

UNAMIR

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

17 JAN 1994 - 27 JUNE 1995

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# UNAMIR

## UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

17 January 1994

### The Joint Military Commission (JMC) And its Working Groups

Reference :      A.    Arusha Peace Agreement , dated 4 August 93  
                  B.    UNAMIR, No. 1000 (FC), dated 8 Dec 1993  
                  C.    RPF - Proposed Amendments, dated 12 Dec 93  
                  D.    RGF - Minister of Defense, No. 3880 dated  
                          16 December 1993

#### 1.    General

It has been agreed upon by both parties that the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), consisting of senior mandated military decision makers of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), the Rwandese Patriotic Front Forces (RPFF), and UNAMIR, is essential before and during the life span of the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). Its mandate would be to monitor, discuss, provide direction, and be an open forum for problems resolution on all military matters.

2.    The JMC will deal with all matters enumerated in Annex A. The UNAMIR Force Commander or his deputy will act as the chairman. He shall be assisted by the Chief of Plans Section who shall provide the appropriate secretarial and administrative requirements for the meetings. Its membership shall comprise two Officers of the Army, two Officers of the Gendarmerie and four Officers of the RPF until the installation of the Army High Command Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie. In accordance with the importance of the subject, UNAMIR will propose the level of representation, in consultation with both parties. After the installation of BBTG, the AHCC and the CCNG will review the representation of the of the JMC with UNAMIR.

3.    The JMC will normally meet in NGONDORE, unless otherwise agreed upon by all parties, in consultation with UNAMIR, upon a written invitation of the initiating party. The invitation will include the agenda and all possible documents relating to the subject of the meeting. All parties and UNAMIR must inform the Planning Section of meetings about 48 hours in advance.

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4. The Working Groups

a. The Working Group on Programs (WGP).

This WGP as created in accordance with Art. 79 of the military Protocol of Reference A, shall deal with matters under the jurisdiction of the Joint Drafting Committee, as stated in Art. 48. It shall deal with disciplinary regulations and with syllabi.

b. The Working Group on Training (WGT).

This WGT will deal with training separately from the points being considered by the Joint Commission in order to avoid any confusion.

c. The Working Group on Operations (WGO)

The Working Group on Operations mainly deals with the tasks listed in Article 54 of Arusha Peace Agreement, and specified in Paragraph 3 of Annex A.

d. The Working Group on Administration and Logistics (WGAL).

This working group deals with the tasks listed in Paragraph 4 of Annex A.

5. Other matters

Without prejudice to the Peace Agreement, the ACHC and the CCNG may attend to any other matter mentioned here as need arises. The ACHC and CCNG will specifically handle the matters specified in Paragraph 5 of Annex A. All other subject matters that fall within the mandate of the JMC can be raised to that body in accordance with directives stated in paragraph 4.

6. Responsibilities

a. JMC.

The JMC is liable to the articles of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the limitations of the UN Resolution 872(1993) of the Security Council. The JMC will supervise the smooth functioning of the working-groups both in content and in working atmosphere.

b. WGP, WGT, WGO, WGAL.

UNAMIR HQ Chief of the Planning Section chairs these working groups.




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7. Administration.

The organization of the meeting site, NGONDORE is a permanent responsibility of UNAMIR FORCE HQ. The NGONDORE SOPs provide all details on administration and logistics of the meetings.

  
BIZIMANA Augustin  
Minister of Defence  
of the Republic of Rwanda  
KAGAME Paul  
Major General  
Chairman  
RPA High Command  
Romeo A. Dallaire  
Brigadier General  
UNAMIR Force Commander

Annex A: Tasks of the Working Groups of the Joint Military  
Commission


Annex B: Diagram

Annex A

Tasks of the Working Groups of the Joint Military Commission

1. Tasks of the Working Group on Programs (WGP)
  - a. Disciplinary Regulations
  - b. Military regulations for the National Army and the National Gendarmerie
  - c. Statutes
  - d. Political and Civic Education
  - e. Tactics
  - f. Weapons
  - g. Drill
  - h. Keeping of Law and Order and Enforcement
  - i. General Principles of Gendarmerie Services
  - j. Traffic regulations
2. Tasks of the Working Group on Training(WGT)
  - a. Training in Assembly points
  - b. Training of Rwandese Instructors for the Integrated Training Center
  - c. Training in the Integrated Training Centers
  - d. Training of Rwandese Instructors for the National Gendarmerie
  - e. Training in the National Gendarmerie Training Center
  - f. Training of the Engineer Battalion.
3. Tasks for the Working Group on Operations(WGO)
  - a. Demarcation of new DMZ
  - b. Identification and assessment of assembly points, Cantonment Points and Training Centers
  - c. Transformation of Army and Gendarmerie camps into Assembly points.
  - d. Disengagement process
  - e. Movement of troops and equipment to their respective Assembly
  - f. Movement of troops to the integrated training centers.
  - g. Mine clearance operations
  - h. Tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country
  - i. Recovery of weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by civilians
  - j. Establishment of the training centers for the National Army and National Gendarmerie
4. Tasks of the Working Group on Logistics(WGL)
  - a. Logistic support for the RPF Kigali Battalion
  - b. Harmonization of uniforms, insignia, salaries and allowances
  - c. Logistic support for Assembly points, Cantonment

Annex B



points and Training Centers for the National Army and National Gendarmerie.

- d. The study of the distribution of positions according to the organizations contained in the Peace Agreement and for the new structures to be proposed by the ACHC and CCNG.

