

UNAMIR

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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1/4

CRN 074-03

File
17 Mar 95

TO: ANNAN/HANSEN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: AIME/KITTANI/GHAREKHAN

FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Signature of J. Khan

DATE: 16 MARCH 1995

NO.: MIR 997

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT GENERAL PAUL KAGAME
ON 14 MARCH

1. Vice-President, General Paul Kagame received me at 5:00 pm on March 14. I was accompanied by General Tousignant. The meeting lasted 75 minutes. The subjects that I raised were the same as with the President, two days earlier, except that I dwelt in greater detail on the need to clear misunderstandings and friction points at regular staff meetings which had not recently been held because RPA had cancelled them. The other subjects raised were:

- a) UNAMIR mandate after June 9
- b) The security situation in Rwanda
- c) The militarisation of refugee camps in Zaire

The Vice-President's response is summarized below:

Mandate after June 9

2. In a long and convoluted rationalisation, General Kagame indicated that Rwanda was now ready to measure up to its national responsibilities in terms of security and sovereign governance

of its territory. United Nations' role was appreciated and marked a successful chapter in its peace-keeping operations but Rwanda must now stand on its own feet. He likened the process in Rwanda to that of a child who needs help in learning to walk. A time comes when he must walk alone and without help. UNAMIR's presence was appreciated and had been helpful but it also derogated from Rwanda's sovereign ability to "stand on its own feet". He agreed that the issue should be discussed in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two sides. He said that he would give the matter some detailed thought and would be in a position to discuss UNAMIR's mandate beyond June 9th after "about 10 days". I replied that we would be glad to have a preliminary round of discussions on this issue as indicated by the Vice-President.

RPA-UNAMIR frictions

3. On the increasing number of friction-points between UNAMIR and RPA, I stated that these should be addressed at the regular staff meetings which regrettably had been cancelled of late. General Kagame pointed to a file on his table listing complaints against UNAMIR - minor issues, like insensitive driving, arrogant behaviour, not heeding security barriers etc. He agreed that these matters needed to be resolved at the staff level. He ordered his staff to schedule the meetings (and one is being held on 16th March). Kagame added that these incidents tended to become exaggerated locally and did not reflect the spirit of cooperation between the two sides. Kagame stated that though the friction and the mandate were two separate issues, a certain link could be found between them. However, the issues needed to be addressed separately.

International aid and security

4. On international aid, Kagame was cynical over the slow response of the international community. He mentioned that a vast number of VIPs and International delegations had visited Kigali and a number of conferences had taken place but hardly any meaningful aid had come through. The international community was constantly raising the concerns over greater security. However, when Rwanda requested that vehicles and equipment that the army needed for increased security be purchased, permission was not granted. Kagame said that 70% of the security patrols by the RPA were on foot which was hardly an effective way of bringing about security. So while the world built up expectations from Rwanda, it denied the Rwandese government the means to deliver. Accordingly there was frustration among the government and

people which manifested itself in many ways. Kagame stated that the opposing forces had started a propaganda campaign raising security concerns but he was confident that his government would effectively handle the situation. He repeated again that Rwanda today was better governed than many of its neighbours, especially Zaire, Burundi and even Kenya !

Zaire

5. On Zaire, the Vice-President said that its role had been known and evident all along. From the beginning of the war, Zaire had helped the RGF to train and to receive arms supplies. The international community had known about this and had done nothing to stop it. In fact, vast amount of humanitarian aid had been poured into the refugee camps in Zaire which were controlled by the killers. This aid was openly being converted into military capability. Kagame added that resolutions were passed and action plans approved but no real change in the situation on the ground was forthcoming. It did not surprise him that Zaire was receiving arms and helping the RGF to prepare militarily. Rwanda would have to face the threat alone and through its own resources. It was ready to do so.

Comment

6. On the mandate, it was evident that Kagame was looking for a gradual phase-out. He recognizes UNAMIR contribution, but considers its large visible presence to detract from his government's capacity to govern. His long convoluted reasoning to justify a reduction was aimed at softening the impact because he, more than anyone, knows the real support that UNAMIR has provided his government. Kagame's reference to current friction between UNAMIR and RPA being separate and yet a connected issue to the mandate is recognition that he is being pressured by the rank and file and the hardliners. At times, Kagame was almost apologetic on his recent public utterances saying that he apologized if he had caused affront. He was a frank soldier and not a diplomat. "I may have offended some people", he remarked.

7. Kagame's view of the security situation was reassuring. He said that a propaganda campaign to vilify the government had been launched but Rwanda, he claimed, would deal with the situation effectively. He blamed the agencies for "spoon-feeding wastrels and criminals" in refugee camps. He said that their pandering to them was needlessly prolonging the camps when

the majority should be going home and working for a living. The camps were also hot-beds of armed sedition that were being kept alive by the Agencies.

8. Kagame was cynical and sarcastic about international aid to Rwanda. He had virtually despaired of the process of justice being started or for aid to come through except in the smallest, conditional trickle. In his eyes, Zaire's rogue behaviour in promoting armed aggression went unnoticed and vast sums of humanitarian aid were provided to killers while Rwanda was subjected to the minutest scrutiny by hundreds of human rights monitors. To him and to the Rwandese people this was a travesty of justice.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BENON SEVAN
UNSECORD
UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KOFI ANNAN, USG, DPKO

CHAIRMAN, ICSC
OIC, COMPENSATION AND
CLASSIFICATION SERVICE, SACCD/OHRM


HOCINE MEDILI/DA COSTA, FALD

FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN, SRSG,
UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 15 MARCH 1995

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: HAZARD PAY - RWANDA



1. I have just received a fax No.KGMF 2327 dated 10 March 1995 informing this Mission that hazard pay for Rwanda is being discontinued because hazardous conditions which existed in prior months no longer prevail. I found this decision to be grossly unfair and demoralizing for those who are serving in Rwanda for the following reasons:

- (a) The superficial lull which gave the impression of calm was misleading as basic, underlying political and ethnic tension always lay beneath the surface. This lull has been recently broken by deliberate attacks on UNAMIR military and civilian personnel as well as on several government functionaries. For example during February and March, hazardous conditions increased to a dramatic level with attacks on UNAMIR positions, including the emplacement of mines on Tunisian positions in Ruhengeri and grenade attacks on the Nigerian Company in Byumba, resulting in serious injuries to several UNAMIR personnel. The hijacking of UN vehicles at gunpoint also continued with the latest reported incidents of shots being fired at a UN vehicle carrying three civilian International Staff and the hold up of a staff member at gun point at his residence, during which the armed gang stole the staff member's money and watch and drove off with the UN vehicle. About the same time, the Director of Medical Services and his family were murdered in Ruhengeri and the Prefect of Butare and his family were ambushed and assassinated by armed persons, still unidentified. Both incidents followed the beating of a newsman in Kigali who is still hospitalized with severe brain injuries.

(C)

(b) At our Milobs Conference on 11 March, increased active hostility towards UNAMIR has been reported from RPA and from the local population which has led to our taking steps to ensure security.

(c) In Kigali all UN agencies have reported increasing concern at their safety and a security conference to safeguard against threats and attacks has been scheduled for Monday 20 March 1995.

(d) Bullet-proof cars have been requested for SRSG and FC by UNAMIR because of the tension and high security risk.

(e) With the anniversary of April 6 genocide coming up in 3 weeks, tension has moved to high pitch as rumours circulate that there will be an eruption of violence in the whole country. Road blocks which had disappeared are reappearing in Kigali at night and we have received reports of harassment at these roadblocks.

(f) I have sent out a circular advising security curfew for all UN staff in view of this high tension.

2. Given the above factors, I find UN's decision to discontinue hazard pay to be based, seemingly, on a brief respite and superficial factors that certainly do not apply.

3. I would, therefore, request that you review the situation and recommend the extension of the hazard pay for an additional period of three months.

4. Best regards.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

95 MAR 15

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar M. Khan*
DATE: 15 MARCH 1995
NO.: MIR 983
NO. OF PAGES:
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU - 13 MARCH AT 10:00 A.M.

1. I called on President Bizimungu at my request for a 40 minute meeting. I was accompanied by General Tousignant, Force Commander and Dr. A.H. Kabia, Executive Director. The following are the main points of the discussion:

UNAMIR Mandate

2. I stated that it was important that the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR look beyond the conclusion of the present mandate on June 9 and discuss between themselves adjustments reflecting the changing ground conditions. It was important that these discussions be held in confidence and not aired in public.

3. President Bizimungu agreed that negotiations should begin and suggested that as a first step Gen. Tousignant and Gen. Kagame, should discuss the "phase-out" of UNAMIR forces in keeping with an agreed mandate.



Public attitude towards UNAMIR

4. I expressed concern that recent attitudes from Government elements at the middle and lower level reflected an unfriendly even hostile stance towards UN, the Agencies and the international community. This was not in consonance with the positive attitude of the leadership. While every large organization had individuals who erred, there was a tendency by Rwandese radio and media to regard every case of bad driving or not stopping at barriers as typical of the entire force. The Mission Status Agreement and formally signed lease agreements were not being respected and generally a grating attitude had crept into RPA's attitudes towards UNAMIR. I felt that the positive elements of UN's effort in Rwanda need to be projected.

