

TANZANIA

9 SEPT 1994 - 7 FEB 1995

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG APR 2009

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1063

BOX 17

FILE 3

ACC. 1998/0278

2020

W.R.U.

Nahen

A 06FEB95 1537z

AF40-0602-0284 010.HC

HCR/rwa/0256

Please onpass to BUKAVU and GOMA

from Augustine Mahiga, Coordinator, SURB

Please find hereafter Second Revision of Tentative Itinerary for the High Commissioner's mission to Great Lakes Region from 9 to 19 February 1995.

Thursday 9 February 1995:

GENEVA - KINSHASA

12.15 - 21.05 (Swissair):

Night in KINSHASA.

Friday 10 February 1995:

morning:

Meeting with Zairean Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Meeting with Diplomatic Representatives in KINSHASA.

afternoon:

Meeting with the Cabinet members.

Night in KINSHASA.

Saturday 11 February 1995:

morning:

Visit to the President in GRADOLITE (by Gov. plane).

noon:

Proceed to GOMA Airport (change aircrafts).

GOMA to BUKAVU (by UNHCR plane).

Formal dinner with Governor of BUKAVU.

Night in BUKAVU.

Sunday 12 February 1995:

morning:

Visit refugee camps in BUKAVU.

afternoon:

Proceed to GOMA.

Visit MUGUNGA Camp in GOMA.

Meeting with heads of agencies

Night in GOMA.

Monday 13 February 1995:

8.00 : Proceed to KIGALI

9.00 : Field visit to returnees (by helicopter)

11.30 : Meeting with SRSG Mr. S. KHAN,

12.00 : Lunch with SRSG, Force Commander, heads of agencies,

14.00 : Meeting with President/Vice-President,

17.00 : Proceed to KAMPALA

19.00 : Arrive in KAMPALA,

Private dinner,

Night in KAMPALA.

Tuesday 14 February 1995:

morning:

Meeting with Gov. of UGANDA,

12.00 : Reception with Gov. officials, diplomatic

representatives, heads of agencies,

16.00 : Proceed to BUJUMBURA,

Night in BUJUMBURA.

Wednesday 15 February 1995:

09.00 : OAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Thursday 16 February 1995:

09.00 : OAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Friday 17 February:

09.00 : OAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Saturday 18 February 1995:

Field visit in Burundi/OAU Summit Meeting (?)

Sunday 19 February:

morning:

Proceed to NAIROBI.

NAIROBI - GENEVA (via ZURICH)

12.15 - 20.15 (Swissair)

Accompanying Officers: Francois Fouinat, Chef de Cabinet,

Kamel Morjane, Director RBA.

Logistical arrangements:

KINSHASA/NAIROBI: Arrange flights from KINSHASA to GRADOLITE, and

from GRADOLITE to GOMA.

NAIROBI: flight arrangements for: GOMA to BUKAVU, BUKAVU to

GOMA, GOMA to KIGALI, KIGALI to KAMPALA, KAMPALA to BUJUMBURA,

BUJUMBURA to NAIROBI.

All B.O.s and F.O.s:

Prepare briefing notes to be sent to Geneva by 5 February.

Arrange VIP receptions and accommodation for HC and make

necessary appointments.

Media: Journalists can have coverage from Bukavu to Bujumbura.

Logistics/accommodation for journalists should be arranged

separately.

As of 6 February 1995, 16.00.

(UNHCR GENEVA)

NNNN

HCRWAKI:####Msg saved: IN-FEB06.005 2707:bytes###

11-13 FEB -
+ Shan Team to B
Anda will all. 30
visiting And. from
for man use to NOH
the 8

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

DATE: 7 February 1995

TO: Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG, UNAMIR, Rwanda
c/o Karachi, Islamabad

FAX: 9221 587-4701

FROM: Abdul Hamid Kabia
UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda

We have just obtained a copy of Mrs. Ogata's itinerary which we are transmitting to you for your immediate information.

However, the Security Council decided yesterday to send a seven person fact finding mission to Bujumbura from the 10th of February. This mission is scheduled to arrive in Kigali on the evening of 11th February and to depart also on the evening of the 13th.

You may wish to review Goulding's proposal to accompany Mrs. Ogata within the context of the Security Council's decision to send a mission to Kigali whose terms of reference include holding consultations with you.

Ms. Isel Rivero will accompany the Force Commander to Nairobi on 9 February to receive and brief you.

Best personal wishes.




UNAMIR - MINUAR

95 FEB -12 12 00

TO: Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG, UNAMIR, Rwanda
c/o Karachi, Islamabad

FAX NO: 9251 587 4701
9221 587 4701

FROM: 
Abdul Hamid Kabia
UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda

DATE: 4 February 1995

Since my return to Kigali, I have tried several times to reach you but unable to get through over the phone.

Mr. Goulding addressed a fax to you informing that Mrs. Sadako Ogata plans to visit the region of the Great Lakes to express her gratitude for the assistance Zaire, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have given to the UNHCR over the past months. While in Kinshasa, Mrs. Ogata will formally sign the Agreement reached with the Government on arrangements to improve security in the refugee camps.

Mrs. Ogata will visit Kinshasa, Bukavu, Goma, Kigali, Kampala and Bujumbura from 9 to 14 February 1995. The Secretary-General wishes you, as his Special Representative for Rwanda, to accompany her to these places. Mr. Goulding also confirms that he will let us know the exact date of Mrs. Ogata's arrival in Kinshasa so that you can join her there.

The Bujumbura meeting is scheduled to take place from the 14 to the 18 February. Ambassador Kouyate will represent the Secretary-General at the meeting. He expects to visit Kigali from 12 to 14 on his way to Bujumbura.

We hope you managed to have some rest and spend uninterrupted time with your family. We are all doing fine but look forward to your return.

Best wishes.

Karachi

6 / Feb / 1995

For: Dr Ali Kabir

from Shauqyar Khan SRSG

Many thanks for your message. I am planning to proceed to Nairobi by PIA on Thursday 7 Feb. I can join up with Hame Ogata in Kinshasa or any other capital we would be visiting. I would need to be taken there by UN plane as commercial connection would be difficult. Grateful if the following actions could be taken.

i) Joel Pivoro should meet me (with copies of essential documents, especially reports to Security Council) in Nairobi on 7/feb. She should also brief me on developments in Rwanda.

ii) Once I am with Hame Ogata, I would travel in my plane. Arrangements may be made for a place for me in the plane. I would also need visas on arrival.

iii) Please let me know Hame Ogata's schedule. It may be easier to join up with her from Geneva in which case, the Nairobi briefing would not be necessary.

iv) I am contactable at the following numbers in Karachi (Pakistan time which has 3 hour difference to Rwanda).

11am to 4pm : 9221 : 587 : 4797

5pm to 9pm : 9221 : 450 : 3838

Very glad all of you are well. I have recovered after a brief bout of gastro-enteritis. Look forward to seeing you soon. Every good wish.

ZCZC

A 06FEB95 1557z

AF40-0602-0284 010.HC

HCR/rwa/0256

Please onpass to BUKAVU and GOMA

from Augustine Mahiga, Coordinator, SURB

Please find hereafter Second Revision of Tentative Itinerary for the High Commissioner's mission to Great Lakes Region from 9 to 19 February 1995.