5. Tasks for the ACHC and CCNG

- a. The deployment of the National Army and National Gendarmerie units
- b. The movement of army and gendarmerie personnel from Training Centers to their respective camps
- c. The disengagement of the RPF Kigali Battalion

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The third meeting of the Joint Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Thursday, 4 May 1995 at 10 am at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence (Leader); Mr. Nyandwi Tharcisse, Counsellor, Prime Minister's Office; Mr. Telesphore Kagaba, Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.
2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda (Leader); Col. T. S. Sivakumar, Chief of Staff; Mr. Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative; Mr. Ike Minta, Legal Adviser.
3. Col. Mugambage opened the session by stating that the meeting should now be guided by UNAMIR's suggestions on the role it could play in view of present realities in Rwanda.
4. The Special Representative acknowledged that the present realities in



Rwanda were different from when UNAMIR was initially deployed and that its mandate would have to be defined according to the existing realities. He then referred to Security Council Resolution 965 and read out the present mandate of UNAMIR. He also referred to recent trilateral agreements which had been concluded by Rwanda with UNHCR and Zaire, in which the protection of security corridors and transit camps for the returning refugees could be considered relevant. The Special Representative said that it was for the Government to indicate the adjustments to be made on the mandate.

5. Continuing, the Special Representative, expressed a personal opinion. Cross border military oriented activities from Zaire had been increasing and were more organized. Both the President and the Vice President had indicated their concerns about this development. Was it contemplated that UNAMIR should play a border monitoring role?

6. Col. Mugambage stated that at the last meeting he had given the conceptual framework for a future UNAMIR operation in Rwanda. He was now expecting UNAMIR to make proposals relating to the mandate. For example, the concept of social rehabilitation could be included in the mandate. He expected a constructive discussion guided by the Special Representative's suggestions.

7. The Special Representative reminded Col. Mugambage that all issues related to the mandate had to be forwarded to United Nations Headquarters in New York. It was for the Security Council to decide on UNAMIR's mandate. However, the Joint Commission could develop recommendations, which if initially agreed on,

were likely to find greater acceptance by the Security Council.

8. The socio-economic and developmental tasks mentioned by Col. Mugambage were issues which belonged in the sphere of United Nations Specialized Agencies and the United Nations Development Programme and were not related to a peace keeping mission.

9. Col. Mugambage reasserted the views he had expressed at the last meeting. Namely, that on June 9th, UNAMIR's mandate would end. Rwanda was a sovereign country and decisions taken elsewhere were unacceptable. UNAMIR I had mishandled the situation and had not prevented the genocide. It had further provided people with false expectations of security. The former SRSG had been biased. UNAMIR II was not providing any security in Rwanda, on the contrary it was creating a dangerous situation with a parallel system of security. Therefore, the military component of UNAMIR was superfluous and should phase out. A limited UNAMIR presence could be agreed to, but a substantial presence, even in any other role, was not acceptable.

10. The Special Representative replied that UNAMIR did not wish to perpetuate its presence in Rwanda. Yet, it was important for the Joint Commission to determine the specific roles that UNAMIR was to play as for example, the question of the training of the gendarmerie. Such issues needed to be spelt out in order to appraise United Nations Headquarters of the Government's thinking.

11. Col. Mugambage requested that UNAMIR should list the tasks that it

considered it should assume. The Government would do the same. At the next meeting ideas could be exchanged. He proposed the next meeting on Monday, 8th May.

#### **Bilateral Matters**

12. The Special Representative then brought to the meeting's attention a paper UNAMIR had prepared concerning problems which had arisen regarding implementation of the Status of Mission Agreement (copy attached). These points were not being presented as a complaint, but as a list to be discussed in order to avoid friction between UNAMIR and the Government. It was clear that many of these issues could be resolved.

13. Col. Mugambage thanked the Special Representative for bringing these matters to his attention, and promised to examine them in order to find solutions.

The meeting rose at 11:45 am.



Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG/UNAMIR



Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The **fourth** meeting of the Joint Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Monday, 8 May 1995 at 10 am at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence (Leader); Mr. Nyandwi Tharcisse, Counsellor, Prime Minister's Office; Mr. Telesphore Kagaba, Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Faustin Musare, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer to UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.

2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General for RWanda (Leader); Col. T. S. Sivakumar, Chief of Staff; Mr. Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative; Mr. Ike Minta, Legal Adviser.

3. The Special Representative summarised the discussions of last meetings by stating that Rwanda contentions were as follows:

(a) The mandate ends on June 9th. If no further mandate was agreed on the only issue was to finalise the withdrawal. A fresh mandate would need to

reflect the qualitative change in the ground situation.

(b) The UNAMIR force strength was excessive as it (i) derogated from Rwanda's sovereignty, (ii) acted as a parallel force in the country and (iii) was redundant.

4. Responding, the Special Representative had stated there was indeed a changed context and that UNAMIR did not wish to perpetuate or impose itself in Rwanda. UNAMIR had no political agenda in Rwanda. The objective in these consultations was to find common ground and if that were possible the Security Council would be able to decide on a new mandate with greater ease. If not, Rwanda was free to negotiate directly with the Security Council.

5. Col. Mugambage had raised a number of criticisms against UNAMIR. However, UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda had surely not been completely negative. Much of UNAMIR's contribution was intangible and could not be measured in dollars and cents. Some of the following elements were part of UNAMIR contribution to bringin stability and security to Rwanda:

(a) The peaceful, incident free take-over from Operation Turquoise when everyone expected another Goma like crisis;

(b) The normalisation achieved in towns and villages;

(c) The support for Rwanda at the Geneva Round Table;

(d) The successful cooperation in Operation Hope and Operation Retour;

(e) The Gersony report contradiction;

(f) The sense of confidence that UNAMIR's presence provided to returning refugees and IDPs.

6. The Special Representative added that even if common ground was found the current campaign of vilification against UNAMIR was causing serious concern in the United Nations. It was not the demonstrations that bothered the Special Representative, it was the officially approved harassment that UNAMIR was experiencing in its daily activities. For instance, UNAMIR diesel supplies had been confiscated, helicopters were being circumscribed, telecommunication links were being restricted and a general atmosphere of non-cooperation and harassment was preponderant. Over the past weekend three cars had been hijacked by people in uniform carrying AK-47 rifles. If this attitude continued it would be better to close down completely. A new mandate would require this "UNAMIR bashing" to stop and be reversed.