5. The President assured me that the Rwanda Government remained appreciative and cooperative with UNAMIR. He felt minor incidents should be discussed and sorted out at the appropriate level. As for UN's rights and privileges, there was no direction from Government and some headstrong officials may have taken the initiative into their own heads. The President asked his Chef de Cabinet, Emmanuel Gasana, to look into the case of the Mission Status Agreement and again reassured me of his Government's cooperation with UNAMIR. The President mentioned the recent case of the Senegalese battalion commander who gave refuge to 'known criminals' and did not allow RPA access in Kibuye to them. The Senegal battalion commander was also understood to have encouraged locals to adopt an anti-government line. I told the President that since he had raised the issue, I would have the matter investigated thoroughly. Gen Tousignant added that the Senegalese battalion would be replaced by Malawi within a week's time and provided with a better briefing for their new assignment.

Zaire

6. I stated that at my last meeting with the President, I had conveyed my impression of a deterioration in Rwanda-Zaire bilateral relations. Since then, the slide appeared to have continued. I asked the President if he had learnt of military supplies and training of former RGF in Zaire and



CAR. I added that, according to some unconfirmed reports from journalists, a military build up was taking place in Zaire.

7. The President confirmed that Zaire continued to support military training and supplies to the RGF. He said it made a mockery of Zaire's support for UNHCR initiatives on refugee return. The President said that he would consider, in consultation with his Cabinet, taking up this issue in the Security Council.

Conclusions

8. Despite the President's assurances, I am not convinced that RPA has not been given the signal to take a harder, more aggressive line with UNAMIR. Certainly, RPA excesses which are too many to recount are not being reigned in from Senior Officers of RPA.

9. On negotiating a renewed mandate, I read the President's reference to "**a phase out**" to mean a gradual reduction in the formed troops after June 9. The President was appreciative of UNAMIR role and agreed that discussions should not be in public. We shall be conveying to you our thoughts on this important issue within a few days and will seek your approval for a negotiating brief before engaging in talks with Gen. Kagame.

10. With regard to the threat from Zaire, it is evident that Rwandese authorities knew of the increased military preparations across Lake Kivu. the President showed concern but was not, in my view, prepared to take Zaire head-on diplomatically. Possibly once the TV story breaks, they would take up the issue in the Security Council.

11. Best regards.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

95 MAR 14

11 31

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CRN-69
MIR-962

TO: HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shahmury J. Khan

DATE: 14 MARCH 1995

② *Noted*
[Signature]

NO. OF PAGES: 5

17.03.95

SUBJECT: RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP MEETING

Regarding your request for information pertaining to the abovementioned, the following represents a summary of the actual funds which have been received by the Government:

BILATERAL DONORS:

Austria: Austria pledged 1.7 million dollars in Geneva, however, there is no confirmation of disbursement as of yet.

Belgium: A total of 35.5 million dollars was pledged, of which the 12.3 million pledged for financial support can be broken down as follows:

2.0 million was disbursed to the World Bank to pay arrears.

5.3 million in matching funds has been disbursed to pay salaries in the education, health and judicial sectors. 50% of this 5.3 million has already been spent. The donors are waiting for: (a) a report on the manner in which the first portion was spent (b) an expenditure plan for the second portion.

95 MAR 14 11 14
UNAMIR

The remaining 5 million dollars will be used for an importation programme which is currently being negotiated with the Belgium government.

Belgium : Total sum disbursed: 7.3 million.

Canada: Of the 17.2 million dollars pledged at the Round-Table, the 7.7 million designated for financial support can be broken down as follows:

2.0 million was disbursed to the World Bank to pay arrears.

5.7 million in matching funds disbursed at the old exchange rate.

Canada is also studying the question of assistance to the judicial sector, however, no concrete disbursement has been made yet.

France: France's assistance to Rwanda has yet to be determined. Thus far, France has provided educational materials to Rwandan schools. The French assistance to the Rwandan justice system will be implemented by the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT), and, according to UNDP, 20 French speaking magistrates and assistant justice personnel will arrive in Kigali on 15 March 1995. More precise information regarding France's assistance will be available at a later date.

Germany: Of the 80 million dollars pledged at the Round-Table, 4.7 million has been designated to purchase equipment to assist in the functioning of the Government. The accord granting the funds for this equipment has been signed.

Germany: Total sum disbursed: 4.7 million dollars.

Netherlands: The Netherlands donated 5 million dollars to the Secretary General's Trust Fund. The first 1 million was spent on the HABITAT project which seeks to: (a) clean up the city of Kigali (b) repair public buildings and (c) build housing units for returnees. The 4 million remaining will be spent in the following manner:

2 million dollars for equipment and vehicles for the Government

1 million for further repair to public buildings and

1 million to build additional housing units for returnees.



The Netherlands pledged an additional 11 million to the Trust Fund at the Round-Table.

Netherlands: Total sum disbursed: 5 million.

United Kingdom The 3 million dollars pledged by the United Kingdom at the Round Table will be used to purchase equipment for the Government. The accord granting the funds for this equipment has been signed.

United Kingdom: Total sum disbursed: 3 million.

U.S.A. Of the 59.8 million dollars pledged at the Round-Table the 6.5 million designated as financial support can be broken down as follows:

2.5 million was provided to the World Bank to pay Rwanda's arrears.

4 million dollars has been disbursed for the purchase of equipment for the Government. This equipment is currently being ordered by USAID Nairobi.

USA: Total sum disbursed: 6.5 million

MULTILATERAL DONORS:

European Union: All figures have been calculated at the rate of 1 ECU = \$1.20.

Of the 127.2 million dollars pledged at the Round-Table, the following has been disbursed:

- 8 million ECU (approximately 9.6 million dollars) in matching funds to pay salaries in the health education and judicial sectors. The first 30% of this funding has already been spent and the second slice is in the process of being disbursed. These funds will cover the payment of salaries for the period November 1994 through March 1995.

- 5 million ECU (approximately 6 million dollars) has been disbursed to finance the deployment of 50 human rights observers who are scheduled to arrive at the end of March 1995.
- 15 million ECU (approximately 18 million dollars) in matching funds has been disbursed to the National Bank of Rwanda to cover the cost in hard currency of goods imported by Rwandan companies. Goods to be imported in this programme are grouped into two categories:
 - Hydrocarbons valued at 10 million ECUs (1.7 billion RWFs);
 - Other goods valued at 5 million ECUs (0.8 billion RWFs).
- 10.2 million ECU (approximately 12.24 million dollars) has been disbursed to repair the four tea factories in Shagasha, Kitabi, Mata and Mulindi. The contract will be executed by the Marshall-Fowler Engineering Firm in Nairobi, Kenya. The amount includes a second contract of 700,000 ECU awarded to the BOHEA office of England who will oversee the repairs.

European Union: Total sum disbursed: 45.85 million.

World Bank: The World Bank has disbursed 50 million dollars in emergency credit. The credit has been officially granted, and the funds will be made available to the Rwandan Government before the end of March. The 50 million dollars can be broken down as follows:

5 million dollars in technical assistance.

45 million dollars of which:

15 million will purchase imports for the public sector and

30 million, support to the balance of payments, will generate matching funds to purchase imports for the private sector.

This emergency credit is flexible, therefore, the government can use the 5 million and the 15 million portions for the private sector imports if it chooses.

World Bank: Total sum disbursed: 50 million.



UNDP: The UNDP has disbursed 1 million dollars to support the Follow-up Secretariat of the Round-Table.

UNDP : Total sum disbursed: 1 million.

Grand Total disbursed by donors: 118.35 million

OBSERVATIONS:

Total funds pledged at Round-Table: 582.7 million

Approximately 20% of the funds pledged at the Round-Table have been disbursed.

One of the European Union's conditions for disbursement of funds, the institution of a floating exchange rate, was satisfied with the implementation of this measure on 14 March 1995. Several institutions, including the World Bank, are encouraging the Government to privatize state-owned companies. Several donors are in the process of elaborating their programmes of assistance and preparing dossiers for submission to the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry of Planning appears to be doing its utmost to process and approve these dossiers as quickly as possible.

U.S. State House
1.02.95

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE FOR RWANDA
FUNDS PLEDGED (US Millions of dollars)

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
BILATERAL					
Austria	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		1,7
Belgium	12,3	2,7	20,5		35,5
Canada	7,7		9,5		17,2
France				amount to be determined	
Germany		14,0	66,0		80,0
Ireland	0,6	N.A.	N.A.		1,6
Italy				to be announced	
Japan		22,5			22,5
Netherlands	18,0		15,0		33,0
New Zealand				to be announced	
Russia				to be announced	
Spain	N.A.		4,5		9,5
Sweden	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		3,0
Switzerland	0,8		12,0		12,8
United Kingdom	1,5		1,5		3,0
USA	6,5		35,0	18,3	59,8
SUB-TOTAL	47,4	39,2	164,0	18,3	279,5
MULTILATERAL					
ADB/ADF	20,0		30,0		50,0
EUC	49,2		68,4	9,6	127,2
IFAD			15,0		15,0
IMF	13,0				13,0
OPEC				12,9	12,9
UN System			10,0		10,0
World Bank	45,0		30,0		75,0
SUB-TOTAL	127,2	133,4	169,5	22,5	309,1
TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED	174,6	39,2	333,5	40,8	588,7
FUNDS REQUESTED	189,6	273,7	300,9		764,1

Notes:

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

Pledges by Austria, Ireland, Spain and Sweden remain to be allocated into specific sub-programmes.

Thus the total of funds allocated to sub-programmes do not add up to the total.

20/01/1995 16:19



CRN 66

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PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 13 MARCH 1995

NO.: MIR 955

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: ROSG MEETING

I enclose two up-dates on:

- (a) International Tribunal for Rwanda,
- (b) Human Rights Observers in Rwanda.

Best regards.



