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United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories of
East Africa

1/01/1960 - 31/12/1963

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RECORDS CONTROL^{IB/dw}

10 JUN 1960

8 June 1960.

TR 140 EAAF-1960

Dear Mr. Baker,

I wish to thank you for so promptly sending me the release and clippings relating to the Visiting Mission report. It is indeed gratifying when one can work on a report which can get a wide degree of acceptance both in the Territory and at the United Nations.

Thanking you for this official material reminds me that I did not find time -- as I should have -- to thank you for the kindness you showed me outside the scope of your official duties when I was sick in Dar es Salaam. It was, I assure you, very much appreciated. I am quite recovered now, but had to spend a few days in hospital in London on the way home.

I do not see my own duties taking me out to Tanganyika in the foreseeable future, and can only hope that yours will bring you to New York in the near future.

Yours sincerely,

Ian Berendsen,
Division of Trusteeship.

Mr. G.W. Baker,
Ag. Director of Public Relations,
Public Relations Department,
Dar es Salaam,
Tanganyika.

AIRMAIL

PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT,
RECORDS CONTROL DAR ES SALAAM,
TANGANYIKA

20 JUN 1960

5/146/117.

31st May, 1960.

Dear Mr. Berendson;

TR 140 EAAF-1960

I am enclosing cuttings from today's Tanganyika Standard which contain the Press report taken from our summary Press release (copy also attached) and an editorial leader on the Report of your Visiting Mission which has been released today. You will no doubt see these through other channels, but I thought you would like to have these sent to you personally by airmail. It is gratifying that the Report was written in favourable terms and I am sure you will be glad to know that it has had a good Press here.

With best wishes to you. I hope we shall somehow meet again before long.

Yours sincerely,

George Baker

G.W. Baker.

Ag. Director of Public Relations.

I.E. Berendson, Esq.,
United Nations Secretariat,
United Nations Headquarters,
New York City,
NEW YORK, U.S.A.

P.S. I hope you are fit now.

E.

Signed copy.

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TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960, ON
TANGANYIKA (T/)

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1/ In order to avoid delay the report is being made available in its present form subject to minor editorial corrections. In its published form paragraphs and pages will be numbered consecutively from the beginning. The two annexes referred to are not attached to the present document but will accompany the published version.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL DATED 20 MAY 1960
FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VISITING MISSION TO THE
SECRETARY--GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 2009 (XXV) of 4 February 1960 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Tanganyika.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to members of the Trusteeship Council, withholding it from general release until 31 May 1960.

(Signed) MASON SEARS

Chairman

United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust
Territories in East Africa, 1960

UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960
REPORT ON TANGANYIKA

INTRODUCTION

Terms of reference

1. The arrangements for the dispatch of a visiting mission to Trust Territories in East Africa were made by the Trusteeship Council during its twenty-fifth session.

2. At its 1048th meeting on 4 February 1960, the Council decided that the Mission should be composed of the following persons:

Mr. Mason Sears (United States of America), Chairman
Mr. P. K. Edmonds (New Zealand)
Mr. Miguel Solano López (Paraguay)
Mr. Omar Loutfi (United Arab Republic).

3. At the same meeting, the Council adopted resolution 2009 (XXV) setting forth the terms of reference of the Mission. By that resolution, the Council having decided that the Mission should visit the Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika in that order and that the duration of its visit should be approximately two months, directed the Mission:

- (a) to investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in the above-mentioned Trust Territories towards the realization of the objective set forth in Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account the terms of General Assembly resolution 321 (IV) of 15 November 1949 and other relevant Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 1412 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the preparation and training of indigenous civil cadres in the Trust Territories, 1413 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories and 1419 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on plans for political reform for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;
- (b) to give attention, as might be appropriate in the light of discussions in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly and of resolutions adopted by them, to issues

raised in connexion with the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories concerned, in petitions received by the Council relating to these Territories, in the reports of the previous periodic visiting missions to these Territories and in the observations of the Administering Authorities on these reports;

- (c) to receive petitions and to investigate on the spot, in consultation with the local representative of the Administering Authority concerned, such of the petitions received as, in its opinion, warranted special investigation; and
- (d) to submit to the Council, in time for consideration by it at its twenty-sixth session, a report on each of the Territories visited containing its findings, with such observations, conclusions and recommendations as it might wish to make.

Itinerary

4. The Mission set out from New York on 28 February 1960 and, after visiting Ruanda-Urundi, arrived by air at Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanganyika on 1 April. The next day, the Mission held discussions with the Governor, the Speaker of the Legislative Council, the Mayor of Dar es Salaam and the Chief Secretary.

5. On Sunday, 3 April, members of the Mission toured Dar es Salaam and were present at a large public meeting organized by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) at which its President, Mr. Julius Nyerere, gave an address on his recent visit to the United States and England.

6. On the two following days, the Mission held discussions with the Ministers (in one case the acting Minister) for Mines and Commerce; Finance; Provincial Affairs; Lands and Surveys; Natural Resources; Education and Labour; Urban Local Government and Works; Health; and Social and Co-operative Development. The Mission also met with the Chairman and members of the Tanganyika Elected Members Organization and held a number of oral hearings.

7. In view of the limited time at its disposal, it had been decided that the Mission should split into two groups, the first group, consisting of the Chairman, Mr. Mason Sears, and Mr. Omar Loutfi, touring

the northern part of the Territory while the second group, consisting of Mr. Solano López and Mr. Edmonds would tour the southern, western and central.

8. Accordingly, on 6 April the first group left Dar es Salaam by air for Tanga where it spent two days. During this period, the group had discussions with the Provincial Commissioner and officials of the Provincial team, met the Tanga Town Council and held a number of oral hearings. The group also visited the sisal research station at Milingano and attended receptions given by the Arab Association and the Town Council.

9. On 8 April, the group left Tanga by air for Moshi, the Chagga headquarters in the Northern Province but, owing to unfavourable weather and ground conditions were obliged to land at a neighbouring airfield in Kenya. The group proceeded by car to Moshi where it visited the headquarters of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union and held a number of oral hearings.

10. On the following day, the group held a meeting with the Chagga Council, paid a visit to the sugar estate and factory of the Tanganyika Planting Company at Arusha China and later held more oral hearings at Moshi, before leaving by road for Arusha, the headquarters of the Northern Province.

11. The group spent three days, 10-12 April, at Arusha. During this period it had discussions with the Provincial team, held a number of oral hearings and had a meeting with representatives of the Tanganyika Farmers' Association. On the third day, it visited the Northern Region Research Centre, the Natural Resources School and the headquarters of the Social Development Department at Tengeru.

12. On 13 April, the group travelled by air from Arusha to Musoma in the Lake Province flying over the vast expanse of the Serengeti Game Reserve. At Musoma, it was welcomed at the airstrip by a large number of TANU supporters. It then had discussions with the District Commissioner and officials and held oral hearings. It also met at Musoma the District Commissioner of the Masai District and the Chief of the Masai.

13. On the following day, the group left by air for Bukoba, the headquarters of the West Lake Province, but owing to adverse weather conditions and the fact that an airplane had crash-landed on the airstrip making

landing impossible, was obliged to proceed to Mwanza, the headquarters of the Lake Province, where it was taken by the Chairman of the Town Council on a tour of the town. On the following day, the group inspected African rural housing and visited the Western Region Agricultural Research Station at Ukiriguru. On 16 April, the group had discussions with the Provincial Commissioner and senior officials, visited the headquarters of the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions, held a number of oral hearings and attended a reception given by the Mwanza Town Council.

14. On 17 April, the group returned by air to Dar es Salaam.

15. The second group, consisting of Mr. Solano López and Mr. Edmonds, also left Dar es Salaam on 6 April, but proceeded by air to Mtwara, the headquarters of the Southern Province. Here the group had discussions with the Provincial team, held a number of oral hearings and was present at a large and well-ordered rally organized by TANU. Thereafter the group toured the town and port installations which had been originally constructed for the Groundnuts Scheme.

16. On the following day, the group left Mtwara by air for Lindi, the second port and former capital of the Southern Province. Here the group attended a reception given by the Local Council and held a number of oral hearings. The group later left by air for Machingwa, the large agricultural centre operated by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, where it held discussions with the General Manager and other officials of the Corporation and inspected the Corporation's own farms and those run by African tenant farmers; in the course of this tour, the group had an opportunity to meet and talk with several African tenant farmers. In the evening, the group attended a reception given by the General Manager of the Corporation and later were guests at an informal meeting with entertainment organized by the employees of the Corporation and the local branch of TANU.

17. On 8 April, the group departed by air for Mbeya, the capital of the Southern Highlands Province, where it had discussions with the Provincial team, met with the Mbeya District Council and held a number of oral hearings.

18. On the following day, the group had an opportunity to see for itself something of the difficulties of road maintenance during the wet season as it travelled by car to Tukuyu, the headquarters of the Rungwe District.

an area of high mountains and heavy rainfall. En route, the group was able to inspect an African peasant coffee farm which had been developed with the aid of an African Productivity Fund loan. At Tukuyu, the group had discussions with the District Commissioner and his team of officials, visited the headquarters of the Rungwe African Co-operative Union, met with members of the Rungwe African District Council and held a number of oral hearings.

19. On Sunday 10 April, the group flew over the vast Bohoro Flats to inspect the Mbarali irrigation scheme in the upper Rufiji Basin operated by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation. It later attended a public rally at Mbeya organized by the district branch of TANU.

20. On 11 April, the group travelled by air to Tabora, the capital of the Western Province. Here it had discussions with the Provincial team, held oral hearings and attended a reception given by the Provincial Commissioner and also a reception and open-air rally organized by the provincial and district branches of TANU. The following day, the group visited the station of the East Africa Tobacco Company at Tumbi and inspected African-owned tobacco farms and tobacco curing barns which are being developed under the Company's "master growers" scheme.

21. In the afternoon of 12 April, the group proceeded by air to Dodoma, the capital of the Central Province, where it has an enthusiastic reception from several thousands of TANU supporters at the airfield and lining the route into the town. At Dodoma, the group held oral hearings, met with representatives of the Town Council and the Ugogo Union and attended a well-ordered public meeting, at which an estimated 5,000 persons were present, organized by TANU. Later in the day, the group visited the headquarters of the Geographical Survey Department.

22. The next day, the group continued by air to Sao Hill in the Iringa District of the Southern Highlands Province. From there it continued by automobile to Mufindi where it held oral hearings, had a discussion with the District Commissioner of the Njombe District and visited the estates and factory of the Tanganyika Tea Company, including the hospital and primary school which the Company maintains for its employees. From Mufindi, the group travelled by road a distance of 80 miles to Iringa, stopping on the way to greet numerous groups of TANU supporters.

23. On the morning of 14 April, the group had discussions with the District team and visited the headquarters of the Uhehe Council where it met with the Chief of the Hehe tribe and members of the Council. In the afternoon the group held oral hearings, attended a large public meeting organized by TANU at which an estimated 7,000 persons were present and inspected the new and well-equipped buildings of St. Michael's and St. George's School, a secondary school for European children.

24. On 15 April, the group travelled by road a distance of 193 miles to Morogoro, the capital of the Eastern Province, passing through part of the area which has recently been the subject of the Rufiji Basin Survey. On the way, the group stopped at Mikumi to inspect the work in progress on the construction of the railway extension from Kilosa to Mikumi and was also shown the site of the proposed tourist hotel in Doma/Mikumi Game Controlled area. At Morogoro the group inspected the proposed site of the university college of Tanganyika.

25. On 16 April, the group had discussions with the Provincial team, met with the Sultan of Uluguru, Chairman of the Morogoro Native Authority, held oral hearings and attended a public meeting organized by TANU. It later visited the Kingolwira Prison Farm.

26. On the following day, the group left Morogoro and proceeded by road to Dar es Salaam, a distance of 121 miles.

27. The Mission reunited at Dar es Salaam on 18 April. During that day it held further oral hearings, and had a discussion with the Administrative Officer in charge of the Dar es Salaam Extra Provincial District.

28. On 19 April, the Mission had discussions with the Minister of Education and Labour and with a deputation from the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture.

29. On 20 April, the Mission toured the industrial area of Dar es Salaam, and held its final oral hearings, which included deputations from TANU and the Asian Association.

30. On the following day, the Mission had final discussions with the Governor and Chief Secretary.

31. The Mission left Dar es Salaam by air on 22 April and after spending one day in Nairobi, Kenya, where it had discussions with the Administrator of the East African High Commission, arrived in London on 24 April. On the following day the Mission held discussions with the Secretary of State

for the Colonies and other officials of the Administering Authority. It departed by air for Brussels on 26 April and arrived in New York on 29 April.

32. The Mission was assisted during its tour in Tanganyika by the following members of the United Nations Secretariat; Mr. Ian E. Berendsen (Principal Secretary), Mr. Myles Minchin (Assistant Secretary), Mr. Guy de Warlincourt (Administrative Officer), Miss Monique de Gravelaine (interpreter), and Miss Denise Wynn (stenographer).

33. The Mission wishes to express its appreciation to the Governor of Tanganyika, to the staff of the Tanganyika Administration and of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation for the manner in which they facilitated its task. The Mission is particularly grateful to the Government Ministers, members of the Legislative Council and political leaders for the helpful assistance which they rendered to it and the frank manner in which they discussed the problems and aspirations of the people. The Mission wishes to express its warm thanks to all the people of Tanganyika, officials and private persons, for the cordial hospitality and welcome which it received from them at all stages of its tour.

34. The Mission wishes to acknowledge in particular, the valuable assistance rendered to it by Mr. A.J. Chant, the Administering Authority's liaison officer.

Circumstances of the Mission's visit

35. Previous Missions have rightly stressed the great diversity between the various natural regions which compose the large Territory of Tanganyika (360,000 square miles, or more than France and the British Isles combined) and the many ethnic groups - indigenous and non-indigenous - which go to make up its steadily increasing population of over nine millions. In addition to a small European community of 21,000, an Asian community of 81,000 and an Arab population of 21,000, there are no less than 113 separate tribal groups, ranging in size from the Sukuma, with well over a million members, to small tribes of only a few thousand persons. The

provinces to the west and south-east of Lake Victoria and the coastal districts are the only considerable areas capable of supporting a substantial population density. Elsewhere high population density exists only in a few favoured mountainous areas. Very large regions of the Territory are sparsely populated because of shortage of permanent water or because of the presence of the tsetse fly with its accompanying ills of human or bovine trypanosomiasis. The considerable distances between the main centres of population and the relatively poor communications between them have in the past been major obstacles both to the economic development and to the growth of a nationally-oriented political consciousness.

36. Over the last few years, however, factors promoting the development of a national unity have become increasingly effective. It is true that the basic economic diversity remains and that because of limited resources only relatively slow improvements have been possible in the system of communications. There has, however, been a steady increase in production of crops for sale by African peasants and a resultant change from a predominantly subsistence economy on a district basis to the beginnings of a unified money economy for the whole Territory. A much greater factor for unity, however, has been the emergence of African political consciousness on a national scale and of representative political institutions.

37. Previous Visiting Missions found it advisable to spend some five to six weeks in the Territory, the greater part of which was devoted to extensive travel in the interior and to the study of regional problems. Because of the development of centralized institutions and of a national movement, the Mission wished to devote a greater portion of its stay to discussions with Ministers, officials and political leaders in Dar es Salaam and in fact spent several days more there than previous Missions. On the other hand, the need to make a much longer stay than previous Missions in Ruanda-Urundi owing to the urgency and complexity of the problems of that Territory, and the instructions given to the Mission by the Trusteeship Council that its reports should be submitted in time for consideration by the Council at its twenty-sixth session

combined to limit the stay of the Mission in Tanganyika to three weeks, only half of which was available for touring in the interior. Nevertheless, by dividing itself into two parties, which travelled mainly by chartered airplanes, the Mission was able to visit all but one of the provincial centres, as well as several important district centres. Inevitably visits to institutions and to economic projects in the field had to be kept to a minimum, but the Mission went to great pains to acquaint itself, through written memoranda and oral briefings by the officials concerned, with the major aspects of economic and social progress. By holding meetings with recognized local authorities and elected representatives and by granting interviews to leaders of political organizations and other individuals and groups, the Mission believes that it has acquired a representative, if hurried, view of public opinion in the Territory.

38. The Mission has found the shortness of time available to it for the preparation and adoption of the report to be a greater difficulty than the shortness of its stay in the Territory. It trusts, however, that it has been able to present in an organized fashion all important matters brought to its attention.

II. POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT

General political situation

1. The most noteworthy feature of the political situation in Tanganyika is the peaceful and harmonious atmosphere of goodwill. Nowhere did the Mission get the impression that there were any political tensions or any current threat to law and order.
2. The Mission was informed by both officials and African leaders that the situation had not been always so harmonious. In the years immediately preceding the 1958 election there had been a certain tension between the then wholly official Government and African nationalists, which had erupted into several minor breaches of the peace and into a determined opposition to certain policies of the Government.
3. The Mission was informed, however, that the situation had improved after the 1958-1959 elections, in which as is well known all 30 representatives seats were won by candidates who were members of or were endorsed by the Tanganyikan African National Union, which will henceforth in this report, as it is in Tanganyika, be referred to as TANU.
4. Since that time various measures of constitutional advance have occurred at such frequent intervals as to bring about that peaceful state of affairs to which the Mission has already referred. The appointment of the Post-Election Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Richard Ramage in May 1959, the establishment of the Council of Ministers and the appointment of five elected members as ministers in July 1959, the announcement that new elections would take place in 1960, the publication of the Ramage Report in December 1959 with its recommendations that a great majority of seats in the new Legislative Council should be elective, the announcement made on 26 April 1960 that from 1 October ten of the twelve ministries would be held by unofficial members of the Legislative Council have all contributed to creating the present wholly satisfactory climate of public opinion.

5. This is not to state that pressures for constitutional changes have not continued to exist. Indeed in the budget session of the Legislative Council in May 1959, criticism by the representative members of the budget was very vigorous indeed, and demands for responsible government in 1959 were put forward. There was some impatience expressed at the delay in announcing the action to be taken on the Ramage Report, but this dissolved into widespread satisfaction when the Governor finally made his announcement in December 1959. There has been continued criticism of the fact that elections will be held only in September, thus delaying the achievement of responsible government until October, to which the Government has replied by emphasizing the complexity of the operations concerned. There has also been criticism of failure to grant universal adult suffrage, though this is tempered by a general feeling that the results of the election will not be affected by the type of suffrage, ^{and} by a realization ^{under responsible government} that universal adult suffrage will speedily be proposed. Finally, there is a steady emotional pressure for Uhuru, for complete independence in the near future. This natural feeling is shared by even those African leaders who realize the serious practical problems which newly independent Tanganyika will have to face.

6. The Mission found only one political organization in Tanganyika, which gave proof of enjoying mass support, namely, TANU. Members of the Mission were present at a meeting organized by TANU in Dar es Salaam, at which Mr. Julius Nyerere gave an address on his recent visit to the United States and England. It was attended by an orderly but enthusiastic crowd estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000 people. The members of the Mission who toured the south of the Territory attended large public meetings, totalling in one instance about seven thousand persons, organized by TANU in almost every place visited. Those members who toured in the north saw only one large gathering of TANU supporters, but they had no reason to doubt the assurances of various deputations of the party in other centres that their branches had a large paid-up membership and enjoyed wide popular support.

7. TANU of course enjoys the great prestige of having won its campaign for responsible government and for the abolition of the parity system.

It stands for the laudable principle of democratic equality without distinction of race, sex, language or religion. It is true that TANU members on the Ramage Committee agreed to the establishment of European and Asian reserved seats in 10 or 11 constituencies respectively out of a total 50. This concession is, however, regarded by TANU as a measure designed to give some reassurance to the members of the minority communities over the period of transition to self-government or independence. Moreover, elections to the reserved seats will take place on the same common roll as for the open seats.

8. In earlier statements, Mr. Nyerere had suggested that responsible government was the major goal and that the remaining steps toward independence could be taken as soon as the necessary preparations had been made. The attitude of TANU on this question as expressed to the Mission has, however, become more urgent. In a communication which was addressed to it not only by the headquarters of TANU, but also by the majority of the branches,^{1/} the request was made "that the proposed September general election should be mounted as a plebiscite for the independence of the Territory." The reasons given were as follows:

- "(1) The electorate gave the present elected members of the Legislative Council the mandate of Responsible Government. Responsible Government is therefore no longer an election issue.
- (2) The whole country is united and peaceful and is demanding for immediate independence.
- (3) Mounting another election after the September one before the country attains Independence would be unnecessary, unwise and wasteful. It seems to be a convention of the U.N.O. to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of a Trust Territory through a plebiscite prior to the accession to Independence of the Territory.
- (4) Events in Africa, other Trust Territories and the World at large and within the Territory are such that Tanganyika has to attain independence immediately.
- (5) Such a move would give the Territory that peaceful and confident climate which is essential for social and economic development."

9. The Mission sought to clarify this matter when receiving the principal TANU deputation, led by Mr. Nyerere himself. Mr. Nyerere

^{1/} This memorandum is annexed to the present report.

explained that it was the intention of TANU to seek from the people at the September elections a mandate to ask for independence without further elections. If victorious at the polls, TANU would then feel free to implement this policy in the way it considered best. One possibility might be the adoption by the Legislative Council of an appropriate resolution requesting the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary steps to terminate Trusteeship over Tanganyika. When questioned by the Mission, he agreed that it would be desirable to take certain measures, including the enactment of a Constitution and citizenship law, before independence was achieved. The Mission gained the impression that one of the aims of TANU in presenting the memorandum was to ensure that the restricted suffrage at the next elections, to which TANU is in fact opposed, should not be a bar to the attainment of independence by Tanganyika.

10. TANU is conscious of the great economic problems which an independent Tanganyika will have to face, but it hopes to meet them in the first instance by promoting a much more urgent productive effort on the part of the people and in the second place by the receipt of aid from abroad "without strings attached." It is particularly anxious to receive aid through United Nations agencies and to that end to have a United Nations Office established in Tanganyika. Even if international aid is not forthcoming, however, TANU will continue to press for independence.

11. The only other African political party in the Territory is the Tanganyika African National Congress, which "broke away" from TANU several years ago and which unsuccessfully contested one seat in the 1958 elections. The Mission received deputations of this organization in Dar es Salaam headed by its leader Mr. Zuberi Mtemyu, while members visiting the north met small deputations at Tanga and Mwanza, as well as a representative at Arusha. In the southern part of the Territory, members met with a small deputation at Tukuyu in the Southern Highlands Province and was informed of the existence of a branch in the Eastern Province. The Mission also received several communications purporting to come from branches of the Congress in places not visited by it. In no case was the Mission invited to attend a meeting of Congress supporters.

12. The Congress is like TANU, restricted to African membership, but unlike it, seeks to restrict political rights to Africans born in Tanganyika. It is prepared to concede, however, an economic role to members of the immigrant communities and has recently changed its policy so as to recognize their right to naturalization after 45 years residence. The African National Congress calls for independence immediately after the September elections. Mr. Mtemvu stated that his party would contest a number of seats in those elections.

13. Another African organization with a political aspect is the All-Moslem National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). Basing itself on the fact that much of the education in Tanganyika has been conducted by Christian missions and that predominantly Moslem parts of Tanganyika have not benefited to the same extent from educational facilities, AMNUT has asked for improved facilities for Moslem education and in a recent petition to the Trusteeship Council asked for a postponement of independence for Tanganyika until such time as the Moslem community, which amounts to some two million persons, could stand on an equal footing with the Christian population. The Mission understands that this last request has been withdrawn. In any case, the AMNUT deputation which appeared before the Mission stated that it did not intend to enter candidates in the forthcoming election.

14. Apart from these organizations there are a number of African organizations operating at the local government level, where the increasing use of elective methods gives them scope. Thus at Moshi, members of the Mission received deputations from the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union and from the Chagga Democratic party, which compete in the rather turbulent local politics of the Kilimanjaro district, while at Iringa, a memorandum was received from the Hehe Democratic Union.

15. Among the immigrant communities, there is little organized political activity. An exception should be made, however, as regards the Asian Association, which has 1,500 paid-up members, but claims majority support among the Asian community. As the political ally of TANU, the

Asian Association put forward the majority of the present Asian elected members of the Legislative Council. In its interviews with the Mission at Dar es Salaam and Tabora, the Association was even more insistent than TANU in pressing for early independence and for a fully democratic method of voting. The Asian Association has an honourable record, which goes back beyond the foundation of TANU, of support for the principle of the common roll and, since 1956, for universal adult suffrage. The Association stated also that it was opposed to the reservation of seats for minority groups.

16 In only one place, Tukuyu, in the Southern Highlands Province, did the Mission receive a deputation from the United Tanganyika Party which, as a national political organization, ceased to exist after the 1958-1959 elections. This branch, while claims 1,020 members in the Rungwe District was opposed to the TANU request that the forthcoming elections should be "mounted" as a plebiscite for independence on the grounds that a transitional period of responsible government was necessary to prepare the Territory politically and to permit the development of a parliamentary opposition. The Mission did not encounter any evidence of activity by this party elsewhere in the Territory, and understands that this is the only remaining organized group.

17. In interviews and private conversations with small groups of Europeans and Asians established in Tanganyika, the Mission noted a degree of apprehension about the rapidity of political progress in the Territory and about the protection of their economic rights when Tanganyika attained its independence. The Mission is bound to state that these cases were somewhat isolated and were accompanied by no suggestions for political action. They were moreover outweighed by statements by other members of these communities that the political situation was excellent and that the present African leadership would have due regard to their rights.

18. The Mission realizes that some feeling of apprehension is inevitable when a major change of regime is shortly to take place. Such a change

is, however, never likely to take place under more favourable circumstances than in Tanganyika. Furthermore, the leaders of TANU have given all reasonable assurances, which they repeated to the Mission, that the rights of such persons will not be infringed. The Mission is confident that the framers of the constitution of the independent state of Tanganyika will see the wisdom of including therein provisions respecting human rights and fundamental freedom for all inhabitants, as has been done in most modern constitutions.

19. Before concluding this survey of the political situation in Tanganyika, the Mission would like to bear witness to the excellent relations existing between persons of various races. The ease and graciousness of social contacts is very remarkable. A potential source of friction lies in the fact that in general members of the immigrant communities have a much higher standard of living than do most Africans. There is, however, a growing realization by thinking Europeans and Asians of the need to help enterprising Africans to set themselves up in business or as master farmers. All things considered, the present situation is an encouraging example to other multiracial societies.

20. Finally, as a practical example of racial cooperation in action, the Mission wishes to refer to the Tanganyika Elected Members' Organization which is composed of all African, Asian and European elected members of the Legislative Council and through which their attitudes in the Council are coordinated. The Mission held a discussion with those members of TEMO who were present at the time in Dar es Salaam at a meeting in which Sir Ernest Vasey, the Minister of Finance, also participated. All members present were united in their determination to press forward towards the attainment of independence for Tanganyika and in their realization of the economic problems which the Territory faces. They were confident that these problems could be solved by determined leadership and expressed the hope that United Nations aid and other forms of international assistance would also be made available.

Reform of the Executive Government

21. At the time of the previous Mission's visit the composition of the executive branch of government was of a predominantly official character. The Chief Executive Officer was the Governor acting, however, after consultation and in many matters with the consent of the Executive Council composed of nine members who were Government officials and seven who were/ ^{nominated} members. The individual responsibilities of the officials for the direction of groups of departments of Government had been emphasized by their having been given the status of ministers in 1957, a reform which had been accompanied by the appointment of six assistant/ ^{nominated} ministers (four Africans, one European and one Asian). However, the assistant ministers, with one exception, were not members of the Executive Council. The other six members of the Executive Council (two from each of the three main racial groups) had no administrative responsibilities.

22. After the conclusion of the first elections to the Legislative Council in February 1959, consideration was given to setting up a Council of Ministers in which a number of ministers chosen amongst the elected members of the Legislature might play a full part. As established on 1 July 1959, this Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consisted of seven official ministers and five elected ministers, three of whom are Africans, one is an Asian and one a European. ^{1/} The Executive Council was, however, kept temporarily in existence to give advice in connexion with the exercise of the prerogative of mercy and, in a subordinate position in relation to the Council of Ministers, on questions of general policy.

23. The elected ministers are expected to support government policy in the Legislative Council. They are, on the other hand, all supporters of TANU.

24. In view of the fact that the TANU leader, Mr. Nyerere, did not take office in the new Council of Ministers and that as Chairman of the Tanganyika Elected Members Organization he had conducted quite a vigorous campaign of criticism against what he still regarded as a bureaucratic

^{1/} ^{official} Early this year the retiring Minister for Finance was replaced by Sir Ernest Vasey, formerly Minister for Finance in Kenya, who is neither a career official nor an elected minister, but is described as an appointed Minister.

and alien form of administration, the position of the elected ministers might have been difficult. In fact, the elected ministers seem to have had a considerable freedom in administering the departments under their control and to have been able to influence general government policy to such an extent that they have been able to support it without any embarrassment. Indeed, the position has been recognized by all parties as transitional pending the projected reform of the Legislative Council, following which it was generally agreed a corresponding change in the Council of Ministers would take place.

25. The reform of the Executive Government was not included in the terms of reference of the Post Elections Committee. However, when the recommendations of that Committee were announced, the Governor stated that he had been authorized by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to say that Her Majesty's Government had agreed that, provided there were no untoward developments, the Executive Government would be reformed after the General Election on the basis of an unofficial majority; that is to say, the Council of Ministers would be reconstituted in such a way that the number of ministers selected from amongst the people of the Territory would be greater than the number of ministers who were public officers.

26. The Governor went on to say that the precise structure of the Executive Government in its new form had yet to be decided upon: in order that this might be done, and for the purpose of examining the considerable number of related matters which would require to be dealt with in connexion with this constitutional change, it was proposed that discussions should be held in London in the Spring of 1960. Not the least of the matters that would require to be studied was the position of the Civil Service in the conditions which would be created by this and future constitutional changes. It was the intention of the Secretary of State that representative unofficials should be invited to take part in these discussions.

27. Before the Mission left Tanganyika it was informed that in the opinion of the Administering Authority and of the political leaders in the Territory such a conference was unnecessary. Instead a statement concerning the future executive government of Tanganyika would be made to the Legislative Council when it next met.

28. The text of this statement, which was made on 26 April shortly after the Mission left the Territory, was as follows:

"It is announced by the Governor, with the authority of the Secretary of State, that the following changes will be made in the executive Government of Tanganyika with effect from October 1, 1960:

- (1) A post of Chief Minister will be created. The Chief Minister will be the Governor's principal adviser and Leader of Government business in Legislative Council. In carrying out his general co-ordinating functions, the Chief Minister will work through the Provincial Administration.
- (2) The post of Chief Secretary will be abolished. A new post of Deputy Governor will be created. The Deputy Governor will be a member of the Council of Ministers but not of the Legislative Council. He will be the head of the Civil Service.
- (3) The Council of Ministers will consist of the Governor (President), the Deputy Governor, ten unofficial Ministers^{1/} and two Civil Service Ministers. The Civil Service Ministers will be the Attorney-General and the Minister for Information Services.
- (4) An unofficial Minister will be appointed as Minister for Home Affairs. His portfolio will include Police, Prisons and Immigration. Responsibility for the use and operational control of the Police Force will remain vested in the Governor himself, who, acting in his discretion may, in the exercise of that responsibility, give directions to the Commissioner of Police as the professional head of the Force.
- (5) The Executive Council will cease to exist."

29. In its final discussions with the Governor and with officials of the Colonial Office in London, the Mission was apprised of the tenor of this statement and given some explanation of its implications. In particular, it noted that the new constitutional change does not represent the last stage before self-government or independence. That stage will be reached when the Governor and the official members of the Council of Ministers retire from its deliberations and there is a Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet. In the meantime, the Governor will retain the power, which the Administering Authority considers necessary in view of its responsibilities under the Trusteeship Agreement, to reject the advice of the Council of Ministers, a power which in practice he is unlikely to exercise.

^{1/} The Mission understands that one of these will be Sir Ernest Vasey, the present Minister of Finance, who although not an elected member of the Legislative Council, has the support of the elected members.

30. When the Mission inquired what were the reasons for the intermediate stage, it was informed by the Governor that one of the main reasons was to permit the orderly transfer from a civil service, for the conditions of service of which the Secretary of State was still responsible, to one over which the future Prime Minister and Government of Tanganyika would have full control. It would also provide an opportunity for putting the finances of Tanganyika on a sounder basis.

31. Speaking in the Legislative Council after the statement had been made by the Chief Secretary, Mr. Nyerere, as Chairman of TEMO, welcomed the announced changes as a major step towards full independence and expressed the belief that the new Government would have sufficient powers to tackle the raising of the standards of living of the people and to lead the country rapidly to independence. He expressed reservations concerning the continued presence of the Governor in the Council of Ministers, since if the Governor insisted on some particular point it would lead to a constitutional crisis. Finally, Mr. Nyerere thought that the forthcoming elections could take place by early August at the latest, in which case he considered that the new Government should be formed as soon as possible thereafter. He expressed the hope that the United Kingdom Government would take note of the points he had raised, but believed on the other hand that a London Conference would be unnecessary after the statement.

32. It seems that the introduction of the new system of Government will constitute a major constitutional advance and will amount in fact to a large measure of internal self-government. The Mission is confident, however, that the Administering Authority will give due consideration to the reservations made by Mr. Nyerere.

Reform of the Legislative Council

33. At the time of the visit of the previous Mission the electoral provisions for the first election of representative members of the Legislative Council had just been decided upon and the detailed arrangements for the holding of these elections in two stages in September of 1958 and 1959 were being worked out. In essence, the sole change was that the representative side of the House would be elected on a restricted franchise rather than be nominated by the Government as had previously been the case. In all, thirty members were to be elected in nine provincial areas and in Dar es Salaam. In each constituency there was a common roll of qualified

electors, each of whom was required to vote for one European, one Asian and one African candidate in his constituency. Thus the principle of parity first recommended by the Constitutional Committee in 1951 and for some years the target of considerable criticism in the Trusteeship Council, was continued in force for the time being. The first stage of the elections, held in September 1958, was marked by a number of contests between candidates supported by the United Tanganyika Party and TANU. In the event, however, candidates who were members of or who were endorsed by TANU easily won all of the contested seats. In the second stage of the elections which were advanced to February 1959, the TANU candidates were either returned unopposed or obtained large majorities over independent candidates.