Thursday 9 February 1995:

GENEVA - KINSHASA

12.15 - 21.05 (Swissair):

Night in KINSHASA.

Friday 10 February 1995:

Morning:

Meeting with Zairean Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Meeting with Diplomatic Representatives in KINSHASA.

Afternoon:

Meeting with the Cabinet members.

Night in KINSHASA.

Saturday 11 February 1995:

Morning:

Visit to the President in GBADOLITE (by Gov. plane).

Noon:

Proceed to GOMA Airport (change aircrafts).

GOMA to BUKAVU (by UNHCR plane).

Formal dinner with Governor of BUKAVU.

Night in BUKAVU.

Sunday 12 February 1995:

Morning:

Visit refugee camps in BUKAVU.

Afternoon:

Proceed to GOMA.

Visit MUGUNGA Camp in GOMA.

Meeting with heads of agencies

Night in GOMA.

Monday 13 February 1995:

8.00 : Proceed to KIGALI

9.00 : Field visit to returnees (by helicopter)

11.30 : Meeting with SRSB Mr. S. KHAN,

12.00 : Lunch with SRSB, Force Commander, heads of agencies,

14.00 : Meeting with President/Vice-President,

17.00 : Proceed to KAMPALA

19.00 : Arrive in KAMPALA,

Private dinner.

Night in KAMPALA.

Tuesday 14 February 1995:

Morning:

Meeting with Gov. of UGANDA,

12.00 : Reception with Gov. officials, diplomatic

representatives, heads of agencies,

16.00 : Proceed to BUJUMBURA,

Night in BUJUMBURA.

Wednesday 15 February 1995:

DAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Thursday 16 February 1995:

DAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Friday 17 February:

DAU/UNHCR Conference on Rwanda and Burundi.

Saturday 18 February 1995:

Field visit in Burundi/DAU Summit Meeting (?)

Sunday 19 February:

Morning:

Proceed to NAIROBI.

NAIROBI - GENEVA (via ZURICH)

12.15 - 20.15 (Swissair)

Accompanying Officers: Francois Fouinat, Chef de Cabinet,

Kamel Morjane, Director RBA.

Logistical arrangements:

KINSHASA/NAIROBI: Arrange flights from KINSHASA to GBADOLITE, and

from GBADOLITE to GOMA.

NAIROBI: flight arrangements for : GOMA to BUKAVU, BUKAVU to

GOMA, GOMA to KIGALI, KIGALI to KAMPALA, KAMPALA to BUJUMBURA,

BUJUMBURA to NAIROBI.

All B.O.s and F.O.s:

Prepare briefing notes to be sent to Geneva by 15 February.

Arrange VIP receptions and accommodation for HC and make

necessary appointments.

Media: Journalists can have coverage from Bukavu to Bujumbura.

Logistics/accommodation for journalists should be arranged

separately.

As of 6 February 1995, 16.00.

(UNHCR GENEVA)

NNNN

HCRWAKI:####Msg saved: 1N-FEB06.005 2707:bytes###

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

ED

Cmde

R

DATE: 7 February 1995

TO: Ms. Isel Rivero UNAMIR Kigali, Rwanda	FROM: Florence Barrillon-Pomés Senior Political Affairs Officer Africa Division II, DPA Room S-3341F FDP
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212) 963-4037
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 3	

1. In response to your message of this morning, I should like to confirm that the Secretary-General has indeed informed Mrs. Ogata that he had asked Amb. Khan to accompany her during her tour of the Great Lakes region from 9 to 14 February. He did so in a telephone conversation. Mrs. Ogata had agreed to that arrangement. Mr. Jessen-Petersen, here in New York, is quite au courant!

2. I informed this morning the members of the Mission that you will assist them in their meetings in Kigali and that you will help them draft their report on Rwanda.

3. As far as I am concerned, I will be in Kigali essentially to prepare the Mission's report on Burundi. I will therefore appreciate it if UNAMIR could kindly put at my disposal for the 2 days I will be in Kigali an office and a Wang machine to enable me to type the report. At the same time, the Mission has indicated at a session this morning that it would appreciate it if UNAMIR could accommodate all of us (including the interpreter Bruce Boeglin) together to facilitate our work. Obviously, I will have to show them my drafts as they come back from their meetings with Rwandese authorities. Please, Isel, let us know at your earliest convenience in what hotel we will be and also indicate the telephone numbers where the Mission can be reached in the evening.

4. Finally, I am looking forward to receiving a tentative programme for the Mission's stay in Kigali. We will have a final briefing session tomorrow 1 p.m. our time and they expect a programme. In that respect, please find attached copy of a Fax from Mrs. Alison Des Forges to Ambassador Kovanda giving some information about her whereabouts in Rwanda.

-2-

5. Meanwhile, Mr. Kouyaté is making separate arrangements with Mr. Gbeho (UNOSOM II) to use a UNOSOM aircraft from Nairobi to Kigali (12 February) and then from Kigali to Bujumbura (14 February). Kindly liaise with them for confirmation. Mr. Kouyaté is also inquiring about the draft message of the Secretary-General to the OAU/UNHCR Conference in Bujumbura which Mr. Goulding had requested UNAMIR to prepare before 6 February. Finally, Mr. Kouyaté is looking forward to receiving his tentative programme during his stay in Kigali. Could you please let me know who is the UNAMIR Officer who will assist him in his meetings in Kigali?. I surmise that you are trying to work out both the programmes of the Security Council Mission and of Mr. Kouyaté at the same time.

6. I will try to call you again tomorrow morning if I do not hear from you before. I got your message and will gladly bring you the package. I trust you will bring the contents of my Fax to Amb. Khan and/or your colleagues concerned. Thank you again for your help.

Warm regards.

Flerece

cc: Mr. W. De Souza
Mr. Annabi
Mrs. Laheurte for Mr. Kouyaté

**PROGRAMME FOR MR. L. KOUYATE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
VISIT TO KIGALI
12 - 14 FEBRUARY 1994**

Accompanied by: Mrs. Barrillon-Pomes, Special Assistant

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
11/01/95	08h25	Arrival in Nairobi	SAO/GIGIRI MOVCON
12/02 5	08h00	Departure for Kigali on UNAMIR flight ----- ---	MOVCON/ AIROPS
	09h00	Arrival in Kigali Met at the airport by: <i>SR SG</i> Dr. Kabia Mr. Buo Mr. Conde Transport - vehicle	PROTOCOL CTO
	10h00	Briefing with the FC	UNAMIR HQ PROTOCOL/ A/MA/FC
	11h00 / <i>11/20</i>	Briefing with the Civpol/Commissaire - Col Diarra	
	<i>12h00 / 11/20</i>	Lunch at the Belgium Village with: Dr. Kabia Mr. Buo Mr. Conde	PROTOCOL
	13h00	Departure from Kigali Hellpad to: Visit camp Kibaho for displaced persons. Partic: Dr. Kabia <i>DAO</i> Ms. Rivero Mr. Conde	- AIROPS - PROTOCOL
	16h30	Departure for Kigali	AIROPS
	17h00	Arrival at the Kigali Hellpad	AIROPS