UPDATE: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA

12/3
ml 955

More than 75 human rights field officers, from 40 countries around the world, are presently working for the High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR). Their work entails documenting the genocide, assisting with technical assistance for the protection of human rights (including the judicial system), monitoring and facilitating solutions for present human rights problems and developing a human rights education action plan.

There are presently 11 Field Offices located throughout the country. 61 human rights field officers are deployed in ten of the eleven prefectures and 15 are stationed in Kigali as part of the Kigali and prison teams. European Union monitors are expected to arrive in mid-March and a total of 36 will be sent to Rwanda by mid-April to assist HRFOR. In addition, 20 UNVs, bringing the total number to 26, are also due to arrive in mid-March. These monitors will be deployed in order to reinforce teams that are located in difficult areas of the country. At present HRFOR has intensified monitoring in the prefectures of Kibungo, Gitarama and Butare.

The methodology of monitoring such a complex situation is still developing. Human rights field officers have established good relations with local authorities throughout the country and regularly consult with local authorities to improve the human rights situation in their respective areas. Despite these efforts, the general human rights situation appears to be deteriorating with an increase in the number of arrests which invariably lead to long-term incarceration in detention centres under inhumane conditions. The Rwandese Government is still unable to deal effectively with the number of criminal suspects arrested due to lack of sufficient resources. As a result, there is an urgent need to improve prison facilities and to rebuild the country's judicial system so that those detained may be brought to justice as soon as possible.

UPDATE: INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

P3/3
mir 955

The Office of the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for Rwanda was established on 23 January 1995 in Kigali and during the ensuing weeks Tribunal staff have been gathering documents, information and evidence from a number of sources both in Rwanda and other countries. The evidence gathered by the High Commissioner for Human Rights is currently being handed over to the Tribunal and it is anticipated that this work will be completed by 31 March 1995. Recruitment of staff is taking place and prospective international candidates for the Tribunal are being sought.

A number of governments are actively involved in searching for suitable staff to be seconded to the Tribunal and it is hoped that these people will start to join the Office of the Prosecutor in late March 1995. Additionally, governments have pledged financial and technical support to the Tribunal and this will greatly assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of its work. An investigative strategy has been devised and this will centre upon investigating those individuals principally responsible for the planning, commission and incitement of crimes covered by the Statute of the Tribunal.

Following adoption of resolution 977 on 22 February 1995, the Security Council decided that the seat of the Tribunal should be in Arusha. A team comprised of the Special Representative, Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal and staff from the Department of Legal Affairs will visit the United Republic of Tanzania in April 1995 to seek agreements with the Tanzanian Government regarding the needs of the Tribunal. In the mean time, the Tribunal will continue to gather and assess evidence obtained for purposes of seeking indictments against those individuals suspected of involvement in the recent genocide in Rwanda.



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TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaheryar Khan*
DATE: 13 MARCH 1995
NO.: MIR 956
NO. OF PAGES: 7
SUBJECT: RWANDESE JUDICIAL PROCESS-URGENT NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

1. Highest priority needs to be accorded to starting the national judicial process in Rwanda. At present, the national judiciary barely functions as there is an insignificant gendarmerie/police force, few magistrates and prosecutors, no forensic or criminal investigation facility nor even the basic administrative structure to back-up the judicial system. Rwanda has recently passed a decree enabling foreign prosecutors, magistrates etc. to function in Rwanda. Thus it expects foreign technical aid until it prepares its own cadres.

2. The urgency for the immediate starting up of the judicial system is due to:

(a) Appalling crowding in the prisons which cannot be alleviated until a judicial process begins to function;

② Noted
FTT
15.03.95





(b) The psychological impact on the Rwandese public that would assure them that criminals and perpetrators of genocide are being brought to justice. Delay in this judicial retribution is leading to political tension;

(c) Given the growing number of propriety claims, an urgent need to resolve contending claims to land, houses etc..

3. There is general agreement between donor countries, UN agencies and the Rwandese Government that the restoration of the judicial process must be given highest priority. Donor countries have already indicated funding that they are prepared to provide for this process. A resumé prepared by UNDP Resident Representative in Kigali is attached and gives an indication of available funding.

4. The Minister of Justice has given me a list of cadres required to make up the judicial process in Rwanda. A copy of the requirement is attached. Even if 50% of the personnel required were recruited, the system could begin to function. It must be recognized, however, that the foreign cadres would need accommodation and above all security protection as their judgements are likely to have sensitive political repercussions.

5. As you know the High Commission for Human Rights has the restoration of the judicial process in Rwanda as one of his projects. The HCHR has already assumed overall responsibility for this task. I find, however, a duality of responsibility is emerging between UNDP which is anxious to take on this basic responsibility and HCHR which finds that its mandate is being undermined by UNDP's initiative. This question, therefore, needs to be resolved at Headquarters level as dual responsibility is not only creating difficulties between UNDP and HCHR but is confusing for the home Government. I would recommend that the HCHR and UNDP agree to cooperate so that HCHR takes the lead role and UNDP provides the financial back-up that would facilitate the earliest possible start-up of the programme.

6. Best regards.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE
B. P. 160 KIGALI

Ref No :

Index :

Objet :

22/2/95, 7pm

The Minister gave me this
envelope for the SRSG after
the interview - He said
he forgot to mention
national police inspectors
in this morning's meeting

2-FEV. 1995

/06.00

P3/7
MIR956

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Coyline
P. 813 cur
Feb 24 2

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

Comme convenu, je vous transmets les besoins


en ressources humaines pour la Coopération Technique comme suit :

- La Magistrature assise : 303
- La Magistrature debout : 300
- Les Enquêteurs Policiers : 75
(policiers spécialisés en
enquêtes)

TOTAL : 678

Il est entendu que ces Coopérants
dépendront en tout de la Communauté Internationale (moyens de subsistance,
logement et déplacement).

Le Ministre de la Justice,
NKUBITO Alphonsse Marie.



Copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur
le Président de la République
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Premier Ministre
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires
Etrangères et de la Coopération
KIGALI.

ASSISTANCE TO REHABILITATE THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN RWANDA

USAID:

- ☐ 450.000 USD has already been committed for logistics support.
- ☐ Funding is available for 10-20 foreign Magistrates to come and work in Rwanda for one year.
- ☐ Desire to assist the administration in the Ministry. A mission is expected the 15 March 1995 with the objective to:
 - define the contents of a direct assistance to the Ministry of Justice;
 - assist the Ministry to elaborate the terms of reference for the foreign Magistrates who will work on a temporary basis in Rwanda.
- ☐ 1.000.000 USD are committed to the International Tribunal.

GERMANY:

- ☐ Approximately 27.000 USD has been disbursed 1993-1994 for the adaptation of Rwandese legal texts to the Arusha Accords. This activities can be taken up again if deemed necessary.

Germany is ready to commit funds for logistics support to the Ministry while waiting for the arrival of an evaluation mission to determine the contents and form of an assistance to the justice system.

CANADA:

An evaluation mission is in Kigali from the 2 to 26 March 1995 to determine actions to be undertaken and funds to be made available to the Ministry of Justice.

FRANCE:

- ☐ The French assistance to the Rwandese justice system will be implemented by the ACCT and will be covering the following areas:
 - 2.000.000 FFR will be available for french speaking Magistrates and

P5/7
m/R956

- assistant justice personnel to come and work in Rwanda;
- training of local staff and experts (in real estate law, traditional mechanisms for settlement of disputes, review of laws, creation of a Bar), 700.000 FFR;
- 100.000 FFR are committed to the creation of an information center, advice and judicial assistance for women;
- 100.000 FFR will be available for human rights training;
- 500.000 FFR will be used for the creation of a database over judicial data and information.

WORLD BANK:

Once priorities are established the World Bank is ready to reinforce, on a short-term basis, the institutional and logistical capacities of the Ministry of Justice. In relation to the logistics support the World Bank will only cover costs for importations (necessary for the reconstruction).

The World Bank is ready, on a mid-term basis, to assist in the establishment of a trade court by placing an expert in the Ministry of Justice with the task to study the implementation of a structure to deal with the settlement of commercially related disputes.

HOLLAND:

- ☐ Holland is committing 30.000.000 USD in 1995 for assistance to Rwanda. Half of this amount is available through the Trust Fund and the other half through direct bilateral cooperation. 1 to 5 million USD of the second half (bilateral) will be set aside for the rehabilitation of the justice system.
- ☐ 100.000 USD are committed to the International Tribunal.

BELGIUM:

- ☐ 1.000.000 USD are committed to the International Tribunal.
- ☐ A Belgian expert, Mr Marc van Wymeersch, is assisting the Ministry of Justice in questions concerning the reconstruction of courts, prosecutors offices and other buildings (5.000.000 BFR). Another 5.000.000 BFR are planned to be made available once a second phase of the assistance is identified.
- ☐ 125.000.000 Rwandese Francs are made available to the Government to

126/7
mk 936

improve conditions for detainees in the prisons.

The possibility of training some 100 magistrates not having a formal judicial training/background is being studied by an identification mission. A first training session is being elaborated by the mission. There are some logistical problems in the rehabilitation of a training center.

The training of the OPJ is being done by Citizens Network, with Belgian funds.

Discussions with the Ministry of Education are being carried out concerning the training of jurists at the Department of Law (Butare). There is a desire to direct this training more towards the work of Magistrates and the exercise of judicial authority.

Subvention of foreign Magistrates to come and work in Rwanda is envisaged.

Citizens Network is, in collaboration with the University of Antwerpen, going to publish some volumes of the Rwandese legal code (four volumes could be available in 2.000 copies, in 3-4 months time). A general inventory is also being made of the library of the Department of Law in Butare in order to estimate its need of replenishment.