34. It had long been the intention of the Tanganyika Government that a Post Elections Committee should be set up to consider further constitutional advances. This Committee was established on 22 May 1959 with the following terms of reference:

- "1. Having regard to the fact that it is not intended that parity of representation in the Legislative Council should be a permanent feature of the Tanganyika Constitution, and bearing in mind the need for adequate representation of the main minority communities and the desirability of keeping the total number of elected members to a figure not greatly in excess of the present total of representatives; to recommend that, if any, changes should be made in the existing provisions for representation by elected members in the Legislative Council; what, if any changes should be made in the present number of constituencies and in their boundaries; and what, if any, changes should be made in the present system of tripartite voting.
- "2. To recommend whether there should continue to be members of Legislative Council representing such interests as the Governor may think fit, and, if so, to recommend how many there should be and how they should be selected.
- "3. To recommend whether, within the general principles of a qualitative franchise, any changes in the present qualifications for candidates and voters would be desirable; and if so, what those changes should be.
- "4. To consider whether a Territorial Council composed of representatives of the chiefs and of others, whose experience and wisdom enable them to make a valuable contribution to the deliberations of such a council, should be established, and to consider its composition, powers and functions including the power to consider any Bill referred to it by the Governor before the conclusion of the second reading of the Bill and to report upon it to the Legislative Council; and to make recommendations accordingly."

35. The composition of the Committee was:

Sir Richard Ramage, C.M.G. (Chairman); Chief H.M. Lugusha, M.B.E., M.L.C. (Nominated Member - Deputy Chairman); Mr. J. Baker, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Mr. M.K. Barghash, M.L.C. (Nominated Member); Mr. P. Bomani, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Marion, Lady Chesham, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Mrs. J. Davis, M.L.C. (Nominated Member); Mr. W.E.M. Dawson, Q.C., M.L.C. (Nominated Member, Solicitor General); Mr. G.W.Y. Hucks, O.B.E., (also Secretary); Mr. Al Noor Kassum, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Mr. R.M. Kawawa, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Mr. J. Keto, M.L.C. (Elected Member); Chief J. Maruma, M.L.C. (Nominated Member); Mr. M.N. Rattansey, M.L.C. (Elected Member) and Mr. L.N. Sijaona, M.L.C. (Elected Member).

36. The report of the Committee was published together with an exchange of despatches between the Governor of Tanganyika and the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 15 December 1959, concerning proposals accepted by the Government for a major re-constitution of the Legislative Council. In fact, the report contained two proposals for the composition of the elective side of the Legislative Council, according to whether or not it was the intention of the Administering Authority to retain an official majority in the Council. Since it has subsequently been made clear by the Secretary of State that it is no longer intended to maintain an official majority for the next elections (in fact the official majority had already been relinquished at the opening of the last session of the Legislative Council), only the second alternative will be described here.

37. The Committee proposed that the great majority of elected seats, namely 50 constituencies out of a total of 71, would be open seats to which any person regardless of race who fulfilled the necessary qualifications required of a candidate could be elected. In 11 of the constituencies in which there was a comparatively large Asian population and in 10 in which there was an appreciable European minority, the qualified electors regardless of race, would also elect Asian and European members respectively. Seats hitherto reserved for Africans were eliminated, although it is natural to expect that Africans would be elected in the great majority of the open constituencies, particularly since it was also proposed that the electorate should be greatly expanded. The proposals for minority representation were put forward unanimously by the Committee and were in fact accepted as a transitional measure in a considerable number of African representations, particularly in the memorandum by TANU. The Committee made no comments on the principle involved except to recall the view that minority representation should be regarded as being for the best interest of Tanganyika in the existing circumstances but liable to review at a later date. It may be noted that the proposals did not require that the member elected to the reserved seat should represent the majority opinions of the members of his race in that constituency. In fact he would be chosen by an electorate that would be overwhelmingly African and the only assurance that he would represent the opinion of

persons of his own race would be the requirement that his nomination paper should be signed by thirty-five persons, of whom twenty-five must belong to his community.

38. It may be noted that in determining constituencies the Committee recommended as a general rule that districts rather than provinces should be used as the basic constituency. This, however, maintained the considerable disparities in the size of the constituencies which exist in the present arrangements.

39. As regards the other aspects of the composition of the Legislative Council, it may be recalled that the Committee was called upon to recommend whether there should continue to be members of the Legislative Council representing such interests as the Governor might think fit. In the light of the movement of opinion away from the principle of nomination of members to the Legislative Council, the Committee had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that in the stage of constitutional development under consideration the appointment of members nominated to represent such interests could not be justified, but indeed that as long as the Governor had the power to nominate members to the government side of the Council, it would be possible to give representation to any interests of importance which appeared otherwise likely to be inadequately represented. In accepting this recommendation of the Committee, the Governor and the Secretary of State stated that its acceptance should not be taken as in any way restricting the Governor's discretion in any nominations that he might be empowered to make to the Legislative Council in accordance with the forthcoming constitutional legislation.

40. Another feature of the terms of reference of the Post Election Committee which had implications regarding the enactment of legislation, if not regarding the composition of the Legislative Council, was the requirement that the Committee should consider whether or not a Territorial Council composed of representatives of chiefs and of other persons of experience and wisdom should be established as a second chamber with restricted powers of recommendation on draft legislation. There had recently been established in Tanganyika a Chief's Convention in which the important Chiefs of the Territory meet periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest and matters which have been referred to them by the Government for advice. The Chief's Convention was naturally interested in seeing

this body developed into the suggested Territorial Council. After due consideration the Committee noted that there was considerable opposition to this course from persons who were suspicious of any brake on a largely elected Legislative Council and those who felt that such a proposal might involve a serious danger of bringing the Chiefs openly into the political arena to the detriment of their position in local government. The Committee recommended against the establishment of the suggested Territorial Council but in favour of giving statutory recognition of the Chief's Convention by means of local legislation.

41. The recommendations of the Committee were accepted by the Administering Authority (subject to certain modifications relating to suffrage which are described below) and embodied in the Tanganyika (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1959. These new arrangements will accordingly come into effect with the forthcoming elections to be held in September, or, as Mr. Nyerere has suggested, August 1960.

42. The Mission has very little further to report on this matter, except to state that the arrangements for electing the new legislature are going forward with little or no controversy. The Mission has already noted that TANU has accepted the principle of reserved seats for Asian and European members only for the life of the next Legislative Assembly and that the African National Congress is opposed to that principle. In any case, in the next legislature a large majority of seats will be filled by African elected members. The Mission was further led to believe that the right of the Governor to nominate members at his discretion would be exercised very sparingly indeed.

Changes in the Franchise and the Electoral System

43. When elections were first introduced on a territory-wide scale for the election of members to the Legislative Council in 1958 and 1959, the following qualifications were required of voters:

Age - minimum 21 years;

Residence - minimum 3 out of the last 5 years in Tanganyika or possession of a certificate of permanent residence;

Other qualifications - at least one of the following:

Income - a minimum of £150 during the preceding year;
or

Education - minimum satisfactory completion of Std. VIII in Tanganyika Government schools or its equivalent;
or

Office holding - membership of various councils or holding the office of Chief or other native authority or headman or being recognized by native law and custom as head of a clan.

44. As has been noted above, electors were enrolled on a common roll for the constituency concerned but, to validate their ballots, were obliged to vote for a candidate for each of the three seats - African, Asian and European - which were actually contested in the constituency concerned. Although the total electorate was roughly estimated at 150,000 persons, only 28,526 voters registered for the first stage of the elections and 30,791 for the second stage.

45. The Trusteeship Council and its Missions had in the past expressed some criticism of the restricted size of the electorate and of the mechanism of the compulsory tri-partite vote. For its part the Administering Authority had for some time intended that the question of the franchise to be used in future should be one of the terms of reference of the Post Elections Committee. This intention was, as noted above, given effect to, though the Committee's recommendations were to be within the general principles of a qualitative franchise.

46. In presenting its report, the Committee noted that it had received many representations in favour of adult or adult male franchise and recognized that under the present world conditions any restrictions could not be maintained over any length of time. Within the limits of its terms of reference the Committee was anxious to provide a very wide franchise and it therefore considered the merits of two qualifications: literacy and payment of personal tax. Believing that the latter qualification would permit a wider franchise and would be more easily established, it accordingly recommended that the payment of personal tax or the holding of a certificate of tax exemption covering the preceding year should be a qualification for the franchise. The Committee recognized that a tax payers' franchise would in large measure discriminate against women, who are not normally required to pay personal tax. While noting that public opinion was less clearly formed in regard to the desirability

of women voting than in the case of men, the Committee considered it important that an opportunity to vote should be given to as many women as possible who seemed likely to be able to use it to advantage. The Committee reached the conclusion that one of the following alternative qualifications would be appropriate at this stage of development to qualify a woman to vote:

- (1) owning a house in a town or having a homestead elsewhere, or
- (2) paying any form of direct tax or rate, or
- (3) holding a licence for any form of business for which a fee is paid, or
- (4) possessing literacy, in either English or Swahili, to the extent that she could, without assistance, fill in the application form for registration as a voter.

47. The proposals set out above in regard to men and women would replace the present educational and income qualifications and the Committee recommended that those provisions should be repealed.

48. With regard to the office holding provision, the Committee noted that all men in the scheduled offices would almost certainly be qualified under the tax paying provision, but that the proposals regarding women would not be so comprehensive. The Committee, therefore, recommended that the office holding provision should be maintained and should be extended to include members of recognized village councils as well as past or present membership of any of the scheduled offices. It was hoped thus to bring within eligibility of voting a number of older women who played an important part in village community life.

49. The existing qualifications for candidates were in every respect more stringent than those of electors. In particular, one of the following alternate qualifications was required:

- (a) satisfactory completion of a course of general education not lower than Std. XII; or
- (b) an income of £200 a year; or
- (c) previous membership of the Legislative Council.

The Committee maintained these relatively restrictive qualifications and in addition recommended that candidates should have not only

sufficient fluency in English to be able to read and understand documents normally considered by the Legislative Council but also ability to follow a debate in English. (This follows from an intention to abolish the facilities in the Legislative Council for simultaneous translation of English into Swahili and vice versa; in practice proceedings have always been in English). On the other hand the Committee recommended that the period of residence required of a candidate should be reduced to three years out of the last five, instead of four years out of the last six.

50. In forwarding the conclusions of the Committee to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Acting Governor of Tanganyika stated that it was the view of the Council of Ministers that the registration of male voters should be made dependent upon the payment of personal tax (or exemption therefrom) during the period of three years immediately preceding the year of registration.

51. Commenting on the qualifications for voters, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a despatch published together with the report of the Post Elections Committee, stated that he shared the desire of the Committee and of the Tanganyika Government that there should be a substantial widening of the franchise but felt that there were valid objections to making the payment of personal tax, even over a period of three years, the main qualification for a voter. In the first place, the existing electoral arrangements in Tanganyika made no distinction between male and female voters. Any male or female who complied with the existing requirements could qualify as a voter. Bearing in mind that only males paid personal tax in Tanganyika, it would be appreciated that to link the right to vote with the payment of personal tax would differentiate against women.

52. The Secretary of State concluded that there were three basic, but alternative, qualifications which might be regarded as indicating that the person concerned possessed 'the discretion and experience necessary to exercise his vote with responsibility'. These three qualifications related to his stake in the country (i.e., his income); or to his literacy

(i.e. his ability to read and write); or to his ability and willingness to take a responsible part in the conduct of public affairs (i.e. his holding of a prescribed office). He therefore decided that, in place of the alternative qualifications recommended by the Committee, one of the following three qualifications should be required of any person whether male or female, seeking, for the first time, registration as a voter:-

- (a) having the ability to read and write in English or Swahili; or
- (b) having an income (as defined in the Personal Tax Ordinance) or £75 per annum; or
- (c) being the present or past holder of a prescribed office.

53. The qualifications for voting in the forthcoming elections were accordingly drawn up in accordance with the Secretary of State's decision. An important modification resulted, however, from a subsequent decision to interpret the income qualification as meaning income in cash or kind. This enabled peasants who possess little or no cash income to include the estimated value of their subsistence crops and other activities. Thus, in effect practically every head of household became eligible to vote under the income qualification.

54. Registration for the election was completed shortly before the Mission arrived in the Territory and resulted, on the final count, in a total of 885,000 registrations, a very substantial increase over the previous figure of some 60,000. This was nevertheless only about half the number of persons who were estimated as potentially eligible to register. The Mission, enquiring into the reasons for this, found that the proportion of persons who had registered to the estimated potential varied greatly from district to district; for example, in the Western Province the number of registrations exceeded expectations while among the Masai, where most of the adult males in a population of 46,000 were probably eligible under the income qualification, the total number of registrations amounted to only 500. Various reasons were adduced in areas with poor registration returns, the most cogent of which were probably lack of political awareness, difficulty of communications and suspicions and misunderstandings concerning the reasons behind the income qualification. Moreover, the absence of substantial political competition also seems to have discouraged registration.

55. The Mission believes that the failure of many potential voters to register is to be expected in any community where the holding of elections is for many people a relatively new innovation. Viewed in this light the total of registrations is not unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Mission feels that results would have been more satisfactory if the franchise had been broader and if there had been no income qualification. In view of the demand for a wider suffrage, the Mission regrets that it ^{decided} was not to introduce universal adult suffrage at this stage, but thinks that the present restrictions in the franchise are not likely substantially to affect the results of this year's elections. The Mission is confident that the new Government which will enter office after the elections will give this matter further attention and that the introduction of universal adult suffrage will not be long delayed.

Local Government

56. It is necessary to make a clear distinction between urban and rural local government. In urban areas, the establishment of town councils along usual modern lines has proceeded rapidly since the creation of the first council at Tanga in 1952 and by now all the main towns of the Territory have such councils. Although the unofficial membership of these councils was at first nominated, in most cases on the parity principle, there has been a rapid trend towards the election of town councillors except for a few official members. Dar es Salaam, the capital and largest town has been distinguished from the other centres in having a Municipal Council with wider powers and in having retained a nominated council for a longer period than the others. Perhaps because of this fact or because of the greater complexity of the problems of this rapidly growing area, the affairs of Dar es Salaam had been the subject of considerable criticism in the Legislative Council and by political leaders. In any event, elections on the basis of wards and of a householder franchise were held in Dar es Salaam at the end of 1959, and resulted in a predominantly African council, which elected the first African mayor. The Mission is pleased to note that a similar method is now being envisaged for a number of the town councils. In general, therefore, the trend of development of urban local government must be regarded as satisfactory. It, nevertheless, affects only a very small proportion of the population of the Territory.

57. Progress in the field of rural local government has been much less systematic. It may be remarked that the majority of existing local authorities in Tanganyika have developed from the efforts of the Administering Authority in the early years of the Mandate to introduce in the Territory a system of indirect rule, by which the conduct of local affairs was to be vested in the traditional tribal authorities. In many areas, no such authorities existed and they had to be somewhat artificially created. In few areas were these authorities able to provide leadership for their people in the task of achieving economic and social progress. In fact, they were in most instances agents for administrative officers in their necessarily somewhat coercive and unpopular efforts to achieve the same objective.

58. With a view to giving these institutions greater vitality and greater popular support, the Tanganyika Government has endeavoured, since World War II, to associate representatives of the people, chosen by various simple forms of election, with the chiefly authorities in the conduct of local affairs. In order to furnish a systematic basis for such developments as well as to grant appropriate representation to non-Africans living in the areas affected and thus enable their somewhat more progressive point of view to be brought to bear, a Local Government Ordinance of 1952 provided for the establishment of county and local councils which might be called upon to exercise any or all of a wide range of local government functions. Despite official encouragement, only one County Council covering what is now the Lake Province^{1/} and one Local Council in the Newala District were established, there being a marked reluctance by Africans to admitting Europeans into what was felt to be a traditional African function. With a view to overcoming this difficulty, the Government organized multi-racial "District teams" with advisory powers only.

59. In 1958 under a Local Government (Amendment) Ordinance, nine District Councils with prescribed functions were established, but local hostility, inspired partly by TANU organizers, resulted in the early demise of four of these and yet another, the Geita District Council was later replaced by a purely African Council following protracted disturbances and a Government inquiry. The remaining District Councils are all in the Southern Province.

^{1/} The South East Lake County Council was abolished in 1959, as being too remote from the people it served.

60. In a number of areas where chiefly Native Authorities continued to exist, local government was hardly more successful. The national aspirations for Uhuru made the people in rural areas distrustful of Government measures and somewhat impatient of authority. Chiefs and sub-chiefs, in enforcing on a local scale measures recommended by Government officials in the natural resources field, incurred unpopularity, which on occasions led to resistance to their authority or resulted in their resignation. Attempts to overawe local courts or to rescue persons from custody also occurred. These events, were most common during 1958 and may in large measure be discounted as "growing pains" of nationalism. They did, however, cause the Government to incur unpopularity with the elected members of the Legislative Council by having additional funds voted in the 1959 budget for police in rural areas and obliged the Government to recognize that its plans for rural local government had been in large measure frustrated. In October 1959, the Governor announced the appointment of a Ministerial Committee to study this question further.

61. At the time of the Mission's visit, the disturbances in the local government field appeared to be a thing of the past, in part because of the general improvement in political atmosphere and in part because of the abandonment of coercive measures in the natural resources field.

62. The Mission's contact with Native Authorities or with African Councils was necessarily limited by the hurried nature of its tour of the Territory. In general, it found amongst African authorities an eagerness for development activities in their districts tempered by a consciousness of a lack of financial resources for the purpose. The Mission was informed by the Minister for Provincial Affairs that an increasing proportion of the limited revenues of local authorities were being devoted to general administration and to the provision of social services, at the expenses of development activities. It was not surprising that the Mission was approached with several requests for aid for local projects. The Mission had to explain that any international aid which might be provided to Tanganyika would necessarily have to be channelled through the central government.

63. The Mission was informed by the Minister for Provincial Affairs that wherever local circumstances were ripe the Government was taking ad hoc steps to make African councils at all levels more democratic. Nevertheless, the Mission could not avoid the impression that no comprehensive policy of developing rural local government has at present been worked out either by

the existing officials or by the prospective members of the future responsible government. The Mission, however, is confident that the future responsible government will endeavour to intensify and to make more systematic the development of democratic institutions of rural local government.

The Civil Service

64. Tanganyika possesses at the present time an efficient, conscientious and well organized Civil Service, of which however the senior ranks are composed predominantly of expatriate officers. In April 1960, there were 3,814 senior posts in the Civil Service, of which 2,215 were filled by expatriate officers domiciled in European or similar countries, 505 by officers domiciled in Asian countries and 467 by locally domiciled officers (346 Africans, 76 Asians and 45 Europeans); in addition there were 627 vacancies, of which 282 were filled by local temporary appointment. The higher range of posts and the more technical class of posts are held almost exclusively by European domiciled officers who receive an inducement allowance and overseas leave privileges in addition to the appropriate local salary.

65. The Mission is conscious of the importance of preparing African cadres to take over as many senior posts in the Civil Service as possible. The Mission believes that this principle has been for some time one of the preoccupations of the existing Government of Tanganyika. Thus the number of Africans in senior posts, which was only one in 1951 and 155 in 1957 had increased to 306 by the close of 1959 and, as noted above, to 346 at the time of the Mission's visit. The Mission was assured that a determined effort was being made to fill vacancies locally wherever possible.

Africanization or

66. Nevertheless, there is unfortunately no reason to believe that the/ localization of the Civil Service will be substantially achieved in the immediate future. For the majority of the posts involved, university degrees or other comparable technical qualifications are a prerequisite. At the present time, the total graduating class from the top of the African secondary school system is only of the order of 90 a year and the number emerging from institutions of higher education is even smaller. The Mission has recommended elsewhere in the report a marked intensification of secondary education and the Tanganyika Government is already making some efforts in this direction, but in any case it would be several years before this could have any effect on the rate of entry into senior posts in the service.

67. Another line of approach which has been pursued in the past and could no doubt be intensified in the future is the in-service training and promotion of talented Africans holding junior posts in the service. This method has been notably successful in introducing a considerable number of Africans into the senior posts in the Provincial Administration where ten local officers are District Officers (one African is a District Commissioner, in the Manyoni District) and sixty-five are Assistant District Officers. For more technical posts, bursaries for serving officers at Makerere or abroad can bridge the gap in qualifications.

68. The Mission is confident that the future responsible Government will place the localization of the civil service on a more planned and more intensified basis. It was assured by the present ministers that they were already reviewing the situation in their departments. The Mission was also supplied with a paper prepared by the Establishments Division of the Civil Service showing that much advance planning is already being done.

69. Nevertheless it became clear to the Mission during its tour of the Territory that the retention of a sufficient number of existing officials is by no means assured. From the Tanganyika European Civil Servants Association and from many serving officers, the Mission heard representations that, compared with salary scales in effect elsewhere, conditions of service in Tanganyika had progressively deteriorated and that uncertainty about their future status and about the protection of their rights in an independent Tanganyika was causing them anxiety. While many of them expressed a readiness and even a desire to continue to serve in Tanganyika if reasonable improvements in salary and appropriate assurances were forthcoming, the Mission was led to believe that a very large proportion of the staff would leave Tanganyika in the next year or two if such improvements were not decided upon. It has already been noted that 627 posts, for which recruitment from overseas was considered necessary, could not be filled while 220 officers have left the service since 1 July 1958, including 64 officers on the permanent and pensionable establishment.

70. In its interviews with the Governor in Dar es Salaam and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, the Mission was informed that they attached great importance to the handing over of an efficient

administrative machine when independence came.. The Secretary of State informed the Mission that he was aware of the anxiety among European Civil Servants in Tanganyika and hoped that a special Commission which would be required to report swiftly, perhaps dealing with some matters in an interim report to save time, would soon be appointed to study the whole question of their emoluments.

71. The Mission feels that this problem must be solved as soon as possible by agreement between the British Government and the new responsible Government of Tanganyika if the situation is not to deteriorate rapidly. If Tanganyika, at a crucial stage in its development, is not to lose the services of some of the devoted and experienced public servants who at present occupy key positions, a solution is urgently required of the difficulties connected with the emoluments and terms of service of those expatriate officers whose employment the territorial government wishes to continue. This problem calls for a bold and imaginative approach. The Mission considers it very important for Tanganyika that there should be no hiatus in administrative or technical services over the next few years and suggests that the most positive way of tackling the problem would be in the context of an intensive and comprehensive programme of localization of the public service. Such a programme could include provision for the urgent training of local officers to replace expatriates, and the satisfaction of legitimate demands concerning emoluments and terms of service made by those expatriate officers whose employment is for the time being continued. It should also provide for the expansion and intensification of secondary and higher education in an effort to supply the public service with sufficient qualified local officers. Such a "crash programme" would not be inexpensive, and would almost certainly be beyond the unaided financial and physical resources of the Tanganyikan Government. The Mission is confident, however, that the Administering Authority is willing to co-operate with the territorial authorities in this work and suggests that early and substantial assistance towards planning and implementing some agreed programme of the kind mentioned above would be one of the greatest contributions which the Administering Authority could make towards the future stability and progress of an independent Tanganyika. The Mission believes that the United Nations also will wish to help in bridging any gap which may occur in this field, by making available experts under the technical assistance programme and providing scholarships and fellowships

for the training of Tanganyikan officials abroad.

Common services and common market with Kenya and Uganda

72. The arrangements by which a number of services, notably, railways and harbours, posts and telecommunications, the collection of income tax and of customs and excise duties, defence and a wide range of research services are administered in common for Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda under the East African High Commission have been carefully studied by the Trusteeship Council and by its Standing Committee on Administrative Unions and there is no need to describe them in detail in this report.

73. The Council is of course aware that there has long been criticism in Tanganyika, which has been echoed by the present elected members, that Tanganyika has not benefited sufficiently from the operation of these services and that Kenya, where most of the services have their headquarters, has been the prime beneficiary. Nevertheless, the Tanganyika Legislative Council at the end of 1959 unanimously passed a motion calling for the extension of the life of East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, the legislative arm of the High Commission, for a period of two years, during which time a review of the operation of the existing services could be carried out. Similar motions by the Legislative Councils of Kenya and Uganda had called for the extension of the Assembly for a period of four years. The Administering Authority early this year compromised by adopting an Order-in-Council extending the Assembly for three years and at the same time appointed a Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Jeremy Raisman, a distinguished expert on fiscal problems, with the following terms of reference:

- (a) To examine arrangements at present in force in East Africa for a common market area, for economic co-ordination between territories and for fiscal uniformity with regard to measures now taken:
 - (i) To facilitate interterritorial trade in products of local agriculture and manufacturing industries and to develop such industries in East Africa.
 - (ii) To secure uniformity in fiscal and financial matters, including method used to allocate yields from customs, excise and income taxes between territories.
 - (iii) To provide the East Africa High Commission with revenue necessary to meet the costs of services administered by the Commission for the benefit of the territories and to apportion the cost of such services between the territories.

- (b) To consider the advantages and disadvantages generally of the present arrangements and whether or not those arrangements are economic and are fair to the interests of each of the individual territories; and to make recommendations for any necessary adjustments, additions or modifications to them."

74. Of even greater importance than the formal arrangements under the East African High Commission is the virtual common market existing between the three Territories. Though the movement of imported goods between them is subject to declaration so that the custom duties can be credited to the appropriate Government and though there are a few restrictions and duties on the exchange of local products, there is no effective customs barrier, while there is substantial identity of external customs tariffs between the three Territories. This has obviously facilitated inter-territorial trade and has encouraged the establishment of new industries in East Africa. However, it is the complaint of Tanganyika politicians and businessmen that there has been an excessive tendency for new industries and for the headquarter offices of the main commercial firms to be established in the Nairobi area in Kenya, thereby retarding the industrial and commercial development of Tanganyika. It was alleged that Kenya had benefited unfairly from the collection of income tax from companies whose headquarters were in Kenya but which operated in the other territories. This last allegation would seem to fall within the terms of reference of the expert Commissioner.

75. The operation of the High Commission services in Tanganyika has been attended by recent unfavourable publicity as a result of labour troubles. There was a short strike by postal workers early in the year and a strike by the Tanganyika African Railway Workers Union, which began on 8 February was not settled until a week after the Mission left Tanganyika, although the Railways and Harbours Administration continued to operate all essential services. Certainly the relations between the High Commission Services and their African employees have been less harmonious than those of the Tanganyika Government and the African members of its Civil Service.

76. Undoubtedly with the approach of Tanganyika towards independence and with the constitutional changes occurring in the other East African Territories, there will have to be a complete renegotiation of the various arrangements for inter-territorial cooperation between the emerging local representatives from each of the countries concerned. From its conversa-

tion with the present non-official ministers of the Tanganyika Government, the Mission believes that the new Tanganyika Government will probably wish to maintain arrangements with its neighbours much along the present lines, provided that these arrangements can be so modified as to be a more positive factor in the industrialization and development of Tanganyika. The Mission is confident that those who will represent Tanganyika in future discussions on this subject will bargain in a tough and realistic way and from a strong position.

Indeed the presence of elected members from Tanganyika on the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly has already resulted in the forceful presentation of Tanganyika's interests. It is perhaps significant in this respect that while the Mission was touring the Territory, the Assembly approved the construction at a cost of £2.2 millions of the long deferred railway link between Tanga and Dar es Salaam.

III. ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT

General observations

1. In view of the rapid constitutional progress now taking place in Tanganyika and the possibility of its emergence from trusteeship in the not too distant future, the serious economic and financial problems of Tanganyika assume special importance. The Mission was deeply impressed at all stages of its visit by the realistic appraisal of these problems on the part of political leaders and by the intensive propaganda being undertaken by TANU to bring home to the people the need for a sustained effort to increase economic production.
2. During recent years Tanganyika's economy has been expanding at a fairly rapid rate, although from a very narrow base. According to information supplied to the Mission, the gross domestic product has increased by approximately 25 per cent since 1954 while the volume of exports has risen by an average annual rate of 6 per cent and has nearly doubled over the past ten years. The "monetary" sector of the economy as opposed to the "subsistence" sector is steadily increasing (it now accounts for 60 per cent of the gross domestic product compared with 56 per cent five years ago) while, despite the general economic growth, the rate of capital formation has remained relatively high, totalling more than 16 per cent of the gross domestic product in 1959. An important feature of recent growth has been the increasing diversification of the economy. Whereas, ten years ago the economy was dominated by the sisal industry, there are now seven major export crops and mineral production contributes more than six per cent of the total value of domestic exports. Nevertheless, the Mission wishes to stress that the Territory is still in the early stages of economic development and further substantial capital investment will be required, particularly for the improvement of communications, provision of water supplies and development of agriculture, if the present rate of expansion is to be maintained.
3. At the present time, the revenue of the central Government, exclusive of external aid, amounts to only approximately £21 million annually and, in a territory the size of Tanganyika with a population of over nine million, must

be devoted almost entirely to the maintenance of essential services. With capital reserves virtually exhausted and very limited possibilities for increasing revenue from an economy in which total money income divided by population yields an average of only about £11.7, the Government is heavily dependent upon external financial assistance both for developing the basic infrastructure of the economy and for carrying out development programmes in other fields such as education and health. This assistance is now being provided by the United Kingdom Government in the light of its responsibility as Administering Authority but the question arises as to what arrangements will be appropriate when the present rate of political progress leads the Territory to emergence from trusteeship. This, in the Mission's opinion, is one of the main problems facing Tanganyika today, and the Mission has dealt with it in greater detail in the final section of the present chapter. The Mission wishes to stress at the outset, however, that the rate of future progress in Tanganyika will depend largely on the amount of external technical and financial assistance which can be rendered to it. In the Mission's opinion this is an obligation which the international community and international organizations cannot ignore.

4. In the following sections of the present chapter the Mission has given some indication of the progress which has been achieved in the principal sectors of the economy and of the main problems which were brought to its attention during the short time which it was able to spend in the Territory. It should be possible for a full examination of Tanganyika's economic development needs to be undertaken when the survey recently undertaken by the Study Group of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is published, and the Mission was informed that one of the first tasks of the new Government which will take office in October 1960 will be the formulation of a new and comprehensive development programme.

Agriculture and animal husbandry

5. The principal source of Tanganyika's ^{present} wealth lies in its agricultural and livestock products which in 1958 accounted for nearly 54 per cent of the gross domestic product. Little more than one-third of this entered into the monetary economy, however, for over large areas of the Territory cultivation is mainly confined to the growing of staple crops for subsistence. Livestock are kept less as a source of revenue and more as a sign of wealth and as a traditional form of investment to be drawn on in times of drought and crop failure. The extent of the subsistence sector of the economy is shown by the fact that roughly 30 per cent of the marketed agricultural product comes from non-African estates which cover only 1.2 per cent of the total land area.

6. The production of export crops has nevertheless increased substantially in recent years, an increase which is not fully reflected either in national income statistics or in the value of exports due to the fact that world market prices have been generally depressed. Thus, output of sisal which in terms of value is the Territory's leading export but which is produced on non-African estates, increased steadily from 121,600 tons in 1950 to 205,273 tons in 1959 although the revenue from exports rose from £11.8 million to only £12.3 million. ^{The production of} cotton, which is almost entirely grown by Africans, mainly in the vicinity of Lake Victoria, more than trebled

over the same period, increasing from 8,900 tons in 1950 to 35,607 tons in 1959 while the value of exports increased from £1.4 million to £7.7 million. ^{The} coffee, ^{prop} which is also largely African-grown and produced mainly in the Bukoba District and in parts of the Northern and Southern Highlands Provinces, increased from 13,700 tons to 22,400 tons over the same period, while its export value rose from approximately £3.5 million to nearly £7.6 million in 1958, falling to £6.8 million in 1959 owing to the difficulties ⁱⁿ the world market. Other lesser cash crops grown by Africans which are expanding rapidly are oilseeds and nuts (including particularly cashew nuts, castor and sesame) production of which has more than doubled over the last five years, pyrethrum, which increased from 290 tons in 1950 to 811 tons in 1959, and tobacco. ^{The output of} tea, at present produced entirely by non-Africans in the Southern Highlands and to a lesser extent in the Usambara mountains, increased from 780 tons in 1950 to 3,640 tons in 1958.

7. The encouraging feature of this growth is that much of it is attributable to African farmers whose output now accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the value of all agricultural exports. At the present time African political leaders are carrying on an intensive campaign to increase economic production and there is every reason to believe that the expansion of cash crops can continue. The Mission was given some indication of possible future developments during its stay in the Territory. For example, in the case of cotton, for which there is a favourable market in Asia, it is hoped to achieve an increase of more than 50 per cent over present output by 1964. The main limiting factors are the lack of adequate communications, not only in the Lake Province but also in the Eastern Province where there is a possibility of considerable expansion, and the danger of loss of soil fertility. Production of sugar, a non-peasant crop, has increased substantially in the past two years, and may be more than doubled by 1964 if plans for large-scale development in the Kilombero Valley are successfully concluded. This would not only relieve the Territory of its dependence upon imports of sugar but would create an exportable surplus. Particular attention is at present being given to developing peasant production of Turkish tobacco for which there appears to be a ready market, and possibilities of developing cocoa, now grown on only one plantation in the Tanga Province, are being explored as a long-term project. At the Milingano Sisal Research Station, members of the Mission saw trial plantings of a new sisal hybrid which, if successfully introduced, should give nearly twice the yield of the present plant and would enable about half of the existing sisal estates to be made available for alternative crops or for cattle ranching. Wattle is also being grown both in the Usambara mountains and in the Southern Highlands where 30,000 acres have been planted by the Colonial Development Corporation and a further 9,738 acres by the local people. The latter plantings will not begin to come into full production until 1964.

