

ICFy

CROATIA

1 MAR - 17 JUN 1997

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[3 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

CONFIDENTIAL

PC/LG

JUNE 2012

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1835</u>
BOX	<u>33</u>
FILE	<u>2</u>
ACC.	<u>2011/0195</u>



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

MOST IMMEDIATE

CRYPTO FAX

TO: WAHLGREN
UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

(FOR FC AND DCM)

FROM: VANCE, ICFY GENEVA

DATE: 20 MARCH 1993

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF 802 NEGOTIATIONS

John B. Vance
JW

1. As discussed Thornberry/Wilson at 1545 hours today, today's discussions cannot be regarded as a great success. A copy of the Croatian suggested draft agreement will be sent to you separately, possibly via New York, by the Joint Chairmen.

2. The following observations could however be drawn from today's discussions:

- a. That they have no intention of implementing 802, in particular effecting a withdrawal of their police forces and possibly armed forces.
- b. They wish to profit from the internal struggle in progress in the RSK.
- c. They are aggressively seeking negotiations with local Serbs, bypassing the Hadzic leadership, in the hope of establishing fruitful contact.
- d. They appear to be hoping for a limited extension of the UNPROFOR Mandate (1-2 months) and in the meantime be able to tie the implementation of Resolutions 743, 762 and 802 together.

3. They also indicated that Jakular (ph) had returned safely from Belgrade and advised that he was calling the Western Slovenian Parliament together on Wednesday to present the 11 point agreement. He was apparently confident his proposal would be supported.

4. The Joint Chairmen are still determining their next course of action but it will probably involve referring the matter to the Co-Chairmen in New York to see what pressure can be brought to bear. You will be kept advised.

*HSD Action*

United Nations
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
OFFICE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN
New York, New York 10017
FAX N°. (212) 963-1992

*Raised with
Coaction Del. 3/20/93 11:00 AM.*
TO: Ambassador Herbert S. Okun

19 March 1993

Page 1 of 5

FAX NO: (41-22) 917-0079

FROM: B. G. Ramcharan

TEL. NO. (212) 963-8894

ROOM NO. S-3327

The attached was received on Friday evening, 19 March, at 8:30 p.m. after Mr. Vance had left. In view of the urgency of the matter, I am sending it to you for such action as you may consider appropriate with those concerned in Geneva. Regards.

cc.: Cyrus Vance
Lord Owen

DISTRIBUTION:
<i>HSD</i>
<i>JW</i>

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTOFAX

10 93 MAR 15 ma 18Z

CODE RESTRICTED

Page 1 of 3

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZU-070

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY GENEVA
VANCE, UNATIONS NEW YORKFROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *C. Daudin HK for*

DATE: 18 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-348SUBJECT: CROATIAN INCURSION AT BLINJSKI KUT

DISTRIBUTION:

HSD

JW

GA

.... 1. ATTACHED IS COPY OF LETTER WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TODAY TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED 10 MARCH INCURSION. FOR THE PAST WEEK, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE THE REMOVAL OF THEIR TROOPS FROM THE BLINJSKI KUT AREA. THIS HAS, HOWEVER, PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL.

2. THE MATTER HAS BEEN RAISED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE GENEVA TALKS. IT IS CLEARLY SEEN BY THE SERB SIDE AS VERY DISRUPTIVE TO THE EFFORTS TO SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 802. THE SERBS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THIS IS ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY CROATIA TO SEE HOW FAR IT CAN GO IN REGAINING BY FORCE AREAS IN THE "PINK ZONE" WITHOUT THERE BEING A REACTION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

2

FO 485

B2

3. DCM HAS INFORMED US TODAY OF FRESH PROGRESS IN THE 802 TALKS AND WE FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS IN REGARD TO THIS NEW INCURSION. PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. WE ARE CONSIDERING MAKING THE LETTER TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLIC. WE SHOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS, AS WELL AS INDICATION FROM YOU OF ANY STEPS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE TAKEN IN REGARD TO THE INCURSION AT ISSUE. ENDALL.

CZV-370

P3/3

FO 485

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR


18 March 1993

Dear Mr. Vice-Premier,

I regret to have to bring to your attention a matter which we view as being of considerable gravity, especially in view of the continuation of peace talks in the context of Security Council resolution 802 of 25 January 1993. As you are aware, on 10 March there was a new incursion by the Croatian Army at Blinjski Kut, in the Pink Zone adjacent to Sector North. The incursion has been protested at the local level and was also raised by myself in Geneva with the Croatian delegation at the talks on a cease-fire and implementation of Security Council resolution 802. Assurances were then given that this situation, which was indicated as being an aberration, would be rectified. However, as of today, no action has been taken by your Government to withdraw your troops. The matter is particularly disturbing because the incursion is not only in breach of the cease-fire agreement and of Security Council resolution 762, but also of resolution 802, and a very tense and explosive situation exists in the area.

We must therefore call upon the Government of Croatia immediately to withdraw its forces to the former confrontation line. In view of the gravity of this situation, we have informed Headquarters in New York for consideration of appropriate action.

Yours sincerely,

FM 
Cedric Thornberry
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Ivan Milas
Vice Prime Minister of the Government
of the Republic of Croatia (C)
Zagreb



Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia
Predsjednik / President

His Excellency

Boutros Boutros Ghali

Secretary-General of the UN

Your Excellency,

My country highly regards your indefatigable and devoted efforts to bring peace to the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the area of former Yugoslavia. The United Nations has the pivotal role in the ongoing initiatives for creating stability and security in the region. With sincere appreciation for all the actions you are currently undertaking, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate some of the highlights of Croatia's proposal for the facilitation and improvement of the future UNPROFOR performance.

Croatia welcomes the fact that the United Nations is seriously considering our call for a more effective and resolute UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia. We firmly believe that the execution of the new UNPROFOR mandate should clearly conform with the political solution that is to be defined under the auspices of the Security Council. This solution should secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, including the imposition of the authority of the Croatian Government over the entire territory of the Republic, as well as providing maximum respect for human and minority rights in Croatia.

We advocate defining the obligations the Croatian Government and Serbian local authorities must fulfil during each stage of the peace process, thus ensuring the complete implementation of the Vance plan. It is our firm opinion that the peace operation taking place on Croatian soil should be redefined in order to utilize concrete mechanisms for the active implementation of the Vance plan, including the time-frame for its gradual execution. Only through the effective implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions will we be able to reach a just and everlasting solution to the ongoing crisis within the shortest possible period.

At this moment the UNPROFOR operation is taking place on the territory of two sovereign UN member states - Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - and on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, "Yugoslavia" has no competence either in a legal or a political sense for the ongoing UNPROFOR action. This is not a civil war but an international armed conflict caused by Serbian aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the essence of the crisis. Therefore the definition of the character of the peace mandate and the formal agreement on the status of United Nations forces must be reached among the respective Governments and the United Nations. Consequently the agreement on the future mandate and status of UNPROFOR in Croatia must be concluded between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia would like to see the UNPROFOR mandate prolonged for an additional six months, based upon the premises of the dynamic concept of gradual implementation of the Vance plan and relying on the political solution that would mutually respect Croatia's sovereignty as well as the rights of minorities on its territory with the goal of creating lasting internal and regional stability and security.

