Expanded Number: S-0881-0004-03-00001

Title: Items-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - Disarmament - 1966 (see list of items, appendix No. 21)

Date Created: 01/06/1966

Record Type: Archival Item

Container: S-0881-0004: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs)
Attached PSCA/DAD/9, "Reaction of East European Countries to the FRG Note of 25 March 1966".
RE{:tITtON OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
TO THE FRG NOTE OF 25 MARCH 1966

I. Introduction

The note of the Government of the FRG of 25 March 1966 on disarmament, European security and world peace drew an immediate negative reaction from the East European countries to which it had been presented (see FS{CA/BA/3 of 29 March 1966). Nevertheless the West German proposals were carefully studied by the Governments of East European countries and some of those most directly concerned recently forwarded detailed replies to the FRG Government: the Polish reply on 29 April, the Czechoslovak Note on 5 May and the USSR reply on 17 May 1966.

The replies can be divided into two parts: the first describes the West German desire to improve relations with East European countries as not very convincing. The second part replies to the ideas and suggestions contained in the FRG note regarding partial disarmament measures. The reaction to these suggestions is mostly negative, without excluding a further exchange of ideas. The Soviet note concludes with concrete proposals, on which the USSR Government "would like to hope for a possibility of cooperating with the Government of the FRG.

II. Replies to the FRG disarmament proposals

1. Non-Proliferation

To the FRG suggestions concerning a settlement of the non-proliferation problem, the USSR note expressed doubts whether the Federal Republic of Germany is ready to renounce its plans for access to nuclear weapons through NATO, and considers it significant that the Government of the FRG does not say a single word on its attitude to the idea of the conclusion of a treaty on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The "desire of the Government of the FRG to obtain access to nuclear weapons within the NATO framework" is accompanied, according to the Soviet note, "by the stepping up of the building of its own nuclear industry in West Germany."

The USSR Government takes note of the FRG Government pledge renouncing the production of nuclear weapons made to the West European Union in 1954. "All the more so since it directly flows from the commitments of the FRG under the Potsdam agreement."

The Soviet note reiterates that the Warsaw Treaty Members will take necessary countermeasures if the FRG gains access to nuclear weapons by NATO nuclear sharing or other means.

Finally the USSR Government expressed the hope for a possibility of cooperation with the FRG Government in the following:

"Joint efforts of states are necessary for the solution of the most vital task of our time--to avert the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. A major step in this direction would be immediate conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which in accordance with the United Nations decisions would stop all loopholes for such proliferation. The treaty should also envisage prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states--the signatories of the treaty--which have no nuclear weapons on their territory." (Press Release of the USSR Permanent Mission: 20 May 1966, p. 10, par. A)

The Czechoslovak note criticized the FRG for confining the whole complex of problems concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the question of their actual production and of national ownership.

According to the Czechoslovak note the FRG continues to strive for access to nuclear weapons within NATO. It also draws attention to the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Powers of January 1965 that they will take the necessary defensive measures if the NATO members follow the path of implementing the plans of nuclear integration.

The note recalls that the OER submitted to the EHDC in February 1966 proposals to the effect that the two German States should renounce nuclear
wepons and undertake nothing that would impede the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

The Polish note stated that the FRG omitted in its note the importance of the ban on the spread of nuclear weapons through various forms of co-ownership within military alliances, co-disposal and co-decision on their use, and states that the gaining by the FRG of access to nuclear weapons may bring about a further increase of tension in Europe and eliminate the chances for a non-proliferation treaty.

2. Nuclear Freeze in Europe

The FRG was prepared to pledge along with the whole of Europe "not to increase the number of nuclear weapons in Europe" but "reduce them in stages" ...

The Polish note recalled the Polish proposal of 1958 for the establishment of an atom-free zone covering Poland, Czechoslovakia the GDR and FRG as well as its 1963 proposal on the freezing of nuclear armaments on the territories of those states. The FRG Government proposals - according to the Polish note - only deform its own ideas. The note considers as quite unrealistic the FRG condition to extend those obligations over the European part of the USSR while the territory of the USA would be excluded.

The Czechoslovak note stresses that the DDR "proposals for the 'freeze' are unrealistic and unacceptable both because of their territorial impact and for the condition 'attached, namely to make 'decisive progress in solving political problems in Central Europe'."

The USSR note stated that the FRG proposal coincides with the proposals of the USA, which are "directed against disarmament", because it tries to curtail the nuclear potential of the USSR leaving aside the nuclear potential of the USA.
The USSR government responds to the FRG proposal by the following suggestion:

"The Soviet government declares its support of the proposals of the German Democratic Republic for both German states to renounce nuclear weapons, reduce armed forces and armaments and for steps to an atomless zone in Central Europe and other proposals for European security put forward by European socialist states." (Press Release of the USSR Permanent Mission, 20 May, Page 11, Par. F)

3. Control of import of fissionable material

The USSR note simply states that the USSR is a resolute opponent of mass accumulation in the FRG of materials which could be used for the production of nuclear arms.

Also the Polish note rejects the FRG proposals relating to the control of fissionable materials as devoid of any practical value.

4. Renunciation of the use of force

The Polish note stated that, by proposing an exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of force between the FRG government and all Socialist States in Europe with the exception of the GDR, the FRG is distorting the basic sense of the previous proposals made by the Socialist countries for a non-aggression pact.

As regards the idea of conclusion of non-aggression pacts or exchange of declarations on renunciation of the use of force bilaterally between the FRG and a European state, the USSR reply stated that it supported the idea of non-aggression pact or declaration provided the agreements of such kind "would not serve as a cover for aggression against some third state".

To this FRG proposal the USSR Government responds by the following suggestions:

"With a view to ending the arms race and easing international tensions, the Soviet Union advocates dissolution of military blocs including the military alignments which oppose each other in Europe--NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization whose armed forces are in direct contact on German soil. The Soviet government is prepared to take part in working out a system of reliable guarantees of security of European states." (Press Release of the USSR Permanent Mission, 20 May 1966, page 10, par. 0)
5. Exchange of military observers

The proposal is rejected as "devoid of any practical value" (Poland) or is seen as an endeavour to "divert attention from the dangerous policy of the FRG in nuclear armament" (Czechoslovakia).

6. The FRG is prepared to participate in a World Disarmament Conference or in any other disarmament conference promising success

The USSR note responds to this by the following suggestion:

"The Soviet government finds it important to discuss on an all-European basis the proposals of the socialist and other European states on the questions of European security, including military disengagement and reduction of armaments in Europe. Development of peaceful, mutually advantageous contacts between all European states. The convocation of an appropriate conference of European states would serve this purpose." (USSR Permanent Mission Press Release, 20 May 1966, page 11, par. 6)

III. Conclusions:

1) The basic positions of East European countries on FRG and non-proliferation seem to be unchanged. The East European countries repeat the Warsaw Treaty members' statement of January 1965 that they will take "countermeasures" if the FRG gains access to nuclear weapons "by NATO nuclear sharing or other means."

2) The East European countries appear to favour talks on the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe or at least on the 1964 Polish proposal on the freezing of nuclear armaments in that area (the latter seems, at present, to be more realistic than the former). However, the position of the FRG on those suggestions was flatly rejected and there seems to be little hope for further development as long as the FRG links such talks to progress in the solution of political problems in Central Europe and ignores the OEEC.

3) The East European countries do not seem to be interested in the FRG suggestion concerning IAEA control of supplying of fissionable materials.

4) The East European countries are interested in their previous proposals for a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty. Talks on declarations renouncing the use of force excluding the OEEC are, at least for the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, unacceptable.
5) The proposal for an exchange of military observers is considered devoid of any practical value.

6) The FRG declaration of preparedness to participate "in any disarmament conference promising success" led to the USSR suggestion for a convocation of a conference of European states on the question of European security, including military disengagement and reduction of armaments in Europe. The USSR seems to be very interested in such a conference and, if there are further exchanges of ideas between the East European countries and the FRG regarding the questions raised by the FRG note, it is possible that this question will be given greater prominence.

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Note: The Czechoslovak, Polish and Soviet replies to the FRG note stated explicitly that their replies were made also on behalf of the Government of the GDR, which did not receive the note and could therefore officially not reply to it. However the East German newspaper "Neues Deutschland" carried a commentary on the FRG note, which fully followed the line of the official replies of Czechoslovakia, Poland and USSR.
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**Date:** 8 June  
**From:** A.E. Nesterenko  
**CR.13 (11-64)**
Note on Recent U.S. and Chinese Contacts on Disarmament Matters

Following the third Chinese nuclear test on May 9, Premier Chou-En-Lai seemed to justify it, in part, by arguing that China was forced to continue nuclear testing since the U.S. had rejected a Chinese offer that the two nations pledge that neither would be first to use atomic weapons against the other*. According to a report in the New York Times on 3 June, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland raised with the Chinese representative the question whether the statement by Premier Chou-En-Lai meant that the People's Republic was linking its accession to the limited test ban treaty to an undertaking by the U.S. of a "no first use" pledge. Nevertheless, this step by the U.S. does have several noteworthy aspects.

The U.S. response contributes to an incipient dialogue with the PRC on arms control, especially on nuclear weapons. In the past twenty years the Great Powers have often used the subject of disarmament as a means of opening new phases of relations with adversaries. Recent statements of U.S. willingness to work with the PRC, among others, to prepare for a world disarmament conference may have the same purpose and/or effect. While these moves may have some utility for diplomacy, they hold out very little promise of an early abandonment either of atmospheric tests by the Chinese, or of U.S. opposition to a "no first use" pledge.

* "... China has proposed to the U.S. that the two countries undertake the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. But U.S. imperialism has rejected China's proposal, continued to develop and mass produce nuclear weapons of various kinds, further expanded its nuclear blackmail and threats against China and other peace-loving countries. In collusion with U.S. imperialism, the revisionist leading group of the Soviet Union is actively engineering a treaty on the prevention of nuclear proliferation so as to maintain their nuclear monopoly, intimidate the oppressed nations and peoples, and realize its dreams of world domination through Soviet-U.S. collaboration. In these circumstances, China cannot but conduct necessary and limited nuclear tests to develop nuclear weapons."

(FBIS, No. 91, 11 May 1966, p. BBBl)
For the Chinese, nuclear testing is indispensable to achieve a nuclear military capability which its leaders deem essential especially in view of a feeling of encirclement by Soviet and American nuclear power. Its unilateral "no first use" pledge could be interpreted as a painless declaration from a strategic standpoint since it is unlikely that the PRC could or would in the foreseeable future initiate the use of nuclear weapons in view of the overwhelming nuclear deterrent capability of its opponents. The Chinese unilateral declaration did show, however, that the PRC understood some of the possible uses and nuances of disarmament proposals in international diplomacy.

