

[CONFIDENTIAL]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>5-1120</u>
BOX	<u>44</u>
FILE	<u>1</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/02 18</u>

DEC 21 P 2:56

MAIL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE, UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE, UNATIONS NEW YORK

REFERENCE:

OUTGOING CODED CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: SRSG KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
SRSG ABDALLAH, BUJUMBURA, BURUNDI
FROM: PETER HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *P Hansen*
DATE: 20 December 1994
Nº.: 4190 Nº. of pages 14

Attached please find a copy of the informal summary minutes of the Rwanda Operational Support Group meeting held at the US Mission to the United Nations on 16 December 1994.

Regards,

This is an important document. It should be shown to FC and HC (contact). Then kept in record - handy.
See 23.12
W.Das

P2/14

NOTE FOR THE FILE

CNR 705/12
cnd 048/12

Subject: Informal summary minutes of the Rwanda Operational Support Group meeting
Friday 16 December 1994 at the US Mission
9:00 - 13:30

Ambassador Inderfurth welcomed the participants to the second Rwanda Operational Support Group (ROSG) meeting. He briefed the participants that Vice-President Paul Kagame had just spent three days in Washington meeting with White House, Pentagon and State Department officials. He gave the floor to Mr. Timothy Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the US State Department, to chair the meeting.

After underlining that the Group is not a "contact group" but a "friends group", Mr. Wirth introduced the new US Rwanda Coordinator, Mr. Townsend Friedman, formerly the US Ambassador to Mozambique. Regarding the meetings of Vice-President Kagame in Washington, he noted that the Vice-President repeated the same issues in all of the meetings: 1) overall security, 2) financial assistance to the Government of Rwanda (GOR), 3) humanitarian assistance inside the country and 4) reconciliation. The US Government would support the efforts on these issues.

Mr. Wirth stated that, though the agenda listed only several points, the US Government viewed them to be most crucial requiring the focused attention of the Group. (The agenda and a list of the participants are attached.)

Japan summarized the mission of the International Peace Corporation Corps which was deployed in the Goma area to provide humanitarian assistance to Rwandese refugees. The mission was ending and it was handing over its activities to NGO's.

Security in the camps

Mr. Hansen stated that there was no easy option. A DPKO/UNHCR mission was visiting the refugee camps with a view to provide further precision to the options contained in the Secretary-General's report. As for the WFP/UNHCR mission to assess

the possibility of direct distribution to the refugees, the initial indication was positive. Concerning the IDP camps, the UN was trying to dissuade GOR from unilateral closure of the camps. GOR saw them as the harbouring ground for the former political and military leaders. An earlier forced closure of an IDP camp caused an exodus of 30,000 people to Burundi. The "Operation Hope" carried out by UNAMIR with RPA backing and HR and ICRC monitoring successfully screened suspected elements by arresting 47 people and confiscating weapons. A new programme, "Operation Retour", to facilitate return of IDP's was about to be launched. Its success was a pre-requisite to bring back the refugees.

General Baril informed that 60 countries had been approached to consider sending troops for the proposed peace-keeping operation and for providing police support. However, they showed little interest in committing troops. Regarding the "Operation Hope", it was a successful operation and the right message was sent to the destabilizing elements. It had to be stressed that secrecy was paramount to launching a successful security operation. Despite the success, a similar operation in Zaire could not be contemplated. Apart from the mandate considerations, UNAMIR resources were too limited for a confrontation with the target groups which were much stronger outside Rwanda. Furthermore, there would not be a RPA backup.

France stressed that GOR needed to do more to assure the refugees. They were concerned about property rights, etc. It noted a recent statement of Prime Minister Twagiramungu who acknowledged that 600,000 returnees were in Rwanda with some occupying illegally houses left vacant by the refugees and that GOR needed assistance to deal with the problem. It understood hesitation to contribute troops as the mandate was still unclear. Furthermore, the position of Zaire was also uncertain. On the use of private operators, it believed that security is the responsibility of States and can not be substituted by "mercenaires ameliorees". It would be important for humanitarian organizations to be associated with security operations.