8. Owing to the short duration of its stay in Tanganyika, the Mission had an opportunity to visit only a few of the many projects which are contributing to this growth. It was especially impressed, however, with the important role being played by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation. This organization took over the land owned by the Overseas Food Corporation in 1955 and among its activities has been running large farming or ranching operations, together with supervised African tenant farming schemes, at Nachingwea, Urambo and Kongwa, in the Southern, Western and Central Provinces, respectively. It also maintains a ranching scheme at Ruvu in the Eastern Province, where cattle purchased from overstocked areas are fattened for sale, and an experimental tobacco farm at Lupa Tingatinga to which a tenant farming scheme is being added. It has participated with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in the survey of the Rufiji Basin (see section on water supplies and irrigation) and is currently developing an irrigation scheme at Mbarali in the Bohoro Flats. At Kongwa, the emphasis of the tenant farming scheme is upon training Africans to undertake mixed farming, while at Urambo attention is mainly concentrated on the development of flue-cured tobacco. At Nachingwea, which members of the Mission visited, the aim is to demonstrate to Africans the advantages of an intensive system of cultivation with mechanized ploughing provided by the Corporation. Owing to high overhead costs, depressed prices for the three cash crops (soya, sesame and groundnuts) and a rather large turnover of tenants, the scheme has not flourished^{ed} in recent years and it has now been reorganized, the overhead costs being reduced and the number of tenant farmers cut from 138 in 1956 to twenty-three. It is hoped that the reduction of overhead expenses will increase profits and enable the scheme to be built up again to and beyond its former proportions. Similar cost-profit problems have arisen in respect of the mechanized production farms (12,700 acres) operated by the Corporation at Nachingwea. The fundamental difficulty which the Corporation faces is that, while its operating deficits are at present covered by annual grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, this assistance will cease in 1962 when, under present arrangements, the Corporation is required to become financially self-supporting. The Mission feels that any reduction in the scale of the Corporation's present activities, particularly at Nachingwea, would be regrettable and it hopes that some means will be found to provide it with continuing financial assistance.

9. Although the Mission was not able to visit the tenant farming scheme at Urambo in the Western Province it did have an opportunity to see a rather similar tobacco scheme run by the East African Tobacco Company at Tumbi in the same area. Until recently this was merely a centre for purchasing, drying and packaging tobacco produced by

African peasants, but in 1959 a start was made on a "master growers" scheme whereby peasants cultivate and cure their own tobacco with advice and supervision by the Company. At present there are only 46 "master growers" but it is intended to expand the scheme which has aroused considerable local enthusiasm. The Mission feels that this type of project, like the tenant farming schemes, in which peasant farming is centered around and supervised from a central farm or commercial undertaking offers great possibilities in Tanganyika both for crop cultivation and cattle ranching. The Mission was also greatly impressed by the contribution being made to the economy by the co-operatives and by the efficient and well-organized non-African estates such as the extensive tea gardens of the Tanganyika Tea Company at Mufindi and the sugar plantation operated by the Tanganyika Planting Company at Arusha Chini. Since 1957 the latter has increased its output by about 50 per cent and expects to achieve a similar increase in the next few years.

10. The Mission was also impressed by the efforts being made in the Northern Province by agricultural officers and also by some European planters to encourage the emergence of a class of "master farmer" cultivating grain crops of more than a hundred acres by mechanized means. Members of the Mission met several of these progressive African farmers, including Mr. Kirilo Japhet, well known to the Trusteeship Council as the oral petitioner on the Meru Land Question.

11. While the present rate of increase is satisfactory, the question arises as to how long that rate can be maintained without mounting capital outlay on development. In discussions with the Minister of Natural Resources, the Mission was told that at the present time the expansion of African agricultural production is being brought about mainly by extending the area under cultivation rather than productivity per acre. The supply of good farming land is limited, however, and apart from the highland areas which are becoming rapidly developed, much of the land in Tanganyika is of relatively poor fertility and lacking in suitable water supplies and communications. Eventually easy possibilities of taking more land under cultivation will become less and extension of the cultivated area will require substantial capital outlay, especially for irrigation and road construction. Since there is very little capital available for this, future growth must come mainly from improved yields and by stimulating a shift from subsistence farming to the growing of cash crops. Over much of the Territory the productivity of African farming is very low, and except where permanent crops have been introduced the peasants still tend to farm the land by traditional methods, based on shifting cultivation, which are wasteful

and often lead to loss of soil fertility and erosion. The Minister pointed out that there were great variations between tribes and areas as regards the degree of development which had taken place and in many areas the introduction of cash crops had made little progress.

12. Slowness to transfer to a cash economy is particularly noticeable in the case of the extensive cattle-raising areas in the Northern, Lake and Central Provinces. Although the cattle population is estimated at 8 million and over-grazing is a continuing problem, the annual take-off is believed to be very low and in 1959 only 290,000 head of cattle found their way to commercial markets. Cattle could be an important cash crop but at present livestock products contribute only 5 per cent of the monetary sector of the economy.

13. If African farmers are to convert progressively from shifting cultivation to static farming and are to increase their crop yields, the major emphasis of Government agricultural policy must be upon research and extension work. The Mission was favourably impressed by the crop and soil research which was being done at the two regional research centres which it visited - Ukiriguru in the Lake ^{Province} and Tengeru in the Northern Province. It must be admitted however that the application of the knowledge thus gained to agriculture is at present largely impeded by the resistance of the African peasant to the extension services provided by the Government. Formerly some degree of compliance with approved methods of soil conservation and land utilization were enforced through local orders enacted by the Native Authorities, but this coercive method of approach was abandoned in 1958 at a time when it was meeting with increasing political opposition. The immediate reaction, particularly in the Lake Province, was a refusal to carry on with any of the imposed practices. Indeed the Mission was told that the only present application of the results of research at Ukiriguru lay in the distribution of cotton seeds that ~~were~~ higher-yielding and more resistant to disease. Even a campaign for the use of fertilizers sponsored by the President of the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions has not yet achieved any significant results. In general the extension services are now deployed for the benefit of those localities and individual cultivators which show a readiness to accept the advice offered.

14. The Mission believes, however, that the situation in this respect **should now** improve. With the changed political atmosphere and the emphasis placed by leaders of the Tanganyika African National Union upon the need for a national drive to promote

economic development, there are the beginnings of a new attitude on the part of many African farmers towards progressive measures of soil conservation and farming techniques. The Mission therefore feels that there is need for an increase in extension work which at present is restricted by lack of funds. It suggests that every effort should be made to increase the number of African agricultural assistants being trained at the Natural Resources School at Tengeru and that serious consideration should be given to a concerted programme of community development. Quite apart from agricultural extension work itself, one of the basic requirements for agricultural development is the provision of more feeder roads and, since the Government's financial resources are extremely limited, this can best be accomplished by voluntary communal work. In setting up a programme of community development, recognition should be given to the important role which the now extensive co-operative movement could play in it.

15. Often during their tour of Tanganyika, the members of the Mission heard complaints that either the credit available to Africans for developing their farms was insufficient or that the conditions for granting credit by the Government, especially the period allowed for repayment, were too rigorous. Africans face a difficulty in obtaining commercial credit because they cannot pledge their land, which is for the most part tribally owned, and moreover, the amount of debt which can be enforced against them is limited by a protective ordinance passed in 1923. A certain amount of credit is provided by local authorities and the co-operatives are experimenting with the furnishing of short-term advances against the proceeds of crop sales. Government credit for farmers is by way of loans from the Local Development Loan Fund and the African Productivity Loan Fund, two revolving funds with assets of £100,000 apiece. These funds are of great importance for the development of peasant agriculture, but their value is reduced by the fact that, in a high proportion of cases repayments have not been made or have been delayed. The situation in 1958 was as follows:

	<u>Local Dev. Loan Fund</u>	<u>African Prod. Loan Fund</u>
Total of loans outstanding	£31,688	£55,957
Loans not yet due for repayment	22,837	40,173
Repayment outstanding	8,851	15,785
Repayments and interest more than three months overdue	5,757	10,398

16. Delay in recovering these loans would inevitably reduce the effectiveness of the revolving funds, although actually the total sums available have not been fully used because, as the Mission was informed, it has been difficult to find suitable loan prospects. Clearly this is a matter which requires careful examination and the solution may lie in more decentralized administration of the loan funds and in increasing the credit facilities furnished by co-operatives. If African agriculture is to develop rapidly, it is undoubtedly important to increase the effectiveness of agricultural credit and the Mission hopes that this problem will receive careful study. The Mission was interested to learn while in the Territory that consideration was being given to the possibilities of making longterm government loans available to African farmers and of establishing a central co-operative bank. These are both interesting proposals which merit consideration.

Land problems

(a) Land tenure and utilization ^{limit}

17. The main factors which ^{limit} tend to / the availability of land for agriculture and pastoral purposes are the prevalence of tsetse fly and the ^{adequate} lack of / water supplies. At the present time, about 60 per cent of the total land area is infested by tsetse and is thereby rendered unsuitable for animal and in many cases human habitation.

Much land is also unproductive because of inadequate rainfall or surface water. No precise figures can be given of the total land area under agricultural or pastoral use owing to the prevalence of shifting cultivation, but the Administering Authority estimated in 1958 that land utilized for arable farming, the growing of tree crops, meadows and pastures accounted for about 45.4 million acres. The Mission was informed that far too little was known of soil properties to determine how much additional land could be made available through development but it was believed that an additional 4.5 million acres could be brought under cultivation by combination of irrigation and flood control, although at considerable cost.

18. For the Territory as a whole there is as yet no immediate shortage of land although conditions vary greatly from area to area and ^{great deal} a / of the undeveloped land is in districts which are underpopulated and lacking in communications. However, in certain parts of the Territory, notably the fertile highlands, including the Kilimanjaro-Meru area, the Bukoba and Tukuyu districts, favourable conditions of soil, climate or rainfall have led to concentrations of population resulting in increasing pressure on land, and in the Kilimanjaro-Meru area, in particular, there is already acute overcrowding.

19. The fundamental problem in Tanganyika is not so much shortage of land as the general low level of productivity. As has been shown in the preceding section, by far the greater part of the occupied land in the Territory is either used for the maintenance of uneconomic herds of livestock or for subsistence farming based on shifting cultivation; in either case the use is wasteful and as population increases there is

growing danger of destroying fertility. Since agriculture is at present, and will probably remain for some time, the main source of wealth in Tanganyika, some means of ensuring more productive use of the land, especially in the more fertile areas, is essential if the Territory is to advance economically at the present rate and if African standards of living are to continue to improve.

20. The generally low level of African productivity has in the past been the chief explanation for the cumulative increase in land alienation, the declared purpose of which has been to assist economic development, on the one hand by increasing the country's wealth and therefore the source of revenue for development purposes and, on the other, by encouraging African subsistence farmers to adopt new farming methods and to cultivate new cash crops. The value of efficient non-African farms and ranches as a guide to better land utilization by the indigenous people has, however, been greatly reduced in recent years owing to the resentments engendered by the steadily increasing amount of land alienated in areas of high population density and fertility. As a consequence, it is now the policy of the Government to grant long-term rights of occupancy to non-Tanganyikans only in special circumstances or for purposes where it is considered necessary to obtain a particular development which the Territory cannot undertake out of its own resources. The Mission notes that as a result of a substantial reduction in the rate of alienation (which in 1959 was the lowest ever recorded under Trusteeship) and also of the changed political conditions in the Territory which have brought about a relaxation of inter-racial tensions and a broader realization of the Territory's development needs, local resentment against land alienation seems to have greatly diminished. Whereas previous visiting missions heard numerous protests against the principle of granting long-term rights of occupancy to non-Africans, the present Mission heard only a few and several of these related to specific grievances of long standing (see below). The Mission, which was approached on several occasions by settlers who expressed anxiety concerning their future security of tenure over land in which they had "sunk all their personal capital", was interested to hear a statement by Mr. Nyerere in a meeting with the National Executive of TANU that there was no intention of revoking titles to land held by individual settlers after independence. Mr. Nyerere said that he was aware that many settlers had such fears but he had done everything possible to assure them that these fears were groundless. He said that the

proportion of land in the Territory occupied by individual settlers was actually very small and they were making a valuable contribution to the national economy by setting an example of good farming. He declared his intention of repeating this assurance at every opportunity.

21. The whole question of land tenure remains one of the most delicate problems in the Territory and it would be wrong to suppose that it relates only to land alienation. Disputes between tribal groups and individual Africans are no less common. Thus, as is explained later, the Meru complained to the Mission that land which they claimed as part of the Meru Reserve had been excised and included in the Moshi District, while in the Tanga District, the Bondei tribe complained that land which should be set aside for future generations had been disposed of in consultation with the chiefs who were not the real traditional land authorities. An even more forceful complaint came from the Masai who fear encroachment on their grazing lands by neighbouring tribes of agriculturalists.

22. These complaints are indicative of the feelings of insecurity created by the growing conflict between traditional concepts of tribal land ownership embodied in customary systems of tenure and the requirements of a modern cash economy. Over most of the Territory African land is controlled not by the occupier but by the traditional lineage heads or tribal authorities who allocate it for use by the individual members of their groups regardless of economic considerations. Under such circumstances there can be little mobility in the transfer and disposition of land which would ensure its most productive use. Moreover, as population grows, land acquires an increasing economic value and sooner or later there must arise a tendency towards fragmentation of holdings which will inevitably further reduce the possibility of efficient land utilization.

23. The chief disadvantage of customary tenure is that it tends to perpetuate subsistence farming on small plots and inhibits the process of integration and specialization which is necessary to achieve increased output and for the application of improved methods of cultivation. Not only is it often impossible for the efficient farmer to acquire more land in order to improve his output but the fact that he has only usufructory rights to that land which he already occupies acts as a disincentive to its development, makes it difficult for him to obtain credit with which to purchase agricultural machinery or make other improvements to the land, and gives rise to the constant fear that he may lose it.

24. The need, therefore, is on the one hand, for greater security of individual tenure and, on the other, for greater mobility of transfer which, by the economic process, would result in more effective land use. In some areas the customary system has already recognized the need for greater individual security, as for example among the Chagga where a form of tenure very similar to freehold is applied to certain plots. Such arrangements are, however, exceptional and are too limited to alter significantly the general conclusions contained in the preceding paragraphs. The reason for the failure of the customary system of tenure to adapt more rapidly to the needs of a modern cash economy is that, for the more conservative Africans, land is not owned merely for its economic value but is the basis for sustaining the identity of the communal group and the authority of the lineage or tribal heads. According to the East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955, it was because the majority of Africans believed that their security lay in maintaining the communal ownership of tribal lands and the customary system of tenure that they regarded the removal of land from communal ownership by alienation as a threat to their security. On the other hand, the Commission noted that there was a desire on the part of an emerging section of the African population to cast off customary restraints on the effective use of land. It felt that the Government should give a lead to this progressive element by applying a more satisfactory tenure law wherever a fair measure of support existed and by inducing exclusive communities either to utilize their land more fully or to make it available to others, preferably on a basis of free negotiation.

25. The Royal Commission made specific recommendations^{1/} which formed the basis for proposals submitted by the Government to the Legislative Council in October 1958. Briefly the Government proposed to guide and encourage the transition to individual tenure in appropriate areas where there was a desire for change, but not to force it in areas where the desire did not exist. The form of individual tenure, to be defined by statute, would be "freehold", by which was meant "a form of tenure which is individual, exclusive, secure, unlimited in time and negotiable". It was proposed that legislation should be introduced (a) to empower the Governor, where land is in stable individual holdings and there is a general desire for individual ownership, to declare such areas for general conversion to "freehold", and (b) to

^{1/} See the report of the previous Visiting Mission, Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-first session, Supplement No. 2 (T/1401), paragraphs 175-178.

define criteria for entitlement to and the rights and obligations attached to "freehold". To facilitate this transition, the Government proposed to establish local land boards, composed of representatives of the local land authorities and the owners and occupiers of land to act as a liaison between the Government and the local inhabitants and to advise the former of local needs and wishes regarding land tenure.

26. The Government also stated that it was aware of the dangers inherent in the grant of "freehold" to inexperienced people, namely that some individuals might be tempted to sell their land without having any productive use for the money or to borrow on the security of their land for unproductive purposes. To safeguard against these dangers, the Government proposed (i) to maintain for the time being the law under which the disposition of land by Africans in favour of non-Africans required approval by the Governor, and (ii) to investigate the expansion of credit facilities available to Africans for financing land development. The Government further stated that it would seek to promote and encourage the consolidation of scattered holdings and would introduce legislation to prevent the uneconomic subdivision of holdings in freehold areas.

27. In presenting these proposals to the Legislative Council for discussion, the Government stated that they related only to land held under customary tenure in rural areas where permanent individual occupation had evolved and that further proposals in respect of other kinds of tenure would be submitted later. However, owing to the complexity of the problem and the constitutional changes which were taking place, the Legislative Council did not discuss the proposals and the formulation of a land tenure policy has been held in abeyance until after the introduction of responsible government in October 1960.

28. The Mission feels that this postponement is probably the wisest course. Sooner or later a solution to the problem of land tenure must be found if the economy is to develop satisfactorily. Any solution must, however, have the support of the people and / ^{this} can best be obtained by a representative government. The Mission hopes that the new Government will give this problem the priority attention which it deserves.

(b) Specific land problems

29. The observations contained in the preceding paragraphs are well illustrated by an earnest complaint which the Mission received from the Masai, a Hamitic tribe of nomadic pastoralists, who occupy a large area of semi-arid steppe in the Northern Province contiguous with the thickly populated Arusha District and the border of Kenya, in which many Masai also reside. The Masai, who are noted as a warrior race, are strong traditionalists to whom the ownership of cattle is a symbol of status and a way of life; they undertake very little cultivation and only for their essential needs. In representations to the Mission, the Chief and elders of the Masai expressed profound fear at the possibility of encroachment on their lands by agriculturalists, particularly from the neighbouring Arusha and Meru areas where there exists severe land shortage intensified by alienation. They argued that cultivation of the savannah or highland areas would destroy the fertility of the steppe and disrupt their pastoral economy at a time when they were trying to build up a cattle industry. Under the existing delimitation of political constituencies, the Masai would have no voice in the Legislative Council and they feared that a government composed mainly of representatives of agricultural areas would be unable to withstand the demands of land-hungry people. They even suggested as a last resort that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing a separate trust territory to include Masailand and the adjacent Masai area in Kenya.

30. The Mission recognizes the sincerity of these fears which arise partly from mistrust engendered by historical rivalries and partly from the strong and almost mystical attachment of the Masai to their traditional way of life which is still based largely on a subsistence economy. Any separation of the Masai from the larger political entity of Tanganyika certainly would not be in their interests but it is questionable how long a subsistence way of life can remain unmodified within a rapidly growing economy. The solution seems to lie in a guarantee of the land rights of the Masai combined with a concerted effort to convert the Masai to a cash economy. There is no reason why Masailand should not become an important centre for the cattle industry in which case demands upon their land would be removed. The Mission feels that the Government should give urgent attention to this problem and should do all possible to assist the Masai to develop their land as an economic asset. At the same time, it is up to the Masai themselves to increase their economic productivity thereby forestalling pressure from outside.

31. While in the Arusha District the Mission, like its predecessors, received an appeal from the Meru Council and from the Meru Citizens Union for the return of the two farms (totalling 6,000 acres) at Ngare Nanyuki from which Meru were removed in 1951 to permit large-scale cattle ranching by non-Africans. This is a long-standing problem well known to the Trusteeship Council and reported on in detail by the previous Visiting Mission.^{1/} They pointed out that some of the settlers, having been unsuccessful in their ranching project, were ready to sell their land back to the Meru. (In fact some of the land has already been returned to the Meru). The real difficulty apparently is that the value of the remaining land has increased beyond the compensation which was set aside for it in 1951.

32. The Mission, while recognizing that the Meru will continue to entertain a residual sense of grievance as long as this problem remains unsettled, wishes to note the remarkable change in the spirit of the tribe which has occurred over the last few years. The sense of frustration that followed the events of 1951 has now completely disappeared and the Meru are now one of the most progressive tribes in the Territory. They have developed with energy the expansion areas made available to them. They have a rapidly expanding coffee crop marketed through their own cooperative organization. The Government has provided considerable assistance in piping water to lower lying ground. The Meru Council is anxious to open up still further land by this method, but because of limited financial resources is in need of additional assistance from the Government.

Water supplies and irrigation

33. Inadequacy or unreliability of water supplies constitutes a major development problem in Tanganyika. Roughly two-thirds of the Territory northwest of a line drawn from Mbeya to Tanga is semi-arid, particularly the Central and Western Provinces, parts of Sukumaland and of the Northern Province. Rainfall over most of the Territory is highly seasonal resulting in periodic flooding of the major river systems such as the Rufiji, Ruvu, Wami and Pangani.

34. With growing population and land use, an increasing share of the funds available for capital expenditure have been devoted to the control and development of water resources. Total annual expenditure by the Department of Water Development

^{1/} Ibid., T/1401, paragraphs 189-196.

and Irrigation rose from a little more than £200,000 in 1950 to £835,487 in 1958. Of the latter amount £407,368 was devoted to capital works. This does not include expenditure by local authorities or expenditure on the Rufiji Basin Survey (see below) which has been administered by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation with funds partly provided by a Colonial Development and Welfare grant, and partly by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

35. A major part of the capital expenditure by the Department has been devoted to the development of rural and urban water supplies, with particular emphasis on the construction of dams and hafirs, boreholes and piped water for local communities or for livestock. During the period 1953-1959, for example, the Department constructed 150 earth dams and drilled 196 boreholes. Larger schemes combining water control and irrigation have, however, received increasing attention during recent years aimed at relieving population pressure in adjacent highland areas and increasing the land under cultivation. Altogether, about twenty schemes of this nature have been undertaken by the Government. Examples of these are the Mlali Scheme, near Morogoro, where 152 acres of irrigated land is used for tenant farming, the Uru Chini Irrigation Scheme at the foot of Kilimanjaro and the recently completed Kilanawe dam with a capacity of 15,000 acre-feet in the Pare District which is intended for the development of rice and food cultivation in the Mkomazi Valley. In the Central Province, one of the principal schemes is the Mang'oinyi Irrigation Scheme (with a dam capacity of 10,000 acre-feet), which provides irrigation for vegetable farming by Africans and has recently been taken over by the Local Authority. Another scheme is at Ikowa where a dam has been built for flood control purposes at a cost of about £30,000 and it is hoped eventually to irrigate 1,500 acres. This scheme is not yet fully developed and experimental plantings are still being carried on by the Agriculture Department. Indications are that both cotton and rice offer promise, cotton for example yielding 2,000 lbs. per acre in 1958 compared with the average yield of about 460 lbs. in the Lake Province. Part of the land is already under African tenant occupation. In the Western Province, dams at Kakola, Uyui, Igigwa and elsewhere, although basically intended to supply community and livestock needs, are also partially used for irrigation purposes.

36. For the most part, none of these schemes at present exceeds several hundred acres and they are small in comparison with some of the irrigation work which has

for example
been done by private capital, on the Arusha Chini sugar estate near Moshi, operated by a Danish company, which covers about 7,500 acres. Irrigation on a much larger scale may come, however, as a result of the reconnaissance surveys of the Pangani, Ruvu and Rufiji river basins instituted some years ago with the assistance of technical experts provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

37. The Mission understands that the preliminary phase of Pangani and Ruvu investigations has been completed and that an interim report on the former has been submitted. The Pangani Basin study involves not only flood control and irrigation but also the possible construction of a hydro-electric station based on a 800,000 acre-feet reservoir at Nyumba ya Mungo to supplement the already inadequate supply to the Tanga area from Pangani Falls. The original plan involved the possible development by irrigation of up to 230,000 acres below the reservoir but preliminary studies indicate that the water may be too saline and the soil unsuitable for this purpose.

38. The most important reconnaissance has been that of the Rufiji Basin which covers roughly one-fifth of the Territory, or an area of 68,500 square miles including parts of the Central, Southern Highlands and Eastern Provinces. Although the first report will not be submitted until September 1960, the Mission was informed that the results of the preliminary survey indicate very substantial development possibilities for combined irrigation and flood control as well as the provision of hydro-electric power. The studies indicate, among other possibilities, that about 200,000 acres of the Bohoro Flats in the Mbeya District could be developed by irrigation and about 500,000 to 750,000 acres in the Kilombero Valley. To develop the whole Basin fully, including the construction of thirty-eight minor dams and one vast dam for flood control purposes on the lower Rufiji, would cost about £100 million. There is a possibility of piecemeal development, however, especially in the two areas mentioned and at the time of the Mission's visit consideration was being given to determine which project should have priority. Much further work remains to be done, particularly in the form of soil surveys, trial irrigation farms and pilot projects and consequently large-scale development of these areas is still a matter for the future. In the arid Bohoro Flats there are several small trial irrigation farms but only one at Mbarali, near Rujewa, which members of the Mission were able to see from the air, is of sufficient size to furnish information on the possibilities of large scale irrigated farming in the area.

Here an area of 5,000 acres was set aside in 1958 as a pilot farming scheme supervised by the Tanganyika Agriculture Corporation and experience on the small area developed so far has indicated that a wide range of crops, including cotton, rice and vegetables can yield a satisfactory economic return. The Mission feels that the initiation of this pilot project before the completion of the FAO survey is to be commended and notes that progressive development of this area would serve to alleviate population pressure in the nearby highlands around Iringa.

39. Development of the Kilombero Valley is a different proposition for, although the soil in places is reported to be more suitable for cultivation, it is situated in a relatively underpopulated region. This area would therefore seem most suitable for large-scale undertakings of a primarily commercial character such as the plan now being considered to establish an irrigated sugar cane plantation on 6,000 acres near Kidatu.

40. The results of these reconnaissance surveys clearly illustrate the Territory's need for more basic data on its natural resources. The hydrological and soil studies undertaken with the aid of FAO experts have revealed extensive potential for development but much more still remains to be done before this potential can be fully exploited. With the withdrawal of the FAO experts the burden of hydrological survey work undertaken by the Department must increase if the present rate of progress is to be maintained but so far the staff available for this has been limited by lack of funds. The Mission believes that this is a field in which possibilities of further international assistance, both technical and financial, should be explored without undue delay.

Mining

41. Apart from agricultural products, Tanganyika's only other major source of wealth at present is its mineral resources. In terms of value, the most important minerals in production are diamonds, gold and lead and copper concentrates, exports of which amounted to £6.81 million in 1959. Other minerals produced in quantity are building materials, salt, mica, tin and gypsum. Further known mineral reserves, some of which are exploited, although to a much lesser extent, are garnet, graphite, kaolin, lime, magnesite and meerschaum. The Territory possesses extensive proven reserves of coal in the Rungwe, Njombe and Songea Districts but, owing to lack of rail communications and of a suitable market these are exploited only to a very

minor extent. In addition, large pyrochlore deposits have been investigated at Panda Hill, near Mbeya, but commercial production has not yet begun. It is indicative of the healthy growth of mining operations in the Territory that the value of total output has increased from only £2 million in 1951 to over £7 million during 1959.

42. One of the most important developments since the visit of the previous Mission, which is likely to be of substantial benefit to the Territory's economy for many years, was the acquisition by the Government, of half of the entire share capital of Williamson Diamond Ltd. (the other half being acquired by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.) which produces 97 per cent of the Territory's diamond output at its Mwadui mine and also has a controlling interest in the second most important gold mine, Buhemba Mines. Since the transfer of ownership, the plant and technical equipment of the Mwadui Mine has undergone a major modernization and it is mainly due to this that the value of diamonds produced annually in the Territory increased by nearly £1.3 million between 1957 and 1959. The Mission was interested to learn that the company maintains a large force of prospectors in the field, working principally in the Western, Lake and Central Provinces and that the possibility of discovering new diamond deposits is considered to be good.

43. The second major development has been the increased production of gold, exports of which in 1959 exceeded £1 million for the first time since 1941. The Mission understands that this was partly due to the coming into operation of the new Kiabakari Mine in the Musoma District with a milling capacity of some 700 tons of ore a day. On the other hand, the Mission learned with regret that the Mpanda Mine, which had been an important producer of lead, copper, silver and gold concentrates valued at more than £1 million in 1958, had closed down due to the exhaustion of its ore reserves.

44. The Mission did not have an opportunity to visit the Panda Hill project of the Mbeya Exploration Company Ltd., which it understands is nearing the end of the experimental stage. This company which is owned partly by a Dutch concern and partly by the Colonial Development Corporation was formed in 1955 to exploit extensive deposits of niobium-bearing pyrochlore. In 1957 a pilot mill was established but technical difficulties, a temporary weakening of the world market for niobium and chronic labour troubles have delayed the commencement of large-scale mining and milling operations to the extent that the

company is understood to be seriously considering abandonment of the project. The Mission feels that this would be a great loss to the Territory, especially as the pyrochlore deposits at Panda Hill are believed to be sufficient to keep the mill in operation for from 50 to 100 years.

45. A further development has been the discovery of extensive phosphate deposits at Minjingu, east of Lake Manyara in the Northern Province. The deposit was discovered accidentally in 1957 during an aerial survey for the purpose of finding radio-active minerals. The existence of deposits amounting to 10 million tons, with a relatively high phosphatic content, have been proved and the Mission understands that the exploitation of these reserves depends primarily on a decision whether or not to extend the Northern railway line from Arusha to Minjingu. The cost of this extension would be £750,000 and would be economically justified only if shipments of phosphate exceed 50,000 tons annually.

46. The Mission was particularly interested to learn something about the progress of the survey and exploration work which is essential if the Territory's resources are to be fully developed. Apart from the main geological survey being carried out by the Government, mineral exploration on a large-scale is being undertaken by three commercial companies, one of which is seeking oil on the coast while the second, Williamson Diamonds Ltd. is exploring for diamonds only. The third commercial undertaking, the Western Rift Exploration Company has been carrying out since 1957 a general geological exploration over a 34,000 square mile concession in the Western and Southern Highlands Provinces. It is estimated that this work will be completed by September 1961 by which time geological maps will have been prepared for the whole area.

47. The development of the Territory's mineral wealth offers one of the best methods of attracting overseas private capital to the Territory and ^{in order} to stimulate exploration by commercial companies it has been the policy of the Government to offer exclusive prospecting rights, up to a maximum duration of six years in certain areas. Foreign capital is not likely to be attracted, however, unless it can be given some indication that there is a reasonable possibility of an economic return. If private mineral exploration is to be encouraged it is therefore essential to provide basic data in the form of geological maps and mineral surveys to indicate and delimit areas warranting detailed prospection. Hitherto

the regional mapping and survey programme of the Geographical Survey Department has been very much hampered by lack of funds and, although roughly two-fifths of the Territory have been mapped to a minimum reconnaissance standard, it had been estimated until recently that at the existing rate of progress it would take from thirty-five to forty years to complete the task even to the minimum standards. The Mission was glad to learn therefore that financial provision is being made to enable the geological mapping programme to be speeded up to a rate at which it may be possible to complete the work in five years. Geological mapping represents, however, only part of the task of estimating the Territory's mineral potential and must be followed up by mineral surveys of areas revealed by the maps as having potential interests. The Mission was informed that to complete this work within the same five-year period would cost an additional £353,000 which the Government cannot at present furnish out of its own budget.

47a. In view of the great importance of a reconnaissance mineral survey for the development of the Territory the Mission feels that everything possible should be done to find the necessary funds. It will almost certainly be necessary to seek international or other external assistance for this essential purpose.

Co-operative development

48. The rapid growth of the co-operative movement and the important contribution which it has made to the development of Tanganyika have earned repeated commendations from the Trusteeship Council. Between 1954 and 1959 the number of registered societies increased from 311 to 617 with a membership of 330,000 and in the latter year the value of produce marketed by them amounted to £11½ million. Since the greater part of this produce is exported it represents a substantial portion of the total of territorial exports. Co-operative organization has been particularly valuable in Tanganyika, for not only has it facilitated the spread of economic wealth but individual societies, and particularly the unions, have done much to improve farming methods and constitute an important auxiliary to the extension services of the Agriculture Department. They have also contributed to the Territory's advancement in other ways, by capital investment and by providing training and educational facilities.

49. In the course of its tour, the Mission had an opportunity to visit three of the largest co-operative organizations and to see for itself the nature of their operations and the rapid progress which they are making. The first of these was the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, one of the oldest established societies, whose activities are already well-known to the Trusteeship Council. Apart from the marketing of coffee, the Union maintains a College of Commerce, open to persons

of all races, a hostel and an employment agency for its students, a library and also a training programme for staff of its affiliated societies. These facilities are contained in modern buildings which have been considerably expanded since 1957 by, among other things, the addition of a large conference hall. The College, which offers basic training in commercial subjects, is equipped to handle an average intake of 200 students whereas the actual intake is only about 80. In addition, however, some 160 students are enrolled in evening classes for instruction in English, book-keeping, and typewriting. Two buildings owned by the Union have been leased to a commercial bank as branches to provide easier access to banking facilities for some of the affiliated societies.

50. The Union, which has 47 affiliated societies with a membership of about 40,000, handles all the African Arabica coffee crop and together with the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association (a non-African organization) owns the Tanganyika Coffee Curing Co., Ltd. In 1959, the Union grossed £1.85 million of which 82 per cent was returned to the growers in cash.

51. The Mission did not have an opportunity to visit the Bukoba Native Co-operative Union which handles all the African coffee grown in the West Lake area, but received a memorandum from it, explaining its activities. The Union has 73 affiliated societies and owns 51 per cent of the shares in the Bukoba Coffee Hullery which has recently been modernised at a cost of £50,000 to enable it to deal with the whole of the West Lake crop. The Union finances the training of co-operative staff and also maintains coffee nurseries in collaboration with the Agriculture Department. Gross sales in 1958 amounted to 8,747 tons compared with 10,000 tons in 1956. The Mission was informed that there had been a decline in the standards of efficiency of the Union, due largely to its rapid growth.

52. The Rungwe African Co-operative Union, with headquarters at Tukuyu in the Southern Highlands Province, is one of the more recently formed organizations and has 22 affiliated societies with approximately 17,000 members. The Union markets both coffee and beeswax and formerly marketed rice until, in 1957, the seven paddy societies disaffiliated from it believing that they could obtain higher prices for their product by separate marketing, and formed the Unyakyusa Co-operative Union which now has a membership of about 10,000. The Union still holds half of

the shares of the Ipanda Rice Mill, which it owns jointly with the Unyakyusa Union and is keenly interested in a projected coffee curing works for Southern Tanganyika.

