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ACC. 1998/0278

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IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 23 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: **MIR-648**

SUBJECT: **REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

NO OF PAGES: 4

1. Further to our MIR-596 of 18 March, I attach hereto an additional contribution containing proposed revised texts to replace original paras. 17 and 23 as well as proposed additions to the draft report covering developments since 18 March.

2. With reference to your code cable 812 of 21 March, we regret the omission, due to an oversight, and attach hereto a text justifying the need for additional civilian police officers, including a description of the tasks to be performed. You may wish to reflect the request to increase the Civilian Police Component of UNAMIR in the recommendations, if you agree with the proposal.

3. Concerning your code cable 813, we do not think this specific incident should be mentioned in the Secretary-General's report at this time, especially as efforts are underway to deal with it on the ground. However, we think it is useful to make a reference to our concern over reports of arms importation in general. Accordingly, we have proposed a revision to para. 23 of our draft report, in an effort to reflect this point.

4. Regards.

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PROPOSED REVISIONS/ADDITIONS TO DRAFT TEXT
OF FURTHER REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNAMIR

Para. 17 should be revised to read as follows:

17. During separate visits to Tanzania by an RPF delegation and by President Habyarimana on 4 and 8 March respectively, the two signatories to the Peace Agreement sought the intervention of President Mwinyi, the Facilitator of the Rwandese peace process, to try to break the impasse in the implementation of the Agreement. The Facilitator responded by sending his Foreign Minister to Rwanda on 11 March to seek a solution that would allow the transitional institutions to be put in place.

After para. 17, add the following new paras.:

The Tanzanian Foreign Minister, the Honorable Joseph C. Rwegasira, left Rwanda on 18 March after intensive bilateral consultations with various Rwandese political and religious leaders as well as with members of the diplomatic corps, the representative in Rwanda of the OAU Secretary-General, and my Special Representative, Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh.

Prior to his departure, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of the Facilitator, made a statement in Kigali in which he indicated that his consultations had led him to conclude that the stumbling block to putting the transitional institutions in place revolves around the internal problems within the Parti Libéral (PL). He stressed the view that the apparent power struggle within the PL was unacceptable as it had no legal basis within the framework of the Peace Agreement. The proposed composition of the BBTG, he emphasized, was within the prerogative of the Prime Minister Designate as long as he respected the lists of ministers proposed to him during consultations with each of the political forces concerned. The Tanzanian Minister also regarded as "irrelevant and illegal, within the terms of the Peace Agreement, as well as unacceptable the rejection by the RPF of the compromise reached within the PL on a formula for sharing the Party's assigned seats in the transitional parliament. He concluded by underlining the Facilitator's view that all political leaders should strictly adhere to the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Following the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's departure, the Prime Minister Designate, in a nationwide radio address later on the same day, 18 March, announced the proposed composition of the BBTG. The following day, 19 March, the Prime Minister of the current coalition government announced the names of deputies for the TNA.

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According to a communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic on 21 March, President Habyarimana had met earlier that day with the Prime Minister Designate and had informed the latter that he had received a letter, on 20 March, from one of the two factions within the PL protesting against the Prime Minister Designate's choice of candidate for Justice Minister, a portfolio assigned to the PL under the Peace Agreement. The President had requested the Prime Minister to continue consultations with the PL with a view to reaching an acceptable agreement which, according to the President, should be based on the compromise formula reached on 27 February by which the three ministerial positions assigned to the PL should be divided in a two to one ratio between the Party's two factions, with the faction receiving one ministerial portfolio nominating candidates for the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the TNA.

According to the same communiqué, President Habyarimana believed that the list of deputies for the TNA which he had received on 20 March from the Prime Minister of the current coalition government contained a number of anomalies impeding the putting in place of the TNA. Accordingly, the President had once again called on the Prime Minister to: a) ensure that the "unjustified" obstacles to the entry of the CDR in the transitional parliament were removed; b) ensure the "true" representation of the "Parti Démocrate Islamique" (PDI) in the TNA; and c) take into account the recent court rulings on cases brought by some MDR party members seeking to be TNA deputies.

The President would be prepared, the communiqué had concluded, to preside, as of 24 March, over the ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions, once the above-mentioned concerns had been removed.

Para. 23 should be revised to read as follows:

Meanwhile, my Special Representative has stressed to all the parties that UNAMIR will not tolerate the importation of ammunition into Rwanda before the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. He has also expressed heightened "concern about increasing reports on the distribution of weapons to civilians which constitutes a serious threat not only to public security in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda, but also to UNAMIR personnel.