In Croatia, the UNPROFOR operation must have an approach parallel in spirit and execution to the action the world community is prepared to undertake in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The success of the implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina is closely linked to the positive outcome of the peace action in Croatia. Therefore, Croatia is calling for the same level of determination in achieving a peaceful solution based upon the key Security Council resolutions and peace plans formulated under the auspices of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. Failure of the peace efforts in Croatia will decrease hopes of reversing Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ending unbearable civilian suffering and material destruction. We remain determined that the future UNPROFOR operation in Croatia should be based on the following fundamental principles:

- a) immediate beginning of the process of restoring Croatian civil authority in the so-called "pink zones";*
- b) the complete and immediate demilitarization of the UNPAs and the establishment of local police forces in accordance with the general principles of the Vance plan;*
- c) full implementation of Security Council resolution 769 (1992) which imposes firm control by UNPROFOR forces of the border areas in Croatia where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with internationally recognized frontiers of the Republic of Croatia; without the effective control of these borders the aggression by Serbian forces will continue in the*

future; d) voluntary and unconditional return of all the refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

Croatia believes that one of the first steps in the reintegration process that is to be a part of the new UNPROFOR mandate, should be the promotion of confidence-building measures aimed at decreasing distrust and tensions among the people in the area. It is important to normalize life and living conditions in all the territory of Croatia as soon as possible. Therefore one of the primary tasks for UNPROFOR should be the reopening of major roads, railways, aqueducts, electric transmission lines and pipelines throughout the UNPAs. It is essential to establish immediately the normal traffic of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway. In the process of reopening the roads, priority must be given to the highway Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, as well as to the roads Karlovac-Plitvice-Obrovac-Šibenik, Plitvice-Gračac-Knin-Split, Vinkovci-Ilok, Vinkovci-Vukovar and Osijek-Bilje-Beli Manastir-Kneževo.

The UN operation in the Republic of Croatia should also provide continuous humanitarian assistance to the population in the occupied areas and to the population in the parts of Croatia which have been isolated and blocked due to the hostilities, especially in the southern coastal region of Dalmatia. The Croatian Government is preparing various measures for normalizing living conditions throughout the UNPAs, which will be undertaken after the vigorous implementation which is desired from UNPROFOR. We are ready to take all measures for reestablishing and integrating the school system, social and health care, and pension system with the rest of the Republic of Croatia. We will issue Croatian ID cards to all its citizens in the UNPAs, as well as passports and other documents, in accordance with the existing procedure.

Reopening of the high voltage transmission grid through Sector South is of vital importance for the million inhabitants in Dalmatia and is also for the benefit of the Serbian population in Sector South. The Adriatic oil pipeline which partly crosses through Sector West should also be immediately reopened because of its strategic value for the Republic of Croatia, as well as to the neighbouring countries of Central Europe.

The Croatian Government is prepared to proceed with direct talks on normalization, confidence building and minority rights issues with the legitimate representatives of the Serbian population from each of the UNPA sectors, namely those who have been elected in local elections before the outbreak of the conflict. We firmly believe that one of the

important steps in the renewed and revised mandate of UNPROFOR should be organizing internationally supervised local elections in these parts of Croatia, taking into the account the 1991 Census; this will produce legitimate representatives of the Serbian and other local population on all the governmental levels. We would welcome the participation of these elected representatives in the work of both chambers of Croatian Parliament.

Croatia cannot be satisfied with the results of the ongoing UNPROFOR operation, nor with the manner in which it was performed. Although we salute the brave effort of the UNPROFOR personnel and their devotion to peace, we must unfortunately express dissatisfaction with the fact that the most important provisions of the Vance plan have not yet been fulfilled. We think that this is primarily due to the limited character of the existing UNPROFOR mandate, which proved to be inadequate to initiate and support the process of the return of the refugees, control of international borders of Croatia, disarming of Serbian paramilitary units and restoration of Croatian Government authority in the "pink zones" and UNPAs.

Security Council resolution 807 (1993) which provides the UNPROFOR forces in Croatia with additional measures for their own protection, is a good starting point for intensifying the implementation of the Vance plan, given the fact that the Security Council authorization to UNPROFOR to use force when necessary is essential not only for the personal safety of UN troops, but also for the fulfilment of all unaccomplished provisions of the Vance plan.

Although Croatia is committed to full cooperation with the UNPROFOR, we cannot accept the extension of the same mandate that has been badly misused by the Serbian side. Negotiations and confidence building are absolutely essential, but this process cannot be initiated, nor carried out, without a strengthened UNPROFOR mandate and international guarantees for securing the results of the peace process in the region.

Please accept, Excellency, the expressions of my highest consideration.

President
of the Republic of Croatia


Dr. Franjo Tudman

Zagreb, March 19, 1993

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTOFAX

CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 3

CZU-370

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY GENEVA
VANCE, UNATIONS NEW YORK

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE: 18 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-348SUBJECT: CROATIAN INCURSION AT BLINJSKI KUT

DISTRIBUTION:

HSD

JW

GA

.... 1. ATTACHED IS COPY OF LETTER WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TODAY TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED 10 MARCH INCURSION. FOR THE PAST WEEK, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE THE REMOVAL OF THEIR TROOPS FROM THE BLINJSKI KUT AREA. THIS HAS, HOWEVER, PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL.

2. THE MATTER HAS BEEN RAISED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE GENEVA TALKS. IT IS CLEARLY SEEN BY THE SERB SIDE AS VERY DISRUPTIVE TO THE EFFORTS TO SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 802. THE SERBS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THIS IS ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY CROATIA TO SEE HOW FAR IT CAN GO IN REGAINING BY FORCE AREAS IN THE "PINK ZONE" WITHOUT THERE BEING A REACTION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

2

FO 485

B2

3. DCM HAS INFORMED US TODAY OF FRESH PROGRESS IN THE 802 TALKS AND WE FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS IN REGARD TO THIS NEW INCURSION. PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. WE ARE CONSIDERING MAKING THE LETTER TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLIC. WE SHOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS, AS WELL AS INDICATION FROM YOU OF ANY STEPS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE TAKEN IN REGARD TO THE INCURSION AT ISSUE. ENDALL.

CZV--370

P3/3

FO 485

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR


18 March 1993

Dear Mr. Vice-Premier,

I regret to have to bring to your attention a matter which we view as being of considerable gravity, especially in view of the continuation of peace talks in the context of Security Council resolution 802 of 25 January 1993. As you are aware, on 10 March there was a new incursion by the Croatian Army at Blinjski Kut, in the Pink Zone adjacent to Sector North. The incursion has been protested at the local level and was also raised by myself in Geneva with the Croatian delegation at the talks on a cease-fire and implementation of Security Council resolution 802. Assurances were then given that this situation, which was indicated as being an aberration, would be rectified. However, as of today, no action has been taken by your Government to withdraw your troops. The matter is particularly disturbing because the incursion is not only in breach of the cease-fire agreement and of Security Council resolution 762, but also of resolution 802, and a very tense and explosive situation exists in the area.