The UK believed that, for humanitarian organizations, the scope of their activities were becoming narrower and that one needed to start with a "sub-optimum" with Zairian involvement as there was no "cut-and-dry" formula. It suggests an incremental approach. A continuing dialogue with GOR would be essential.

Tunisia believed that more political actions to build confidence among the refugees were needed. GOR actions notwithstanding, UN radio would help in confidence-building efforts.

Belgium also thought that the mandate of the operation was still unclear. It welcomed the "Operation Retour" as it agreed

that refugee repatriation could not occur without IDP's returning first. Therefore, it supported UNHCR's (it was joint UN, NGO and GOR) efforts. As suggested in its non-paper, it believed that repatriation efforts could start first in Burundi where the problem might be more manageable.

Canada believed that the situation continued to be explosive and that the political message sent by the Operation Hope was significant. The UN should be looking more at the means it had already at its disposal.

UNHCR mentioned that it was distributing a position paper and summarized that the situation of 2 million refugees was simply untenable. It was concerned about the current dichotomy of returnees (i.e. the "old caseload" of Tutsis returning whereas Hutus remaining outside). Regarding the WFP/UNHCR mission, it believed that distribution at a level closer to family would be possible and that refugee registration could take place.

Germany believed that the key issues of the Rwanda crisis to be security in the camps, aid and political reconciliation. It saw the linkage among the three and supported the UN radio. Mr. Hansen indicated that GOR had approved the UN radio which would be able to begin broadcasting on 24 December 1994. Mr. Wirth questioned whether one would hear UN broadcast on that day.

The Netherlands viewed that GOR was meeting its obligations and solicited the donors to do their part. It requested more precision on the military analysis and the feedback to the Secretary-General's options. General Baril replied that it estimated that there are some 10,000 militia and 20,000 RGF (Rwanda government forces, i.e. former government soldiers). Except for one which showed interest, all other contacted replied negative. Regarding the requirements for Zaire to do its share, it needed financial resources and the training of its "cadres".

*Volcano
just!*
Japan suggested to increase consultations with de facto leaders who were not tainted as well as with the Zairian authorities. Regarding the volcano near Goma, its experts who had been examining it predicted that an explosion could occur in the next six months and advised evacuation of refugees in the nearby areas. Mr. Wirth added that the US had sent three experts as well and suggested that these experts should come up with the same recommendation. Mr. Okubo, Foreign Ministry official, who had just returned from the refugee camps gave an account of his assessment of the situation which he viewed as stabilizing and, except for the Katale camp, not as bad as the time he visited in August.

Tunisia viewed that there are two sorts of refugees: "true and false" refugees. Those with arms should not be treated as refugees and be separated from the "true" refugees. Two possible solutions could be advanced: either integration into the RPA or

demobilization. However, the solutions could introduce further complications.

Mr. Moose concluded with following remarks: 1) further refinement of the mandate of the proposed peace-keeping operation was needed; 2) the Group would look forward to learning the outcome of the current UN mission; and 3) it viewed that no option should be ruled out (e.g. the use of commercial firms).

Mr. Moose added that the US had funds through UNHCR and was awaiting further indication for implementation of its strategy.

The regional refugee conference

UNHCR informed that it begun discussions with OAU on 15 December in Addis Ababa. It expected a preparatory meeting to take place in Addis Ababa on 10 January 1995.

OAU expected the conference to take place in early March 1995.

There were discussions regarding who would be invited to the preparatory meeting as well as the conference itself (the Group should be invited to both), where the preparatory meeting should be held (Bujumbura vs. Addis Ababa) and when the conference should take place (as soon as possible).

Regarding the more general international conference, DPA replied that the Secretariat begun to its preparation and that it would not take place before March 1995.

Mr. Moose concluded with the following remarks: 1) the Group supported the conference and believed that the conference should be held as early as possible and suggested mid-February; 2) it sought clarifications on the conferences; 3) it requested financial information about the conferences; 4) it requested information on invitees of the refugee preparatory meeting and the refugee conference; 5) it suggested that the refugee conference agenda to focus on the points raised by the SRSG (e.g. security, responsibilities of "sending and receiving" countries).