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III. CIVILIAN POLICE

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Add after original para. 29

Since my report of 24 September 1993 to the Security Council (S/26488), the security situation in Rwanda and, especially in Kigali, the capital, has deteriorated alarmingly. While most incidents can be attributed to armed banditry, which has been growing as a result of the easy availability of weapons since the outbreak of the civil war in 1990, ethnic and politically motivated crimes, including assassinations and murders, have also been increasing.

These disturbing developments, unless contained or stopped, could lead to the creation of an environment of widespread and heightened insecurity that could hinder seriously the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, especially within the time-frame recommended in my report of 24 September and approved by the Council in its resolution 872 (1993).

The situation is particularly worrying because the Government's "Gendarmerie Nationale" which is responsible for ensuring law and order, is severely handicapped in terms of personnel, equipment and training. Close monitoring by CIVPOL, within the framework of its mandate, of the activities of the Gendarmerie Nationale as well as the communal police to ensure that they are acting in compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, would therefore be vital, especially during the critical final phase of the transitional period, leading up to the elections. The visibility of United Nations civilian police monitors would help inspire and enhance confidence and promote a greater sense of security within the society which should facilitate the full and timely implementation of the Peace Agreement.

In order to be credible and effective, CIVPOL which, on the basis of the current authorized personnel strength of 60 has been able to deploy and to operate only in Kigali, should be enabled to function in other parts of Rwanda. Accordingly, an additional 45 civilian police monitors would be required for deployment along a formula of 5 monitors per province, to monitor the nine gendarmerie territorial companies responsible for the country's nine provinces. The primary tasks of these additional 45 police monitors would cover the monitoring of the activities of the gendarmerie and the police throughout the nation and, in this connection, include participation in patrols and, as appropriate, investigation of and reporting on related incidents.

DR KABIA

Please see me.
BF. 22 March 94

File: Sec. Council

CNR 054 P1/1

—SRSG—

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 March 1994

NUMBER: 812

SUBJECT: Report to the Security Council

1994 MAR 22 05 34

UNAMIR P 000

1. Thank you for your MIR-596 and for the draft report to the Security Council. We are reviewing the text and have noticed that Section III on civilian police makes no reference to your recent request for an increase in the police component of UNAMIR.

2. You will recall that in our UNAMIR-685, we had suggested that any request for additional personnel was not likely to be well-received by the Security Council. We had also pointed out that a very strong case would have to be made to convince the Council to accept additional expenditures and suggested that you include an appropriate narrative in the draft report to justify the proposed increase of the civilian police component.

3. We would therefore be grateful if you could send us a suitable text justifying the need for additional personnel and including a description of the tasks to be performed. We would strongly advise, in this regard, that the proposed increase be kept to a minimum. We do not think that the Council would agree to double the present strength of the civilian police component.

Regards.

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OFFICE OF SRSG	
Date	22-3-94
No.	286 By pf

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 18 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: *MIR-596*

SUBJECT: REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

NO OF PAGES: 14

[Signature]

18 MAR 18 10 01
UNAMIR

1. With reference to the forthcoming consideration by the Security Council of the situation in Rwanda, I attach hereto the draft text of the Secretary-General's report to the Council. As you are aware, the situation is constantly evolving. Consequently, we will inform you in the event of significant new developments.
2. Regards.

18 MAR 18 10 21
UNAMIR



SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/
March 1994
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months, subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

2. On 30 December 1993, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 872 (1993), submitted to the Council a progress report on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (document S/26927). On 6 January 1994, the Council adopted resolution 893 (1994) by which it, *inter alia*, reaffirmed its approval of the Secretary-General's proposal concerning the deployment of UNAMIR as outlined in his report of 24 September 1993 (document S/26488), including the early deployment of the second battalion to the demilitarized zone as indicated in para. 30 of his report of 30 December 1993. The Council, furthermore, strongly urged the parties to cooperate fully in furthering the peace process, to comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreement, on which the schedule contained in the Secretary-General's report of 24 September is based, and in particular to establish a broad-based transitional government (BBTG), at the earliest opportunity in accordance with this Agreement. It also welcomed the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and enhance dialogue among all the parties concerned and decided to remain actively seized of this matter. In a statement by the President of the Security Council on 17 February 1994, the Council called for the prompt installation of the transitional institutions provided for in the Arusha Peace Agreement and reaffirmed that continued support for UNAMIR will depend upon the full and prompt implementation by the parties, of that Agreement.

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I. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. Since my last report to the Council on 30 December (document S/26927), the peace process in Rwanda has continued to evolve as intensive efforts have been deployed to facilitate and advance the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The United Nations, within the overall framework of the Security Council's mandate, has continued to assist those efforts.