We must therefore call upon the Government of Croatia immediately to withdraw its forces to the former confrontation line. In view of the gravity of this situation, we have informed Headquarters in New York for consideration of appropriate action.

Yours sincerely,

FM 
Cedric Thornberry
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Ivan Milas
Vice Prime Minister of the Government
of the Republic of Croatia (C)
Zagreb

5603

002 P04

010/12

CNZ-226 F1/1

CYZ-113

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, NEW YORK
VANCE, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 18 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: MISC-378

SUBJECT: Croatian incursion at Blinjski Kut

CODED CAELE

Helms

[illegible]

With reference to your Z-348, we agree that the letter should be made public.

DISTRIBUTION:

JW FISO

mw LV

DRAFT: 17 March 1993, 17:00

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and shall complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw and no police of these authorities shall move into any such area that is within the perimeter of the Maslenica Bridge determined in accordance with paragraph 3(b) below or that is included in a Pink Zone.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia armed forces and police pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Steering Committee Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992). The following are the initial steps:

- (a) In all such areas referred to above that are included within a Pink Zone, excepting only the areas within the perimeters referred to in paragraph 3(b) below, UNPROFOR is, in implementation of Security Council resolution 762, promptly to start

the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of which shall correspond to the ethnic composition of the areas concerned in accordance with the 1991 census. This police force shall be composed of persons originating from that area. They shall carry only side arms and fulfil the role of peace officers. In rural areas their number shall be one officer per 500 inhabitants and in urban areas one officer per 200 inhabitants.

- (b) Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam, as well as specified associated roads and facilities, are to be available for civilian use by all persons. Such use, as well as all necessary reconstruction, shall be under the control of UNPROFOR. On these sites, as well as on the specified roads connecting them and on the specified facilities, all necessary police functions are to be carried out by UNPROFOR and there shall be no other police force on these sites, roads and facilities. The perimeters of these sites and the specification of these roads and facilities are to be determined by the parties; to the extent that they cannot agree on any such determination within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, those determinations shall be made by UNPROFOR in consultation with the competent authorities.

4. In order to enable UNPROFOR to carry out the functions foreseen for it under this agreement, UNPROFOR is to re-establish and strengthen its military and police presence in each area from which Government of Croatia armed forces and police are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated. The parties shall request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out these functions under the Vance Plan.

17 March 1993

Revised Twentieth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and shall complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw and no police of these authorities shall move into any such area that is within the perimeter of the Maslenica Bridge determined in accordance with paragraph 3(b) below or that is included in a Pink Zone.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia armed forces and police pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Steering Committee Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992). The following are the initial steps:

- (a) In all such areas referred to above that are included within a Pink Zone, excepting only the areas within the perimeters referred to in paragraph 3(b) below, UNPROFOR is, in implementation of Security Council resolution 762, promptly to start

the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of which shall correspond to the ethnic composition of the areas concerned in accordance with the 1991 census. This police force shall be composed of persons originating from that area. They shall carry only side arms and fulfil the role of peace officers. In rural areas their number shall be one officer per 500 inhabitants and in urban areas one officer per 200 inhabitants.

- (b) Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam, as well as specified associated roads and facilities, are to be available for civilian use by all persons. Such use, as well as all necessary reconstruction, shall be under the control of UNPROFOR. On these sites, as well as on the specified roads connecting them and on the specified facilities, all necessary police functions are to be carried out by UNPROFOR and there shall be no other police force on these sites, roads and facilities. The perimeters of these sites and the specification of these roads and facilities are to be determined by the parties; to the extent that they cannot agree on any such determination within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, those determinations shall be made by UNPROFOR in consultation with the competent authorities.

4. In order to enable UNPROFOR to carry out the functions foreseen for it under this agreement, UNPROFOR is to re-establish and strengthen its military and police presence in each area from which Government of Croatia armed forces and police are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated. The parties shall request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out these functions under the Vance Plan.

UNDE FORMS UNIT
Palais des Nations

460/93
010/12

~~93~~ ~~MAR 17 4 18~~ **OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

CNZ-217 P1/1

CYZ-105

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, NEW YORK
VANCE, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 17 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: MISC-362

SUBJECT: Alleged Croatian Troop Concentration in Hungary



With reference to your Z-338, I would appreciate your assessment as to whether the allegations made by the "RSK" are credible before proceeding any further.

DISTRIBUTION:	
HSD	GMW
JW	

1993 MAR 18 10 14 AM
b7c b7d

IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB

7/93
P1/3

C24:360

C26-262

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

UNPROFOR

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

16 93 MR 17 ma 41 Z

010/12

Page 1 of 3

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 16 MARCH 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- **338**

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION OF CROATIAN TROOP CONCENTRATION IN HUNGARY.

... I ATTACH COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO ME BY THE "RSK" MILITARY COMMANDER ALLEGING CROATIAN TROOP CONCENTRATION IN HUNGARY. YOU MIGHT WISH TO DRAW IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES.

ENDALL

DISTRIBUTION:	
HSD	GM-W
JW	

93 MAR 16 19:23

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

SECTOR SOUTH KNIN

TEL: 873-1301262

15.Mar.93 10:33 No.014 P.02

2/3 2/3

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
HQ OF KRAJINA SERBS ARMY
INF. NO. 01-237
14 March 93

VERY URGENT

C2N=360

P2/3

FROM UNPROFOR

TO: UNPROFOR HQ -ZAGREB (to Gen. E.L. WALHGREN)
SECTORS' HQs
THE RSK STATE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR, KNIN

Dear Sir,

We have been informed from reliable sources that during yesterday and today, a bigger Ustashe group has been concentrating in Hungary, in the area of Pecuj town. Precisely, there are 170 buses which this group was driven by, most likely aimed at being used for attack on the Republic of Serbia and the RSK.

We want to warn you that such actions can cause a general escalation of the conflict in the broader area.

We also warn you that, as far as the territory of Western Slavonia is concerned, we have been given strong guarantees from the Sector West HQ in writing (repeated for many times).

We will be very disappointed if it turns out that we are surprised by their action.

We also want to stress that all our previous warnings, unfortunately came true entirely.

Sincerely Yours

COMMANDER
Brig Gen Mile Novakovic

REGIONALNO UREĐENJE
 10. UREĐENJE
 FROM: UNAILO, MAJ. ASSEBU
 15.06 14.03.93

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA
 GLAVNI UREĐENJE SRPSKE VOJSKE

Inf. Br. 01-231

14.03. 1993. 14.