53. Apart from its marketing activities the Union maintains coffee nurseries with seed from the Lyamungu Coffee Research Station and provides scholarships and training for co-operative staff. The Union also handles goods for resale to members, valued at £11,400 in 1958.

54. The most remarkable growth of the co-operative movement has probably occurred among the African cotton growers in the Lake Province. Here there are 321 primary societies (compared with 113 in 1955), organized into 15 unions and one federation of unions, and with a membership of more than 112,000 growers. The functions of the unions is to make advances to the primary societies, distribute bags and provide for the transportation and marketing of the crop. The Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions is a central policy-making body representing the interests of all the member societies. It undertakes the bulk purchasing of supplies and owns and operates two ginneries, one in Kasanwa and one at Ushashi, the latter completed in 1958 at a cost exceeding £125,000. The Mission was informed that the Lint and Seed Marketing Board had recently approved the loan of £500,000 to the Federation, representing five-sixths of the cost of building four additional ginneries to be undertaken in the near future. This will bring the Federation's share of the ginning capacity in the Lake Province up to one-third of the total. The Federation also undertakes extensive educational and propaganda work among the cotton growers and has been instrumental in maintaining a crop of generally high quality and increasing yield per acre. The Union is now constructing a new headquarters at Mwanza, at a cost of £50,000 to be raised by a one cent per pound levy on cotton sales.

55. The co-operative movement has grown so rapidly in recent years that there is a definite shortage of trained staff; in fact the Mission was informed that not all secretaries of societies were even literate. At the present time training is provided in the Territory at the Mzumbe school of co-operation, the College of Commerce, Moshi, and also through courses conducted by the Co-operative Development Department and by the several unions. At Mzumbe, courses of three months duration are provided designed for officers of primary societies, with particular emphasis on book-keeping. The total number of students attending these courses in 1958

was 65. Outside the Territory, similar courses are furnished at the East African School of Co-operation at Kabete which in 1958 was attended by 32 students from Tanganyika and an increasing number of scholarships for overseas training are being provided by individual societies for members of their own staff.

56. It will be recalled that so far the co-operative movement has developed almost exclusively in terms of marketing co-operatives. Other forms of co-operation, notably consumer societies have been less successful, which is understandable in view of the technical difficulties involved in competitive retail marketing. This is exemplified by the experience of the Bukoba District Bahaya Co-operative Store Ltd., which maintains 53 branches and has been regarded as offering a fair test of the viability of consumer co-operatives in the conditions prevailing in Tanganyika. So far the experience of this society has not been good and in 1958 defalcations totalling some £2,370 occurred in nine branches as a result of which two had to be closed down. The Mission learned that turnover had declined by over 40 per cent in 1958 and that prospects of the society's survival were not strong. The Mission was informed that an expert investigation into the possibilities of consumer co-operatives had ^{been} undertaken in 1959, and that the results of this enquiry were expected shortly.

57. In the Mission's opinion, one of the main weaknesses in co-operative organization is the absence of credit societies, except for a few confined exclusively to the Ismaili sect. The Mission believes that the provision of co-operative credit by marketing societies could be of great value for the Territory. It was interested to learn that both the Victoria Federation and the Bukoba Native Co-operative Union are experimenting with advances to members against proceeds from the next year's crops. This seems to the Mission to be a relatively secure form of lending and one which, if successful, might be employed by other marketing societies.

58. The Mission was also most interested to learn of a decision taken by representatives of the leading societies to form a central Co-operative Union of Tanganyika which would represent the interests of all registered societies. It is hoped that arrangements will be completed to permit this body to be formed in 1960. The Mission feels that this would be a most progressive move and could be of great benefit to the Territory. The formation of such a body would further the growth of the movement and could pave the way for a major consolidation of financial resources including possibly the creation of a central co-operative bank. Furthermore, the existence of a well-knit independent co-operative movement could assist in attracting technical and financial assistance and investment from overseas.

Manufacturing and industry

59. Although Tanganyika is a predominantly agricultural and pastoral country, there has been a substantial growth of industrial activity over the last ten years. Between 1948 and 1958, the net value of manufacturing output doubled while, as has already been shown, mining output grew faster than agriculture. According to the most recent statistical information, the value of industrial production (including manufacturing, mining and power) represents roughly 8 per cent of the gross domestic product and its contribution to the monetary sector of the economy equals about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total receipts obtained from cash crops. On the other hand, the number of persons employed in manufacturing and other branches of industry during 1959 was only about 52,000 or 10 per cent of the total of wage earners.

60. Over half of the output of manufacturing is from secondary processing industries based on agricultural products, such as sisal decortication, the processing of tea, coffee, sugar, cotton ginning, grain milling and extraction of vegetable oils, or the production of beer and soft drinks, canned meat, tobacco and soap. Industries other than those concerned solely with processing include: the manufacture of tin cans and containers, rayon textiles, paints and varnishes, insecticides, coir matting, furniture, spare parts for mining and agricultural machinery, shipbuilding and repairing, leather and rubber products and nails.

61. The extent to which the industrial sector of the economy has grown can be deduced from the fact that the number of registered industries and workshops increased from 1,384 at the end of 1956 to 4,327 in 1958. The most important recent innovations have been the establishment of a rayon textile factory, a rayon knitwear factory, a razor blade factory, a branch of the Bata shoe company in Dar es Salaam, the latter manufacturing rubber and canvass shoes, and also a fruit juice factory at Mtwara. At the time of the Mission's visit a cigarette factory was under construction and plans were well advanced for the building of two additional textile factories, one for rayon and the other to manufacture cotton goods. In the course of its stay in Dar es Salaam, the Mission had an opportunity to visit several of those factories and to see for itself the growth which is taking place. It was particularly interested in the possibilities of textile manufacturing as shown by the initial success of the Territory's first rayon textile factory, Tanganyika Textile Industries Ltd. This company, which commenced operation only seven months prior to the Mission's visit, under the protection

of the Customs Tariff, at present produces on the scale of 1 million square yards of textile from imported rayon. Already however the company is expanding to three times its present output and is contemplating installing spinning plant. The growth of this enterprise and the plans to construct two additional textile factories, for rayon and cotton goods, each with an initial quota of 3 million square yards per annum augurs well for the development of the textile industry on a large scale in Tanganyika, the Government's aim being to see locally grown cotton being fully manufactured locally for the requirements of the domestic market. Apart from these new enterprises a proposal is also being considered for the establishment of a rubber tyre factory and investigations are being carried out into the availability of raw materials for setting up a cement manufacturing plant and the possibility of manufacturing sacks and bags out of kenath, a substitute for jute.

62. The scope for the development of manufacturing industries, apart from those concerned with the processing for export of domestically produced raw materials, depends primarily upon the size of the domestic and neighbouring markets. At the present stage in the Territory's economic growth the limiting factor in the domestic market is the generally low level of cash incomes which restricts the demand for consumer goods. While some increase in consumption could possibly be achieved by making manufactured goods more readily available at rural trading centres, it is clear to the Mission that any substantial expansion in consumer demand must be mainly the result of a major increase in the production of income-producing cash crops. That being so, it seems that the most likely opportunities for industrial development lie in the field of processing industries. In discussions with the Minister of Mines and Commerce and with other officials, the Mission learned that a number of possibilities are under preliminary consideration, among these being the establishment of a leather tanning industry based on the black wattle grown in the Southern Highlands Province, the extension of pyrethrum manufacturing and the processing of cashew nuts which are already an important export (valued at £1½ million in 1959). While in Dar es Salaam, the Mission visited a new pilot factory which is experimenting with the mechanical shelling of cashew. The Mission was told that if the total output of cashew could be processed in Tanganyika at a competitive cost to avoid the necessity of exporting the raw nut for processing elsewhere, the net gain to the Territory would be in the vicinity of £½ million annually.

63. On various occasions it was suggested to the Mission that the growth of industry in Tanganyika has suffered as a result of its participation in a common market with Kenya and Uganda because Kenya, in particular, with its better communications has been in a more favourable position to attract private investment capital. Another factor has been ^{a feeling of} uncertainty regarding the political future of Tanganyika ^{first as a Mandated and then} owing to its status/as a Trust Territory. Although it is true that Kenya has benefitted from the common market, the Mission **is not sure that** Tanganyika would have attracted very much more private investment if the common market had not existed. This impression is somewhat borne out by information furnished to the Mission to the effect that for most of the main consumer goods which are at present imported from Kenya, projects to establish local manufacturing are either under way or are being considered. Kenya has benefitted, however, from the fact that for climatic and other reasons the headquarters of commercial and banking companies are located in Nairobi where profits derived in Tanganyika tend to flow. This is a problem calling for fiscal adjustment and the Mission ^{as already stated} was gratified to learn that a Commission has recently been appointed to investigate this matter and to recommend such adjustments as may be necessary to ensure that each Territory derives a fair benefit from the common market.

64. During its interview with the Minister for Mines and Commerce the Mission was told of proposals to create a Tanganyika Development Company which would promote industrial development and would help to attract foreign capital by its readiness to participate in the financing of new ventures. The scope of the Company's activities had not been decided although the Government envisaged that it would not be concerned solely with manufacturing but would offer assistance in other fields such as the marketing of dairy products and the processing of agricultural products. The Mission feels that since the possibilities for industrial development in Tanganyika, other than light manufacturing industries are likely to be limited in the near future, such a Company would be most effective if it were to operate over as broad a field as possible. If this is decided upon, the Government might consider transferring to the Company a sizeable portion of its equity holdings in commercial enterprises such as Williamson Diamonds Ltd. and Tanga yika Packers and consideration might also be given to the possibility of making the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation a subsidiary of it, thus ensuring the continuation of the valuable work being done by the latter after it ceases to

receive annual grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The Mission feels that at the present stage of the Territory's development one useful function of a Development Company would be to disseminate information and publicity to potential investors overseas.

Tourism

64a. Another source of revenue which offers interesting possibilities for the future, exists in the tourist industry which so far has been very little developed in Tanganyika although it makes quite a significant contribution to the economy of the neighbouring territory, Kenya. Tanganyika has, however, very important tourist attractions in its extensive game reserves and natural parks, including, among others, the Serengeti National Park, the Lake Manyara and Selous Game Reserves and the Doma-Mikumi game controlled area. There are also very important scenic attractions such as the Ngorongoro crater, Mts. Kilimanjaro and Meru and the very scenic Southern Highlands Province with its temperate climate. In the course of their tour members of the Mission had an opportunity to see some of these attractions with which they were greatly impressed.

64b. The development of tourism in Tanganyika has so far been hampered by lack of adequate communications and of hotel accommodation. The Government is however doing its best to encourage tourism through its membership in the South African Tourist Association and by trade and tourist exhibits, notably in the Central African Federation and in the United Kingdom. The Mission learned that a tourist hotel is being built above Lake Manyara on the edge of the Ngorongoro crater highlands and that it is planned to build another in the Doma-Mikumi game controlled area near Morogoro. Plans are also being considered to encourage the establishment of seaside resort hotels and guest houses which would provide an outlet to the sea for tourists from the Central African Federation. The Mission regrets that plans to build a large modern hotel at Dar es Salaam have not matured. It feels that this could be of considerable potential value for Tanganyika.

64c. The most important natural asset which Tanganyika possesses to attract tourists is of course, its extensive wildlife. In recent years efforts to conserve and protect game have been rendered difficult by the depredation of poachers and by the conflicting demands upon land and water supplies for human habitation and cultivation. An example of these difficulties arose recently in regard to the Ngorongoro crater area where the interests of the Masai and their herds of cattle appeared inimical to those of the wildlife in the area. An arrangement was worked out which would permit the Masai to remain in the area under a guarantee that they would not destroy the game

but the Mission was informed that this guarantee had not been fully respected. The Mission believes that the preservation of the Territory's wildlife is in the long-term interests of Tanganyika and it was gratified to learn that this view is also shared by the Government. It trusts that continued efforts will be made to convert the tribal Africans to this point of view.

Problems of Government finance

65. Apart from the continuing need for administrative and technical personnel, the main problem for which a solution must be found if Tanganyika's transition to independent status is to proceed rapidly and smoothly is a financial one.

66. Owing to heavy expenditure on development in the past, the Government possesses virtually no capital reserves and, while the public debt is still low, recurrent expenditure on essential services, including education and health, has increased to a level where it now exceeds Territorial revenue. According to a forecast by the Minister of Finance, the net estimates of recurrent expenditure in 1960-61 will total about £20,750,000 which appears to be less than the estimate of £21,260,477 for the preceding year, but which, owing partly to a budgetary reorganization and partly to financial assistance from the United Kingdom, actually represents an increase of about £1½ million. This increase is to be devoted mainly to African education, health, police and road maintenance. The Minister explained that as from 1960-61, the United Kingdom Government was assuming the financial responsibility for the East African Land Forces, Tanganyika's share of which was about £650,000. Despite that assistance the proposed budget would show a deficit of nearly £500,000, a portion of which might well have to be met by requesting further financial assistance from the United Kingdom. The Minister pointed out that this financial assistance to recurrent expenditure stemmed directly from the present relationship between the United Kingdom and Tanganyika and could scarcely be expected to continue after the latter attained independence. Thus, even on the basis of the 1960-61 estimates, Tanganyika would be faced with a deficit on recurrent account of about 5 per cent.

67. The Minister of Finance went on to state that the problem which the Territory faced in this respect was ^{that} owing to the present low level of the national income, possibilities of increasing revenue, by higher taxation were very limited. With an estimated gross domestic product of £177½ million of which only £106 million is in the monetary sector of the economy, the average ^{taken into account} ~~if the whole population is/~~ less than £11.7% ^{per head}. This does not leave much margin for capital accumulation except

in the hands of a small wealthier group whose capital is important to the economy. The inability to provide savings for public and private investment leads to a dependence upon external capital for development in almost every field and if it is to attract external capital and skills, the Government cannot afford to increase taxation unduly at the higher levels. The possibility that budgetary assistance from the Administering Authority may cease if Tanganyika attains independence, places the Government in a dilemma. On the one hand, a substantial increase of taxation on higher incomes could have the adverse effect of discouraging foreign investors and promoting a flow of private capital from Tanganyika. On the other hand, a reduction in expenditure could impair the rate of progress in the Territory. During the years before and immediately after independence there will in fact be a need for increased recurrent expenditure to provide for essential services and to make possible the rapid expansion of education and technical training. As the Mission explains elsewhere in this report, secondary, technical and higher education must be increased if dependence upon overseas recruitment for essential skills is to be reduced.

68. The Minister pointed out that if the situation was difficult with regard to recurrent expenditure, it was even more so with regard to development funds. In a country at the stage of development which Tanganyika has reached, expenditure by Government is a main catalytic force which determines the level of economic activity. It is essential in order to provide the infrastructural development, such as road communications and educational facilities, which private capital will not undertake. With very limited resources of its own, Tanganyika is at present mainly dependent for its development financing upon overseas assistance. The Mission was informed that the amount of capital expenditure proposed for 1960-61 was approximately £6 million of which about 75 per cent was expected to be furnished by the Administering Authority either by free grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote or in the form of Exchequer Loans repayable over a period of years. Recently the United Kingdom Government has agreed to make available free grants totalling £6 million during the period 1960-64 but with the attainment of independence Tanganyika's right to participate in these sources of financing would disappear and if programmes of economic and social expansion were not to grind to a halt other channels of capital supply would have to be found. This assurance of free grant or loan funds to meet even minimum capital programmes in the period immediately following independence was one of Tanganyika's most urgent problems.

69. In the Mission's opinion, the situation described above calls for special measures of external financial assistance. The Territory will need during the early years of its independence not only financial loans for specific projects which are in themselves viable but long-term loans for general purposes either at low interest or with a moratorium on repayment which would place the minimum immediate burden on the budget. The evidence which the Mission has adduced elsewhere in this report clearly indicates that the economy is expanding at a rapid rate and it is reasonable to suppose that the Government's difficulties will be mainly transitional. The Mission strongly suggests that ways and means of providing such assistance should be the subject of earnest and immediate study by the United Nations.

70. The Mission raised with the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies the question whether his Government would be prepared to give direct aid to Tanganyika after its independence. He replied that there was no difficulty in principle about continuing aid to countries such as Tanganyika after they became independent, although the methods and channels by which aid would be given would be different. Territories in a dependent status had received aid mainly through the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and the Colonial Development Corporation. After independence there would be other channels including, for example, Commonwealth Assistance Loans.

71. The Mission realizes, however, that the present political leadership is looking above all to the international community for financial and technical assistance over the next few difficult years. The Mission is conscious that existing United Nations programmes are capable of meeting Tanganyika's needs only to a very limited extent. It wishes, however, to express the firm conviction that the United Nations, which has helped to accelerate the rapid and peaceful political development of Tanganyika, has a positive duty to assist to a greater extent in the solution of the economic problems associated with its independence. The Mission is confident that both within and outside the scope of the United Nations, the need for organizing multilateral financial aid for the emerging independent countries of Africa will be increasingly realized and that Tanganyika will benefit therefrom.

72. In the meantime, TANU has expressed the wish to see a United Nations Office established in Tanganyika for the purpose of channelling and co-ordinating requests for United Nations technical assistance. The British authorities both in Dar es Salaam and in London have no objection in principle to this suggestion and the Mission is confident that this request will be put forward to the United Nations.

73. Finally, the Mission notes the feeling in Tanganyika that political uncertainties created by Tanganyika's status as a Trust Territory have prevented the Government from borrowing on world money markets and have hindered the flow of private investment. However unjustified this result, it seems that the price of political tranquility has indeed been a lack of publicity and many overseas investors have been unaware of the propitious conditions existing in Tanganyika. Quite apart from the need for international or inter-governmental loans, the Mission feels that the Territory could be greatly assisted by guarantees which would give Tanganyika access to foreign money markets. It suggests that this possibility should also receive careful consideration.

IV. SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT

Labour

1. The basic labour pattern in Tanganyika has remained relatively unchanged since the visit of the previous mission. In a Territory where the majority of the people are peasant farmers, the proportion of African wage earners is extremely small, amounting to less than five per cent of the population. Excluding an estimated 40,000 domestic servants, the total number of Africans in paid employment during 1959 was 409,742 of whom about sixty per cent were unskilled adult males and about thirteen per cent were women or young persons. According to the annual report of the Administering Authority, more than half (220,199) of the total were employed in agriculture and related activities, a large proportion of them on sisal estates, while the second largest group (94,350) were employed by Government, the High Commission services and local authorities. Commerce and industry accounted for only about 52,000.

Not all of those enumerated for a given year are in continuous employment, many being seasonal workers who seek employment during the harvesting periods in order to supplement the proceeds of their own peasant farming. Exact figures of the number of persons who do this are not available but the fact that during 1958 nearly 174,000 migrant labourers used the government-maintained transit shelters while proceeding to and from employment indicates that there is considerable movement of workers.

3. From a general point of view, the two greatest problems confronting industry in the Territory continue to be the assurance of an adequate supply of labour throughout the year and the need to increase the earning and productive capacity of the unskilled African worker. Owing to the fact that a large proportion of the unskilled workers are migrants who take employment for relatively short periods, there is little permanence or stability in the labour force and standards of labour utilization are consequently low. To some degree labour is becoming more stabilized in the towns, especially Dar es Salaam, but the urban areas are beginning to have a problem of their own. As more and more Africans move in from the rural areas the supply of labour is beginning to exceed the demand and localized unemployment is occurring, particularly in Dar es Salaam, where at the beginning of 1959 about 4,000 male adults were estimated to be unemployed and about the same number were described as "under-employed".

4. As the previous mission observed, industrial relations have changed radically within the last five or six years. These years have seen the emergence and rapid growth of trade union activity, previously almost unknown in Tanganyika, accompanied by a marked increase in the number of industrial disputes by the passage of major labour legislation and by efforts to establish and develop joint consultative machinery according to modern techniques.

5. The rapid growth of trade union activities continued after 1957 and at the time of the present Mission's visit there were reported to be a total of 35 unions with 420 registered branches and a membership of 47,000 (these included however eight associations of employers registered as trade unions). In 1959 there were 205 industrial disputes involving 82,878 workers and resulting in a loss of 402,693 man-days. This growth in trade union activity has been closely associated with the spread of political consciousness and at many of the TANU meetings which were attended by members of the Mission throughout the Territory the badges of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (to which most of the African unions are affiliated) were prominently displayed.

6. The spread of trade union organization, particularly in the rural areas, where unions were virtually non-existent prior to 1954, has necessitated the appointment of a large number of officials the majority of whom had no previous training or experience in trade union procedure. Although officials at the national level show a high degree of competency, this does not always appear to be the case at the local branch level. During the course of their tour, members of the Mission heard many complaints about the quality of local leadership and was told that in the settlement of local disputes recourse had often to be made to the national leaders. Interviews which members of the Mission had with representatives of local branches tended to confirm this impression. In discussions with the Secretary-General and other officials of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour in Dar es Salaam, the Mission was informed that the trade unions themselves are very conscious of the need to train local leaders. In 1958 a training centre was established by the ICFTU at Kampala in Uganda from which fifteen Tanganyikans have already graduated while other union officials have received overseas training in the United Kingdom, Mexico and the United States of America; such training is, however, designed mainly for senior executives and the Mission was informed that the courses at Kampala were a little too

"highbrow" for the ordinary rank-and-file union official. Training courses for junior labour organizers have been provided by the Department of Labour but union officials told the Mission that they did not attend them because the instructors, being government officers whose normal functions included arbitration, were inhibited by their official status from giving the type of instruction, including for example training in strike techniques, which the union desired. The Federation has, with ICFTU assistance, organized a number of training courses of its own but these have not been sufficient to meet the need. The representatives of the Federation explained to the Mission that they were very anxious to see increased provision for training local branch officials but, they felt that this was not a proper function of the Government and should be done by the unions themselves. They pointed out, however, that the establishment of new branches had proceeded so rapidly that the trade union movement did not have sufficient resources to cope with the situation by itself. The Mission believes that the development of a responsible trade union movement can be a most important factor in improving the condition of the people and in promoting the Territory's economic advancement. However, if labour organizations are to fulfill their role adequately they must possess competent leaders at the local as well as the national level. So far, the movement has already benefitted greatly from the advice and assistance rendered both by the British T.U.C. and the ICFTU but, in the Mission's opinion, further assistance in the training of branch officials is unquestionably needed. This could best come from within the international labour movement itself through an expansion of the aid at present being rendered by the ICFTU, but the Mission also suggests the possibility of a training programme organized with technical assistance by the International Labour Organization.

7. The growth of labour organization has been paralleled by a substantial development of the machinery for joint consultation. In 1958 the Joint Standing Industrial Relations Advisory Committee was abolished and replaced by a Territorial Labour Advisory Board consisting of public officials and equal numbers of employer and worker representatives. By the end of 1959, a total of 248 joint consultative committees had been established on which it was estimated that some 220,000 workers were represented. One area in which major advances in industrial relations have been achieved despite considerable difficulties is the sisal industry. The difficulties here were very largely

due to the fact that consultative machinery for the industry was established in 1958 at a time when the labour organization was still in a formative stage. As trade unions developed among sisal workers and eventually merged into a single Tanganyika Sisal and Plantation Workers Union, the industry was bedevilled by a large number of industrial disputes some of which were due to efforts by organized labour to obtain recognition and modifications in the consultative machinery. As a result of a detailed investigation into relations in the sisal industry carried out in 1959, the Union has been given full recognition by the employers and changes have been made in the arrangements for consultation. As now constituted this machinery consists of estate, area and regional councils, with a single Central Joint Council at the top. Employee representatives on the 36 estate committees are elected by secret ballot while the Union has statutory representation on each of the superior bodies.

7a. In 1959 a Standing Joint Council was also established for the tea industry with the Tanganyika Sisal and Plantation Workers Union as the recognized representative of the African employees. The agreement establishing this Council provided further for the creation of consultative and welfare committees in the various tea-growing districts. Similar agreements involving union recognition and the establishment of joint industrial councils have been concluded in respect of dock labour at the ports of Tanga and Dar es Salaam. A further major development has been the complete decasualization of labour at these ports which, since October 1959, have been entirely operated by a labour force engaged on monthly terms.

7b. Dissatisfaction with the existing machinery for consultation was one of the principal causes of a strike of African railway employees against the East African Railways and Harbours Administration which had been going on for some time when the Mission arrived in the Territory. The Union had a number of grievances concerning wage rates and other conditions of service but had refused to negotiate them through the existing Staff Advisory Council on which the employee representative side was divided equally between Africans, Asians and Europeans. The Mission understands that since its departure from the Territory a negotiated agreement has been reached with the assistance of representatives from the ICFTU and the International Transport Workers' Federation. The Mission hopes that this agreement will lead to the establishment of joint consultative machinery satisfactory to both sides both at the national and local levels.

8. With ~~improvements~~ in labour organization there has ^{grown} up a continuous demand on the part of trade unions for a standard territorial minimum wage. Requests to this effect were made to the Mission by individual unions and by the Tanganyika Federation of Labour itself. The Mission recalls that provision for the creation of minimum wages boards was contained in the Regulation of Wages and Terms of Employment Ordinance, 1951 but so far only one such board has been created, for Dar es Salaam which is the only area where a statutory minimum wage applicable to all workers is in effect. Provincial wages committees have, however, been set up in all but one Province to regulate the rates payable to Government employees and the Mission was informed that wages in private enterprise tend to follow those paid by Government. The question whether there should be a single minimum wage for the whole Territory was the subject of an expert study undertaken in 1959 by Dr. D. T. Jack, Professor of Economics at Durham University who was opposed to the setting up of a single territorial minimum wage on the grounds that conditions varied substantially in different areas. He recommended however that in principle legal minimum wages should be fixed for different areas and that Provincial Minimum Wages Boards should be set up. Industries in which there already existed satisfactory joint wage fixing machinery, whether voluntary or statutory, should, he believed, be excluded from the scope of these Boards. Dr. Jack suggested that such industries might include sisal, tea, coffee, certain sections of the agricultural industry and railways. He also suggested that a permanent Industrial Court might also be established to which unresolved differences might be submitted. The Mission was told that these recommendations are now being studied by the Government.

9. Generally speaking, although there have been progressive increases in wages since 1957 and in some cases quite substantial increases for which the trade unions are largely responsible, the average level of wages for unskilled work remains extremely low. In 1959, for example, nearly 29 per cent of African adult male workers earned 39 shillings or less per month and nearly 28 per cent earned between 40 and 59 shillings per month. These figures do not of course include the value of food and housing which is often provided, nor does it take into account the fact that many workers are employed only part time. Nevertheless, the present situation is in many respects far from satisfactory and the Mission hopes that the Government will give continuing attention to this problem. The Mission recognizes however that any substantial increase in the general level of

wages for unskilled labour must come partly from increased productivity and better labour utilization. In the absence of a permanent and stable labour force this is difficult to achieve.

10. The Mission heard a number of complaints from trade unions concerning the level of wages paid by the Government for unskilled workers. The minimum wage paid by Government has recently been raised from 79.50 shillings to 107.50 shillings per month but the Government Workers Union, in a representation to the Mission, requested that it should be raised to 150 shillings per month; at the same time, the Union gave as its opinion that no less than 240 shillings per month was needed to enable a worker to lead a fairly comfortable life. The Union also asked that the new wage should be paid not only to workers employed on a monthly basis but also to casual day labourers who, it was said, often earned less than 40 shillings per month in the rural areas. Government officials explained to the Mission that the casual labour to which the Union referred consisted very largely of part-time workers, such as those recruited for road repairs. They stated that an increase of only 25 shillings would place an added burden of about £90,000 on the Territorial budget which under existing circumstances the Government could not afford. They pointed out that the Union's estimate of living costs did not take into account the fact that the workers also possessed their own "shambas" from which they derived produce or revenue. They added that the existing wage was substantially higher than the wages paid by private firms and more than double what the workers would earn as peasant farmers living entirely on the produce of their own "shambas".

11. The Mission notes that there have been sizeable pay increases in both the sisal and tea industries. The increases in the sisal industry followed an investigation into the wages structure by a special committee of the Central Joint Council and came into effect on 1 April 1960. At the same time, the agreement approved by the Council, provided for an increase in the tasks to be performed - in some cases by as much as 30 per cent - and measures to reduce redundancy. The new monthly wage rates given in the agreement for non-technical employees (production and maintenance workers, field and factory workers) range from a minimum of 200 shillings to 600 shillings. For artisans they range from 165 shillings to 600 shillings per month, for drivers from 120 shillings to 500 shillings, for medical and sanitation workers from 90 to 600 shillings per month and for clerical workers from 120 shillings to 600 shillings per month. It is not possible to compare these rates with the previous rates since the latter were based on the "kipande" system (a certain number of tasks performed within a maximum period). Those still working on the kipande system, would be required

to finish their kipande within 42 consecutive calendar days. Kipande rates vary from 75 shillings to 340 shillings.

12. In the tea industry an agreement concerning wage rates and terms of employment was recently concluded between the Tanganyika Tea Growers Association and the Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union which became effective on 1 May 1960 and is to remain in force until 1 July 1961. As in the sisal industry, the agreement as well as providing for increased wages, also stipulated that the tasks would be increased - in this case by 33 per cent. The standard working week for those on a monthly salary would consist of 45 hours and employees on the kipande system would be required to finish their kipande within 42 days. The agreement also covered provision for overtime pay for monthly workers (one and a half times the basic wage), the granting of annual and long leave (14 days per year and 30 days every third year) and sick leave. The monthly wage rates vary from 90 shillings (health orderly in training) to 600 shillings. For kipande workers the rate for adult males is 84 shillings per kipande and 42 shillings per kipande for children. Plucked green leaf tea is paid for on the basis of seven cents per pound, except in the off-season when daily rates are paid. The wages include the value of the rations and when an employee is provided with food in kind according to a standard ration scale, a sum of 21 shillings is deducted from the wage.

13. The Mission was also informed that the minimum wage of dock workers had also been raised to 200 shillings per month.

Medical Services

14. In the expansion of its medical facilities Tanganyika continues to be handicapped by lack of funds, but within the means available much has been done over the last decade to build up these services, emphasis having been given more particularly to the expansion of the curative services. The medical services are being developed, as the Council is aware, within a plan approved in principle in 1956. Under this plan and within the financial means which became available, the greater part of the capital sum from development sources was to be spent on the continued expansion of the hospital services including the replacement of old, unsatisfactory hospital buildings. The eventual target was one government hospital at each district headquarters with one hospital bed per thousand of the major population groups.

15. Commenting on this aspect of medical development, the Minister of Health in a memorandum to the Mission, stressed that to achieve the target would necessitate a very large capital expenditure with a very substantial consequential increase in recurrent ^{capital} costs. It had been assumed that there would be available for medical/development a sum of £200,000 per annum over the next three-year planning period. Such a sum, however, could not possibly go more than part of the way towards achieving the target and in fact substantial development of the curative services could not be envisaged against such a financial background. Provision of a capital sum of £200,000 per annum would only allow of a small expansion of services and the replacement of out-moded and dilapidated structures at certain existing hospitals. Furthermore, even such capital expenditure would inevitably have consequential recurrent commitments, and as the proportion of the national budget at present devoted to health services was already substantial (approximately 9 per cent), there was clearly a limitation to the additional recurrent commitments which could be accepted unless there were a material expansion of the Territory's economy. At the same time, the Minister pointed out that the population was steadily increasing and that the expansions already achieved had had the effect of increasing the demand of the people, so that in many instances the facilities available had become far from adequate.

16. In the field of preventive medicine, it was planned ultimately to replace the simple dispensaries in rural areas by health centres, comprising a dispensary, a maternity and child health clinic and a health office, with a trained personnel of about ten. The immediate aim was the establishment of 40 health centres by 1960 (approximately 25 per cent of the estimated need), but as of the time of the Mission's visit only 14 had been set up. Again lack of financial resources appeared to be at the root of the problem. The health centres were to have been financed by the local authorities which, however, were unable to meet the costs. The Minister of Health in his memorandum to the Mission, stated in this regard that the development of health centres in larger numbers than had been possible in the last two years was considered to be one of the most important approaches to the wider health problems of the Territory. It had become clear during the last two years, however, that interested though the Native Authorities undoubtedly were in the establishment of health centres, they were in general financially over-stretched and were unable from their own resources to pursue this essential development at a pace which was desirable. It was thus considered

that some method of subsidization of the Native Authorities to encourage the setting up of health centres was necessary, but it was doubtful whether the full degree of assistance could be forthcoming from central Government resources.

17. The Mission notes that as of 31 December 1959, there were 48 government general hospitals, 9 special hospitals, and 20 government dispensaries with a total of 6,529 beds. The missions maintained, subsidized by grants-in-aid, 42 hospitals (3,938 beds) with resident medical practitioners and 88 other mission dispensaries and clinics had accommodation for in-patients (3,141 beds). The industrial concerns maintained 30 hospitals or clinics (947 beds) with resident or visiting practitioners. Out-patient treatment was available at 6 government, 663 Native Authority, 130 mission and 260 industrial clinics or dispensaries. In addition there were 337 ante-natal clinics and 285 child health clinics.

18. During 1960, the Princess Margaret Hospital with 438 beds was opened in Dar es Salaam, the medical training centre and health unit associated with the hospital having been completed in 1959. Elsewhere in 1959, hospitals were completed at Sumbawanga and at Chazi. A leprosarium and a new out-patient department were opened at Moshi and improvements and extensions were carried out at the Hospitals at Tarimo, Mirembe, Mbeya and Iringa. Seven Native authority health centres were opened in 1959. The Mission notes that these statistics represent a very substantial increase in medical facilities since the visit of the previous mission in 1957.