7. The Special Representative stated that apart from the general aura of confidence that UNAMIR created in Rwanda which helped in bringing about stability and normalisation in the country, the future mandate was expected to envisage the following tasks:

(a) UNAMIR was obliged to protect the International Tribunal and its staff, Human Rights Monitors, United Nations Agencies, their offices and personnel and UNAMIR personnel and property;

(b) UNAMIR was also obliged to contribute to the security of humanitarian convoys;

(c) If the Government of Rwanda requested, UNAMIR could undertake to monitor the borders with neighboring countries especially those borders where armed incursions had been detected. This could be achieved by deploying military observers;

(d) UNAMIR could provide assistance in establishing security corridors and

transit camps to returning refugees. This task was foreseen in the Trilateral Agreements signed by Rwanda at Bujumbura and at the Nairobi summit;

(e) demining;

(f) training of gendarmes and comunal police.

9. Finally the Special Representative referred to the supporting role UNAMIR could continue to play in the social and economic rehabilitation of the country as a follow-up to the UNDP Round Table.

10. Col. Mugambage, thanked the Special Representative for his summary. He wished to place on record that the Government of Rwanda appreciated the positive contribution that UNAMIR had made to the country. He also explained that it was the opinion of the Government that UNAMIR's formed contingents did not have a role to play, in fact , they were redundant.

11. Regarding acts of hostility against UNAMIR and more specifically armed robberies, Col. Mugambage denied that the RPA had any part in it. As regards negative propaganda, the context had to be looked at especially the role that the international community played during the genocide. It was a fact that UNAMIR provided a false sense of security to those attempting to escape the genocide.

12. Col. Mugambage then referred to UNAMIR's new mandate. He understood that it was up to the national security organs to provide protection to United Nations officials and agencies. However he also agreed that the United Nations also had a responsibility to provide security. Perhaps a limited

number of guards could accomplish that task. As to providing security for convoys by way of escorts it would depend on the numbers that would be required to perform that function. He also believed that it was the role of the Government to provide such type of security.

13. Col. Mugambage then referred to the border monitoring tasks outlined by the Special Representative. In his opinion such monitoring should be carried out where the trouble originated, such as in Zaire and Tanzania. It was a known fact that criminal activities were transpiring not in Rwandese soil, but in the Goma and Bukavu camps. These criminal activities had regional repercussions.

14. As to security corridors, it was his understanding that these corridors would be established in Zaire where refugees were not safe. One should avoid any mention of security which relates to Rwanda since there were no such problems in the country.

15. Regarding the training of gendarmes and comunal police, the Government of Rwanda saw this as a technical compliment to the Rwandese efforts in establishing its own programmes. It was the responsibility of the Rwandese to determine its own needs and in this context the design of the curriculum could be done jointly with the Government.

16. Col. Mugambage welcomed the offer by the Special Representative to provide support in the rehabilitation of Rwanda. He had understood that this work would be carried out primarily by the United Nations Agencies.




In conclusion, Col. Mugambage indicated that these were his preliminary views on the subjects the Special Representative had outlined, and that he would be consulting with his colleagues. It would be easier if by the next meeting certain working groups would be assigned to refine details of the proposal.


17. The Special Representative thanked Col. Mugambage for his preliminary remarks which would be conveyed to New York. He pointed out that while it was true that the United Nations agencies were the executing partners in the rehabilitation process of Rwanda, the Government of Rwanda had to optimize these resources and it was clear that Rwanda was still not ready to absorb such assistance. Where UNAMIR could help was in the intermediary phase which did not overlap with the Round Table but which facilitated the readiness to absorb the assistance.

18. He also wished to clarify that UNAMIR was constitutionally required to provide protection to operations such as the Tribunal and human rights. Secondly, the provision of security for humanitarian convoys would be the responsibility of the government, however, should the government feel that it was unable, UNAMIR should have the reserve personnel required to carry out that task. The Special Representative took note of the important political point raised by Col. Mugambage regarding the monitoring of militarisation in refugee camps.

19. The Special Representative further explained that security corridors were seen as a preventive measure against intimidation. The same applied for transit centres.

20. It was agreed that the next meeting would be held on Thursday, 11 May 1995 at 10 am.

  
Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG/UNAMIR

  
Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The fifth meeting of the Joint Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Thursday 11 May 1995 at 10 am at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Mr. Emanuel Gasana, Head of Delegation and Chef du Cabinet, President's Office; Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence; Mr. Faustin Musare, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of the Interior; Mr. Tharcisse Nyandwi, Counsellor, Prime Minister's Office; Telesphore Kagaba, Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.

2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda, Head of Delegation; Col. T. S. Sivakumar, Chief of Staff; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative; Mr. Ike Minta, Legal Adviser.

3. Mr. Gasana resumed the Chair and invited the Special Representative to

provide a summary of the discussions held in his absence. Ambassador Khan summarized the salient points of the previous meeting and added that there had been noticeable progress achieved in fine tuning the Rwandese Government's requirements after 9 June. He reiterated that the Joint Commission should attempt to find common ground.

4. The Special Representative added that two main points had been made by the Rwandese Government, one, that the size of UNAMIR's military contingent would have to be scaled down in view of the changed context in Rwanda, ~~two~~, that a military presence ran the risk of establishing a parallel military force within Rwanda. It had also been stated by the Representative of the Rwandese Government, that internal security was an issue of national sovereignty.

5. UNAMIR, on the other hand, had made it clear that it did not intend to continue without the approval of the Government. UNAMIR did not wish to perpetuate itself in Rwanda nor did UNAMIR have a political agenda. UNAMIR's presence was predicated on the mandate to assist the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese people.

6. The Special Representative also mentioned the continued criticism on UNAMIR. He indicated that friction points between the two sides could be solved through joint channels which had been established for that purpose.

