to
Draft Recce Order
Dated 6 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
 - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
 - B. Group.
 1. Canadian Helicopters.
 - A. Gp.
 - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
 - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
 - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
 - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
 - C. Tasks.
 - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Crews are to be at 10 Minutes readiness to react to casevac or c2 tasking as directed by TAC HQ from dawn to dusk +/-30 min.
- (3) Casevac helicopter is to deploy to the FOB with the medical team.
- (4) Both aircraft will recover to KIGALI for the night by 1800 or earlier, if the weather is below IFR limits.
- (5) A night casevac standby is to be mounted from KIGALI at 30 mins readiness. This aircraft will be tasked to fly into BUTARE STRIP.

D. Coordination Instructions.

(A) Planning.

- (i) D-Day is 14 Dec 94 - Op commences.
- (ii) Dates as WNGO.

(B) Operational.

- (i) H - hour - first light on D-day.
- (ii) H - hour + 30min - Establish FOB.
- (iii) G - hour - last light.
- (iv) G - hour - 30 Min - recover to Main Operating Base (MOB).
- (v) G - H hour - 30 min readiness at MOB for Casevac out of BUTARE.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- A. All crews to carry days rations and water.
- B. Each helicopter to carry full 1:50,000 map coverage of operating area, including cover of the road to BUTARE.
- C. Each helicopter to carry a copy of Op Order and CEI.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

D. SO Tpt is to provide carriage for 10 barrels of Jet-A1 and a refuelling pump from KIGALI HLS to BUTARE strip. The fuel is to be in place by H - hour + 2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

A. Location of HQ. TAC HQ will be established at Milob HQ Det, Grid TBC. ALT HQ will be TAC HQ BUTARE.

B. Communications.

(1) CEI will be issued 10 Dec 94 to include allocation of Freq and Callsigns.

(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to the helicopter detachment.

(3) OPSEC is vital. All transmissions are use correct voice procedure and absolute brevity.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

① D. [unclear] (GAS)
1. FYI 6.12

② G3 OPS

1. FYA
2. Copies to FMO (me ops) and G4 recommended

Internal Memorandum

TO: G3 Plans 6/12
FROM: G3 Air Ops
DATE: 6 December 94

- ① Pse make copies for the necessary action of G4 and G4 at Para 3
- ② Also make a copy to FMO

G3 PLANS
6/12

SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE HELIOPS RECCE

1. Helicopter Landing Site. The preferred HLS for Op OVERTURE is at (4)4935(97)1050, on a flat spur, adjacent to the road running north out of KIBEHO. It is line of sight to KIBEHO but offers a safe approach and overshoot. There are trees to the east and a cluster of shelters to the north east. An alternative HLS is on the hill to the north at 49551095, this is smaller and is more awkward to access by vehicle.
2. Night Operations. Canadian Helicopters can provide 2 helicopters at this HLS for day operations only. The HLS would be awkward at night and contravenes the ICAO regulations for night operations. In the circumstances of a very high priority casevac coupled with high moon and high levels of ambient light it may be possible to fly an approach to the HLS. This can not be incorporated into the plan as it is a best option.
3. Forward Operating Base. To save transit time and enhance operational effectiveness it is proposed to mount a Forward Air Refuelling Point (FARP) at BUTARE strip. Fuel barrels and a pump can be provided and will have to be transported to the strip, this can be assigned to Logs. Access and guarding will have to be negotiated with the RPA. Emergency lighting for night approaches to BUTARE can be provided by crossed vehicle headlights. TAC HQ should be tasked to liaise with the RPA and ensure that suitable access, security and lighting be made available, including a storage area for up to 10 barrels of Jet-A1 fuel.
4. Night Casevac. Canadian Helicopters will not overnight at the HLS as there can be no guarantee of a suitable weather actual or forecast from KIGALI during darkness to ensure a guaranteed approach back there. As the medical team estimate a road journey of at least 1 hour 40 mins to BUTARE at night it is unnecessary to leave the aircraft at BUTARE overnight. The standby can include a dedicated medical team and be placed on an enhanced readiness. This will enable an aircraft to be at BUTARE with a full medical team within 1 hour 30 mins, provided


UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

the weather is suitable. An accurate assessment of the weather will be required from BUTARE for all night sorties.

5. Full Capability. To ensure that a full capability is always met for this operation, should the AME aircraft be tasked during the day, the third standby aircraft will be tasked to the Op OVERTURE HLS to assume the AME role. This will ensure that day AME will always be available within the launch time plus 5 minutes within the AOR for a casevac.