CEN=360

VRLO HITNO

P3/3

NOTE IMMEDIATE

12060/OPS

Protest zbog gonjenja
 ustaških snaga iz ino-
 stranstva.-

KOMANDI UNPROFOR-a ZAGREB (na ličnost generala E. L. Valgrenia)
 KOMANDAMA SEKTORA
 DRŽAVNOM KOMITETU RSK ZA SARADNJU SA UNPROFOR-om KIJIN (na znanje)

Poštovani gospodine,

Iz pouzdanih izvora obavješteni smo da je u toku jučerašnjeg i današnjeg dana u Madarskoj u rejonu grada Pečuja stacionirana veća grupa ustaša. Konkretno, radi se o 170 autobusa kojima su dovezene ove snage, čiji je verovatni cilj da budu upotrebljene za napad prema teritoriji RS i RSK.

Želimo da Vas upozorimo da ovakvi postupci mogu uticati na opštu eskalaciju sukoba na širim prostorima.

Upozoravamo, takode, da za teritoriju Zapadne Slavonije imamo čvrste i pismene garancije komande Sektora "Zapad" (ponovljene više puta).

Bićemo jako razočarani ako se ispostavi da smo iznenađeni i zatečeni njihovim angažovanjem.

Takode, želimo da naglasimo da su se sva naša dosadašnja upozorenja na žalost u potpunosti obistinila.

S poštovanjem.



MANDANT -
 1-majstor
 Jovaković

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten notes]
 CAC
 CC

MOST IMMEDIATE
CODE RESTRICTED COMMUNICATIONS 459/93
ZAGREB
UNPROFOR 16 93 MR 17 ma 40Z 010/12
OUTGOING CODE CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE
C2N=359
C26=260
P1/3
Page 1 of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA
FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*
DATE: 16 MARCH 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 335
SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST MEETING WITH DZAKULA, 15 MARCH

I attach an interesting report of meeting between our Acting CAC in Sector West, Khalaf, and Dzakula.

Endall.

DISTRIBUTION:	
H50	GMW
JW	
GA	

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
93 MAR 16 19:22

cc EC, DFC, COS, CPO, CMO

2/3

CT

MA

Abit

Bericht: ONV1741 Afdrukt op 15-03-93 (21:46 Z)

T-456 151940

1 15 2130A MAR 93

FM: SHQ WEST/YUSUF KHALAF, ACTING CAC SECTOR WEST, DARUVAR

TO: UNPROFOR HQ SWHQ 167

ATTN: MR. CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION

R E S T R I C T E D

BT

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR DZAKULA ON 15 MARCH AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
IN PAKRAC/OKUCANI AREA

-- MESSAGE --

ON 15 MARCH, MYSELF AND MR. CHERNIAVSKY MET WITH MR. DZAKULA AT HIS
RESIDENCE IN JAFAGA (PAKRAC).MR. DZAKULA MADE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS SUMMARY OF WHICH FOLLOWS
BELOW:

1. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA, ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENT MR. GORAN HADZIC REGARD HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES AS TRAITORS AFTER HE HAD SIGNED IN CAMP POLOM (DARUVAR) AN AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE CROATIAN LOCAL AUTHORITIES. MR. DZAKULA DESCRIBED THE INTENSIONS OF HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS AS POLITICAL LYNCH OF HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES.

2. MR. DZAKULA WAS BITTER ABOUT THE PUBLICITY AROUND THE CAMP POLOM MEETING OF 18 FEBRUARY WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM, WAS MISUSED BY THE CROATIAN SIDE TO ITS POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. SUCH UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY ENDANGERED HIS POSITION AND WORSENERD HIS ALREADY FRAIL RELATIONS WITH THE KNIN AUTHORITIES.

3. HIS PERSONAL POSITION IS DIFFICULT BUT NOT DESPERATE. AT THE END OF THIS WEEK (SATURDAY OF SUNDAY) HE IS PLANNING TO CONVENE SKUPCINA (LOCAL PARLIAMENT) MEETING OF WEST SLAVONIA TO OBTAIN MANDATE TO CONTINUE HIS POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR AND THE SUPPORT OF UN-SPONSORED PROJECTS IN THE AREA. MR. DZAKULA IS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD GET HIS SUPPORT. HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS POLICY LINE HAS FULL SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA.

4. AT THIS TIME, IN MR. DZAKULA'S WORDS, MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED AS AN OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA TALKS BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATS. IF THE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED THIS WEEK, IT WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS HIS OPPONENTS, I.E. HARDLINERS FROM KNIN AND THEIR LOCAL COLLABORATORS.

5. MR. DZAKULA HAS JUST RETURNED FROM BELGRADE WHERE HE RECEIVED ONLY VERBAL SUPPORT FOR HIS INITIATIVES. IN GENERAL, THE BELGRADE AUTHORITIES DID NOT FIND IN THE DARUVAR AGREEMENT SIGNED ON 18 FEBRUARY ANYTHING THAT CONTRADICTS UNPROFOR MANDATE AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT OBJECT TO THIS. HOWEVER, HE MADE US UNDERSTAND THAT THIS SUPPORT WAS AT THE MOST HALFHEARTED.

Dcm

6. MR. DZAKULA WOULD LIKE UNPROFOR TO CONTINUE VILLAGE VISITATION PROGRAMME, AS WELL AS OTHER UN PROJECTS. HE SAID HE WOULD ENCOURAGE SPONTANEOUS VISITS OF SERBS TO VILLAGES ON THE CROATIAN SIDE. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE UNPROFOR ENSURE GENUINE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE IN THE WHOLE SECTOR, INCLUDING VISITATIONS AND FAMILY CONTACTS AT THE CHECKPOINTS.



C2N 357

ANOTHER RELATED DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST WAS A MEETING ON 13 MARCH IN OKUCANI BETWEEN RSK LEADERS MESSRS. GORAN HADZIC AND MILE PASPALJ AND THE LOCAL HARDLINERS, MESSRS. DUSAN VITEZ (VICE-PREIDENT OF RSK), VACO OSTROLUCANIN (POLICE CHIEF OF OKUCANI) AND MILAN CERELETEC (NEW TDF COMMANDER). THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING IS NOT YET KNOWN TO US, BUT ONE CAN GUESS THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO LYNCH MR. DZAKULA AND HIS COLLEAGUES AND BOLSTER POSITIONS OF KNIN IN WEST SLAVONIA.

ON 15 MARCH, MYSELF AND MR. CHERNIAVSKY HAD A MEETING AT PACRAC (SERB) POLICE STATION WITH MR. OSTROLUCANIN AND MR. OROSOVIC, LOCAL SERB POLICE CHIEF OF PACRAC. WE RAISED THE ISSUE OF CONTINUATION OF FAMILY MEETINGS AT THE CHECKPOINTS GAVRINICA, MEDARI, STARI GRABOVAC AS WELL AS RE-INTRODUCING VILLAGE VISITATIONS. BOTH POLICE CHIEFS WERE INTRANSIGENT ON THE ISSUE AS LONG AS THEY HAVE A STATE-OF-WAR WITH CROATIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIGHTING IN SECTOR SOUTH. THEY WERE DEAF FOR OUR ARGUMENTS.

