

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - CONTINGENCY PLANS

29 AUG 1994-14 MAR 1995

UNCLASSIFIED

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 137

FILE 7

ACC. 1998/0283

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

■ Normal Stage

- Routine operations continue
- Liaise with and list all civilian personnel
- Brief all concerned on plan
- Identify and Recce Safe Areas and Staging areas

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Alert Stage One**

- Increased Security Presence
- Troops fall back to Platoon locations
- Establish communications with all UN agencies and NGOs
- Maintain one section per company as RRF
- Movements restricted
- Be prepared to reinforce other sectors as required

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

■ Alert Stage Two

- Troops fall back to Company locations/safe areas**
- Normal operations with enhanced security**
- Civilian personnel may be withdrawn to sector safe areas**
- Provide security to MILOBS and CIVPOL if required**
- Maintain one section per company as RRF**
- Movements restricted**
- Be prepared to receive/send reinforcements**

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Alert Stage Three**
 - Operations continue if security situation permits
 - Troops fall back to Battalion/sector safe areas
 - MILOBS, CIVPOL and civilian personnel withdrawn to sector safe areas if not done earlier
 - Civilian personnel may be evacuated to Kigali
 - Maintain one platoon per company as RRF
 - Be prepared to receive/send reinforcements
 - Movements restricted

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Disengagement Stage One**
 - All operations discontinued
 - Prepare for withdrawal to staging areas or evacuation to alternate destination
 - Civilian personnel evacuated to Kigali if not done earlier

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Disengagement Stage Two**

- Reinforcement of Kigali to meet the additional security requirements and for the preparation for the next stage of the withdrawal/evacuation

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Disengagement Stage Three**
 - Withdrawal to staging areas/evacuation to alternate destination
 - Destruction of non-essential stores
 - Maintain constant communications with Force Headquarters

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Consolidation Stage (Kigali)**
 - Withdrawal of desired forces to Kigali for security tasks
 - Withdrawal/evacuation of remaining sectors to alternate destinations
 - All personnel in Kigali moved into safe areas and property and stores relocated
 - NGOs evacuated
 - Security forces occupy positions to support the evacuation of remaining UNAMIR personnel

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Evacuation Stage One**
 - Evacuation of UNAMIR civilian personnel except core groups
 - Non-essential military prepare for evacuation in the next stage
 - Evacuation of stores and vehicles not required in the next stage

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Evacuation Stage Two**
 - Evacuation of non-essential military personnel and civilian core groups
 - Formation of integrated core group
 - Destruction of non-essential stores

EVACUATION/WITHDRAWAL STAGES

- **Evacuation Stage Three**
 - Destruction of essential stores that cannot be evacuated
 - Evacuation of integrated core group and security force by road and air

BN/SECTOR SAFE AREAS

1. Sector 1. Byumba.
2. Sector 2. Kibungo.
3. Sector 3A. Kibuye.
4. Sector 3B. Gitarama.
5. Sector 4A. Gikongoro.
6. Sector 4B. Butare.
7. Sector 4C. Kamembe.
8. Sector 5. Kibali/Mutura.

SECTOR STAGING AREAS

1. Sector 1. Kigali.
2. Sector 2. Kigali.
3. Sector 3A. Gitarama.
4. Sector 3B. Kigali.
5. Sector 4A. Gitarama.
6. Sector 4B. Gitarama.
7. Sector 4C. Initial Staging area at Area Ruvumbu- Kibingo near the road tri junction of the roads to Nyamasheke, Cyangugu and Gikongoro. Subsequently at Gikongoro/Kibuye or Gitarama. This is the only sector with the requirement of an initial staging area due to its own peculiarities.
8. Sector 5. Ruhengeri/Gitarama or Kigali.
9. Sector 6. Kigali.

SAFE AREAS IN KIGALI

1. Amahoro Hotel.
2. Amahoro Stadium.
3. Transit Camp.
4. UNDP Building.
5. Chez Lando hotel.
6. Air Field.
7. May be TRAFFIPRO.

cc Copy
Pse fwd to
G3 PLANS
24/3

Security Plan

8/23/3

Ops Br

SECURITY PLAN
SECTOR 4-A

Plans 3

For your info
action

24/3

Refs:

- A. FHQ 5000.46(Plans) of 26 Dec 94, Contingency Plans.
- B. FHQ 5000.46(Plans) of 28 Dec 94, Contingency Plans.

Situation

1. General. The general situation in Gikongoro Prefecture continues to remain calm. However of late the RPA presence has increased, and number of arrests are on the rise. Presence of some former RGF soldiers in the IDP camps has been confirmed as few of them have been apprehended. There has been a spurt in banditry activities involving killings, robbery and extortion. The ever swelling IDP camps in the South, like Kibeho and Ndago are a potential "flash point". The proximity of Burundi border on the South, and the adjacent Sector 4-C on the West, makes our sector conducive for any insurgency activity.

2. Threat. The following types of threat are envisaged in this sector:

- A. Laying of mines on the un-metalled roads by former RGF/Interhamwe, with the intention of blowing up RPA vehicles. The milob vehicles may be the unfortunate ones to be affected.
- B. Ambush on UNAMIR or RPA vehicles.
- C. Kidnapping of milobs to make them hostages, for ulterior motives or subsequent bargaining.
- D. Looting of milob houses, and UNAMIR property in the sector HQ office.
- E. Full scale War, resulting in anarchy and confusion.

Preventive Measures

3. Against Land Mines.

A. Follow the tyre marks of a vehicle which could be taking the same route. Wherever the tyre marks are not visible, the vehicle should be stopped and the area to be searched. Any signs of fresh dug up earth, indicates the presence of a possible land mine. The area should be cordoned off and the HQ to be informed about the same on the radio. Monitor the sight till the arrival of Engineer team for further action.

B. Avoid the pot holes with water as a mine could be placed in it.

4. Against Being Ambushed.

A. It is advisable to group with other vehicles, such as those of NGOs and other UN agencies. However grouping with RPA vehicles should be avoided, as they would be the targets.

B. Night driving is forbidden, until the situation demands. Permission for movement of any vehicle in the night has to be obtained from the Sector-Commander.

C. Any vehicle will always have minimum two milobs. Regular communication will be maintained with the Sector HQ.

D. Always avoid set timings and routine.

5. Against Being Kidnapped.

A. Besides the above mentioned precautions, NEVER give lift to un-authorized persons. The keys of the vehicle should never be handed over to the RPA or strangers in any road-block.

B. Avoid driving at night in remote and isolated areas.

C. Stop only at authorized road blocks/check points. Do not stop at any hand signals.

6. Against House Robbery.

A. Before hiring a local servant, ensure proper verification.

B. Keep your belongings always locked. Never display valuable items in front of the servants. When proceeding on CTO, it is advisable to keep valuable items with another milob or with the local UNAMIR battalion.

C. Always keep your passport and money in your possession.

D. Any door knocks in the night should arouse suspicion. Open the door after proper confirmation.

E. The senior of each Milob House, has been provided with a Motorola. Daily Radio check will be carried out with Zambatt Duty Officer, call-sign "Zulu" and with Sector HQ Duty officer, "CR-0". The timings for the radio check are listed at Appendix.

Security Plan : Various Contingencies.

7. Contingency 1 - Attack/Raid on Any Milob House.

A. Immediate contact to be made on radio with Sector HQ, Duty Officer, (CR-0) and Zambatt Duty Officer (Zulu). The list of all call-signs of the sector and Zambatt are listed at Appendix.

B. Transmit the situation in brief, and indicate the type of assistance required.

C. If there is requirement of formed troops, Zambatt will immediately rush the RRF to the concerned spot.

D. During the night it is the endeavour of the Sector to provide a vehicle to each house. However, because of the acute shortage of the vehicles it may not be possible to provide a vehicle to each house. Whenever the situation demands, and the vehicle is available, the team will immediately use the vehicle for a quick get-away to the Zambatt Tac HQ.

8. Contingency 2 - War Scenario.

A. Adopt plan " OP JASON ", issued by the UNAMIR HQ. This plan entails threatened Sectors falling back to Kigali, for final evacuation from Rwanda or alternately being evacuated to neighbouring countries.

B. Op Jason - Jason Yellow "Evacuation Process".

1. All Milobs to concentrate at Zambatt Tac HQ, in the available vehicles. Zambatt to provide formed troops, for escorting milobs from their houses to the Zambatt Tac HQ.

2. Each milob to be in possession of his Iden card, passport, money and only 15 Kgs of baggage.

3. The LOGO will be responsible to carry all essential stores. The non-essential stores will be destroyed in-situ.

4. At Zambatt, the Pers officer will prepare the flight manifest.

C. Modes of Evacuation to Kigali.

1. By Helicopter. The helipad is located within the premises of the Zambatt Tac HQ, which caters for security. The milobs will embark the helicopter based on the flight manifest. The number of sorties would depend on the capacity of the heptr, and the number of milobs.

2. By Road. The milob vehicles will move as a convoy from the Zambatt Tac HQ. The milobs may form part of the Zambatt convoy. This would depend on the instructions from the UNAMIR HQ. Alternately the milob convoy may be tasked to move separately. In this case the protection will be provided by the Zambatt.

Coordinating Instructions.

9. The Zambatt HQ will be provided with a sketch, showing the location of the milob houses. (Refer to Annexure P). Zambatt will detail some officers and troops, to see these locations on ground, so that they are conversant with all the routes for evacuation.

10. Daily radio check will be carried out with Zambatt Tac HQ and the Sector HQ. For details of timing, refer to Appendix.

11. Zambatt will continue to provide the guard at the Sector HQ.

12. The Pers Officer should ensure that all the officers have filled up the following forms:

A. Information / Security Plan Listing.

B. Inventory of Personal Effects.

13. A copy of all these forms will be forwarded to the Milob Group HQ by 30 Mar 95.

14. Rehearsals will be conducted, once every month. The modalities of this will be worked out by the Sector Commander and CO Zambatt. The RPA will be informed about the move of the RRF, so as to avoid any confusion/clash.


(E CASTRO)
LT COL
SECTOR COMMANDER

001/OPS/SEC
23 MAR 95

Distribution:

MILOB GROUP HQ
ZAMBATT
HUMAN RIGHTS
UNREO

SECTOR 4 - A
RADIO CALL-SIGNS
CHANNEL 12

HQ

SECTOR-COMMANDER	CR-9
OPS OFFICER	CR-3
LOGISTICS OFFICER	CR-4
PERSONNEL OFFICER	CR-1
DUTY OFFICER	CR-0

TEAMS

TEAM 1	RM-1
TEAM 2	RM-2
TEAM 3	RM-3
TEAM 4	RM-4
TEAM 5	RM-5
TEAM 6	RM-6

REMARKS

THESE CALL SIGNS ARE OF
THE TEAM LEADERS. TEAM
MEMBER HAS LETTER "A"
SUFFIXED, EXAMPLE RM-
1A.

MILOB HOUSES

HOUSE 1	MH-1	GHANA HOUSE
HOUSE 2	MH-2	OFFICE HOUSE
HOUSE 3	MH-3	FRANCO HOUSE
HOUSE 4	MH-4	INDO-BANGLA HOUSE
HOUSE 5	MH-5	KIGEME HOUSE

ZAMBATT CHANNEL-12 CALL SIGNS

CONTROL/DUTY OFFICER	ZULU
CO	ZULU-9
21C	ZULU-BRAVO
OPS OFFICER	ZULU-CHARLIE
OC A COY (RUNYOMBYI)	ZULU-1
OC B COY (RURAMBA)	ZULU-2
PL CDR (KIBEHO)	ZULU-ONE TWO

NOTE

ALL HOUSES TO CARRY OUT DAILY RADIO CHECK WITH ZULU AT 0600,
2000 AND 2200 HRS.



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No: 696-7-1
MED BR 249/95

G3 Plans 4
For your
action p/s
D
17/3

TO: G3 PLANS D DATE: 14th March 1995

FROM: FORCE MEDICAL OFFICER


SUBJECT: GOMA AREA VOLCANO ERUPTION CONTINGENCY PLANS

Reference:

- A. G3 PLANS 4 Minute 50000.46 (PLANS) dated 25 Feb 95
- B. G3 PLANS 4 Minute 5000.46(PLANS) dated 28 Feb 95

1. Thankyou for the opportunity to review Reference B. It is agreed that contingency plans need to be developed to cope with the number of refugees expected, the lack of reaction time due to the speed of lava flow and the expected demand on supplies including medical requirements. An appropriate UNAMIR contingency plan will assist NGO's in their support of refugee camps.