19. According to the Minister of Health, although important progress had been made with the development of medical facilities in the last ten years, the output of the training schools was not meeting the demands of existing institutions, nor keeping pace with the modest expansions which were envisaged. Thus one of the major problems facing the Ministry was to provide training facilities sufficient to raise the standards of the hospital services to a level in conformity with modern demands. At once the difficulty was encountered that even were teachers and training facilities adequate, it was doubtful whether the Territory's educational system had reached a stage of development at which it could provide in quantity and quality the numbers of trainees required. The establishment of medically qualified personnel in the Ministry at the time of the Mission's visit was 173 and of these only 14 were African graduates of the University College of East Africa. At the present moment there were some 20 Tanganyika students in the Faculty of Medicine at Makerere College, and thus it could be anticipated that

by 1966 the number of African medical graduates available to the Ministry would only have increased to 34. It would of course be possible, and it might be considered eventually to be necessary, to augment the potential supply of graduates from Makerere College by providing bursaries overseas. As a very temporary measure this could perhaps be accepted although it had its disadvantages, but the only satisfactory solution to the problem of the shortage of African doctors lay in an increased output from Makerere. To achieve this would entail two things. First, an increase in the availability of youths educated to the level of entry to the medical course and also a very substantial increase in the capital and recurrent contributions by the Tanganyika Government to the cost of Makerere College. It was doubtful, unless external aid was forthcoming, whether it was at present within the capacity of Tanganyika to accept such additional financial commitments, even were the number of potential trainees made available.

20. With regard to para-medical personnel, the Minister said that the position was less unfavourable, particularly in the case of medical assistants and nurses. The Princess Margaret Training Centre in Dar es Salaam could turn out trained personnel in these categories in reasonably sufficient numbers, but some two years' previously for reasons of economy it had been necessary to reduce the annual intake of trainees and thus from 1960 to 1962 output would be reduced. Should sufficient finance be available to enable the maximum intake to be restored in January 1961, the Training Centre would be reasonably capable of meeting territorial demands for these two types of personnel. In the case of nurses, it was considered that the emphasis should now be placed on quality rather than quantity and to this end the educational standards of entrants would be raised. The aim would be to turn out nursing personnel trained to a level which would enable them to fill the higher posts in the nursing service. Similar considerations applied to the other categories, for example laboratory assistants, hospital steward assistants and assistant health inspectors. A start had already been made by the provision of training-grade posts for inservice training of officers in these categories to fit them for promotion to posts at present occupied by overseas officers. In the case of pharmacists, local facilities did not exist for training to the level required and arrangements had been made for officers to be trained by the Ministry. Thus, should sufficient numbers of persons with the requisite basic educational standards be available, the territorial needs, with regard to para-medical personnel, could be met within a reasonable space of time.

21. The Minister of Health was most interested in obtaining international assistance for the Territory, particularly in the preventive field. He noted, in his memorandum, that a measure of subsidization was at present afforded the rural health centres / ^{through} the provision of equipment by United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, but this, it was clear, was not of itself a sufficient inducement and capital assistance for buildings and a contribution to meet the recurrent costs would in many cases be essential. He pointed to the basic need for the extension of health education in all its aspects and considered that the World Health Organization might be able to assist by subsidizing the development of training facilities for staff specially trained in health education techniques, based on the Health Education Unit in Dar es Salaam. Assistance from the Organisation could also perhaps be directed to the setting up of a health education service throughout the Territory. It was envisaged that this service would not only function in urban centres but would influence conditions in rural areas by working from the health centres established by the native authorities.

22. On more specific subjects it was considered that there was need and opportunity for international assistance in the control of tuberculosis. This infection was undoubtedly one of the Territory's most pressing public health problems as there was evidence of increasing incidence of the disease in many parts of the Territory. During the past five years considerable progress had been made in the provision of facilities for the treatment and control of tuberculosis. The number of beds available specifically for the treatment of cases in 1955 was 369. At the end of 1959 this number had risen to 1,127. Of these, 808 were in Government hospitals and 319 in Mission hospitals and there were approximately 6,000 persons under treatment for this disease. Again in Masailand a tuberculin survey had been carried out in 1956 and 2,591 persons were given B.C.G. vaccination. In 1959, 70,380 school children in the Northern Province received B.C.G. vaccination and arrangements had been made for the whole school population of the Masasi district in the Southern Province to be similarly treated. There was, however, no doubt that the use of B.C.G. vaccination on a much wider scale was necessary and in this the World Health Organisation could no doubt give considerable assistance. Also, assistance in the provision of specific anti-tuberculosis drugs would be welcome as the cost of these was a heavy and increasing burden on the Ministry's budget.

23. The Minister pointed out that bilharzia was also an important and pressing problem and there was little doubt that schistosome infestation caused very considerable morbidity and, particularly in Ukerewe District, a not insignificant mortality. The water conservation schemes, particularly in the Lake, Western and Central Provinces would also no doubt lead to the spread of the condition. In fact, agricultural development could be materially affected if means were not found to control this infestation and it was considered a matter of urgency that methods of control ^{should} be devised. To this end, with assistance from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, an investigational team had been set up at the Institute for Medical Research at Mwanza to study the ecology of the snail vectors and to endeavour to devise methods of control. It was considered that there was room for intensification of this research and this would seem an appropriate field for WHO to enter.

24. A large scale investigation into the possibilities of control of malaria in African conditions by the spraying of residual insecticides had been carried out in the Pare/Taveta mountains by the East African Institute of Medical Research with important assistance from WHO. Although residual spraying greatly reduced the incidence of malaria in the Pare/Taveta region and led to a perceptible improvement in the health of the people, this method on its own was not sufficient completely to interrupt malaria transmission. The benefits to the people, however, were so important that in the more malarious parts of the Territory it would obviously be desirable to use this method of malaria control augmented perhaps by the use of gametocidal drugs. This, however, was at present beyond the financial capacity of either the central or local governments and although these bodies would undoubtedly contribute within their means to such control schemes they would only be possible with substantial external assistance.

25. The Minister also pointed out that there was a great deal of under-nutrition and malnutrition throughout the Territory, not related to actual food shortages. The deficiency was mainly in proteins although avitaminosis was also common. The long term solution lay in the education of people in the proper utilisation of available food resources, but it was considered that much could be done immediately to improve the nutritional status of children by providing diet supplements through the school system. A recent survey by the Nutrition Officer had shown that under-nutrition was widespread in primary schools. This could be met, it was believed, by the provision of a mid-day meal or perhaps by a milk issue each day, but this could only be done if an international body such as UNICEF

was able to supply the milk required. It was, incidentally, a matter for great regret that the limited supplies of dried milk which UNICEF had agreed to supply to the Territory for distribution through maternity and child welfare centres had been discontinued as it was quite beyond the capacity of local resources to fill the gap.

26. Other problems mentioned by the Minister of Health in an interview with the Mission included the need to start a survey of eye diseases (including trachoma). The Government had requested WHO to make such a survey but had not yet obtained the latter's agreement. There was also still a great deal of yaws in the Northern Province and trypanosomiasis was a big problem in the Western Province.

27. The Minister, in his memorandum to the Mission, while giving a few of the more obvious wants in which it was believed that external assistance could profitably be applied to health problems in Tanganyika, pointed out that there were, however, many others and that it would perhaps be a much more fundamental means of providing assistance if an investigation of conditions in Tanganyika could be carried out by WHO and if that organisation itself were to determine the most appropriate ways in which it could help the Tanganyika Government to improve the health status of the people.

28. A memorandum concerning the Territory's health services was presented to the Mission by the African Medical Workers' Union. The Union requested that grants-in-aid to voluntary institutions (i.e. religious missions and local government hospitals and dispensaries) should be increased to 100 per cent on the grounds that the medical facilities provided by some of these institutions was very poor and that they had difficulty in employing well-trained staff because of lack of funds. Referring to hospitals generally, the Union asked for greater dispersal of facilities to obviate existing transport difficulties. It also complained that there was an acute shortage of medical staff in some hospitals which sometimes meant that a medical assistant had to examine and treat more than 200 patients in a day and that some of the more expensive drugs were not available to Africans on grounds of cost. The Mission did not have an opportunity to investigate these complaints and can only observe that, if true, they merely illustrate the problem which the Government faces in endeavouring to spread the limited finances available to it over a vast Territory with nine million inhabitants. The Mission doubts the practicability of the suggestion

that Government policy should concentrate upon building smaller hospitals in order to obtain a greater dispersal of medical facilities. Limitations of skilled medical staff and the need to use the available skills to the greatest advantage clearly indicates the desirability of establishing hospitals of some size. On the other hand, the Mission noted with satisfaction that the greatest expansion in recent years has been in the number of local dispensaries, and clinics.

29. The Union also complained that African medical and technical employees were always classified as "assistants" and were not promoted to full professional status with higher salaries even after many years service and even though in some smaller hospitals or clinics they carried responsibilities similar to those of full professionals. They suggested that an enquiry should be made into the training of local staff to fill higher posts. They also suggested that the Government could save substantial expenditure if overseas nursing sisters were replaced by locally trained nurses and they asked that the period of training required of the latter should be reduced. At present, African nurses had to undergo a four-year training period in the Territory followed by a further period of four years overseas before they could qualify as nursing sisters. The Mission later learned that the reason for this rather long period of training is that candidates for training are accepted from among girls with only standard VIII education whereas in other countries education up to university entrance would normally be required. The problem is of course the small number of girls reaching a higher educational standard and the Mission is confident that as their numbers increase the need to provide student nurses with preliminary training will diminish. The Mission notes, in respect of these complaints, that (as stated in paragraph 20 above) the Government plans to raise the educational standards for the admission of student nurses and that a start has already been made in the provision of in-service training to enable para-medical assistants to qualify for promotion to professional posts.

Social development

30. Elsewhere in this report, the Mission has drawn attention to the important needs of the Territory in the economic, health and educational fields. One way of achieving the most effective results with limited funds is, as the Mission has already pointed out, through the stimulation of local measures of self-help. It is the Mission's opinion that strong efforts should be made to channel present political enthusiasms ^{into support for a concerted and dynamic programme} of community development. A favourable atmosphere for the introduction of such a programme is, in fact, being created by African political leaders through intensive propaganda stressing the need for an increased productive effort if the objective of independence is to be attained at an early date.

31. In the past, measures of community development have been hindered by lack of public funds, the absence of any widespread enthusiasm on the part of the people and the fact that responsibility for initiating and carrying out programmes has been divided between the various government departments. There is, in the Mission's opinion, a need for greater co-ordination of such efforts and to achieve this, consideration might be given to a structural reorganization which would bring all community development programmes under a single central control.

32. At the present time the only department primarily concerned with community development is the Department of Social Development. With extremely limited financial resources, this Department has as one of its main functions to stimulate self-help at the village level by organizing community centres and village teams and, through them carrying out local campaigns to improve rural health and sanitation, literacy, housing, agriculture and stock-raising. The Mission was informed that at the time of its visit an adult literacy campaign was being carried out in the Singida district of the Central Province in which 12,000 people had been enrolled. One of the major tasks of the Department has been the organization of women's clubs, of which a total of 338 had been established in 51 districts (in Moshi district alone, 55 clubs had been established with an enrolment of 2,827 women). These clubs provide courses in health education and childcare, cooking and handiwork, and have been greatly assisted by the provision of free equipment, such as sewing machines, furnished with financial grants from UNICEF and the central Government. The clubs are organized in the initial stages by subordinate staff who receive their training at short

courses at the Natural Resources School, Tengeru, which was partly financed by UNESCO. The Mission was informed that at the time of its visit, the average number of persons trained annually for this work was sixteen, which is much too few for a Territory the size of Tanganyika.

33. There is, in the Mission's opinion, a very definite need to increase this work, a view which was also shared by many persons with whom the Mission talked, including the director of the Social Development Department. As the Mission has shown elsewhere in this report, one of the problems which the Government has faced in the past in certain parts of the Territory has been the apathy of the people towards constructive schemes of development in all fields. While there are indications that this attitude may change, there remains nevertheless the fact that in many areas a high proportion of school places remain unfilled for various reasons while the Mission also heard complaints from medical officers of malnutrition among young children due to faulty feeding (In one instance, it was reported that difficulty was being encountered in inducing mothers to feed milk furnished by UNICEF to their children). The Mission is convinced that one approach to this problem may lie through more extensive efforts to break down conservatism among women and stimulate their interest in welfare and local development projects. The Mission was encouraged to note that the organization of women's clubs has been received with enthusiasm in some parts of the Territory. It hopes that funds will be made available to extend this work, which should form an essential part of any overall programme of community development.

V. EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT

Educational policy: finance

1. The greatest problem in the field of education is the inadequacy of facilities for African education. Thus while in 1959 375,008 African pupils, or 44 per cent of that age group, attended a four-year primary course, only 39,871 were following the four-year middle course and only 4,132 were receiving secondary education. Shortage of funds is of course the main limiting factor.
2. Up to the present time there has been a separate organization and administration for the children of each of four principal racial groups. Those for European and Indian students have been administered by independent Education Authorities composed predominantly of representatives of the communities concerned. The small number of schools for other non-Africans, mostly Goans, and the very large system of African education have been under the direct control of the Education Department of the Territory.
3. Since Tanganyika was placed under the Trusteeship System, both the Trusteeship Council and its periodic visiting missions have stressed the necessity of altering this policy and establishing inter-racial schools and unifying the school system. The Administering Authority informed the Trusteeship Council at its twenty-third session that it had appointed a committee to examine the problems of closer integration of the educational systems of all races in the Territory.
4. The report^{1/} of this Committee was issued shortly before the Mission arrived in the Territory. Perhaps the most important of its twenty-six recommendations to create a new educational system was that any child should be eligible for admission to any Government-supported school in the Territory, provided that he should be able to maintain his place in the school, and provided that in the case of a primary school priority in admission should be given to the children of the community for whom the school was established. Admission to secondary education would be on the basis of a competitive examination applicable to all candidates irrespective of race. The Committee also recommended that the new system be implemented by 1 January 1962.
5. The Tanganyika Government, in a note printed inside the cover of the report, observed that, although it had generally accepted the conclusions reached by the Committee, there were a number of unresolved major issues arising from the recommendations, not the least those of finance. The Government had, therefore, established a working party to examine those issues which would enable it to formulate proposals.

^{1/} Tanganyika: Report of the Committee on Integration of Education, 1959, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1960.

These proposals would then be set out in a Government Paper to be introduced into the Legislative Council as soon as might be practicable.

6. The cost per pupil of the various systems has varied widely. The extra expenses of running the non-indigenous schools have been met in part by a Non-Native Education Tax levied on all male adults of the non-indigenous communities and also by substantial school fees. An appreciable contribution from the general revenues of the Territory for the support of these schools and for capital works has also been required.

7. The estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1959 to 1960 show that there were £79,800 in the European Education Fund on 30 June 1959 and that estimated expenditure on European education for 1959 to 1960 would amount to £392,753 plus £9,933 on capital works and grants. Revenue, in addition to the balance in the Fund, would be derived from the Non-Native Education Tax (£105,000), school fees and staff boarding charges (£84,563); a contribution from general revenue (£215,491) and a capital loan (£9,933). The balance in the Indian Education Fund stood at £116,760 and estimated expenditure for the forthcoming year amounted £541,631, plus £90,109 on capital works and grants, revenue to be derived from the Non-Native education tax (£175,000), school fees (£82,055), a contribution from general revenue (£218,612) and a government capital loan (£90,109). The other non-African education fund stood at £25,572, while estimated expenditure amounted to £27,580, plus £5,000 for capital works, revenue to be derived from the Non-Native education tax (£15,000), a contribution from general revenue (£5,897) and a government capital loan (£5,000).

8. Financial implications, both as regards direct expenditure by the Education Department and grants-in-aid to Native Authorities and the voluntary agencies, were formulated in great detail in the original Ten-Year Plan for African Education, 1947-1956, and its successor, the Five-Year Plan, 1957-1961. It was estimated that the total recurrent Central Government expenditure on African education would increase from £2.1 million in 1956 to £3.6 million in 1961 while a total of £3 million on capital expenditure might be expected to occur over the years 1957-1961. In presenting the Five-Year Plan to the Legislative Council, the Government maintained that the funds to ensure its implementation within the stated

period were not assured and the Plan was accordingly endorsed by the Legislature as a guide for a policy within the availability of development funds. The fiscal situation of Tanganyika has in fact proved even less buoyant than was envisaged in 1956 and it was made clear that the implementation of the Plan would have to be extended over an additional two or three years. Indeed the Mission was informed that the financial difficulties experienced in 1959 had imposed a standstill on the Five-Year Plan except for the starting of Higher School Certificate work in three boys' schools and one girls' school, limited expansion of boys' middle school education and primary education facilities in urban areas and the introduction of single sessions in existing rural primary schools.

9. For the actual calendar year 1959, which does not of course coincide with the financial year, total recurrent expenditure from central government funds on African education amounted to £2,775,000, while capital expenditure was £578,000. (The corresponding figures in 1958 were £2,540,000 and £618,000 respectively). In addition, the Native Authorities which are expected to contribute according to their resources towards the cost of all primary, boys' middle and coeducational middle education conducted in their respective areas provided £563,000 for recurrent and £197,000 for capital expenditures. Thus expenditure on African education from all public sources amounted to £4,113,000, compared with £4,002,000 in 1958. In addition voluntary agencies through subsidization from public funds in respect of the greater part of their educational expenditures contributed from their own resources £566,000 in 1959.

10. The Mission was informed by the Minister of Education and Labour that the expenditure in 1959 for education was about 14 per cent of the budget.

11. In a statement to the Press, the Minister of Finance has recently indicated that the budget estimates of recurrent expenditure for African education would increase in the new fiscal year (1960-1961) by £128,391 over the previous year's expenditure. This includes £51,966 for the provision of an additional 26 education officers and 187 teachers.

12. The Committee on Integration of Education recommended that, provided that they are managed and run efficiently, all Government-aided schools should be aided on a budget basis, that is, by the provision of a grant to cover the shortfall between approved expenditure and approved income.

13. At present no tuition fees are paid in African primary, middle or secondary schools. At primary schools a fee of 10/- shillings has been laid down in respect of equipment and materials in accordance with the policy laid down in paragraph 138 of the Five-Year Plan for African Education 1957-1961. In necessitous cases, this may be remitted, provided that it does not exceed 20 per cent of the total fee revenue of any school. In the case of girls' middle schools, it is realized that a greater incentive is required and a 60 per cent remission of fees may be granted. Fees levied in European, Indian and other non-Native schools vary considerably.

14. No tuition fees are required in African middle and secondary schools, but a boarding fee is levied as follows:

	<u>£ per annum</u>
<u>Middle</u>	
Boys' boarding ^{1/}	12. 10. 0
Girls' boarding ^{1/}	6. 13. 0
Boys' day ^{2/}	5. 0. 0
Girls' day ^{2/}	3. 0. 0
<u>Secondary</u>	
Government	15. 0. 0

^{1/} The boys fees vary from district to district, and the girls' fees from agency to agency.

^{2/} Fees at day schools are for mid-day meals.

15. While the reasons for the imposition of school fees in the existing circumstances in Tanganyika are understandable, their existence and the limitations imposed on their remission are one of the reasons for the fact that there are some 100,000 vacant places in African primary schools and 5,000 vacant places in middle schools, a fact which was noted with concern by the Trusteeship Council at its twenty-third session. Nevertheless in some areas where school fees have been replaced by a contribution from the local tax empty places continue to exist in primary schools.

16. The Committee on Integration of Education has, however, recommended that no tuition fees should be charged in Swahili language (African) primary schools and that for a period of five years following the introduction of the integrated system tuition fees should be charged at other primary schools on the same basis as at present, remissions of fees being made in necessitous cases, and that the position should be reviewed towards the end of the five-year period.

17. In the field of secondary education, the Committee recommended that a tuition fee of approximately 25 per cent of the annual tuition cost per pupil be charged in all schools, and that scholarships or bursaries should be made available to ensure that no child who qualifies is unable to proceed to secondary education on the grounds that his parents are unable to afford the tuition fee.

18. The Committee on Integration of Education also recommended that, within the limits of funds available, all future development, including that provided for in existing plans and proposals, should be so planned as to provide, either by extensions to existing schools or by the building of new schools, for the future education structure of a primary course of eight years, a secondary course of four years and a gradual extension of Higher School Certificate courses.

19. The Committee further noted that in a number of small townships and Minor Settlements, a multiplicity of small Indian community primary schools existed, each with pupils of wide age range and often being taught by one teacher. This it stated, was economically and educationally unsound and it consequently recommended that an examination should be made of the educational facilities available in these areas with a view to combining small schools, and that Government aid should be conditional upon such an arrangement being made.

Development of African education

20. A very small proportion of schools are directly maintained by the Government (mainly urban, primary and middle schools as well as a larger proportion of secondary schools). Nearly a third of the primary and middle schools are operated by Native Authorities, which receive, as is explained above, grants from the Central Government for the greater part of their capital and recurrent expenditure. Over two-thirds of primary and middle schools and more than half the African secondary schools in the Territory are run by voluntary agencies, predominantly Christian missions. Here again, Government aid has provided the greater part of the funds for the construction and maintenance of schools. There are, however, a few unaided schools run by missions and others.

21. While almost all non-African children receive an education, which usually covers a six-year primary course and at least part of a six-year secondary course, primary school places are available for approximately only 44 per cent of African children^{1/} of primary school age. Eighteen per cent of the children who completed the African primary course in 1958 entered middle schools in 1959 and 33 per cent who completed the middle school course entered secondary academic or trade schools. It has been pointed out that if the present student population in standard I is taken as the base, only one in 67 pupils can expect to enter a secondary school and only one in 625 can expect to complete a full educational course.

22. Vigorous efforts have been made over the Trusteeship period to expand facilities for African education at all levels. However, the Five-Year Plan to cover expansion of African education over the years 1957-1961 envisaged only a modest expansion in primary education from 329,832 in 1956 to an estimated total of 402,000 by 1961. The Plan suggested instead that a considerable part of the additional primary school teachers to be trained by that time should be allocated to existing schools so as to eliminate the double sessions in standards III and IV and to enable the teaching of simple English in those

^{1/} The 1957 census figures for the number of African children from 0 to 16 years of age was 3,840,248.

standards. The enrolment on 1 November 1959 had reached 375,008, representing a slight increase over the previous year, but the new enrolment in standard I had remained almost static. In fact, the supply of primary education seems to have outstripped the demand in some areas. No doubt the existence of school fees discourages some parents from sending children to school.

23. It was proposed that the enrolment in middle schools should be increased from 32,845 in 1956 to nearly 57,000 by 1961 thus enabling a greater percentage of those finishing primary school to enjoy a further four years of education. An important feature of the Plan was that a much larger proportion of future middle schools were to be day-schools, thus eliminating boarding fees which had proved an obstacle to the extension of enrolment in the past and facilitating the ultimate aim of a primary-middle course of eight years for all. The number of pupils in the middle standards (V to VIII) increased from 35,000 in 1958 to 39,871 in 1959.

24. As has been previously pointed out by the Administering Authority and visiting missions, a critical situation exists as long as there is not a sufficient number of middle schools to absorb the number of children successfully completing standard IV. The child normally lives in an educationally low environmental level and he is taught mainly in Swahili, the lingua franca. Thus he is not assured a sufficient knowledge of reading and writing and does not receive a general education sufficient to enable him to continue his education alone. As a matter of fact, as was stated by the Minister of Education to the Mission, many who leave school at standard IV relapse into illiteracy. A study of this question is being undertaken with funds provided by the Ford Foundation.

25. On this matter, the Committee on Integration of Education, in its report, stated that it was clearly necessary that the lengths of the primary and secondary courses, which in the existing racial education varied, should be uniform in all schools. The new system should provide for a primary school course, the completion of which would enable a child who does not proceed to further education or

training to take his place as a useful member of the community. Having regard to these considerations, the Committee concluded that the most a Government and Government-aided system could hope to plan to provide in the foreseeable future for all the children of the Territory was a primary school course of eight years, and this is recommended as the ultimate length of the primary course. But the Committee was of the opinion that this would not be possible of fulfilment for many years to come in the case of all African children. Indeed in terms of the present budgetary situation of the Territory, the financial implications of such a course are enormous.

26. The Committee on Integration also recommended that a common syllabus covering the basic subjects of the curriculum should be introduced in all primary schools, with the reservation that the use of a language other than English as the medium of instruction in the lower classes of a primary school would involve some modification in those classes.

27. Major emphasis was given in the revised Five-Year Plan to the expansion of secondary education. The proposed target figures were 5,030 boys and 725 girls by 1961. A somewhat greater range of subjects would be taught and in addition two new standards referred to as Forms V and VI were to be created beyond the existing standard XII to enable Africans wishing to receive higher education to take the Higher School Certificate Course in Tanganyika rather than preliminary courses at Makerere College. The number of pupils in secondary schools increased in 1959 from 3,500 to 4,132. More than three-quarters of that total are in the two lowest standards (IX and X). The need to provide facilities for a greater proportion of pupils to complete at least a four-year secondary course is recognized.

28. The education of African girls still remains a serious problem in the Territory and the disproportion between the numbers of boys and girls in school becomes greater at each progressive level of education. The percentage of girls to boys was only 40 per cent in primary education, 20 per cent in middle schools and less than 10 per cent in secondary schools. In 1959, the number of students in the

highest class - Form V - was 88 boys and 4 girls.

29. In the field of secondary education, the Committee on Integration recommended that admission to all such schools should be by competitive examination; that selection to higher secondary education courses should be made on the basis of the results obtained by a pupil in the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination and on his general school record; that the secondary school examination should be set territorially and marked regionally, and that selections for secondary education should be made regionally.

Advanced studies

30. Pending the construction of a projected University College within the Territory, Africans, as well as Europeans and Asians, must go outside Tanganyika to pursue higher studies. In the case of Africans, the majority enter Makerere College, Uganda, to which the Government of Tanganyika contributes. Others go to study at the Royal Technical College and the Teacher Training College, both in Nairobi, while the remainder go overseas.

31. The Mission assured that no qualified student was prevented from obtaining a higher education because of lack of means. Funds are available in the Government Bursaries Fund for the payment of bursaries to suitably qualified students who wish to proceed overseas for post-secondary education. Fees and allowances of students at Makerere and the Royal Technical College are also paid from this Fund, which derives its income partly from grants made by the Tanganyika Higher Education Trust Fund Board and partly from contributions by Government. Students are not normally given bursaries to colleges overseas if the courses they wish to study are available in East Africa. In 1959, there were 196 Tanganyika students at Makerere as compared with 216 in 1958, but 92 African pupils, who in former years would have been considered for entry to preliminary courses at Makerere, were admitted to Higher School Certificate courses in four secondary schools in Tanganyika.

32. In 1959, fifty Tanganyika students were receiving bursaries from the Tanganyika Government, of whom twenty-four were African, twenty

Asian and six European. Expenditure for 1959 is not yet known but the expenditure in the previous year, when approximately half these numbers of students received awards in approximately the same ratios, was divided equally between African bursaries and those for other races, amounting to over £10,000. Not all students overseas can be said to be pursuing courses in Higher Education but bursaries are normally confined to Higher Education. The Tanganyika Government also assisted five men and two women to obtain teacher training qualifications in the United Kingdom during 1959. The number of Tanganyika students at institutions overseas as at 31 December 1959 were as follows:

Africans in the United Kingdom or Ireland	91
Asians " "	357
Europeans " "	60
Europeans in other countries	4
Asians in India or Pakistan ^{1/}	9
Africans " "	36
Asians in the United States of America	5
Africans " "	29
Africans in Ethiopia	21
Africans in Liberia	9
Africans in Ghana	2
Africans in Australia	3
Total	626 ^{2/}

33. It has long been a concern of the Trusteeship Council that a University College should be established in Tanganyika at the earliest appropriate time. Since 1956, there has existed a Trust Fund for this purpose, the original assets of which were derived from a share of the proceeds of the disposal of ex-enemy property. With some private contributions and despite the fact that two thirds of the interest is used for scholarships and bursaries, the fund amounted to £470,000 on 30 June 1959.

34. The question of the creation of a new institution in Tanganyika and the scope and timing of its establishment was within the terms of reference of a Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, which visited Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in July-August 1958. Because of

^{1/} There are many more private students about whom no details are available.

^{2/} This total was made up of:
191 Africans (including 40 Government servants in training),
371 Asians (including 4 Government servants in training), and
64 Europeans.

the greater development of secondary education in Kenya and the existence, particularly among the Asian section of the population, of a pressing demand for opportunities of university education in Kenya itself, the Working Party considered that the next major step in the development of higher education in East Africa should be the transformation of the Royal Technical College in Nairobi into a University College providing general degree courses in arts and sciences, in addition, to higher technological and professional training.

35. The Working Party felt that provided that educational conditions in Tanganyika developed satisfactorily, the necessary preparatory measures should be taken to make practicable the opening of a university college in Tanganyika in 1965/66 or as soon thereafter as possible. It felt that the exact opening date should be related to the time when an adequate flow of students possessing a Higher School Certificate was assured, thus freeing the college from the comparative handicap of conducting preliminary courses. In addition to basic courses in the Arts and Sciences, the new College might have a Faculty of Law (including Islamic Law) and possibly a School of Agriculture. The Working Party recommended that a site near Morogoro should be set aside for the future college. Another site has also been offered by the Arusha Town Council.

36. The Working Party also recommended that a University of East Africa should be established by 1966 as a degree-giving body co-ordinating the activities of the three constituent colleges.

37. This report is still under consideration by the Governments concerned. Educational officials point out that the output of students from Tanganyika secondary schools could be absorbed for several years to come by existing institutions of higher education, while agreeing that advance planning for the new College in Tanganyika should be begun. African politicians naturally regard the establishment of a University in Tanganyika in the near future as the educational counterpart of political independence, but are conscious that such a project would be expensive and beyond the capacity of the country to meet from its own resources.

Technical and vocational training

38. There are two trade schools and one technical institute in the Territory, built and equipped largely from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The trade schools provide three years' full-time training in skills associated with building and engineering immediately following satisfactory completion of eight years general education. This three years of trade training is part of a five-year apprenticeship scheme, the remaining two years of which are spent in indentured apprenticeship within industry. Each school can accommodate 600 pupils. At the end of 1959, 238 pupils left the schools to enter their indentured apprenticeship; of these 65 were engineers and 173 builders. The scheme has, according to the Administering Authority, proved to be very successful: 111 apprentices completed their training during the year, bringing the total of Certificates of Apprenticeship issued to 425. It is to be regretted that student strikes among the first and second-year pupils at the Trade Schools during 1959 resulted in the expulsion of a large number of students.

39. The Technical Institute at Dar es Salaam is being constructed in a number of phases but in such a way that classes can be held as soon as a particular phase is completed. Classes were begun in 1958 in commercial and clerical subjects. One hundred and twelve students of both sexes and all races, attended a fulltime course throughout 1959, while 109 students attended full-time short intensive training courses. Part-time evening classes were conducted for two terms: 733 students of both sexes and all races enrolled for the first session, while the number enrolling for the second session was 866. Phases II and III, consisting of science laboratories, workshops and hostels, are still under construction. The Ford Foundation is making a substantial contribution to enable the Institute to undertake a full course of technical secondary education.

40. The College of Commerce, at Moshi, sponsored by the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, had 42 full-time and 100 part-time day students in attendance during the year, but is operating much below capacity. Part-time evening classes were also run to meet the needs of office workers.

41. Additional facilities for training are also provided by various Government Departments, the East African Railways and Harbours Administration and Posts and Telecommunications Administration. The Natural Resources School at Tengeru, catering to students who intend to take up employment in the Agricultural, Veterinary and Forest Departments, graduated 97 students in 1959. A full list of pre-service training courses, issued in the Annual Report of the Public Service Commission, indicated that more than 1,900 students passed out of these courses during 1959.

42. The Committee on Integration has recommended that high priority be given to the introduction of part-time classes in all townships to provide opportunities for further academic, technical and vocational education.

Teacher Training

43. During 1959 some 180 men and women qualified for the Grade I Certificate. In addition, there are four Moslem men in Zanzibar undergoing training. Some 500 men and women qualified for the Grade II Certificate. The increase in the number of Grade I teachers and the decrease in the numbers in the Grade II category is a result of the policy of improving quality. In addition to teachers from local training centres, there are those who qualify for entrance to Makerere College on a Government bursary covering the courses leading to the Makerere Diploma in Education. Provision is made for selected students to be granted scholarships for further study and training overseas. In March 1959, a teacher training college for Asian men and women was opened in Dar es Salaam with twenty-five students. The course will extend over two years. There will be a further intake of twenty-five in March 1960.

44. The Committee on Integration has recommended that the teacher training colleges in the Territory should admit students of any race and that a Unified Teaching Service membership of which would be extended to all locally appointed teachers, whether employed by the Government or other agencies, be established as soon as possible. The matter was under investigation at the time of the Mission's visit.

Moslem education

45. The report of the Conference on Moslem Education, held at Dar es Salaam in November 1958, was published early in 1959. As a result of one of the main recommendations made in this report, a working party met in 1959 to consider the establishment in Zanzibar of a Moslem Institute for the teaching of religion, history and Arabic to Moslem students from East Africa and Nyasaland. The report of the working party is now under consideration by the East African Governments.

46. In this connexion, the Mission met with a number of petitioners who requested additional schools for the Moslems in the Territory, staffed by qualified Moslem teachers, who must in the first instance be recruited from abroad. Educational officials expressed the view that there was scope within the existing educational system for Moslem students and noted that ample time was set aside during the school week for religious education. One of the difficulties was that the African Moslem community possessed few members with an education fitting them to manage schools or to give religious instruction to pupils of their community. This fact emphasizes the desirability of establishing a Moslem Institute and of including Islamic studies as one of the faculties of the future University College of Tanganyika. In the meantime the recruitment of a number of qualified Moslem teachers from abroad would help to remove a sense of frustration felt by some Tanganyika Moslems.

Future priorities

47. The Mission has in the foregoing sections set out, what it hopes is an accurate summary of achievements and plans in the field of education. It has made little detailed criticism because it is conscious of the sincerity and devotion of those active in this field and of the serious limitations which the financial circumstances of the Territory have placed on their work. It is also aware that all aspects of educational policy in Tanganyika are undergoing reappraisal. The Mission wishes to pay tribute in this respect to the work of the Committee on Integration of Education; the general principles recommended by it will it is confident be implemented in the near future.