H50
010/12

15 March 1993

Twentieth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and shall complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw and no police of these authorities shall move into any such area that is included in a Pink Zone or into any area within the perimeter of the Maslenica Bridge defined in accordance with paragraph 3(b) below.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia armed forces and police pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Steering Committee Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992). The following are the initial steps:

- (a) In all such areas referred to above that are included within a Pink Zone, excepting only the areas within the perimeters referred to in paragraph 3(b) below, UNPROFOR is, in implementation of Security Council resolution 762, promptly to start

the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of which shall correspond to the ethnic composition of the areas concerned in accordance with the 1991 census. This police force shall be composed of persons originating from that area. They shall carry only side arms and fulfil the role of peace officers. In rural areas their number shall be one officer per 500 inhabitants and in urban areas one officer per 200 inhabitants.

- (b) Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam, as well as the associated roads [and power lines], are to be available for civilian use by all persons, under the control of UNPROFOR. At these sites, as well as on specified roads connecting them [and under specified power lines], all necessary police functions shall be carried out by UNPROFOR and there shall be no other police force on these sites, roads [and lines]. The perimeters of these sites, roads [and lines] are to be defined by UNPROFOR in consultation with military experts of both sides.

4. In order to enable UNPROFOR to carry out the functions foreseen for it under this agreement, UNPROFOR is to re-establish and strengthen its military and police presence in each area from which Government of Croatia armed forces and police are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated. The parties shall request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out these functions under the Vance Plan.

MOST IMMEDIATE
C2A-339
CODE F-339
2G-243

010/12 398/93

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PARIS 121900Z MAR 93

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

MAR 12 19:40

DISTRIBUTION:

JW HSO

MW

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 12 March 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-317

SUBJECT : SITUATION IN DUBROVNIK

REF : MY Z-306 OF 11 MARCH 1993

1. SINCE MY LAST REPORT, AT REFERENCE, ON THE SITUATION IN THE DUBROVNIK AREA, WE HAVE CONTACTED THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND THE CMO NEGOTIATED DURING THE AFTERNOON WITH MR BUDIMIR PLESTINA, HEAD OF CROATIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY'S OFFICE FOR UN AND EEC. AT THAT MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER SHELLING IN THE DUBROVNIK AREA, CROATIAN FORCES WOULD NOT RETALIATE FOR A PERIOD OF 24 HOURS. A REQUEST WAS ALSO MADE TO THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES, TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN TO REACTIVATE THE LIGHTHOUSE ON THE EDGE OF THE PENINSULA. THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES WILL RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST IN DUE COURSE.

2. LORD OWEN CALLED DCM, MR THORNBERRY, FROM PARIS YESTERDAY EVENING AND WAS INFORMED ABOUT EVENTS IN THE DUBROVNIK AREA. LORD OWEN SAID THAT HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER AT ONCE WITH PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC.

3. I SHALL GO TO KNIN TOMORROW, 13 MARCH, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND WILL MEET THE KRAJINA-SERB AUTHORITIES.

4. CMO TRAVELS TOMORROW TO VISIT ZADAR AND SIBENIK BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DUBROVNIK ON MONDAY 15 MARCH. MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH LOCAL AND ZONE COMMANDERS IN DUBROVNIK AND HERZOG NOVI (MONTENEGRO) AND WITH THE CORPS COMMANDER OF THE BOSNIAN SERB FORCES NORTH OF DUBROVNIK.

5. SINCE OUR LAST REPORT, AND UP TO 121900 HOURS LOCAL TIME, SITUATION HAS BEEN CALM IN BOTH SIBENIK AND DUBROVNIK.

6. WITH BEST REGARDS,

MOST IMMEDIATE
CODE RESTRICTED

QZN-328

CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZG-234

OUTGOING (CODE OR CLEAR) CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
1993
Page 1 of 2
ma 027

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Wahlgren

DATE : 11 March 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-306

SUBJECT : SITUATION IN DUBROVNIK

REF : MY Z-302 OF 10 MARCH 93

CODED CABLE

1. SITUATION IN DUBROVNIK AREA HAS FURTHER DETERIORATED TODAY. UNMO TEAM DUBROVNIK REPORTS EXCHANGES OF FIRE BETWEEN BOSNIAN SERB, MONTENEGRAN SERB AND CROATIAN ARMY POSITIONS IN DUBROVNIK AREA. AT LEAST 57 ROUNDS EXCHANGED BETWEEN 1400 AND 1715 HRS LT. DETAILED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IS ATTACHED.

2. EXCHANGE WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEGUN WITH EXCHANGE OF FIRE BETWEEN BOSNIAN SERB AND CROATIAN ARMY UNITS, FOLLOWED BY SHELLING OF MONTENEGRAN POSITIONS NEAR SITNICA. JA LO HAS STATED THAT SHELLING ORIGINATED WITH BOSNIAN SERBS (HERZEGOVINA CORPS) AROUND SW OF TREBINJE AND WAS NOT FROM MONTENEGRAN SERBS. CROATIAN ARMY LO CLAIMS NOT TO HAVE SHELLED MONTENEGRAN POSITIONS. FURTHER STATES THAT SHELLING OF SITNICA CARRIED OUT BY BOSNIAN SERBS. EXPLANATION REJECTED BY JA LO.

3. UNMO TEAM DUBROVNIK REPORTS FURTHER SPORADIC EXPLOSIONS IN HILLS TO NORTH BUT THAT EXCHANGES HAD STOPPED AT 1715 HRS LT.

4. ALTHOUGH CILIPi AIRPORT NOT SHELLED DIRECTLY, I AM CONCERNED AT DETERIORATION OF SITUATION OVER LAST 48 HRS. CMO HAS ONCE AGAIN CONTACTED ALL PARTIES TO REINFORCE YESTERDAY'S DEMANDS THAT ALL SHELLING AND RETALLIATION CEASE FORTHWITH AND ATTEMPTS AT LOCAL LEVEL TO RESTORE CALM CONTINUE. UNMO TEAM NOW ATTEMPTING TO GAIN ACCESS TO SITNICA TO EXAMINE CRATERS WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION.