Finally, Belgium is paying, together with Canada and the EC, the salaries of Ministry of Justice officials. This assistance is ending March-April 1995 but could be extended if necessary. A decision concerning this question will be taken on the 7 March 1995.

SWITZERLAND:

- ☐ 1.000.000 USD are committed to the Prefecture Tribunals. The rehabilitation of the Prosecutors Office in Kigali is presently studied and will shortly be effectuated.
- ☐ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is planning the following emergency measures (2.000.000 SFR are available as a first phase):
 - financial and, if necessary, logistical assistance for the setting up of a Higher Magistrate Council;
 - subvention of foreign Magistrates to come and work in Rwanda;
 - funding for the repair of buildings and the purchase of office supplies;
 - participation in the training of judicial police and gendarmerie (with Swiss policemen through UNAMIR);
 - review the university study program offered by the Department of Law in Butare and in collaboration with the Swiss Institute for Comparative

p 7/7
mir 952

(O)

- Law offer seminars on human rights and on minority protection;
- assistance in questions concerning judicial documentation and information, i.e. through the creation of a Fund for the library of the Department of Law in Butare. Training of Rwandese librarians in Switzerland (in collaboration with different Cantons);
- assistance in the elaboration and realization of seminars on real estate problems, on customary law and on mediation;
- support to human rights educational projects.

A list of needs is anticipated from the Department of Law in Butare. This list will enable Switzerland to consider and study the form and content of further assistance to the Department.

The NGO Synergie has been requested to elaborate a project to employ foreign Magistrates to come and work in Rwanda as well as a project to train Rwandese Magistrates.

Switzerland is particularly interested to assist in the rehabilitation of the Nyabisindu Magistrate School. A specialist from Citizens Network is presently working on the project.

GREAT BRITAIN:

- ☐ 200.000 £ are committed to the International Tribunal.



CPN/68

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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PAGE 1 OF 4

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 13 MARCH 1995

NO.: MIR 957

NO. OF PAGES: 4


SUBJECT: TRUST FUND AND ROSG

I enclose a note from Randolph Kent, UNREO, to make the Trust fund more effective. I agree with the recommendations contained in the note.

Best regards.

*② Seen
JLT*

15.03 95





The Secretary-General's Trust Fund. Despite constant urgings to establish new procedures to use the Trust Fund in a creative and efficient way, nothing has happened. Previous memoranda have outlined the need for agreement with donors on ways to expedite the use of this fund, on a small action team to assist the Ministry of Plan, etc.. In light of the importance of the ROSG in this regard, the recommendations are reiterated below:

Recommendations:

[i] An urgent meeting between Trust Fund contributors and the USG/DHA, USG/DAMS and the UNDP Administrator should be called to establish the accountability procedures for the Trust Fund. The result of this meeting should be waivers of all conventional UN procedures, and an OFDA-type post-operational accountability system;

[ii] Authority for the expenditure of the Trust Fund should be vested directly with the field, viz, the SRSG, the DHA Representative and the UNDP Resident Representative, in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning. The authority to draw upon the Trust Fund, ie, write out cheques, should be given to the Trust Fund Committee, under the chairmanship of the SRSG;

[iii] Working capital, ie, a portion of the Trust Fund, should be placed in the National Bank of Rwanda;

[iv] A working team of three, comprising a highly experienced programmer/planner from a major Trust Fund donor, an accountant from a donor government and a project implementer, should be rapidly put in place to oversee the day-to-day implementation of the Trust Fund. This team will work directly with the Minister of Plan and report regularly to the Trust Fund Committee;

[v] All organisations benefitting from the Trust Fund will be subject to penalty clauses for delayed implementation or failure to comply with project agreements;

[vi] At the same time, the contributors to the Trust Fund should be reminded that one cannot spend pledges, and that, despite their good intentions, it would seem from a most recent communication on this subject from DHA-New York, very little of the pledged funding have actually been received.

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Priority Targeting. The ROSG should be made aware that the purpose of a portion of its activities is not to raise new funds, but rather to make good on funds that have already been pledged. However, it is essential that these pledged funds be reviewed in the context of urgent priorities of the nation. It is worth noting three key priorities:

Recommendations:

[i] Home Communes. Security and material resources in home communes targeted for returning IDPs and refugees ultimately have to be priority activities for the country as a whole. The humanitarian community, to fulfil its commitment to these efforts, must have adequate food available, and donors should be requested to fill the pipeline as a matter of urgency. Donors should also encourage the NGOs that they fund to focus upon assistance to those targeted communes, and resources from the Trust Fund should be immediately employed to enhance the capacities of local authorities, eg, Prefets, Bourgmestres. At the same time, Human Rights monitors should be deployed in greater number to strengthen security monitoring in the communes. [Attached, please find a copy of a Draft Advisory Note from UN Agencies to the Integrated Task Force that refers to some of these needs.];

[ii] The Justice System. It is almost an embarrassment to make note of the need to introduce as quickly as possible into the country a basic system of justice. It has become part of the litany of Rwanda which everyone intones, but for which until very recently there has been little positive action. UNDP and UNHCHR have been trying to guide this process; and in that regard, in that regard under separate cover, we will forward the project document that reflects at least a good start. UNDP and UNHCHR are meeting again with donors next week, and UNDP-UNHCHR will be reporting on progress to date.

However, there is a growing reality that has to be borne in mind, namely, that with increased insecurity and the increase in random arrests, etc. and the delay in responding to this need earlier, realism may well dictate that greater emphasis should be placed on security systems than initially intended, while justice systems are put in place.

[iii] Capacitating the Government. Emphasis must be placed on assistance to local government as well as on assistance to central authorities.

The Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting. The Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting appears to be an interesting "talk shop" where issues are covered that have already been reflected in extensive documentation from the field and from various UN agency

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mir 957

headquarters. It is also a touch ironic that the ROSG has never held a meeting in Rwanda, although it has held meetings in New York, Washington, Geneva and Bujumbura.

Recommendation:

[i] A high-level ROSG meeting take place in Rwanda, with the intention of bringing in key Government of Rwanda figures to review priorities and to explain specific follow-up action;

[ii] The ROSG commits itself to action, and towards that end, establishes a mechanism to monitor the actions of participating governments to fulfil their commitments. The results of such monitoring will be a major agenda item at subsequent meetings of the ROSG.

RCK - 10 March 1995

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
UNAMIR
95 MAR 11 15 '09

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 11 MARCH 1995
NO.: MIR - 938
SUBJECT: NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT
NO OF PAGES: 2

Shaharyar M. Khan

*② Seen
WTT*



UNAMIR
95 MAR 11 15 '09

1. Please refer to your cable number 797 of 9 March 1995 on the above subject. The issue raised therein is extremely important and requires careful consideration in its various aspects.
2. You will recall that when the Security Council decided, in its resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, to impose an arms embargo on Rwanda, it did so after "determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region". It is therefore vital, in our view, to determine whether or not the threat that led to the embargo in the first place has diminished or disappeared. You will also recall that under the terms of the embargo, the Security Council, in paragraph 13 of resolution 918, decided that "all states shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda ... of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts".
3. Before examining the political implications of a partial lifting of the arms embargo, the question of whether or not 'non-lethal' items fall within this category needs to be examined. It may be argued that items such as uniforms and boots are not specifically included in the embargo which bans "arms and related matériel of all types". Dual-purpose equipment such as trucks and other large vehicles which can be used both for peaceful and military purposes may be more problematic, requiring closer examination by the Council.
4. Secondly, we are also not sure about the modalities, procedural as well as legal, of a "partial" lifting of the embargo. Does this mean that the embargoed items listed in

.../...

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paragraph 13 of resolution 918 would be redefined? Or does it mean a conditional lifting of the embargo? We can see how the Security Council could, following a review of the embargo, decide to lift it or to revise it, specifically listing only the items banned. But, it is not immediately clear what would constitute a "partial" lifting of the embargo.

5. As regards the political implications of a partial lifting of embargo, it would be seen as a signal encouraging the Rwandese Government to maintain course and as a mark of approval from the Security Council and the international community. Until about a month ago, I would have unreservedly supported taking such a step. However, recently there has been an increase in tension in and around Rwanda which has led to intemperate xenophobic rhetoric, a hardening of attitude from RPA across the country and a worsening of the human rights situation. (These developments have been catalogued in my code cables Nos 798 and 847, dated respectively 28 February and 3 March). To show a mark of approval against the backdrop of these negative developments would be seen as misplaced, certainly without a clear public commitment by the Rwandese Government of a) a just, fair and welcoming attitude towards IDPs and returning refugees; b) a policy line welcoming reconciliation at all levels but not with those who encouraged genocide; and c) a positive, friendly attitude towards UN and its agencies.

6. A more serious development, however, is the apparent inflow of arms into adjacent countries, notably Zaire. A reputable journalist's report (conveyed to you in our fax No. 906, dated 9 March), indicates 9 plane loads of weapons from Bulgaria and Israel delivered to Goma. The Rwandese Government is obviously aware of preparations for renewed war and the consequent tension in the country is partially explained by these developments.

7. Given this background, I would recommend that the Security Council should direct its attention to eliminating the threat of invasion, infiltration or sabotage against Rwanda. This could take the form of extending the existing embargo to cover the Rwandese communities in the neighbouring countries and to ban also military training by or for these communities. Once the insecurity that continues to grip this country has abated substantially, the Council could review the embargo with a view to its lifting or revision. In addition to removing the threat of an invasion of Rwanda from outside, conditions for lifting or revising the terms of the embargo should also include measures by the Government aimed at reaffirming its commitments to ensure the safe return and proper resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, to pursue reconciliation with Rwandese not implicated in the genocide including putting in place an effective and credible judicial system and a positive attitude towards UN.