48. The necessity for an additional effort in education is recognized on all sides and the Mission is pleased to note that Sir Ernest Vasey in his new budget has made an appreciable increase in the funds set aside for educational purposes. Even so, these funds do not enable all levels of education to be developed in a balanced manner.

49. It may be argued with cogency that too large a proportion of the Territory's limited educational resources was devoted in the past to extending the four-year course of Primary Education, which by itself did not make an immediate contribution to the development of Tanganyika or to the supply of the trained personnel which it needs. It is now recognized that any further major advance at this level must come from the resources of local authorities, strained though these are already. Political leaders will doubtless play a major role in stimulating popular support for local primary and middle schools. Schemes of mass education of which an interesting example has just been carried out in the Singida District as part of a Community Development Scheme, may also prove an effective yet inexpensive way of spreading literacy in rural areas.

50. The Mission noted amongst both officials and political leaders a realization that the main priority in the next few years must be in secondary education. In view of the urgent need for educated Tanganyikans capable of playing major roles in political life, in the civil service, in economic activities and it must be added in education itself, the Mission heartily endorses this view. The Mission was informed that the expansion of facilities for secondary education was expensive; moreover, it would be necessary to recruit additional teachers from abroad, a matter which had proved to be difficult in the immediate past. Nevertheless, the immediate intentions of the Government included the extension of courses at a number of secondary schools from Standard X to Standard XII and an increased number of streams for Higher School Certificate Courses.

51. The Mission notes these intentions with satisfaction. It nevertheless wishes to observe that the increase possible within the present financial provisions can make only a modest impression on this problem.

It notes that the Administering Authority has been making some contribution to the expansion which is taking place through Colonial Development and Welfare Grants. It believes, however, that a major intensification of effort over the period up to independence and for a few years thereafter is urgently called for. In fact some sort of "crash programme" is called for in this field if present difficulties are to be overcome within a reasonable period. The Mission believes that there are few ways in which the Administering Authority could make a more valuable contribution to the future stability and progress of Tanganyika than by co-operating with the responsible Tanganyikan Government in the planning of such a programme and assisting its implementation both financially and technically. A comprehensive plan of this sort should, in the Mission's view, have as its main object the rapid expansion and improvement of facilities for secondary education, while providing for some expansion and improvement of the middle schools system from which secondary school students will be drawn. Improvements in technical and vocational education and in teacher training are also required.

52. The Mission also noted in Tanganyika a keen desire for the establishment of a university college. While this cannot have at this very moment the priority that an expansion of secondary education should have, the Mission believes that it will become a political and educational necessity well before the date of 1965/66 suggested by the experts. There will obviously be great difficulty in providing capital costs for an investment which will bear fruit only over a long period of years. International grants may well be forthcoming and there is a small trust fund already in existence. The Mission is confident that private philanthropic foundations will regard such a project as worthy of substantial support.

VI. ATTAINMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE

1. All the evidence which the Mission has presented in this report clearly indicates that Tanganyika is progressing smoothly and rapidly towards the ultimate goal of the International Trusteeship System and that the problems which remain are very largely of a technical and financial nature. The constitutional advances which have occurred since the visit of the previous Mission have far exceeded expectations, and with the institution of responsible government towards the end of 1960 the Territory will in fact have entered the final stages before independence.

2. As the Mission has already shown, the Territory's progress will depend to some extent upon the successful solution of two major problems: (1) The provision of a competent corps of officials in sufficient numbers to provide for the growing needs of the Territory, and (2) the provision of sufficient financial and technical assistance to permit an independent Tanganyikan Government to continue and expand essential services such as education and to maintain a satisfactory rate of economic development. Solution of the first problem lies partly in increased efforts to train local officials and partly in the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements to assure a continued supply of overseas personnel until such time as all positions can be filled locally. Solution of the second problem depends mainly upon the co-operation of the Administering Authority and of the international community. Neither of these problems need of themselves prevent the emergence of the Territory from trusteeship status, but it is clearly desirable that satisfactory solutions should be found.

3. The constitutional changes which will take place towards the end of 1960 will effectively transfer the main responsibility for the conduct of the Territory's affairs into the hands of a government composed predominantly of elected Ministers. This will not, however, constitute the final stage of constitutional development before self-government or

independence. That stage will be reached when the Governor and the official members of the Council of Ministers retire from its deliberations and there is a Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet. Apart from this, there are a number of other constitutional matters which it would be desirable to settle as quickly as possible. For example, a constitution and a citizenship law will have to be drafted and arrangements will have to be made to complete the organization of its own civil service. The Mission is confident that the new Government of Tanganyika will give these matters urgent consideration.

4. As the Mission has already recorded, TANU in the memorandum which it presented to the Mission, requested that the forthcoming general election should be considered as a plebiscite for independence. One of the main reasons given was that the whole country was united and peaceful and was demanding immediate independence.^{1/} In discussions which the Mission held with leaders of TANU, Mr. Nyerere explained that it was the intention of TANU to seek from the people at the September elections a mandate to ask for independence without further elections. If victorious at the polls, TANU would then feel free to implement this policy in the way it considered best. One possibility might be the adoption by the Legislative Council of an appropriate resolution requesting the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary steps to terminate Trusteeship over Tanganyika.

5. The Mission gained the impression that one of the main aims of TANU in presenting the memorandum was to ensure that the restricted franchise at the next elections should not be a barrier to the attainment of independence by Tanganyika during the life of the Legislative Council resulting therefrom. The Mission notes that in its memorandum TANU stated: "We have welcomed the findings of the Ramage Committee and, in principle, the recommendations of the Administering Authority on the Ramage report. Nevertheless, we strongly feel that universal suffrage should have been granted." The Mission was assured that TANU, if victorious at the elections, would propose that universal adult suffrage should be introduced.

^{1/} The full text of this memorandum is annexed to the present report.

6. In the course of the discussions in London, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that he was anxious that Tanganyika should remain a showpiece among territories developing towards independence. Each territory's problems were different and each had to advance at its own pace. He could assure the Mission that Tanganyika would not be held back because of possible repercussions in other territories. He believed that the way forward for Tanganyika in the immediate future was to put into effect the constitutional decisions which had just been taken, and after the elections to be held in September, to study, in consultation with the elected leaders, what the next steps should be.

7. The Mission is convinced that these statements will be warmly welcomed by the Trusteeship Council. In the light of these assurances, the Administering Authority may be expected to receive with sympathy any motion concerning the termination of Trusteeship which may be submitted by the Legislative Council of Tanganyika and to work out, in consultation with the elected representatives of the people, the necessary steps to achieve that goal.

Mason Sears
P.K. Edmonds
Miguel Solano Lopez
Omar Loutfi

(Signed) MASON SEARS (United States of America) - Chairman

(Signed) P.K. EDMONDS (New Zealand)

(Signed) MIGUEL SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay)

(Signed) OMAR LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)

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**United Nations Visiting Mission
to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960**

REPORT ON RUANDA-URUNDI

**TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTION
OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL**

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

(14 April – 30 June 1960)

SUPPLEMENT No. 3

NEW YORK

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REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960, ON RUANDA-URUNDI (T/1538)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL DATED 2 JUNE 1960 FROM THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE VISITING MISSION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 2009 (XXV) of 4 February 1960 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Ruanda-Urundi.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to the members of the Trusteeship Council as soon as possible, and have it generally released on 13 June 1960.

(Signed) Mason SEARS

*Chairman, United Nations Visiting Mission
to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960*

INTRODUCTION

I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MISSION

1. The arrangements for the dispatch of a Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa were made by the Trusteeship Council during its twenty-fifth session.

2. At its 1048th meeting, on 4 February 1960, the Council decided that the Mission should be composed of the following persons: Mr. Mason Sears (United States of America), Chairman; Mr. Paul K. Edmonds (New Zealand); Mr. Miguel Solano López (Paraguay); Mr. Omar Loutfi (United Arab Republic).

3. At the same meeting, the Council adopted resolution 2009 (XXV) setting forth the terms of reference of the Mission. By that resolution, the Council, having decided that the Mission should visit the Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika in that order and that the duration of its visit should be approximately two months, directed the Mission:

(a) To investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in the above-mentioned Trust Territories towards the realization of the objectives set forth in Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account the terms of General Assembly resolution 321 (IV) of 15 November 1949 and other relevant Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 1412 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the preparation and training of indigenous civil cadres in the Trust Territories, 1413 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories and 1419 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on plans for political reform for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;

(b) To give attention, as may be appropriate in the

light of discussions in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly and of resolutions adopted by them, to issues raised in connexion with the annual reports of the administration of the Trust Territories concerned, in petitions received by the Council relating to these Territories, in the reports of the previous periodic visiting missions to these Territories and in the observations of the Administering Authorities on these reports;

(c) To make a special investigation of the conditions and causes of the recent disturbances in Ruanda-Urundi;

(d) To receive petitions and to investigate on the spot, in consultation with the local representative of the Administering Authority concerned, such of the petitions received as, in its opinion, warrant special investigation;

(e) To submit to the Council, in time for consideration by it at its twenty-sixth session, a report on each of the Territories visited containing its findings, with such observations, conclusions and recommendations as it may wish to make.

4. The Mission visited Ruanda-Urundi from 2 March to 1 April 1960. Before and after the visit it made brief stops at Brussels where it had discussions with representatives of the Belgian Government. A more detailed account of its trip is presented in section II. During its trip the Mission was accompanied by the following Secretariat members: Mr. Jacques Rapoport (Principal Secretary); Mr. F. T. Liu (Assistant Secretary); Mr. Guy de Warlincourt (Administrative Officer); Miss Monique de Gravelaine (Interpreter) and Miss Denise Wyns (Stenographer).

5. While in the Territory, the Mission received a

very warm welcome from the Trusteeship and customary authorities, as well as from the population and its political leaders. Because of lack of space, the Mission cannot name here all the many persons who extended their hospitality to it or who helped it in one way or another to fulfil its task. It would like, however, to express its special gratitude to Mr. J. P. Harroy, Resident-General of Ruanda-Urundi, Colonel G. Logiest, Special Resident of Ruanda, Mr. I. Reisdorff, Resident of Urundi, Mwami Kigeli V of Ruanda and Mwami Mwambutsa of Urundi for their generous hospitality. It wishes also to acknowledge the valuable assistance furnished by the two liaison officers of the Administration, Mr. Henri Guillaume and Mr. Paul Lannoy, as well as the members of the provisional special council of Ruanda who accompanied the Mission throughout its tour of that State.

6. Lastly, the Mission cannot fail to mention the cordial co-operation which marked its relations with the representatives of the Administering Authority and particularly with Mr. A. De Schrijver, Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Mr. Raymond Scheyven, Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and Mr. Harroy, the Resident-General. At this critical time in the history of Ruanda-Urundi, the Mission was deeply thankful for having encountered so many persons of good will who desired to co-operate with the United Nations in assisting the Territory. If there were differences of opinion on problems affecting the Territory's future, the members of the Mission and the representatives of the Administering Authority always talked them over with the greatest candour and tried to find a satisfactory solution in a spirit of mutual understanding.

7. In view of the special circumstances of the Territory, the Mission considered that it should not only gather information and prepare a report, but also try to bring together the Administration and the representatives of the people and help them, if not to find immediate solutions to the Territory's serious difficulties, at least to work out generally acceptable procedures for a constructive discussion of these problems.

8. Before concluding this introduction, the Mission wishes to express one regret. In view of the gravity of the situation in Ruanda-Urundi, of the complexity of the problems faced by the Territory and also of the wealth of documentation which the Mission gathered there, it would have liked to have had more time at its disposal to prepare its report. Unfortunately this was not possible. The Mission was obliged to give rather broad treatment to certain very intricate problems and to spend little time on a number of questions which in other circumstances would have been given wider coverage in the report.

II. ACCOUNT OF THE MISSION'S TRIP

9. On its stay to Ruanda-Urundi, the Mission stopped briefly at Brussels on 29 February and 1 March 1960 in order to have a first meeting with the represen-

tatives of the Administering Authority. It discussed with Mr. De Schrijver and Mr. Scheyven, and their associates, a variety of problems related to the disturbances of November 1959, the future of the Territory and the arrangements for the Mission's forthcoming visit. It also had talks with the three members of the Commission of Inquiry who had shortly before submitted their report on the November disturbances to the Belgian Government, and it spoke with representatives of students from Ruanda-Urundi in Belgium.

10. On 1 March the Mission left for Usumbura, where it arrived on the following day. It was to remain there until 8 March. From its arrival at the Usumbura airport, the Mission realized that its visit to the Territory was unlikely to proceed in a calm atmosphere. A military camp with olive-coloured tents for Belgian paratroopers had been erected at the airport and a number of Congolese gendarmes stood guard before the hotel where the Mission was to stay. Both at the airport and in front of the hotel the Mission was met by large and boisterous crowds of demonstrators carrying banners and placards bearing the words "Uhuru" and "Immediate independence", slogans of the Urundi political parties of UNARU and UPRONA.¹ During the Mission's stay at Usumbura, Africans streamed to the hotel to speak to the Mission on behalf of political parties or as individuals, to submit documents or to request a hearing.

11. On 3 March, in honour of the Mission's arrival, the Resident-General delivered to the Mission and a large audience an important address in which, after enumerating the principal developments introduced in the Territory since the last Visiting Mission in 1957, he surveyed the political situation in the Territory, particularly in Ruanda because of the recent disturbances there, and made some comments on the reforms recently projected for the Territory. He also arranged a working meeting at which senior officials of the Administration informed the Mission about their departments' achievements and problems.

12. The Mission had learned before its arrival in the Territory that, in the face of the growing tension, the Administration had called in a battalion of paratroopers from the Belgian Congo to assist local forces in maintaining order and protecting the Mission. While recognizing that it was part of the Administration's functions to take the necessary measures to ensure order in the Territory, the Mission did not wish to be associated with the military precautions adopted: it did not feel that it needed protection and hoped that, without disregarding the needs for maintaining order, security measures might be reduced to a minimum. The Mission had several talks on this subject with the Resident-General and the Special Resident of Ruanda; these talks are described in paragraphs 259-261 of this report. The arrangements for the Mission's visit were also the subject of interviews with certain political lead-

¹ To simplify the account of the trip, political parties will be referred to by their abbreviations in this section. The abbreviations for Ruanda parties are explained in paragraph 266 and for Urundi parties in paragraph 364 of this report.

ers, following which the Mission altered a few particulars of its original programme to meet certain of their wishes.

13. While at Usumbura, the Mission spent a large part of its time hearing any person who wished to speak with it. It spoke with, among others, representatives of the UNARU party of Urundi and the UNAR party of Ruanda, and with many persons who had come on their own behalf, including Mr. Albert Maus, a member of the General Council, and Mr. Jamar, attorney for chief Mbanda who had recently been sentenced to death for the part he had played in the November disturbances. Owing to the large number of requests for hearings, the Mission was unable to spend as much time as it would have liked in surveying local economic and social projects. It was able, however, on 5 March, to visit construction sites of the new Usumbura-Bugarama road, as well as two villages and a model farm in the Ruzizi paysannat.

14. On 8 March, after issuing an appeal to the population of Ruanda to remain calm, the Mission left Usumbura by road for Astrida. Before reaching the Ruanda border it made two stops in order to visit the administrative centre of the Imbo-Mugamba chiefdom and the Butegana co-operative of coffee planters. The Mission was greeted at the co-operative by a crowd of some 3,000 persons waving placards and shouting political slogans. Most of the demonstrators were sympathizers of the PDC, which demanded "Democracy before independence", but there were also some elements of UPRONA, which called for "Immediate independence". In addition, several groups varying in size from about ten to several hundred persons stood waiting for the Mission along its route in order to demonstrate their support of one or the other of these two parties.

15. The boundary between Urundi and Ruanda in this region is marked by the Akanyaru river, a few kilometres north of Butegana. There, the Mission was stopped by a considerable crowd of some 10,000 people, many of whom carried banners and UNAR placards reading "Immediate independence" and "Long live Kigeli V", and who shouted slogans at the top of their voice. The Mission had some difficulty in persuading the crowd to stand back so that it could continue on its way. Before reaching Astrida, the Mission was stopped a few more times by similar but much smaller groups. Before this journey was over, the Mission had received several hundred leaflets and documents from demonstrators.

16. The security measures taken by the Administration along the Mission's route were very discreet. The approach to Astrida, however, was guarded by a considerable force which permitted only persons with official authorization to pass. The district administrator subsequently explained to the Mission that these measures were intended to prevent mass demonstrations in the vicinity, that anyone wishing to see the Mission could obtain a pass, and that in fact passes had already been issued to nearly 500 people. The large number of requests for hearings, which was to increase as time

went on, posed a difficult problem. The Mission wished to hear everyone, but had too little time to do so. It discussed this matter the same day with the Special Resident and the members of the provisional special council who were to accompany the Mission during its tour of Ruanda. It was possible, thanks to their co-operation, to resolve the problem in a satisfactory manner. Proceeding on the assumption that most of the indigenous inhabitants requesting hearings were members of, or sympathizers with, the principal political parties, the Mission requested the members of the provisional special council, who are the representatives of these parties, to organize them into groups and to ask each group to designate approximately ten representatives who would express the group's views to the Mission, it being understood that anyone who wished only to submit written documents could do so without any restriction.

17. This system was successfully inaugurated on the following day. In a very orderly fashion, each of the four principal parties designated a group of about ten representatives who presented to the Mission a detailed exposition of their party's views on the problems over which they were concerned. Apart from these representatives, the Mission had the time to hear a great many non-political persons and groups, among them the Anglican Bishop, the Right Reverend Percy James Brazier; the Abbé Alexis Kagame; Mr. M. d'Hertefelt, sociologist of the Institute for Scientific Research in Central Africa (IRSAC); Mr. P. Bourdeaux, Dean of the Faculty of Agronomy at the official University of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and several groups of students.

18. At Astrida, the Mission devoted almost all of its time to interviews. Whereas everything was orderly at the IRSAC buildings, which served as the Mission's temporary headquarters, the same was unfortunately not true for other parts of the region. The Mission subsequently learned, in fact, that there had been several incidents in the vicinity of the town during its stay. According to the report which the Mission received from the Administration, several groups of demonstrators had gathered in the course of 8 and 9 March and had made a stone-throwing attack against the police unit which had been sent to disperse them. The latter threw tear-gas bombs among the demonstrators, causing minor injuries to five of them.

19. On 11 March the Mission left for Nyanza. At the request of the APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU leaders, it made a detour to the Savé hill where it was greeted by a crowd of several thousand Hutu. The demonstrators carried APROSOMA banners and placards calling for democracy, reform of the land system, abolition of feudalism, the founding of a republic and the continuance of Trusteeship. A large number of letters and leaflets was also handed to the Mission.

20. Before reaching Nyanza, the Mission stopped briefly at Rubona to visit the INEAC station in the area. All along the road, large numbers of groups stood waiting for the Mission to demonstrate their political convictions. Some of them were APROSOMA suppor-

ters, but more of them, especially closer to Nyanza, sided with UNAR.

21. At Nyanza, the Mission was received by the *Mwami* and his retinue at the administrative centre of the State, where an immense throng estimated at nearly 40,000 persons had assembled and stood holding placards and banners reading "Long live Kigeli V", "Immediate independence", "General amnesty" and "Deliver us from the Belgians". The Mission attended a performance given by the famous dancers of the king. Later, while it was in private conversation with the *Mwami*, its secretariat received several hundred communications from demonstrators. A crowd of several tens of thousands of people in a state of political excitement had been standing in the sun for hours, which always constitutes a possible danger, and incidents had therefore been feared, but the demonstrators at Nyanza showed great self-discipline and everything proceeded in a calm atmosphere. The *Mwami* intervened personally several times to keep the crowd from blocking the way of the Mission's vehicles.

22. The Mission then conducted interviews by the method adopted at Astrida, which it used afterwards everywhere else. Apart from local representatives of the four major parties, the Mission heard a delegation of independents, two Brothers from the Collège du Christ-Roi and a group of ten prisoners brought under escort by the local police. After these interviews, the Mission left Nyanza for Gitarama. It was frequently met on the road by groups of demonstrators, supporting either UNAR or PARMEHUTU.

23. The entire day of 12 March was given over to interviews at Gitarama. The Mission first heard local delegations from the four major parties, following which it received a large number of persons, including the Protestant school group, a delegation of independents, four customary chiefs, two widows of victims of the November disturbances, two Catholic priests and one prisoner. Meanwhile, a crowd of several hundred people, some belonging to UNAR, the others to PARMEHUTU, had gathered in front of the Mission's headquarters. The members of the special council, whose assistance to the Mission was very valuable, separated the crowd into two groups according to their political sympathies and placed them on either side of the road.

24. On the morning of 13 March, the Mission went first to Kabgayi, where it spoke with the Archbishop of Kabgayi, Mgr. André Perraudin, and visited the mission hospital. It then set out for Kigali, the seat of the Ruanda Residency. All the way from Kabgayi to the Marangara chiefdom, a distance of six kilometres, a considerable crowd estimated at nearly 30,000 people had gathered on the roadside and greeted the Mission with PARMEHUTU slogans. Over the remaining distance, other less numerous groups also awaited the Mission, some of them supporting PARMEHUTU and others UNAR. On several occasions, the Mission's convoy was stopped by the groups, which threw letters and leaflets and even placards into the vehicles.

25. On arriving at Kigali the Mission learned that

two serious incidents had taken place on the road after it had passed. According to the report which the Mission received from the Administration, the first incident had occurred seventeen kilometres from Kigali. A detachment of gendarmes patrolling the road had been subjected to a stone-throwing attack by a group of some 300 very excited people who shouted: "You killed *Mwami* Mutara; we want to die for the *Mwami*". The detachment prepared to defend itself and ordered the crowd to disperse, but the demonstrators continued to advance and to assail the gendarmes with stones. Several tear-gas bombs were thrown into the crowd but produced no effect. After the final order to disperse, the head of the detachment ordered his men to use their weapons: two women were killed and four men wounded among the assailants, while several gendarmes were injured by stones. The second incident took place not far from the first, close to the village of Runda. The District Administrator of Gitarama with two members of his staff, on returning to Gitarama after having left the Mission's convoy, was attacked by a group of more than 500 people. To protect themselves, the Administrator and his companions were obliged to use their firearms. Eight people were wounded, and one of them later died. Some African political leaders gave different versions of these incidents. The Mission also learned that from 9 to 12 March, in a new outbreak of violence resembling that of November 1959, the Hutu population of some Biumba chiefdoms had set fire to approximately 1,100 Tutsi huts and nearly 700 Tutsi families had been forced to seek protection with the Administration or the religious missions or to take refuge in other regions.

26. The Mission immediately discussed these incidents with the Special Resident and afterwards decided unanimously that everything possible should be done to prevent a further outbreak of incidents. To that end, it decided to make a new appeal to the population forthwith (see annex III) and to call an emergency meeting for the following day at which not only all the members of the special council and the leaders of the main political parties of Ruanda would attend, but also the *Mwami*, the Special Resident and the Resident-General himself. At one o'clock in the morning it held a second interview with the Special Resident, who promised to co-operate in the implementation of the Mission's plan and to notify all the persons concerned without delay.

27. At 2.30 p.m., all the participants, including the Resident-General, assembled at the meeting place. In his opening statement, the chairman of the Mission stated that the Mission had learned of the recent incidents at Gitarama and Biumba with profound regret and it was convinced that order could not be maintained without the complete co-operation of all leaders and all political parties. He proposed that the political leaders immediately issue a joint *communiqué* renouncing the use of violence and calling on the people to remain calm and observe the law. The Resident-General and the *Mwami* spoke in support of the Mission's proposal which, after an animated but cordial discussion, was accepted by all the leaders present. A

text was drafted and signed by the chairmen of the four political parties and countersigned by the Resident-General, the Special Resident, the *Mwami*, the members of the special council and the chairman of the Mission [see annex IV]. It should be emphasized that this was the first time that a formal agreement of this sort had been reached between the leaders of the political parties, the *Mwami* and the Administration.

28. On the morning of 14 March the Mission held an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel E. Lamy, Presiding Judge of the Military Court, who told it of the Court's activity. It then heard a number of persons including two UNAR leaders who were being held in the town prison (Mr. François Rukeba and chief Hormisdas Mbanda), three Protestant missionaries of the Church Missionary Society and two Europeans (Mr. Olbrechts and Mr. Goossens).

29. On the following morning the Mission broke up into two groups. One of them visited Kibungu where it heard, apart from local representatives of the four political parties, a delegation from the cultivators' association, another from the stock-raisers' association, and Dr. Tenet, Director of the Medical and Scientific Centre of the Free University of Brussels in Central Africa (CEMUBAC) for Ruanda-Urundi. A crowd of nearly a thousand people carrying placards and banners of political parties had gathered in front of the offices which were to be used for the interviewing. Some of them declared their support of the Hutu parties, but the majority were UNAR supporters. In addition, along the road between Kigali and Kibungu, large numbers of groups stood waiting for the Mission to pass. These groups were clearly dominated by UNAR elements in the vicinity of Kibungu, but the followers of PARMEHUTU of APROSOMA became more and more numerous on nearing Kigali.

30. The second Mission group travelled, in the company of the *Mwami*, to Nyamata and visited the local refugee reception centre, where more than 5,000 Tutsi refugees from the Ruhengeri region had been established. There it heard representatives of the Tutsi refugees, who expressed their wish to be reintegrated in their former regions. The crowd of refugees, several of whom carried placards calling for immediate independence, gave the *Mwami* a warm welcome. On returning to Kigali, and after visiting the vocational school of the Salesian Brothers, the group resumed the interviews, which the Mission had had to interrupt the day before, and heard representatives of the four major parties as well as a UMAR delegation, a delegation of local Swahili, a delegation of Ruanda women and a number of individuals.

31. On 16 March the Mission left Kigali for Biumba. This visit, which was not originally scheduled, had been included at the last moment because of the recent incidents there. The *Mwami* had offered to accompany the Mission, but changed his plans on the suggestion of the Special Resident, who feared the occurrence of more incidents. Upon arrival, the Mission held an interview with the District Administrator, who told it of the recent disturbances and of the steps taken by

the Administration to aid the refugees. It then saw delegations of the PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR parties. In front of the temporary headquarters stood a crowd of several hundred people, most of whom were supporters of UNAR.

32. The Mission then set out for Ruhengeri. At Rulindo, it encountered an immense crowd of several thousand demonstrators all of whom belonged to PARMEHUTU and who demanded democracy and the continuance of Trusteeship. It had to make a brief halt there to hear an address by the local chief and to receive hundreds of letters and leaflets. Upon arrival at Ruhengeri, the Mission attended a gathering in front of its hotel of several dozen UNAR supporters who called for immediate independence, followed by another and larger gathering in which several hundred supporters of PARMEHUTU demonstrated in favour of democracy.

33. The next morning, the Mission met the local representatives of RADER and PARMEHUTU, a delegation of local Moslems who favoured the UNAR programme, a group of Hutu chiefs and several individuals including a priest who maintained that the *Mwami* Mutara had committed suicide. During the interviews, a crowd of over 2,000 persons had gathered in front of the offices of the Mission to demonstrate in support of PARMEHUTU. In the afternoon, the Mission went to Ntaruka, where it inspected the hydro-electric plant. There were numerous groups of PARMEHUTU supporters in front of the plant and along the road.

34. On 18 March, the Mission left for Nyundo and Kisenyi. On the road between Ruhengeri and Nyundo, the many demonstrators awaiting the Mission were nearly all PARMEHUTU sympathizers. But at Nyundo itself, a large crowd of several thousand, including a number of schoolchildren accompanied by European and African nuns, were voicing pro-UNAR sentiments and demanding independence, at the same time as other demonstrators were shouting anti-Tutsi slogans. The Mission was met by Mgr. Alois Bigirumwami, Bishop of Nyundo, with whom it had a long conversation before resuming the journey to Kisenyi. On the road there were a number of groups, mostly PARMEHUTU supporters.

35. To prevent the Kisenyi headquarters from being invaded by demonstrators, the approaches to the hotel where the Mission was staying were guarded by soldiers. During the afternoon of 18 March and the morning of the 19th, the Mission gave a number of interviews at Kisenyi and heard the representatives of PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR, as well as a delegation of Protestant ministers from the Church Missionary Society and several prominent Europeans.

36. On 20 March, a party from the Mission went by boat to Kibuye. There, it gave a hearing to two groups of prisoners of opposite political views, as well as to the PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR delegations. No crowd had gathered to demonstrate before the Mission. The Administrator informed the Mission that a number of persons had come from the interior to demonstrate but that, in order to avoid trouble, the

police had prevented them from entering the centre. After the hearings, the Mission returned by boat to Kisenyi.

37. The next morning, the Mission took the plane to Shangugu, the last stopping-place on its tour of Ruanda. The town of Shangugu, which borders on Bukavu, in the Belgian Congo, is somewhat detached from Ruanda politics. This district had remained untouched by the disturbances of November 1959, and the atmosphere was therefore less tense there than elsewhere. Nevertheless, in his interview with the Mission, the District Administrator said that the population had recently become far more agitated, that two huts had been set on fire four days earlier, that some twenty persons had stopped his car the day before and thrown stones at him, and that the current investigation had not so far yielded any clues as to the nature of the incidents. The Mission then gave a hearing to the representatives of APROSOMA, UNAR and MUR, to a delegation of the Union des intérêts communs and several individuals. After these hearings, the Mission left Shangugu in the afternoon by air for Kitega, the capital of Urundi.

38. The Mission arrived at Kitega in the afternoon of 21 March and stayed there until the morning of 26 March. On disembarking from the plane, it was met by a large crowd of UPRONA and UNARU supporters who were shouting and waving placards. Despite their fervour, the demonstrators were disciplined and no incident occurred. However, the Resident later informed the Mission that after the demonstration several groups of Swahili had tried to break into the administrative centre and had been held back by the police. There had been no casualties. In the evening, the Mission had a meeting with the Resident, the *Mwami*, the members of the interim committee and the senior officials of the Resident's Office.

39. The next day was devoted almost entirely to hearings. After hearing a statement by the Resident on conditions in the country, the Mission received delegations from the PDC, the PP and UNARU as well as several private persons. Representatives of the five-party congress of UPRONA, UNARU, the VPM, the DNB and the PDJTB also came to announce that the congress was working on a joint draft resolution and asked for a hearing for 25 March, which was granted.

40. On 23 March, the Mission separated into two groups. One group went to Mosso, via Rutana. Just outside Musasa, the group encountered a crowd of several hundred PDC demonstrators headed by chief Kigoma who read a speech advocating democracy. At Musasa, it heard a statement by the director of the INEAC station describing the achievements of the station and visited part of the *paysannat*. It then proceeded to Mwishanga, where it was met by chiefs Raphaël and Léon Ndenzako, who were surrounded by a crowd of several hundred persons, the majority of whom were demonstrating in support of UPRONA and demanding independence. In his address to the Mission, chief Raphaël Ndenzako thanked Belgium for the work it had done in Ruanda-Urundi and requested independence for the country at an early date.

41. The other group went to Ngozi by way of Karusi. On the way, at Karusi, it visited an experimental farm for large-scale stock-breeding and a station run by the research mission on water resources and witnessed several demonstrations—one at Bugenyazi, where several hundred persons headed by chief Bakereke were calling for independence, another at Mwimebero, organized by sub-chief Bisharu and very similar to the first, and another at Gisha at which chief Bigayimpunzi, surrounded by several hundred persons, was advocating the institution of a democratic government prior to independence and announcing his intention of forming a new party (which was to be established some days later as the PDR). On its arrival at Ngozi, the group, which had been joined by *Mwami* Mwambutsa, found several thousand persons, in two groups of about the same size, assembled outside of the district offices. The UPRONA group was calling for independence and the PDC group was demanding democracy. After having received representatives of UNARU, the Protestant mission and several individual petitioners, the Mission called on Mgr. Martin at the Ngozi bishopric, and on the Right Reverend Percy James Brazier, the Anglican bishop, at the mission of the Church Missionary Society.

42. In the morning of 24 March, the Mission held an important meeting at Kitega with the Resident-General who had come by plane from Usumbura to see it. This meeting, which was essential for the drafting of the Mission's conclusions, is described in paragraph 443 of this report. In the afternoon of the 24th, the Mission visited Mgr. A. Grauls, the Archbishop of Kitega, and had a private conversation with him.

43. The next morning, the Mission received three members of the interim committee of Urundi, the representatives of the congress of UPRONA, UNARU, DPM, DNB and PDJTB parties, a delegation of the Association des oeuvres sociales and a number of individuals. In the afternoon, it had a final interview with the Resident of Urundi and attended a reception given by the *Mwami* Mwambutsa, at which a group of chiefs and sub-chiefs presented it with a joint memorandum.

44. On 26 March, the Mission again divided into two groups. The first group went to Muranvya, where it gave a hearing to a UPRONA delegation and to five agricultural instructors and three farmers who were all sympathizers of that party. At the entrance to the building, a crowd of several hundred persons formed at the sides of the road to express support for the same party's views. After the hearings, the group proceeded to Usumbura.

45. The second group also went to Usumbura, but via Luvironza and Kisozi. At Luvironza, it visited the local zootechnical station and the rural development zones of the region. On the journey from Luvironza to Kisozi, it had to stop twice to witness rival demonstrations: the first in front of the hospital of the Matana Protestant mission where a crowd of several hundred people, including a large number of schoolchildren, were calling for immediate independence, and the second at the Kitandu chiefdom, where, in the presence of the

chief, a crowd of approximately the same size was demanding democracy before independence. At Kisozi, the group was shown round the station of the Belgian Congo National Institute for Agronomic Studies (INEAC) by the director.

46. The Mission arrived at Usumbura on the afternoon of 26 March and was to remain there until 1 April. On 27 March, it had a talk with Mr. Scheyven, Minister for Economic and Social Affairs of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, who was in the Territory at the time, and with the Resident-General, to review the questions raised at the Kitega meeting. As mentioned in paragraphs 449-450 of this report, the Mission had made at those meetings a number of suggestions which the Resident-General had immediately forwarded to the Belgian Government. It was now necessary to await the reply from Brussels.