7. Referring to the specific mandate, the Special Representative stated that constitutionally, UNAMIR was required to perform certain tasks such as the protection of the International Tribunal, human rights monitors, and other

United Nations personnel working in Rwanda. Secondly, there were tasks that were assigned in support of the Government such as protection of humanitarian relief convoys. Thirdly, within the framework of agreements reached by Rwanda with UNHCR and other regional governments, there was a provision of security in transit camps and corridors. Border monitoring had been mentioned as a potential task for UNAMIR, however, Col. Mugambage had pointed out that the monitoring should take place in the countries from where military incursions were originating. Finally, the Special Representative mentioned the tasks of demining and of civilian police training.

8. Col. Mugambage added that the principal elements to be examined by the Joint Commission were the details of the withdrawal of UNAMIR's troops and determining the size of the contingent that would remain. He restated his position that the Government of Rwanda could provide security to the Tribunal and United Nations personnel and that there was no need to monitor Rwanda's borders. In addition security corridors and transit camps were a matter to be considered in Zaire and Tanzania. Regarding demining, he had stated that the Government already had its own programmes and that assistance was required in supporting these programmes. Finally, Col. Mugambage recalled that the Special Representative had mentioned the issue of rehabilitation and how UNAMIR could facilitate the flow of assistance in support of Government's priorities.

9. Mr. Gasana then stated that he could assume that the Commission agreed to consider a new mandate for UNAMIR after June 9, and that it was evident that in view of prevailing circumstances and changes in the political situation of

Rwanda, UNAMIR's military component would be "drastically reduced". He then invited the Commission to consider establishing a working group to consider the following two main tasks:

(a) In close cooperation with national security forces, assist in the protection of the civilian components of the United Nations presence in Rwanda including United Nations International Tribunal personnel, Human Rights monitors and other international staff invited by the Rwandese Government;

(b) the Government of Rwanda would specify tasks which would be supported by United Nations in the social field where a reduced UNAMIR force could contribute to the rehabilitation of the country.

10. Mr. Gasana then indicated that the training of the Gendarmerie and Comunal Police, which was a task that UNAMIR had been undertaking, would not be included in a new UNAMIR's mandate since the Government would be undertaking training through bilateral arrangements. He further stated that regarding security corridors and border monitoring, it was not in the interest of the country to create the impression that an international force was needed to instill confidence among the refugees nor that a border monitoring force should be stationed within Rwanda. Rwanda was not the aggressor, therefore these tasks could be implemented where the problem originated, namely, Tanzania and Zaire.

11. Regarding demining activities, Mr. Gasana pointed out that the Government had already a programme in place and that it would only require advisory

services.


12. Mr. Gasana concluded by saying that a working group should meet the next day to examine (a) and (b) above, as well as demining activities, and make suitable proposals to be reviewed next Saturday, 13 May at 900 am by the Joint Commission.

13. The Special Representative agreed.

The meeting rose at 11:10 am.



Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG/UNAMIR



Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The **sixth** meeting of the Joint Commission was held on Saturday 13 May 1995 at 9 am at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Mr. Emanuel Gasana, Head of the Delegation and Cabinet Director, President's Office; Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.
2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda, Head of Delegation; Col. T. S. Sivakumar, Chief of Staff; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative.
3. Mr. Gasana invited Col. Sivakumar to introduce the report of the working group which had been scheduled to meet the day before. Col. Sivakumar explained that the meeting had not been able to begin its work due to the procedural difficulties involving the substantive discussion on the numbers of a future UNAMIR force.
4. Col. Mugambage added that the working group should have been able to



determine the number of forces needed on the basis of the new requirements.

5. The Special Representative indicated that he appreciated the difficulties confronted by the working group. United Nations Headquarters had stated their need to have a general guideline on the mandate before discussing figures. Once these guidelines were agreed, the working group discussions could begin. The working group work was relevant because it provided a framework for the future mandate.

6. The Special Representative also stated that he was not able to provide a figure when the Security Council had not even begun their own informal consultations on the subject. Since any continuation of UNAMIR would be under a Chapter VI mandate, it could be easier for the Government to state what the real needs were. The solution laid in finding a common ground.


7. In this regard, the Special Representative drew the attention of the Joint Commission to the present UNAMIR mandate and proceeded to read out a consolidated summary of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. He indicated that the summary could be considered a non-paper (copy attached) .


8. Mr. Gasana welcomed the Special Representative's initiative and requested the distribution of the non-paper. He added that the Joint Commission should be able to make substantive proposals, and these could only be elaborated through the mutual exchange of views and information. He indicated that at the next meeting of the Joint Commission he would be able to provide the Government's views in the same manner, as a non-paper, and that this could serve as a starting point for further discussion.

9. In addition, Mr. Gasana suggested that the definition of the military component of UNAMIR could also be presented, once discussions had been completed, as a non-paper.

10. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Joint Commision would be held on Monday, 15 May 1995 at 17 hours.

The meeting rose at 11 am.

  
Iseñ Rivero, SA/SRSG/UNAMIR

  
Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The **seventh** meeting of the Joint Commission was held on Tuesday 16 May 1995 at 8:30 am at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Mr. Emanuel Gasana, Head of the Delegation and Cabinet Director, President's Office; Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence; Mr. Telesphore Kagaba, Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.
2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda, Head of Delegation; Mr. Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative.

### MANDATE

3. Mr. Gasana referred to the previous meeting of the Joint Commission and introduced a non-paper prepared by the Rwandese Government . (copy attached).
4. The Special Representative stated that the non-paper would be given

Careful consideration and a detailed response given at the next meeting. It would, of course, be conveyed to United Nations Headquarters, New York. The Special Representative added that since Mr. Gasana was expected to brief the Cabinet later in the morning, he would give his immediate reaction to the broad issues raised in the non-paper, as follows:

- (a) there was agreement that since the previous mandate there was a changed situation in Rwanda which should be reflected in the mandate;
- (b) the mandate would be under Chapter 6, which meant that the mandate would require acceptance of the Rwandese Government;
- (c) there was agreement that there would be a reduction of UNAMIR military forces. The Rwandese side had called for a drastic reduction while the Special Representative used the term substantial.