8. In short, I recommend that the Security Council must first take note of the increased tension and the preparations for renewed conflict from neighbouring countries. If this threat is confirmed, then the embargo must be extended to the countries concerned and ban all military training and build-up in the camps. Thereafter, a partial lifting of the embargo on Rwanda for the supply of non-lethal weapons may be agreed, provided the Rwandese Government and specifically the Vice-President and Minister of Defence affirms commitments outlined in para. 5 above.

9. Best regards.

CRN-65

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR
95 MAR 11 15 11

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: MEDILLI/DA COSTA/DOSSAL, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 11 MARCH 1995

NO.: MIR-939

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: PX STORE



UNAMIR
95 MAR 11 15 17

1. Grateful for your support and contribution to Welfare Club. This sum was needed for basic capital expenditure. We shall run the Club through regular contributions.

2. I now seek your decision on the PX store. It has been over 3 months since this issue has hang-fired and awaits UNHQ's decision. Basically the issue is simple. A UNAMIR official, at a lower level, wrote a letter informing one of the parties who had bid for the PX store contract that it had been awarded the contract. The official had, apparently, not cleared the matter in accordance with established procedure. The LCC then recommended rebidding. When informed, the party was prepared to sue for breach of contract. The point is that if the offending official has committed UNAMIR irrevocably to the party, then let us go ahead with the contract. If the party falls short of expectations, it could subsequently be replaced. On the other hand, if we are not bound by the contract through the letter, let us award the PX contract to a company which will be approved.



3. All I request is that a decision be made quickly, one way or the other. The opening of a PX store is a genuine need and would also greatly boost morale. Not having one is liable, also, to lead to leakage of duty free imports which damage our image.

4. Best regards.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN/KETTANI/AIME, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar Khan*

DATE: 10 MARCH 1995

NO.: MIR 927 *② Seen*

NO. OF PAGES:

SUBJECT: RWANDA - ROSG MEETING

15.03.95

135 MAR 10 17

UNAMIR

C.G. TOUSIGNANT P.C.

1. Thank you for your Code Cable No. 776 dated 8 March 1995. I appreciate your taking immediate action on the issues raised.

2. I am adding the following information which could help fine tune the recommendations made in my Code Cable 847 of 3 March 1995.

(a) Agenda

You may wish specifically to include "immediate support for national judicial process" as an agenda item in lieu of or in addition to Human Rights Monitors which is not a such a high priority issue.

(b) Trust Fund

You may wish not only to seek additional support for the trust fund but also approval for the methodology for quick, non-bureaucratic dispersal of the funds. We are



sending you a combined paper on this issue agreed between UNREO, UNDP Ops in Kigali and myself.

(c) **Kagame's speech**

The Vice-President's speech, we are reliably informed, was aimed against the Belgian Ambassador in Kigali who was considered in Bujumbura to be peddling the "reconcile with MRND" view point in the corridors. When I informed him, the Ambassador appeared stupefied. As stated in para. 1 (c) of my Code Cable, the Leader of the Belgian delegation did not subscribe to this view. A milder English translation of Kagame's speech has since been circulated thereby acknowledging the damage by the initial (correct) version.

(d) **World Bank**

The World Bank Team has been persuaded to visit Rwanda and arrived on 9 March.

(e) **Military Build-up in Zairian Camps**

The report sent to you by Randolph Kent on this subject is alarming. The increased tension may be due to information connected with the report. Regrettably UN has no intelligence gathering system. Presumably you could obtain confirmation through bilateral sources.

3. I shall keep you informed of developments so that you have an up-to-date picture of developments before the ROSG Meeting.

4. Best regards.



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UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 062/

95 MAR -9 03 07 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PAGE 1 OF 4

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar Khan*
DATE: 9 MARCH 1995
NO.: MIR 893
NO. OF PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PREFECT RWANGABO, CLAVER OF BUTARE

1. On Saturday 4 March 1995, the Prefect of Butare, Mr. Rwangabo, Claver Pierre, was travelling by road from Gikongoro to Butare when, at 9 p.m. about 5 kms from Kigali he was flagged down by a man on the road. When the Prefect stopped and opened his window, he was shot in the head. Immediately some other persons, in a carefully laid ambush, opened fire and killed three of the four travellers including the Prefect's son. The fourth (an RPA guard), ran from the car and opened fire. He was shot in the shoulder and leg but the attackers decided to flee.

2. Mr. Rwangabo was a Hutu and member of Parti Socialist Democratic. His tenure as Prefect of Butare had been controversial because of a financial scandal and his attempt to free a priest from prison. The attached article illustrates.

3. There could be three motives for the Prefect's murder.

(a) An act of banditry which failed. This is the least likely explanation as the ambush and killing was professionally executed.



(b) Part of campaign by Hutu militants to demonstrate their strength through selective assassinations and sabotage of Moderate Hutus. The Prime Minister has gone on record to accuse refugees operating from Zaire for the crime.

(c) An in-house job by extremist Tutsis. The arguments in favour of this contention are: (i) the Prefect attempts to release the priests; (ii) The fact that all three Hutus in the car were killed and the only Tutsi - the guard-survived; and (iii) that the RPA has gone through the motions of an enquiry but there has been no searching man-hunt. Our milobs and officers in Butare are convinced that it was an inside operation.

4. Inevitably we expect greater security checks, leading to harassment in the camps and the virtual stoppage of Operation Retour.

5. The assassination of the Prefect is another link in the recent chain of incidents that have increased security concerns in Rwanda. The Prime Minister has asked me for assistance in the Government's investigations in the murder. I have agreed to the request.

6. Best regards.

IMVAHO, Government-owned newspaper No 1062 of 30 January 1995

Title of article: "Prefect Rwangabo of Butare prefecture writes to the Head of State in defense of Interahamwe"

"Since he took the leadership of Butare prefecture, Rwangabo has been misleading the prefecture. He wrote to the President of the Republic to ask for the release of Abbot Denis Sekamana who is being held in Butare prison. Rwangabo says Abbot Sekamana is innocent while according to eyewitnesses he is an interahamwe and he possessed a gun.

Rwangabo is also embezzling public funds. He requested an exaggerated amount of money to repair the house to be used by the Prefect."

In Imvaho No 1063 of 12 February 1995, Rwangabo defends himself in an article he writes to the newspaper and that is published.

Title of article: "I did not betray the country, this is not my objective."

"In the article signed by Rwabukwandi A. published in Imvaho No 1062, there were untrue statements about the Prefect of Butare. In my whole lifetime, I have never supported criminality and social divisions among the Rwandese."

"It is true that I drafted a document to ask for the examination of the case of Abbot Sekamana, but I had not yet sent the document to the President of the Republic, even if it is my right to do so, and I did not say anywhere that he is innocent, but I thought very much about his case, given the great number of letters from his family and people he saved from massacres, who claim that he is innocent."

"I think that the person who stole my confidential documents, which I know I did not send to the Head of State, should be brought to justice because he is sabotaging my leadership."

"Those statements about my diversion of public funds are equally lies. I always made reports to the concerned Ministries on the use of public funds in my prefecture office."

"I believe that someone in fact used Rwabukwandi A. as a false name to tarnish my image for unknown objectives and to divert the attention of the leaders of the country."

The Imvaho newspaper comments on the Prefect's article:

"Revealing the State's secrets is not equivalent to sabotage the State when those secrets are bad. Those secrets must be revealed when they are not good in order to rectify them."

CRN 062

4 of 4

"Even if we did not publish them, the article was accompanied by
copies supporting the statements of the article criticising the
Prefect".

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 FROM: ANYIDOHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Offidulu* CRN 428/1 of 38
 DATE: 8 December 1994
 NUMBER: MIR 2710
 SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACE KEEPING OPERATION FOR THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS

References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94.
- B. MIR 2322 dated 7 Nov 94.
- C. UNAMIR fax F/O 3051 dated 9 Nov 94.
- D. MIR 2408 dated 14 Nov 94.
- E. UNATIONS 3787 dated 18 Nov 94.
- F. UNATIONS 4025 dated 2 Dec 94.

UNAMIR
DEC-8 19 02

1. Thank you for your offer for UNAMIR to contribute further to the staffing of the plan for a possible operation in the Zairian refugee camps. Much advice has been already been provided at References A to D, copies of which are enclosed for ease of reference.

2. Paragraphs 18-25 of Reference E gave command guidance and framed in broad terms a concept of operations. There is to be a 2 phase operation to isolate the Former Government Forces and their political and militia elements from the remainder of the refugees in order to ensure the security of international relief workers, and provide protection for the storage and delivery of humanitarian assistance. In Phase One, 2 mechanised battalions are to enter camp sites and establish secure areas, by disarming the Disruptive Elements (DEs) and isolating them in holding areas. Once security has been achieved, they are to hand over responsibility for security to a locally trained force, and continue to the next site. In Phase Two, area security is to be provided by motorised units, operating at Company Group level, which will assume responsibility for a number of camps that were cleared in Phase One. Safe passage is to be provided for refugees to the border where UNAMIR Rwanda forces will assume responsibility for security during transit to and after arrival at home communes.

3. Mission. From Reference E I have deduced the following mission:

"To create security conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, in order to encourage the return of Rwandan people from refugee camps in Zaire."

4. Limitations. Limitations on the Mission are:

- a. The size of the assigned force is yet to be confirmed.
- b. The Mandate is yet to be formulated.
- c. ROE has not been established.
- d. I have been directed to initiate the operation in North Kivu.