47. Meanwhile, on the morning of 28 March, the Mission visited the Collège du Saint-Esprit and the Athénée royal at Usumbura, as well as the town prison and the port. On the afternoon of the same day it had a talk with the Resident-General. On 29 March there was still no news from Brussels. The interviews with political parties, which the Mission had provisionally planned for that day, had to be postponed.

48. On the morning of the following day the Resident-General received a reply from Brussels. After noting the contents of the reply and after discussing with the Resident-General the problems which it raised, the Mission met in a series of interviews during the course of the afternoon the *Mwami* of Ruanda, the members of the provisional special council of Ruanda and the leaders of political parties of that country, namely, UNAR, APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, RADER, UMAR and MUR. On the morning of the following day, the Mission consulted, in a second series of interviews, the *Mwami* of Urundi, the members of the Urundi interim committee and the leaders of Urundian parties, including UPRONA, MPB, PDC, UDP, DNB, PP and PDR. Following these consultations, the Mission drafted a *communiqué* which was issued the same evening. It also sent a cable concerning the matter to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. This sequence of events is described in greater detail in paragraphs 452-455 below.

49. The following day, 1 April 1960, the Mission left the Territory for Dar es Salaam where, on 4 April, it granted an audience to the UNAR leaders who had gone to Tanganyika—Mr. M. Kayihura, Mr. M. Rwagasana, Mr. C. Rebero, Mr. C. Bagirishya, Mr. P. Mungarulire and Mr. C. Rwangombwa—who presented it with several documents.

50. After its visit to Tanganyika, the Mission made a second stay at Brussels from 27 to 29 April 1960. During that stay it had talks with the representatives of the Administering Authority, first with Mr. Van den Abele, the Administrator-General, and other high officials of the Ministry for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and then with Mr. De Schrijver, Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and with

Mr. Wigny, Minister for Foreign Affairs. These discussions, which are described in paragraphs 456 and 457 of this report, marked the end of the Mission's journey.

51. After returning to New York, the Mission prepared the present report, which was adopted unanimously on 2 June 1960.

III. GLOSSARY

52. The terms used in any report on Ruanda-Urundi are somewhat complicated for the uninitiated reader. It was therefore considered useful to provide at this point some explanations which are mainly based on the Working Group's report.

53. The languages spoken in Ruanda (Kinyaruanda) and in Urundi (Kirundi), as well as the *lingua franca* of East Africa (Kiswahili), are Bantu tongues distinguished by the use of prefixes which determine the nature of the word and whether it is singular or plural. For example, the following are formed from the radical Rundi: *Murundi*—a man of Urundi; *Barundi*—men of Urundi; *Kirundi*—the language of Urundi; *Urundi*—the country of Urundi.

54. This creates problems whenever Bantu words are used in a text in another language. The European written form of these words has not become standardized and is not always logical. In some cases, one of the forms given is used invariably as noun and as adjective: *a Barundi*, *Barundi* (plural), *a Barundi house*. Sometimes, in a European context, the Bantu form is used with the correct prefix, e.g., *the Barundi*, *a Murundi warrior*, *Barundi peasants*, *the Kirundi language*. The practice has recently been introduced of using only the invariable radical, without any prefix: *a Rundi house*, *Rundi warriors*, *the Rundi language*. This is more logical but, since the root is never used without a prefix in the vernacular, this form is somewhat artificial and confusing.

55. Nevertheless, this last method is the one which has been most followed for some years and it has also been adopted in this report, with a few exceptions.

56. Below will be found a list of the words of Bantu origin which occur most frequently in this report:

Ruanda: the European form has been used because it corresponds to the spelling adopted in the Trusteeship Agreement. In the language of Ruanda, the form *Rwanda* is used and, under the influence of local nationalism, its use is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the Territory.

Urundi: this Swahilized form has been used (in Swahili *U* is the prefix used to indicate the country because it corresponds to the spelling used in the Trusteeship Agreement. In the Rundi language, the name of the country is *Burundi*. Under the influence of local nationalism Burundi has recently been used in preference to Urundi, even in French texts.

Munyarunda (plural *Banyaruanda*): native of Ruanda.

Murundi (plural *Barundi*): native of Urundi.

As far as possible, the noun and adjective forms have been replaced in this report by the invariable radical: *Ruanda*, *Rundi*, or by the words *Ruandese* and *Urundian*, except in certain direct quotations.

Mututsi (plural *Batutsi*), of the Tutsi ethnic group.

Muhutu (plural *Bahutu*), of the Hutu ethnic group.

Mutwa (plural *Batwa*), of the Twa ethnic group.

As far as possible, these forms, both as noun and as adjective, have been replaced by the radicals: *Tutsi*, *Hutu* and *Twa*, except in certain standard expressions and in some direct quotations (e.g., the Manifesto of the *Bahutu*).

Kinyaruanda: the language of Ruanda.

Kirundi: the language of Urundi.

Kiswahili: the language of East Africa.

The names of the languages are generally replaced by the following expressions: the Ruandese language, Ruandese or Ruanda; the Urundian language, Urundian or Rundi; the Swahili language, or Swahili.

Mwami (plural *Bami*): king. In this case the word

is still used with the singular or plural prefix in order to avoid using the radical *Ami*.

Muganwa (plural *Baganwa*): of the family of the princes of the blood of Urundi, descendant of the last four *Bami*. In this case the radical *Ganwa* has been used.

57. The following few words have been retained in their vernacular form:

Ubugabire: a customary livestock lease contract between an owner and a client, in Ruanda.

Ubugabire: the same contract in Urundi.

Igikingi (plural *Ibikingi*): formerly a minor political and land fief in Ruanda; now an individual pastoral land holding.

Ubukonde: forest occupied by clans which cleared the forest in Ruanda.

Mukonde (plural *Bakonde*): head of family representing the clans of those who had cleared the forest (in Ruanda).

Isambu: farmer's family holding (in Ruanda).

Itongo: farmer's family holding (in Urundi).

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTION

58. This report is set out very differently from the reports of earlier Missions. It deals almost entirely with those political problems which are now of primary concern to the people of Ruanda-Urundi and which have pushed other problems into the background.

59. The Mission's visit to Ruanda-Urundi took place at a period when the Territory was going through a serious crisis. On the one hand, tragic events took place in Ruanda in November 1959 and since then the people have been living in an atmosphere of grave tension and the fear of renewed violence. On the other hand, political agitation which had been for so long unknown in the Territory sprang up in both Ruanda and Urundi. The speedy and unexpected political developments in the Belgian Congo which is to become independent on 30 June 1960, the subject of independence having been mentioned for the first time in a statement on 13 January 1959, have had profound repercussions on Ruanda-Urundi. Certain sections of the population of the Trust Territory which until recently did not even envisage self-government in the near future now demand immediate independence. The political reforms announced by the Belgian Government in November 1959 have already been superseded by events. It has become necessary to work out more radical and accelerated forms, including some procedure whereby the people of the Territory may be consulted without

delay concerning their wishes and especially concerning the process by which they desire to attain independence.

60. The Mission was entrusted with the task of making a special inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the disturbances which have recently occurred in the Territory. The tension in Ruanda was still great at the time of the Mission's visit. During its stay in the Territory, it received thousands of communications, oral or written, dealing almost exclusively with political problems. For these reasons the Mission, despite the fact that it spent four weeks in the Territory, had to devote virtually all its attention to the political situation and neglect economic, social and educational factors save when they most directly influenced the political issue, although it fully realized the fundamental importance of those factors to the future well-being of the country.

61. Another characteristic of this report is worthy of special attention. Until recent years the differences between conditions in Ruanda and Urundi had been minimized and the political situation in the Trust Territory had been presented as a whole. The disturbances of November 1959 in Ruanda drew attention to the differences between Ruanda and Urundi and led the Administering Authority to follow in Ruanda policies which it did not feel obliged to apply in Urundi.

62. The need to make a special inquiry into the tragic events in Ruanda, to seek their causes in the

past and explain their after-effects and the fact that the present problems of Ruanda and Urundi now appear in a different light, induced the Mission to present the problems of the two countries in separate sections of its report.

63. This procedure has the disadvantage of making a certain amount of repetition inevitable, but the Mission believes that it will in that way make the report clearer and enable the reader to understand more clearly the problems involved. None the less, the Mission has not lost sight either of the fact that there is a single Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi, or of the many similarities which exist between Ruanda and Urundi and the interests that they have in common. It has therefore provided for a section on the common problems of Ruanda and Urundi and the reciprocal relations between them. In addition, the Mission has preferred to group its conclusions and recommendations in a single section to avoid needless repetition and to facilitate consideration of this report by the Trusteeship Council.

I. Ruanda

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUANDA UP TO 1956

Ruanda before the German occupation

64. In order to understand the problems of Ruanda as they appear in 1960, it is necessary to know various ethnological and historical facts which are, as it were, the key to the present complex situation.

65. The African population of Ruanda is not of one single physical type: it includes Tutsi Hamites (or Ethiopids), Hutu Bantus (or negroids) and Twa pygmies. The Twa, who no longer represent more than a small minority (0.67 per cent of the population), are related to the pygmies of the Belgian Congo and have probably been in the country from time immemorial. The Hutu came later, but nothing is known of their origin. They now form the great majority of the population (82.74 per cent of the population of Ruanda). Lastly, the Tutsi (16.59 per cent of the population of Ruanda) are related to the Hima, who are the ruling caste in all the kingdoms between the lakes. They probably came originally from Ethiopia. They undoubtedly migrated to Ruanda some time before the fifteenth century. The Tutsi were nomadic pastoral people, who gradually occupied the country and subjugated the indigenous inhabitants, establishing various small kingdoms in the east of what is now Ruanda, and extending those kingdoms towards the west. They gradually subjugated the whole population of Ruanda; in some parts this took place at a comparatively recent epoch.

66. As described by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefelt,² from all this has emerged a society which is integrated and homogeneous from certain points of

² J. J. Maquet and M. d'Hertefelt, *Elections en société féodale*, Brussels, 1959.

view but varied and complex from others. Thus the Hutu language was adopted by the Tutsi. On the other hand the difference between conqueror and conquered has crystallized in a system which has been called a system of castes. This dichotomy between conquering Tutsi and subject Hutu is a fact that has dominated social relations, and especially economic and political relations. The sharing of political power and economic assets among the castes was very unequal. The Hutu were a body of farmers upon whom lay the whole burden of agricultural production in the country, yet they had no part in government. The Tutsi had nothing to do with agricultural production but they were the warrior caste and were in command. By a complex political system in which there were three hierarchies—administrative, military and feudal—they managed to gather all the agricultural surplus into their own hands. The feudal system established relations of personal allegiance between Tutsi and Hutu, which both acted as a counterbalance to the inequities of the caste system (the identification of the Hutu servant with his Tutsi lord ensured greater protection for the Hutu) and provided the Tutsi with goods and services without depriving them of the ownership of the cattle and land which they placed at the disposal of their Hutu dependents.

67. The outcome is a very complex but stable civilization, in which the ownership of cattle plays a predominant role. The Hutu, who are farmers, long to possess cattle. The Tutsi, pastoral people, want domestic servants and labour for their crops. In order to obtain cattle, the Hutu mortgage their services and take on for themselves and their descendants a series of commitments relating to cattle, pastures and arable land. The *ubuhake*, a cattle contract, was a basic factor in the establishment of the new social structures. It enabled the Hutu to obtain the use of the cattle, subject to complete loyalty towards his master. The Working Group set up by the Administering Authority in 1959 to study the political problem in Ruanda-Urundi, concluded in its report that it was the spirit of the *ubuhake*, combined with precarious living conditions, that had for many years made the common man a subject creature, defenceless, with very rare possibilities of initiative, and more often than not waiting for his fate to be decided by others.

68. The Tutsi conquest which had probably begun before the fifteenth century was accompanied by a vast effort of political integration and unification, using very varied methods. Tutsi officials, emissaries of the court, were appointed to exercise various functions in the provinces. The people were obliged to pay tribute to the *Mwami*, a percentage of which was taken at each administrative level. The levying of this organized and systematized tribute became a real system of taxation for the benefit of the ruling class. The ownership of land was gradually withdrawn from the Hutu tribes and became the supreme right of the *Mwami*.

69. The king, or *Mwami*, became the supreme head and absolute master of the country. He was the incarnation of the State, "the eye through which God

looks upon Ruanda". He enjoyed an almost divine prestige: without him cattle would cease to multiply, there would be no more rain and plants would cease to grow. According to a Ruanda saying, the *Mwami* of Ruanda has no race, and the motto of the country "*Imbaga y'inyabatutu iya mbera*" ("the three united races advance") seeks to unite the three ethnic groups in one movement towards progress.

70. The policy of the *Bami* of Ruanda was to carry out the fragmentation of the land *ad infinitum*, in order to prevent any large homogeneous provinces being formed under over-powerful vassals.

71. A complex political system evolved. Abbé Muzenzi³ noted that below the *Mwami* stood the *Biru*, or Crown Council, guardian of the constitutional principles by virtue of which the dynasty ruled; the king was obliged to submit for its information and approval all important decisions of a general nature. As far as the executive organization was concerned the *Mwami* was assisted by a council of ministers (*Abatware b'intebe*) while below them were the governors, one for each province in the country (*Abatware b'Amacibiri*), and the sub-chiefs (*Abatware b'ibikingi*); contact between these bodies and the population was maintained by the family chiefs (*Abakuru b'Imiryango*, i.e., heads of families or households), who informed their relatives of the "royal decrees".

72. Economic administration was based on the system of fiefs. Abbé A. Kagame defines the fiefs in Ruanda in terms either of head of cattle, parcels of pasture land or landed property, which the holders either inherited from their forbears, received from the political authorities or acquired by their own industry within the framework of indigenous custom and under the protection of the authorities. The administration of this system was based on the existence of a body of chiefs of pastoral fiefs (*Abatware b'Imikenke*), who were responsible for both the allotment of pasture land and the supervision and control of the services rendered under the *ubuhake* contract, and a body of chiefs of landed fiefs (*Abatware b'Ubutaka*).

73. There were also army chiefs who commanded the warriors and were in charge of mobilization and security. Finally, judicial power was exercised by the *Mwami* and by courts composed of family chiefs and presided over by the local political authority.

74. An account of political and social organization in Ruanda, however brief, should take into account the fact that conditions are not absolutely identical throughout the country. The penetration of the Tutsi varies from one area to another. While it accounts for 16.59 per cent of the population of Ruanda as a whole it varies from 5.62 per cent in the Kisenyi district to 30.71 per cent in the Kibuye district. It is true that the domination of the Tutsi has been solidly established in the central part of Ruanda for centuries but the same cannot be said of the peripheral areas in the

vicinity of the Congo-Nile crest, which in some cases were only nominally subject to the authority of the *Mwami* until the end of the nineteenth century or later. Tutsi officials penetrated into the area with caution and the inhabitants cherished the memory of the Hutu principalities.

75. Another consideration which should be borne in mind is that the castes were to a certain extent open to each other. Custom allowed a particularly worthy Twa or Hutu to rise to the rank of a Tutsi, while conversely an impoverished Tutsi who had fallen from his former estate could be assimilated in every way to the Hutu. It was this aspect of Ruanda society which was to give rise to controversy concerning the racial, political, social and economic character of the castes.

76. Finally, it should also be noted that while there are some whose physical appearance in every way corresponds to the Hamitic, Bantu or Pygmoid type there are others whose appearance does not identify them at first glance as belonging either to the Tutsi, the Hutu or the Twa.

Ruanda under the German régime

77. After the Berlin Conference of 1885 the German zone of influence included Ruanda-Urundi. Count von Götzen crossed Ruanda from east to west for the first time in 1894 and met the *Mwami*, Kigeli IV. In 1897 Ruanda was detached from the authority of the Resident at Usumbura and headquarters for Ruanda were established at Kigali.

78. The relations between *Mwami* Yahi Musinga and the German authorities were relatively peaceful. The results of the two decades of German administration, however, were negligible. It was at the most a military occupation concerning itself exclusively with measures of pacification and security. No changes were made in the tribal organization. The indigenous political institutions continued to function. Thus, an indirect form of administration was established under which the protecting power administered Ruanda-Urundi through the traditional authorities, in accordance with the laws and customs of the country.

79. Richard Kandt, the first German Resident in Ruanda, wrote: "Our political and colonial interests require that we should support the King and uphold the supremacy of the Tutsi and the corresponding extreme dependence of the great mass of the population. Considering the nature of the country and the character of its people, this arrangement can be reconciled with those humanitarian imperatives which require the elimination of abuses of power and arbitrary rule over subject populations."

Belgian policy in Ruanda from 1916 to 1956

80. As the Resident-General recalled in his address of 3 March 1960, the first Belgian authorities adopted a position identical with that of the Germans in order to tackle the country's major problems, namely, hunger, disease, the absence of roads and a widely scat-

tered population. In setting up the first administrative cadres they turned to the Tutsi aristocracy and with its aid began to carry out the most urgent tasks, such as the establishment of the first colonial administration, the intensification and improvement of agriculture, the introduction of public-health services and the opening of the first schools. In accordance with this policy, the influence and authority of Tutsi chiefs were extended over the north-western region of Ruanda during the earlier years of the Belgian administration.

81. This policy is summarized in the explanation of the purposes of the Legislative Ordinance of 4 October 1943: the Administration found in Ruanda-Urundi socially and politically vigorous ethnic groups which had remained immune to any destructive influences which more advanced peoples might have been expected to have on them; thus the Administration had only to recognize them and modify their internal structure in order to adapt them to the new conditions created by the introduction of European civilization and the policy of indirect administration which it was successfully pursuing in Ruanda-Urundi.

82. Nevertheless, while the Belgian administration respected the customary political organization it did so only to the extent that generally held concepts of public order were not thereby violated. A number of steps were taken to eliminate any features of the customary organization which might seem objectionable or undesirable. Thus in 1917 the *Mwami* and the indigenous authorities were deprived of their arbitrary power, and in 1926 domestic slavery was abolished and the triple hierarchy of indigenous authorities (the authorities responsible for farming, pastures and the armed forces respectively) was replaced by a single authority.

83. It is interesting to note that those who have recently assessed the policy pursued during that period have reached greatly differing conclusions.

84. Some, including, in particular, the Abbé Muzenzi, the traditionalists, the present entourage of the *Mwami* (according to various communications received by the Mission) and some Europeans, stated that this pseudo-indirect government was in reality only a camouflaged form of direct government. In support of this view they quoted the latitude given the European authorities to dismiss the tribal authorities, their power to alter the customary *circonscriptions* without prior consultation, the transformations of customary officials into executive agents of the European administration and the superimposition and juxtaposition of a European administration (staffed with Africans and Europeans) on the traditional administration, which has led to the existence of two authorities whose traditions and interests do not necessarily coincide. This criticism is levelled even at the present institutions (and also at the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959) and constituted the basis of the claims of some existing parties.

85. However, others, particularly the leaders of the Hutu movements, expressed a very different view. In a memorandum delivered to the Mission, the declared that this policy, "in theory a happy marriage of

traditional feudal institutions and the requirements of democracy, has in fact only consolidated the traditional hegemony of the Tutsi minority, practically ignoring the existence of the Hutu majority." They say that it has "oriented to the benefit of the same privileged persons of the traditional regime the very generous innovations introduced by the Mandatory Power and that intentional or unintentional discrimination reserves the monopoly of all strategic positions of power to the Tutsi oligarchy and the monopoly of poverty, destitution and servile labour to the Hutu common people."

86. The Administration believes that its policy has been reasonable and justified. In a speech made on 3 March 1960, the Resident-General said: "Thus, for many years, Belgians and the Tutsi of Ruanda have co-operated in a great common task, that of improving the well-being of Ruanda, a task in which, over a long period, no major conflict divided them. The old order did not appear to be threatened. The Belgian authorities, for their part, saw the people making undeniable progress, eating and dressing better, receiving better medical care, becoming gradually but steadily more prosperous and gaining access to education. They hoped that nothing would intervene to hamper that progress because, in due course, the ruling class would come to understand that it was in its own interest to accept a new politico-social order in which the aristocracy could distinguish itself in new fields. Moreover, some indications led to the belief that this would come about. Some Tutsi spokesmen had long advocated the very policy which I have just mentioned. It was therefore not unreasonable to believe that the entire ruling caste might some day support that realistic policy."

87. Towards 1930 a programme of political and economic development was initiated which included regrouping of chiefdoms, improvement of agriculture in order to overcome periodic famines and shortages, introduction of coffee cultivation, improvement of livestock, intensive reforestation of eroded hills, mineral prospecting and trial mining operations, construction of an adequate road network and reorganization of trade.

88. In 1931, the Belgian administration removed *Mwami* Yahi V Musinga (who had reigned since 1896), as it considered that the latter's attitude towards the Belgian authorities and the missions constituted a major impediment to Ruanda's advancement. He was replaced by his son Mutara III Rudahigwa who, as stated by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefeldt, "appeared to be well disposed towards the Belgian Administration and the Catholic missions". Mutara, they added, was in fact, from a traditional viewpoint, one of the possible successors of Musinga. However, those who had appointed him—i.e., the European administrative and religious authorities—had not followed the traditional practice in selecting him. At that time, the action of the Belgian authorities consisted more in decisions of that nature than in structural reforms. Late in 1931, a regency council was established in Ruanda. In view of the youth of the new king and the fear of the authorities

³ Abbé Muzenzi, *Etude sur quelques problèmes du Ruanda* (A study of certain problems in Ruanda), Brussels, 1958.

that he might encounter opposition from certain feudal chiefs and headmen, the Resident decided to establish a council composed of several notables of noble families, who would have the responsibility of helping and guiding this high dignitary in his task. This council was composed of four members from 1931 to the beginning of 1936, and thereafter of six members.

89. The chiefdoms, which, prior to 1931, had numbered in the hundreds and had frequently consisted of parts and enclaves scattered throughout the State, were grouped according to geographical and practical criteria, without regard for the traditional principles of land tenure.

90. According to the apologists of the traditional regime, the loss of power of the Hutu dates from that reform. They claim that under the system of *ibikingi* (minor political and land fiefs) many Hutu had actually been appointed chiefs and sub-chiefs. After the regrouping, the proportion of Hutu in positions of command decreased considerably. The same traditionalists pointed out that the increasing monopoly of all positions of control and responsibility by the Tutsi was indirectly due to action by the European authorities, because it was the Belgian Administration which decided, after consulting the *Mwami*, on the removal of traditional authorities. They added that the policy of making systematic use of the Tutsi was not only adopted by the Belgian Administration, but was also recommended by the Catholic Church.

91. The Church had, in fact, noticed, about 1926, that it received its greatest support from the Tutsi aristocracy. Furthermore, the Church, momentarily concerned at the "vacillation of the colonial administration with regard to the traditional hegemony of the well-born Tutsi",⁴ vigorously supported the Tutsi cause. Mgr. Classe, Bishop of Ruanda, sent the following memorandum to the Administration in 1930: "The greatest disservice which the Government could do to itself and to the State would be to eliminate the Tutsi caste. A revolution of that nature would lead the entire state directly into anarchy and to bitter anti-European Communism. Far from furthering progress, it would nullify the Government's action by depriving it of auxiliaries who are, by birth, capable of understanding and following it. This is the view and the firm belief of all superiors of the Ruanda mission, without exception. Generally speaking, we have no chiefs who are better, more intelligent, more active, more capable of appreciating progress and even more fully accepted by the people than the Tutsi. It is therefore primarily and essentially with their aid that the Government will succeed in developing Ruanda from all points of view."

92. It had also been the Belgian Administration's policy to pay special attention to the Tutsi in the field of education. In the first years of the Belgian occupation an official primary school was established at Nyanza, which was reserved for the sons of Tutsi chiefs and notables.

⁴ L. de Lacger, *Le Ruanda*, Namur, 1940, vol. II, p. 181.

93. In 1929, a Groupe scolaire was established at Astrida, where the Frères de la Charité of Ghent operated, on the Administration's behalf, a new special school for the best students from the missions' primary schools. One branch of this school was reserved for future chiefs and sub-chiefs and was designed gradually to replace the school at Nyanza. The pupils in this branch were almost all sons of Tutsi chiefs and notables. In the other branches, where the pupils were trained to become secretaries or agricultural, veterinary or medical assistants, the proportion of Tutsi children was also very high.

94. This factor enabled the UNAR to claim that the reason why Tutsi children had enjoyed a privileged position as far as post-primary education was concerned was that this had been the deliberate policy of the Administration and of the missions and that the Tutsi themselves were not to blame.

95. In the light of recent events, there appears to be more or less general agreement that the policy of indirect government has met with failure in Ruanda. Although its material achievements have been substantial, it has not yet brought about social justice. However, many different interpretations are given of the causes of this failure.

96. As explained earlier, the traditionalists have accused the Administration of having perverted the traditional system through increasingly direct and arbitrary intervention, and of having strengthened or even created a Tutsi monopoly of the ruling class whose prestige was employed as a tool but which was given less and less opportunity or power to contribute to the welfare of the population as a whole. The European Administration had, they say, "taken over all posts of any importance, leaving the indigenous Administration only the insignificant function of transmitting orders". As for the Tutsi monopoly of the indigenous civil service, it is alleged that it was partly due to the appointment by the Belgian Administration of chiefs and sub-chiefs trained in the first government schools, which had been reserved exclusively for Tutsi children.

97. The Administration defined its policy on page 72 of its annual report for 1938.⁵ It declared itself convinced that "the Government should endeavour to maintain and consolidate the traditional *cadre* composed of the Tutsi ruling class, because of its important qualities, its undeniable intellectual superiority and its ruling potential. However, the mentality of this class must gradually alter. A way must be sought gradually to modify its conception of authority, which must be changed from one of domination exercised solely for the benefit of its holders, to one of a more humane power to be exercised in the interests of the people." Twenty years later, the Administration was to accuse the Tutsi of having shown egotism and lack

⁵ Rapport présenté par le Gouvernement belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda Urundi pendant l'année 1938, Brussels, Etablissements généraux d'imprimerie, 1939.

of appreciation of an inevitable evolution towards democracy, and of having sought only to perpetuate their privileged position to the detriment of the general population.

98. Finally, the Hutu theorists criticized the system of indirect government itself. One of them said: "In practice, some measures taken by the Administration to eliminate abuses have provided further opportunity to exert pressure on the weak. This is due to that principle of its native policy, according to which the traditional authority should be considered as the official intermediary between the Trust Administration and the general population. The practice has therefore always been to strengthen the prestige of the traditional authority while turning a blind eye to certain of its acts. How could that authority, strengthened by the moral support of the Administration, have done otherwise than be led to abuse its power?"⁶

99. It appears that the choice of a native policy in Ruanda was dictated by the Administration's basic desire to ensure, as rapidly as possible, the economic and social progress of which the country was in such great need. The 1954 Visiting Mission stated that "the Administering Authority places greater emphasis on economic progress than on political development, with a view to creating equal opportunities for the people and material equality for all".⁷ The Belgian representative challenged this statement on 8 March 1955,⁸ declaring that it was in order to promote political development that the Administering Authority was now laying stress on economic, social and cultural progress, which were the essential foundations for political development. "Contrary to the beliefs of certain members of the Visiting Mission," he went on, "our policy inspires confidence in the indigenous inhabitants, both among the best elements of the *élite* and among the masses of the people. This confidence has made progress possible in the past and is a guarantee of even greater progress in the future."

100. Three important dates should be mentioned in order to complete the picture of the political evolution of Ruanda up to 1956. These are:

- 1943: first political and judicial reorganization;
- 1952: second political and judicial reorganization;
- 1954: abolition of *ubuhake*.

101. The Ordinance of 1943 created nothing new. It recognized that the Administration would continue to operate in the customary manner, subject, however, to certain conditions. It recognized the existence of a hierarchy composed of the king, the chiefs and the sub-chiefs, who administered the State, the chiefdoms and the sub-chiefdoms. The king was elected according to tradition but had to be invested by the Governor. The chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed by the king, according to tradition, but were invested by the Belgian

Administration. The ordinance also recognized the existence of chiefdom councils and of a Council of State but without defining their constitution, organization or powers.

102. The Ordinance also established autonomous administrative funds for each chiefdom and for the State, which were administered by their respective authorities. As regards judicial organization, the Ordinance merely gave official sanction to the indigenous courts which functioned already.

103. The Decree of 14 July 1952 went further and the organization which it approved has been described in detail in various documents submitted to the Trusteeship Council in the past.⁹ The Decree fixed the membership of the sub-chiefdom councils, the chiefdom councils, the district councils and the High Council of State. An attempt at democratization was made in the case of the sub-chiefdom councils; their members were to be selected by an electoral college consisting of notables whose names would be selected from a list prepared by the sub-chiefs taking into account the preferences of the inhabitants. The other councils were to consist partly of sub-chiefs or chiefs, *ex officio* members, of notables elected indirectly by an electoral body appointed by members of the lower council, and of co-opted members.¹⁰ These councils had advisory powers.

⁹ Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement belge à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1952, Brussels, Etablissements généraux d'imprimerie, 1953; Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement belge à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1953, Brussels, Etablissements généraux d'imprimerie, 1954; Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 2; *ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 3.

¹⁰ Article 28 of the Decree of 14 July 1952 provides that: "The councils referred to in article 27 shall be constituted as follows:

"1. Sub-chiefdom council. This council shall be presided over by the sub-chief. It shall comprise:

"(a) the sub-chief;

"(b) not less than five or more than nine members, at the rate of one member for every 500 inhabitants.

"These members shall be chosen by an electoral college. The college shall consist of notables whose names shall be selected from a list prepared by the sub-chief taking into account the preferences of the inhabitants. The number of names on the list of notables shall be at least twice that of the members of the council. The list shall be approved by the chief and accepted by the Administrator of the Territory. After it has been drawn up in this manner, it shall be posted in the chief town of the chiefdom and, after proclamation, in the chief town of the sub-chiefdom.

"2. Chiefdom council. This council shall be presided over by the chief. In addition to the chief, it shall comprise not less than ten or more than eighteen members selected as follows:

"(a) Five to nine sub-chiefs elected by their peers;

"(b) Notables to the same number as the sub-chiefs. These notables shall be elected as follows:

"Each sub-chiefdom council shall designate three of its notables;

"Together these notables shall constitute an electoral college which shall elect those of its members who are to be members of the chiefdom council.

"3. District council. This council shall consist of the chiefs of the district, an equal number of sub-chiefs elected by their peers and a number of notables equal to the total number of

⁶ G. Cyimana, "Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Ruanda-Urundi", *La Revue nouvelle*, 15 March 1959.

⁷ Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 2, para. 129.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

104. The elective and representative system thus instituted was still on a limited scale. The Visiting Missions of 1954 and 1957¹¹ had already reached that conclusion. Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefelt¹² pointed out that the electoral college of the sub-chiefdoms, on which the entire system was based, was in fact appointed by the sub-chief and was accordingly not representative, so that the higher levels which rested on that basis would not be representative either. In fact, they considered that the councils provided for by the Decree of 1952 were not designed to represent the opinions of the mass of the population, but that the Decree was designed to reduce the powers of the *Mwami* and the chiefs, by compelling those authorities, in certain important matters, to ask for and act on the opinion of persons of lower rank but belonging generally to the Tutsi class.

105. Proceedings with a view to constituting the various councils took place in Ruanda at the end of 1953. The results were as follows:

	Total	Tutsi	Hutu	Twa
Sub-chiefdom electoral colleges (electors appointed)	13,145	5,442 (41.4%)	7,674 (58.38%)	29 (0.22%)
Sub-chiefdom councils (members elected)	4,187	2,190 (52.3%)	1,995 (47.65%)	2 (0.05%)
Chieftdom councils (members)	692	613 (88.6%)	79 (11.4%)	—
District councils (members)	204	185 (90.7%)	19 (9.3%)	—
High councils of the state (members)	32	29 (90.6%)	3 (9.4%)	—

chiefs and sub-chiefs. These notables shall be elected as follows:

"Each chieftdom council shall appoint three notables from among its members;

"Together these notables shall constitute an electoral college which shall elect those of its members who are to be members of the district council.

"The district council shall choose its chairman and vice-chairman from among the chiefs. They shall remain in office for one year and shall be eligible for re-election.

"4. *High Council of the State*. This council shall be presided over by the *Mwami*. In addition to the *Mwami*, it shall comprise:

"(a) The chairmen of the district councils of the State;

"(b) Six chiefs elected by their peers;

"(c) One representative elected by each district council from among the notables in the council;

"(d) Four persons chosen for their knowledge of the social, economic, spiritual and cultural problems of the State;

"(e) Four indigenous persons who are holders of the civic merit card or are registered, not including chiefs or sub-chiefs who may be holders of that certificate or be registered.

"The members referred to in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) above shall be co-opted by the other members.

"The Governor shall determine the procedure for preparing the list of notables in each sub-chieftdom and for the selection, election and co-optation to which this article refers. He shall also determine the time-limits within which these formalities are to be carried out." (*Bulletin officiel du Congo belge*, 1^{re} partie, 45^e année, No. 8, p. 2007)

¹¹ *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 2*, paras. 138-143; *ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session*, paras. 47-51.

¹² *Op. cit.*

106. In 1956 when the councils were re-elected, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi decided to interpret the 1952 legislation in such a way as to permit the introduction of a form of universal male suffrage. Instead of leaving the establishment of sub-chieftdom electoral colleges to the discretion of the sub-chiefs, the notables of the electoral colleges were appointed by secret ballot of the entire adult male population. Participation in the elections was about 75 per cent of registered voters (i.e., over 300,000 voting out of 400,000 registered voters). The results were as shown in the table on page 150.