6. Communications. The helicopters can communicate on Motorola channel 7 with ground agencies. When airborne they can speak to KIGALI FLIGHTWATCH on HF radio. Messages can be relayed through that flightwatch system to the HQ operations room or Air Ops. Note that the medical coordination will be through AUSMED at UNHQ KIGALI location via the OVERTURE TAC HQ.

7. Operation Order. I attach at Annex A the draft operation order Annex for the support helicopter element of Operation OVERTURE.


J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
G3 Air Ops
Ext 11161

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
 - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
 - B. Group.
 1. Canadian Helicopters.
 - A. Gp.
 - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
 - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
 - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
 - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
 - C. Tasks.
 - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Crews are to be at 10 Minutes readiness to react to casevac or c2 tasking as directed by TAC HQ from dawn to dusk +/-30 min.
- (3) Casevac helicopter is to deploy to the FOB with the medical team.
- (4) Both aircraft will recover to KIGALI for the night by 1800 or earlier, if the weather is below IFR limits.
- (5) A night casevac standby is to be mounted from KIGALI at 30 mins readiness. This aircraft will be tasked to fly into BUTARE STRIP.

D. Coordination Instructions.

(A) Planning.

- (i) D-Day is 14 Dec 94 - Op commences.
- (ii) Dates as WNGO.

(B) Operational.

- (i) H - hour - first light on D-day.
- (ii) H - hour + 30min - Establish FOB.
- (iii) G - hour - last light.
- (iv) G - hour - 30 Min - recover to Main Operating Base (MOB).
- (v) G - H hour - 30 min readiness at MOB for Casevac out of BUTARE.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- A. All crews to carry days rations and water.
- B. Each helicopter to carry full 1:50,000 map coverage of operating area, including cover of the road to BUTARE.
- C. Each helicopter to carry a copy of Op Order and CEI.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

D. SO Tpt is to provide carriage for 10 barrels of Jet-A1 and a refuelling pump from KIGALI HLS to BUTARE strip. The fuel is to be in place by H - hour + 2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

A. Location of HQ. TAC HQ will be established at Milob HQ Det, Grid TBC. ALT HQ will be TAC HQ BUTARE.

B. Communications.

(1) CEI will be issued 10 Dec 94 to include allocation of Freq and Callsigns.

(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to the helicopter detachment.

(3) OPSEC is vital. All transmissions are use correct voice procedure and absolute brevity.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

OP RETOUR

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Dem
fil
27/11
802 OPS 27/12

1. Op RETOUR (previously codenamed Op RONDAVAL) is a strategic plan for the people of Rwanda to return home, in conditions of safety and dignity, developed for implementation by the Government of Rwanda with the assistance of both national and international organisations.
2. This paper seeks to establish a Concept of Operations for Op RETOUR. It will be subject to the following circulation procedure:
 - a. By the Government of Rwanda to all members of the Op RETOUR Policy Cell on Tue 22 Nov 94.
 - b. For discussion and acceptance at the first meeting of the Policy Cell during the week 22-26 Nov 94.
 - c. For dissemination to all participating organisations by Mon 28 Nov 94.
3. Concurrent Work. The Op RETOUR Task Force will draft planning guidance instructions for the subsidiary plans to the main operation, based on this document. These instructions will be amended as this paper is circulated, and it is also hoped to issue them for initial circulation by 28 Nov 94.
4. Timetable. A detailed timetable for the planning sequence for Op RETOUR will be submitted to the Policy Cell as soon as it is ready.

AIM

5. The aim of Op RETOUR is for the people of Rwanda to return home, within the following limitations:
 - a. The people must return in conditions of dignity and safety.
 - b. The initial emphasis will be placed on return from IDP camps in Rwanda.
 - c. It is expected that extremists and those guilty of genocide are unlikely to return voluntarily.
 - d. All efforts must be aimed at completing Op RETOUR within two years, including the consolidation and re-establishment of infrastructure.

PRINCIPLES

6. Total Political Endorsement. All plans evolved to support Op RETOUR must have the full support of the Government of Rwanda.
7. No Enforced Camp Closure. Camps will not be forcibly closed. An environment in which the people are motivated to leave voluntarily, will be created.
8. Initial Operations Must be Successful. The first stages of Op RETOUR must demonstrate a high degree of success. This is essential to build confidence in the population and momentum in the operation. In the later stages of the operation less perfect results may be acceptable, provided they do not undermine its progress.
9. Confidence Building. Confidence building measures, primarily in the security and information dimensions, will be essential to the success of Op RETOUR.
10. "Pull Principle". Conditions in the Home Communes will be established on the "pull principle". The aim will be to create a secure environment and provide essential social services which attract people home from the camps.
11. Impartial Information. Information promulgated as part of confidence building measures must be impartial and subject to close editorial scrutiny by all those responsible for contributing to it.
12. Return in Safety. Considerable effort must be expended to ensure that the people return in safety. This must allow for the Government to execute due process of law. A comprehensive security plan will be developed in order to achieve this.
13. Cooperation. The success of Op RETOUR will require the full cooperation of all contributing organisations, within the scope of their mandates.
14. Flexibility. All plans developed to support Op RETOUR must be flexible and lend themselves to modification.