5. The Special Representative added that the new mandate should reflect a partnership between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Government, with the view of promoting stability, harmony and reconciliation.

6. Responding, the Chairman stated that with regard to refugees returning to transit camps, the Government considered that an international military presence would not be necessary and that it was for the Rwandese Government to ensure such security. In addition the six month extension should be perceived as a winding down of UNAMIR's operation. In regard to the Government's attitude towards UNAMIR, he affirmed that the best way to avoid negative incidents in the future, was to agree on a mandate with which the Rwandese Government felt comfortable.

7. Mr. Gasana proposed that a restricted Joint Commission meet in closed

session might be held to refine certain areas of the mandate before holding the full meeting. The Special Representative agreed and suggested that the closed meeting could take place just before the formal meeting since he believed the work of the Joint Commission should conclude at the end of the present week.


8. Col. Mugambage agreed that it was not necessary to have the working group meet since the same could be accomplished as the Chairperson had proposed.


#### BILATERAL MATTERS

9. The Special Representative asked the Chairperson to transmit to the President UNAMIR's request for space to erect a prefabricated building facility in order to accommodate its personnel. He also provided copies of a recent compendium on UNAMIR Forces Humanitarian Activities for Rwanda which might be of interest to the Government.

10. Col. Mugambage referred to the unresolved situation of the Amahoro Stadium which UNAMIR was to repair. He explained that great damage had been done by UNAMIR troops while they had occupied the facility.

11. It was decided that the next meeting would be held on Thursday 18 May, at 10 am for the closed working session and at 10:30 for the Joint Commission.

  
Isef Rivero, SA/SRSG/UNAMIR

  
Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## **MINUTES**

### **MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE**

1. The eighth meeting of the Joint Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Thursday, 18 May 1995 at 10:00 at the Rwandese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Mr. Emanuel Gasana, Head of the Delegation, Cabinet Director, President's Office; Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence; Mr. Faustin Musare, Cabinet Director, Ministry of the Interior; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Chief of Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Multilateral Cooperation; Mr. Telesphore Kagaba, Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Tharcisse Nyandwi, Prime Minister's Counsellor; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.

2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Mr. Shaharyar Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Rwanda; Major General Guy Tousignant, Force Commander; Mr. Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative.

3. As agreed by the Joint Commission at the previous meeting, a closed session was held prior to the regular meeting. The closed session was attended by the Heads of both Delegations as well as by Col. Mugambage and Major General Tousignant.

4. Mr. Gasana opened the regular meeting by thanking the Special Representative for the spirit of cooperation and frankness that had permeated the closed session. He then read out the five points on which final agreement had been reached concerning the future UNAMIR mandate (copy attached).

5. Mr. Gasana then indicated that the Rwandese Government representatives had submitted the figures on the number of troops which the Government considered commensurate with the mandate agreed to. He expected that after consultations with the Secretary General, the Special Representative would inform the Joint Commission of the results. Mr. Gasana indicated that the Joint Commission had now concluded its work but that lines of communication would remain open should any of the parties consider that another meeting was necessary.

6. The Special Representative expressed his full satisfaction with the manner in which the Joint Commission's work had proceeded in the spirit of openness and collaboration, as the Commission had sought to reach a common ground in order to facilitate the work of the Security Council. He referred to his previous statements that all along he had agreed that the changed circumstances prevailing in Rwanda should be reflected in UNAMIR's mandate. He had also pointed out that any future presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda would

have to be under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.


7. The Special Representative indicated that he would be conveying the agreement reached to United Nations Headquarters. Ambassador Khan also indicated his appreciation for having received from the Government the figures on the number of troops; these would be studied and given careful consideration bearing in mind that a substantial reduction was warranted.

8. The Special Representative also took note of the Government's expressed views regarding the length of the future mandate which would end after six months. The future mandate ought to be seen as a United Nations effort to support the people of Rwanda and its Government, in partnership, to find solutions to the many problems facing the country and its citizens. He agreed that though the Joint Commission had finished its work, the lines of communication would remain open.

The meeting rose at 12:30.



Isel Rivero, SA/SRS6/UNAMIR



Faustin Musare CC/MI/RW



## UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - RWANDA

## NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

KIGALI RWANDA

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PAGE 1 OF 2

OUTGOING

FAX NO : 4448

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MISC NO : 2120

 TO: MR DIMETRIOS, Y.  
 S.A.O, ADMINISTRATION  
 UNAMIR, NAIROBI.

 FROM: CHAIM OUZIEL  
 C.A.O  
 UNAMIR, KIGALI.

 ATTN : MR D. DRIGGERS  
 DEPUTY CHIEF  
 AIR OPS/MOVCON

DATE: 27 JUNE 1995

FAX No : 254-2 622755/2668

 INFO :  
 FAX No :

 FAX No : 212-963-3090  
 PHONE: 212-963-3582

 DRAFTER : ROBERT MCCOY  
 MOVCON  
 UNAMIR, KIGALI  
 FBC : 06-00261

 INTERNAL DIST : FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR  
 NILSVANG, K. - CCPO

REFERENCE: RESERVATIONS FROM NBO TO KGLI

PLEASE KINDLY MAKE THE FOLLOWING RESERVATIONS:

NAME	ID NO	ORG.	NAT.	DATE
FABIAN, KAISER	447	UNAMIR	PERU	29.06.95
ELENA, BATIOUK	049	UNAMIR	UKRAINIAN	29.06.95
SISSAY, T.	172	UNAMIR	ETHIOP	29.06.95
LAHRACH, A	39529	HCDH	MORROCAN	30.06.95
ASSIATOU, D	067	UNAMIR	GUINEA	30.06.95
AMBORE, M	M8915	NIBATT	NGR	01.07.95
NATALIYA, OSMATCHIKINA		UNAMIR	RUSSIAN	01.07.95
DOGBEGAN, E	014	UNAMIR	GHANA	01.07.95
BOWERS, WADE	234	UNAMIR	US	01.08.95
BOWERS, CARMEN		UNAMIR	MOZAMB	01.08.95
PARKES, E	215	UNAMIR	JAMAICAN	03.07.95
ERNST, MATTIAS	0070971	UNHCR	CH	03.07.95

LOUTFI, B.	38321
FALETTI, CORINE	39713
OKALI'S	
STANISLAS E	116
ERLANDSSON L	403
MINTA, IKE	127
DIALLO, I	362
BRIERE, G	104
HABLUTZEL, W	6657928
LCPL JENKINS	M8849
CAPT HANCKEL	M8473
SGT BOHUN	M8847
PTE HOOPER	M9010
PTE KENNEDY	M8053
LAC MACDONALD	M8856
CPL WHYTE	M8868
CPL RUSSEL	M8886
MAJ FELIX, CARDOZO	
GORCIO, SERGIO	10641
WOI CASTLE	M8266
LTCOL DUNN	M7888
JULIO, RAMIREZ	M7657
MCPL CHOUWARD	M7578
NP SINGH	M6124
M. PARVEZ	M6526

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AUST	20.07.95
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INDIAN	24.07.95

THANK YOU AND BEST REGARDS.

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## UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

## The Joint Military Commission (JMC) And its Working Groups

## 1. General

2. The JMC will deal with all matters enumerated in Annex A. The UNAMIR Force Commander or his deputy will act as the chairman. He shall be assisted by the Chief of Plans Section who shall provide the appropriate secretarial and administrative requirements for the meetings. Its membership shall comprise two Officers of the Army, two Officers of the Gendarmerie and four Officers of the RPF until the installation of the Army High Command Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie. In accordance with the importance of the subject, UNAMIR will propose the level of representation, in consultation with both parties. After the installation of BBTG, the AHCC and the CCNG will review the representation of the of the JMC with UNAMIR.

3. The JMC will normally meet in NGONDORE, unless otherwise agreed upon by all parties, in consultation with UNAMIR, upon a written invitation of the initiating party. The invitation will include the agenda and all possible documents relating to the subject of the meeting. All parties and UNAMIR must inform the Planning Section of meetings about 48 hours in advance.

#### 4. The Working Groups

a. The Working Group on Programs (WGP).

This WGP as created in accordance with Art. 79 of the military Protocol of Reference A, shall deal with matters under the jurisdiction of the Joint Drafting Committee, as stated in Art. 48. It shall deal with disciplinary regulations and with syllabi.

b. The Working Group on Training (WGT).

This WGT will deal with training separately from the points being considered by the Joint Commission in order to avoid any confusion.

c. The Working Group on Operations (WGO)

The Working Group on Operations mainly deals with the tasks listed in Article 54 of Arusha Peace Agreement, and specified in Paragraph 3 of Annex A.

d. The Working Group on Administration and Logistics (WGAL).

This working group deals with the tasks listed in Paragraph 4 of Annex A.

## 5. Other matters

Without prejudice to the Peace Agreement, the ACHC and the CCNG may attend to any other matter mentioned here as need arises. The ACHC and CCNG will specifically handle the matters specified in Paragraph 5 of Annex A. All other subject matters that fall within the mandate of the JMC can be raised to that body in accordance with directives stated in paragraph 4.

## 6. Responsibilities

a. JMC.




The JMC is liable to the articles of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the limitations of the UN Resolution 872(1993) of the Security Council. The JMC will supervise the smooth functioning of the working-groups both in content and in working atmosphere.

b. WGP, WGT, WGO, WGAL.

UNAMIR HQ Chief of the Planning Section chairs these working groups.

7. Administration.

The organization of the meeting site, NGONDORE is a permanent responsibility of UNAMIR FORCE HQ. The NGONDORE SOPs provide all details on administration and logistics of the meetings.

  
BIZIMANA Augustin  
Minister of Defence  
of the Republic of Rwanda  
KAGAME Paul  
Major General  
Chairman  
RPA High Command  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Brigadier General  
UNAMIR Force Commander

Annex A: Tasks of the Working Groups of the Joint Military  
Commission

Annex B: Diagram

Annex A

Tasks of the Working Groups of the Joint Military Commission

1. Tasks of the Working Group on Programs (WGP)
  - a. Disciplinary Regulations
  - b. Military regulations for the National Army and the National Gendarmerie
  - c. Statutes
  - d. Political and Civic Education
  - e. Tactics
  - f. Weapons
  - g. Drill
  - h. Keeping of Law and Order and Enforcement
  - i. General Principles of Gendarmerie Services
  - j. Traffic regulations
2. Tasks of the Working Group on Training(WGT)
  - a. Training in Assembly points
  - b. Training of Rwandese Instructors for the Integrated Training Center
  - c. Training in the Integrated Training Centers
  - d. Training of Rwandese Instructors for the National Gendarmerie
  - e. Training in the National Gendarmerie Training Center
  - f. Training of the Engineer Battalion.
3. Tasks for the Working Group on Operations(WGO)
  - a. Demarcation of new DMZ
  - b. Identification and assessment of assembly points, Cantonment Points and Training Centers
  - c. Transformation of Army and Gendarmerie camps into Assembly points.
  - d. Disengagement process
  - e. Movement of troops and equipment to their respective Assembly
  - f. Movement of troops to the integrated training centers.
  - g. Mine clearance operations
  - h. Tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country
  - i. Recovery of weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by civilians
  - j. Establishment of the training centers for the National Army and National Gendarmerie
4. Tasks of the Working Group on Logistics(WGL)
  - a. Logistic support for the RPF Kigali Battalion
  - b. Harmonization of uniforms, insignia, salaries and allowances
  - c. Logistic support for Assembly points, Cantonment


points and Training Centers for the National Army and National Gendarmerie.