5. Specified Tasks and Troops Required. Reference E specified the following tasks, from which a Troops to Task calculation has been drawn:

- a. Provide Security for International Aid Workers. Currently there are over 70 NGO bodies in the Goma area, with a total expatriate strength of approximately 1000 souls. If benign security conditions persist, area protection in the form of vehicle and foot patrols will suffice. It will be a single company task. Should the situation deteriorate and the requirement for the aid workers to operate continue, this task alone will occupy one battalion. CRN 428 2/38
- b. Provide Security for the Storage and Delivery of Humanitarian Supplies. There are over 30 storage sites and approximately 600 NGO personnel, delivering to 6 camps. In benign conditions this is a company task. In a deteriorated situation, a static guardforce will be required in addition to escorts, raising the requirement for troops to a 4 company battalion and an additional company.
- c. Establish Screening Procedures to keep Weapons Outside the HPZ. For this task not to produce a heavy manpower bill, the DEs must be removed during the Phase One. The task can then be achieved by local security forces.
- d. Provide Safe Passage for Refugees to the Rwandan Border. In benign conditions this will be a platoon task. In a deteriorated situation, protected vehicle escort convoys would be required. This would raise the manning cost to one mechanised company.
6. Implied Tasks. From those tasks the following implied tasks have been determined and information to assist:
- a. Gain information on disruptive elements (DEs). This task should be given to the agency charged with the selection and training of the local security force. Additional technical assistance should be sought from member countries. See Reference A Paragraph 1.a.
- b. Search for and confiscate weapons. Additional search training will be required for infantry troops. Detection equipment will be needed for search teams.
- c. Apprehend DEs. The mandate for the Force must clearly define what activities are illegal, to allow the separation of DEs. The camp leaders can be expected to claim a legitimate right to exercise their authority over their people. If they remain within the law, their political influence may be extremely difficult to overcome.
- d. Establish cage system. This will require a military guard force of up to one company, with some spare capacity.
- e. Provide escort for DEs move away from HPZ. This will require up to one motorised company, with some spare capacity.
- f. Provide EOD capability. This will require an EOD capability for each of the 2 mechanised battalions for detection and disposal of UXO.
- g. Provide medical support. This task will require a first, second and third line medical capability. First line should be organic to the battalions, the remainder will be an additional Force Troops requirement. See Reference C.
- h. Provide Protection for UNAMIR Troops and Materiel. The troops will self-protect. Materiel protection will require 250 - 500 troops. See Reference C.

- i. Participate in Coordination of Humanitarian Activity. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff. CRN 428
- j. Coordinate Repatriation. This will be a function of the FC's staff, in conjunction with UNAMIR and Rwandan agencies. 3/38
- k. Provide Escorts to Border. See Paragraph 4.d. above. It will require a mechanised force of between a platoon and a company.
- l. Provide Security for Safe Corridors in Rwanda including the Coordination of Welcome Centres and Transport. This will be a UNAMIR Rwanda task.
- m. Coordinate C² with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.
- n. Coordinate Log Sp with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.
- o. Produce Public Information plan. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff, in consultation with SRSG.
- p. Traffic Control. This will require an MP capability to coordinate vehicle and personnel traffic flow. See Reference C.

7. Factors.

a. Enemy/Ground.

- (1) Numbers. The size of the problem relative to my strength forces me to phase my operation.
- (2) Weapons. It is not considered likely that the RGF will mount a conventional military operation against UN forces, therefore I do not need conventional force ratios to achieve my mission. They are likely, however, to assist DEs in the provision of weapons, so I should be prepared to encounter RPG, MMG, grenades, small arms, mines and booby traps.
- (3) Tactics. It is likely that the enemy will either escape quickly, or use small scale actions to disrupt my activity, and tie down my forces. To counter this I must channelise and block the enemy from the outset, and maximise an overt presence and an effective reactive capability.
- (4) Civil Disturbance. The enemy is likely to incite local civil disturbance, to maintain control, therefore I require crowd control equipment and my troops must be trained appropriately. Sound understanding and strict adherence to the ROE will be essential.
- (5) Ground. The ground is flat, but the volcanic rock is extremely damaging to wheeled vehicles when moving off-road. Within the camps the access roads are extremely narrow. The 6 camps are extremely large (Katale has 250,000 occupants) and are not separated by any definable geographic feature. I must divide them into tactical sectors and subsectors according to the size of the manoeuvre elements. I must also consider the best disposition and force requirement to establish the HPZ. I must plan a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles, and establish

a traffic flow system within camps. This will be a task for an MP Unit. I must plan additional ES to deal with wheel and track maintenance. I must have engineer defence stores to establish effective boundaries within my AORs. CRN 428
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b. Operational Security. Operational surprise will not be achievable due to its impracticality. Since the operation has to be conducted sequentially tactical surprise will also be unlikely, as the enemy will easily deduce what my successive objectives are to be. I can, however, plan small deception operations, to assist me to maintain the initiative, and keep the enemy off balance. I can also achieve limited surprise by concealing the precise timings of my operations. Area security can be afforded by the motorised battalion operating in a screen or guard role. The training agency for the local security force should be given the task of assisting in my surveillance plan.

c. Time. I have been given between 24-30 months to conduct the operation which requires the pacification of 870,000 refugees in North Kivu, and 370,000 in the South. Given a 20% planning margin, my operation will require to neutralise camp areas to the total of 35,500 refugees per month to achieve the task in 30 months. I cannot achieve this with the force available to me. The situation may change as the operation develops, and camps increasingly "melt down", but if they do not I will need additional time.

d. Logistics. To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since there will be a requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit will be vital. For stocks, sustainability and tasks see Reference C.

8. Constraints. Appropriate ROE is a vital precondition of deployment. See Reference D Paragraph 20.a.

9. Additional Concepts to be Developed. Prior to the plan being developed there are a number of additional concepts that require consideration. These have not been explored in this paper since they are, in the main, dependant on the size of the force, but are included for your consideration.

a. Task Organisation.

b. Concept of Manoeuvre.

- (1) How mission is to be achieved.
- (2) Effect to be imposed on DEs, and for how long.
- (3) Force posture.
- (4) Axis of effort.
- (5) Determination of Objectives and Phases.

c. C² Arrangements.

- (1) Tactical missions.
- (2) Command relationships.
- (3) Provision of Rear Link Communications.

(4) Locations of CPs.

d. Rear Area Operations.

e. Employment of Tactical Reserves. Note that UNAMIR will supply the reserve at the operational level.

f. Employment of Helicopters. Note that UNAMIR has no spare capacity.

g. Logistic Concept. See Reference C.

h. Engineer Concept.

i. Withdrawal Concept/Contingency Plans.

j. Liaison/Coordination Concept.

k. DE/Detainee Handling Concept.

l. Public Information/Psyops Concept.

m. Military Information Collection Concept.

n. Operational Deployment Concept.

10. Early Selection of Commander. While fully understanding the difficulties that the Secretary General has experienced in securing offers of troops from member countries, I restate the importance of the early nomination of the Force Commander for the Zairian part of the operation, to allow his input to planning and the formulation of a mandate and ROE.

11. Best regards.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 14 November 1994
NUMBER: 2408
SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES

CRN Y28
35/38

References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94 (Security in Rwandese Refugee Camps).
- B. UNATIONS 3659 dated 4 Nov 94 (Working Paper).
- C. MIR 2322 dated 7 Nov 94 (UNAMIR observations on Working Paper).
- D. UNAMIR Fax F/O 3051 dated 9 Nov 94 (Logistic Support for Operations in Zaire).
- E. UNATIONS 3730 dated 11 Nov 94 (Report on the Situation of the Rwandese Refugees).

I. Thank you for your Reference E. My comments refer to the paragraphs in that document.

Paragraph 10. Add as a final sentence *"There are additional significant factors that deter the refugees' return: there is a dearth of tangible evidence to prove the sincerity of the BBGNU's statements of reconciliation with former government officials; there has been a deterioration in security within Rwanda; there remains no effective civil police force or judiciary; there is no land commission to determine conflicting property claims; there is an insufficiency of tools seeds and hoes in the home commune areas; and basic materials for the refurbishment of housing is not evident in quantity."*

Paragraph 11.

Paragraph 15. In this paragraph the reader can become confused between the situation within the military camps and that within the refugee camps. You may wish to insert as a new beginning to Sentence 3 *"However, inside the refugee camps, it is difficult to determine..."*.

Paragraph 19. Add as a final sentence *"Control of radios within the refugee camps has been opposed and restricted by the hostile elements, and so consideration must also be given to the distribution of portable radios, to facilitate the public information campaign."*

Paragraph 20.



a. I feel that the peacekeeping force from the outset should operate under the authority of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. I was originally of the opinion that a robustly framed Chapter 6 operation was feasible, since we had the compliance of the Zairian authorities. I now feel that, since there will be resistance to our mission which only force will overcome, our earlier concept of peace assistance must give way to one of peace enforcement. There will be no time for a commander to wait for UN high-level negotiation to allow him to continue his task if opposed. To facilitate this requirement, insert a new fourth sentence *"To undertake these tasks against the wishes of the hostile elements in the camps, violence is to be expected. The peacekeeping force must be given authority under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to use appropriate and necessary force to conduct its tasks"*.

b. The final sentence, which nominates UNAMIR the responsibility to provide logistic support to the Zairian operation, does not recognise or address UNAMIR's current serious logistic problems to support its own operation. The need for logistic infrastructure enhancement must be made explicit. Add as a final sentence *"To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since there will be a requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit will be vital."*

c. Delete the single line at subsection heading III.c) "Action under Chapter 7" between Paragraphs 27 and 28, since Chapter 7 operations are now introduced earlier in the text.