Aid activities

Mr. Wirth informed the participants that the US would collate and distribute contribution information received from them. Regarding the \$10 million arrear to the World Bank, the current contributions for this purpose were as follows: \$2.5 million from the US, \$2 million from Belgium, \$2 million from the Netherlands, \$1.5 million from Canada, \$800,000 from Norway and \$750,000 from Switzerland. As no transfer of funds had yet taken place, all donors were urged to expedite the process. The Bank

CNR 705/12
and 048

would take up Rwanda at the end of January 1995 at which time it would be essential for Rwanda to have paid back the arrear. The Bank would then be able to proceed its quick disbursement fund amounting to \$50 million. Further funds/loans would be possible.

On the importance of supporting Rwanda, Spain agreed that the focus of assistance should shift from the camps to inside Rwanda.

Belgium was concerned with two assistance-related issues: first, how the assistance would be focused in areas where it would help to create conditions necessary for a return of the refugees; and the need for coordination. It suggested that UNDP should participate in the next ROSG meeting which it proposed to take place around the dates of the Round Table meeting.

The Netherlands supported Belgium. It suggested that the Trust Fund could serve as an instrument to facilitate aid coordination.

France, Germany, Sweden and the European Union gave information on their respective contributions. Mr. Wirth requested that, when informing, it would be useful to distinguish funds for inside for Rwanda and outside, and funds for humanitarian assistance and for reconstruction.

Mr. Hansen confirmed that the Round Table meeting would take place on 17 and 18 January in Geneva and there would be a back-to-back reconstruction and humanitarian sessions with the launching of the humanitarian appeal. He gave a summary of the 1995 appeal and assured that he had paid a particular attention to ensuring the transition between the humanitarian and the reconstruction phases. He requested that conditions placed upon GOR should be lessened in order to have the successful Round Table meeting.

Belgium requested to know the level of representation at the meeting. For its part, it would send the Minister for Development Cooperation. The Netherlands indicated likewise.

Mr. Wirth accepted the suggestion to hold the next ROSG meeting on 16 January in Geneva. He added that, at the next meeting, the Group should be informed on the DPKO mission findings, Tanzanian and Zairian government positions on possible security operations and the UN radio.

Human rights monitors

The Group unanimously agreed that fielding of human rights monitors had been extremely slow and this was to the detriment of all other efforts for Rwanda. Mr. Wirth viewed that the situation was "appalling" and merited his bringing the Group's concern

CNR 705/12
CND 048

to the attention of the Secretary-General. A number of participants questioned how the UN was taking advantage of EU contributions of 50 monitors.

Mr. Moose underlined that actions must be expeditiously taken and requested the UN representatives to inform the Geneva counterpart of the Group's view.

International Tribunal

Mr. Wirth invited Judge Goldstone to address the participants.

As the chief prosecutor for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Judge Goldstone said that, in order to break the cycle of violence and to allow reconciliation to occur, justice must be served. However, the cost of doing so was not cheap. He believed that, if done successfully, the Tribunal would be the cheapest means of peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy. As opposed to the former-Yugoslavia where war was continuing, he hoped that the Rwanda trials could begin quickly, possibly in mid-1995. That would send positive signals to the refugees. The involvement of the international community and GOR with the Tribunal was essential. So far 32 States made contributions. He also looked to NGO involvement.

He briefed on the organizational aspects indicating that the Tribunal secretariat would be in the Hague and there would be two investigation units. Ten investigation teams would operate in and outside of Rwanda. Cooperation of countries would be important to enable the teams to carry out work quickly and effectively.

Regarding the relation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Judge Goldstone stated that he was in constant contact with the High Commissioner. He would distribute a note prepared by the Office of Legal Affairs on this matter. Since judicial and legal experts would be in Rwanda to carry out the work of the Tribunal, he wanted to see close operation with those working to establish the judicial system in Rwanda. His experts could help in this effort.

Judge Goldstone underlined that immediate funding was most crucial. If not for the Switzerland's contribution to the Tribunal Trust Fund, he would not be able to begin his third mission to Rwanda starting tomorrow.