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
13/01/95	08h00	Breakfast meeting at the Belgium Village with: - FC - Dr. Kabla, ED - Mr. Clarence (Human Rights)	PROTOCOL
	09h00	Meeting with Heads of UN Agencies/UNREO <i>unop</i> Partic: Dr. Kabla Mr. Kent (UNREO) - UNAMIR Conference Room	PROTOCOL
	10h30	Meeting with the President of Rwanda Accompanied by Dr. Kabla	PROTOCOL
		Meeting with the V-P Accompanied by Dr. Kabla	PROTOCOL
		LUNCH	
		Meeting with the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs and Int. Coop. Accompanied by Dr. Kabla	PROTOCOL
14/02/95	09h00	Departure for Bujumbura	MOVCON/ AIROPS

PROGRAMME FOR MR. L. KOUYATE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL,

10/2/95 3RD Draft

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS


VISIT TO KIGALI

12 - 14 FEBRUARY 1994

Accompanied by: Mrs. Barrillon-Pomes, Special Assistant

(* Zambatt to provide escort to the Assistant-Secretary-General on the ground in Gikongoro)

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
11/02/95 (Saturday)	08h25	Arrival in Nairobi	SAO/GIGIRI MOVCON
12/02/95 (Sunday)	08h00	Departure for Kigali on UNAMIR flight	MOVCON/ AIROPS
	09h00	Arrival in Kigali Met at the airport by: Dr. Kabia Mr. Conde Transport - vehicle	PROTOCOL CTO
	10h00	Briefing by the SRSG/ FC D FC UNAMIR HQ	PROTOCOL/ A/MA/FC
	11h00	Briefing by the Civpol/ Commissaire - Col Diarra	
	12h00	Lunch at the Belgium Village	PROTOCOL
	13h00	Departure from Kigali Helipad to: Visit camp Kibeho for displaced persons. Partic: Dr. Kabia Mr. Dao Mr. Conde	- PROTOCOL - AIROPS - SECURITY - <u>MILITARY</u>
	16h30	Departure from Kibeho	AIROPS
	17h00	Arrival at the Kigali Helipad	AIROPS
	19h30	Buffet Dinner with Ambassadors/Ministers/ Mr. Kouyate	PROTOCOL

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
13/01/95 (Monday)	08h00	Breakfast meeting at the Belgium Village with: - SRSG - FC - Dr. Kabia, ED - Mr. Clarence (Human Rights)	PROTOCOL 
	09h00	Meeting with Heads of UN Agencies Partic: Dr. Kabia UNDP Res Rep. Mr. Dao UNDP BUILDING	PROTOCOL HUMANITARIAN OFFICE
	10h00	Meeting with the President	PROTOCOL
	10h30	Meeting with the Prime Minister Accompanied by Dr. Kabia	PROTOCOL
		Meeting with the V-P Accompanied by Dr. Kabia	PROTOCOL
		LUNCH	
			PROTOCOL
14/02/95 (Tuesday)	09h00	Departure for Bujumbura	PROTOCOL MOVCON/ AIROPS



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Ms. F. Barrillon-Pomés
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Africa Division II, DPA
Room S-3341F, UN, New York

FAX NO: 212 963 4037

FROM: Abdul Hamid Kabia
Executive Director, UNAMIR, Kigali

DATE: 8 February 1995

SUBJECT: Security Council Mission to Rwanda

Ref. your fax of 7 February to Ms. Isel Rivero, please be advised of the following arrangements that have been made in connection with the visit of the Security Council mission to Rwanda.

1. Reservations have been made at Hotel Milles Collines for the entire delegation including the interpreter and yourself from 11 to 13 February. The hotel telephone numbers are (250) 76530 and (250) 76531.
2. An office with secretarial support will be provided for you at UNAMIR headquarters upon your arrival.
3. Mr. Sammy Kum Buo, UNAMIR Political Adviser has been designated to assist the mission in its meetings and in preparing its Report.
4. Appointments with Government leaders have been requested and awaiting confirmation. Meetings with UN Agencies, NGOs and diplomatic-corps are being organized. The SRSG will be in Kigali to meet with the mission and coordinate the visit.

Looking forward to seeing you in Kigali and best regards.

[Redacted signature block]

-ED } done
-Cmde }

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 7 February 1995

TO: Mr. Victor Gbeho, SRSG UNOSOM II Mogadishu	FROM: Louise Laheurte <i>Laheurte</i> Spec. Asst. to the ASG DPA, UNATIONS, New York
FAX NO: 3-2662	FAX NO: 3-1323
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 1	

1. Mr. Kouyaté has asked me to convey his thanks for making a UNOSOM Learjet available to him from Nairobi to Bujumbura, where he will participate in the OAU/UNCHR Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region. He is currently in Paris, to represent the Secretary-General at a UNESCO Conference on social development in Africa which is taking place from 6 to 10 February.

2. Mr. Kouyaté will arrive in Nairobi on 11 February at (00:35 a.m., on AF 484 from Paris) and will be at the Nairobi Hilton (tel. 254-2-334000). His confirmed itinerary and travel dates in the region are now as follows:

Nairobi/Kigali: 12 February
Kigali/Bujumbura: 14 February

He will use therefore the UNOSOM Learjet on the above dates only, as he will depart from Bujumbura to New York via Brussels on 19 February, on Sabena Airlines.

3. He would very much appreciate it if the UNOSOM aircraft could take him from Nairobi to Kigali in the morning of 12 February, at 08:00 a.m. His departure time on 14 February, from Kigali to Bujumbura, will be confirmed in consultation with UNAMIR which is arranging him several official meetings in Kigali. Ms. Florence Barrillon-Pomès, DPA Senior Political Affairs Officer, will travel with Mr. Kouyaté from Kigali to Bujumbura.

Thank you again for your kind assistance. Regards.

cc: Ms. Lindenmayer, DPKO
Ms. Rivero, UNAMIR

TOTAL P.01

243-884-6732
Mobile phone.
Kigali

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

ED
Cmde
963-3582 ✓
4821

85 FE - 7 15:00 552
DATE: 7 February 1995

TO: Ms. Isel Rivero UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda	FROM: F. Barrillon-Pomès United Nations New York
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212) 963-4037
ATTN:	REF:
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 1	

Subject: Security Council Mission to Burundi and Rwanda

1. I should like to draw to your attention a change in the composition of the Mission: for Indonesia, it is the Ambassador himself who will participate. His name is Nugroho Wisnumurti. Please inform accordingly the authorities of Burundi and Rwanda.
2. The name of the free-lance interpreter who will accompany us is Bruce Boeglin.
3. I should also like to confirm that the Mission, including the interpreter and myself, will arrive in Bujumbura on 10 February at 8.45 a.m. with Sabena 571. It was not possible for the Mission, or for us, to get visas for Burundi. I understand from Mr. Masaki Sato from FALD/DPKO that arrangements are being made so that we can get the visas upon arrival. And that it will also be possible for those who did not get visas for Rwanda to get them in Bujumbura.
4. Also, the Mission is grateful to UNAMIR which has accepted to put at its disposal an aircraft which will take them to Kigali in the evening of 11 February.
5. Finally, the Mission will leave Kigali on 13 February at 8.10 p.m. with Sabena 565.
6. Please let us know by tomorrow in what hotels the Mission will be accommodated. The Mission also needs the telephone numbers where they can be reached. We expect to receive, also by tomorrow, the tentative programs both for Bujumbura and Kigali.