4. In my report of 30 December, I had pointed out that most of the projected tasks in phase I of the four-phase implementation schedule for UNAMIR proposed in my report of 24 September (document S/26488) and approved by the Security Council in its resolution 872 (1993), had been accomplished. That phase was to last approximately 90 days, until the coming into place of the BBTG.

5. Despite the fact, as I informed the Council in my 30 December report, that the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) had agreed at Kinyira on 10 December to set up the BBTG and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) before 31 December, this did not take place due to the inability of the parties concerned to agree on the relevant modalities, including the lists of members of the BBTG and the TNA.

6. As the Peace Agreement had provided that the incumbent President of the Republic and Head of State shall remain in office until the outcome of elections to be held at the end of the transitional period, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana was sworn in as President of the Republic and Head of State on 5 January 1994. Expectations that the BBTG and the TNA could also be installed on that same day could not be met because of continuing difficulties, especially within the Parti Libéral (PL) and the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), to agree on the lists of their representatives to serve as ministers in the BBTG and as deputies in the TNA.

7. The failure to install the BBTG on 5 January 1994, 90 days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, meant that the completion of phase I of the implementation schedule approved by the Council would be delayed. My Special Representative, Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, expressed his concern over this delay to the various political leaders. On 6 January 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 893 (1994) in which it called for the establishment of the BBTG "at the earliest opportunity". Following the adoption of that resolution, I spoke with President Habyarimana on a number of occasions by telephone and also wrote to him on 27 January to convey the international community's strong expectations for the prompt establishment of the BBTG. This message has been reiterated by my Special Representative during his many meetings and other discussions with the President and other Rwandese political leaders.

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8. The preoccupation of the United Nations over the delay in putting the transitional institutions in place is based not only on the fact that such delays have tended to compromise the implementation schedule for UNAMIR that had been approved by the Security Council, but also because, in our view, the early emplacement of a government reflecting the consensus of the Arusha Peace Agreement could contribute to creating and enhancing a positive climate that could facilitate other actions to further advance the peace process as a whole. As the Security Council emphasized in a Presidential Statement on 17 February, the absence of the BBTG constitutes an impediment to progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in the smooth functioning of state institutions.

9. The various Rwandese political leaders have also recognized the urgent need to set up the BBTG and the TNA in order to ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of their country. Like the rest of the international community they agree that the installation of those institutions is vital, indeed essential, if Rwanda is to be able to address its priority needs for social rehabilitation, economic reconstruction and the overall consolidation of the peace process, including the building of democracy. They nevertheless remain deadlocked on the modalities for putting those institutions in place, reflecting the continuing jockeying for power among the various political forces.

10. My Special Representative and I have stressed to Rwandese political leaders that without the early establishment of the BBTG and TNA it would be difficult to say that substantive progress has been made in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to warrant the international community's continued support. The governments of member states, both within and outside the region, including the Representative of the Facilitator, the Representative of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the representatives of the observer states to the peace process, have supported my Special Representative's efforts to promote agreement among the parties on the setting up of those transitional institutions.

11. Largely because of those efforts, important progress has been made to bridge the gap in the views separating the various parties and to move them closer to a compromise. Following a series of all-party consultations my Special Representative organized at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali on 7, 10 and 13 February, broad consensus was reached among the various political leaders to set up the transitional institutions on 14 February while giving time to the Parti Libéral (PL) to resolve its internal problems and to join those institutions thereafter and while leaving the courts to decide on the factional rift within the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR). However, reservations to the consensus were expressed by the Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement et la Démocratie (MRND), and by other elements close to the Head of State, who argued that all outstanding problems should first be resolved before proceeding to set up the BBTG and the TNA so that all political parties concerned could participate in those institutions from the outset. Nevertheless, the key element in that consensus, which provides for the installation of the BBTG and the TNA even without the participation of all political parties from the beginning, has continued to inspire the ongoing discussions and other efforts among the Rwandese political leaders themselves in the quest for a solution.

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12. An agreement reached at meetings of the political parties on 16 and 18 February to set up the transitional institutions on 22 February was tragically set back by the sudden outbreak of violence beginning on 21 February in Kigali and in other parts of the country. This resurgence of violence, in the course of which two prominent political leaders, Mr. Félicien Gatabazi, the Minister of Public Works and Energy who was also the Secretary-General of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), and Mr. Martin Buchyana, the President of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), were murdered and an RPF soldier killed and a UNAMIR military observer wounded in an ambush, contributed to heightening tensions and worsening the overall political climate. On 23 February, another effort to install the transitional institutions also failed when the ceremony organized for that purpose by President Habyarimana was boycotted by most political parties concerned as well as by the RPF which, in a press release issued on the same day, accused the President of trying to impose a unilateral solution to the internal problems within the PL and MDR political parties.