2. FMO agrees to the recommendations proposed, particularly the need for a medical reconnaissance of the GISENYI and MUTURA areas to identify aid sites and other health issues.


B.R. CURREN
LTCOL
For FMO

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

file
NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

To: FMO
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
FEO

File: 5000.46(Plans)

From: G3 PLANS *Am*

Date: 28 Feb 95

Subject: GOMA AREA VOLCANO ERUPTION CONTINGENCY PLANS

Reference: A. G3 PLANS 4 Minute 50000.46 (PLANS) dated 25 Feb 95

1. Reference A (attached) is a report from CAPT Ian Denny, G3 PLANS 4, on a meeting held in GISENYI on 25 Feb 95 to discuss contingency plans for a volcanic eruption in the GOMA area.

2. I would appreciate your views on the report, in particular the recommendations.



File No 5000.46 (PLANS)

To: G3 PLANS *D*

From: G3 PLANS 4 *[Signature]*

Date: 25 Feb 95

Subject: GOMA AREA VOLCANO ERUPTION CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. The subj meeting took place with the aim of coordinating a contingency plan in the event of a volcanic eruption in the GOMA area. The minutes to the previous meeting, held 15 Feb 95 in GISENYI, are enclosed.

2. The following participants attended:

- a. TUNBATT Ops O;
- b. MILOB Sector 5 Comd;
- c. UNHCR GISENYI;
- d. ICRC;
- e. RPA LO;
- f. Human Rights representative;
- g. Italian volcanologist;
- h. British Direct Aid (BDA) rep; and
- g. HQ UNAMIR representatives.

GENERAL

2. The volcanoes in question are NYAMULGIRA and NYIRAGONGO, Annex A. NYAMULGIRA is of minor concern and was described as a "tourist attraction". NYIRAGONGO is the volcano causing the main concern and has erupted as recently as 1977. It should be stated at this point that the volcano is not expected to erupt in February or March. NYIRAGONGO volcano is a threat to the GOMA area camps and potentially to GISENYI should the eruption be greater than the 1977 eruption. The 1977 eruption approached GOMA airport and started toward GISENYI. However, there have only been 2 eruptions of the volcano in 1,000 yrs. NYIRAGONGO volcano has a main crater with an interior crater (or sputter cone).

3. To date the lava has been contained within the interior crater and has approached a volume of approx 20 million cubic metres between August and January (less than the 1977 eruption). The lava is very viscous and at 50 km/hr would take less than 10 minutes to reach the GOMA camps. At present the lava has been solidifying and no new lava has been seen. One concern is that the volcano is weaker since the 1977 eruption, however, in 1982 32 million cubic metres of lava was recorded in the crater in a very short time. There was no resulting eruption. It was at this point that the volcanologist stated that contingency plans were however always important and we must assume that it could happen.

4. The volcano will be monitored again on approx 15 March and every 15 days after if possible. Monitoring will then decrease to a monthly basis. It is expected that seismic activity will precede any eruption by several days since the lava must come from a point approx 15 km below the surface.

UNHCR

5. It was stated that UNHCR would be the coordinating agency and was represented by a GISENYI area UNHCR worker. UNHCR is currently capable of handling 2,000 people in GISENYI and is in the process of forming a planning group in KIGALI which was not represented.

6. UNHCR has a fleet of 100 vehicles at its disposal. They currently commit 8 vehicles to the area and could easily move another 30. They feel that they would not have sufficient transportation for a worst case scenario. Additional transportation should be all drive vehicles in order to handle the poor road conditions. Thirty UN vehicles were requested.

7. If an eruption was to occur, UNHCR expects 300,000 refugees made up of both Rwandans and Zairians. They are concerned that the Rwandan government would not let them into the country in a time of emergency. The RPA LO indicated that there were some security concerns associated with a large influx of people. UNHCR further expressed concerns that if refugees were to enter, the Rwandan government may not allow them to leave if they wished to return to Zaire. UNHCR requested that UNAMIR take the lead in securing an agreement with the Rwandan government to allow for the opening of the borders in a time of emergency. They also questioned whether the UN would provide safe haven areas for the refugees.

MILOBS

8. Although UNHCR is to be the coordinator of the contingency planning, the Sector 5 MILOBS seemed to steer the meeting. Annex B is a MILOB Op Order for two contingencies; the influx of an additional 300 - 400 pers/day and the worst case influx of 300,000 pers.

9. Refugees are expected to enter Rwanda by two points; GISENYI and the MUTURA area. The MUTURA area is approx 7 km x 5 km and can accommodate up to 300,000 persons but the road access must be improved. They also stated the need for pre-positioned food, supply of troops for security, repair and recovery assets to keep the roads clear and the need for AUSMED medical resources.

10. Sites for pre-positioned food have been identified in NYUNDO, GISENYI, MARERU and MUTURA. The sites would have to be prepared by the engineers and guarded.

11. The BDA rep said that they currently have recovery vehicles in KIGALI and CYANGUGU. BDA is responsible for the repair and recovery of all IOM and UNHCR vehicles. He felt that the CYANGUGU vehicle could be moved to GISENYI but was concerned about security. He was also prepared to assist in the recovery and minor repair of UNAMIR vehicles during an emergency. A second recovery vehicle (UN) would be required in the MUTURA area.

12. The MILOBs felt that the AUSMED medical response should be on 4 to 5 days notice to move.

13. Of great concern was the provision of water. It was requested that UNAMIR conduct a recce of water points and indicate the local capacity. The UNAMIR Engr rep indicated that we could not provide water carrying resources. UNHCR has a spare 18,000 ltr vehicle and the ICRC rep said that there are at least 20 UN water vehicles in the GOMA area that could follow the refugees.

14. The MILOBs concluded by requesting increased coordination by HQ UNAMIR.

ICRC

15. ICRC will look at prepositioned resources at its current locations to make them more attractive to the refugees.

HUMAN RIGHTS

16. Human Rights echoed the concerns of UNHCR about ability of refugees to return to ZAIRE if desired and the treatment or imprisonment that would occur.

TUNBATT

17. The TUNABTT Ops O indicated that he could handle the security situation if he had more patrol vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Engineering recces of the area should be conducted to identify required road improvements, water points and water supply capability, and preposition points and engineering requirements.

19. A medical recce should be conducted by AUSMED in the GISENYI and MUTURA areas to identify medical aid sites and requirements.

20. Required engineering work be conducted on roads and preposition points.

21. UNAMIR secure agreements with the Rwandan government covering the ability of refugees to enter and leave Rwanda in the event of an eruption.

22. An assessment of the security requirements be done.

Annexes: A. 1:250,000 map of the GOMA - GISENYI area.

B: Sector 5 MILOB Op Order

Enclosure: 1

ANNEX B TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED 25 FEB 95

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151

117


AREA IN DISPUTE BETWEEN
NORD-KIVU AND KIVU-CENTRAL

GOMA

GISENJI

KIVU-CENTRAL
GISENJI

A C K I V U



SECTOR 5 MILOB OP ORDER

SIT

1. Option 1 - Increased rate of return (300 - 400/day).
Option 2 - Mass return (Volcano Plan).

MSN

2. Be ready to handle both Option A & B.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline: Two phase plan with three essential elements:

- a. Upgrade existing reception facilities at GISENYI;
- b. Preposition essential aid packs in Sector with UNAMIR security; and
- c. Identify required tpt and personnel resources.

4. Phase 1

Upgrading of facilities.

- a. RPA inspection point - lighting, shelter, water.
- b. Gisenyi transit camp (CERAI) - to support 1000 persons.
- c. RUBB-HALL (NYUNDO) - gravel floors and road improvements.

Preposition Aid Packs.

- a. Warehousing at NYUNDO and NKUMIRA sites.

5. Phase 2 Deployment of required transportation and personnel resources.

6. Timings

- a. Phase 1 - Immediate.
- b. Phase 2 - On call.

LOGISTICS

7. Following to be identified:

a. Phase 1

- (1) Actual upgrade requirements for sites.
- (2) Aid pack composition, number required/available (incl water bladders).
- (3) Identify IOM/UNAMIR tpt requirements.

b. Phase 2

- (1) Water supply plan (transit camp).
- (2) Fuel supply (UN vehicles).
- (3) identify personnel requirements (including vehicles).
- (4) Accn plan for increased staff (Options A & B).

COMMAND & CONTROL

8. HQ

- a. Phase 1 - UNHCR GISENYI.
- b. Phase 2 - NKUMIRA

MILOB 5 GP HQ

TO: MILOB GP HQ

FROM: COMD MILOB SECTOR 5

DATE: 15 FEB 95

SUBJ: REPORT OF MEETING TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR MASS RETURN OF RWANDESE REFUGEES FROM GOMA FOLLOWING A VOLCANIC ERUPTION

1. The meeting was held at Meridian Hotel Gisenyi at 0900 hrs on 15 Feb 95, as a follow up of the meeting held on 07 FEB 95.

Participants:

2. The following attended:

- a. Comd Sector 5 (represented by TUNBAT Ops O)
- b. Comd MILOB Sector 5 (represented by operations officer).
- c. HAC, Kigali (Maj Mande).
- d. HOD, UNHCR Gisenyi sub-office.
- e. International Federation of Red Cross (Mr Andrei Kisselev, Mr Buch, Dr David Bracht).
- f. Political officer Sector 5.
- g. Humanitarian officer Sector 5.
- h. Representative UNREO.
- j. RPA LO.
- k. Representative Human Rights.

Discussion:

3. Following a resume of the previous meeting, Mr Andrei Kisselev, the HOD IFRC gave an update on the volcano situation. The HOD highlighted the following, based on analysis carried out by various volcanologists:

- a. The consolidated report along with recommendations of IFRC will be available later after it has been reviewed in Nairobi.
- b. The volume of lava in the volcano Nyiragongo is about 5 times as was present during the eruption in 1977. However due to large volume of lava

c. Fissures in the southern walls of the volcano could serve as outlet to high pressured thin lava flowing out in a fast moving stream, which in turn would engulf Goma in as less as 25 minutes. Though weekly measurements of the lava is being carried out, it is not possible to have a suitable warning time for the eruption. It could erupt at any time and even be triggered off by the sister volcano Nyamulagira.

d. The volcano Nyamulagira is comparatively less potent. The flow from this volcano would be a more viscous flow mixed with ashes and would take anything upto a month to flow down and affect the surroundings.

e. The refugee camps of Kibumba and Mugunga are deemed to be outside the lava cone of the volcano Nyiragongo and hence safe. The population that would actually be affected would be 200,000 in Goma and another 200,000 in the surrounding area.

f. The volcano may erupt any time from now to 20 months in future.

4. Answering a query by the UNHCR and UNAMIR regarding the degree of preparation in Zaire in relation to this impending danger Mr. Andrei explained that:

a. The Zairian government has been contacted and they are aware of the situation, but there is no formal approval as yet on the recommendations made to the cabinet.

b. It has been recommended that a taskforce comprising all the concerned agencies should look into the aspects of evacuation, temporary resettlement and that further resettlement be set up at the earliest, but is yet to be fixed.

c. The Zairian government is unable to provide support in terms of food, water and shelter to the affected population. The lava after flowing out would take about 48 hours to gel and during this period people who would have left their homes would be on their own. Assistance in terms of crowd control would be provided by the Zairian authorities.

d. Measures like construction of stairs for high buildings has been suggested. This would help the people stay out of the reach of the lava till it solidifies.

5. In a discussion that followed the following emerged:

a. While threat to the refugee camps was considered to be minimal, it came out that, on eruption people in the Kibumba camp would panic and cross over to Rwanda through the NW border near IP 4. Thus there would be an influx of both Zaireans and Rwandese refugees across the border to Rwanda.

b. It is necessary that at the time of eruption, the NW border around BP 4 be opened by the RPA, to enable the masses to come into Rwanda. If this is not done then there could be unpleasant repercussions in terms of casualties, deaths and mauling of the old, women and children in the ensuing melee. Should the RPA feel that this incoming mass would be used by the trouble makers as a cover to enter Rwanda and hence the

c. Once the danger diminishes (after 48-72 hours), it is obvious that the Zaireans would like to go back to their country. It is highly possible that a large proportion of the Rwandaise refugees who have reasons to feel unsafe under the present rule would also like/try to go back to Zaire. The question that arises now is that, whether the RPA will permit the same. It is very likely that any such move would be opposed by them and may lead to arrests and killings. The same needs to be negotiated through UNAMIR and UNHCR channels with the government at top priority basis.

d. There would be a requirement for various NGOs based in Zaire to enter Rwanda during this period in connection with relief and resettlement work. Hence, an additional opening in the area of BP 4 would be necessary to enable them get into Rwanda speedily. This is in view of the likelihood of the main artery Goma- Gisenyi-Ruhengeri being clogged with refugees and relief trucks. Also the RPA should be impressed upon to allow unhindered entry to the NGOs to facilitate their work. The matter should be taken up with the government through UNAMIR and UNHCR channels.