For the U.S., the mere raising of the possibility of a "no first use" policy with respect to China is of some interest, since heretofore it has strongly opposed any declaration which would restrict or limit the use of nuclear weapons outside of the framework of general disarmament under effective international control. The Warsaw probe, however, probably does not signify a change in that basic policy; rather it would seem to have more restricted purposes. By making public its possible interest in a "no first use" pledge in relation to China, the U.S. may hope to remove or dissipate speculations and fears that the Vietnam war is part of a design to use nuclear weapons against China in a preventive war. (With its air power in the Pacific, of course, such a war could, in any event, be carried on with conventional weapons.) Secondly, it places the onus and odium of continued testing on the Chinese while reaffirming U.S. support for the test ban treaty. Thirdly, the probe suggests that the U.S. has begun to develop different policies towards different nuclear powers depending on their nuclear capability and the geopolitical context of the rivalry (e.g., South East Asia as distinct from Europe). This would seem to be a by-product of the thinking that has been going on with regard to proliferation in anticipation of the possibility of the failure of efforts to stem the tide.

As mentioned earlier, however, the main significance of this move lies in the diplomatic and political realm and especially in the evidence it offers of the U.S. willingness to treat the PRC as an adversary with whom limited arrangements are not inconceivable, rather than as an enemy with whom war or confrontation is inevitable. The recent U.S. approaches to China on the subject of disarmament must be viewed as some evidence of a flexibility that many observers thought did not exist at this time.
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Date: 9 June 1966

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko

CR.13 (11-64)
Note on Further Steps taken by the
Non-Aligned Countries Regarding a World Disarmament Conference

Pursuant to the decision taken by the non-aligned countries at their meeting on 13 May 1966*, a second informal meeting was held on 1 June 1966 at UN Headquarters. The representative of Algeria was again in the Chair and some 48 to 50 representatives of non-aligned countries put in an appearance. It was agreed that the representative of Algeria should continue as Chairman of the non-aligned countries.

As regards the agreement in principle at the first meeting to set up a preliminary working group of non-aligned countries, it was decided to leave to the Chairman the designation of the members of this working group. No decision was taken on the number of members or composition of the working group but various criteria were suggested during the meeting such as, experience in the field (which would cover the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC), the principle of geographic distribution, and the desire or willingness of countries to serve. Wide discretionary authority was vested in the Chairman to conduct consultations and to establish the working group.

It was also agreed that the terms of reference of this working group would be to prepare an inventory of problems, both procedural and substantive, that would have to be dealt with in connexion with the holding of a world disarmament conference. The working group would then report back to the full non-aligned group.

It was also agreed that there should be a third meeting of non-aligned countries in due course, but no date was set.

As a result of the consultations already carried on by the Chairman, there appears to be some sentiment in favour of having the preliminary working group consist of 16 members. These would include the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC plus eight additional non-aligned countries with the same geographic distribution - i.e. three from Africa, two from Asia, one from Europe and two from Latin America. While no final decisions have been made, it is expected that the working group will be set up in the near future.

* See "Situation Report on World Disarmament Conference" (PSCA/DAD/6).
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Date: 10 June

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko

CR. 13 (11-64)
Note on the Conference on Seismological Data Exchange in Stockholm
23-26 May 1966

The Swedish idea of organizing a "detection club" was discussed at a conference of experts of eight countries which took place in Stockholm from 23 to 26 May. Experts were present from Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Arab Republic as official representatives of their governments. The participants were apparently in general agreement that the exchange of seismological data through international co-operation could contribute to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Future action was left to the decisions of the participating governments, but it was agreed that Sweden should provide an informal secretariat for the time being for conducting the exchange of information and ideas in the immediate period ahead.

A copy of the press communique adopted by the conference is annexed hereto.

Apparently some consideration is currently being given to the question of whether and how the efforts being made for the establishment of the "detection club" should be reported to the next session of the General Assembly, and whether, and to what extent, any action or endorsement by the General Assembly might usefully be sought. There appears, however, to be little likelihood of the question being submitted as a separate item for the agenda.
Press Communiqué Issued on 26 May 1966

"On the invitation of the Swedish Government, representatives of the Governments of Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have met in Stockholm from 23 to 26 May, 1966 to discuss the possibility of developing a system of exchanging seismological data through international co-operation which might be useful in connection with a comprehensive test ban.

The Head of the Swedish Delegation, Dr. T. Magnusson acted as chairman of the Conference and the Head of the Indian Delegation, Dr. R. Ramanna as chairman of the Conference drafting group.

The Conference adopted a report to be submitted to the Governments of the countries represented. In this report the Conference has dealt with the aims of the proposed international co-operation, the scientific and technical problems involved and made some suggestions as to their solution.

The Conference left the decisions on future action to the participating Governments. However, it was recognized by all delegations that there was a very great interest throughout the world in the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and that if seismology was to contribute to this goal its resources should be mobilized as rapidly and effectively as possible.

To ensure that the interest and momentum developed at the Stockholm meeting was not lost and to provide the necessary administrative basis for the exchange of ideas and information in the immediate period ahead, the meeting requested Sweden to provide for the time being an informal secretariat for these purposes. The Swedish Delegation agreed to undertake this task subject to approval by the Swedish Government.

All visiting Delegations expressed their deep appreciation to the Swedish Delegation and its Government for their valuable and continuing initiative as well as for the excellent arrangements made for the Conference."
You may find the attached paper of some interest in view of the current press reports on the matter.
On 9 March in Paris the council of ELDO gathered to discuss their future programme. On the eve of this meeting Britain announced her decision to withdraw from the organization because of the increasing costs in its operation which she felt unable to support.

The European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) came into being in 1964. There are six European member States — Belgium, France, F.R. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — and Australia, which provides the launching facilities and equipment.

In 1960 there was a growing feeling in Europe that unless launchers were built on a European-wide basis, Europe would remain forever dependent on the United States for space orbital launchings. This was considered a very serious shortcoming by the entire European aerospace industry which, deprived of a major activity such as that of launcher design and manufacture, would have have been excluded from the space development work closely related to general technological progress. Thus, when the British Government cancelled its "Blue Streak" ballistic missile project as too costly and offered it to a joint European and Commonwealth programme of scientific, peaceful, space exploration as the first stage of a launching rocket, the above countries welcomed the offer.

The aims of ELDO were outlined as having the purpose of designing, developing and producing a multi-stage satellite launcher. The financial contributions for the initial 5-year programme for the development of the Europa 1 satellite, calculated on the basis of an estimate of £70 million, were assessed as follows:

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By the end of 1964 there were indications of rising costs and the present revised estimates, according to the London Times of 3 June, have risen to £150 million.
The London Times of 3 June reported that Britain's decision to withdraw from the European Launcher Development Organization, which was strongly urged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. James Callaghan, as an economy measure, met with vigorous opposition on the part of the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Aviation and other Ministers. Mr. Duncan Sandys, a leading member of the Conservative party, said "If the British Government now opt out of this, and our European partners continue without us, Britain will be relegated for an indefinite period to the category of a scientifically third-class power."

Although the original cost of the programme had more than doubled, it was felt that the price for the sale or hire to others of the fruits of ELDO's research would have risen also. At the same time, were the project to be abandoned, the cost of hiring Russian or American equipment would also have increased.

Some anxiety was expressed that by withdrawing its support (nearly 40% of the total cost) Britain's European partners would be forced out of the big rocket launcher business, leaving it and the indirect technological rewards for industry to the United States and the Soviet Union.

There has been some technical dissatisfaction with the programme. Although there was no malfunction in the rocket itself at its launching on 24 May at Woomera, a site nearer the equator is considered necessary for operational use.

Reports from Paris, 10 June, state that Britain's threat of withdrawal evoked a tentative agreement that the other member States would pay more and she would pay less. However, no firm commitment had been made and the seven participating countries are scheduled to meet again at a "decisive" meeting on 7 July.

In the interval, President de Gaulle goes to Moscow. Following his visit there, in the opinion expressed by C.L. Sulzberger in the New York Times of 12 June, there will be announcement of a Franco-Russian collaboration in space and, possibly, co-operation on a communication satellite that would compete with that of the United States. Then, he continues, France might start the process of withdrawing from ELDO.
Although there has been some concern that the demise of ELDO would mean the end of all European progress in space and space-related fields this is not a completely valid supposition. There is another European venture called the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). The Convention of ESRO was signed in 1962 by nine Governments: Belgium,* France*, FR. Germany*, Italy*, the Netherlands*, the United Kingdom*, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and later joined by Denmark with Norway and Austria as "Observers".

The purpose of ESRO is to design and construct sounding rockets payloads, satellite and space probes; to procure launching vehicles and arrange for their launching; to provide means for collection, processing and dissemination of space data among Member States; to support research and development, to co-operate with research Institutions in Member States and to provide for contacts between scientists and engineers, their interchange and advanced training. The budget for an eight-year programme has been set at $306 million. It is financed by contributions from Member States in proportion to their national income.

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Attached herewith PSCA/DAD/12, 26 September 1966, "Note on Disarmament Aspects of US and USSR Statements in the General Debate."

Date: CR. 13 (11-64)
Note on Disarmament Aspects of US and USSR Statements in the General Debate

U.S. Statement

Mr. Goldberg's statement on disarmament, on 22 September, was unusually brief. The U.S. representative confined his remarks to the statement that the completion of a non-proliferation treaty and the extension of the partial test ban to cover underground tests were the most urgent disarmament questions, and the remaining differences on these issues "can and must be resolved on a basis of mutual compromise."

USSR Statement

A large and significant part of Mr. Gromyko's address to the General Assembly, on 23 September, was devoted to disarmament. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, and European security were the subjects on which Mr. Gromyko focused his attention. He also referred to CCD and a world disarmament conference. He did not mention the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests nor the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons. He stressed, on the other hand, the right of the United Nations to set forth its opinion "clearly and firmly" on the question of ways to eliminate the nuclear threat, and stated that, while the nuclear Powers carried a special responsibility for the elimination of such a threat, much would depend on the United Nations as a whole. The United Nations he thought should give new impetus to the disarmament negotiations.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The Soviet Foreign Minister, stating that there were still chances of concluding a non-proliferation treaty, (1) called on the U.S. to make its actions conform with its acceptance in principle of the goal of non-proliferation; (2) underscored the efforts of the FRG "for participation in the disposal of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO"; (3) stated that the USSR position remained unchanged, but that, in seeking solutions which would allow a treaty to be signed, it was "listening attentively to all constructive considerations, including the opinions of states which do not possess nuclear weapons"; (4) negotiations on non-proliferation "could be completed in a comparatively short period of time. Meanwhile it is important that no one
take steps which might lead, directly or indirectly, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Consequently, the USSR submitted to the G.A. an item entitled "On the Renunciation by States of Actions Hampering the Attainment of Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

Elimination of Foreign Military Bases

Repeating the Soviet contention that military bases established in foreign territories by the U.S. and other Western Powers served as a major instrument of aggressive policy, Mr. Gromyko said that it was possible and feasible to begin solving this problem, and announced that the USSR was submitting an important and urgent item: "On the Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America". In explaining the Soviet viewpoint, Mr. Gromyko said that even if the bases were not removed all at once, and even if this happened first "in some regions, in some States", it was necessary to move in that direction. Only thus could the United Nations really display its concern for an international détente and for conditions under which every State would feel secure.