Paragraph 21. There needs to be a preparatory phase, prior to the First Phase, during which time the Zairian military and paramilitary forces are trained and equipped. This phase could be begun well before the main external military force had been defined to allow immediate cooperation and employability of the Zairian force.

Paragraph 21.

a. In the first sentence, remove the tautological phrase (*provided with some protected vehicles*). The "well trained and equipped mechanised battalions" must arrive fully equipped with the complete scale of armoured vehicles. The armoured vehicles will provide protection to UN troops and assurance to the refugees.

b. I restate my comment at Reference C where I addressed your Paragraph 15. A battalion will not be capable of taking on a camp of 30,000 refugees. I wrote:

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Troops to Task to achieve missions given for Operations in 30,000-strong Camps. My staff has estimated that a battalion of 800 could be expected to carry out the missions given only within an AOR bounded by a 1.5 km square, depending on terrain. This will make it unlikely that camps of 30,000 inhabitants could be considered a single battalion task. It also places most linear camps beyond the scope of one battalion. The analysis is as follows: given a bayonet strength within the battalion of 600 and a 50% factor for self protection, reserve and relief, the 24/7 operating force would be 300. The requirement to escort NGOs, guard sites, maintain a patrolling presence and a quick response force, seriously reduces the numbers available for an effective cordon, thus limiting the size of the AOR. This will slow the operation.

Change the second sentence to read "Each battalion would establish secure areas, systematically and progressively taking control of the camps. Their rate of progress will be determined by level of consent of the refugees, the population density, and local terrain constraints. Thus, at an early stage, significant areas would come under the protection of the peacekeeping force."

Paragraph 23. By defining a timescale of 30 days for the First Phase, you deny the commander an opportunity to exploit any improving situation or react appropriately to any deterioration. He may be able to close down some camps in, for example, 20 days, so should not be constrained: similarly, it may take longer than 30 days. The First Phase should be determined by size of population that can be taken on and refugee activity, and not to a strict timeline. If the Zairian selection and training is begun expeditiously, as recommended above, there will be no requirement for the external UN force to train them concurrent with conducting their initial camp operation.

Paragraph 25.

a. Paragraph 25 would be better placed after Paragraph 26, then

renumbered.

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b. Refer to my Logistic Estimate at Reference D which outlined the significant manpower bill for support. Change the opening sentence to read "Under this option, it is estimated that a force of 4,800 all ranks would be required."

c. Refer to my comments at Reference C where I discussed your Paragraph 16. Add a third sentence "*For military considerations, the simultaneous operation is preferred*".

Paragraph 28. Refer to Paragraph 3 of Reference C. I disagree with your premise that the first option does not involve separation. All operations will involve separation. I restate from the Reference:

To summarise, you rightly state that the groups would object to being moved from the camps. But of greater significance is that, under all options, that prior to movement they must be separated. They know that, once separated, they will be a greatly weaker force, and so will fight. The finesse in this operation lies in the separation of the groups (the distance and period of separation are secondary issues) so I cannot overstate the sophistication that we will need to employ to ensure we succeed.

Paragraph 30. Add to the first sentence " Should it be decided to undertake the *institutionalised* separation of..."

Paragraph 34. Add a final sentence "*Existing plans which call for the reduction in strength of UNAMIR to its mandated ceiling of 5,500 by April 1995 may now require reconsideration. The requirements for security within Rwanda during the period, and for UNAMIR to provide command and logistic support to the Zairian operation, mitigate against a force reduction within UNAMIR.*"

2. The capability of the RPA to continue to provide security within Rwanda throughout the repatriation is most significant. To prevent a re-infiltration by Interahamwe the RPA must be adequately trained in counter-insurgency techniques. At the moment they lack expertise across the board in the conduct of low intensity operations. This should be addressed by means of a request to a member country to provide bilateral military training assistance.

3. Best regards.

~~CRN 391/1 of 6~~

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Paragraph 6. You may wish to add as a concluding sentence " The conditions demanded of the leaders could be addressed by a plan that UNAMIR is presently offering: a joint BBGNU/UN/NGO operation which utilises all the resources available from the international community, coordinated by a central Task Force in Rwanda." CRN399
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Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11. The analysis on which the threat assessment is based in these paragraphs is sound but I must stress that it is based on unsubstantiated information. Please consider adding "This underscores the need for a sophisticated and detailed intelligence operation which should be initiated at the earliest opportunity."

Paragraph 14. The current position with regard to the UNAMIR radio station is that UNAMIR has staffed its request through BBGNU for permission to transmit, but a licence has not yet been granted. A decision whether or not to acknowledge BBGNU authority in this area is pending. Technical engineering and initial programme production work is complete. Programmes could be transmitted within the Kigali area immediately. Providing that planned installations of repeaters are conducted to schedule, coverage to Zaire and throughout Rwanda could be achieved within 3 weeks.

Paragraph 15.

a. Troops to Task to achieve missions given for Operations in 30,000-strong Camps. My staff has estimated that a battalion of 800 could be expected to carry out the missions given only within an AOR bounded by a 1.5 km square, depending on terrain. This will make it unlikely that camps of 30,000 inhabitants could be considered a single battalion task. It also places most linear camps beyond the scope of one battalion. The analysis is as follows: given a bayonet strength within the battalion of 600 and a 50% factor for self protection, reserve and relief, the 24/7 operating force would be 300. The requirement to escort NGOs, guard sites, maintain a patrolling presence and a quick response force, seriously reduces the numbers available for an effective cordon, thus limiting the size of the AOR. This will slow the operation.

b. Operational Command. Because UNAMIR is identified by the refugees as part of the problem and as such has lost impartiality in their eyes, the UN Zairian force should be seen to be a separate mission. But for SRSG to command both, and for a myriad of operational reasons which I need not rehearse to a military

reader, the missions must be linked, although they will operate under different mandates. I propose that I, as SRSG's military advisor, be made FC of the joint operation and operate from Kigali with a small staff, retain OPCON of all forces, and retain centralised command of an element of logistics. Both UNAMIR and the Zairian operation should be commanded each by a brigadier general, operating from Zaire and Kigali respectively. This will provide the separation which is necessary for presentational reasons, but maintain the sound principal of unity of command.

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c. Logistic Support. Refer to Paragraph 1.b. of Reference A. Logistical support to the present UNAMIR operation is of critical concern to me. I struggle to support my force, quite literally scraping the barrel day by day, and I remain unacceptably short of daily maintenance items. I strongly recommend that you do not consider the operation without first establishing a robust logistic system based on conventionally established military criteria of sustainability and expenditure rates. To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since I envisage the requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit is vital. This will limit your choice of which nations to approach with this request. To avoid delay to the operation logistic requirements that involve long lead times should be identified soonest and ordered. The need for mapping and imagery will be significant and should not be overlooked. To facilitate planning, my staff has begun a logistic estimate.

Paragraph 16.

a. Selection of UN Forces. This enterprise will be one of the most difficult low-intensity operations yet attempted. Your stated requirement in this Paragraph that the force is to be well trained and equipped is welcomed. Ideally the force should come from a single nation, but I accept the obvious difficulties in this. Within the infantry battalions however, the option of a composite force should be discounted. Cohesiveness and common, practiced, operating procedures will both be vital characteristics of the force.

a. Selection of Tracked or Wheeled APCs. A terrain assessment should be conducted before a choice is made between the procurement of wheeled or tracked APCs. UNAMIR has experienced severe problems with tyre wear when operating wheeled APCs in the

volcanic areas of Rwanda, caused by lava rock. While I would prefer to operate wheeled APCs inside camps rather than tracked vehicles, because they look and sound less aggressive to refugees, the terrain should influence the decision. Within the limitations of restricted access of UNAMIR to Goma and the camps, if you wish I will task my staff to investigate this problem. CEN 391
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b. Choice of Initial Operating Area. Your paper indicates that you plan to begin the operation in the northern camps. In this most difficult enterprise the scheme of manoeuvre is crucial to success. It will be influenced by many factors and so requires to be subjected to the command estimate process. I have some initial observations:

(1) The option of a discrete northern operation would demonstrate the resolve of the UN to act quickly, and may deal with the immediate problem. It may also serve to allow an escape route into Burundi for the hostile elements, which could result in a transfer of the problem, rather than its solution. It also places an untried force at the heart of a most difficult and unique military problem where from Day 1 it has to operate against the toughest and best organised threat.

(2) A southern option would begin the operation in the south around Bukavu, where the camps are smaller and less militant. Early success there would send signals to the refugees in the north who may then gain confidence to challenge the influence of the hostile elements even before any military operation reached Goma. It would also seal the Burundi border, removing one avenue of escape. It would not, however, tackle the most immediate and deteriorating security situation in Goma at the outset.

(3) A combined operation, where forces are inserted north and south simultaneously, must also be considered. A small southern force could prevent or reduce the spillage of refugees into Burundi.

All options have merit, and so I suggest that a decision is withheld until a full military estimate is conducted.

c. Screening Procedures.

(4) Criteria. The first 2 military tasks given in your Paragraph 15 (protect NGO personnel and materiel) could be conducted without any screening of the population. It is the third task (assist the safe passage of refugees to Rwanda) that produces the further implied task of screening the population. The criteria for separation must fall within international law and be clearly expressed to the military commander. Thus, it may be legitimate to separate any armed element, and anyone whose name appears on a list of alleged genocide perpetrators. It becomes much more difficult to support the separation of personnel on grounds of their political persuasion, or merely from reports that an individual has been seen assisting in the day to day organisation of the refugee camp. So the separation of hostile elements will be a most complex issue.