13. In the face of a deteriorating political and security situation, I telephoned President Habyarimana on 24 February and stressed the need for urgent action to break the political stalemate and, in particular, to put the transitional institutions in place. I strongly reaffirmed this position when I received the President's special envoy on 1 March in New York. On the ground in Rwanda, my Special Representative and other senior UNAMIR officials, intensified their efforts even more not only to promote agreement on the BBTG but also to prevent the further aggravation of the tense political and security situation.

14. As a result of meetings held on 25 and 27 February at the initiative of the President, the five political parties represented in the current coalition government indicated in a communiqué dated 27 February and signed by the participants that agreement had been reached on a formula to resolve the internal problems within the MDR but that a consensus had still not been found to settle the rift within the PL because of the reservations expressed by one of the leaders of that party. Following the announcement of the RPF's rejection of the proposed compromise through a communiqué dated 28 February, my Special Representative met on 1 March with the President of the RPF, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, at the RPF's headquarters in Mulindi, in a continuing search for a solution to the persistent deadlock. He urged all parties concerned to maintain dialogue and to refrain from any actions that could further inflame an already dangerous situation. On 3 March, through the good offices of my Special Representative, the Director of President Habyarimana's Cabinet met with the First Vice-President of the RPF at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali.

15. Member states within and outside the region have also increasingly urged the various Rwandese parties to maintain dialogue and refrain from resuming hostilities as a means of solving the country's problems. Senior officials of the Governments of several member states, including the United States Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Defence Minister have recently visited UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali and expressed support for United Nations efforts to unblock the political impasse and to promote dialogue in order to advance the peace process.

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16. On 7 March, President Habyarimana paid a one-day official working visit to Uganda. According to a joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit, President Habyarimana briefed President Museveni on the current political situation in Rwanda and President Museveni commended President Habyarimana and the people of Rwanda as a whole for the efforts made so far in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement. President Museveni furthermore expressed the hope that the deadlock which has delayed the installation of the transitional government would soon be overcome so that the long awaited era of peace, national reconciliation and economic development for the people of Rwanda and stability in the sub-region could begin. The two Presidents expressed appreciation to the United Nations for its role in assisting the implementation of the Peace Agreement and renewed their call on the international community to lend both moral and material assistance to facilitate the fulfilment of that Agreement. President Museveni, on his part, reaffirmed his commitment to assist where possible.

17. President Habyarimana also visited Tanzania on 8 March for discussions with President Mwinyi, the Facilitator of the Rwandese peace process. During the visit, the two Presidents exchanged views on recent developments in the peace process and President Habyarimana requested President Mwinyi to continue his efforts to facilitate progress in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Subsequently, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania visited Rwanda from 11 to 18 March and held discussions with the various political leaders, including representatives of the two signatories to the Peace Agreement.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS

18. Despite the increased tensions and insecurity engendered and/or exacerbated by the political impasse described above, and especially the continuing absence of the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), the cease-fire and the overall military situation appeared generally to hold during the period under review. UNAMIR forces, whose operational capacity was further enhanced during the period under review with the arrival, on the ground, of additional personnel and equipment, continued to play an increasingly central stabilizing role.

19. With the arrival in Kigali on 28 December 1993 of a UNAMIR-escorted 600-man RPF security battalion, the military tasks projected for phase I of the operational plan were thus effectively concluded, ahead of schedule. It is to be recalled that this phase, which commenced on 5 October 1993 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 872 (1993) setting up UNAMIR, was to last 90 days and to be completed with the installation of the BBTG by 5 January 1994. The persistent stalemate in efforts to put the BBTG in place has delayed the start of phase II operations, which was to last also 90 days and to comprise preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces and gendarmerie. UNAMIR forces earmarked for phase II operations are nevertheless in place and ready to begin operations on short notice, as soon as the BBTG is established. In addition, planning for phase III, which would involve the actual disengagement, demobilization and integration process, is well advanced.

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20. It is to be recalled also, as stated in my report of 24 September 1993, that the projected strength of UNAMIR military personnel was to stand at 1,428 by the end of phase I and to reach a peak, at the end of phase II, with a total of 2,548. As of 14 March 1994, UNAMIR had a strength of 2,506 military personnel, from the following 22 nations: Austria (15), Bangladesh (942), Belgium (413), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), Congo (26), Egypt (10), Fiji (1), Ghana (843), Hungary (4), Mali (10), the Netherlands (9), Nigeria (15), Poland (5), Russia (15), Senegal (39), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (25) and Zimbabwe (29). These figures include the 81 military observers serving with UNOMUR.