- d. The study of the distribution of positions according to the organizations contained in the Peace Agreement and for the new structures to be proposed by the ACHC and CCNG.

5. Tasks for the ACHC and CCNG

- a. The deployment of the National Army and National Gendarmerie units
- b. The movement of army and gendarmerie personnel from Training Centers to their respective camps
- c. The disengagement of the RPF Kigali Battalion

Annex B





FC has copies of unsigned version of PA.

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## ROUTING - REQUEST

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and

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To Force Commander

Signed Minutes of the

Joint Presidential

Commission on

UNAMIR's Mandate

Date 27/6/95

From J. Rivera

MIN  
MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDE

1. The first meeting of the Presidential Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Tuesday, 25 April 1995 at twelve noon at the Rwandese Foreign Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Mr. Emanuel Gasana, Head of Delegation and Director of Cabinet, President's Office; Mr. Faustin Musare, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Chief of Division, Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Telesphore Kagabga, Information, Documentation and Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Tharcisse Nyandwi, Prime Minister's Adviser; Mr. Jean Damascene Ntakirutimana, Director of Cabinet, Prime Minister's Office; Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy to National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence.

2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Mr. Shaharyar Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Rwanda; Major General Guy Tousignant, Force Commander; Mr. Hedi Annabi, Director, Africa Division, Department of Peace Keeping Operations, United Nations; Mr.

Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director, Office of the Special Representative;  
Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative; Mr. I.  
Minta, Legal Adviser of the Special Representative.

3. After an exchange of greetings both sides expressed their desire to address the issue of a new mandate for UNAMIR in a spirit of cooperation and friendship. Ambassador Khan and Mr. Annabi underlined the importance of completing the consultations before mid May. They also requested the Rwandese side to state their views on the new mandate underlining the fact that UNAMIR was in Rwanda at the request of the sovereign government.

4. Mr. Gasana expressed the hope that discussions on the future role of UNAMIR would not be conditioned on what the Security Council considered palatable; rather the government and people of Rwanda would seek to enlist the assistance of the Security Council to redefine UNAMIR's role after June 9th. Mr. Gasana suggested that in view of the timetable the meetings should be more intensive. He also proposed that technical sub-groups could meet separately to speed up the negotiating process.

5. Ambassador Khan suggested that apart from the mandate the two sides could also discuss issues between UNAMIR and the Government that quantitatively were leading to unnecessary friction and that could be resolved expeditiously. Mr. Gasana agreed to this suggestion.

The Mandate

6. The following points were agreed on:

(a) the Joint Commission agreed to meet three times a week, at 10 a.m. on Mondays, Thursdays and Saturdays, and took note that the recommendations pertaining to the new mandate for UNAMIR would have to be ready by the middle of May bearing in mind the United Nations time table for the submission of reports to the Security Council. They also agreed to technical sub-group meetings when necessary.

(b) Mr. Gasana indicated that he would convey the Rwandese Government's position at the next meeting of the Commission.


#### Bilateral Issues

7. Ambassador Khan stated that the most important problem that was vitiating relations between the two sides was the implementation of the Status of Mission Agreement by the Government. Other problems such as accommodation, alleged payment of property rental to criminal elements, communications and negative propaganda by local media were raised in outline by Ambassador Khan.

8. Mr. Gasana, stated that the Government recognized the SOMA. He wished to indicate, however, that sometimes the Government did not have the capacity to implement in detail the privileges and immunities of over five thousand UNAMIR officials. Contraventions to the SOMA should not therefore be seen as deliberate.

9. He indicated that the problem of accommodation was well known and that the Government would seek a solution once the future number of UNAMIR forces and its mandate were known. Regarding payment of property rental, a law was being discussed by the Cabinet which would provide the legal framework to UNAMIR and other agencies to effect payments. Finally in response to the negative propaganda directed to UNAMIR by some local media sources, Mr. Gasana remarked that the root causes had to be investigated especially its social dimensions. On the communications issue he said that he would be consulting his colleagues and would revert to the issue at a later meeting.

The meeting rose at 13:30.

  
Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG, UNAMIR

  
Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW

## MINUTES

### MEETING OF THE JOINT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. The **second** meeting of the Joint Commission to review UNAMIR's mandate was held on Tuesday, 2 May 1995 at 10 am at the Rwandese Foreign Ministry. Representing the Rwandese Government were Col. Frank Mugambage, Deputy of the National Assembly, Army Spokesman, Ministry of Defence (Leader); Mr. Jean Damascene Ntakirutimana, Director of Cabinet, Prime Minister's Office; Mr. Faustin Musare, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of the Interior; Mr. Tharcisse Nyandwi, Services of Prime Minister; Mr. Sam Nkusi, Director General of RWANDATEL; Mr. Felix Bagambiki, Chef de Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, Liaison Officer to UNAMIR, Ministry of Defence and Mr. Telesphore Kagaba, Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. UNAMIR was represented by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Rwanda (Leader); Col. T. S. Sivakumar, Chief of Staff; Mr. Samuel Buo, Acting Executive Director; Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the Special Representative; Mr. Ike Minta, Legal Adviser.

3. Col. Mugambage stated that he would be leading the Rwandese Delegation in the absence of Mr. Gasana, who was out of the country for a week. He also indicated that he had invited Mr. Sam Nkusi Director General of RWANDATEL to explain problems related to communications issues. Following Mr. Nkusi's presentation, Col. Mugambage indicated that he would introduce the government's views on UNAMIR's mandate.