93 MAR 11 20:13
Packed 11 20:13

DISTRIBUTION:	
DM	W
LV	
GA	

C2N-328 Page 2 of 2
C2G-234

CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS DUBROVNIK

- A. 1400 HRS LT IMPACT OF 5 SHELLS ON TRESTENAC MOUNTAIN, 2.5 KM FROM AIRPORT (240150).
- B. EXCHANGE OF ARTILLERY/MORTAR FIRE IN VICINITY OF AIRPORT BETWEEN 1400-1417 HRS LT. TOTAL 26 ROUNDS OF WHICH 20 ESTIMATED TO BE INCOMING TO CROATIAN TERRITORY ON LINE KUPARI (160204) TO GRUDA (315080) AND 6 OUTGOING. HOUSES SEEN BURNING.
- C. 1445-1452 HRS LT FURTHER 6 SHELLS RETURNED BY CROATIAN ARMY FROM UNCONFIRMED LOCATION.
- D. 1500 HRS LT 10 ROUNDS ARTILLERY/MORTAR FIRE HEARD BY UNMO TEAM TO IMPACT ON FRONT LINE NEAR IVANICA (140240) AND TREBINJE (285289).
- E. 1520-1530 UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM LOCAL CIVILIANS OF 2 IMPACTS 5 KM SOUTH EAST OF AIRPORT (2808).
- F. 1526 HRS LT ONE SHELL IMPACTED NEAR DUBRAVKA 11 KM EAST OF AIRPORT (355103).
- G. 1530 HRS LT 2 SHELLS FIRED BY CROATIAN ARMY FROM AREA OF DUBROVNIK.
- H. 1530 HRS LT JA LO REPORTS 3 ROUNDS 82MM MORTAR LANDED SITNICA (MONTENEGRO) (373125). CLAIMED FIRED FROM DUBRAVKA. THIS DENIED BY CA LO WHO ADMITS CA SHELLING JABLANDO (351151) AND KOZINDO (351142) (BOTH BOSNIAN SERB, HERZEGOVINA CORPS POSITIONS).
- I. 1555 HRS LT JA LO REPORTS 2 MORE IMPACTS ON SITNICA.
- J. 1610-1717 HRS LT UNMO TEAM DUBROVNIK REPORTS SPORADIC EXPLOSIONS IN HILLS TO NORTH.
- K. 1717 HRS LT ALL REPORTED QUIET.

CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZN-331
CZG-237

OUTGOING (CODE OR CLEAR) CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE

1/3
UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
LOG

Page 1 of 3
11 93 MAR 18 22Z

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO : VANCE, GENEVA
FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*
DATE : 11 March 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-309
SUBJECT : SITUATION IN SIBENIK
REF :

CODED CABLE

1. The Krajina-serbs shelled Sibenik at two occasions during 10 March. Please find attached the special sitreps sent by the UNMO team in Sibenik.
2. Between 111340 hrs and 111430 hrs the UNMO team registered twenty 82 mm mortar shells in Sibenik. The Croatian forces have not yet retaliated but threatens to do so against Benkovac and Knin.
3. I have ordered Cmdr Sector South to demand the Krajina forces to stop the shelling.

DISTRIBUTION:	
PH	
GA	
JW	

93 MAR 11 20:12

TO : UNMO HQ ZAGREB



CZM-331

CZG-237

2/3

INFO : UNMO HQ KNIN

FROM : UNMO SIBENIK

DTG : 110100 MAR 93

SPECIAL SITREP

1. REF OUR SPECIAL SITREP, DATED 102700 MAR 93. PTL INSPECTED THE MRC M-77 IMPACTS IN SIBENIK TOWN AND COMPLETED AT 110100 MAR.
2. 15 IMPACTS HAS BEEN PHYSICALLY OBSERVED 6 RDS HIT GENERAL HOSPITAL OF TOWN AREA, NO CAS BUT SEVERAL AMBULANCES, CARS AND HOSPITAL BUILDINGS, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN DESTROYED. IT IS A HUGE DAMAGE ALL THE PATIENTS ARE NOW UNDER SHELTER AND IN UNDER GROUND CORRIDOR.
3. ONE CHURCH OF TOWN IS DIRECTLY HIT 4 COMPLETELY DAMAGED. W
4. 4 HOUSES ALSO DIRECTLY HIT AND BADLY DAMAGED.
5. 3 RDS IMPACTED ON THE ROAD AND ONE OUT SIDE OF TOWN IN THE WOOD.
6. THERE WERE NO CAS DUE TO GENERAL ALARM SOUNDED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TK FIRING WHICH LANDED OUT SKIRT OF TOWN AT 101638 MAR 93 AND THIS MRL WAS LANDED AT 101946 MAR 93. AT THAT TIME EVERYBODY WAS UNDER COVER/SHELTER. W
7. DAMAGE OF HOSPITAL COST COULD NOT BE GUESSED BECAUSE IT IS BADLY DAMAGED, ACCORDING TO CHIEF OF DOCTOR. HOSPITAL WAS 750 BED AND NOW NOT MORE THEN 200 BED WORKABLE. ONE EMERGENCY SURGERY ROOM IS ALSO DESTROYED WHICH WAS VERY MODERN. NOW THEY HAVE ONLY TWO PERSON AT A TIME CAN MAKE OPERATION. WE VISITED ALL THE AREA OUTSIDE AND INSIDE OF HOSPITAL. W
8. SIT IS VERY TENSE, EVERYBODY ARE UNDER SHELTER, ALARM IS STILL ON. W
9. WITH REGARDS.

FC

DFC

DCM

DDCA

IOS

DL BL

11/3

Special SITREP

CZN-331

CZG-237

3/3

To: UNMO HQ Zagreb

From: UNMO Sibenik

Date: 102100 March 1993

1. There were several CFV, made by Serbian side along the CFL during last 24 hours. The rate of CFV was more than a normal day. Weapons being used were down from SA up to MRL 262 mm (Orkan).

2. The township Sibenik was shelled twice today. Firstly, at 1658 eight tank rounds landed on the outskirt of Sibenik fired from Sonkovic 7157. There was no casualty but material damage. General alarm was imposed after the shelling. Informations are yet to be confirmed.

3. At 1946 hours 12 rounds of MRL landed on Sibenik. We heard the sound of those shells from our office. Immediately after that liaison officer CA advised MG to inform Knin so that all UNPROFOR personnel there, should take shelter as CA were forced to retaliate by shelling onto Knin. As I informed this to UNMO Knin, the sector Comd appealed in the scene and requested CA authority not to do so as he would take actions at his end to stop the shelling from Serbian side. Loca agreed that and till now refrained themselves from shelling onto Knin.

4. Reliable source informed that there was huge damage to the properties. One hospital was hit and partially destroyed. Some houses and cars caught fire. Casualties are not yet known. General alert continuing, civilian population is in panic. Detailed reports followed after investigation tomorrow morning.

5. Regards

Duty Officer
UNMO Sibenik

MOST IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

10 53 HR 16 00 472

CZN-324 CZG-231

OUTGOING (CODE OR CLEAR) CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 10 March 1993

NUMBER : UN PROFOR Z-302

SUBJECT : SITUATION IN DUBROVNIK

REF :

UNMO TEAM DUBROVNIK REPORTED AT 1545 HRS LT THAT FIFTEEN (15) ROUNDS OF 105/120 MM ARTILLERY/MORTAR FIRE IMPACTED 800 METERS FROM CILIPAI AIRPORT DUBROVNIK. SITUATION AT 1700 HRS LT REPORTED CALM, UNMO TEAM ATTEMPTING NOW TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION. ON MY BEHALF, CMO HAS INFORMED AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE, PALE AND BANJA LUKA AND THE CROATIAN ARMY. HE HAS DEMANDED THAT SHELLING BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AND THAT THERE BE NO RETALIATION BY CROATIAN FORCES. UNMO TEAM DUBROVNIK HAS ALSO MADE LOCAL CONTACT WITH CROATIAN ARMY AND MONTENEGRO AND BOSNIAN AUTHORITIES ON SAME LINES.