TIMESCALE

15. Phases. Op RETOUR is already in motion. Op HOMEWARD should be considered as a preliminary operation and immediate plans to increase its scale have already been made. In the coming weeks, the emphasis will be on intensifying voluntary IDP return, consistent with the urgency of the situation and the resources available. Concurrently, the larger-scale plan of Op RETOUR will commence **as soon as is practicable**, and should be completed within a maximum of two years. Rough planning guidance on the phases of Op RETOUR are:

- a. Phase 1. Completed **as soon as possible**. In this phase, Op HOMEWARD and other IDP plans will intensify and detailed planning for Op RETOUR will be finalised. The information strategy will be developed and the Home Communes will be prepared for large-scale return and reintegration.
- b. Phase 2. All IDPs to be moved from IDP camps to their Home Communes. If possible, Phase 3 will overlap with this phase.

c. Phase 3. This phase will concentrate on the repatriation of the refugee population, under the coordination of UNHCR. Methods developed under Phase 2 may be utilised to assist the development of the plan for this phase.

d. Phase 4. In this phase of consolidation, the aim will be to achieve the completion of the re-establishment of social, economic, legal and political infrastructures through the Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan (RENP).

16. Detailed Planning. The detailed planning for Op RETOUR has now commenced. The full planning process will reveal the extent to which the schedule can be accelerated, while still ensuring a high degree of success.

SEQUENCE

17. General. The sequence described below is the procedure planned for the IDP camps. It is intended to develop a "pipeline" system through which IDPs can be processed, at a sustainable and increasing rate. Given that there are 340,000 IDPs, and the time provisionally allocated to their resettlement is six months, a throughput of a minimum of 2,000 per day is required. An increase in this capacity is highly desirable, in order to accelerate the schedule. The process may be modified, as required, when extended to the refugee camps under Phase 3. In order to satisfy the principle of successful initial operations, it is expected that the first camps to participate in OP RETOUR will be those which fulfil one or more of the following criteria:

- a. The population has indicated a strong desire to return home.
- b. The security threat is of a low order, in comparison to other camps.
- c. The population is relatively homogeneous ie. from the same or co-located Communes.
- d. The distance from camp to Commune is relatively short.

18. Initial Survey. To build up a population distribution database within camps, an initial survey process will be required. Some of this information is already available, through UNHCR and NGOs. The aim will be to establish the destinations of the camp population, in order to target the relevant Home Communes and prepare them for occupation.

19. Confidence Building. Once the Op RETOUR camp schedule has been drawn up, confidence building measures must be initiated. The timing and content of these measures will be important components of the information plan. Information will specifically focus on the following:

a. Information on conditions on the routes home and in the Home Communes, including particular emphasis on the security situation, aid distribution and the right to restoration of private property.

b. Information on procedures to be adopted on the routes home and in the Home Communes, including:

- (1) Screening and searching procedures.

(2) Registration.

(3) The legal processes to be adopted in resolving land disputes, dealing with various categories of criminal and arrest procedures.

c. The image of the RPA. Perception of the RPA as a guarantor of security must be achieved. This will be initiated through modification of procedures and cooperative operations with UNAMIR.

20. Preparation of the Home Communes. Concurrent with confidence building measures, preparations must be made in the Home Communes to receive the IDPs. An initial reconnaissance, carried out by the Government, the RPA, UNAMIR and relevant UN agencies and NGOs will determine the level of preparation required, and pre-position the necessary services, particularly in the following areas:

a. The legal and administrative structures in place, and enhancements that are required.

b. The aid available for food, water, medical support, building materials, seeds and tools, and the level of enhancement required.

c. Security conditions and how they can be improved, if necessary.

d. The occupation of land and buildings by bona fide or other residents.

e. Condition of the buildings and the improvements necessary for habitation.

21. Security in the Camp. Before the people can be encouraged to leave the camps, a positive security environment must be created. This will inevitably involve an increased RPA/UNAMIR presence in the camps by the day on which the people are expected to move. The aim will be to create conditions in which intimidation and harassment will not be possible by extremists or Interahamwe. It may be necessary to arrest those elements as part of the process, but this is not an essential requirement.