Warm regards, looking forward to seeing you all.

Un abrazo.



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA


NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

95 FEB - 2 17 10

TO: Ms. F. Barrillon-Pomés
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Africa Division II, DPA
Room S-3341F, UN, New York

FAX NO: 212 963 4037

FROM: 
Abdul Hamid Kabia
Executive Director, UNAMIR, Kigali


DATE: 8 February 1995

SUBJECT: Security Council Mission to Rwanda

Ref. your fax of 7 February to Ms. Isel Rivero, please be advised of the following arrangements that have been made in connection with the visit of the Security Council mission to Rwanda.

1. Reservations have been made at Hotel Milles Collines for the entire delegation including the interpreter and yourself from 11 to 13 February. The hotel telephone numbers are (250) 76530 and (250) 76531.
2. An office with secretarial support will be provided for you at UNAMIR headquarters upon your arrival.
3. Mr. Sammy Kum Buo, UNAMIR Political Adviser has been designated to assist the mission in its meetings and in preparing its Report.
4. Appointments with Government leaders have been requested and awaiting confirmation. Meetings with UN Agencies, NGOs and diplomatic-corps are being organized. The SRSG will be in Kigali to meet with the mission and coordinate the visit.

Looking forward to seeing you in Kigali and best regards.



THE WORLD BANK GROUP
Headquarters: Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.
Tel. No. (202) 477-1234 • Fax (202) 477-6391 • Telex No. RCA 248423

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET AND MESSAGE

Attention: Ms. I. Rivero

DATE: January 31, 1995

NO. OF PAGES: 1 MESSAGE NO.:
(including this sheet)

TO: Gen. G. Tousignant
Title: Force Commander
Organization: UNAMIR
City/Country: Kigali, Rwanda

DESTINATION FAX NO.: 212-963-3090

FROM: Esperanza Durán
e: Country Economist
Division: AF3C2
Room No.: {Room #}

DIVISIONAL FAX NO.: (202) 473-8564
Dept./Div. No.: AF3C2

Telephone: (202) 458-4733

SUBJECT/

REFERENCE: Mission to Rwanda--Request to Board UNAMIR Flight to Kigali

MESSAGE:

Dear General Tousignant,

I would much appreciate if it were possible for me to use the UNAMIR service Nairobi-Kigali. Given my date of departure from Washington, it is not possible to get either a Sabena flight Brussels-Kigali, nor the Cameroon Airlines flight Nairobi-Kigali.

I will arrive in Nairobi on February 3, on Kenya Airways Flight 101, which arrives in Nairobi at 8:00 AM.

Many thanks for your help and I look forward to seeing you soon.

Yours sincerely,

Esperanza
Esperanza Durán

Action taken by
Seel on 31/1/95

Transmission authorized by: authorization

If you experience any problem in receiving this transmission, inform the sender at the telephone or fax no. listed below



KIGALI • RWANDA 95-1-31 8:58 202 473 8584- COMMEN
THE WORLD BANK GROUP
Headquarters: Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.
Tel. No. (202) 477-1234 • Fax (202) 477-6391 • Telex No. RCA 248423

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET AND MESSAGE

Attention: Ms. I. Rivero

DATE: January 31, 1995

NO. OF PAGES: 1 MESSAGE NO.:
(including this sheet)

TO: Gen. G. Tousignant
Title: Force Commander
Organization: UNAMIR
City/Country: Kigali, Rwanda

DESTINATION FAX NO.: 212-963-3090

FROM: Esperanza Durán
Title: Country Economist
Division: AF3C2
Room No.: {Room #}

DIVISIONAL FAX NO.: (202) 473-8564
Dept./Div. No.: AF3C2
Telephone: (202) 458-4733

SUBJECT/

REFERENCE: Mission to Rwanda--Request to Board UNAMIR Flight to Kigali

MESSAGE:

Dear General Tousignant,

I would much appreciate if it were possible for me to use the UNAMIR service Nairobi-Kigali. Given my date of departure from Washington, it is not possible to get either a Sabena flight Brussels-Kigali, nor the Cameroon Airlines flight Nairobi-Kigali.

I will arrive in Nairobi on February 3, on Kenya Airways Flight 101, which arrives in Nairobi at 8:00 AM.

Many thanks for your help and I look forward to seeing you soon.

Yours sincerely,

Esperanza
Esperanza Durán

Transmission authorized by: authorization

If you experience any problem in receiving this transmission, inform the sender at the telephone or fax no. listed above

**UNITED NATIONS**

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

T R E S U R G E N T

OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 1

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

TO: M. GOERANSSON SAO, Administration UNAMIR NAIROBI	FROM: B.P. DESSANDE OIC/ED. OSRSG UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: OIC Admin. Chef AIROPS	DATE: 5 JANVIER 1995
FAX NO: 254-2-62-2755/2668 PHONE NO: 254-2-62-2380/ 2090	PHONE: 212-963-3093 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ORIGINATOR: B.P. DESSANDE	SECTION: PROTOCOLE
SUBJECT: Mission du RSG à Nairobi, Kenya	

VOUS COMMUNIQUONS CE QUI SUIT:

- AAA. LE REPRESENTANT SPECIAL ARRIVERA DEMAIN EN FIN DE L'APRES-MIDI A NAIROBI POUR ASSISTER AU SOMMET DU 7 JANVIER 1995.
- BBB. SA DELEGATION COMPREND:
- BR. GEN. HENRI ANYIDHOHO, CDT. ADJOINT, FORCE MINUAR
MME. ISEL RIVERO, ASSISTANT SPECIAL SU RSG,
CAPT. ABRAHAM NSIAH, AIDE DE CAMP DU GENERAL,
M. SHARFI SAMIR, SECURITE
- CCC. LE REPRESENTANT VOUS DEMANDE DE RESERVER CHAMBRES A L'HOTEL RENGECY ET D'INFORMER LE MANAGER DE SON ARRIVEE. PREVOIR TRANSPORT POUR RSG ET DELEGATION.
- DDD. L'AMBASSADEUR ET SA DELEGATION RETOURNERONT A KIGALI LE MATIN DU 9 JANVIER 1995 PAR LE VOL REGULIER DE LA MINUAR. PRIERE BIEN VOULOIR FAIRE LE NECESSAIRE.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND REFUGEE CAMPS

TRIP REPORT SEPTEMBER 15-20, 1994 UNREO/USAID-DART

A mission was undertaken September 15-20 to Bujumbura and northern Burundi as well as to the Rwandan refugee camps along the Tanzanian border by Kate Farnsworth, Team Leader for the USAID Rwanda Disaster Assistance Response Team, and Charles Petrie, Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator. The mission was motivated by concern about reports of growing insecurity in Burundi and the continued outflow of Hutus into refugee camps in Tanzania. The specific purpose of the trip was to assess the:

- regional impact of the Rwandan emergency; and
- most urgent humanitarian needs in the camps as the rainy season approaches.