#### **Communications and Telecommunications**

4. Mr. Nkusi stated that after the war ended, the Government had developed regulations and guidelines governing the use of communications and telecommunications equipment in Rwanda. These were now approved and it was expected that international and national organizations operating in Rwanda should comply with them. The Government did not intend to restrict the use of equipment or of frequencies but wanted to organize them in a proper framework. This was in keeping with international practice.

5. UNAMIR alone was using over 100 frequencies. Agencies and NGOs also had their own frequencies. Last week the Government had completed its survey and called a meeting of all frequency users in order to explain the Government's position. Unfortunately when this subject was brought up, it was taken as "UNAMIR bashing". A similar situation arose when the Government asked UNAMIR to vacate certain areas or to allow access by the Government officials to inspect sites where UNAMIR had installations.

6. On a positive note, he wished to inform the meeting that the Government

had released the communications equipment which had been held up at the airport. The delay in the release had been due to the fact that the Government had not completed its survey.

7. Mr. Nkusi added that in its VHF and national communications, UNAMIR intended to introduce a system which by-passed Rwanda's national facilities. It was also five times more expensive. He asked if this policy was justified. The assistance mission could use some money to rehabilitate the national telecommunications system which could serve it efficiently.

8. The Special Representative took note of Mr. Nkusi's observations and made the following comments:

(a) UNAMIR understood Rwanda's efforts to bring order in a chaotic situation after the war. It was Rwanda's sovereign right to regulate the frequencies in accordance with its priorities. UNAMIR would conform to these general principles.

(b) However, in the absence of any regulations, UNAMIR had been working on frequencies that it was now required to change. While UNAMIR would make the necessary technical adjustment, the Special Representative expressed the hope that Rwandatel would help UNAMIR in making minimum changes to avoid dislocation and sufficient time to make the adjustments.

(c) UNAMIR had certain rights under the Status of Mission Agreement which needed to be respected. For instance, access to its telecommunications sites would not be denied but prior notice was required to be given. The remaining

issues raised by Mr. Nkusi would be discussed further and it was agreed that a technical subcommittee on communications should be appointed to resolve the issues.

9. As regards difficulties with United Nations Agencies, the Special Representative stated that he would advise to cooperate with Rwandatel.

#### **Mandate**

11. Col. Mugambage stated that on June 9th, UNAMIR's mandate would be completed. The Rwandese Government considered that in view of the changed context from the time the mandate was initially conceived, the Joint Commission should address itself to two issues:

- (a) The practical steps to facilitate the withdrawal of UNAMIR
- (b) The identification of elements of the mission which would require extension.

12. Elaborating, Col. Mugambage stated that in the political context of Rwanda today, UNAMIR's role was irrelevant. UNAMIR I had been deployed to supervise the implementation of the Arusha Accords which were, at best, dormant. UNAMIR II was mandated to provide security but this role was solely the responsibility of the Rwandese Government. Today the Rwandese Government has control over its territory, an administrative structure and its own security organs. These institutions could take over the responsibilities that UNAMIR II was tasked to implement. He added that it was impossible to



justify the need for a large UNAMIR force carrying out duties parallel with national security forces. The continuation of the presence of these forces would cause conflict, and while the country is facing an arms embargo a large UNAMIR force would compromise national sovereignty.

13. Secondly, the size of UNAMIR's military component provided false confidence to those who resisted the mainstream of change. Kibeho was a blatant example of how people had collected arms and were intent on perpetuating the elements of Operation Turquoise.

14. A large UNAMIR contingent also created socio-economic problems. For instance, all UNAMIR personnel claimed diplomatic immunity, occupied prime housing and competed with the population for facilities. This created friction.

15. Col. Mugambage referred to the assistance element of UNAMIR's mission. He asked how precisely UNAMIR assisted Rwanda. According to his information UNAMIR was spending US\$1.2 million per day. Did Rwanda gain anything from this expenditure? It was true that UNAMIR had repaired one or two bridges and performed some demining but considering the totality of United Nations expenditure, there was scarcely any tangible results to show. Col. Mugambage concluded that at the next meeting he would give the Government's views in a written paper.

16. The Special Representative thanked Col. Mugambage for his remarks and welcomed the fact that the discussion on the mandate had started. His

comments would be conveyed to New York for a response. The Special Representative looked forward to Rwanda's written paper.

17. The Special Representative stated that he wished to clarify a matter that had been raised by the President and Vice President with the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, Mr. Aldo Ajello during his recent visit. The Permanent Representative of Rwanda at the United Nations, New York, had reported a purported conversation with officials at New York Headquarters in which it had been stated that the United Nations would impose UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda regardless of the government's wishes. The Special Representative wished to place on record that this information was incorrect. As stated by Messrs. Ajello and Annabi, UNAMIR was in Rwanda under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which meant that UNAMIR was present at the request of the Government. This also meant that the United Nations would respect the views of the government bearing in mind Security Council considerations. There was no desire to impose any formula on the Rwandese Government.

18. A second point which the Special Representative wished to make was that the United Nations had no political agenda in Rwanda. UNAMIR was present only to assist the Government and people of Rwanda.

19. Commenting on the assistance provided by UNAMIR to Rwanda, the Special Representative stated that the evaluation of UNAMIR's contribution to the country could not be measured in tangible terms of dollars and cents. The provision of security or the creation of conditions leading up to a stability and reconciliation were not quantifiable in terms of money. The Special


Representative also remarked that while it was true that sometimes the large presence of international personnel might lead to social and economic friction, it was also true that benefits accrued from their presence.

#### Bilateral Matters

20. The Special Representative then referred to the arrest of Rwandese nationals who work for United Nations agencies. He provided a list to Col. Mugambage with the suggestion that these 17 cases be looked into on the basis of priority. He also requested that in the future, the United Nations agencies be given prior notice before arrest of local employees.

21. Col. Mugambage indicated that the Special Representative's request would be examined carefully bearing in mind the normal screening process of the Judiciary.

The meeting rose at 11:45.

  
Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG, UNAMIR

  
Faustin Musare, CC/MI/RW