Spain, Belgium, Germany and the US stated that they were/would be contributing.

Mr. Wirth concluded that the Group would receive a list of needs from Judge Goldstone. He would take an initiative to form

a NGO support group which would contribute to the work of Judge Goldstone.

Political dialogue

Mr. Moose stated that this item was added to the discussion because the US felt that, assured GOR intention and deepening and broadening of political dialogue notwithstanding, the process of political reconciliation needed to be accelerated. The US's opinion was that an envoy might be the missing element to act to catalyze the process.

France thought that such an envoy might lead to "double-emplois". It added that what was important was "hammering of the message" to GOR and referred to the 30 November Security Council's Presidential Statement.

Germany felt that GOR was receiving the message as diplomatic contacts with GOR were increasing, particularly as countries were establishing their presence in Rwanda.

OAU informed that it had a conflict resolution mechanism which facilitates in bringing conflicting parties together. It would be ready to participate fully in the dialogue involving all parties.

Sweden questioned the validity of information which it had on a Kagame/Kengo meeting where Vice-President Kagame supposedly declared that "all good Hutus" were already back in Rwanda (i.e. those acceptable to be in GOR) and how to identify Rwandese leaders outside Rwanda. Mr. Moose replied that such assertion was likely to be false as he was in the meetings with Vice-President Kagame in Washington. Mr. Moose believed that GOR was making sincere efforts for political reconciliation. But it needed to do more. It should be talking with persons who have constituents.

On the DPA's suggestion, Mr. Moose acknowledged that the US examined the Tanzania as a possibility but, for the moment, concluded that it was inappropriate.

The UK seemed to summarize the feeling of the Group that the donors could encourage GOR to continue its reconciliation efforts and that a new person coming in at this time was counterproductive. It preferred supporting the SRSG or, perhaps, an OAU initiative. Also, it suggested looking elsewhere such as El Salvador to draw ideas.

Mr. Moose concluded that the US would continue to search for the "missing element" necessary to "jump-start" the process, await the ideas from the Group and look forward to information from the UN on this issue.

Burundi

Mr. Moose stated that Burundi was put on the agenda because efforts must continue to "keep the lid on" in Burundi.

Belgium gave an account of the latest situation highlighting a renewed friction in the already fragile national reconciliation process. As a result, the international attention was a must. In the past, it had an effect. Preventive diplomacy was working. The Government must be made aware to restrain itself. Belgium added that Burundi faced the problem of impunity in which 100,000 people were massacred in 1993 but no justice done to the guilty.

Germany agreed with Belgium's analysis and informed that it had contributed 1.1 million DM for the preventive diplomacy efforts.

DPA informed that, according to the SRSG in Burundi, the National Assembly would convene in April 1995. She added that a UN fact-finding mission report (Ake/Huslid report) would be transmitted to the Burundi Government shortly.

Mr. Moose concluded that it was important to magnify efforts for Burundi. The US National Security Advisor would be in Burundi today to make the point to the Government of Burundi. He learned that NGO's through their social interventions were contributing enormously to the reconciliation efforts complementing those made at the political level and wanted to arrange that the NGO information reach the SRSG.

Mr. Moose stated that Burundi would be on the next Group meeting agenda.

Mr. Moose closed the second Rwanda Operational Support Group meeting by informing that the next meeting would be held in Geneva on 16 January 1995 and that the US would compile information on assistance to Rwanda. As no other Group member volunteered, the US would continue chair the meeting.