21. Under the implementation plan approved by the Security Council on 5 October (resolution 872), UNAMIR operations were to be divided into five sectors. Due to the situation which developed in the south of the country following the attempted coup d'état of 21 October in neighbouring Burundi, the possibility of a sixth sector to cover the requirements identified in my report of 30 December, was foreseen, leading to its establishment in February. During the period under review, major developments in the six sectors have included the following:

- (a) The Force Headquarters, responsible in particular for the command and control of the operations of the UNAMIR military contingent as a whole has, with the recent arrival of vehicles, communications and other equipment, become fully functional and operational. It is also increasingly active in conducting and coordinating security operations, briefing and escorting visiting dignitaries, coordinating joint meetings with Government and RPF military officials on various issues and undertaking reconnaissance and planning for the envisaged disengagement and demobilization process.
- (b) The Military Observer Group Headquarters (MILOBS) has also become fully operational. It exercises command and control over the three established observer sectors, namely the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) Sector, the RPF Sector and the Southern Sector. MILOBS has not yet taken over operational command of UNOMUR, as was envisaged in my last report, due to the continuing lack of long-range communications equipment. MILOBS continues to conduct valuable reconnaissance, as well as investigatory and escort operations.
- (c) The Kigali Sector Headquarters has also become fully operational and with the arrival of the remainder of the Bangladesh Battalion and military observers, has been brought up to full strength. Continuing shortages in transport, communications and logistics are however hampering its increasingly intensive and expanding operations. The main activities of the sector have included providing security for the RPF Battalion and civilian officials encamped in the CND building in Kigali, providing security for senior government and opposition leaders and enforcing the Kigali Weapons Secure Area. To help deal with the worsened security situation in Kigali, 200 military personnel from the Ghana Battalion in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) were recently temporarily redeployed to assist the Kigali Sector which has become increasingly involved in helping the Gendarmerie in the maintenance of security in the capital.

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- (d) The DMZ Sector became fully operational in late February with the establishment of the Sector Headquarters in Byumba and the deployment of the Ghana Battalion and the Bangladesh Engineer Company. With over 1,000 UNAMIR military personnel in the area, this has permitted greater security and monitoring of the DMZ which in turn has encouraged growing numbers of formerly displaced persons to return to their homes in the DMZ area. Major activities of the Sector have included, among others, patrolling, observation, investigation, demolition and disposal of ammunition and escorting humanitarian operations in the area. A number of cease-fire violations, mainly in the form of RPF armed advances into the DMZ and firefights between RGF and RPF forces, have occurred, but they have largely been local and minor in nature although both the RGF and RPF have suffered casualties from the firefights. These violations have been protested and investigated, and where required discussions have taken place to reconcile the incidents. As indicated, earlier above, the cease-fire in the DMZ is, in general, holding satisfactorily.
- (e) The RGF and RPF Sectors are fully operational in Ruhengeri and Mulindi, respectively, although continuing shortages of military personnel, transportation, communications and other equipment are hampering operations. The main activities of the two Sectors have covered reconnaissance of assembly points in preparation of phase III operations, confirming the positions of RGF and RPF forces, monitoring both sides' activities, monitoring the spontaneous return of refugees and investigating reported incidents. In addition, these Sectors constitute a valuable source of information on and a vital contact point with the armed forces of the two sides.
- (f) The Southern Sector Headquarters in Butare was established as an additional sector in February, from existing resources of military observers and equipment. It covers a sensitive and increasingly tense area festering from the influx of refugees from neighbouring Burundi, cross-border activities, heightened ethnic tensions, increasing reports of para-military training and arms distributions, famine and the continuing volatility of the overall political situations in Burundi and Rwanda itself. It is vital that UNAMIR be provided with 48 additional military observers as well as with transport, communications and other equipment to enable it to meet the requirements of the new and critical tasks for which the Southern Sector is responsible. The Sector is, in particular, frequently called upon to assist humanitarian operations by providing escorts for delivery convoys and security for storage depots and distribution points.

22. Due in part to the continuing political stalemate, the period under review has seen a rapid and dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Kigali. January and February saw increasingly violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassinations of political leaders and assaults and murders of civilians, developments that severely over-stretched the resources and capabilities of the Gendarmerie. Following an upsurge in violent incidents in late February, culminating in

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the assassinations of two prominent political leaders and the ambush of a UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy which resulted in the death of an RPF soldier and the injury of a UNAMIR military observer, the Government imposed a curfew in Kigali and in other major cities. Furthermore, UNAMIR and the entire United Nations community in Kigali moved into phase II security status for a period of about three weeks, requiring only essential staff to report for work. The United Nations community has since returned to the phase I status, as the security situation has begun to stabilize, especially following the increased support provided to the Gendarmerie by UNAMIR military and police forces.