Allegations by refugees in camps in Tanzania of supposed RPA exactions against the Rwandan Hutus became a point of major concern. This resulted in the team undertaking a rapid tour of three collines in the Byumba prefecture in Rwanda, sites of alleged RPA reprisals as described by the refugees.

PART I: REGIONAL IMPACT

Though many observers, following the peaceful transition of power to the RPF in the old french zone, may be tempted to conclude that the Rwandan crisis/emergency is finished, this brief tour highlighted the fact that on a regional level, the crisis is far from over -- the Rwandan tragedy has contributed to growing instability in the region. The large influx of Hutu refugees (including former RGF soldiers and militia) to Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire has the potential to trigger, if not exacerbate already existing humanitarian crises and political tensions in each of the countries.

The allegations by refugees of systematic RPF reprisals against Hutu populations in Rwanda are plausible given the scale and dimensions of the genocide which occurred in April and May of 1994 as well as the underlying hatred and tensions between Tutsis and Hutus. However, the danger is that public handling of the issue without irrefutable evidence at a time when the international community's response to the genocide remains ambiguous, may lead to the alienation of the RPF and further contribute to strengthening Hutu extremists positions in the region.

A. Burundi

The signing of a power sharing arrangement between most political parties in Burundi on September 10 spawned a wave of optimism amongst the international community. Were Burundi to be taken out of its regional context, the recent achievements could be seen as sustainable steps towards resolving age-old tensions in that country. The discussions which led up to this agreement highlighted the seriousness with which most parties take the current threat of insecurity and underscored their resolve to reach a broad consensus. However the lack of endorsement of the agreement by the extremists of both sides compromises the agreement's future. Concessions made by the moderates of each party may not be tolerated over the short or medium term by the extremist groups. These extremist groups' beliefs/positions are each reinforced by the prevailing realities of the region resulting from the Rwandan crisis:

- the Hutu's feel confident to take extremist positions given the existence of militant armed elements in Uvira (twelve kilometers from Bujumbura) and Benaco/Ngara; and
- the Tutsis query their need to cede power following thirty years of total control given the RPF's victory in Rwanda following an equal number of years in exile.

These have resulted in heightened tensions which are translated into increasing acts of violence by angry extremists both in Bujumbura and in the countryside. Rumors are rife that Tutsis are training in the forest near Bujumbura and that extremist Hutus (Palilehutu) are rearming.

Inadvertently, there is growing friction between the predominantly Hutu Rwandan refugees in the north of Burundi (estimated at 237,500) and the displaced in Burundi (both Hutu and Tutsi) over resource allocations, particularly food -- refugees benefiting from full food rations while the displaced often receive a half ration. These refugees are perceived as a threatening political element for the Tutsi. It is arguable that their presence will further increase tensions between the Tutsi military and the resident Hutu majority. Tutsi extremists could begin to feel increasingly more threatened as they are surrounded by "hostile" forces.

An added element of the regional crisis is the outflow of Rwandan Tutsis, estimated to be as many as 200,000, from Burundi into Rwanda. This newly arriving population is settling on land vacated by fleeing Hutus who now reside in refugee camps in Tanzania. Resolving land tenure issues in the southeast of Rwanda will be crucial if an effective repatriation campaign is to take place. This will be the responsibility of the new government.

B. Tanzania

Tanzania now hosts nearly 500,000 refugees along its northwestern border with Rwanda and numbers continue to grow. In the last month the Ngara camps have received on average 1-2,000 new arrivals per day while the Karagwe District camps count between 50-500 per day. Overall totals in the camps have almost doubled since July 15.

The profile of the camp populations in Tanzania is of concern to the international community. The leadership structure that existed in Rwanda previously, part of which was directly involved in the genocide, has transferred to these camps where it is respected and recognized by the refugees. Previous experience with a camp uprising in June when a local militia leader was asked to leave Benaco camp, suggests that security could rapidly deteriorate. Possible RGF infiltration into the camp from Goma and the training of militia add to the explosive environment.

The UNHCR-led effort to coordinate assistance to the refugees has been well managed and designed. However, the geographical location of the camps combined with pressing problems of firewood, water and sanitation make the immediate development of a repatriation strategy a priority (see Section II). Flying in the face of these stark realities are the accusations of RPF reprisals against Hutus and information from the camps and from relief officials that the RPF is actively encouraging expatriated Tutsis in Tanzania and Uganda to return and claim land in the northeast of Rwanda.

PART II: Rwandan Refugee Camps in Tanzania

The camps for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania are unsustainable and a strategy to close them must be developed. While there is no question that this is not a simple task, the international community must ask itself if it is willing to pay the bill to support 2 million refugees, and specifically, 500,000 in western Tanzania. This opinion of the team is shared by many other visitors and by UNHCR itself. The evidence:

-- Benaco camp, Ngara District, originally designed to accommodate 80-90,000 refugees now supports 236,671 (based on figures of 9/19/94). The site is being decongested by the move to Musuhura Hill (which has already received over 20,000) but there is not sufficient water to allow this process to occur rapidly. As a result it is likely that the majority of the Benaco population will weather the rainy season at Benaco where the risk of disease and epidemics is high.

-- Generally speaking the northern camps (Murongo, Kagenyi I "Rubera", Kagenyi II and Chabilissa I and II have been forgotten. Although admittedly

accommodating smaller caseloads (the largest camp, Chabilissa I has a population of 84,945 which is being decongested to Chabilissa II to 30,000), these camps are understaffed and under resourced by UNHCR. The protection officer in Kagenya, a critical function in refugee operations, has been turned into a field officer, and the head of sub office does not even have a vehicle. Luckily, in the case of all but Chabilissa I (where CARITAS is overwhelmed by the case loads), the camps are staffed with excellent international NGOs (MSF, OXFAM, CONCERN, MEMISA) who are able to keep health and sanitation under control. The camps' isolated location north of Benaco further diminishes their profile on the UNHCR screen. Once the rains start these camps will be virtually inaccessible as road conditions will deteriorate dramatically. The identification of a new site 10 km off the main road Omukirio is good news but site development will not be completed before the heaviest rains set in.

-- The population of all the camps continue to grow. This is by far the most worrying aspect of the situation. Statistics show average weekly arrivals in Benaco range from 1-2,000 per day over the last month and for the Karagwe District camps from between 500-1,000 per week. Physical and human resources are stretched to accommodate the newcomers. Evidence of the system's growing failure to meet the basic needs of the population can be seen in the absence of a complete food basket, growing numbers of children in special feeding programs, rampant dysentery (before the heaviest rains set in), and growing violence in the camps.

Specifically:

-- The food supply, which is already stretched to handle the previous population, cannot keep up with the sustained need for 500 MT daily to Benaco alone. UNHCR/WFP's fleet consists of small short haul trucks that must effect numerous journeys from warehouse to food distribution sites each day when several 20 MT trucks could ensure a more efficient handling of the ration. Delivery of food to central warehouses is also slowed by the long truck turnaround times in Ngara. It is common knowledge that each truck dallies in Ngara before returning to pick up the next WFP load at the rail head in order to transact personal business. At the same time, rail cars for food movements from Dar Es Salaam are scarce due to slow offloading at the rail head for Burundi in Kigoma.