The Question of European Security

Mr. Gromyko had much to say about Europe, "the barometer of the world's political weather," and the security of the European nations which "can be assumed only ... on an all-European basis, on the basis of cooperation of states situated in Eastern as well as Western Europe." He repeated that the Soviet Union and its allies were "willing to sit at the negotiating table together with all European States to discuss the pressing problems of European security", and would exclude no European state. He summed up the views of the Soviet Union on this subject by recalling two basic measures proposed by the Warsaw Treaty Powers in their recent Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe: (1) the inviolability of the existing European borders, and (2) the prevention of access to nuclear weapons for the FRG. "There can be no lasting peace and security in Europe and beyond," Mr. Gromyko said, "without compliance with these provisions."

General Disarmament

The problem of disarmament "in its totality" required close attention on the part of the General Assembly and the Soviet Union rejected the pessimistic philosophy which assumed that "the world was incapable of dealing with the arms race at all". Without the efforts of those nations which genuinely desired to achieve the solutions of this problem, and to reach agreement on separate measures as well as on general and complete disarmament, the situation of the world today would be more complex and dangerous.
World Disarmament Conference

In order to overcome the present stagnation in disarmament negotiations (the work of the EDC could be compared to "a monotonous movement in a closed circle"), the idea of convening a world conference on disarmament, with the participation of all countries of the world was "all the more pressing."

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The brevity of Mr. Goldberg's observations on disarmament should not be interpreted to mean a decreased U.S. interest in disarmament negotiations. For reasons that are well known, Mr. Goldberg's intervention in the general debate centered around the question of Vietnam. It is clear, however, that the United States continues to give priority to non-proliferation.

Mr. Groysko, in giving non-proliferation such a prominent place in his intervention, and in the explanatory memorandum requesting the inclusion of the new item in the agenda (A/6398), seemed to invite the U.S. not to do anything regarding nuclear sharing within NATO which would hamper agreement. The fact that the U.S., in the General Committee, expressed its willingness to co-sponsor the new USSR item serves to highlight the differences in approach between the USSR and the U.S.; the latter maintains that its proposals for NATO nuclear arrangements would not result in any proliferation, while the former maintains that they would constitute a ban to agreement. If the USSR and the U.S. both co-sponsor a resolution along the lines of the Soviet draft, the non-nuclear countries may regard it as being aimed more at them than at proposals for nuclear sharing.

It is to be expected that the efforts to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty will be intensified during the current Assembly. The non-nuclear countries can also be expected to put additional stress on questions relating to their own security. As to the other disarmament issues, the prospects for progress remain limited. The Members of the UN will no doubt continue to express great interest in ways to find a solution - even a trial solution - of the question of banning underground weapon tests, and in other steps designed to reduce the dimensions of the nuclear threat.

The USSR in the past has not succeeded in obtaining the adoption, in the context of disarmament, of a resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases, although such a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly in the context of decolonization (A/2105 (XX)). It is difficult to forecast at this stage how the new Soviet item and draft resolution, limited to the elimination of bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, will be received when dealt with in the First Committee in a disarmament context.
I forward herewith copies of the "Notes for the Chairman" with regard to disarmament agenda items being dealt with in the First Committee.

Date: 21/X  
FROM: A. E. Nesterenko  
CR. 13 (11-64)
Twenty-first Session
Agenda Item 97

RENUNCIATION BY STATES OF ACTIONS
HAMPERING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Note for the Chairman

1. On 23 September 1966 the USSR requested (A/6398) the inclusion of the above item in the agenda of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. (See also Note on agenda item No. 26, "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.")

2. In submitting its request the USSR recalled that on the basis of the recommendations of the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had conducted negotiations in 1966 on the preparation of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the USSR stated, the ENDC negotiations had "as yet produced no positive results."

3. This situation, the USSR further stated, "results from the fact that the Western Powers, and in the first instance the United States, are attempting, in spite of the clearly worded recommendations of the General Assembly, to leave loopholes in the non-proliferation treaty which open the way for non-nuclear States belonging to NATO, particularly West Germany, to gain access to nuclear weapons or for the implementation of other projects for the so-called 'division of nuclear responsibility' within that military alliance."

4. The USSR expressed its conviction that at the present time, when the urgent necessity of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was recognized by an overwhelming majority of governments and when international negotiations were under way on this question, it was particularly important to create a favourable atmosphere for these negotiations and to avoid any actions which might block an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the USSR urged the General Assembly to give the fullest possible consideration, at its twenty-first session, to the item in question.

5. At the same time the USSR submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.368) by which the General Assembly would urgently appeal to States: (i) pending the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to refrain from any actions which might hamper the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement; (ii) to take all necessary steps for the earliest possible conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

6. The USSR draft resolution was subsequently sponsored by Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Italy, Mongolia, Ukrainian SSR, United States, Czechoslovakia, Norway and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.368/Add. 1-4).
Twenty-first Session
Agenda Item 26

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Note for the Chairman

I. Introduction

1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been debated as a separate agenda item by the General Assembly since its fourteenth session. Two items dealing with this question have been put on the agenda of the twenty-first session: (i) "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament" (item No. 25); and (ii) "Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (item No. 97, submitted by the USSR). A separate note has been prepared for each of these two items.

II. General Assembly Decision at the Twentieth Session

2. On 24 September 1965, the USSR requested the inclusion of the item "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" in the agenda of the 20th session of the General Assembly (A/5976). The item was considered by the First Committee at the 1355th to 1373rd meetings. The resolution adopted in connexion with this item on 19 November 1965 (A/RES/2028 (XX), copy attached) urged all States to take steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation; called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) to give urgent consideration to this question, and set out guidelines which the ENDC was to follow; requested the ENDC to submit to the General Assembly a report on the results of its work. The ENDC dealt with this question at meetings held in Geneva between 27 January and 25 August 1966, and submitted a report for consideration by the twenty-first session of the General Assembly (A/6390).

III. Previous General Assembly Decisions on Non-Proliferation

3. At the fourteenth session, Ireland requested that the question of prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The Irish initiative resulted in the adoption of resolution 1380 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 which suggested that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee consider "appropriate means" of dealing with the problem "including the feasibility
of an international agreement subject to inspection and control." The vote was 68 to 0, with 12 abstentions.

4. The question of non-proliferation was placed on the agenda of the fifteenth session, again at the request of Ireland. On 20 December 1960, the General Assembly adopted by 68 votes to none, with 26 abstentions, resolution 1576 (XV) calling upon all Governments to make every effort to achieve permanent agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; calling upon Powers producing such weapons, pending the negotiation of a permanent agreement, to refrain from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and from transmitting information necessary for their manufacture; calling upon Powers not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing such weapons and from otherwise attempting to acquire them.

5. At its sixteenth session the General Assembly took further steps to deal with the spread of nuclear weapons. As in previous years, Ireland requested the inclusion of a separate item on the agenda of the Assembly. Furthermore, Sweden proposed an inquiry to determine the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might refrain from acquiring them in the future.

6. As a result of the new Irish initiative, resolution 1665 (XVI) was unanimously adopted on 4 December 1961. This basic resolution called upon all States, and in particular upon the States possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours "to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons."

7. As a result of the Swedish initiative, resolution 1664 (XVI) was adopted on 4 December 1961 by 58 votes to 10 with 28 abstentions. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to make an inquiry as to the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons, and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country. Replies to the Secretary-General's inquiry were received from 62 U.N. Members, whose replies indicated a diversity of opinions without any dominant viewpoint. The Secretary-General's report to the Disarmament Commission (DC/201 and Add. 1-3), containing the texts of the replies, was circulated to the members of the
General Assembly for their information.

8. At the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions, no further decisions were taken, but support for the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons continued to develop. At the nineteenth session, the item "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" was put on the agenda of the General Assembly at the request of India. Following the general debate in which a number of members stressed the importance of non-proliferation, and in particular of guarantees to be given to the non-nuclear Powers undertaking not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons, the Assembly recessed owing to disagreement over financial and constitutional questions.

9. Discussion on non-proliferation, including the question of guarantees, was subsequently taken up in the Disarmament Commission, which convened at the request of the USSR and met from April to June 1955. The Disarmament Commission adopted a resolution, by 83 votes to 1 with 18 abstentions, calling on the ENDC to reconvene as soon as possible and to accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures.

IV. ENDC Deliberations

10. When the ENDC reconvened in Geneva on 27 January 1956, it had before it two draft treaties: the U.S. "Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons" (ENDC/152) which was later amended (ENDC/152/Add.1), and the USSR "Draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/154, A/5976). These two drafts, which are both annexed to the report of the ENDC (A/6390), together with Resolution 2028 (XX) provided the main basis for discussion by the ENDC throughout the session. In the course of the session Canada submitted a tabular comparison of the U.S. and USSR draft treaties (ENDC/175, which is also annexed to the report of the ENDC (A/6390)).

11. By the U.S. draft treaty (ENDC/152), nuclear States parties to the treaty would undertake (i) not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance; (ii) not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons; (iii) not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear States would undertake corresponding obligations: (i) not to manufacture nuclear weapons; (ii) not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into their national control, either directly, or indirectly through a
military alliance; and (iii) not to take any other action resulting in an increase of the total number of states and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

12. In its amendments to the draft treaty (END/C/152/Add.1), the United States defined "control" in the context of non-proliferation as the "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon state"; it made clear that each of the nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons not only in the national control of any non-nuclear weapon State, but also into the control of any association of non-nuclear weapon States. It further clarified that the obligation not to assist any non-nuclear weapon State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons extended to "preparations for such manufacture, as well as the testing of nuclear weapons," and also "encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire ... nuclear weapons." None of the actions prohibited by the treaty could be taken either directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel were under the command of a military alliance.

13. By the USSR draft treaty (END/C/154), parties to the treaty possessing nuclear weapons would undertake: (i) not to transfer nuclear weapons in any form -- directly, or indirectly through third States or groups of States -- into the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons; (ii) not to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them and over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance; (iii) not to provide assistance -- directly, or indirectly through third States or groups of States -- to non-nuclear States in the manufacture, in preparations for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons and not to transmit to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information which could be used for the purpose of the manufacture of use of nuclear weapons. The parties to the treaty not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake corresponding obligations not to create, manufacture or prepare for manufacture nuclear weapons either independently or jointly with other States, and to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form, directly, or indirectly through third States or groups of States, for purposes of ownership, control or use of such weapons or of testing them, etc.
14. The USSR and its allies maintained that the U.S. draft, even as amended, made it possible to transfer the control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers through military alliances. The definition of "control" in the U.S. draft made this possible. The U.S. draft, they said, appeared to be subordinated to the political and strategic interests of NATO and could become a legal basis for a third category of non-nuclear Powers to obtain access to nuclear weapons through the so-called sharing of nuclear responsibilities. NATO nuclear plans, they contended, envisaged giving the FRG access to nuclear weapons. The USSR and its allies could not sign a treaty that would allow a nuclear role for the FRG. No nuclear weapons should be allowed to fall into the hands of the FRG, either through the MLF, ANF or in any other form.