23. As a result of the February incidents, the UNAMIR military contingent was authorized to undertake limited deterrent operations in co-ordination with and in support of the Gendarmerie. The United Nations is constantly reviewing the security situation in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda to determine whether additional measures should be considered within the overall framework of UNAMIR's mandate. In this connection, it is to be noted that the easy availability of weapons in civilian hands constitutes a potentially ominous threat not only to public security in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda, but also to UNAMIR personnel.

24. In January the RGF continued, despite repeated protests, to mine the major route from Kigali to Mulindi and the Ugandan border. Due to the threat that this posed to UNAMIR personnel and to humanitarian convoys, this issue became the topic of discussions at the highest levels between UNAMIR and the Government and resulted in the removal of the mines and the clearance of the route. On several other occasions, the RGF has alleged that the RPF is using UNAMIR - escorted convoys to smuggle armed personnel and weapons into Kigali. To help remove such concerns and suspicions, a strict inspection procedure has been initiated to the satisfaction of the two parties.

25. This period saw the final deployment of the engineer, logistics and medical units. The engineers, due to a shortage of vehicles and other equipment, are so far only partially utilized but are conducting valuable reconnaissance in preparation for the disengagement and demobilization process planned for phase III. The medical unit is functioning and providing basic as well as emergency medical assistance to UNAMIR personnel as well as to the local population. The shortage of medical supplies and personnel continues to hamper the unit's effective operation. The overall logistics situation has improved with the arrival of vehicles, communications and other equipment from UNTAC and ONUMOZ, but critical shortages still exist in all these areas. In this connection, it is to be pointed out, in particular, that the helicopters already identified and approved for UNOMUR and UNAMIR have still not arrived. This has severely limited reconnaissance operations and air mobility overall in the mission area, a situation which, unless corrected, could adversely affect the mission's ability to monitor more closely the Uganda/Rwanda border in accordance with UNOMUR's mandate or to respond to rapidly changing events, including evacuation preparedness.

26. The composition of UNAMIR personnel from diverse nationalities has reinforced the need for interpreters and translators, and in even larger numbers than was identified in my last report. The ability for UNAMIR personnel to communicate with the local population could make a difference between life and death, especially in emergency situations.

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27. Planning for the demining programme is well advanced. The continued co-operation of both the RGF and the RPF is deemed vital, indeed essential, if this programme is to succeed. A Mine Clearance Co-ordination Centre has been established in the Force Headquarters and a data bank has been started. Samples of mines used by both parties are expected shortly so that testing and training can be conducted. Co-ordination in mine clearance matters has been established between UNAMIR, the two parties and the various interested humanitarian agencies.

III. CIVILIAN POLICE

28. With the arrival of the Police Commissioner, Col. Manfred Bliem (Austria), on 26 December 1993 and of the police units from Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Mali and Togo in January and February 1994, the UNAMIR Civilian Police contingent (CIVPOL) has set up its Headquarters in Kigali and become operational, with a current strength of 47 police monitors, out of an authorized peak of 60. The CIVPOL Headquarters in Kigali includes a Special Investigation Team, a Liaison Section and six Police Monitor Teams. Due to equipment and personnel shortages, it has still not been possible for CIVPOL to be deployed in other areas of the country.

29. In carrying out its mandate, which is to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and the communal police, CIVPOL works closely with the "Gendarmerie Nationale" and the "Police Commune" in Kigali. Its Special Investigation Team, which co-operates closely with the Government Prosecutor and maintains contact with local human rights groups, follows cases involving ethnic or politically motivated crimes as well as complaints against the Gendarmerie itself. Since CIVPOL became operational in January, the Special Investigation Team has dealt with 54 serious crimes (including the murders of the Minister of Public Works and Energy on 21 February and of the President of the CDR party on 22 February), complaints and allegations of human rights violations. During the same period, CIVPOL has received reports of 36 people killed as a result of demonstrations or riots. The Liaison Section monitors the activities of special units of the Gendarmerie such as the mobile intervention groups, the airport, road and VIP sections and the training school. The six Police Monitoring Teams are deployed to the Gendarmerie's four territorial brigades and the "Groupement" headquarters as well as to the "Police Communale" in Kigali. In response to the recent deterioration in the security situation, which has seriously strained the Gendarmerie's limited personnel and logistics resources, CIVPOL is assisting in patrolling, including accompanying gendarmerie night patrols, and in setting up new Gendarmerie bases.