-- The food pipeline has been precarious and could get worse. There has been no oil or CSB for a month and WFP projects a maize and bean shortage in the next weeks.

-- Nutritional levels are falling and NGOs are expanding special feeding programs as a result. A combination of pipeline breaks in high calorie items such as oil and CSB as well as undigestible maize grain is resulting in rising malnutrition rates in children. The installation of two maize mills in Benaco may alleviate the

maize grain problem for children but in other camps the distribution of grain will continue as a major nutritional problem for children. UNIMIX is distributed as a general supplementary food to children in the southern camps but not in the northern.

-- Provision of health services by the NGOs is good but all are bracing themselves for an outbreak of epidemic levels of dysentery in the coming months. There is great concern over the rampant spread of AIDs although the start up of the CARE AIDs program is a positive development in this arena. Health workers are also preparing themselves for a massive population explosion over the next 6-9 months with some estimating that as many as 90 percent of women are pregnant. This will have dramatic resource implications in the health, water and nutrition sectors.

-- Sanitation is a losing battle, particularly in Benaco. UNHCR has no permanent wat/san coordinator which has resulted in a lag in efforts to expand latrine programs. The need to dig new latrines and close old ones before heavy rains turn the camp into a cesspool is so urgent that UNHCR has asked IRC to move into Benaco to help IFRC whose program is way behind schedule. Sanitation in the Karagwe District has been more manageable largely due to the smaller populations and less congested conditions in most camps.

-- Firewood is becoming one of the most critical issues for the sustainability of the camps. Already the UN, with the assistance of GTZ is providing transport to refugees up to 20 km from the camps so that they can gather firewood. As maize grain continues to be the grain that is prevalently distributed, firewood consumption will continue to be alarmingly high. This issue is also sensitive for Tanzania in districts which are drought prone and where soil erosion due to deforestation will further marginalize agricultural productivity.

-- Water supply is inadequate. Water levels in boreholes are dropping as it is the end of the dry season but will rebound with the rains, reducing the water problem in the short term. With the ever increasing refugee population, major alternative sources of water will have to be considered. One option involves expanding the borehole network in the area. Estimated to cost USD 3 million it will necessitate pumping from vast distances to avoid depleting the aquifer currently under use. It would take up to 9 months to complete. A second option involves starting a purification/tankering operation from the river and a third an expansion on that to draw water from the river to the reservoir at a minimum cost of USD 5-6 million. Both have huge investment implications but the latter would ensure full water supply for 600,000 although construction time could take as much as 9 months. UNHCR feels it will have no choice but to explore these options if repatriation does not occur within two months. In all cases, the camps at Ngara are looking at a long term water shortage problem.

-- Security is poor in most camps and very poor in Benaco. Based on UNHCR estimates there could be as many as 5 unofficial deaths for every official death reported to the UN. Most of these unreported deaths are believed to be from murders. There are also alarmingly high numbers of rapes occurring resulting in high levels of trauma among women. Most rapes occur when women go to the latrine at night or collect fuelwood and water. NGOs feel insecure in Benaco in particular which has constrained the development of truly viable community outreach programs. Fifty Tanzanian police are too few to exert any real authority in the camp although it is said their presence can be a deterrent. However, they are not present at night when most violence occurs.

-- Moral issues surrounding the profile of the camp population plagues many relief workers and causes UNHCR to worry that NGO interest cannot be sustained over a long period.

-- Refugees do not see repatriation as an option. Highly influenced by the leadership structure in the camp, they are convinced that certain death awaits them should they return to Rwanda (reports of contents of the UNHCR commissioned "Gersony Report" suggests that this could indeed be the case). Reports of Tutsis seizing land in the south and northeast of Rwanda only reinforce these fears. The longer the issue is left unresolved the more entrenched the Hutu resolve not to go back will be.

-- Finally, the Government of Tanzania is highly concerned about the impact of the refugee population on the environment and growing inequities between refugees and residents in the Ngara and Karagwe districts. In a recent public statement former President Nyerere reinforced these concerns, calling for the camps to be closed as soon as possible.

Short term emergency interventions can fill gaps in the current assistance program to the camp, but over the long term the camps will require tremendous donor resources to sustain populations in areas which are not viable over the medium-long term from either a political or environmental perspective. A plan of action must be developed immediately with the collaboration of all partners, UNHCR, the refugees, the RPF, UNAMIR, Human Rights workers, the international relief community and donors. Such a program must address the fundamental issue of why Rwandans continue to flee by:

1. Confronting the RPF with concerns over reprisals in the southeast. Offer international assistance to them to investigate the reported massacres if necessary. Warn them of the negative press that could result should they fail to address this problem aggressively. Reassure them that the international community will continue to take seriously the prosecution of genocide.

2. Initiating dialogue with the RPF on land tenure issues. Be prepared to fund solutions to the problem, i.e. assist repatriating Tutsis to settle elsewhere. While Hutus may resent this gesture, it may be a palatable strategy if it frees up the land for them to return.
3. Launching an information campaign that will broadcast neutral information on the situation in Rwanda thereby permitting refugees to make individual informed judgments on the possibility of return. Consider using international reporters broadcasting from outside Rwanda (Reporters without Borders?).
4. Working with NGOs in Rwanda to start programs that prepare the way for repatriation and design appropriate packages as needed.
5. Identifying new sites in Tanzania well away from the borders (in accordance with the OAU Convention of 1966) for those who will not be able to repatriate.
6. Breaking down the powerful leadership structures in the camp that prevent individual decision making and initiative. At present the leaders, many who masterminded and executed the genocide, rather than being sidelined by the international community, are being reinforced in their position as they are used for the allocation and delivery of relief to the refugees. It is in their interest to retain the population in Tanzania both as human shields against genocide prosecutors and to fuel their economic strength.
7. Initiating a dialogue with refugee leaders and refugees themselves on the constraints to sustainability of the camps and issues surrounding repatriation. Consider possibility of "look see" visits as well as meetings between RPA and refugees in Tanzania.

PART III: Issue of RPF reprisals/systematic elimination of Hutus

This mission was undertaken at the same time as the contents of the forthcoming UNHCR report on repatriation (the "Gersony" report) were briefed to the UN and the RPA. The team attempted to confirm some of the allegations made by refugees in Tanzania. Though the information collected among both resident Rwandans and refugees strongly suggests that RPA has carried out systematic reprisals against Hutu populations, the team found that there was no way to corroborate or refute the allegations without an explicit mandate and resources for the UN to do so. Of specific concern to the team was the fact that in interviewing refugees in camps in Karagwe District of Tanzania, most who came from the northeast areas around Byumba, Rutare, Muhura, the team heard similar stories as those recounted to the UNHCR team by refugees who came from the southwest. It should be recalled that the northeastern part of Rwanda has been under RPF

control for the longest period and has until fairly recently been the main focus of NGO and UN activity.