6. Based on the inputs received, the UNHCR Chief of Gisenyi and the humanitarian officer sector 5 presented the plan to deal with the impending eruption. The highlights are as follows:

a. The plan caters for both, i.e. a controlled influx along the road Gisenyi- Ruhengeri, and a mass exodus through the NW border in the region of BP 4.

b. The holding areas along the main artery at Gisenyi (1000-2000) and Nyundo 2411 (5000 heads) would cater for overnight or stay upto 48-72 hours for the refugees as they move along by foot/IOM trucks to their respective communes or move back to Zaire.

c. The storage areas at Gisenyi, Nyundo and Nkumira (3118) would cater for food and non food items for both contingencies.

d. Should the refugees come in through the NW border, it is expected that approximately 300,000 would come into the Mutura (2923)-Rwerere (2722) region. Once the exact areas are identified, aid could be pumped in from Nkumira. The facilities at the university at Mutura could be used to hold upto 10,000 and be used as a storage as well.

e. Road improvement in Mutura area to include the surrounding tracks has been requested.

f. TUNBAT was briefed to be prepared to provide security at the above places including possible deployment in the Mutura region. TUNBAT intimated that they were short of vehicles and this would hamper their task.

g. Additional formed troops would be required in case of a mass exodus into Mutura in order to monitor the situation in terms of arrests/excesses by the RPA, of which there is a distinct possibility as mentioned earlier.

h. Dedicated resources in terms of transport (IOM, UNAMIR), medical detachment (AUSMED), repair/recovery facilities (workshop), MF (Force HQ) would be required in Gisenyi and Nkumira, to cater for both contingencies. These are required to be earmarked in advance and put on 24 hours notice.

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
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E Essien
LCol
Comd MILOB Sector 5



File No 5000.46 (PLANS)

To: G3 PLANS

From: G3 PLANS 4

Date: 25 Feb 95

Subject: GOMA AREA VOLCANO ERUPTION CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. The subj meeting took place with the aim of coordinating a contingency plan in the event of a volcanic eruption in the GOMA area. The minutes to the previous meeting, held 15 Feb 95 in GISENYI, are enclosed.

2. The following participants attended:

- a. TUNBATT Ops O;
- b. MILOB Sector 5 Comd;
- c. UNHCR GISENYI;
- d. ICRC;
- e. RPA LO;
- f. Human Rights representative;
- g. Italian volcanologist;
- h. British Direct Aid (BDA) rep; and
- g. HQ UNAMIR representatives.

GENERAL

2. The volcanoes in question are NYAMULGIRA and NYIRAGONGO, Annex A. NYAMULGIRA is of minor concern and was described as a "tourist attraction". NYIRAGONGO is the volcano causing the main concern and has erupted as recently as 1977. It should be stated at this point that the volcano is not expected to erupt in February or March. NYIRAGONGO volcano is a threat to the GOMA area camps and potentially to GISENYI should the eruption be greater than the 1977 eruption. The 1977 eruption approached GOMA airport and started toward GISENYI. However, there have only been 2 eruptions of the volcano in 1,000 yrs. NYIRAGONGO volcano has a main crater with an interior crater (or sputter cone).

3. To date the lava has been contained within the interior crater and has approached a volume of approx 20 million cubic metres between August and January (less than the 1977 eruption). The lava is very viscous and at 50 km/hr would take less than 10 minutes to reach the GOMA camps. At present the lava has been solidifying and no new lava has been seen. One concern is that the volcano is weaker since the 1977 eruption, however, in 1982 32 million cubic metres of lava was recorded in the crater in a very short time. There was no resulting eruption. It was at this point that the volcanologist stated that contingency plans were however always important and we must assume that it could happen.

4. The volcano will be monitored again on approx 15 March and every 15 days after if possible. Monitoring will then decrease to a monthly basis. It is expected that seismic activity will precede any eruption by several days since the lava must come from a point approx 15 km below the surface.

UNHCR

5. It was stated that UNHCR would be the coordinating agency and was represented by a GISENYI area UNHCR worker. UNHCR is currently capable of handling 2,000 people in GISENYI and is in the process of forming a planning group in KIGALI which was not represented.

6. UNHCR has a fleet of 100 vehicles at its disposal. They currently commit 8 vehicles to the area and could easily move another 30. They feel that they would not have sufficient transportation for a worst case scenario. Additional transportation should be all drive vehicles in order to handle the poor road conditions. Thirty UN vehicles were requested.

7. If an eruption was to occur, UNHCR expects 300,000 refugees made up of both Rwandans and Zairians. They are concerned that the Rwandan government would not let them into the country in a time of emergency. The RPA LO indicated that there were some security concerns associated with a large influx of people. UNHCR further expressed concerns that if refugees were to enter, the Rwandan government may not allow them to leave if they wished to return to Zaire. UNHCR requested that UNAMIR take the lead in securing an agreement with the Rwandan government to allow for the opening of the borders in a time of emergency. They also questioned whether the UN would provide safe haven areas for the refugees.

MILOBS

8. Although UNHCR is to be the coordinator of the contingency planning, the Sector 5 MILOBs seemed to steer the meeting. Annex B is a MILOB Op Order for two contingencies; the influx of an additional 300 - 400 pers/day and the worst case influx of 300,000 pers.

9. Refugees are expected to enter Rwanda by two points; GISENYI and the MUTURA area. The MUTURA area is approx 7 km x 5 km and can accommodate up to 300,000 persons but the road access must be improved. They also stated the need for pre-positioned food, supply of troops for security, repair and recovery assets to keep the roads clear and the need for AUSMED medical resources.

10. Sites for pre-positioned food have been identified in NYUNDO, GISENYI, MARERU and MUTURA. The sites would have to be prepared by the engineers and guarded.

11. The BDA rep said that they currently have recovery vehicles in KIGALI and CYANGUGU. BDA is responsible for the repair and recovery of all IOM and UNHCR vehicles. He felt that the CYANGUGU vehicle could be moved to GISENYI but was concerned about security. He was also prepared to assist in the recovery and minor repair of UNAMIR vehicles during an emergency. A second recovery vehicle (UN) would be required in the MUTURA area.

12. The MILOBs felt that the AUSMED medical response should be on 4 to 5 days notice to move.

13. Of great concern was the provision of water. It was requested that UNAMIR conduct a recce of water points and indicate the local capacity. The UNAMIR Engr rep indicated that we could not provide water carrying resources. UNHCR has a spare 18,000 ltr vehicle and the ICRC rep said that there are at least 20 UN water vehicles in the GOMA area that could follow the refugees.

14. The MILOBs concluded by requesting increased coordination by HQ UNAMIR.

ICRC

15. ICRC will look at prepositioned resources at its current locations to make them more attractive to the refugees.

HUMAN RIGHTS

16. Human Rights echoed the concerns of UNHCR about ability of refugees to return to ZAIRE if desired and the treatment or imprisonment that would occur.

TUNBATT

17. The TUNABTT Ops O indicated that he could handle the security situation if he had more patrol vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Engineering recces of the area should be conducted to identify required road improvements, water points and water supply capability, and preposition points and engineering requirements.

19. A medical recce should be conducted by AUSMED in the GISENYI and MUTURA areas to identify medical aid sites and requirements.


20. Required engineering work be conducted on roads and preposition points.

21. UNAMIR secure agreements with the Rwandan government covering the ability of refugees to enter and leave Rwanda in the event of an eruption.

22. An assessment of the security requirements be done.

Annexes: A. 1:250,000 map of the GOMA - GISENYI area.
B: Sector 5 MILOB Op Order

Enclosure: 1



ANNEX B TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED 28 FEB 95

AREA BETWEEN
NORD KIVU AND KIVU CENTRAL

GOMA

KIVU-CENTRAL
GISENYI

A C K I V U

SECTOR 5 MILOB OP ORDER

SIT

1. Option 1 - Increased rate of return (300 - 400/day).
Option 2 - Mass return (Volcano Plan).

MSN

2. Be ready to handle both Option A & B.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline: Two phase plan with three essential elements:

- a. Upgrade existing reception facilities at GISENYI;
- b. Preposition essential aid packs in Sector with UNAMIR security; and
- c. Identify required tpt and personnel resources.

4. Phase 1

Upgrading of facilities.

- a. RPA inspection point - lighting, shelter, water.
- b. Gisenyi transit camp (CERAI) - to support 1000 persons.
- c. RUBB-HALL (NYUNDO) - gravel floors and road improvements.

Preposition Aid Packs.

- a. Warehousing at NYUNDO and NKUMIRA sites.

5. Phase 2 Deployment of required transportation and personnel resources.

6. Timings

- a. Phase 1 - Immediate.
- b. Phase 2 - On call.

LOGISTICS

7. Following to be identified:

a. Phase 1

- (1) Actual upgrade requirements for sites.
- (2) Aid pack composition, number required/available (incl water bladders).
- (3) Identify IOM/UNAMIR tpt requirements.

b. Phase 2

- (1) Water supply plan (transit camp).
- (2) Fuel supply (UN vehicles).
- (3) identify personnel requirements (including vehicles).
- (4) Accn plan for increased staff (Options A & B).

COMMAND & CONTROL

8. HQ

- a. Phase 1 - UNHCR GISENYI.
- b. Phase 2 - NKUMIRA

MILOB 5 GP HQ

TO: MILOB GP HQ

FROM: COMD MILOB SECTOR 5

DATE: 15 FEB 95

SUBJ: REPORT OF MEETING TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR MASS RETURN OF RWANDESE REFUGEES FROM GOMA FOLLOWING A VOLCANIC ERUPTION

1. The meeting was held at Meridian Hotel Gisenyi at 0900 hrs on 15 Feb 95, as a follow up of the meeting held on 07 FEB 95.

Participants:

2. The following attended:

- a. Comd Sector 5 (represented by TUNBAT Ops O)
- b. Comd MILOB Sector 5 (represented by operations officer).
- c. HAC, Kigali (Maj Mande).
- d. HOD, UNHCR Gisenyi sub-office.
- e. International Federation of Red Cross (Mr Andrei Kisselev, Mr Buch, Dr David Bracht).
- f. Political officer Sector 5.
- g. Humanitarian officer Sector 5.
- h. Representative UNREO.
- j. RPA LO.
- k. Representative Human Rights.

Discussion:

3. Following a resume of the previous meeting, Mr Andrei Kisselev, the HOD IFRC gave an update on the volcano situation. The HOD highlighted the following, based on analysis carried out by various volcanologists:

- a. The consolidated report along with recommendations of IFRC will be available later after it has been reviewed in Nairobi.

- b. The volume of lava in the volcano Nyiragongo is about 5 times as was present during the eruption in 1977. However due to large volume of lava

c. Fissures in the southern walls of the volcano could serve as outlet to high pressured thin lava flowing out in a fast moving stream, which in turn would engulf Goma in as less as 25 minutes. Though weekly measurements of the lava is being carried out, it is not possible to have a suitable warning time for the eruption. It could erupt at any time and even be triggered off by the sister volcano Nyamulagira.

d. The volcano Nyamulagira is comparatively less potent. The flow from this volcano would be a more viscous flow mixed with ashes and would take anything upto a month to flow down and affect the surroundings.

e. The refugee camps of Kibumba and Mugunga are deemed to be outside the lava cone of the volcano Nyiragongo and hence safe. The population that would actually be affected would be 200,000 in Goma and another 200,000 in the surrounding area.

f. The volcano may erupt any time from now to 20 months in future.