15. The U.S. and its allies maintained that none of the various proposals under discussion in NATO would allow the control of nuclear weapons to pass into the hands of anyone who did not at the moment have that control. The United States stressed that it would never give up its veto on the use of its own nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the United States contended that the language of the USSR draft treaty, particularly in Article I, was so broad that it could be said to bar even consultation between NATO allies in preparation for their defense against possible nuclear attack, as well as the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons, under U.S. control, on the territory of NATO allies. Nobody could prevent allies from consulting each other on such matters. If it was the Soviet Union's intention to prohibit such consultations, any chance of negotiating a treaty would be destroyed.

16. The non-aligned countries in the ENDC mainly emphasized that non-proliferation extended beyond the exclusive sphere of interest of the Great Powers, and that an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers must be found in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX). The non-aligned Joint Memorandum on non-proliferation (ENDC/178 of 19 August 1966 which is annexed to the report of the ENDC (A/6390)) recognized that the problem of nuclear defense measures within alliances fell mainly within the field of competence of the major nuclear Powers and their allies. It re-stated that the question of balance was of particular importance to the non-aligned as, through a non-proliferation treaty, they would have to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In their view, in order to preserve the desired balance, a number of tangible steps could be taken in conjunction with a non-proliferation treaty. Such steps "could be embodied in a treaty as part of its provisions or as a declaration of intention." The non-aligned Powers were apparently unable to reach agreement on the specific measures that should be "coupled with" or should "follow"
a treaty. In this respect, the Joint Memorandum simply recalled the suggestions for such specific measures which had been "individually" submitted by the non-aligned in the course of the ENDC session such as a comprehensive test ban, a cut-off of production of fissile material for use in weapons, a freeze and gradual reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery means, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, and assurance of the security of non-nuclear weapon States.

17. The three nuclear Powers -- the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR -- held that it would be harmful to the cause of non-proliferation if the non-aligned countries were to insist on some concrete measures of disarmament by the nuclear Powers being linked to a treaty on non-proliferation.

18. On the question of guarantees, the U.S. stated that the nations that did not seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons could be sure that they would have U.S. strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail. The USSR declared its willingness to include in a non-proliferation treaty a clause on the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. The non-aligned countries, in their above-mentioned Joint Memorandum (ENDC/178), stated that among the questions to be dealt with in connexion with a non-proliferation treaty was that of "the security of non-nuclear weapon States." The Memorandum again referred to the suggestions "individually" put forward by the non-aligned countries in the ENDC. Among the suggestions put forward by most of the non-aligned countries was that the nuclear powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries.
QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Note for the Chairman

Introduction

The question of general and complete disarmament first came under active discussion in the U.N. in 1959. Since that time, it has been an important objective of the U.N. and has been discussed at every session of the General Assembly and of the ENDC. In recent years, there has been more emphasis on collateral measures of disarmament — particularly a comprehensive test-ban and non-proliferation — than on general and complete disarmament as such. The ENDC has met in each year from 1962 until the present but without the participation of France.

General and Complete Disarmament

1. Origins at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly

A new item "General and complete disarmament" was included in the agenda of the fourteenth session at the request of the Soviet Union (A/4216). On 18 September 1959, Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, proposed a three-stage disarmament programme to eliminate all armed forces and armaments in four years. Alternatively, the Soviet Union was prepared to consider certain partial measures of disarmament. The United Kingdom proposed a three-stage plan for comprehensive disarmament based on the balanced and controlled reduction of all armaments (A/63/620).

2. On 20 November 1959 the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV) which stated that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today", and which (1) called upon governments to make every effort to solve the problem, (2) transmitted to the ENDC the proposals and discussions of the session, and (3) expressed the hope "that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". 
General and complete disarmament was discussed in the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee which met in Geneva from March 1960 until its meetings were terminated in June of that year.

Attempts to find a way for resuming disarmament negotiations were successful at the sixteenth session when on 20 September 1961, the Governments of the USSR and the United States issued a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations as a basis for multilateral negotiations (A/4379).

On 20 December 1961, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1722 (XVI) whereby it: (a) welcomed the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; (b) recommended negotiations based upon those principles; (c) endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee — Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom and United States; and (d) recommended that the Committee, as a matter of utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, taking into account, in particular, the agreed principle that efforts to insure early implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudice to progress on the total programme.

US and USSR Draft Treaties on General and Complete Disarmament

The USSR Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament of 15 March 1962 (ENDC/2); and the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World of 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30) were submitted to the ENDC when it first convened in Geneva in March 1962. These documents, with some modifications, remain the basic documents for discussion of general and complete disarmament.

The USSR original draft provided for three stages over a four-year period. In the first stage of fifteen months all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases would be eliminated, and the USSR and the United States would reduce their armies to 1.7 million men each.
8. The United States Draft provided for three stages without a terminal time limit. In the first stage, which would last three years, all major weapons would be reduced by 30 per cent, and the level of forces for the United States and the USSR would be set at 2.1 million men. The United States also suggested a system of progressive zonal inspection for the verification of the level of forces and armaments retained and to guard against clandestine production or stockpiling.

9. While the USSR accepted verification of the reduction as well as of the production of armaments, it maintained that inspection, even zonal inspection, in relation to retained or possible hidden weapons was objectionable because it meant control of armaments, which in turn would be a danger to Soviet security because of the military information that would thereby be obtained.

10. The United States stressed that new and effective peace-keeping machinery, including a peace force, to be developed pari passu with the disarmament process, would be essential. The USSR held that the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 43, should be the basis for maintaining peace during and after completion of the disarmament process.

11. Later the USSR and the United States introduced amendments to their respective treaty plans:

   (a) The USSR accepted the United States' concept of a percentage reduction of conventional armaments. It also accepted some ideas contained in the United States plan with regard to the reduction of the risk of war and added a new provision to prohibit, from the commencement of the first stage, substantial joint military movements or manoeuvres of armed forces of two or more States (ENDC/2/Add.1). In addition, the Soviet Union proposed extending the time limit for the programme of general and complete disarmament from four years to five years, and, for the first stage, to 24 months from the date of entry into force of the treaty. It agreed to set in Stage I a level of 1.9 million men each for the reduced armed forces of the United States and the USSR instead of 1.7 million. It also expressed readiness to shift the elimination of nuclear weapons from the second to the first stage of its plan, an offer which the West rejected as impractical. At the 17th session it proposed the retention by the USSR and the US of a limited number of inter-continental anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles until the end of the second stage (A/C.1/367, ENDG/2/Rev.1). Later, at the 18th session it proposed their reten-
tion until the end of the third stage (A/1205, ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

(b) The United States amended its plan so as to provide for a restriction on the production of existing armaments and the prohibition of production of new types of armaments in stage I (ENDC/30/Add.1). It also amended its provisions relating to the transition from stage to stage to provide that the transition would take place by decision of a Control Council (of the major Powers, and others on a rotating basis) with the concurrent votes of at least the Soviet Union and the United States; unlike the original United States proposal, the matter would not be referred to the Security Council (ENDC/30/Add.2). It later amended the provisions for nuclear disarmament in stage I (ENDC/30/Add.3 14 August 1963) and tabled draft treaty articles (ENDC/69 — 10 December 1962, ENDC/109 — 14 August 1963), putting into treaty language certain provisions of the US Outline/Basic Provisions.

12. Explaining its concept of elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles at the ENDC in 1964, the USSR stated that the proposed "nuclear umbrella" should provide for a minimum deterrent, during the disarmament process, sufficient to guarantee international security but not large enough to enable the parties to launch a nuclear war. The USSR denied that it had in mind to liquidate 97 to 99 per cent of the existing nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, but stated that it could not accept the basic US plan (which retained 70 and 35 per cent of the nuclear delivery vehicles at the end of the first and second stages respectively), as that plan would maintain an "overkill" capability, and consequently the danger of nuclear war throughout the disarmament process.

13. The US supported by its allies, held that a staged percentage reduction would not upset the present rough balance of power between the two sides and would safeguard the nuclear deterrent, as the mainstay of peace, though at progressively lower levels. It thought that the USSR "nuclear umbrella" would rapidly alter in favour of the Soviet Union the present mix of armaments upon which the existing balance rested.

14. All Western delegations stressed as essential elements the development of an effective control system and of peace-keeping institutions. The USSR observed that the peace-keeping provisions of its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament were based on the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.

15. The non-aligned countries generally took the position that if immediate elimination of nuclear weapons was unacceptable, the next best alternative was the reduction of stocks to the lowest possible level at the earliest stage of
the disarmament process that could be agreed upon.

16. The discussion on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles was spurred by the Soviet offer to participate in a detailed study of this question in an appropriate working body, provided the "nuclear umbrella" concept was taken as a basis for discussions. The USSR, supported by its allies, suggested that a Working Group should carry out its studies on the premise that: (1) all means of nuclear delivery, except those of the "nuclear umbrella", must be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament; (2) the agreed number of missiles to be retained until the third stage of disarmament must be strictly limited, i.e., minimal. The USSR simultaneously stated that while it was ready to consider within the Working Group any proposal or suggestion leading to implementation of the "nuclear umbrella" concept, it strongly opposed discussion of percentage-reduction plan of elimination, as proposed by the U.S. because such a plan would not meet the requirements of early radical disarmament. The U.S. and its allies stated that they could not agree to terms of reference that prejudged the issue and that the Working Group should be able to study all proposals. The differences over the terms of reference of the Working Group have not been resolved.

Collateral Measures

17. The ENDC from the outset in 1962 has discussed, concurrently with general and complete disarmament, "various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at lessening international tension, consolidating confidence among states, and facilitating general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/Add.1). Resolution 1767 (XVII) adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 21 November 1962 recommended that the ENDC give urgent attention to collateral measures of disarmament. Many proposals for collateral measures have been made since 1962 by various members of the ENDC; of particular importance were the "Memorandum on Measures for slowing down the arms race and relaxing international tension" (ENDC/123) submitted by the USSR on 28 January 1964, and the five-point proposal submitted by the US in a message from President Johnson on 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120). Most of the time of the ENDC was devoted to the discussion of a test ban and non-proliferation as the most urgent collateral measures. (See the relevant Notes for the Chairman on these items.)

In 1963 agreement was reached on two collateral measures: the USA-USSR Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link between the two Governments, (ENDC/97) which was signed in Geneva on 20 June 1963; the banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from
outer space (Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 17 October 1963.)

The principal collateral measures considered in the LNDC are summarized under headings hereunder:

Measures Proposed by the USSR and its allies

Renunciation of the Use of Foreign Territories for Stationing Strategic Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/75).

Proposed by Soviet Union in 1963 and rejected by Western powers as depriving them of the possibility of defending themselves against Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe.

Non-aggression Pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries (ENDC/77)

Proposed by Soviet Union in 1963 and rejected by Western Powers as related to European regional security and hence unsuited to discussion in ENDC where not all interested countries were present.