DISTRIBUTION:

P.H.

93 MAR 10 17:14

212.9 000 1 100NS

600.2 1000000 1001

010/12

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: Lord Owen/Cyrus Vance

DATE: 5.3.93

FAX: 00012129631992

PAGE: 1 OF: 6

FROM: P E Hall

FAX NO: (41-22) 917 0096

-
1. The attached is for your information

4 March 1993

Seventeenth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. In order to implement paragraph 4 below, UNPROFOR shall re-establish and strengthen its military and police presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia forces are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia forces and police are withdrawn, immediately after the implementation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above:

- (a) At the sites of Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik airport and Peruca Dam, and on specified roads connecting these facilities, all necessary police functions shall be carried out by UNPROFOR and there shall be no other police force on these sites and

KRAJINA TALKS, GENEVA, 1-4 MARCH 1993

1. Four days of proximity talks (i.e. no trilaterals) have brought us to a seventeenth draft, tabled by us. Although this has not been initialled by the Croats, they have referred it to Susak and have told us categorically that it is acceptable to their side. They have now departed. The Serbs have come up with an eighteenth draft, which we are faxing to the Croats. Both texts attached.

2. It is not impossible - though far from certain - that the Croats will find the eighteenth draft broadly acceptable (particularly if the Serbs agree to delete, from the second sentence in paragraph 1, the words quote except the police unquote. They have indicated that they may be able to). However, that hurdle apart, the problem of substance remains: the return of the local Serbian police.

3. On the plus side, both the latest drafts set down reasonably clearly the important areas on which agreement has been reached: Croatian army and police to withdraw to pre-January positions; Serbian heavy weapons to be put under UNPROFOR control; Maslenica bridge, Zemunik airport, and Peruca dam to be under exclusive UNPROFOR control. The problem of the local Serbian police has been redefined, and we hope limited. The issue is no longer whether any such police can return (the Croats have indicated that a very limited presence will be tolerable), but where and in what numbers. Our tactic has been to argue that for security reasons there will have to be perimeters, also under UNPROFOR control, around Maslenica, Zemunik and Peruca; the point being that this would reduce the areas to which Serbian police might theoretically return, and thus reduce the scope of the problem. This notion, and the proposition that experts from both sides should meet next week to discuss with UNPROFOR and ICFY the area of such perimeters, seems acceptable to both sides. The meeting will have to be held on or near the line of confrontation: the Serbs have suggested Obrovac, 15 kilometres east of Maslenica.

4. This is a small step forward. But it is only a small step. Undoubtedly the Croats will argue for maximum perimeters, the Serbs for minimum. There is of course no goodwill to hand; the talks here were decidedly difficult, and involved some blunt speaking, including by us. The chances of agreement next week on perimeters, and hence on the ceasefire package, are extremely slim (though we think the effort must be made). Behind all this the two sides are as far apart as ever on fundamentals, i.e. who has sovereignty over the Serbian enclaves. It is not even certain that the meeting will be held, since the Serbs are muttering that a precondition should be that both sides initial a draft text beforehand.

5. Geert Ahrens plans to fly to Belgrade on Tuesday 9 March, for talks that day and 10 March on minorities problems. He hopes to see the Serbian Education Minister (Kosovo), the Patriarch (Macedonia) and the Krajina Serbs. Pavicevic has indicated that Ahrens may also be able to see Cosic and Milosevic. If so, he would brief the Presidents on state of play on minorities, especially Kosovo and Krajina, and invite their views. He is then scheduled to go to Skopje for a day or two. The Krajina perimeter talks are therefore likely to be at the end of next week, or possibly as early as Monday 8 March, if Ahrens and Thornberry can both get to Croatia that day. Ahrens will be flexible, and will take account of the plans of Thornberry and of course the Co-Chairmen.

6. My judgement is that, given the continuing yawning gap between Croats and Serbs over the fundamentals of the Krajina, and the risk of renewed conflict, pressure by the Co-Chairmen at the highest level in Belgrade and Zagreb will be essential. But I doubt if that pressure needs or should be applied in the immediate future i.e. in the context of next week's meeting on perimeters. Of course if the Co-Chairmen decide for other (Bosnian) reasons to go to Belgrade or Zagreb next week, the opportunity should not be lost to press for flexibility and moderation over the Krajina. In that case Ahrens might need to adjust his schedule. He plans to telephone Lord Owen today morning New York time.

2

routes. These facilities and routes are to be available for civilian use, under the control of UNPROFOR, by all inhabitants.

The perimeters of these sites and routes will be defined in consultations of military experts of both sides under the chairmanship of ICFY and UNPROFOR. These consultations will take place in the week beginning March 8, 1993.

- (b) In all such areas that are included within a Pink Zone and that are not covered by (a) above, UNPROFOR shall, in implementation of Security Council Resolution 762, immediately start the formation of a civilian police force, the composition of which shall correspond to the ethnic composition of the areas concerned prior to the conflict, in accordance with the 1991 census.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4 above.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

7. Without prejudice to the obligations of both parties to fulfil the provisions of Security Council resolution 802, the entry into force of the elements set out in paragraphs 1-6 above is conditioned upon agreement being reached on the perimeters of the above-mentioned sites and routes (para. 4 (a) above).

4 March 1993

Eighteenth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 in accordance with Security Council Resolution 802 (1993), and complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces [except the police] of the Serb authorities in protected areas shall move into any area from which the Government of Croatia armed forces and police thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia's forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days of the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR and in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. In order to implement Security Council Resolution 802 (1993), UNPROFOR shall re-establish its presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia ^{armed} forces ^{and police} are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia armed forces and police are withdrawn, immediately after the implementation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above:

- (a) At the sites of Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam, and on specified UN 'blue' routes, all necessary functions shall be carried out by UNPROFOR and there shall be no other armed force, police, administrative presence, or state symbols of either of the

two sides on these sites and routes. These facilities and UN 'blue' routes are to be available exclusively for civilian use by both sides, under the control of UNPROFOR.

- (b) The parameters of the sites of Maslenica Bridge and Zemunik Airport and UN 'blue' routes Maslenica-Zadar will be defined in consultations of military experts of both sides under the chairmanship of ICFY and UNPROFOR. These consultations will take place in the week beginning March 8, 1993.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

'93 MAR -3 -9 127

IMMEDIATE

CZY-040

6VA00500

CRYPTO FAX TRANSMITTAL

PAGE 1 OF 4

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO: VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK
INFO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB
FROM: THORNBERRY, UNPROFOR GENEVA *Cedric Thornberry*
DATE: 3 MARCH 1993
SUBJECT: CROATIAN/SERB LOCAL AUTHORITIES' MEETING,
2 MARCH 1993

1. The second day's round of this second phase of these meetings did not produce results, and we enter the third day without sign of breakthrough. The Croatian Government delegation, led by Susak who, however, departed last evening, showed some further slight flexibility in their position. However the "RSK" did not, and we are still unable to close the really quite small gap between them.
2. Yesterday morning the Croats agreed, as shown in "draft 13", attached hereto, to accept a token presence of Serb police in the one village which, they asserted, was Serb, in the area of their advance.
3. In the afternoon the Serbs declined to discuss this approach. Instead, they provided once again their variant "draft 6" on which they had insisted on Monday. They went on at length about their sovereignty, including over the Pink Zones and, when challenged on this, gave a most uncertain reply. At the final meeting of the day with the Serbs, Hadzic and Paspalj did not appear, and the presentation was made by Milosevic. He insisted that 802 should not be related to any other resolutions eg 762. We emphasised that this was in breach even of 802, which makes several references to the overall context in which it has to be implemented, but all to no avail. We benefited from several further historical presentations by them, but that got us nowhere.