Kaz Kuroda
19 December 1994

c.c.: Mr. Hansen
Mr. Fareed (o/r)
Mr. Baker
Mr. Tsui
Mr. Griffith
Ms. Saidy

Mr. Kent

AGENDA

Second Meeting of the
Rwanda Operational Support GroupU.S. Mission, New York
December 16, 1994

- 0900-0930 Registration
- 0930-0945 Very brief opening remarks, as appropriate
- 0945-1045 Key next steps on:
-- security in the camps
-- the regional refugee conference
- 1045-1100 Break
- 1100-1200 Key next steps on:
-- human rights monitors
-- the International Tribunal
-- restarting a political dialogue
- 1200-1230 Information sharing:
- aid activities and planned activities in Rwanda
- 1230-1300 Information sharing:
- preventive diplomacy activities in Burundi
- 1300-1315 Closing remarks/next meeting

CNR 705/12, CND 048/12
Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting
December 16, 1994
U.S. Mission, New York

PROVISIONAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM:

Amb. Frans van Daele,
MFA Director for Political Affairs

Mrs. Sonia Gerlo
Chef de Cabinet to State Secretary for
Development Cooperation

Amb. Alexis Reyn
Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. Thomas Baekelandt
Counsellor, UN Mission

CANADA:

Amb. Bernard Dussault
DFA's Special Envoy for Central Africa

Mr. Achim Holzenberger
DFA, Peacekeeping Section

Mr. Howard Strauss
Counsellor (Legal Affairs)

Mr. Francois Taschereau
First Secretary, UN Mission

FRANCE:

Mr. Herve Ladsous
Minister Plenipotentiary, UN Mission

Mr. Bruno Foucher
First Secretary

GERMANY:

Mr. Steffen Rudolph
Minister Counsellor, UN Mission

Ms. Jutta Schmitz
First Secretary, UN Mission

Mr. Axel Dittmann
Second Secretary, UN Mission

JAPAN: Amb. Shunji Maruyama
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. Okubo
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Eiji Yamamoto
First Secretary, UN Mission

Mr. Jiro Usui
Second Secretary, UN Mission

NETHERLANDS: Amb. Nicolas H. Biegan
Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. Remmert H. Cohen
First Secretary, UN Mission

Mr. Antonie de Jong
First Secretary, UN Mission

Mr. Rene Ch. Aquarone
First Secretary, UN Mission

SPAIN: Amb. Juan A. Yanez-Barnuevo
Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. Ernesto de Zulueta
First Secretary, UN Mission

SWEDEN: Mr. Henrik Salander
Minister Plenipotentiary, UN Mission

Ms. Lena Sundh
Counsellor, UN Mission

TUNISIA: Amb. Amor Ardhaoui
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. El Walid Doudech
First Secretary, UN Mission

UK: Amb. Stephen Gomersall
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr. Julian A. Evans
First Secretary, UN Mission

UNITED STATES:

Global Affairs

Under Secretary Timothy Wirth
Special Assistant Anne Joyce

Africa Bureau

Assistant Secretary George Moose
Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell

AF/C

Ms. Arlene Render, Office Director, AF/C
Mr. Reed Fendrick, Deputy Office Director, AF/C
Mr. Kevin Alston, AF/C

IO/UNP

Mr. Greg Stanton

Democracy, Labor

Human Rights Special Assistant Josiah Rosenblatt

LEGAL

Ms. Crystal Nix

AID

Mr. Glen Slocum

OSD

Col. Beraud

USUN

Amb. Karl F. Inderfurth
Alternate U.S. Representative for
Special Political Affairs
Ms. Laurie L. Shestack, Adviser
Ms. Susan Varisco, Adviser

*Amb.
Townsend
Friedman*

CAU:

Amb. Ibrahima Sy
Permanent Observer to the UN

Dr. Omotayo R. Olaniyan
Adviser

EUROPEAN

COMMISSION:

Amb. Angel Vinas
Head of Delegation of EC to UN

Dr. Dieter Koenig
Deputy Head of Delegation of EC to UN

- 4 -

CNR 705/12, CND 048 P14/.

UNITED NATIONS: Mr. Peter Hansen
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator

Mr. Kzuhide Kuroda, DHA

Major General Maurice Baril
Military Adviser
Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Mr. Hedi Annabi, Director
Africa Division
Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Mr. Soren Jessen-Petersen
Director
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Ms. Pirkko Kourula
Deputy Head, UNHCR

Ms. Florence Barrillon-Pomes
Senior Political Affairs Officers
Africa II Division
Department of Political Affairs

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: Justice Richard Goldstone
Prosecutor