Nuclear-free zones

Central Europe: Stressed by the Soviet Union and Poland as a nuclear-free zone or for a nuclear freeze. Mediterranean: Proposed by Soviet Union in 1963 and again in 1964 and 1965. Others were proposed from time to time for the Balkans, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and Northern Europe etc. All of these were rejected by the Western Powers as one-sided.

Renunciation of the Use or of first use of Nuclear Weapons

Proposed by the Soviet Union in 1962 and described as unrealistic by the Western Powers. (See also the Note for the Chairman on Item 29)

Freezing or reduction of Military budgets by 10-15 percent

Proposed by the Soviet Union in 1963 and criticized by the West in the absence of verifiable information on military budgets. The non-aligned countries, in principle, supported the reduction of military budgets, and hoped that unilateral actions of the USSR and US in this field could be extended and embodied in formal commitments. They also urged that at least a part of the savings be devoted to economic aid to developing countries.

Destruction of all Bomber Aircraft

Proposed by the USSR on 28 January 1964. The U.S. termed the proposal impractical because it envisaged total elimination of all bomber aircraft of all states and itself proposed the destruction of a fixed number of bombers by the
US and USSR over two years (see below). Later the USSR explained that, although complete destruction of bombers was the final goal, it was ready: (1) to limit the proposed measure to bomber aircraft of major powers; (2) to work out a flexible timetable within a specified period of time for the destruction of all bombers.

Elimination of Foreign Bases and Withdrawal of Troops from Foreign Territories

Proposed by the USSR, to which the US and its allies replied that foreign bases were not a cause but the result of international tension, and that they could be eliminated only as part of a programme of general disarmament.

Prevention of Surprise Attack

This measure was proposed by the USSR by establishment of ground control posts at airports, railway junctions, motor roads and large ports, in conjunction with other partial measures, such as the reduction of foreign troops in both parts of Germany, and the exchange of representatives of East and West with the troops of the other side in the two parts of Germany.

Measures Proposed by the US and its allies

Reduction of the Risk of War by Surprise Attack, Accident, Miscalculation or Failure of Communication (EMDC/70)

The U.S. in 1962 proposed advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres; a system of observation posts; additional observation arrangements such as aerial observation, mobile ground observation teams and overlapping radars; the exchange of military missions; a special communications link for emergency use. The USSR rejected most United States proposals concerning accidental war on the grounds that, if implemented outside the program of general and complete disarmament, they would only give a false sense of security, and would therefore prove harmful. However, it agreed to enter into negotiations on establishing a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington. (See above).
Establishment of International Safeguards over Nuclear Reactors

In 1966 the U.S proposed that IAEA or equivalent international safeguards be established over all nuclear reactors in non-nuclear countries and on a reciprocal basis in the nuclear countries. The USSR has not yet given its reaction.

Destruction of B-17 and TU-16 Bombers

In 1964 the U.S proposed the monthly destruction of 20 B-17 and TU-16 bombers respectively, for a two-year period, to be carried out under inspection. The USSR rejected this proposal as dealing only with obsolescent bombers.

Proposal on freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles

Proposed by U.S in January 1964. The USSR and the U.S would freeze the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The USSR deemed the U.S proposal unacceptable because it would result in control without disarmament. In 1966 the US also stated that it would explore the possibility of reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles if agreement was reached on a freeze.

Cut-off of fissionable materials for military purposes

The US proposed a verified halt in production of weapon-grade fissile materials and a reduction of existing levels of production through cut-backs or the closing of comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis. It offered to transfer 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to non-weapons use if the USSR would undertake to transfer 40,000 kilograms. The Soviet Union said this proposal was not a disarmament measure and that it would require granting to foreigners access to the nuclear energy facilities and was therefore unacceptable for security reasons.

On 21 April 1964 the delegations of the USSR, US and UK informed the EMDC of unilateral decisions of their Governments to cut back the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes in their respective countries. The non-aligned countries welcomed the announced cut-backs of fissile materials production and called for further steps in that direction.

In 1965 the US proposed a reciprocal shut down by the USSR and the US of all or some of their plants producing fissionable materials for weapon purposes. In 1966 the US also proposed the demonstrated destruction of the nuclear weapons from which the fissionable material was extracted. The USSR did not accept these proposals which it described as control without disarmament.

Proposal for regional arrangements to limit the conventional arms race

In 1966 the US urged agreements on a regional basis to limit the conventional arms race. The proposal was supported by Nigeria with reference to Africa.

Measures proposed by the non-aligned

Throughout this period, the non-aligned countries have given priority to a test ban and non-proliferation. On 6 May 1963, Brazil and Mexico submitted a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America (E/MD-87) drawn up jointly by the Governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico on 29 April and brought to the attention of the Heads of State of the other Latin American Republics with a request that they accede to it. On 10 June 1963, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic submitted
the resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the second conference of independent African States at Addis Ababa (EN0/95/Rev.1). It called for an African nuclear-free zone, the elimination of military bases and the cessation of nuclear tests on African territory. The USSR has also stressed the need for the elimination of foreign military bases in accordance with the appeal of the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference in September 1964.

Developments at the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly

18. The USSR and the US and a number of other countries reaffirmed their attachment to the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Both in the discussion of general and complete disarmament and in the debate on the item on the world disarmament conference, a number of members urged that the Peoples Republic of China should be closely associated with disarmament negotiations. Most of the discussion again dealt with collateral measures.

Collateral Measures

19.–21. The United States restated its proposal for a 

freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles and expressed its willingness to explore a reduction of these vehicles. It also reiterated its former proposal to halt production of fissionable material, and made a new proposal for "the demonstrated destruction by the U.S. and the USSR of a substantial number of nuclear weapons from their respective stocks". It also restated its readiness to transfer 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to non-weapon uses if the USSR would be willing to transfer 40,000 kilograms and additionally — "if the Soviet Union will do likewise" — to transfer plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons and place it under IAEA or equivalent safeguards.

22. The Soviet Union recalled its Memorandum of 7 December 1964 (A/5227) which set forth proposals on: reduction of military budget; withdrawal of foreign troops in alien territories; banning the use of nuclear weapons; preventing their further spread; establishing demilitarized zones; discontinuing underground tests; elimination of bomber aircraft; elimination of foreign military bases; signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries; prevention of surprise attack and reduction of total forces.

23. Other collateral measures were raised by a number of delegations. Malta felt that publicizing transfers of arms between States would help control them and thus contribute to reducing tension. A draft resolution (A/571/L.349) to this effect, tabled in the First Committee was defeated by 19 votes to 18.
with 39 abstentions. Poland reiterated its proposals for a conference on security in Europe. A number of Latin American Members supported the denuclearization of Latin America.

24. On 3 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2031 (XX) on the question of General and Complete Disarmament by 102 votes to none with 6 abstentions whereby it (a) requested the ENDC to continue its efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control and on collateral measures; (b) referred to the ENDC all records of the First Committee; (c) requested the ENDC to resume as soon as possible and report progress.

25. On 29 November 1965, the Assembly also adopted resolution 2030 (XX) on the question of convening a world disarmament conference and on 3 December 1965 adopted resolution 2033 (XX) on the question of "Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa".

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(27 January to 25 August 1966) (Report: A/6390)

General and Complete Disarmament

26. The Soviet Union and its allies continued to maintain that the basic task of the Conference should be GCD. The USSR restated its position on early elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, under strict international control. The Soviet Union once again suggested that the "nuclear umbrella" proposal be considered. It also suggested that should agreement on first stage measures be deemed by other Powers not possible at present, the Committee might start discussing third stage measures where there was some measure of agreement between positions of East and West. Romania held that the elimination of the nuclear threat was the primary objective of the ENDC and it invoked the destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and as a first step, a non-first use commitment by the nuclear Powers.

27. The United States and its allies reaffirmed their belief in GCD as the final objective of the Conference and said that the main problem was the size and composition of the deterrent forces in the disarmament process. In their view a balanced percentage reduction of all types of weapons and means of delivery under effective control was the only possible way of achieving general and complete disarmament. They maintained that a working group should consider all proposals for elimination of the delivery vehicles, levels of
deterrents to be retained during disarmament process and the role of verification in deterrence. Canada agreed that the USSR proposal to consider first the third stage measures of disarmament deserved examination but felt that a new approach to the elimination of delivery vehicles was essential to overcome the impasse on GCD.

28. India, supported by Nigeria, said that general and complete disarmament should have priority and that security of nations could be assured only in that context. While supporting the "nuclear umbrella" proposal and believing that disarmament should be undertaken on a large scale with substantial reductions in the first stage, India did not rule out consideration of other suggestions for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

29. The UAR urged the EWDC to adopt a common view on the role of the nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process, to establish a working group to examine the most appropriate instrument of nuclear deterrence and to study the problem of European security. The UAR believed that nuclear deterrence should be accepted only as a means to achieving GCD. It further stressed that to protect the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear countries two conditions should be fulfilled: (1) the spread of nuclear weapons should be blocked by a treaty; (2) nuclear deterrence during the process of disarmament should result in neutralization of the existing nuclear forces.

30. The USSR opposed the UAR suggestion as being diversionary and as creating a misleading impression of progress. The UK welcomed the UAR suggestion and observed that after an objective examination of the concept of deterrence it should be applied to the stage-by-stage process of GCD in order to ensure that a balance was achieved at all stages and that neither side maintained forces exceeding the agreed levels.

Collateral Measures

31. As for collateral measures the United States restated its proposals for a verified halt in the production of fissile materials for weapons use accompanied by transfer of such materials to peaceful purposes and the demonstrated destruction of the nuclear weapons from which the material came, and a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles followed by significant reductions in the number of such vehicles. The United States also proposed application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities and regional initiatives to limit the conventional arms race through undertakings by the interested countries not to acquire costly conventional military equipment.
32. As for the "cut-off" proposal the USSR and its allies maintained that it would not eliminate or reduce the nuclear threat because of the present huge nuclear over-kill capability. Some of the non-aligned countries supported the US proposal for a cut-off. Sweden suggested a target date for the cut-off and a plan for its verification entailing: (1) controls on all transfers of source of fissile materials and principal nuclear facilities between all countries and for all purposes, both peaceful and otherwise; (2) the extension of control to cover all new facilities and (3) a further extension of control to cover the already existing production facilities.

33. The USSR stated that the U.S. freeze proposal was meant to take care of U.S. over-production and that it would not reduce the nuclear threat. Several of the non-aligned countries, however, supported the proposal.

34. The USSR with the support of its allies reiterated arguments in favour of nuclear free zones and particularly in Central Europe. It also favoured such zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic and stated its readiness to assume obligations to respect such zones, if the other nuclear Powers did likewise.

35. The UK observed that patterns of military alliances or political alignments might make it difficult to seek security by establishing a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, even though it was not against it in principle. Canada supported in principle the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe but saw special security problems in that area; it nevertheless said that gradual reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe could be studied.

36. The non-aligned countries generally expressed support for the establishment of nuclear free zones, particularly in Latin America and Africa. Ethiopia submitted a Memorandum (EMC/180) dealing, among others, with demilitarization of Africa and the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries.