22. Movement to Overnight Way Stations. Those people who wish to leave the camp will be escorted to Overnight Way Stations (OWSs). (In Phase 3, in intermediate movement through **Welcome Centres**, close to the national borders, is to be expected). Initially and ideally, this move will be conducted by vehicle, and resources to achieve this will be required. In the later stages of the operation, or where resources do not exist, they must be escorted on foot, by security elements capable of ensuring their safe passage.

23. Overnight Way Stations. It is intended to establish OWSs, close to the camps and astride metalled roads. These will offer a high security environment where IDPs will be safe from harassment and where the following procedures will be carried out:

a. Registration.

b. Searching and screening.

c. Food and water provision for the period of stay.

- d. Provision of accommodation.
- e. Marshalling for onward movement during the following morning.

24. Movement to the Home Communes. Initially, it is expected that IDPs will be moved by vehicle to the Home Communes. Later, when confidence has been built and where distances are short, it may prove possible for the people to move on foot, provided route security can be achieved. Some movement on foot may be required from metalled roads to the Home Communes, if road conditions require the use of cross-country vehicles.

25. Open Relief Centres. It is intended to establish a network of Open Relief Centres (ORCs). These will be located in consultation with the local authorities, activated as required and then manned by Government, UN agency and NGO personnel, on a temporary basis, until IDPs and refugees have become re-established. ORCs are intended to be a source of local support and assistance in the initial reintegration stages only. Their main purpose is to provide a focus for further assistance to IDPs, refugees and the local needy, in the following areas:

- a. For those who need aid, a source of aid until they become self-sufficient.
- b. For those who have security concerns, a safe area, under the protection of the Gendarmerie, the RPA and/or UNAMIR, as resources dictate. The source of these concerns must also be alleviated, under due process of law.

26. Local Authorities. The offices of local officials may be co-located with ORCs, providing a range of social services. For those who need to resolve a land dispute, an initial source of advice and help, under the auspices of the legal framework of Rwanda, will be provided. In time it is expected that local structures will be augmented by a formal Land Commission.

27. Restoration of the Infrastructure. As the process of normalisation and reconciliation develops, ORCs will be closed as soon as possible. Their function will be replaced as the infrastructure of Rwanda develops, as a result of the Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan (RENP), and the provision of advice and assistance from the supporting national and international organisations. The re-establishment of a peaceful, self-sufficient society, as soon as possible thereafter, must remain a central aim.

SUPPORTING PLANS

28. Supporting plans must now be developed for the following:

- a. The Information Plan. This is of the highest priority. The development of a comprehensive plan to develop media lines, the release of information on Op RETOUR and the building of confidence among the IDP population is a necessary precursor to further progress. This will be coordinated by the Information Cell in the Task Force.
- b. The Aid Plan. The distribution of aid to support Op RETOUR is an immense task, to be coordinated by UNREO. Consideration in all the functional aid areas must be given to:

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

- (1) Decreasing aid in the IDP camps, as the people leave.
- (2) Establishing the aid structure for the OWSs, the ORCs and the receiving Communes.
- (3) Transferring assets to the ORCs and the receiving Communes.
- (4) Decreasing emphasis on the ORCs as the population becomes re-established.
- (5) Increasing emphasis on local structures as the population becomes re-established.

c. The Security Plan. The RPA and UNAMIR will need to develop a coordinated security plan. This will include the use of security resources to:

- (1) Provide security in the Home Communes.
- (2) Deliver a strong security presence in the camps as the people are encouraged to leave.
- (3) Provide a high security environment in the OWSs.
- (4) Provide route security throughout the movement of the IDPs.
- (5) Establish a presence in the Home Communes as they are being re-established.
- (6) Provide a reactive security capability throughout the country to support Op RETOUR.

d. The Transport Plan. A flexible large-scale transport plan must be developed. In particular the early identification of both on- and off-road transport requirements is essential. The circumstances under which travel on foot can be undertaken must also be established.

e. The Human Rights Plan. The work of the Human Rights Team must be coordinated within Op RETOUR.

f. The Land Commission Plan. Arrangements for providing Land Commission support to the Government's resettlement objectives will become an important component of the overall plan for Op RETOUR.

g. Follow Up Plan. A comprehensive plan will need to be developed to follow up the movement to the Communes. A system of monitoring, using Government resources, MILOBs, CIVPOL and Human Rights monitors will need to be developed. The emphasis will be on evaluating the success of the reintegration process and making additional provisions if they are required.

CONCLUSION

29. Op RETOUR offers a coherent plan to reintegrate Rwanda's population in the medium term. The full utilisation of all available resources will be required to ensure its success.

30. The role of the Government of Rwanda remains central to the coordination of Op RETOUR. The full commitment of the supporting national and international organisations is necessary in order to realise its objective.

November 1994

P KAGAME
Major General
Vice President
and Minister of Defence