4. Answering a query by the UNHCR and UNAMIR regarding the degree of preparation in Zaire in relation to this impending danger Mr. Andrei explained that:

a. The Zairian government has been contacted and they are aware of the situation, but there is no formal approval as yet on the recommendations made to the cabinet.

b. It has been recommended that a taskforce comprising all the concerned agencies should look into the aspects of evacuation, temporary resettlement and that further resettlement be set up at the earliest, but is yet to be fixed.

c. The Zairian government is unable to provide support in terms of food, water and shelter to the affected population. The lava after flowing out would take about 48 hours to gel and during this period people who would have left their homes would be on their own. Assistance in terms of crowd control would be provided by the Zairian authorities.

d. Measures like construction of stairs for high buildings has been suggested. This would help the people stay out of the reach of the lava till it solidifies.

5. In a discussion that followed the following emerged:

a. While threat to the refugee camps was considered to be minimal, it cannot be ruled out that, on eruption people in the Kibumba camp would panic and cross over to Rwanda through the NW border near IP 4. Thus there would be an influx of both Zaireans and Rwandese refugees across the border to Rwanda.

b. It is necessary that at the time of eruption, the NW border around BP 4 be opened by the RPA, to enable the masses to come into Rwanda. If this is not done then there could be unpleasant repercussions in terms of casualties, deaths and mauling of the old, women and children in the ensuing melee. Should the RPA feel that this incoming mass would be used by the trouble makers as a cover to enter Rwanda and hence the

c. Once the danger diminishes (after 48-72 hours), it is obvious that the Zaireans would like to go back to their country. It is highly possible that a large proportion of the Rwandaise refugees who have reasons to feel unsafe under the present rule would also like/try to go back to Zaire. The question that arises now is that, whether the RPA will permit the same. It is very likely that any such move would be opposed by them and may lead to arrests and killings. The same needs to be negotiated through UNAMIR and UNHCR channels with the government at top priority basis.

d. There would be a requirement for various NGOs based in Zaire to enter Rwanda during this period in connection with relief and resettlement work. Hence, an additional opening in the area of BP 4 would be necessary to enable them get into Rwanda speedily. This is in view of the likelihood of the main artery Goma- Gisenyi-Ruhengeri being clogged with refugees and relief trucks. Also the RPA should be impressed upon to allow unhindered entry to the NGOs to facilitate their work. The matter should be taken up with the government through UNAMIR and UNHCR channels.

6. Based on the inputs received, the UNHCR, Chief of Gisenyi and the humanitarian officer sector 5 presented the plan to deal with the impending eruption. The highlights are as follows:

a. The plan caters for both, i.e. a controlled influx along the road Gisenyi- Ruhengeri, and a mass exodus through the NW border in the region of BP 4.

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c. The storage areas at Gisenyi, Nyundo and Nkumira (3118) would cater for food and non food items for both contingencies.

d. Should the refugees come in through the NW border, it is expected that approximately 300,000 would come into the Mutura (2923)-Rwerere (2722) region. Once the exact areas are identified, aid could be pumped in from Nkumira. The facilities at the university at Mutura could be used to hold upto 10,000 and be used as a storage as well.

e. Road improvement in Mutura area to include the surrounding tracks has been requested.

f. TUNBAT was briefed to be prepared to provide security at the above places including possible deployment in the Mutura region. TUNBAT intimated that they were short of vehicles and this would hamper their task.

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
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E Essien
LCol
Comd MILOB Sector 5

MILOB 5 GP HQ

COPY

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FROM: COMD MILOB SECTOR 5

DATE: 15 FEB 95

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
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E Essien
LCol
Comd MILOB Sector 5

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.5 (PLANS)

01 01 111200Z FEB 95 RR UUUU

PLANS 045

HQ UNAMIR//G3 PLANS//

CANCON

GHANBATT

MALAWICOY

MALICOY

FRAFBATT

ETHIOBATT

UNCLAS PLANS 045

SUBJ: AIR MOVEMENTS POINT OF CONTACT

REF: A. PLANS 041 OF 040830Z FEB 95

1. REF A REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE A POINT OF CONTACT(POC) FOR AIR
MOVEMENT MATTERS

2. PLS FORWARD THE NAME, RANK, POSITION AND PHONE NUMBER OF YOUR
CONTINGENTS POC

G3 PLANS

CAPT I. DENNY, G3 PLANS 4, 11162

LT COL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE 5000.46

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

⑤ COS

Approved

[Signature]

19 Jan 95



Minute

From: DCOS Ops *[Signature]*

To: COS

Date: 16 Jan 95

Subject: DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS (Attached)

1. As requested by the FC, please find attached the paper addressing the deployment options once FRAFBATT has rotated.
2. Based on the advantages that it offers, Option 1 is strongly recommended for adoption in accordance with the suggested timings.
3. Request you peruse and offer any comment for incorporation if so desired. Alternatively, please forward for approval.

② DFC

1. I agree with the recommendations made and request approval. Both Frafbatt and Malawi Coy are due for rotation in Feb 95 (21 & 27 Feb 95).

2. As regards rotation of Etnibatt from Sect 4C, it is scheduled only in Mar/Apr 95. Zambatt will also be due for rotation around the same time. These rotations are yet to be confirmed. We may tentatively plan on a mutual change over of areas between Etnibatt and Zambatt.

3. For perusal and directions please.

[Signature]
27
1995

③ COS

I held an earlier discussion with FC on these issues. I agree with the recommendations.

[Signature]
17/1
DFC

④ FC

For approval please

[Signature]
27
1995

DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS
ON
FRAFBATT ROTATION

General

1. FRAFBATT is a three company coalition unit with a strength of 487 personnel. Contributing countries are:
 - a. Senegal;
 - b. Chad;
 - c. Congo;
 - d. Guinea-Bissau; and
 - e. Niger.
2. Each of the above countries are due to rotate on 21 Feb 95. Action is now in hand to effect negotiations with Senegal to contribute a commensurately structured battalion of 500 personnel to replace FRAFBATT.
3. For some time, friction has existed in Sector 4B between the RPA and FRAFBATT, principally because of the unit's participation in Operation Turquoise. In addition, FRAFBATT has experienced considerable difficulty with resupply and accommodation. Earlier considerations to redeploy FRAFBATT were rejected because of the unavailability of a suitable replacement unit and the operational situation which prevailed. It is considered that many of these difficulties could be obviated by redeploying the replacement battalion to a different sector at the time of rotation.

Assumptions

4. The following assumptions are made:
 - a. UNHQ will endorse the UNAMIR requirement to avoid the formation of a coalition contingent to rotate with FRAFBATT;
 - b. If the minor contributors to the FRAFBATT coalition wish to extend their commitment, UNHQ will authorise independent company deployment;
 - c. Senegal (SENBATT) will be the contributing nation to rotate with FRAFBATT; and
 - d. That the attitude of the RPA in Sector 4B toward FRAFBATT will not change significantly after rotation:

Aim

4. The aim of this paper is to present options for the redeployment of the replacement SENBATT when FRAFBATT rotates.

Options

5. Option 1 Redeploy MALAWICOY to Sector 4B and deploy SENBATT to Sector 3A:

a. Advantages:

- (1) The FrancoAfrican contingent is effectively removed from the former HPZ;
- (2) The Francophone influence on the predominantly Hutu population of Sector 3A is of advantage;
- (3) The logistic liability in Sector 4B, an area which is currently difficult to support, would be reduced by approximately one third;
- (4) The RPA force which occupies Sector 4B is principally Anglophone. Accordingly, a more robust liaison between MALAWICOY and the RPA may well develop.
- (5) Sector 4B is adjacent to Sector 3B which will maintain the currently effective command and control arrangements from the existing Sector HQ at Gitarama;
- (6) Redeployment of MALAWICOY to Sector 4B will ease the acute accommodation shortage in that sector;
- (7) A stronger force in Sector 3A will be available to monitor the potentially more volatile Burundi border. A battalion would better meet the security requirement since the closure of IDP Camps in Sector 4B and the need to provide security to the Sector 3 communes in support of Operation Retour has shifted the security emphasis from Sector 4B to Sector 3A.
- (8) The configuration of Sector 3 will facilitate closer operational cooperation between MALAWICOY and SENBATT whose countries share a common border and enjoy cordial relations.

b. Disadvantages

inevitable

- (1) The rapport established by MALAWICOY with the Sector 3A population will be lost. This is inevitable as contingents rotate.
- (2) A measure of operational effectiveness will be lost for a period of approximately two weeks by MALAWICOY as the contingent re-establishes in a new sector;
- (3) The relatively rugged nature of the terrain in Sector 4B and the structure of MALAWICOY (three platoons) might necessitate a boundary change to reduce the sector to a manageable size;
- (4) Redesignation of sectors to accord with the current command and control arrangements will be necessary (Sector 4B becomes Sector 3A and vice versa);
- (5) There is presently insufficient accommodation in Sector 3A to accept a 500 man force.

6. Option 2 Redeploy NICOY to Sector 4B and deploy SENBATT to Sector 1:

a. Advantages:

- (1) The FrancoAfrican contingent is effectively removed from the former HPZ;

(2) The logistic liability in Sector 4B would be reduced marginally from 500 to 358 all ranks;

(3) The RPA force which occupies Sector 4B is principally Anglophone. Accordingly, a more robust liaison between NICOY and the RPA may well develop.

b. Disadvantages

(1) The rapport established by NICOY with the Sector 1 population will be lost;

(2) A measure of operational effectiveness will be lost for a period of approximately two weeks by NICOY as the contingent reestablishes in a new sector;

(3) The relatively rugged nature of the terrain and the structure of NICOY (three platoons) in Sector 4B might necessitate a boundary change to reduce the sector to a manageable size;

(4) The utility of the SENBATT's Francophone capability might not be fully realised in Sector 1;

(5) Removal of NICOY's significant engineer capability will reduce the demining and EOD effort where a significant threat remains; and

(6) This option does not significantly ease the accommodation difficulties in Sector 4B.

Discussion

7. General Further options have not been presented in detail principally due to the incompatible size of contingents and sectors. An option to redploy MALICOY to Sector 4B and vice versa was considered, however the disruption to the command and control arrangements for the independent companies is sufficiently significant to discount this course of action.

8. Timing The redeployment of an alternate contingent to Sector 4B should take place during the FRAFBATT/SENBATT rotation to minimise disruption to operations. Reconnaissance and familiarisation with Sector 4B should commence on 1 Feb 95.

9. Preferred Option Option 1 is preferred due to the proximity of the sectors, the retention of the existing command and control relationship and the administrative and logistic advantages to be gained.

Recommendations

10. The following recommendations are made:

- a. Adopt Option 1;
- b. MALAWICOY commence reconnaissance/familiarisation of Sector 4B on 1 Feb 95;
- c. Analyse the availability of accommodation for a 500 man force in Sector 3A and commence action to address the requirement;
- d. Effect Option 1 during the FRAFBATT/SENBATT rotation;
- e. Redesignate Sector 4B as 3A and Sector 3A as 4B; and

- f. Be prepared to reduce the size of the MALAWICOY sector to accord with its operational capability.

Prepared by G3 Plans in consultation with LCOL Thiandoum, CLO

Cleared by DCOS OPS

PROGRESS - CONTINGENCY PLANS

<u>SN</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REF</u>
1.	07 Dec	Plans received from INDBATT, FRAFBATT, TUNBATT AND NICOY.	
2.	07 Dec	First check list for guidance.	Copy A att
3.	08 Dec	Reminder One	Copy B att
4.	14 Dec	Letter to Air Ops to calculate air resources for evac.	Copy C att
5.	23 Dec	Reminder two	Copy D att
6.	24 Dec	Second check list	Copy E att
7.	27 Dec	Extracts of SRSG's letter pertaining to mil.	Copy F att
8.	28 Dec	SOP on security for the mil staff.	Copy G att

Note :

1. We had sent the logistics implications to DCOS (Sp) on 12 Dec 94 but no response.

2. NO plans received from ETHIOBATT, MALICOY and MALAWICOY till today. Reminder three planned to be issued today.

3. Plans of all the contingents except INDBATT and TUNBATT needs revision. All have been sent the guidelines vide check list on 24 Dec 94.


DCOS/OPS
14.1

(B)

5000.46 PLANS

08 Dec 94

FROM - G BLANS

DISTRIBUTION

- GHANBAT
- ZAMBAT
- ETHIOBAT
- MALAWICOY
- MALICOY
- FILE

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. Reference the security instructions on Ops NIKE, HECTOR and JASON.
2. You were expected to forward the contingent instructions on the above mentioned Ops by 05 Dec. Please forward the same at the earliest on priority for immediate compilation at this end.