37. The USSR and its allies urged the convening of an international conference on European security to discuss proposals on the lessening of tension, reduction of armaments in Europe, and the establishment of peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European states. Poland strongly supported the idea of holding a conference to discuss a system of European security without discrimination against any State and continued to favour a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. It also reaffirmed the validity of the Rapschki and Gomulka plans. Romania proposed the liquidation of military blocs.
38. The USSR and its allies also reiterated the arguments in favour of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, and also the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and a declaration of non-first use. These proposals were supported by some of the non-aligned members of the ENDC. Furthermore, the USSR supported by its allies called on the ENDC to appeal for an immediate end to flights of aircraft, with nuclear weapons aboard, beyond the national frontiers of States.

39. The U.S. stated that the various collateral measures proposed by the USSR and its allies were unbalanced and would give unilateral military advantages to the USSR. The U.S. allies stated that the proposal for a non-aggression pact, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of bases as well as the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons were not negotiable. As for the non-aggression pact, Canada said that the ENDC was not a suitable body to negotiate it as it was not a disarmament measure.

Study of Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

40. The Secretary-General in the Introduction to his Annual Report this year stated: "I believe that the time has come for an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons, including problems of a military, political, economic and social nature relating to the manufacture, acquisition, deployment and development of these weapons and their possible use."

41. This suggestion has been explicitly supported in the general debate in the XXI Session by eleven countries: Belgium, Canada, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Ireland, Liberia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Poland, while not specifically referring to the Secretary-General's initiative, said it was essential to make nations aware of the effects of weapons of mass destruction, and said that it might submit a resolution in the First Committee on this subject.
I. Introduction

1. Since 1955, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has, at the request of India, or pursuant to a previously adopted Assembly resolution, been debated at every session of the General Assembly.

2. At the twentieth session, as a result of the consideration of the item "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests" resolution 2032 (XX) was adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December 1965.

II. Report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6390)

3. Resolution 2032 (XX) noted with satisfaction the Joint Memorandum submitted by the eight delegations of non-aligned countries (ENDC/145). The resolution expressed the conviction that agreement in regard to taking this further step towards nuclear disarmament would be facilitated, inter alia, by the important improvements made in detection and identification techniques. In its operative paragraph the Resolution urged that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended; called upon all states to respect the provisions and the spirit of the partial test ban treaty; and finally requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the 21st Session of the General Assembly.

4. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submitted its report to the General Assembly on 30 August 1966 (A/6390). The report points out that no specific agreement was reached on questions before it.

5. The issue of on-site inspection remained the major obstacle in the way of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.
6. The USSR supported by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland reiterated its willingness to sign a treaty on the prohibition of underground tests, on the basis of the use of national means of detection and identification. The USSR maintained that an underground test ban could be effectively observed without on-site inspection.

7. The U.S., while reiterating its willingness to sign a treaty on the prohibition of underground tests, maintained that scientific evidence still called for verification, including on-site inspection, over the observance of an underground test ban treaty. To verify such a treaty the U.S. would ask for only that number and kind of inspections which modern science held to be strictly necessary. The U.S. supported by its allies and Nigeria, asked the Soviet Union to submit technical data in support of its contention that national detection systems were adequate to verify a comprehensive test ban.

8. The U.K., while endorsing the need for effective verification, urged a careful study of some of the suggestions made by the non-aligned members, particularly by Sweden, the UAR and Mexico, which offered possibilities of reconciling differences. Canada called for a meeting of scientists, including those from seismologically advanced non-aligned and non-nuclear countries, to resolve the question of verification and urged the USSR to reconsider its position on the question of scientific discussion of detection and identification.

9. Sweden repeated its proposal for a "detection club" calling for the initiation of informal and voluntary international co-operation in the seismic field among technologically advanced countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, with a view to reducing the problem of detection and identification connected with an underground test ban agreement. Ethiopia said that the "detection club" idea could serve as a basis for a test ban agreement which was the first step the nuclear Powers should take to demonstrate their sincerity. It said Ethiopia's contribution to the "detection club" would be made through the joint research of countries belonging to the Organization of African Unity. The idea of the "detection club" was supported by the U.K. and U.S.; the USSR expressed interest in the idea.

10. Sweden also put forward a new proposal -- "verification by challenge" -- and said the proposal was directed towards reducing the need for controls of a direct and obtrusive kind. The proposal envisages an arrangement under which a party suspected of having conducted an underground test, in
violation of the treaty, would be expected voluntarily to offer clarifying information to allay suspicion, the assumption being that the suspected party would itself be vitally interested in establishing its innocence. An "invitation to inspection" might be forthcoming anywhere along the line of exchanges of views, spontaneously in some instances and under milder or stronger pressure in more severe cases of doubt. If such a challenge went unheeded on several occasions, other parties to the treaty would gain the right to withdraw from it. Parties could withdraw by giving three months' advance notification of their intention to withdraw to other parties as well as to the U.N. Security Council accompanied by documentary evidence of the "extraordinary event" justifying their withdrawal. The threat of withdrawal might induce the accused party to offer clarification of the suspected event, or if the accusation persisted, to invite inspection. The system of "verification by challenge" would be useful whether or not obligatory inspections were envisaged in the treaty. If obligatory inspections were envisaged "verification by challenge" would help reduce the size of the unresolved problem, and if inspection were not envisaged it would help resolve suspicions.

11. The U.K. favoured the concept of "verification by challenge", but preferred that it be called "verification by consent". Initially, the U.S. responded to the proposal negatively, stating that it could not accept an unverified moratorium and that differences regarding inspections had to be resolved before the conclusion of the treaty. Later, referring to the Scarborough Symposium, an unofficial gathering of experts which suggested a suspension of underground tests during a trial period together with verification by "challenge" or "invitation", the U.S. stated that it was studying this suggestion and particularly the question of whether it could help achieve an agreement of indefinite duration. The U.S. sought clarification on challenge procedures, including what kind of evidence would be furnished, and means of resolving disputes. The U.S. invited the USSR to state its views on verification by challenge or invitation, and to indicate that opportunities would be provided for on-the-spot visits should other evidence fail to resolve ambiguous events. At the last meeting of the Committee in 1966, the USSR said the proposal for verification by challenge or invitation was unacceptable since it was, in its opinion, a disguised form of international inspection.
12. The U.A.R. recalled its proposal for a treaty banning underground tests above the threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75, a moratorium on tests below that threshold, and the exchange of scientific information among major nuclear Powers and other interested States, with a view to improving the techniques of detection and identification. It said Sweden's proposals for "verification by challenge" and a "detection club" were compatible with and complementary to the U.A.R. proposal.

13. The USSR expressed readiness to settle the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests on the basis of the U.A.R. proposal, i.e., for a ban of all tests above seismic magnitude 4.75, with a moratorium on tests below that threshold. The U.S., without specifically dealing with the threshold treaty, opposed any arrangement for a moratorium of tests without agreed inspection procedures, but it supported the idea of exchange of scientific information. Canada favoured a threshold solution but without a moratorium of tests below the threshold. Burma urged consideration of a voluntary test suspension with verification by challenge.

14. India called on the Committee to devote its primary attention to the question of a test ban in all environments and asked priority on making the partial test ban treaty universally binding. It suggested that the solution could be found along the following lines: (1) immediate suspension of all tests pending a formal treaty; (2) a threshold treaty (4.75 or 4.80 seismic magnitude) containing a withdrawal clause and providing for verification by challenge; (3) development of the trend for international exchange of seismological data set in motion at the Stockholm Conference; (4) continued scientific research concerning identification so that the threshold could be lowered and ultimately eliminated.

15. Mexico proposed that unidentified residual events might be subjected to on-site inspection by scientists from neutral and non-aligned countries. A list of such inspectors should be compiled and deposited with the U.N. Secretary-General, and parties would select inspectors from this list. Mexico also suggested that, as a last resort and only if an agreement on inspection could be reached, the partial test ban treaty could be extended to cover underground tests "beyond the present threshold of uncertainty", even without a moratorium, and that this threshold could be reviewed annually in the light of seismological progress.

16. Brazil held that differences should be reconciled on the scientific level, where questions could be addressed to an impartial body of scientists recruited from neutral States. Such a body would ascertain the adequacy of national systems for detection and identification of all underground tests. If national systems were found to be adequate, the comprehensive test ban
agreement could be negotiated without in loco verification, but if found inadequate, the scientific body should inform the EMDC as to the seismological magnitude of tests which could be detected and identified. This response would not be a "scientific arbitration" but could be a basis for the EMDC to give momentum to negotiation and solution.

17. Burma felt that technical aspects of the test ban had been thoroughly explored and the need was for a political decision by the great Powers.

18. Before the end of the session, the eight non-aligned countries tabled a Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (EMDC/177) in which they expressed their concern for lack of progress on an underground test ban and stressed the dangers of continued atmospheric and underground testing. An underground test ban would be an effective non-proliferation measure and, with the partial test ban treaty, would make development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States practically impossible and would inhibit the development of new nuclear weapons. The means of verifying observance remained the major obstacle. The Memorandum set out the non-aligned suggestions put forward individually: the UAR proposal on a threshold treaty with suspension of all underground tests; Sweden's suggestions for a detection club; Sweden's proposal for verification by challenge; Mexico's suggestion for a panel of inspectors; and Brazil's suggestion for a panel of scientists from neutral States to provide opinions on identification of underground tests. Pending conclusion of the Treaty, the Memorandum called on the nuclear Powers to discontinue nuclear weapons tests.

III. Other Developments - 1966


The Swedish idea of organizing a "detection club" was discussed at a conference of experts of eight countries which took place in Stockholm from 23 to 26 May. Experts were present from Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Arab Republic as official representatives of their governments. The participants were apparently in general agreement that the exchange of seismological data through international cooperation could contribute to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Future action was left to the participating governments, but it was agreed that Sweden should provide an informal secretariat for the time being for conducting the exchange of information and ideas in the immediate period ahead.

20. Scarborough Conference

In June 1966 a group of experts from twenty-five nations, including government officials of the United States and the Soviet Union met unofficially in Scarborough, Canada. At that meeting, a modification of the Swedish proposal
was suggested to end underground tests "for a limited trial period, with a system of verification of seismologically ambiguous events by challenge or invitation".

21. **Nuclear Test Explosion by the People's Republic of China**

On 9 May 1966, the PRC exploded its third atomic device containing thermonuclear material over its western region.

22. **French Series of Nuclear Tests**

From 2 July - 4 October 1966, France conducted a test series of atomic devices in the Pacific.
Twenty-first session

Agenda Item 29

QUESTION OF CONVENING A CONFERENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SIGNING A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF
NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

I. Introduction

1. Since the beginning of the disarmament negotiations in 1946, the
question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has been repeatedly
considered by the United Nations, both in the framework of general
disarmament plans and as a collateral measure.