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IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

30. Since my last report, on 30 December, the humanitarian situation in Rwanda has become even more worrying as new challenges have added to persistent difficulties to deepen the crisis. The continuing drought in parts of the country as well as the inadequate availability of seeds for planting in other parts have increased the threat of famine to hundreds of thousands of Rwandese, while declining national revenues, due to the worsening overall economic situation, is hindering efforts to improve seriously deteriorated public services in health, sanitation and social relief and rehabilitation, thus increasing the risks of vulnerability and need among the population.

31. Thanks in large measure to the assistance provided over the years by United Nations and other international humanitarian relief agencies (non-governmental as well as intergovernmental), mortality and malnutrition rates, which are still unacceptably high, have dropped in refugee and displaced-person camps since last December. But, other problems persist, including in particular inadequate housing and rampant epidemic diseases due to shortages of medicines and, above all, cramped and unsanitary living conditions in the settlements. Another source of concern is the fact that the overall number of refugees and internally displaced people who continue to need humanitarian assistance, currently estimated at 640,000 (270,000 refugees and 370,000 displaced) remains disturbingly high, and threatens to grow even higher unless the climate of political and security uncertainty currently casting dark clouds over Burundi and Rwanda gives way to substantial and convincing evidence of irreversible movement towards genuine and enduring stability and order.

32. Other new challenges involve tensions associated with the consequences and impact of the growing numbers of spontaneous returnees, many of whom left Rwanda years ago. Some, upon returning to the country, have settled on land vacated temporarily by citizens internally displaced as a result of the recent war while others have begun to make claims on land and other property reportedly left behind when they left the country. These developments have caused or exacerbated tensions in various communities and humanitarian relief agencies are increasingly concerned that if left unresolved, they could have a damaging effect on the smooth and safe operation of humanitarian relief activities, including in particular repatriation and rehabilitation programmes.

33. Close inter-agency cooperation and collaboration in the field of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda is facilitating operations to reach those in need. The Resident Coordinator's office was recently strengthened with the establishment of an Inter-Agency Support Unit which supports the work of the Disaster Management Team. Arrangements are underway to put in place an integrated regional early warning and resource mobilization information system. UNAMIR, which assists in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in Rwanda, has stepped up security support for these activities, including providing escorts for convoys and protection for depots and distribution centres. My Special Representative has begun visiting refugee and displaced person settlements, thus contributing to focussing greater national and international

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attention on the needs and problems involved. I wish to seize this opportunity to express deep appreciation to those members of the international community who have responded to the humanitarian assistance appeal for Rwanda launched last year and to call once again for continuing, and increased assistance to meet the growing needs. I would also like to commend the dedicated staff and volunteers who continue to participate in relief operations, often in very difficult conditions, and sometimes even at great personal risk.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS

34. (Text on financial aspects to be provided by United Nations headquarters)

35. In the meantime, bearing in mind the request of the Security Council, I will continue to seek economies through the phased deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel, in accordance with the timetable set out in my implementation plan.

36. It is to be pointed out, at the same time, that UNAMIR continues to function at a level of resources, both in personnel and equipment, below the authorized levels. In order to enable the mission to fulfil its mandate effectively, it is vital for it to be brought up to its full capability.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

37. The Rwandese peace process is currently at a critical juncture. On the one hand there are firm indications that the parties, and the Rwandese people as a whole, do not want to see their country revisited by the scourge of war, with all the pain and destruction that it would bring. Through their continuing respect of the cease-fire, a critical requirement for a successful peace process, the parties appear to be demonstrating that they remain committed to the peace and reconciliation objectives sought by the Arusha Peace Agreement. We can see further evidence of a fundamental recommitment by Rwandese to pursue a settlement of their problems through dialogue by the good will and cooperation extended to the peace mission of the United Nations by the parties and the population at large. These, without a doubt, are positive developments. But, equally incontestable is the fact that they, alone, are not enough to achieve peace. We have seen, regrettably on the other hand, that those encouraging signs have not been translated into concrete movement in the Rwandese peace process. Notwithstanding the intensive efforts that have been made at various levels, the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the internationally recognized framework for the peace process in Rwanda, has stalled.

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38. The United Nations was invited to assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement by its two signatories. As the implementation process commenced, there was an accepted expectation that new institutions of state sovereignty would come into place by 5 January 1994 to guide Rwanda through a two-year transitional period. Only one of those institutions, the presidency, which was officially installed on the target date of 5 January, has so far been put in place. The continuing absence of the others, especially the transitional government and the transitional parliament, in which executive and legislative power has been vested by the Peace Agreement, effectively brings to a halt any further action to implement the other provisions of the Agreement. This has practical implications for the United Nations which has put in place the necessary resources to enable the Organization to play the role entrusted to it by the Security Council, namely to assist the parties in their implementation of their Agreement.