P K Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3

5000.46 (Plans)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

G3 PLANS - ~~11/1~~ 11/1
2 - ~~me~~ 16/1
3 - ~~me~~
4 - 12/1 TD

DATE: 9 January 1995

TO: All UNAMIR Personnel

FROM: K. Nilsvang, Officer-in-Charge a.i.
Administration

SUBJECT: Security Plan

In his message of 16 December 1994 the SRSG requested all personnel to fill out Annexes 1 and 2 with information that will assist the Security Management Team in completing the security and evacuation plan for UNAMIR. To date, not one information sheet has been returned to this Office.

I would like to kindly request that all personnel fill out Annexes 1 and 2 of the SRSG's message and submit it to my office no later than Thursday 12 January 1994.

Filling out these forms and handing them should be done without delay as this is in the interest of your own personal security.

ANNEX I

INFORMATION OR SECURITY PLAN LISTING

UNAMIR ID N° _____

NAME: _____
(Family name) (Other names)

NATIONALITY: _____

COUNTRY/CITY OR HOME LEAVE: _____

DUTY STATION WITH UNAMIR: _____

TELEPHONE: _____

RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT DUTY STATION: (state quarters, floor, entrance,
type of building; attach location sketch to main road)

HOME TELEPHONE: _____

FUNCTION/TITLE: _____

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT DUTY STATION: _____

UN LAISSEZ-PASSER N°.: _____ EXPIRY DATE: _____

NATIONAL PASSPORT N°.: _____ EXPIRY DATE: _____

PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

LOCATION OF PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

EXPIRATION DATE OF CONTRACT WITH PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

* DEPENDENTS PRESENT AT DUTY STATION : YES _____ NO _____

* SPOUSE: _____

* CHILDREN/DOB/SCHOOL (attach additional info. on a separate sheet)

* It should be noted that the presence of these groups in the UNAMIR mission areas runs contrary to UNAMIR administrative circular #13/94. If these individuals are present in the UNAMIR mission area, they are the sole responsibility of the staff member. Under no circumstances will UNAMIR be held liable for their security and safety.

CIVILIAN STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE

CIVPOL STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF, CIVPOL PERSONNEL OFFICE

MILITARY STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICE

AGENCY STAFF: SUBMIT TO UNDP FIELD SECURITY OFFICER

ANNEX 2

INVENTORY OF PERSONAL EFFECTS OF FURNITURE, HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AUTOMOBILES AND VALUABLES

Note: Please complete this form in the following order:

I. FURNITURE AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS IN:

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| A. Living Room | E. Bedroom No. 3 | I. Laundry |
| B. Dining Room | F. Bedroom No. 4 | J. Balcony |
| C. Bedroom No. 1 | G. Office | K. Other rooms |
| D. Bedroom No. 2 | H. Kitchen | L. Garage |

II. AUTOMOBILE(S)

III. VALUABLES

IV. CLOTHING

Name: _____

Functional Title: _____ Grade/Rank: _____

Address: _____ Date of Inventory: _____

DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	PLACE OF PURCHASE	DATE OF PURCHASE	PURCHASE COST**		ESTIMATED REPLACEMENT COST
			LOCAL	US \$	

* IT IS THE STAFF MEMBER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE THE DESIGNATED OFFICIAL OF ANY CHANGES IN THE INFORMATION GIVEN.

** STATE ONLY IN CURRENCY ACQUIRED.

ANNEX 2

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** STATE ONLY IN CURRENCY ACQUIRED.

ANNEX 2 (Cont'd)

Page _____ of _____

[illegible]

** State only in currency acquired.

CIVILIAN STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO SECURITY AND SAFETY UNIT

CIVPOL STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CIVPOL PERSONNEL OFFICE

MILITARY STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICE

AGENCY STAFF: SUBMIT TO UNDP FIELD SECURITY OFFICER.



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

1ST BATTALION

UNAMIR - MINUAR

082/12/A

11 January 95

From : INDBATT

To : COS

Subject :-

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

1. Reference your letter No 5000(PLANS) dated 09 January 95.
2. Acknowledged.

63 Plans 3

13/1

(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT

UN CONFIDENTIAL

HQ UNAMIR II



MINUTE

*Noted
B
G3 Plans
5/1*

758-1-1
MED BR 01 /95

G3 PLANS 3

UNAMIR CONTINGENCY PLANS

Reference:

A. Your 5000.46 of 28 Dec 94.

1. As required by the Ref, the following guidance is provided on essential staff from Med Br:

a. Essential Staff.

- (1) M 796 COL W.P. Ramsey, FMO; and
- (2) M 795 MAJ R.J. Crawford, G3 MED.

b. Non Essential Staff.

- (3) M 1531 MAJ S.V. Press; and
- (4) M 1530 WO2 S.P. White.

2. A list of essential and non-essential equipment will be forwarded to CMPO along with the other forms required by Ref A.

R. J. CRAWFORD
MAJ
G3 MED

2 Jan 95

UN CONFIDENTIAL



G3 - PCANS
2 - TUK 23/12
3 - M
4 - ID 23/12

Nations Unies
Mission pour l'Assistance au Rwanda

United Nations
Assistance Mission to Rwanda

Le Représentant Spécial
du Secrétaire Général

The Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

MESSAGE FROM THE SRSG TO ALL PERSONNEL

RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA
UNAMIR DESIGNATED OFFICIAL INFORMATION CIRCULAR

16 December 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: *All United Nations Personnel in Rwanda*

FROM: *Shaharyar Khan,
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General*

*Shaharyar Khan
17.12.*

SUBJECT: **Security Plan**

1. *The Secretary-General has instructed that security arrangements for all United Nations personnel in Rwanda be coordinated by myself and by the UNDP Resident Representative, acting as my deputy, will coordinate UNDP and the other UN agencies personnel with appropriate coordination between the entities.*
2. *The Security Plan for Rwanda is currently being revised and, as part of the routine requirements of the Plan, information regarding the location of personnel and property must be submitted as indicated below.*
3. *In the event of internal disorder or hostilities, and depending on the level of disturbance, one of the following five Security Conditions will be declared and UN personnel will be notified regarding what precautions to take and how to conduct themselves:*

- (i) **Phase I - Precautionary**
(Movement should be limited to essential activities)
- (ii) **Phase II - Restricted Movement**
(All movement should be restricted)
- (iii) **Phase III - Relocation**
(Personnel and, to the extent possible, property should be relocated to concentration centres in anticipation of possible evacuation)
- (iv) **Phase IV - Programme Suspension**
(Regular operations cannot continue; all non-essential personnel will be evacuated)
- (v) **Phase V - Evacuation**
(All operations must be halted; all personnel will be evacuated)

Phases III - V are only applicable to personnel whom the UN is under obligation to repatriate, although some exceptions do exist.

- 4. *Shortly, you will be notified of the appointment of a Zone Warden or Area Coordinator who will be primarily responsible for security in the geographic area in which you live. If you have any questions regarding the Security Plan, they may be directed to your Zone Warden or Area Coordinator.*

Precautionary Measures

- 5. *In the meantime, all personnel should take certain measures now, as routine precautions. Specifically, all international personnel should undertake the following preparations:*
 - (a) *Prepare an inventory in quadruplicate of all furniture, valuables, household effects and automobiles (Proforma inventory blanks are attached to this circular) and, for military staff, send two copies to the Chief Military Personnel Officer; for civilian staff, send two copies of inventory to the Civilian Security and Safety Unit Amahoro Hotel, Agency staff send two copies to UNDP Field Security Officer. You should retain the remaining two copies. The Security and Safety Section and the UNDP Field Security Officer will maintain a data bank for purposes of the Security Plan. Every three months, you should send an updated inventory to the Security and Safety Unit;*
 - (b) *For military staff, advise the Chief Military Personnel Officer and your superior officer of the location of your residence; make sure to notify the relevant officials of your new address whenever you move. For civilian staff, advise the Personnel Section and your Chief of Division/Section/Unit of the location of your residence;*

make sure to notify the relevant officials of your new address whenever you move. For agency staff, advise the UNDP Field Security Officer of the location of your residence, old or new. This data will be transmitted to the Security and Safety Unit Data Bank and to the UNDP Field Security Officer as required;

- (c) For all staff, advise the Security and Safety Unit and other relevant officials of any medical conditions which you may have which might affect your mobility or ability to comply with any security directives.*
- (d) Check regularly to see that identity cards, passports, Laissez-Passers and health certificates are in order;*
- (e) Check that at least one week's supplies of water and food are maintained in your residence;*
- (f) Check that reserves of gas supplies are maintained;*
- (g) Ensure that supplies of flashlights, candles, matches and contents of first-aid kits are maintained;*
- (h) Check that UN and privately owned vehicles, if any, are constantly refuelled and that spare wheels and tool kits are in order;*
- (i) Maintain reserve finances of at least US\$400 (e.g. in traveller's checks);*
- (j) Consider what arrangements will be made for care of household pets in case evacuation is ordered;*
- (k) Give consideration to selection of clothes, depending on the season, to be packed should an evacuation be ordered, the limit in weight to be 15 kgs per person.*

Family members, non-local domestic servants, visitors

- 6. As UNAMIR is a non-family mission, there is no direct obligation and thus, there are no special provisions for the evacuation of family members. Further, because it is anticipated that UNAMIR will continue functioning during periods of greater disruption than a family mission, it is anticipated that family members of UNAMIR staff who happen to be in Kigali despite instructions to the contrary will evacuate earlier than UNAMIR personnel. Thus it is recommended that family members in the Mission area leave the country as soon as Phase I is declared by commercial carrier before UNAMIR evacuates. In any event, any UNAMIR staff member with family in Rwanda should ensure that spouse's and children's locations are known at all times and that appropriate arrangements are made for their security. Exceptions and special arrangements will be made for dependents of agency staff, as the situation normalizes further.*
- 7. Similarly, non-local domestic servants employed by staff members and visitors, including dependents, are not covered under the Security Plan. These categories of individuals should*

be advised to leave the country during Phase I. Financial responsibility for their travel is solely that of the staff member involved. In any event, these categories of individuals should be advised to maintain valid passports, visas, health certificates and other documents required for travel outside the country.

Payment of allowances/compensation for loss or damage

8. *In the case of evacuation, allowances will be paid in the safe haven area or home country, to those eligible under the provisions of the Security Plan.*
9. *Compensation of internationally-recruited staff members for loss of, or damage to, personal effects, including household goods, attributable to service in connection with an emergency situation or a disaster will be payable in accordance with the relevant administrative instructions. In cases of hardship, appropriate advances may be made pending final settlement of a claim for compensation.*

Parting words

10. *Again, I remind you that it is essential to your own security that you fill in and submit the attached forms to the appropriate offices as indicated above to ensure that those responsible for the implementation of the Security Plan are able to locate you in case of an emergency.*
11. *Please retain this letter for reference and continue to update the appropriate offices within UNAMIR of any change of address or property inventory.*

File ; contingency plans

G3 021

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Distribution List

FROM: LCol P. Desnoyers *AD*

DATE: 16 September 1994

SUBJECT: REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
RETURN HOME

BACKGROUND

1. Numerous quantities have been mentioned with regard to the amount of refugees/displaced Rwandans within and outside Rwanda. Suffice it to say that the exact number is well above one million persons or the equivalent of more than 25,000 vehicle-load of 40 persons per vehicle. Very little movement is currently observed coming from the refugee/displaced persons camps. The camps are themselves contributing to the instability of the country. Many UNAMIR vehicle resources are now available pending the arrival of the main bodies of contingents and the now routine weekly resupply concept adopted for the Force.

AIM

2. To propose a military option to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of the refugees/displaced Rwandans.