- 2 -

4. This morning we hope to look at the military implications of the Serbs offer re Maslenica, Zemunik and Peruca, and the "blue routes". But our impression is that the Serb delegation, because of the disarray at home, and absent effective pressure from Belgrade, is basically unable to take a forward step without which it will be very hard to get an agreement to implement 802.

5. The Croats told us that Dzakula and the others from Sector West who had participated in the recent discussions with them were under actual or house arrest, and I raised this with the Serbs. Milosevic seemed especially taken aback and promised to find out overnight what had been going on. We made ominous noises.

Endall.

*agreed by C. State of 1300 hrs
+ 1515 hrs 2-
C77-090 3/1*

2 March 1993

Thirteenth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, UNPROFOR shall re-establish and strengthen its military and police presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia forces are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1. before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia forces and police are withdrawn, immediately after the implementation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above:

- (a) In all such areas that are included within a Pink Zone and that are not covered by
- (b) below, UNPROFOR shall carry out the necessary police functions until the second sentence of paragraph 16(d) of the

report of the Secretary-General set out in document S/24188 is implemented as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992). There shall be no Serb police in these areas, except that until such implementation no more than 6 Serb local police, who shall carry no more than side arms, may be in the village of Islam Grcki.

- (b) At the sites of and on specified routes connecting the following facilities (whose exact perimeters are to be defined in further consultation with UNPROFOR): Maslenica Bridge; Zemunik airport; and Peruca Dam, there shall be no Serb police and UNPROFOR shall carry out the necessary police functions. These facilities and routes are to be available for civilian use, under the control of UNPROFOR, by all inhabitants.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4 above.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

010/12



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: Mr. Bertie Ramcharan
I.C.F.Y.
Room S-2920A
United Nations
New York

FAX: 00-1-212-963 1992

PAGE 1 OF 5

FROM: J. Cummins

FAX NOS:
(41-22)-917 0080
(41-22)-917 0079
(41-22)-917 0078
TEL NO:
(41-22)-917 3148

DATE: 2 March 1993

Please see attached.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Janet".



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

1 March 1993

TALKS WITH DELEGATIONS FROM ZAGREB AND KNIN

A meeting with representatives of the Serbs from Krajina (Knin) was held on 1 March 1993. The Serbian representatives were led by Mr. Goran Hadzic, "President" of "The Republic of Serbian Krajina". Other members of the Serbian delegation were Mr. Paspalj, Mr. Jarcevic and Mr. Milosevic. Present for the ICFY were the two Co-Chairpersons of these talks, Ambassadors Ahrens and Okun, as well as Ambassador Hall and Messrs. Thornberry, Szasz and Coutinho.

Ambassador Okun opened the meeting by stressing the importance the Co-Chairmen attach to this issue, the need to reach an agreement and that talks of such importance should not be broken off by either side.

Before handing over to the Serbs the tenth draft of "Elements of a ceasefire agreement between the Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities in implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)" (Annex 1), Ambassador Ahrens drew the attention of participants to the time pressure the Group was under. There were approximately 3 weeks before the report to the Security Council regarding the prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate should be submitted.

After consulting with his delegation, Mr. Hadzic said that he was not willing to discuss the tenth draft which he did not see. He stated that the Group should discuss the Serbian proposal of 26 February (Annex 2). Mr. Hadzic clearly stated that he would make no further concessions prior to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 and that the Serbian standpoint would not change throughout the talks. He also mentioned that the Serbs would not be ready to seat around the same table and discuss with the Croatian authorities before receiving a clear signal from the field concerning the "in loco" implementation of Security Council Resolution 802, mainly the withdrawal of the Croatian army to the positions it held before 22 January.

Ambassador Ahrens, by comparing the Serbian proposal with the tenth draft, made it clear that disagreement was still only in one point: whether the Serbian police could return into the 802 areas once the Croats had withdrawn.

SC

1/3/93

ANNEX 1

23 February 1993

Tenth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement between the
Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, UNPROFOR shall re-establish its presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia forces are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia forces and police are withdrawn, immediately after the implementation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above:

- (a) Police of the Serb local authorities may only be in those parts of the specified areas as are not included in (b) or (c) below.

(b) In all such areas that are included within a Pink Zone, UNPROFOR shall carry out the necessary police functions until the second sentence of paragraph 16(d) of the report of the Secretary-General set out in document S/24188 is implemented as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992).

(c) UNPROFOR shall also carry out the necessary police functions at the sites of the following facilities (whose exact perimeters are to be defined in further consultation with UNPROFOR): Maslenica Bridge; Zemunik airport; and Peruca Dam. These facilities are to be available for civilian use, under the control of UNPROFOR, by all inhabitants.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4 above.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

ANNEX 2

20 February 1993

Sixth Draft

Elements of an Agreement on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)
between the Croatian and Serb sides

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993.

2. No armed forces of the Serb authorities in UNPAs shall move into any area from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1.

Neither the armed forces nor the police of the Serb authorities in UNPAs shall move into the sites provided for joint civilian use under UNPROFOR control: the Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam.

3. UNPROFOR, including UNCIVPOL, shall take control of the sites specified in paragraph 2 and shall also re-establish its presence in the other areas from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1 as soon as each area is vacated pursuant to that paragraph.

4. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 5 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

22 February 1993

Ninth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement between the
Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces of the Republic of Croatia shall, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 5 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, UNPROFOR shall re-establish its presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia forces are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia forces are withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 1:

- (a) All police of the Republic of Croatia shall be withdrawn from the specified areas at the same time as the armed forces are.
- (b) Police of the Serb local authorities may only be in those parts of the specified areas as are not included in (c) or (d) below.

- (c) In all such areas that are included within a Pink Zone, except for the sites specified in (d) below, UNPROFOR shall carry out the necessary police functions until the second sentence of paragraph 16(d) of the report of the Secretary-General set out in document S/24188 can be implemented as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992).
- (d) UNPROFOR shall also carry out the necessary police functions at the sites of the following facilities (whose exact perimeters are to be defined in further consultation with UNPROFOR), which are to be available for civilian use, under the control of UNPROFOR, by all inhabitants: Maslenica Bridge; Zemunik airport; and Peruca Dam.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4 above.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).