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Not a good idea

(5) Implications. The concept of screening implies a requirement for sound intelligence. It also implies that the force must anticipate and be equipped to deal with violence: the hostile elements are most unlikely to allow themselves to be separated from the population that provides them their power and their sanctuary from the process of law. The screening process will produce an additional caging and guarding requirement as the hostile elements are separated from innocent refugees.

Not a good idea

d. Choice of Indigenous Security Forces. Who to select as a police force is a thorny issue. The established command structure within the camps has been thoroughly compromised by hostile elements. A "sheriff" approach which allows communes to elect their own policeman may also perpetuate the undesirable element and reinforce the current hierarchy. The system currently exploited of using paid "scouts" who operate in protection gangs is workable in the short term, but cannot be considered as a nucleus for a responsible future civic force in Rwanda. It may be necessary to remove a number of screened citizens from the camps at the beginning of the operation for gendarmerie training in Rwanda, returning them to their communes about 3 months later as policemen, while in the interim relying for security within the camps on Zairian Army, civpol and scout groups.

Not a good idea

3. To summarise, you rightly state that the groups would object to being moved from the camps. But of greater significance is that, under all options, that prior to movement they must be separated. They know that, once

separated, they will be a greatly weaker force, and so will fight. The
finesse in this operation lies in the separation of the groups (the distance
and period of separation are secondary issues) so I cannot overstate the
sophistication that we will need to employ to ensure we succeed.

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4. Best regards.



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TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 4 November 1994
NUMBER: MIR 2300
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS

Reference:

A. UNAMIR fax 2125 dated 3 Oct 94 (Force Structure Appreciation).

1. Thank you for UNATIONS 3613, which was a copy of the minutes of your meeting on 1 Nov. The notes indicate a most positive attitude which I welcome. Let me state clearly at the outset that this military plan will come to nothing if the security situation within Rwanda is not addressed. That must remain the key to the unlocking of the regional crisis. With regard to the Secretariat's continuing work on security in the Rwandese camps, I consider that option (a) - a peacekeeping force - should be favoured, with an inclusion of limited support from option (b) - Zairian forces. Option (c) - funding and equipment support to Tanzania, should also be pursued. The 2 areas which will affect this plan at a strategic level are intelligence and logistics.

a. Intelligence. The difficulties in the collection of intelligence cannot be overstressed. Work must begin now. No collection means should be discounted. This will break new ground for the UN and will require hard bargaining to secure agreement, but there is an immediate need to recruit an agency capable of sophisticated collection and analysis. The use of technical means, cash inducement, infiltration and straight observation will all be necessary.

b. Logistics. The operation will stand or fall on its logistic support. If the experience of UNAMIR is used as a yardstick, its success is unlikely: 5 full months after the second UNAMIR resolution (SC 925/1994 dated 8 Jun) I remain short of troops, weapons and

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equipment, and woefully short of daily maintenance items. For this future operation to work the logistics must be on the ground before D Day. Troops must be self sufficient, either by bringing their own equipment or being provided a complete issue by a donor country, with time to train with it, before Day 1.

2. My comments below refer to the Paragraphs in your document.

1. No comment.

2. Zairian forces must be involved in the UN military operation. The issue is one of finding a suitable task for them. I feel that they would be best used in Lines of Communication duties, Rear Area Security etc. My recce team will testify that some among the Zairian forces were respected by the refugees, so with appropriate selection and training, a useful force may be available. This, of course, will incur a time penalty. The C2 of Zairian forces within the AOR requires detailed consideration. All Zairian forces within AOR must be OPCON to the UN FC of the Zairian mission.

3.

a. Gendarmerie. While the use of Gendarmerie could be included in a plan, I feel their influence would be extremely marginal, in the short to medium term. The Rwandan gendarmerie is a heavily attrited force, having been in the front line during both the 90 and the 94 campaigns, hence few remain. Of that number, how will acceptable individuals be identified and selected? How reliable will they be and how heavily will they be infiltrated by ex-govt agencies. How long will their training take?

b. Chapter 6 Peacekeeping Force.

(1) The first principle to confirm is that the operation will be conducted with the full compliance and support of the Zairian and Tanzanian governments. That given, I agree with the concept of a force working within Chapter 6, since there are no warring factions. But within Chapter 6 an appropriate mandate must be developed to allow the FC sufficient elbow room to deal with any deterioration of the

situation. The prospective FC should be involved from the earliest stage in the development of the mandate. I am also very willing to offer assistance from my staff to assist in its development. GRV 4
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(2) The UN agencies and NGOs must support the operation, since they will be required to adjust the flow and type of aid to encourage refugee withdrawal to their communes.

(3) Note that in the Zairian/Tanzanian peacekeeping operation there may be difficulty in aligning the political priorities which influence the decision on which camp is to be tackled first, with the practicalities of the military task in achieving them: geography, logistics and threat will be significant factors.

(4) But the overarching requirement remains the establishment of a satisfactory security situation within Rwanda, since only this will encourage the Rwandan people to return to their communes in peace.

c. UNAMIR's Responsibilities to Refugees. UNAMIR will willingly take responsibility for the refugees when they recross into Rwanda.

d. Op RONDAVAL. We are currently developing a plan for the return of DPs to their homes. It was briefed by me to the Vice President today (Fri 4 Nov) and will be presented by SRSG to the Secretary General on Tue 8 Nov. Its start date is currently planned to be 1 Mar 95. In essence it is a joint BBGNU/UN/NGO operation which utilises all the resources available from the international community, coordinated by a central Task Force in Rwanda. Op RONDAVAL can work in synergy with the refugee return: they are complementary and can be conducted simultaneously. This will, however, have a significant effect on the logistic demands on my force.

4. Your notes leave unaddressed the parent body or providing countries of the "international security personnel". I can think of no commercial security firm capable of mounting an operation as envisaged;

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their position in international law is also untested. My appreciation delivered at the Reference indicates the size of force needed for the task, so I believe that an international civpol of 600 would be insufficient. It would be unable to match any increased threat, and would bring with it concomitant logistic, C2 and training concerns. Experience here suggests that the operation would take nearer to 4-6 months to be established, vice 4-6 weeks.

5. Refer to my comment above at Sub-paragraphs 3.b. and 3.d.

6. I fully support the issue of provision of funds to allow the BBGNU to restart their administrative machinery. To address the issue of reintegration of the armies I strongly advise a training programme, run by member states and including officer and NCO training. This has been a feature of the reconciliation process of many former adversaries within Africa. What prevents UN forces from participating in the reconciliation process in this area?

7. Agree. See Brig Gen Anyidoho's Zairian technical recce report.

8. Refer to my appreciation at the Reference. I believe that the combat strength required for this limited mission should be 3 battalions, 2 of which should be mechanised. In addition there needs to be engineer, signals, transport, mechanical repair, aviation, medical, logistics and movement control, all at squadron size. Add a staff and civpol and the force should number 4000. With only 2 battalions, the figure would reduce to 3000.

9. My staff were unable to enlighten me as to the military concept of bubble operations. They remain submerged in their thick soup of conventional military practice and await, breathless, for this oxygen of inspiration.

10.

a. C2 within the Region. I would expect SRSG to be made the political supremo of the regional operation. The C2 of the Tanzanian operation requires to be linked to that of the operations in Zaire and Rwanda, since they are mutually supporting. There needs to be a military cell (I suggest collocated with UNAMIR) to coordinate SRSG's direction into

military language. (S)

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b. Location of Logistic and Mounting Bases for Operations.

The Tanzanian operation should be mounted from that country. For Zaire, a full military estimate will obviously be required, however I include some preliminary considerations. The Zairian, operation is influenced by the requirement to begin the operation in the South, to start on the smaller of the 2 problem areas, and to prevent leakage of militia into Burundi. Bukavu airstrip cannot take aircraft larger than C130 equivalents, which suggests that Kigali should be used as the primary airhead for troop arrival and logistic support. This would require an additional logistic cell in Kigali, and some expeditionary accommodation. Road improvements to the Zairian border are being staffed at present. Given the road improvement, road movement could complement air transport from Kigali to Bukavu. This would require additional transport assets to be provided. As the operation advances into Goma, the logistic chain would take advantage of its better airstrip.

11. Refer to my comment at Sub-paragraph 8.

12. Chapter 6 is adequate, given an appropriate mandate. Refer to Sub-paragraph 3.b. above. The considerable requirement for equipment, movement and planning support cannot be overstressed. I welcome the US government's offer of assistance in these areas. A complete shopping list is required at the earliest stage, to allow an appreciation of the scale of the requirement, and to give contributing states the opportunity to contribute where they feel best suited.

3. Force Reduction within UNAMIR. I have expressed that the security situation within Rwanda is crucial to this plan. I am currently under remit to reduce my force to its mandated ceiling of 5500, which is approximately my current strength. At present I find that I have to juggle forces to produce a deployable reserve, even before I am asked to deal with the return of 2 million persons in an increasingly more tense security situation, from 3 points of the compass. To achieve the reduction to the mandated ceiling it will be necessary to reduce to 5 battalions and 3 companies, a loss of one battalion. Within the overall reduction I may lose Frafbatt, a francophone battalion. As such its importance in presentational terms is significant. It

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will assume even greater significance as the cultural mix of the population alters with the return of the Hutus. I ask you to reconsider the force reduction, to raise my ceiling to approximately 6000, and also to pursue the possibility of replacing or rotating Frafbatt with another francophone battalion of similar strength. This would allow me to maintain a force structure of 6 battalions and 3 companies.

4. Best regards.