2. At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, in 1961, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution (1653 (XVI)), originally submitted by
Ethiopia, which declared that the use of nuclear weapons was a violation of
the Charter and an act contrary to the laws of humanity. By this resolution
the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to consult Member
Governments to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a
special conference to draft a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons. The eighteenth session of the General Assembly, in 1963, requested
the UNDC to study the question of convening such a conference. The
Disarmament Commission in 1965 considered a USSR draft resolution on the
subject, which, however, was not pressed to a vote. The twentieth session
of the General Assembly, in 1965, again referred the question to the UNDC
for further study, while deferring consideration of this item in the General
Assembly until the twenty-first session.

II. Consideration of the question by the General Assembly (16th to 20th
session) and by the Disarmament Commission (1965)

3. At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly a draft resolution
was submitted by Ethiopia and co-sponsored by Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea,
Indonesia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.
By it, the General Assembly would declare:
(a) that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, was a direct violation of the United Nations Charter;

(b) that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

(c) that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in a war in which these weapons were used would be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of these weapons;

(d) that any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization.

By this resolution, the Assembly would also ask the Secretary-General to consult United Nations Member Governments to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultations to the General Assembly's seventeenth session.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1961, by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions, as resolution 1653 (XVI).

In pursuance of the mandate given to him by this resolution, the Secretary-General, in a note on 2 February 1962, requested Member States to express their views on the matter. Sixty-two Member States responded to his enquiry. The Secretary-General's Report (A/5174 and Add. 1-2) transmitted the replies of these Member States to the General Assembly. These replies indicated a diversity of opinions without any dominant viewpoint.

The positions of the United States and the USSR were made evident in their replies to the enquiry of the Secretary-General, as well as in the Assembly debates. The United States, while deploring the necessity to arm with weapons of mass destruction, believed that a prohibition of their use, unaccompanied by measures leading to the attainment of general and complete disarmament, could not provide any real or lasting protection to potential victims of a nuclear attack. A convention which would be merely an expression of the desire to eliminate nuclear weapons or prevent their spread, said the United States reply, "would not in itself establish the conditions of confidence necessary for universal renunciation of such weapons."

The USSR noted that "the conclusion of such a convention should prove an important step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the armaments of states and the liquidation of all accumulated stocks of such weapons".
7. Discussions in the seventeenth session centered on a draft resolution submitted by 21 non-aligned powers. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to consult further Member States to ascertain their views on the proposal for holding the conference. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1962 by 33 votes to none, with 25 abstentions, as Resolution 1801 (XVII).

8. The Secretary-General, in his note of 8 February 1963, requested these Member States that had not given their views to do so. On 17 September 1963 he submitted his report to the General Assembly (A/5518) transmitting the texts of twelve additional replies.

9. At the eighteenth session a draft resolution was submitted by 19 non-aligned powers. By the draft resolution the General Assembly would request the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 27 November 1963, by 64 votes to 18 and 25 abstentions as Resolution 1909 (XVIII).

10. The question was again on the agenda of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, following the ENSC Report (A/5731). However, the question was not discussed in committee, due to the adjournment of the Assembly after the general debate. At the twentieth session, in 1965, neither Ethiopia, nor any other member pressed for consideration of the item, and the General Assembly referred it to the ENSC for further study and deferred its consideration to the twenty-first session (A/PV.1388).

11. Previously, during the Disarmament Commission session in the spring of 1963, the USSR had introduced a draft resolution (DC/219) calling upon all States to bring about the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons not later than the first half of 1966, and in the meantime inviting States possessing nuclear weapons to declare that they would not be the first to use them. A number of countries had supported this approach, but others had contended that the question must be dealt with in the context of balanced general disarmament. As stated above (para. 2), the USSR did not press for a vote on its draft resolution.
III. Developments at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

12. Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII), the ENDC discussed the question in the course of 1964. Ethiopia suggested that the ENDC should recommend to the General Assembly to convene a conference for the signing of the proposed convention. It pointed out that while such a convention might not be a sufficient safeguard against the danger of nuclear war and was no substitute for general disarmament, it would be a preliminary step towards the total destruction of nuclear weapons and would have a salutary effect on attempts to halt the armaments race. The USSR and its allies supported the Ethiopian proposal and stressed the importance of the question, as a means to promote general disarmament. The United States, supported by its allies, reaffirmed its opposition to the holding of such a conference. While sharing the motives of the supporters of the proposed convention, the United States did not believe that nuclear war could be prevented by a statement of good intentions alone, and noted that the Western Powers depended on nuclear weapons as a necessary deterrent against potential aggression. Nigeria supported the Ethiopian proposal, as did India, which noted that the Western objections to the proposed convention could be raised at the conference called for in the General Assembly resolution. Mexico stated that while it supported the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, it believed that in the light of the opposition of a number of States, including several nuclear Powers, the time was not yet opportune to convene such a conference.

13. During the 1965 ENDC meetings the USSR restated its position on the subject, emphasizing that in the existing political situation the signing of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons or, as an initial step, the issuing of declarations by nuclear Powers with regard to non-first-use of nuclear weapons, would become an effective means of relaxation of tension and of providing an increased sense of security to all States. The United States reaffirming its opposition, said it would never use any kind of weapon with aggressive intent, but it considered declaratory statements of good intention as totally inadequate. Among the non-aligned delegations, the measure was supported by Nigeria and Ethiopia who wanted to see the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as a part of a non-dissemination programme.
14. At the 1966 session of the ESDC Conference the USSR, supported by its allies, urged the Committee to prepare concrete recommendations for the twenty-first session of the General Assembly with a view to convening an international conference for the signing of a convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons; it also suggested that the ESDC issue an appeal to the nuclear Powers that, as a first step, they assume a solemn obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and stated that it was prepared immediately to assume such an obligation, provided the other Powers did likewise. The U.S., supported by its allies, held that an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was impracticable. The non-aligned countries in general favoured a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Ethiopia submitted a memorandum (ESDC/180) inter alia calling for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against demilitarized territories or regions, as a first step towards the banning of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and towards general and complete disarmament.

IV. PRC Proposal

15. On 17 October 1964, following its first atomic explosion, the People's Republic of China sent a message to the heads of governments of countries of the world in which it proposed that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." It was further proposed that as a first step the world summit conference should reach an agreement by which "nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other."
Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in the Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America

(A/6399)

Note for the Chairman

1. On 23 September 1966, in a letter (A/6399) to the President of the General Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, an item entitled "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America." The letter called attention to the Summit Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa in May 1963 and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries held at Cairo in October 1964, where the necessity for such a measure had been stated. The existence of military bases in foreign territories was incompatible with the General Assembly "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", Resolution 1518A (XV); with the General Assembly "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty", Resolution 2131 (XX); and the General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", Resolution 2105 (XX).

The draft resolution attached to the letter invited States with military bases in the territory of independent States or dependent territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America immediately to eliminate these bases and never to establish others; and requested the Secretary-General to supervise the fulfilment of the terms of this resolution and to report on the result of its implementation to the twenty-second General Assembly session.

3. Since the inception of the United Nations, the questions of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops had been primarily raised by the Soviet Union and its allies, and discussed in various organs of the United Nations as a part of the broader question of dis-
armament, and as a collateral measure in the ENDC, but no resolution has ever been adopted on the question in the context of disarmament.

4. The question of "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America" will now be debated for the first time as a separate agenda item in the General Assembly.

5. In 1965, the USSR stressed the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops as a priority issue for the Disarmament Commission and on 27 May 1965 submitted a draft resolution on the subject (DC/218) which was not pressed to the vote. On 7 December 1964, among the eleven points contained in a Soviet memorandum (A/5827) for consideration by the General Assembly dealing with the further reduction of international tension and limitation of the arms race, the USSR had included dismantling of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

6. In the ENDC, the USSR, supported by its allies, had urged the liquidation of foreign military bases and withdrawal of troops from alien territories. Foreign military bases in the territories of other States, in which as a rule nuclear weapons are included, the USSR stated, increase the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war. There was a close relationship between the presence of military bases, foreign intervention and international tension. The presence of military bases could also cause accidents similar to the one which had occurred in Spain in early 1966.

7. The United States and its allies mainly stressed in the ENDC that military bases were the result and not the cause of international tension; they were established at the desire of the host countries in response to the Soviet threat and constituted defense arrangements among nuclear countries and their allies for the protection of their security. Therefore, foreign bases could be eliminated only in connexion with an overall disarmament programme. Implementation of these Soviet proposals would, for geographic and military reasons, result in a situation advantageous to the Soviet Union.
Comments on statements of the USSR and the U.S. in the First Committee on Non-Proliferation.

Date: CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko
Comments on the Statements of the USSR and the U.S. in the First Committee on Non-Proliferation 20 October 1966

The debate on non-proliferation got off to a good start with the speeches by Mr. Fedorenko and Mr. Goldberg. Their positive statements confirmed the strong desire of the two Governments to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty and, in the meantime, to ensure that nothing should be done to hamper it.

For the first time in many months both the representatives of the USSR and United States were cautiously optimistic in assessing the situation. Mr. Fedorenko stated that "some change for the better can be discerned in the problems of non-proliferation presently." It was to be hoped, he added, that the "assurances made by United States responsible officials ... would be supported by concrete practical deeds." This appeared to echo the remarks of Mr. Brezhnev on 15 October 1966 in Moscow when he said about non-proliferation: "We welcome certain changes which have lately appeared in this matter and will exert efforts in order that a corresponding international treaty be concluded ...."

Mr. Goldberg's view was that there was "a new situation" which provided "a more hopeful prospect for concluding a non-proliferation treaty." He informed the Committee that the United States and the Soviet Union were "engaged in a continuing and joint search for mutually acceptable ways of overcoming" the "important differences" which still remained.

There was also agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that the danger facing the world, if not checked by an effective non-proliferation treaty, would be universal. In Mr. Fedorenko's view, proliferation of nuclear weapon States was no less serious for the non-nuclear weapon Powers than for the nuclear Powers. Mr. Goldberg went even further when he stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more and more states would cause "increased danger which would be felt not primarily by the present nuclear weapon States, but by the States which today do not possess nuclear weapons." He added that the treaty "will do more for the security of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, than any conceivable programme of disarmament."

Both representatives also stressed that in working for the non-proliferation treaty, both the United States and the USSR did not strive to consolidate and perpetuate the so-called "nuclear monopoly" or to impose unequal obligations on others. Non-proliferation was to be regarded as a step towards other significant disarmament measures. It was important, however, not to make non-proliferation
dependent on the solution of other questions, as this would create new obstacles in the way towards agreement.

Both the USSR and the United States stressed the importance of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear powers. The USSR expressed again its willingness to include in the treaty an article prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territory. The United States repeated its readiness to explore with all delegations what action might be undertaken by the General Assembly to ensure their security.

Where the positions of the two speakers diverged was with respect to the specific disarmament measures which could follow agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. As in the past, the United States stressed: (i) a "cut-off" or "cut-back" of production of fissile material for weapon purposes; (ii) a reduction of nuclear stockpiles by transferring significant quantities of fissile material to peaceful uses; (iii) a "freeze" of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; (iv) a ban of underground nuclear tests; (v) regional arrangements to halt the conventional arms race. The USSR, on the other hand, called for (i) prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; (ii) nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; (iii) prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers; (iv) banning of all nuclear weapon tests. Although the banning of underground tests appears on both lists, Mr. Goldberg referred to the gap between them on verification.