39. The United Nations is not in Rwanda to impose peace. It was invited by the former belligerents to help them implement a programme they themselves had elaborated to put confrontations behind and to embark on a new road towards peace and reconciliation. The United Nations responded on the understanding that there was a firm commitment by the parties to fulfil the terms of the Agreement within an accepted time frame. It would neither be practical nor reasonable to maintain a United Nations presence indefinitely if the premise for that role has been eroded and its modus operandi called into question.

40. As we all know, peacekeeping missions, by their very nature, are complex operations which, although planned and executed on the basis of certain overall guidelines and principles, must at the same time bear constantly in mind the specificity of each situation of conflict. Experience has shown that there are no pre-packaged formulas for resolving the world's conflicts. An operation, to be effective, is tailored and shaped to respond to the particular challenges, history and characteristics of the conflict situation it is expected to handle. We are now faced with one of those challenges in Rwanda where, having deployed, the United Nations operation must now wonder why it should remain since it cannot operate. Yet, it is recognized, even by those whose intransigence is blocking progress, that the withdrawal of the United Nations at this stage would be catastrophic for the country and its people, and in the process unleash a chain reaction with potentially damaging consequences for the region as a whole.

41. The situation in Rwanda is, it must be acknowledged, complex. The signature of the Arusha Peace Agreement was a significant historic achievement which represented the existence of political will on the part of Rwandese to begin to try to put their differences behind and to build a more harmonious, democratic state. Arusha therefore launched a peace process to which the parties have continued to pledge their commitment. The current impasse typifies the awesome challenge of trying to overcome long-held differences and mutual suspicions even as societies embark on a process towards reconciliation. The impasse is regrettable and costly, above all, to the Rwandese people who must now wait even longer for the promise of peace, social rehabilitation and economic reconstruction as well as the building of democracy. But the alternative to waiting, if it means abandoning the peace process completely, could be even costlier, not only to Rwanda but to the region and the international community as a whole. The establishment of the transitional institutions would constitute an important contribution to the

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revitalization of the overall process by fostering a climate of mutual confidence and cooperation. The parties should therefore set aside their differences over what are clearly technical details and put the institutions in place promptly, otherwise the investments put into the peace process so far could be jeopardized.

42. The peace process is, at the present juncture, at knife's edge and because of it Rwanda is perched dangerously on the brink. I am encouraged by the fact that the parties have continued to reaffirm their commitment to the objectives of the Arusha Peace Agreement, as evidenced by their continuing respect of the cease-fire. I especially welcome their continued reliance on patient dialogue, despite the occasional frustrations, rather than giving in to the temptations of a quick fix through the use of force. The increasingly hectic and intensive pace of consultations, to which other regional states as well as other members of the international community are contributing constructively, appears to point to earnest efforts being made to find an implementable compromise. I believe that these are significant developments which can and should be built upon to overcome present difficulties and to pull Rwanda and the region from the brink of slipping back into the nightmare of war. But, the international community and, I also believe, the Rwandese people, cannot and should not be asked to wait indefinitely. If they are not prepared to carry out their commitments under the Peace Agreement and to install the transitional government at the earliest opportunity, I would see a need for the Security Council to review the overall situation, including the role of the United Nations, to determine what if anything, can or should be done.

43. On balance, I believe that despite the present stalemate, there are elements in place that encourage the conclusion that a peaceful settlement is achievable in the time frame envisaged in the approved implementation schedule. It is therefore vital for the necessary resources to be in place in order to continue to provide effective support and assistance to facilitate progress in the peace process. In view, furthermore, of the continuing fragility and volatility of the situation in the region as a whole, I believe that the need to enhance the chances for peace, and to continue to deal with the deteriorating humanitarian conditions as well as assure the security and safety of the United Nations personnel already deployed, would be better served, at this time, by maintaining the operation at its authorized level of resources.

44. Taking into account the above considerations, I recommend that the Council, in carrying out a review of UNAMIR at the present stage, agree that this operation should continue to implement the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 872 (1993) for a period of six months and be provided with an additional 48 military observers to meet the previously unforeseen requirements in the Southern Sector. I further recommend that the Council agree to review, within 60 days, the continued role of the United Nations if, by that time, the transitional institutions are still not installed and the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement remains stalled.

45. Finally, I would like to seize this opportunity to express deep appreciation to Member States for making personnel available at short notice and for other efforts they have made and continue to make in support of the United Nations role to help advance the peace process in Rwanda.