FACTORS

3. The following factors are considered in the assessment of options:
- a. Will to Return Home. The will to return home depends on the following aspects:
 - (1) Security. Will it be safe for them to return home?
 - (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The humanitarian effort has been very successful so far; over one hundred camps have been established and are being resupplied and supported by various relief agencies. Are the refugees/displaced persons becoming dependant on the relief effort itself? Will the rain season permit the continuation of the uninterrupted provisioning of support/relief?
 - (3) **A propaganda campaign to reassure and encourage people to return to their home is essential to the success of this task:**

- b. Health Conditions. The health conditions in these camps are not ideal and, in some cases, contagious diseases could be spread in non-afflicted areas if the sick are not contained and treated first. **A medical screening is required prior to moving any refugees/displaced persons;**
- c. RPA Verifications. Currently, verifications are conducted at check points which slows down the movement process because of the offloading and loading of personnel on the vehicles. **These verifications should be done with the full participation of the authorities, including the receiving prefects, at the initial loading points (at the camps themselves);**
- d. Final Destinations. Because almost 90% of the Rwandan population were rural-based, it must be assumed that most of the refugees/displaced persons should not be returned to cities/villages. **Close coordination is required with the selected receiving prefectures to ensure that correct moves are made;**
- e. Road Conditions. The conditions of the roads are very difficult, either because of hills or dirt surfaces, which limits the selection of the vehicles that are capable of performing the task of moving people. This situation will worsen shortly with the arrival of the rain season. **Movement and use of military-type vehicles should be restricted to those areas not accessible to other types;**
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. Staging is an important step of the return home of refugees/displaced persons. It ensures that they are provided with the essential ingredients to start up in their home as well as ensuring that they arrive at their final destinations during daylight hours. **Close coordination is required with the UNHCR/IOM staging areas;**
- g. Mass Population Effect. This factor cannot be underestimated following its effect during the war. **The more concentrated the relocation effort for refugees/displaced persons the more chances are that all those in the targeted areas will want to return home;**
- h. Location of Camps. Camps are located throughout the country but most are concentrated in sector 4 (for those within Rwanda), estimated at well over half a million persons;
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. These agencies have mainly hard surface resources including 50 passenger buses; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Until the arrival of ZAMBATT and TUNBATT and while BRITCON is available, the following assets are available:
 - (1) 50 x Bedford 4T trucks (British and Brown and Root drivers) - 3 have been allocated to sector 5 for the movement of refugees/displaced persons,
 - (2) 50 x DAF trucks (Zambian drivers),

- (3) 10 x ISUZU/MAN trucks (Brown and Root drivers), and
- (4) a transport company/squadron command and control element (BRITCON).

OPTIONS

4. Considering the factors, all the options considered must have the following criteria:

- a. A propaganda campaign sponsored by the government in cooperation with UNAMIR;
- b. The presence of prefecture, RPA and medical authorities at loading points;
- c. Staging at a UNHCR/IOM base; and
- d. Coordination with NGOs bringing relief aid to camp to ensure the transfer of the aid is done concurrently with the transfer of persons.

5. Option A - Split the UNAMIR Vehicle Resources under Sector Control.

This option ensures that all sectors get a proportionate quantity of vehicles in accordance with the number of refugees/displaced persons in their sectors. The coordination is difficult as most refugees/displaced persons will have to cross between sectors.

6. Option B - Retain Centralized Control in KIGALI. This option ensures the broadest view of the situation but enhances the coordination problem of Option A with the involvement of all sectors (5) and prefectures (12).

7. Option C - Focus on One Area which has a High Contration of Persons.

This option favours one area over the others but provides the following advantages:

- a. Simplifies coordination;
- b. Accelerates the planned movements; and
- c. Provides the potential generator for mass population movement within that area.

CONCLUSION

8. Though UNAMIR has resources available to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons, its number is relatively small compared to the total requirements. Nevertheless, there is a potential impact that a concentrated effort on a selected area could have on the remainder of the population.

RECOMMENDATION

9. Option C in sector 4 A with the following details:
- a. task each sector (1, 4B and 4C) to provide 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons;
 - b. provide sector 2 with 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons (sector 5 already has 3 x trucks);
 - c. provide all other available trucks (up to 100) for the movement of refugees/displaced persons from sector 4A - the GIKONGORO Prefecture (350,000 in 28 camps) - to sector 3 the BUTARE and GITARAMA prefectures;
 - d. locate these transport assets in the BUTARE area to be in proximity to the UNHCR/IOM staging base and one of the prefects involved (30 minutes from GIKONGORO and 60 minutes from GITARAMA);
 - e. task BRITCON with the coordination requirements of all parties involved; and
 - f. locate the command and control element of this task in the current TAC HQ location for ease of communication and liaison.
10. This task should be assigned as soon as possible as the rain season is already starting and the main bodies of new contingents are scheduled to arrive shortly.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

CHAC

Information

FC
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans
G4 Log

ΔCOS ops

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

①

File No 5000.46 (PLANS)

To: UNAMIR HQ (TAC)

From: UNAMIR HQ (MAIN)

Date: 29 AUG 94

Subject: CONTINGENCY SECURITY MEASURES IN
SECTORS 3 AND 4 PLANNING GUIDANCE

Reference: TELCON SDO HQ TAC/G3 PLANS 26 AUG 94

-
1. THE PLANNING GUIDANCE BELOW IS PROVIDED AS PER REF.
 2. IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLAN FOR UNAMIR TROOP WITHDRAWAL GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE REQR FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES AND SOME TROOP REDEPLOYMENT MAY BE NECESSARY. YOUR PLANNING SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. NO TROOP REDEPLOYMENT IS TO TAKE PLACE UNLESS ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR (MAIN).
 - B. IN THE EVENT OF A DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN SECTORS 3 AND 4, THE UNAMIR FORCE IS TO PRESENT A GRADUATED RESPONSE AS FOLLOWS:
 - (1) INCREASE SECURITY IN CURRENT POSITIONS;
 - (2) REDEPLOY SECTION LEVEL POSTS TO PLATOON POSITIONS;
 - (3) RESTRICT PATROLLING TO PLATOON LOCALITIES;
 - (4) REDEPLOY TO SUB-UNIT POSITIONS;
 - (5) RESTRICT PATROLLING TO PLATOON LEVEL;
 - (6) REDEPLOY TO BATTALION/SECTOR SECURITY POSITIONS; AND
 - (7) REDEPLOY UNMO/CIVPOL TO SECTOR SECURITY POSITIONS.

1/2

② G3 Plans
For your recs / follow
up.
ΔCOS ops
30.8.94

3. ADDITIONAL FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARE:
- A. LOCATION OF UN CIV AND NGO IN SECTORS;
 - B. SECURITY OF UN CIV, NGO AND "IN LOCATION" TROOPS;
 - C. RECOVERY OF ESSENTIAL STORES AND EQUIPMENT;
 - D. INVENTORY OF NONSECURE STORES AND EQUIPMENT;
 - E. IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR NON ESSENTIAL STORES AND EQUIPMENT;
 - F. STATUS OF COMBAT SUPPLIES AND DEFENCE STORES IN EACH SECTOR/SUB-SECTOR;
 - G. INDENT REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DEFENCE STORES;
 - H. REVIEW OF WEAPON READINESS STATUS/ROE;
 - I. CONTROL MEASURES;
 - J. ADDITIONAL MEASURES;
 - K. REHEARSALS;
 - L. DESTRUCTION POLICY; AND
 - M. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
4. DRAFT TO BE SUBMITTED NLT 4 SEP 94. CONTACT G3 PLANS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION IF REQR.



H. ANYIDOHO
BGEN
DFC/COS

CONCEPT OF INSTALLATION OF PREFECTS IN SECTOR 4

AIM

1. To install three prefects (administrators) in Sector 4. Each will be accompanied by a five man RPA security element.

CURRENT SITUATION

2. THREAT

a. Threat from organised elements of the RGF/Interhamwe in Sector 4 is low. There have been no reports of organised elements other than ex-Gendarme working in Sector 4.

b. Threat from unorganised, independent elements is medium. While there have been no reports of violent occurrences from Sector 4 since the withdrawal of the French, the possibility of individual/small element action cannot be discounted.

3. RPA CAPABILITIES More than one half of RPA in service have been recruited in the last six months. Many are not well trained and may not be capable of responding "appropriately" in tense situations. Based on recent actions by RPA Officers in the city, it will be imperative that the RPA be hand-picked, well-disciplined, mature and diplomatic.

4. POLITICAL This Op has the potential to be an extremely good Public Relation move for the new government. Everything will depend upon how RPA handles itself. It is their opportunity to either win or fail.

FACTORS

5. RPA. The success of the initiative will be largely dependent on RPA commitment to meet the following requirements:

a. The security element must be a well-disciplined, cohesive and well-lead, formed body.

b. The commander of each element must have sufficient experience to ensure effective liaison with UNAMIR throughout the operation and to effect adequate control over his subordinates.

c. Acknowledgement by the RPA that the image presented will set the tone in terms of speed and scope of future reintegration.

d. Each group must be well turned out, well equipped and logistically self sufficient.

6. CURRENT ADMINISTRATION. It is understood that the FCF

installed prefects during their occupation of the HPZ. Some preliminary action may be necessary to ensure a smooth transition of control from French sponsored prefects to those of the BBGNU.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS. Public perception will be a significant factor affecting the success of the operation. A course of action which will minimize the conditions for rumour and speculation and maximize security will be necessary. Options are presented as follows:

a. Option 1. Conduct the operation with no notice.

(1) Advantages

- (a) Security is maximized.
- (b) The level of coordination required is reduced.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) UNAMIR may be perceived to be jeopardizing the security of the population.
- (b) The lack of warning may damage UNAMIR credibility and perceived lack of control of the situation.
- (c) The positive impact of the initiative may be diluted to a negative extent if the press is not involved at the outset.

b. Option 2. Announce intention to execute the proposal withholding information pertaining to precise timings, routes, method of insertion and destinations.

(1) Advantages

- (a) The conditions for interference by disaffected elements are minimized.
- (b) UNAMIR impartiality is maintained.
- (c) An adequate level of security would still be maintained.
- (d) Wide press coverage will add credibility UNAMIR's efforts to effect its mandate to assist in early reintegration.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) The element of surprise is lost, therefore the level of security will be potentially reduced.
- (b) UNAMIR may be perceived to jeopardize the security of the population which may affect

confidence.

8. SECURITY. Security of the prefects and of RPA elements is of concern to UNAMIR. It is assessed that MILOB escort must be provided throughout the operation to present the image of UN supervision. The options to optimize security are as follows:

a. Option 1. Provide each prefect group with an armed UNAMIR escort.

(1) Advantages

(a) Security is maximized.

(b) UN supervision is maximized, therefore a degree of control is implied.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) Public perceptions may damage UNAMIR's mandate of impartiality.

(b) UNAMIR may be setting preconditions for loss of credibility in the event of an incident.

b. Option 2. Enhance security under the auspices of current operations.

(1) Advantages

(a) An image of "business as usual" is projected.

(b) UNAMIR retains the flexibility to redeploy troops when and where the greatest need is determined.

(c) UNAMIR is not seen to accept direct responsibility for RPA security but maintains supervision status throughout.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) The benefit of dedicated protection is foregone.

(b) The conditions for perceptions of UNAMIR failure in the event of an incident are established.


9. COMMUNICATIONS. Clear instruction and procedures must be developed to maintain continuous, reliable communications with MILOB escort teams.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended that:

a. RPA agreement to the conditions and requirements at para 5 be sought.

b. Notice of the Government's intention be provided at the earliest prudent time.

c. The provision of security by UNAMIR troops be effected within the parameters of the current operational concept.



J. ARP
Col
DCOS OPS

Prepared by: Lt Col A. Brimelow

CONCEPT FOR DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF GENDARMES IN
SECTOR 4

Introduction

1. Prior to occupation of Sector 4 (formerly known as the HPZ) by UNAMIR troops, a number of Rwandans were installed, armed and equipped as Gendarmes by the FCF. This element continues to operate in Sector 4.
2. Discussions with the BBGNU Minister of Defence reveal that the Government does not recognise the legitimacy of the Gendarme Force. Accordingly, the force is to be disarmed and demobilised.

Aim

To disarm and demobilise the French installed Gendarme element in Sector 4.

Concept

4. The operation would be conducted in two phases as follows:
 - a. Phase 1 *Declaration to surrender weapons (voluntarily)* ~~Declaration of amnesty~~ by the BBGNU of RWANDA.
 - b. Phase 2 Disarmament and demobilisation by UNAMIR troops.

5 General Outline

- a. Phase 1 would require a Government public announcement of the proposed amnesty; the purpose of which would be to reduce risk of escalatory action by the Gendarmes and UNAMIR troops and to progress the process of reconciliation and integration. This week long period would seek to encourage the Gendarmarie to voluntarily surrender their weapons and ancilliary equipment. The announcement to start this phase should be widely disseminated (radio, bilingual leaflets, edicts etc) stating the intent, process and methodology. Simultaneously, UNAMIR would issue orders to Sector 4 commanders to cover the action to be taken by UNAMIR troops.
- b. Phase 2 would require UNAMIR troops, during the conduct of normal operations, to disarm Gendarmes who did not avail themselves of the terms of the amnesty. This is potentially a sensitive phase and should be executed with sound judgement and care.