Failing an immediate clarification as to the veracity of the contents of the report, it is the management of the "Gersony" report that has become an essential concern of the relief community in Rwanda. By revealing the contents of the report to the press and the highest echelons of the RPA without allowing the RPA to respond may lead to the alienation of the movement. It should be recalled that the RPF is skeptical of the international community's commitment to rapidly bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice.

The dilemma facing the international community with the improper handling of the report is the impossibility of verifying the veracity of the allegations. The horror of Rwanda has been such that it is conceivable that the RPF have a plan to eliminate Hutus and create a nearly pure Tutsi land. Points arguing in favor of this thesis include massive organized attempt to move expatriated Tutsi back into areas of the southeast and resultant issue of land tenure, the dimension of the genocide and the lack of any judicial process to deal with the perpetrators.

Arguing against the thesis would be RPFs previous attempts at confronting reprisals including arrest of sixty of their own troops and execution of two of them and the RPA's continuous request to the international community to assist in the control of "sporadic" reprisals which they freely admit are occurring in the absence of a police/justice system that functions. By giving credence to the report which may be incomplete, the international community could be undermining the emergence of a legitimate and committed government.

Summary

SRSG's Mission to Zaire and Tanzania

Monday, 12 September 1994

The American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. John M. Yates - there is no Ambassador in Kinshasa - agreed with the SRSG proposals to provide support to the Zairean authorities and for the UN to carry out the transfer of refugees to a different location/s in Zaire. In fact, he was awaiting a full scale plan on how to do it. He also indicated that the Prime Minister had already requested US support in this endeavour. He further indicated that the Zairean military was a liability rather than a support. In his opinion, both President Mobutu and Prime Minister were committed to the transfer.

The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Pierre Coulont, in the absence of the Ambassador who was on leave, was more concerned with disarming the military and militia than with the actual transfer. The European Community was concerned with the violent state of affairs in the camps. In his government opinion, disarmament would have to be carried out by Zairean military with UN Observers acting as monitors. Also a Human Rights presence would perhaps be helpful. Upon suggestion by SRSG, he acknowledged that Belgium could look into assisting with airlift. He underlined that the backing of the President was essential and also the consent of local authorities in the Provinces.

.../...

After discussing the topic with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lunda Bululu, the Vice-Minister of the Interior, Mr. Bayombo Mbokol, and the Vice-Minister of Justice, Mr. Kikadi Gabongolo, it was evident that the Vice-Minister of the Interior had been planning the actual logistics of the transfer. He volunteered that the government had identified three locations for the transit of the military, Bas Zaire (close to Angola), Mbandanka, in the North, and Banoundu, towards the South by Equatoria. As far as the government was concerned, he stated, the regional authorities had already agreed, and he did not share the SRSG's concerns about the willingness of the refugees to move, since Zaire was a sovereign state and could decide on selection of suitable locations for such a large refugee population. He further stated that the government expected UN support for the operation and that the Zaireans themselves would then be ready to carry out the transfer. He explained in great detail the environmental and communal degradation caused by the refugees and pointed out that the numbers were a dislocating factor in the demographics of the Goma and Bukavu region which could affect their future electoral process. Regarding the political leadership of the former Rwandese government, he saw no major problem with their staying in Kinshasa until another country accepted them for asylum.

.../...

The UNHCR representative, Mr. Michel Moussalli, pointed out that security was a crucial element in the transfer of refugees and the Vice-Minister indicated that the presence of Blue Helmets would be reassuring to both government officials and the refugees themselves. The SRSG suggested that a basic proposal be prepared with a rough budget which could serve as the basis for discussion in New York. However, any decision would be subject to the Secretary-General's consultations with Member States and if Military Observers were requested, then approval by the Security Council would have to be sought.

.../...

Tuesday, 13 September 1994
Meeting with the Prime Minister,
Mr. Kengo Wa Ndonga

The Prime Minister referred to three communications he had addressed to the Secretary-General regarding the Rwandese refugee crisis in Zaire. His analysis of the situation can be summarized as follows:

- (a) The present situation in the Goma and Bukavu camps is intolerable and has caused and continues to cause tremendous hardship in the Zairean population and Zairean resources.
- (b) Zairean government does not have the means to solve the crisis and thus the request for assistance from the United Nations.
- (c) The best solution was to assist in the return of refugees to Rwanda as soon as possible. In this effort, the Rwandese government had to propitiate their return.

.../...

- (d) Political refugees could not stay in Zaire. The assistance of the Secretary-General was needed to find other country of asylum, specially in French-speaking African countries.
- (e) The sites for an approximate 16,000 military refugees had been identified in former Zairean armed forces barracks in Lukanbu and Kongolo, but these would have to be refurbished.
- (f) The Zairean authorities were proceeding to identify Hutu leaders within the camps to enable the identification of those who were harassing and/or preventing the refugees from returning.
- (g) The Prime Minister underlined that the majority of the refugees had been disarmed and that the Zairean army would continue to do so.
- (h) Clothing, maintenance and transport of refugees would have to be provided by the United Nations and Agencies. The Zairean government could assist initially with two companies but in general security would have to be the responsibility of UN troops or Observers.

.../...

- (i) Foremost in the Prime Minister's mind was the fact that since there is a large Zairean Hutu and Tutsi population in the lake areas, a Palestine situation had to be prevented at all costs. The Hutu refugee problems, he said, are thorns in my feet, which I'll be happy to get rid of. He requested the SRSG for an assessment team to help in determining the needs and requirements of UN assistance.

.../...

Tuesday, 13 September 1994
Meeting with the Minister of Defence,
Mr. Mavua Mudima

The Minister of Defence, while not departing from the basic thrust of the Prime Minister's statement, disagreed on the number of military elements in the camps. He calculated that with their families, the total amount would be approximately 90,000.

He offered his Ministry assistance to the UN assessment team bearing in mind that the resources of the Zairean military here were very meagre.

He also reiterated that the Zairean military had been progressively disarming the refugees and that they would continue to do so. The Rwandese military refugees carried the same uniforms as the Zairean armed forces and therefore it was important to give them civilian clothes so that they would not be confused. Acts of vandalism were occurring for which the Zairean military was not responsible.

.../...

He remained opened to suggestions of other sites and pointed out that (a) airstrips and (b) location far from the border with Rwanda would be essential.

A reconnaissance assessment mission from the UN would be welcomed and Zairean military and civilian officials would join and provide assistance.

He also pointed out that the military refugees had to be fed in the camps prior to their transfer. This was one of the reasons why the present situation was not conducive to stability inside the camps.

ICRC had explained that their agency could not assist the military who were not prisoners of war.

.../...

Tuesday, 13 September 1994

Meeting with French Ministre Conseiller

The French Ministre Conseiller, Mr. Philippe H.M.G. Arcq, contrary to the USA and Belgian diplomats, was rather pessimistic at the prospects of a UN intervention in the refugee crisis which would require the Zairean government support. For him, the Hutu refugee crisis could become a permanent feature. It had happened before. He agreed wholeheartedly with the SRSG that the optimum solution was for the refugees to return, but certainly some of them had other ideas in mind. He referred to a EEC Mission headed by Germany which had recently visited Zaire for an assessment of the situation. He also added that the matter of EEC assistance would be discussed next week in Brussels.