On the question of safeguards, the United States welcomed the progress made international at the UNDC in accepting the need for safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. The USSR hinted that it was moving in this direction when it asked why did the FRG Government refuse to place its atomic installations under the IAEA control? The control exercised by Euratom, the USSR said, could not be taken seriously.

For the first time in the General Assembly, the United States outlined its position, first stated in August at the UNDC, that nuclear States should make available to other States nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications, so that these states would not need to develop their own peaceful nuclear devices, which would be the same as that used for nuclear weapons.

On the paramount question of nuclear arrangements within alliances, the USSR representative, rather significantly, criticized only the FRG for wanting the MLF and refrained from criticizing the USA.

On the other hand, Mr. Fedorenko said that the U.S. position in the UNDC had prevented agreement there, but Mr. Goldberg said that the discussions in the UNDC showed a growing awareness that, while the non-nuclear members of an alliance "were entitled to have a voice in their collective nuclear defense, ... this must not and
need not, whatever form it takes, ... lead to proliferation," (He also pointed to progress on three other matters in the ENDC: safeguards, peaceful nuclear explosions and exploration of ways to reverse the nuclear build-up.)

Despite the continuing differences between the USSR and the U.S. on this main aspect of a non-proliferation treaty, it is evident that there has been an important improvement in the atmosphere and a clarification of basic objectives.

The differences between the nuclear powers and some non-nuclear ones is evidenced by the fact that no non-aligned member of the ENDC has co-sponsored the present draft resolution and that they are now engaged in working out proposed amendments thereto. Nevertheless, it is expected that the original Soviet draft resolution or some slightly modified version thereof will be overwhelmingly adopted.
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Date: 12 Dec.'66  FROM: E.E. Nesterenke

CR.13 (11-64)
Assessment of the Debate in the First Committee
On General and Complete Disarmament

While the debate on general and complete disarmament covered some nine meetings, there was little hopeful reference to general and complete disarmament itself. Most of the discussion turned on three topics: a report on nuclear weapons by the Secretary-General; chemical and bacteriological warfare; and over-flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. There were more references than usual to the Introduction to the Secretary-General's Annual Report, speakers singling out especially the adverse effect on disarmament of escalation in Vietnam; the continued underground tests; the alarming consequences of strategic weapons race, including AIM's and offensive weapons.

The resolution requesting the Secretary-General's report arose from an initial Polish draft calling for a report limited to the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. This was broadened at the initiative of Canada and Norway to include also the security and economic implications of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. The revised draft was adopted unanimously. France voted for this resolution but abstained on others on this item.

The debate on chemical and bacteriological warfare, based on a Hungarian draft and African and Western amendments, was interesting when compared with the fate of comparable resolutions introduced at the time of the Korean War. The last text dealing with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, introduced by the Soviet Union in 1953, was rejected by the General Assembly by 41 to 5, with 13 abstentions. This time the Western Powers, after succeeding in having the Committee eliminate language which they described as propaganda from the draft resolution, voted for the paragraph of the resolution inviting all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol. This development on chemical and bacteriological warfare is in large part due to African countries, and may presage more active consideration of this subject in the future. Belgium and the Netherlands suggested that the 1925 Geneva Protocol needed bringing up to date.

Resolution 2162 C, the traditional CCD resolution, referring the subject to the ENDC (introduced by the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC) follows its predecessors very closely but this year singles out, as did the Disarmament Commission in 1965, non-proliferation and a ban on underground tests for urgent action.
The Polish-Ukrainian draft resolution prohibiting over-flights of aircraft carrying nuclear bombs again was viewed by the Host as propaganda. Poland, perhaps sensing that a majority was doubtful, suggested that prohibition should apply in the absence of consent by the overflowed country, and Tanzania suggested an oral amendment to this effect. The sponsors did not press the resolution to a vote.

The non-aligned countries raised the subject of the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament, in a draft resolution which sought to reap immediate economic benefits from disarmament measures without awaiting the distant goal of CCD. A vote on this draft resolution which found no support from either Eastern or Western developed countries, was indefinitely postponed.

In the debate on general and complete disarmament, as on non-proliferation, concern was expressed about disarmament negotiating machinery and the absence of France and the PRC. The suggestion for rotation of membership in the UNCD was again made. The debate also confirmed the diminished prospects of a World Disarmament Conference.
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Attached herewith PSCA/DAD/27,

General Assessment of the Disarmament Deliberations at the XXIst Session of the General Assembly of the UN.

Date: CR.13 (11-64)
FROM: A. E. Nesterenko
CONFIDENTIAL

PSCA/B&D/27
20 December 1966

General Assessment of the Disarmament Deliberations
at the XXIst General Assembly of the UN

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General Assessment of the Disarmament Deliberations
at the XXIst General Assembly of the UN

I. General

The deteriorating international situation, which has led to an intensification of the arms race, had been expected to have an adverse effect on the disarmament discussions. However, the very worsening of the situation to some extent helped to make delegations more aware of the necessity to approach the problems very seriously and at least try to do something which would prevent further deterioration. In addition the growing appreciation, particularly by the nuclear weapon powers, of the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, gave an added sense of urgency to this aspect of disarmament. The debates this year were of high quality and demonstrated a desire to grapple in a realistic way with the problems of disarmament.

II. Achievements

Resolutions

The General Assembly adopted an unusually large number of resolutions on disarmament: three on non-proliferation, three in the context of general and complete disarmament, and one each on the items dealing with the test ban, with a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and with the elimination of foreign military bases.

Some of the resolutions were primarily procedural, transmitting the problem to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (negotiations on general and complete disarmament and the elimination of foreign military bases) or to a world disarmament conference, the convening of which is in itself doubtful (convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons).

The other resolutions brought new ideas or a new approach to old problems: asking States to rescind actions which might hamper the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement; deciding to call a conference of non-nuclear powers; calling for the elaboration of an underground test ban treaty; requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons; calling for strict observance by all States of the principles of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of gas and bacteriological warfare.

However, the most significant feature in the disarmament deliberations of this session was the improvement in the atmosphere of the debate on non-proliferation. The debate revealed that the positions of the United States
and the USSR had more in common than any time before, and substantiated the feeling that the US and USSR are moving towards agreement. There was a marked shift in emphasis away from the differences dividing the nuclear weapon powers and towards the differences between them on the one hand, and the non-nuclear weapon powers on the other. The latter powers again stressed the importance they attach to a "balance of mutual obligations" and to questions of how their security can be assured. Against the opposition of the major nuclear powers they pushed through a resolution calling for a conference of the non-nuclear weapon powers in 1969.

In the debate on general and complete disarmament there was little hopeful reference to general and complete disarmament itself. The most interesting development in this item was the adoption of a resolution inviting all States to observe and to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological warfare. A similar proposal in 1953 was badly defeated. The Secretary-General's suggestion for preparation of a report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons was adopted unanimously.

The debate on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests lacked the intensity of previous years. The delegations, including major nuclear powers, for the most part only restated their previous positions. The main new feature of this year's resolution was the specific hope expressed that States would support the idea of the international exchange of seismic data, and the specific call for the elaboration of a treaty to ban underground tests.

A new development in the question of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons was the request that "the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference give serious consideration" to the question of signing a convention. This new approach may have the effect of shelving the question for the time being, as there is little expectation that a World Disarmament Conference can be convened in 1967.

The question of the elimination of foreign military bases received more attention than it did in the past as it was limited to bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the absence of any clear trend, the item was referred to the ENUC by a procedural resolution. For the first time when considering this item the newly-independent countries have started some clarification of the complex issues involved in the problem of foreign military bases as these issues affect them.

### III. Attitude of Nuclear Weapon Powers

**US and USSR**

Both the US and the USSR were most active in the non-proliferation debate. The USSR presented a new item dealing with this problem; the US initiated a discussion of the problem of peaceful explosions; the US also gave stronger support to the concept of IAEA safeguards, in which the USSR also seemed more interested than in
the past. While the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty tended to emphasize the common interests of both major nuclear Powers and their allies, the debate on the remaining disarmament issues reflected their differences (comprehensive test ban, overflights of planes carrying nuclear weapons, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons), sometimes in the context of the situation in Vietnam (chemical and bacteriological warfare, elimination of foreign military bases).

While the UK mostly illustrated the Western point of view and showed no great initiative of its own, it did differ somewhat in emphasis and details from the U.S. It cast an affirmative vote in the resolution calling a conference of non-nuclear states while the other nuclear Powers abstained.

For the first time in years France voted affirmatively on two important resolutions: on one non-proliferation resolution -- calling on States to renounce actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation -- and on the resolution requesting the Secretary-General's report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons. While this does not necessarily mean that a more positive attitude of France towards disarmament negotiations or the EEC is to be expected, it does perhaps indicate a desire by France to show that it is not wholly uninterested in disarmament questions and that it opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

IV. Attitude of non-aligned

In the non-proliferation talks the non-aligned were sometimes supported by some "aligned" non-nuclear-weapon countries, which in spite of their alliances with nuclear-weapon Powers, found their interest more on the side of the non-nuclear non-aligned countries than of their nuclear allies. The adoption of the resolution deciding to convene a conference of non-nuclear Powers was the successful result of the determination of the non-aligned plus some of the aligned non-nuclear weapon countries in this respect.

The debate on the suspension of nuclear tests indicated the great non-aligned interest and understanding of the subject. They appeared to give little credit to the arguments of the nuclear-weapon Powers and did not hesitate to say so. They were unable, however, despite their various compromise proposals, to bring the positions of the nuclear-weapons Powers any closer, although the USSR seemed to be more sympathetic to the idea of the "detection club" than in the past.

The development of the debate on chemical and bacteriological warfare and on the elimination of foreign bases was in large part due to non-aligned (mainly African) countries, which showed a considerable interest in both subjects, feeling that they were directly concerned.
On the other hand the debate on the resolution to ban overflights of planes with nuclear weapons proved once again that, with respect to issues which they regard as being strictly between the major Powers, the non-aligned tend to refuse to take sides.

It appears that the non-aligned countries played a larger role in the disarmament discussions in comparison to previous years. The major powers may have to take their opinion more into account in the future. One possible effect of this is to tend to bring the nuclear-weapon countries closer together on issues where they have a common interest.

V. Disarmament negotiation machinery

The need for the participation of France and the PRC in the disarmament negotiations was increasingly stressed but no new ideas emerged.

The ENDC was criticized for its lack of concrete achievements but a majority of delegations held that it was still useful as a negotiating body. Nevertheless there are indications that the nature and structure of disarmament conference machinery may require increased attention in the future. There will probably be increasing pressure for rotation of membership by non-aligned countries who are not members of the ENDC; at the very least, for new methods of consultation or observation, if not participation.