Factors

6. Government Statement The statement of intent should revoke the legitimacy of the Gendarme Force and include the requirement to hand in their weapons, ammunition, uniforms, appointment credentials and equipment to the nearest UNAMIR unit with the

offer of reintegration into the newly formed force.

7. Reintegration It is anticipated a proportion of the force may wish to pursue the option of integration. Accordingly, UNAMIR would undertake to transport those individuals to an appropriate location for the necessary administration. This activity should be well advertised/emphasised. A meeting should be organised on approximately D+3 to allow UNAMIR and BBGNU representatives to announce the reintegration procedure.

8. Collection Centres A Collection Centre would be established by UNAMIR forces at GIKONGORO, CYANGUGU and KIBUYE. The function of each centre would be to receive and catalogue all weapons, ammunition and equipment and to document the details of all participants who wish to avail themselves of the reintegration offer. Each centre would be manned as follows:

- a. Administrative support;
- b. MILOB;
- c. Security element;
- d. HRC/ICRC representative(s);
- e. BBGNU representative; and
- f. Interpreters.

9. Weapon Disposal The following procedure for weapon disposal is proposed:

- a. Storage in sector locations.
- b. Transport weapons and safe ammunition, under UNAMIR escort, to KIGALI Logistics Base.
- c. Unsafe ammunition would be destroyed in situ.
- d. Disposal options are as follows:
 - (1) Option 1 Turn over recovered weapons to the RPA. This option may be perceived by disaffected elements as an unacceptable course of action which advantages the RPA.
 - (2) Option 2 Turn over recovered weapons to a Government representative. This option presents the Government with the prerogative to dispose of weapons as it desires and preserves the neutrality of UNAMIR.
- e. Phase 2 ROE Due to the sensitive nature of actively disarming Gendarmes, it is proposed that ROE be pursued to the fullest extent necessary to ensure

self protection. In the event that an individual seeks to actively avoid disarmament, pursuit by UNAMIR forces and disarmament by force is not authorised. The limitation must be clearly understood down to the lowest level.

f. Timings The following timings are recommended:

- (1) D-2. Commence preparation (issue orders, prepare leaflets, establish collection centres etc);
- (2) D Day. Government declaration ~~of amnesty~~;
- (3) D+3. Reintegration meeting
- (4) D+7. Phase 1 complete; and
- (5) D+8. Phase 2 commences.

Proposed Tasks

10. Sector Commanders

- a. Establish collection centres;
- b. Provide administrative support;
- c. Provide security;
- d. Effect weapon collection; and
- e. Assist in leaflet distribution

11. MILOB

- a. Assist in leaflet distribution;
- b. Provide escorts as required;
- c. Effect weapon collection; and
- d. Carry out liaison tasks as required.

12. HAC

- a. Source replacement clothing for Gendarmes if required (NB. uniform recovery is required);
- b. Effect liaison for the provision of HRC/ICRC representatives at collection centres; and
- c. Facilitate the supervision of documentation procedures.

13. CAO

- a. Provide suitable interpreters at each collection centre.
14. For your consideration.


J Arp
Col
DCOS/OPS

Prepared by LTCOL A.D. Brimelow, G3 Plans

File - Contingency Plans
BB

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR PLANNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF NGO'S FROM HPZ

1. Location of individuals involved.
2. Nature of their duties (eg medical, food, etc)
3. Available Resources:
 - a. Transport (type, description, passenger capacity);
 - b. shelter;
 - c. food;
 - d. water;
 - e. fuel;
 - f. map (civil or military); and
 - g. radio communications capability.
4. Nearest town, airstrip, UN installation or UN troop location if known.
5. Names of individuals involved.
6. Any other information which would assist UN troops to access the NGO representatives and escort them accordingly.

DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD, OR SMUDGE - NE PAS BROCHER, PLIER, FROISSER OU MACULER

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RELEASING OFFICER - L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SÉCURITÉ				
NAME - NOM		OFFICE - BUREAU		TEL - TÉL						
SIGNATURE										



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

C PLANS
18/8

Kigali, August 11, 1994

To: All UN Agencies, NGO's and Governments Engaged in Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda

From: Ambassador Shaharyar Khan,
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

Subject: RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN (RENP)

Please find attached a copy of the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan (RENP) which we have prepared in consultation with representatives of the Rwandan Government, UN agencies, NGOs and Foreign Governments currently engaged in Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda.

Please note that the agencies and countries listed for each project have already indicated or demonstrated an interest. This does not, however, preclude other agencies or countries from offering their assistance.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Shaharyar Khan

Internal

RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN (RENP)

1. Grant/Soft Loan

Rwanda needs liquid funds to start functioning i.e. pay salaries, essential imports, diplomatic missions etc. A grant/soft loan would greatly help the process of normalization.

2. Immediate measures (i.e. before August 22)

a) Reopening of Airport.

This has already been achieved thanks to logistic support given by USA and Canada. The technical equipment was not badly damaged and is easily repairable. The reopening of airport to commercial traffic would need additional air-traffic controllers, immigration, customs, airport administration.

Countries/Agencies responsible: Canada - USA,
UNDP/ICAO

Officer in Charge follow up actions: R. Lambo UNAMIR/
Arturo Hein

b) Transport of Returnees and Displaced persons.

This includes the establishment of transit depots which contain food, water and medical components. All agencies and NGO's are requested to inform UNREO/ Colonel Yaache of all transport available for returning refugees and displaced persons. This transport would then be requested to schedule return journey from specified pick-up points. All information regarding transit depots may also be conveyed to UNREO/Colonel Yaache.

Agencies / Countries involved: WFP/UNHCR/IOM/USA

Officer in Charge: Col. Yaache.

c) Restoration of Power and Electricity.

Rwanda's power supply depends on a hydro-electric project on Rwanda/ Burundi/Zaire border. Operation Turquoise has reported that there is power in the HPZ. The source of the electrical problem thus lies between the border of the HPZ and Kigali. This source will have to be investigated, and repairs will have to be made.

.../...

Agencies/Countries responsible: USA/Civilian
Contractor, World Bank

Officer in Charge: Col. Yaache

d) Repair of Water Supply.

The water supply in Kigali and other major towns needs to be repaired through the provision of chemicals for water-purification and the pumping of water supply which requires resumption of power. ICRC and UNICEF have already researched this project.

Agencies/Countries responsible: ICRC/UNICEF/USA/
AUSTRIA/CIVILIAN
CONTRACTOR

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein (UNREO)

The water treatment plant currently being operated by UNICEF requires 3000 litres of diesel fuel per day to service Kigali. The American government has promised to provide diesel fuel for the first ten days. Another source of diesel fuel will have to be found.

e) Radio.

Radio Kigali is not strong enough for its transmission to reach camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. It is essential to provide Radio Kigali either with a booster capability or for more powerful radio to inform Rwandan population of measures being taken for humanitarian relief, transport, normalization plans.

Agencies/Countries responsible: GERMANY/CANADIAN SIGNAL
SQUADRON, UNAMIR/JAPAN/
BRITAIN, UNDP

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein, UNREO,
Capt. Stephane Grenier

f) Telecommunications.

There are no telecommunications in Rwanda (telephone, post, fax). These need to be restored on an immediate basis. The Canadian contingent in UNAMIR has done some research. The local and international equipment is not badly damaged and can be repaired quickly.

Agencies/Countries responsible: CANADIAN SIG SQDRN/
GERMANY/AUSTRIA/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Thad Anglin UNAMIR/
Major Rutherford CANSIG

.../...

According to the Canadian Signals Squadron, the satellite earth station at Nyanza will have its generator power restored today. There is, however, a need for some cable to connect the equipment to the satellite dish (cost of approximately \$500.00). The repair of this Nyanza station will give the city of Kigali international calling capability.

Also according to CANSIG, the local telephone service will be restored by tomorrow. (The government was reportedly waiting for computer software to be used for billing purposes). Also, the Minister of Transport & Telecommunication now has international calling capacity.

g) Harvest/Supply of Agricultural Inputs.

The sorghum crop is ripe for harvesting. If the harvest does not take place within the next two weeks it is likely to be lost. Seed for next harvest must also be distributed.

Agencies/Countries responsible: WFP/FAO/UNICEF/UNHCR/
UNDP

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein, UNREO/
Mr. Gascon FAO

h) Re-opening of hospitals.

The Australian contingent is operating Kigali Centre Hospital in coordination with Samaritan's Purse. The British contingent is operating a hospital in Ruhengeri. Mediciens Sans Frontieres is operating the King Faycal Hospital in Kigali. The location of hospitals and health care centres may be indicated to Colonel Yaache. WHO is planning to set up health stations between the following towns:

Kigali and Kabale, Kigali and Ngara, Kigali and Bujumbura,
Kigali and Goma and Kigali and Bukavu.

Agencies/Countries responsible: AUSTRALIA/BRITAIN/
WHO/ICRC/MSF

Officer in Charge: Col. Yaache

...../.....

3. Operations to be completed by October.

a) Training of police force - gendarmerie.

UNCIVPOL has made a beginning in training a police force. A fully equipped police force needs to be trained to implement law and order. Police equipment needs also to be provided for the police force/gendarmerie.

Agencies/Countries responsible: UNCIVPOL/BELGIUM/
JAPAN/EUROPEAN UNION

Officer in Charge: Col. Diarra (UNAMIR)

Colonel Diarra has drafted a plan that calls for the immediate training of 100 gendarmes in Kigali. The second phase involves the formation of a National Gendarmerie. He is arranging a meeting with the Ministers of Defense, Justice and Interior in order to collect specific information regarding their needs.

b) Prison systems.

A prison system along with a prisons service needs to be built up for Rwanda.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/EU/GERMANY

Officer in Charge: Col. Diarra (UNAMIR)

c) Opening of Central Bank and Mint.

The Central Bank need to be reopened and experts trained to handle central bank. Currency and coins need also to be issued.

Agencies/Countries responsible: WORLD BANK/US/UNDP/OAU

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein (UNDP)

d) Re-opening of schools.

i) For primary and secondary schools teachers are immediately required. They need books and scholastic equipment. A teachers training school would also need to be opened.

.../...

ii) The University would also need to be opened with adequate staff.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/CANADA/UNESCO/
UNICEF/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein (UNDP)

UNICEF and UNESCO have a joint program. UNICEF is also providing funds to UNESCO.

e) Training of cadres and Administrative services.

The administrative cadres have been severely depleted and would need to be filled by newly trained personnel. A training school for administrative cadres would be necessary. Equipment (Computers, typewriters, telecoms, fax machines, data bank) need also to be repaired for use.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/OAU/AFRICA/
JAPAN/EU/UNDP/UNICEF

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein/
Assadi Ahmadi (UNDP)

f) Physical repair of Ministries.

Most of the Ministries have been physically damaged by mortars, shelling etc. They need to be repaired for use. Offices must also be equipped.

Agencies/Countries responsible: US/Civilian contractor
(all UN agencies should help their counterparts)

Officer in Charge: CAO UNAMIR

g) Restoration of Municipal Services.

Training of cadres as also provision of equipment (fire engines, cleaning vehicles, garbage collection, sewerage cleaning) would need to be provided.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/JAPAN/EU/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein/
Assadi Ahmadi (UNDP)

.../...

h) De-mining.

Requires immediate attention.

Agencies/Countries responsible: UK Civilian Contractor/
UN de-mining unit

Officer in Charge: Col. Yaache UNAMIR/
General Blagden DPKO

i) Repair of roads and bridges.

Several bridges and roads require early repair.

Agencies/Countries responsible: USA/CANADA/BITAIN/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Arturo Hein (UNDP)

j) Transport.

Buses, taxis need to begin plying on the roads again between major towns.

Agencies/Countries responsible: JAPAN/EU/GERMANY

Officer in Charge: CAO UNAMIR

CONCEPT FOR DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF GENDARMES IN
SECTOR 4

Introduction

1. Prior to occupation of Sector 4 (formerly known as the HPZ) by UNAMIR troops, a number of Rwandans were installed, armed and equipped as Gendarmes by the FCF. This element continues to operate in Sector 4.
2. Discussions with the BBGNU Minister of Defence reveal that the Government does not recognise the legitimacy of the Gendarme Force. Accordingly, the force is to be disarmed and demobilised.