After discussing the initial plans with the SRSG, including the transfer and transit process, the French was skeptical that the military would move willingly, and also pointed out that the Zairean military were out of control, point of view which coincided with the USA. He further stated that he wondered whether there would be convergence on tactics and action plan between the Prime Minister and the President, indicating that he was doubtful.

.../...

The Representative of UNHCR referred to the Minister of Justice and suggested that at Addis, the Minister had announced that the French would assist in the transport of the refugees out of Goma and Bukavu.

The French underlined that he had not received any confirmation from his government in this regard.

He further stated that during the visit of the EEC Mission, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is close to the President, had suggested that there should be a Regional Summit on Rwanda.

The Representative of UNHCR indicated that the Secretary-General of the OAU had apparently asked President Mobutu to organize such a summit. The acting President of Burundi had also requested the same.

.../...

Wednesday, 14 September 1994
Meeting with President of Zaire,
Mr. Mobutu Sesse Seko

President Mobutu was assertive that the new Rwandese government should encourage the return of refugees by providing guarantees that no harm would befall them. The UN presence could be reassuring in this respect. He referred to an agreement which was concluded in Nairobi in 1966 among Central African States related to the problem of refugees. This agreement stipulated that refugees should be located at least 150 km away from the border of any of the signatories. The problem of Rwanda was predictable because it was not new. Outside interference had just made it worse.

President Mobutu also stated that in the camps everyone was politicized, hinting at the difficulties in making distinction among the groups. The Zairean government had proceeded to disarm certain elements, but the UN would have to support efforts at relocating the most vitriolic elements. The Minister of Defence, he indicated, had already briefed him and had mentioned that three different locations had been identified. The President seemed receptive to cooperate with a reconnaissance mission. This was subsequently brought up with the Deputy Chief of Cabinet who

.../...

indicated that in order for the President to follow up, the points of discussion should be faxed to his office as soon as possible.

However, the President did show a certain reluctance with the idea of a possible demobilization of the RGF elements and seemed skeptical to the suggestion that the RPF would absorb a number of them into their ranks.

.../...

Friday, 16 September 1994

Meeting with the President of Tanzania,

Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi

The President of Tanzania explained that Rwandese refugees in his country consisted mainly of extremists and people of mixed ancestry and marriages (Hutu-Tutsi). In this sense, the situation was different from the Zairean camps where there were thousands of RGF soldiers. A separate location was being sought to transfer the mixed marriages group. He also referred to past waves of refugees; now most of them had become Tanzanian citizens, with the condition that they would not use Tanzanian territory as a launching pad for subversive activities against another neighbouring state.

In his opinion, the most important initiative that the present government could make was to facilitate the return of all refugees and make the situation stable and safe enough for this to occur. He agreed with the SRSG that the UN could play a role in securing the transit activities and indicated that he would consult with his Cabinet and get back to the SRSG through the UNDP Resident Representative.

Copy for Ikel Rivero

MP

'To SRSG

From Nicholas Harman 9 September 1994

Trip to Bukavu, 7-8 September

You requested an informal report on this trip, which I made with Pierre Mehu, the spokesman. It follows:

Contacts

We made many contacts, notably with senior workers at the UNHCR, UNICEF and Reporters sans Frontieres, the NGO that maintains a local radio station for refugees. I shall source the following statements only where it seems relevant.

Bukavu

Bukavu town is a far worse wreck than anything in Rwanda: roads almost impassable, shops deserted, sanitation negligible, an intimidating police force. Refugees have brought some prosperity, as well as much squalor. The tourist hotels are busy. Many semi-derelict villas are rented to aid workers. Relief supplies appear on the open market. Many Zairois do well out of all this.

Bukavu port is full of boats of all sizes and states of repair, from pirogues to steamers. It would be easy to land a strong armed force by night on the Rwanda shore of Kivu, assuming Zairois help is for sale.

Camps

The main refugee camps, by the airfield some 30 km north of the town, are far less squalid than those at Goma. They are still growing, not from new arrivals from Rwanda but by the concentration there around water and sanitation points of the 35,000 refugees still scattered in filthy "informal" sites, at the rate of 1,000 a day. The refugees will soon be comfortably settled.

The local Head of Protection at UNHCR considers the Bukavu refugees to be less severely intimidated than those at Goma. At Goma, people are physically grouped according to their commune of origin, under the former leaders, who assert their control through the usual chain of prefects, parliamentarians, bourgmestres, policemen and militiamen. Since most such leaders are at Goma, Bukavu is less disciplined against the broad-based government. But the few Tutsi refugees - even children - are hated, tracked down and driven out.

Radio

UNICEF's local chief seemed very keen on a UN radio. Reporters sans Frontieres are doing a splendid job on a shoe-string, and nothing the UN does should undermine their work; both can usefully coexist.

The UNHCR people are very cautious about the radio idea. They do not want to convey a message of confidence in the new government until that confidence is seen to be deserved. They hear many stories of anti-Hutu behaviour by the RPA.

Radio France Inter recently reported a statement by Africa Watch in New York that killing persists in Rwanda. This caused alarm in the camps, and strengthened the hands of the militia. The UNHCR people assumed the report to be true. Further, UNHCR has helped transport a few refugees home on fact-finding visits. Some of these visitors did not return to Zaire. Of course they may simply have decided that it was safe to stay. But their non-return looked sinister.

The APR

We saw a bus-load of returners being searched at the checkpoint out of Area 4. The search looked rough and intrusive. This may well be justified, but cannot help build confidence. This busload was the only evidence we saw of people returning from the former French zone. The tourist guides in Nyangwe forest reported almost no movement either way, save for illicit charcoal-burners, monkey-fur hunters, and so on.

At Gikongoro we saw a fierce-looking detachment of government soldiers, lounging about aggressively. The Ghanaian soldiers were keeping a good eye on them.

The journey

I last made the trip to Cyangugu just over two weeks ago. The empty landscape has filled up, with people (apparently Hutu) working everywhere in the fields, especially on the rich valley land. Roadside markets are full of food, with everything necessary available and cheap. The next harvest may be planted after all.

The APR checkpoints seemed far more relaxed than before.

On the return journey I drove the car into a puddle, causing it to leave the road and turn over. The car seemed a write-off. I was slightly scratched, the passengers undamaged but alarmed. I was treated with great kindness and efficiency by the local Ghanaians, hospitably entertained by the Bangladeshis, and visited by a Malawian doctor. My warm thanks to all.

MilObs

Without attribution, may I reflect the view of more than one Military Observer, to this effect? Truck-loads of food and help pass down the road to the SW and Zaire. But those along the route, often hungry and insecure, get nothing. They ask the MilObs for help of some kind, and are puzzled to be told none will be forthcoming. The Observers found this frustrating, and thought it undermines trust in their work.

I suggest it might be useful to supply the MilObs with a simple factsheet explaining their job. Local readers (teachers and so on) could pass on the explanation to the illiterate. It might further help to build trust if the MilObs could indeed be a channel for more practical help, and if people inside Rwanda did not feel that the UN neglects them but helps the killer refugees.