Aim

1. To disarm and demobilise the French installed Gendarme element in Sector 4.

Concept

4. The operation would be conducted in two phases as follows:
 - a. Phase 1 Declaration of amnesty by the BBGNU of RWANDA.
 - b. Phase 2 Disarmament and demobilisation by UNAMIR troops.

5 General Outline

a. Phase 1 would require a Government public announcement of the proposed amnesty; the purpose of which would be to reduce risk of escalatory action by the Gendarmes and UNAMIR troops and to progress the process of reconciliation and integration. This week long period would seek to encourage the Gendarmes to voluntarily surrender their weapons and ancilliary equipment. The announcement to start this phase should be widely disseminated (radio, bilingual leaflets, edicts etc) stating the intent, process and methodology. Simultaneously, UNAMIR would issue orders to Sector 4 commanders to cover the action to be taken by UNAMIR troops.

b. Phase 2 would require UNAMIR troops, during the conduct of normal operations, to disarm Gendarmes who did not avail themselves of the terms of the amnesty. This is potentially a sensitive phase and should be executed with sound judgement and care.

Factors

6. Government Statement The statement of intent should revoke the legitimacy of the Gendarme Force and include the requirement to hand in their weapons, ammunition, uniforms, appointment credentials and equipment to the nearest UNAMIR unit with the

Approved
FCF
30 Aug 94

self protection. In the event that an individual seeks to actively avoid disarmament, pursuit by UNAMIR forces and disarmament by force is not authorised. The limitation must be clearly understood down to the lowest level.

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- (1) D-2. Commence preparation (issue orders, prepare leaflets, establish collection centres etc);
- (2) D Day. Government declaration of amnesty;
- (3) D+3. Reintegration meeting
- (4) D+7. Phase 1 complete; and
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Proposed Tasks

10. Sector Commanders

- a. Establish collection centres;
- b. Provide administrative support;
- c. Provide security;
- d. Effect weapon collection; and
- e. Assist in leaflet distribution

11. MILOB

- a. Assist in leaflet distribution;
- b. Provide escorts as required;
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- d. Carry out liaison tasks as required.

12. HAC

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- b. Effect liaison for the provision of HRC/ICRC representatives at collection centres; and
- c. Facilitate the supervision of documentation procedures.

13. CAO

offer of reintegration into the newly formed force.

7. Reintegration It is anticipated a proportion of the force may wish to pursue the option of integration. Accordingly, UNAMIR would undertake to transport those individuals to an appropriate location for the necessary administration. This activity should be well advertised/emphasised. A meeting should be organised on approximately D+3 to allow UNAMIR and BBGNU representatives to announce the reintegration procedure.

8. Collection Centres A Collection Centre would be established by UNAMIR forces at GIKONGORO, CYANGUGU and KIBUYE. The function of each centre would be to receive and catalogue all weapons, ammunition and equipment and to document the details of all participants who wish to avail themselves of the reintegration offer. Each centre would be manned as follows:

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- a. Storage in sector locations.
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- c. Unsafe ammunition would be destroyed in situ.
- d. Disposal options are as follows:


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- e. Phase 2 ROE Due to the sensitive nature of actively disarming Gendarmes, it is proposed that ROE be pursued to the fullest extent necessary to ensure

a. Provide suitable interpreters at each collection centre.

14. For your consideration.


J Arp
Col
DCOS/OPS

Prepared by LTCOL A.D. Brimelow, G3 Plans

AN ASSESSMENT ON THE REINTEGRATION OF SECTOR 4

For: MGEN GC Tousignant
Force Commander
UNAMIR

Prepared by: Lt Col A.D. Brimelow
G3 Plans

Date: 03 September 1994.

AIM

1. To assess the feasibility of and tasks necessary to complete reintegration of Sector 4 by 13 Sep 94.

FACTORS

Threat

2. There are reports of as many as ten (10) thousand RGF members located in ZAIRE opposite CYANGUGU. These soldiers are believed to have crossed with 50% of their personal weapons. The possibility of having heavy weapons can not be disregarded. About two thirds of these soldiers were recruited and trained during the civil war and are believed to be poorly trained.

3. There are strong rumours that these soldiers are being trained by the ZAIRIAN army. None of these reports/rumours have been confirmed.

4. During the past week, there have been reports of RGF members being seen entering Rwanda in small groups. Some have been seen crossing the border in civilian clothes. They have been using the normal roads either by vehicles or on foot. There are also increased reports on RGF banditry and murders in the sector. Some of the RGF members have surrendered themselves and some have surrendered weapons, grenades and vehicles. There are also reports on RGF members blocking refugees returning to Rwanda.

5. Assessment The possibility of the RGF mounting a large scale formed attack in Sector 4 in the next thirty days or so is very minimal. The likelihood of insurgent activity on a small scale (ie section/ platoon attack or raids) will grow. They may only be able to mount a large scale attack when they re-organize which may take some time. The possibility of RGF establishing caches (especially in the forests) can not be ruled out either.

6. The chances of direct attacks on UNAMIR forces in Sector 4 are significantly higher than in other sectors. However, should relations be established between Zaire and the BBGNU, the RGF will further be isolated, thus decreasing its capabilities.

7. Deductions

- a. UNAMIR action to prevent the establishment of caches is necessary.
- b. Positive and early border control is essential.
- c. Intense patrolling by UNAMIR forces during the reintegration process will be necessary.
- d. Increased activity in veh searches through rd blocks is necessary.

Terrain

8. Sector 4 is bounded by ZAIRE to the west and BURUNDI to the south. Vehicular access to RWANDA is difficult along the borders, however access on foot is less restricted. The NYUNGWE forest presents a major obstacle to movement although it provides significant cover and concealment. The sector is generally hilly with small rivers and marshes at the foot of the mountains. There is a dominating natural forest (NYUNGAE FOREST) covering almost 1/3 of the sector in the central part. There are a few tarmac roads inter-joining the main towns in the sector with many more secondary roads joining other small towns.

9. Assessment The mountains and hills present slow go terrain to troops. In most areas, it is no go for vehicles. The rivers and swamps make it difficult to traverse in the absence of bridges or any other river crossing facilities. The tarmac roads provide all weather access. The secondary roads are rough to pass through in the dry season and difficult for vehicles in the wet. The natural forest is difficult to pass through in vehicles and is slow go on foot. It also offers suitable areas to launch insurgent activities from.

10. Deductions

- a. Access to the forest areas must be tightly controlled.
- b. Control measures on primary and secondary routes must be intensified.

RPA Capability

11. Approximately five plus brigades. Many are newly recruited and trained. Careful selection must be stressed for sensitive tasks especially in early phases.

12. Deductions

- a. Acceleration of UN CIVPOL deployment is required.
- b. The BBGNU must take action to establish and recognize Communal Police throughout the country.
- c. The training of RWANDAN Gendarmerie must be accelerated.

Political

13. The political process must be accelerated in order to develop a national will for reintegration. In order for the RENP to succeed, a secure and stable environment must exist so that outside agencies and governments feel confident enough to invest funds and resources to assist the BBGNU to rebuild Rwanda. Accordingly, UNAMIR must create an atmosphere of law and order. UNAMIR does not have sufficient resources or the proper mandate to conduct police operations in addition to its other tasks. The BBGNU does not recognize FCF installed Gendarmes and UNAMIR forces have been ordered to disarm them. The resultant vacuum must be filled by a viable security force.

14. Deductions

- a. The political process must effect the provision of:
 - (1) Prefects.
 - (2) Coordination of Communal Police and disarmament of Gendarmerie.
 - (3) RPA elements for the provision of security.
 - (4) Ministers and public servants for administrative and technical assessment of the three affected prefectures.

UNAMIR Forces

15. Three infantry battalions are fully committed to the conduct of security and humanitarian operations in Sector 4. There is no residual capacity to intensify operations, provide security for reintroduced RWANDA authorities, effect disarmament or prevent infiltration by subversive elements.

16. Deductions

- a. Reinforcement of Sector 4 is necessary to effectively facilitate reintegration. The following options are available:
 - (1) Redeploy (additional) UNAMIR troops to Sector 4.
 - (2) Introduce RPA troops to Sector 4.

Time and Space

17. Reintegration must be effected in order to set the appropriate security conditions for the development of the RENP. Nine days have been identified in which this process is to be effected. The options are as follows:

- a. Option 1. A gradual approach where Govt representatives and RPA elements are introduced in limited numbers:

(1) Advantages

- (a) Public apprehension will be controlled.
- (b) Government bona fides will be more readily accepted.
- (c) Security requirement will be more manageable.
- (d) RPA operation will be more readily absorbed and accepted.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) This approach may promote Govt dissatisfaction.
- (b) Impatience with the rate of progress might set conditions for unilateral action.
- (c) Civil unrest and banditry may increase unless held in check (could be outside UNAMIR's capability).

b. Option 2. Rapid integration where large numbers of RPA and Civil Administration are introduced in the relatively short period of time available.

(1) Advantages

- (a) Govt control is established early.
- (b) The current security burden on UNAMIR forces would be eased.
- (c) UNAMIR forces may be released to address higher priority peripheral security tasks.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) Public apprehension is heightened.
- (b) Premature UNAMIR withdrawal from the sector may be forced.
- (c) UNAMIR impartiality may be compromised.
- (d) Conflicts between warring factions more likely. Could result in public opinion of UN failure.

18. Deductions

a. The risk of provoking Govt dissatisfaction with gradual reintegration requires early positive measures by UNAMIR to facilitate a perception of tangible progress.

b. Rapid reintegration presents an unacceptable risk of UNAMIR losing control of the security situation which could facilitate the conditions for instability.

c. Limited but positive action to facilitate mature reintegration is feasible within the time limitation.

Assessment of Tasks

19. Conduct of the following tasks is required:

a. Coordination of Communal Police recognition by the Government.

b. Disarmament and reintegration of FCF installed Gendarmerie in Sector 4C.

c. Deployment of prefects with manageable sized RPA security elements.

d. Coordination of Ministerial and Public Servant visits to the sector.

e. Conduct of security operations by RPA.

f. Maintenance of stability by UNAMIR.

g. Control of sustainment supplies (food, water, fuel).

h. RPA escort of NGO convoys and assistance in humanitarian aid distribution.

20. Deductions

a. A number of the above tasks are within the capacity of the RPA.

b. SRSG support will be required to effect the initiation of Government coordination and activity. Daily joint coordination meetings are required at the staff and political levels.

c. Reintroduction of RPA elements to the sector to conduct these tasks will ease the security burden on UNAMIR troops.

d. The allocation of a discrete, small or sub-sector to RPA control may be feasible.

e. UN supervision of RPA activities will be necessary.

f. Achievement of these limited tasks is feasible within the time limitations as follows:

(1) D DAY - 4 Sep.

(2) D + 3 - Tasks at para 19 a, c, f, g.

(3) D + 5 - Tasks at para 19 b and d.

(4) D + 7 - Tasks at para 19 e.

Administration Considerations

21. RPA self sufficiency is not assured. UNAMIR logistic capacity is limited.

22. Deductions

a. Logistic support to reintegrate Govt and RPA elements may be requested.

b. RPA resupply convoys may require UN escort/supervision.

COURSES OF ACTION

Course A

23. The conduct of independent operations by RPA forces.

a. Advantages

(1) An early perception of Government control is achieved.

(2) The risk of UNAMIR involvement in security incidents is reduced.

b. Disadvantages

(1) UN supervision is diluted.

(2) Public apprehension may increase.

(3) Population migration may be incited.

Course B

24. The conduct of joint UNAMIR/RPA operations.

a. Advantages

(1) UN supervision is maintained/maximized.

(2) Public perceptions will be moderated.

b. Disadvantages

(1) UN impartiality may be compromised.

(2) UNAMIR's current security tasks prevent full commitment to joint operations.

Course C

25. Independent RPA operation in designated areas in conjunction with the conduct of security and humanitarian tasks throughout Sector 4; all under UN supervision:

a. Advantages

(1) This course of action is a compromise between courses A and B.

(2) Government control is maximized within the constraints of public perception and the maintenance of security.

(3) UNAMIR troops could be released to reinforce higher priority tasks.

(4) The maintenance of security will be manageable.

b. Disadvantages

(1) A measure of control by UNAMIR will be lost.

(2) Public confidence will be at risk in the RPA "occupied" area(s).

Recommended Course of Action

26. Course C is recommended as it will facilitate reintegration within the time frame available and will remain within the capacity of UN troops to contain while meeting the Govt desire to effect control as soon as possible.

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