107. This electoral consultation was the subject of a very detailed study by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefelt,¹³ made on behalf of the Institute for Scientific Research in Central Africa (IRSAC). Some of their conclusions are worth quoting: "Considerations of caste played an important part in the popular consultation of 1956 and in the resulting formation of the councils. This special concern was shown in two ways: on the one

hand, some Hutu showed a desire for emancipation from their caste; on the other hand, results show that the Hutu have an attitude of dependency and submission towards the higher caste. ... Historically, the hold of the pastoral caste over the peasant masses has varied widely according to regions. Following those variations, the traditional attitudes came out more clearly in the voting at the popular consultation. Thus, in the north-west of Ruanda, which was effectively occupied by the Tutsi only towards the end of the last century, the proportion of the ruling caste in the sub-chieftdom electoral categories was reduced by 50 per cent, sometimes by over 70 per cent, in the popular consultation, whereas in the region of Ruanda proper the reduction was only by about 10 per cent or even showed some increase in the power of the Tutsi". Further on, the authors also noted that "the screening of the people's wishes (of the first degree electors) through seven ballots before the High Council was reached resulted in 1956 in a reversal of the trend in the open popular vote".

108. One last important aspect in the development of Ruandese society before 1956 which should be noted here is the suppression of *ubuhake* in 1954. The role of *ubuhake* in the society of Ruanda has already been mentioned. (See para. 67 above.) In 1954, the High Council of Ruanda decided on the gradual suppression of

¹³ *Op. cit.*

	Total	Tutsi	Hutu	Twa	Swahili and Congolese
Sub-chieftdom electoral colleges (electors elected)	9,743	3,223 (33.08%)	6,501 (66.72%)	1 (0.01%)	18 (0.19%)
Sub-chieftdom councils (members elected)	4,160	1,895 (45.56%)	2,261 (54.35%)	1 (0.02%)	3 (0.07%)
Chieftdom councils (members)	704	597 (84.8%)	107 (15.2%)	—	—
District councils (members)	184	163 (88.6%)	21 (11.4%)	—	—
High councils of the State (members)	32	31 (96.9%)	1 (3.1%)	—	—

ubuhake. This historic decision happened to be adopted on the same day when the 1954 Visiting Mission, on its way through Nyanza, was attending the meeting of the High Council of the State.¹⁴ Orders allowing the distribution of cattle between patrons and clients, and determining procedures for that distribution were made and between 1954 and 1958, over 200,000 head of cattle had been distributed in Ruanda. This measure, encouraged by the Administration and introduced by the High Council of Ruanda on the recommendation of the *Mwami* was at the time interpreted by the Administration as evidence that the *Mwami's* entourage was in favour of making concessions in the interests of the people.

109. In recent political documents, the measure has also been mentioned on many occasions by parties supporting the *Mwami* as proof of his progressive spirit and as evidence that the Hutu were the first to benefit from that progressive spirit. The Hutu politicians, on the other hand, have more than once suggested that the abolition of *ubuhake* has done the Hutu little good, as its effects on the land tenure system caused problems which the Tutsi ruling class has not tried to settle. In fact, the possession of cattle was of little use if the owner did not also possess the necessary pastureland. The pastureland, however, continued to be under the feudal control of the Tutsi; some even alleged that this control became tighter.

EVENTS FROM 1956 TO JULY 1959

110. Between the years 1952 and 1956 certain criticisms had already appeared in the press directed against the indigenous authorities, the political institutions, the Tutsi and the operation of the courts. They appeared in particular in the Ruandese-language publication *Kinyamateka*, published in the diocese of Kabgayi. Although the criticisms did not at first arouse much interest, they none the less were evidence of some unrest.

111. The first time that the problem of the Tutsi and the Hutu received some publicity was when Mr. Maus, a European settler, member of the Council of the Vice-Governor-General of Ruanda-Urundi,

¹⁴ *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 2*, paras. 69-72.

proposed in April 1956, on the occasion of the debate on the question of reorganizing that Council as the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi, that a special list of four members, indigenous and Europeans, should be drawn up to provide separate representation for the Hutu. That proposal met with opposition from *Mwami* Mutara, who said that there was no ground for distinguishing between the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu". Mr. Maus' proposal was rejected unanimously except for his own vote. At that point Mr. Maus submitted his resignation to the Council in a letter in which he took *Mwami* Mutara to task as having "by his statement revealed his anti-democratic spirit; he is in favour of a single party, that of the Tutsi, which will continue to dominate the two other indigenous groups; he is quite well aware that separate representation for the Hutu would be the first crack in the edifice of Tutsi domination, and he means to safeguard that at any price". He concluded that "the conflict of interests between the Tutsi and Hutu communities, which is the most pressing social problem and the most poignant human drama in the Territory, will therefore continue to be officially ignored by our institutions and left without any constitutional means of defence".

112. In February 1957, the High Council of Ruanda approved its "Statement of views". That document was reproduced verbatim in annex II to the report of the 1957 Visiting Mission¹⁵ and was the subject of some comment by that Mission. The purpose of the statement of views was to raise the problem of the accession of Ruanda to self-government through full use of the *élite*. In that connexion, the High Council requested, *inter alia*, that education should be directed towards the training of an *élite* technically capable of participating as soon as possible in the direction of the State's affairs, and to provide some of the *élite* with an opportunity to have an apprenticeship in managing their own affairs.

113. In the Trusteeship Council, the representative of Belgium stated that the statement of views was not an official document of the High Council of the State. The High Council strongly objected to that interpretation and said that it could only turn the members of the High Council against the Administration.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first session, Supplement No. 3*, pp. 42-46.

114. In the following month there appeared the "Manifesto of the Bahutu, a note on the social aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Ruanda", which for the first time gave specific form to the political creed of the Hutu leaders. The manifesto, the text of which is also reproduced verbatim in annex I to the report of the 1957 Visiting Mission,¹⁶ contained the following passages: "No solution of the Mututsi-Belgian relations can be durable until the fundamental difficulties between the Mututsi and the Muhutu are settled." The Hutu-Tutsi problem is "primarily a question of a political monopoly" of the Tutsi, which is also an economic, social and cultural monopoly, "to the great despair of the Bahutu who see themselves condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual workers and this, worse still, after achieving independence which they have unwittingly helped to obtain". The document also warns against "a method which, while tending to eliminate white-black colonialism, would leave a worse Hamitic colonialism over the Muhutu", and recommends measures for "the integrated and collective advancement of the Muhutu."

115. Those two documents contain the germ of all the ideological elements which inspired the disturbances of November 1959 and led to the Visiting Mission being received in Ruanda in March 1960 with mutually contradictory slogans: "Immediate independence. Get rid of the Belgians for us" and "Down with Tutsi feudalism. Long live Belgian Trusteeship".

116. At the July 1957 session of the General Council, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi pointed out the difficulties raised by the ideas stated in these two documents. When three members of the General Council presented a *voeu* that the Government would study the "Manifesto of the Bahutu" thoroughly and state its views at the next session of the Council, he pointed out that the question was delicate and difficult to tackle with equanimity.¹⁷

117. In his discussions with the 1957 Visiting Mission, the Governor described relations between the Tutsi and Hutu as the key problem of the Territory, and gave some indication of the contradictory courses of action between which the Administration was torn in its efforts to satisfy the demands of both parties, i.e., to give extensive powers to the High Councils, which were composed solely of Tutsi, and to emancipate the Hutu.¹⁸ The 1957 Visiting Mission recognized the gravity of the problem, but thought that "although there is every likelihood that the Bahutu-Batutsi problem will grow worse in the near future, it is none the less true that it carries in itself the seed of its solution. ... Under the influence of secondary and university education and of contact with the outside world, traditional conceptions are giving way and the *élite* of the old régime are coming up against a new *élite*. The 'statement of views' of the High Council of Ruanda would indicate at least as much an awareness

of the inevitability of a far-reaching change in the structure of the State as a desire to provoke a race in order to consolidate the tottering prerogatives of a dominant class by premature self-government."¹⁹

118. In 1957, the High Council of Ruanda firmly expressed a wish that the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" should henceforth be banished from official documents. On the other hand the Mouvement social hutu, established in June 1957, to promote democratization of institutions and to combat abuses, opposed that proposal on the grounds that there was nothing hurtful about racial descriptions and that the true social advancement of the country could only be revealed by maintaining them and thereby indicating the progress made by the under-privileged majority. That was the origin of the accusation that the Hutu parties are racists.

119. At the outset, the Belgian Administration was in favour of abolishing the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu", or in any case wished to minimize their importance. Thus the special representative of Belgium on the Trusteeship Council stated of the 849th meeting on 31 January 1958²⁰ that the terms Tutsi and Hutu were outworn, and that "the Administration would be happy to see that terminology disappear," and that it was afraid that the proud flaunting of the term "Hutu" could easily be taken as an expression of hostility to the "Tutsi". The controversy as to the real character of the Tutsi-Hutu problem, racial, social, economic, etc., also dates from that time.

120. Towards the end of 1957, the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), founded by Mr. Joseph Habyarimana Gitera, entered the political arena and through its newspaper "*Ijwi rya rubanda rugafi*" ("The voice of the common people"), made increasingly vehement attacks against the social system, the privileges of the Tutsi, the court of the *Mwami*, and the Kalinga drum, emblem of royal power. The question of the Kalinga drum became of great concern to Mr. Gitera. He alleged that that instrument was the object of an almost idolatrous cult, and was an affront to the people and to Christians, because the remains, or to be more accurate, the genital organs of chiefs conquered in the past by the present royal house of Ruanda, were hung from sacred drums. On many occasions he urged that those adornments should be buried with due ceremony and that the drum should be replaced by "a less barbarous national emblem, more worthy of a civilized people, and better calculated to arouse a feeling of pride in all Ruandese, instead of reminding some of them of their past humiliations". He raised the problem in communications to the King of the Belgians, and to the United Nations,²¹ and tried to get the Roman Catholic Church to take up a position on the matter. Those attacks shocked some elements of the population, and antagonized the defenders of tradition.

121. In 1958, consideration of the Hutu-Tutsi problem was once again postponed in the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. On the other hand, in January 1958, Mr. Gitera presented a request to the *Mwami* that the High Council of Ruanda should study the problem of relations between the Hutu and Tutsi. The *Mwami* consented and in April established a special commission on social relations in Ruanda, consisting of Tutsi and Hutu, to study that problem and submit recommendations to the High Council.

122. Before the Council met, the atmosphere again became tense. Several chiefs complained to the *Mwami* of the attacks made on them by APROSOMA and certain missionary circles. Moreover, a group of elderly Tutsi at the *Mwami's* court drafted two notes. In the first, which was submitted to the *Mwami* and the High Council, the authors protested against all possibilities of distributing pasture and arable land, appealing to respect for ancestral custom and asking that the "trouble-makers" should be sought out. In the second, addressed to the members of the commission to study the problem of the social and political relations between the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa of Ruanda, appeared the statement, after certain historical and genealogical considerations, that: "the relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu have always hitherto been based on servitude, so that there is no foundation for brotherhood between us. ... As our kings conquered the country of the Hutu and killed their petty kings, how can they now claim to be our brothers?"

123. In June 1958 the High Council of Ruanda considered the report of the Hutu-Tutsi Committee in which the Hutu spokesmen put forward the following demands: administrative and judicial public appointments should be open to the Hutu on the same conditions as for the Tutsi, Hutu children should have the same educational opportunities as Tutsi children, and so forth. The High Council came to the conclusion that the problem was of a different nature. Appointments were open to all who satisfied certain requirements of ability and training. With regard to education, it was the fault of the Administration and the missions if Hutu children had up to now been unjustly treated. On the other hand, the Council agreed that there was a need for numerous reforms to bring about more social justice in many fields but said that the Administration had not hitherto carried out the High Council's wishes in that respect. In his closing speech the *Mwami* stressed that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were all Ruandese and that there was not a racial but a social question, and a problem of institutional reform.

124. The traditionalists considered that the High Council and the *Mwami* had thus shown understanding, breadth of view and realism. On the other hand, the leaders of the Hutu movements interpreted that attitude, and in particular that of the *Mwami* Mutara, as dismissing the case; they believed that he was not only denying the existence of the problem but was accusing those who continued to raise it of being "dividers of the people, enemies of their country and disturbers of public order". The Hutu leaders said later that the

disappointment at the reaction of Mutara, in whom they had placed their hopes, had caused some of them from then onwards to "reject the role of the sovereign and the insignia of his dynasty".

125. When the *Mwami* Mutara returned from a long visit to Belgium in 1958 his relations with the Belgian Administration changed noticeably. Those relations had first been excellent; they became somewhat cool in recent years, and were almost broken off by the end of 1958. It was rumoured that the *Mwami* had been very displeased with the way he had been treated in Belgium in 1958, which was alleged to be so different from the cordial reception he had been given on previous visits. Whatever the reason, relations with the Administration became very strained. There was a rumour, reported in the press, that he had said shortly after his return: "There will not be a single European in Ruanda at the end of a year."

126. At the opening meeting of the General Council in December 1958 the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi dealt at length with the Hutu-Tutsi question. He stated at the outset that there was a problem. It was perhaps over-simple and dangerous to call it without qualification "the Tutsi-Hutu conflict" but the problem could not be denied. There was a problem of wide-spread poverty among far too large masses of the population; and there was a conviction among those economically very weak masses, which seemed to grow stronger every year, that they were being politically, socially and economically oppressed by a certain number of representatives of their local authorities. From the figures it appeared that the Tutsi social group were in a very high percentage of official positions whose holders could abuse their authority and that, moreover, the Hutu group composed the great majority of the impoverished masses among whom were the victims of those abuses. But that did not mean that there was an oppressive Tutsi class which was exploiting the defenceless Hutu masses. There was a peasant class incompletely protected from the arbitrary actions of certain local representatives of authority who, because of circumstances, and not through a recognized political structure, belonged for the most part to the anthropological group of the Tutsi. The Belgian Administration had therefore endeavoured to hunt down abuses wherever it could find them but not to attack the Tutsi as a whole.

127. In that connexion the Governor pointed out that it had been necessary to remove 152 sub-chiefs from office between 1955 and 1957. But he added that the Administration was nevertheless convinced that it would hardly have helped matters to have deliberately and systematically replaced Tutsi chiefs, judges and monitors by Hutu everywhere. Such a policy would have been the signal for a violent and legitimate reaction from a large and deserving indigenous group against the Administering Authority; it would have probably merely replaced one injustice by another; it would have started a civil war which was to be avoided because it would have no point; and it would have thereby erroneously established that the problem

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-42.

¹⁷ *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 3*, paras. 23, 24 and 28.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 33-39.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 40-46.

²⁰ T/P.V.849.

²¹ T/COM.3/L.25.

was racial and not simply a misuse of local authority. Such an attitude would have also come up against the inadequate training of the Hutu among whom the Belgians would have had great difficulty in finding a sufficient number of efficient personnel. The problem was not one of Tutsi and Hutu but one of rich and poor, of capitalists and workers, of rulers and ruled although it was also undeniable that men who were or who called themselves Tutsi formed the great majority of the governing groups of the country and possessed the greatest part of the country's wealth. The Governor concluded by emphasizing the danger of introducing the notion of discrimination by misuse of the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" and stressed the need to improve the position of the Hutu, to reform the political structure and to fight against poverty.

128. However, in his speech before the Mission on 3 March 1960 the Governor said: "For my part I had gradually modified the convictions which were the basis of my statement of 2 December 1958: the Tutsi-Hutu problem certainly had an economic basis but, as I had tried to emphasize, it also had a politico-social basis and the Administration would have to take it into account."

129. During its December 1958 session a member of the General Council, Mr. Habyarimana Gitara, requested discussion of the Hutu-Tutsi problem. The Governor recalled that he had dealt with it in his opening speech and moreover reminded the Council that certain of its members were drawing up a report on the question and that while awaiting that document "it was not advisable to give free rein momentarily to discussion of a subject which was so difficult to present in an orderly way". The question was therefore not discussed during the session.

130. Five members or alternates of the General Council, among them Mr. Maus and three African (Hutu) members, prepared a long report which was completed at the end of 1958. It was sent to the King of the Belgians, to the Minister, to the Governor-General and to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. This document, which was subsequently also transmitted to the 1959 Working Group, and to the present Visiting Mission, stated that the Hutu problem had two aspects. The first concerned injustices committed by the customary authorities who were in fact all Tutsi. Although the situation had improved during forty years of Belgian rule, under the influence of the Administration, of the religious missions, and of certain Europeans, "the situation of the weak still remains pitifully tragic", particularly as certain steps taken by the Administration designed to improve the position of the peasant (*manant*) had been turned against him owing to the "malignity" of the customary authorities. The other aspect of the problem was the fact that the Hutu were backward as a result of the Tutsi monopoly in the political, cultural and economic fields and the gap between Tutsi wealth and Hutu poverty, and that Tutsi domination of the Hutu common people had been increased under the influence of the Belgian Administration. The report went on to attack certain arguments

such as that the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" could not at present be defined whereas their physical, psychological and cultural differences divided them into groups which were perfectly distinct one from the other. The document suggested a number of solutions, such as the abolition of chiefdoms, with the maintenance of sub-chiefdoms, the supervision and inspection of indigenous authorities and of judges, the separation of administrative and judicial powers, the education of the mass of the people in its rights, the introduction of the principle of numerical parity between Tutsi and Hutu in the distribution of social and public positions, fundamental reforms, and so forth. Mr. Maus and his colleagues stated in conclusion: "To avoid revolution, a revolution must be carried out. The Administration must not be faced with the dilemma of either supporting the oppressors in the name of public order or of supporting the revolt in the name of justice."

131. At the beginning of 1959 the controversy became more intense. Mr. Gitara transformed the APROSOMA into a political party. In a letter addressed to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, a copy of which was sent to the United Nations,²² he requested that Ruanda-Urundi should not be granted independence before the introduction of the numerous reforms demanded by the Hutu.

132. Whereas in 1958 the defenders of tradition had found their theoretician in the Abbé Mulyenzi, who had published his *Etude sur quelques problèmes du Ruanda* (A study of some problems of Ruanda) in 1959, the Hutu now publicized their point of view. The first publication was *Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Ruanda-Urundi* (A plea for the common people of Ruanda-Urundi) by Mr. G. Cyimana, a Ruandese student in Belgium, and later *L'actualité politique au Ruanda* (The political situation in Ruanda) by Aloys Munyangaju, a journalist.

133. Political unrest increased during the period before the arrival of the Working Group in Ruanda. In December 1958 the General Council had expressed the wish that the Belgian Government, which had in August 1958 set up a Working Group to investigate the political problems of the Belgian Congo, should take a similar step for Ruanda-Urundi. Accordingly, a Working Group was formed on 16 April 1959 and arrived in the Trust Territory on the 22nd.²³ Meanwhile, the Belgian Government in its statement of 13 January 1959 had outlined its policy for the Belgian Congo, and its intention to grant independence to the Belgian Congo had clearly awakened great interest in Ruanda and Urundi.

134. In order to submit their views to the Working Group the Ruanda indigenous authorities organized themselves under the leadership of the *Mwami*. The Hutu leaders have described the atmosphere of those proceedings in the following words: "On the arrival

²² *Ibid.*

²³ The 1959 Working Group's report was submitted to the Belgian Government on 2 September 1959 and released on 10 November 1959.

of the Working Group the entire feudal system went into action to demand not only freedom for the oppressed people but nominal independence. Chiefs and sub-chiefs, indigenous judicial officials, committees of cercles d'évolués, delegations from existing associations, keepers of dynastic traditions, high court dignitaries, former army and clan chiefs, higher clergy and feudal Tutsi teachers, in short the whole of Tutsi upper aristocracy assembled at Nyanza to hold council and receive instructions to be spread throughout the country."

135. On 22 April 1959 the indigenous authorities of Ruanda (chiefs, sub-chiefs and judges) expressed the opinion that the contemplated reforms must be based on a democratic system, preferably on a hereditary constitutional monarchy, and recommended internal autonomy in 1960 and the constitution of a Ruandese Government. The following day, those same customary authorities considered that it was appropriate to draw the Belgian Government's attention, by an official statement, to the tense racial relations which were the cause of great uneasiness in Ruanda. In that document they observed that "Evil machinations have recently come to light and seem to us to have their source in the press and in the spreading of malicious statements; this has resulted in the misunderstanding among the ethnic groups of Ruanda." The document recalled that the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi had not carried out the wish expressed by some of its members that it should examine the problems raised in the Manifesto of the Bahutu; that on the other hand, the *Mwami* had instructed the High Council of Ruanda to examine the question, and that the conclusions of the discussion had been transmitted to the Government, which had not taken up a definite position. Meanwhile, it alleged, numerous sections of the Catholic missionary press (*Kinyamateka* and *Temps nouveaux d'Afrique*) kept up the quarrel among the racial groups in Ruanda, and insults and malicious statements continued to be expressed in Mr. Gitara's "*Ifwi rya rubanda rugufi*". Lastly, the document expressed surprise at the Government's silence in the face of these machinations and considered that it should intervene against these incitements to racial hatred.

136. The only Hutu representative at that meeting of the leaders of the indigenous authorities protested. He condemned all forms of racial hatred but observed that the document quoted only writings by Hutu authors while making no mention of the documents by "great servants of the crown" who were against any form of fraternization of the Tutsi with the Hutu and in favour of legal domination by the Tutsi and slavery for the Hutu. The fact that the customary authorities had intentionally said nothing about this document was proof of their partiality.

137. On 28 April 1959 the Commission on Political Reform drew up its conclusions which were approved by the High Council and submitted to the Working Group. This document called for internal autonomy in 1960 and for profound reforms based on a healthy democracy, granting the people a wider

participation in public affairs through the system of electing their leaders, and separation of powers. In the legislative field it recommended the abolition of sub-chiefdom councils and district councils, but the retention of chiefdom council whose members would be directly elected by universal suffrage among men of Ruandese nationality. The president of the chiefdom council, to be known as a mayor, would be nominated by the *Mwami* from three candidates elected by the council. The High Council of the State would be composed of a mayor from each district, elected by all the councils, one delegate for each *commune*, and twenty-five co-opted members (among whom a certain number would be non-indigenous). The Council would be granted power of deliberation in certain matters concerning the State as a whole and would be progressively transformed into an assembly which would become a chamber of deputies.

138. On the executive level the form of government would be a constitutional monarchy. The constitution of the State would be drawn up by a special commission. A number of ministries would be established. The Prime Minister would be appointed by the High Council of the State. Ministers could be Ruandese or Belgians. These ministries would function with administrative staffs composed of Europeans and indigenous inhabitants governed by the same statute and supervised by the Resident, who would have the title of Governor. The chiefdom would become a *commune* with an elected or appointed mayor, and a staff governed by the same statute as for other public servants. Chiefs at present in office who had not been elected at elections for chiefdom councils would be pensioned, integrated into administrative services or given help to set up their own business.

139. The district and the sub-chiefdom would be purely administrative and not political units. Sub-chiefs would be *commune* officials, but in order to satisfy the aspirations of the mass of the people who had indicated their wish to choose sub-chiefs by means of elections, sub-chiefs would be elected by universal male suffrage, and the *Mwami* would appoint sub-chiefs from among the three candidates with the most votes.

140. The document then set out the judicial reform based on the separation of powers.

141. On the economic and financial level the Commission recommended a policy of budgetary compression and expressed the wish to see a policy of industrialization carried out. In the field of education it recommended the revision of the agreement with the missions and a wider state participation in the organization of education.

142. With regard to relations between the different ethnic groups of Ruanda, the Commission considered that the problem was more a social one but that there was a tendency for it to become racial. This was due to the unfortunate intervention of certain ill-disposed or ill-informed people, who stirred up racial hatred through the press and by subversive statements. The Commission was astounded by the fact that the

Government looked on passively at these intrigues aimed at the destruction of the State and seemed to encourage the division by its attitude.

143. The Commission noted, finally, that there was an atmosphere of mistrust between the High Council of the State and the governmental bodies, and that the main reason for this mistrust was the lack of contact and frank exchanges or views, and the absence of co-operation towards a common objective.

144. The Hutu groups, for their part—APROSOMA and the Hutu Social Movement—made known their views to the Working Group. They attacked the traditional customary system, which they held responsible for abuses and the exploitation of the people. They hoped that the authority of the European administration would be strengthened, and that it would retain control of the country for a long time to come. They were in favour rather of the gradual transfer of powers through the Africanization (or Euro-Africanization) of the Territory's government, which would allow time for the political education of the indigenous inhabitants and their initiation into administrative matters. They called for the advancement of the people through the granting of access to education and public office to all qualified persons, the introduction of universal suffrage, even for the appointment of judges, and they recommended the complete elimination of heads of chiefdoms, whom they considered to be too much attached to the feudal system.

145. When the Working Group had left, leaflets again circulated in the country. One anonymous leaflet distributed in June and signed "The warrior-defenders of Ruanda", denounced the Hutu leaders and announced the defeat of APROSOMA and of Gitera, "who have sold Ruanda". The leaflet said: "APROSOMA, which is fighting the Kalinga, will be vanquished by the tripartite people (i.e., consisting of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa); APROSOMA, which hates Ruanda and its Mwami, will be vanquished; APROSOMA, which is opposed to independence, will be vanquished", and, "Here are your orders; be ready for battle. The banner behind which we rally is Ruanda; our Government is synonymous with triumph."

146. The traditionalist groups claimed that many people were troubled by the Administration because they were suspected of distributing the leaflet. On the other hand, they claimed that Gitera was never troubled because of his leaflets, which became more and more violent. The anonymous leaflet made a deep impression on people's minds. Mr. Gitera replied to it with a violent article in his newspaper. At that time, too, a number of false rumours were in circulation. According to the rumours, it was the Belgians who had caused the development of certain cattle diseases, the spread of the tsetse fly in some parts of Ruanda, of tuberculosis, and so on.

147. The report of the Commission sent in January 1960 to investigate the disturbances in Ruanda states that in July 1959, during the last weeks of the life of the Mwami Mutara III, there was evidence of a change in the attitude of the Mwami towards the Belgian Admini-

nistration. Some people, the report says, interpreted it as a political ruse; others attributed it to a sudden awareness of the dangers to which Ruanda would be exposed by a flatly hostile attitude to the Trusteeship Administration at a time when the population was already in the grip of serious tensions. Perhaps, too, the Mwami Mutara had become convinced that the Trusteeship Administration's purpose, like his own, was the accession of the country to independence, and that he had no reason to enter into conflict with it. In any event, he tried to regain the confidence of the Administration and himself; at meetings, he denied certain false rumours which were circulating in Ruanda, such as the one that it was the Europeans who had introduced certain cattle diseases.

148. On 25 July 1959, after attending a showing of the film "The Lords of the Forest" at Usumbura, the Mwami Mutara III went to see his medical adviser. During the visit he was given an antibiotic injection and he died shortly afterwards.

149. It may be interesting to quote here a note from Mr. Vansina, an ethnologist and head of the IRSAC Centre at Astrida, on the political situation on the eve of the Mwami's death:

The political groups active in Ruanda were, on the Tutsi side, a coalition led by the Mwami Mutara, an independent group provisionally called the Christian Democratic Party led by Chief Bwanakweri and Mr. Makuza and Mr. Ndazaro. On the Hutu side, there were the APROSOMA group, led by Mr. Gitera (Habyarimana), a trade-union movement, the Muhutu Social Movement, led by Mr. Kayibanda and a movement led by Mr. Munyangaju, chief editor of the newspaper *Temps Nouveaux*.

The political movements discernible in the population were as follows:

(a) An amorphous mass which, traditionally, was fairly content with its lot, but was asking for political improvements, generally of very local interest;

(b) An ultra-conservative group of the Tutsi, who regretted the times past and wanted to return to them. They were mainly persons who had become impoverished or had not found a place in the ranks of the chiefs and sub-chiefs;

(c) Advanced persons, both Tutsi and Hutu, who demanded a liberalization of the system through the abolition of caste distinctions and the introduction of a democratic system under a constitutional king;

(d) Hutu movements, consisting usually of non-evolved persons, with anarchic tendencies. By contrast with the other movements which are spread throughout the country, these were localized in the Astrida and Giterama regions and, to a lesser extent, around Ruhengeri;

(e) The Hutu population of the north of Ruanda (Kisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba) who, for cultural and historical reasons, are trying to maintain the privileges they enjoyed before the introduction of an effective Tutsi administration.

The political groups were linked to the political movements in the following way:

(a) The Mwami coalition gained its support principally from the amorphous mass. But it encountered many difficulties because it included a Tutsi wing which represented the ultra-conservatives, and one comprising all the ambitious politicians who wanted a constitutional monarchy, but to varying degrees. It was the late Mwami who preserved the coalition.

(b) The Bwanakweri group found its supporters among the more advanced people and, more specifically, among the stu-

dents, it seems. The abolition of caste distinctions was its prime objective.

(c) The APROSOMA group had encouraged the anarchistic Hutu movement in the Astrida district, but its main support came from the Hutu in the northern part of Ruanda. This group, like those that follow, was backed by a large part of the African clergy.

(d) The Kayibanda group wooed the Hutu of Giterama. It also met with sympathy in the north. Its goal, however, was not primarily political. Contrary to the preceding group, it preached friendship between the castes.

(e) The Munyangaju movement was aimed at the advanced group, already being canvassed by the Bwanakweri group.

To sum up, three trends may be detected:

A moderate conservatism on the part of the Mwami Mutara;

A moderate progressivism on the part of the Bwanakweri, the Kayibanda and the Munyangaju;

A reactionary spirit among Gitera's group.

EVENTS BETWEEN 25 JULY 1959 AND NOVEMBER 1959

150. The news of the death of Mutara III was received with amazement. The most extraordinary rumours on the subject have been circulating ever since. It was said that Mutara had been poisoned by Europeans, according to some, at the instigation of the Bishop of Kabgayi. According to others, he had been assassinated by the Hutu leaders and in support of that theory an article was quoted in which his death had been predicted in veiled terms. According to other rumours the Mwami had committed suicide of reasons of custom. In the hope of putting an end to these rumours (which were still current at the time of the visit of the Mission), the Belgian Administration asked for an autopsy to be carried out, but the queen mother objected.

151. There are many detailed accounts—more or less objective—and commentaries—more or less subjective—on the period immediately following the death of the Mwami and the choice of his successor.

152. Instead of reconstituting the facts from innumerable documents we shall reproduce below some extracts from the report of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960:

After the death of the Mwami there was intense activity among the traditional groups (the *Biru*, the guardians of tradition and responsible for the appointment of a new Mwami; the influential chiefs; The High Council of the State; important decisions had to be taken (the interment of the former Mwami, the possible election of his successor, etc.).

Some considered the setting up of a regency council, and certain Hutu leaders even appear to have favoured the formation of a republic.

The burial of the Mwami Mutara III took place on 28 July 1959 on Mwima Hill, near Nyanza, in an atmosphere of extreme tension. When the Vice-Governors-General, Mr. J. P. Harroy and Mr. G. La Fontaine and other Belgian authorities reached the scene, the High Council of the State was in session. When the preliminary religious ceremony (*levée du corps*) was over and it was time for the coffin to be removed from the *Ibwami* (the home of the Mwami) to the church, the indigenous dignitaries had not yet arrived, as the meeting of the High Council of the State had not ended. The meeting had apparently been held to deal with two questions:

1. Should an autopsy on the body of the Mwami be requested and the burial therefore stopped?

2. Should the name of the new Mwami be announced before the burial of the Mwami Mutara and, if so, who should he be?

The High Council of the State decided in the negative as regards the first question. It is said that its decision on the second question was also in the negative.

It appears, therefore, that there was a disagreement between the *Biru*, traditionally responsible for the appointment of the new Mwami, and the High Council of the State, a body comprising the most influential of the chiefs, which, relying on the evolution of the customs, would have liked to assume the right to settle the question itself.

However that may be, the meeting of the High Council of the State came to an end and the procession moved to the church and then, after the religious ceremony, to Mwima Hill. A crowd of armed persons had gathered there and they were extremely nervous. After a statement by Chief Kayihura that according to custom the Mwami should not be buried until his successor was known, Mr. Rukeba began speaking and called to the crowd that the name of the new Mwami should be made known immediately. He was applauded by those present, who were probably afraid that the country would remain without a Mwami unless the successor to Mutara was designated at once. The representative of the *Biru*, Mr. Kayumba, then read out the name of the new Mwami, Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, the son of Musinga and half-brother to Mutara, who was immediately acclaimed by those present.

According to the information supplied to us it seems that it was only after the declaration of Kayihura that the name of the successor to Mutara was finally sent to the Vice-Governor-General and to the Resident. However, during the preceding days, the Belgian Administration had received information (often contradictory or vague) on the questions which were under discussion and in particular on the designation of Mutara's successor; it had been advised that incidents might be expected on the morning of the burial and that there might be objection to the interment until an autopsy had been performed or a new Mwami designated. The name of J. B. Ndahindurwa had been mentioned among the possible successors to Mutara, and the Belgian Administration knew that he had a good chance of being appointed.

Once the name of the new Mwami was known and after the future Kigeli V had agreed to rule as constitutional Mwami, the Vice-Governor-General soon gave his agreement to the choice of the *Biru*, a choice which, moreover, the Belgian Administration considered to be a good one.

There has been talk of the "Mwima coup d'état". We do not think that the election of the new Mwami was in the nature of a plot against the Trusteeship Authority. It seems rather that there was some confused discussion, perhaps even a disagreement, between the *Biru* (the guardians of custom and responsible for the designation of the Mwami) and the majority of the members of the High Council of the State, who considered that the decision should be made by them. There was also some fear, as has been said, of certain republican tendencies which had shown themselves in certain quarters in Ruanda.

The decision taken was not bad in itself: among the various possible candidates the choice of J. B. Ndahindurwa commended itself to the Belgian Administration also. On the other hand, the way in which the traditionalist groups acted towards the Trusteeship Authority was, to say the least, unusual. The highest authorities who were present at Kigali, and then at Mwima, were not even consulted when these decisions were taken.

Whatever one's view may be as to the circumstances in which the choice of a new Mwami was made, it is certain that the incidents of 28 July 1959 were used against the Trusteeship

Authority. The population gained the impression that the authority had been confronted with a *fait accompli* and had been compelled to yield, a circumstance which was not calculated to increase its prestige. Some people considered that the European authority had suffered a defeat and the rumour naturally circulated.

153. The analysis of these days, made on 31 July by Mr. Vansina, and ethnologist and head of the IRSAC centre at Astrida, is also interesting to note:

After the death of the *Mwami*, the political groups had the following solutions to propose: the abolition of the monarchy, the introduction of a monarchy which would be partly hereditary, because rotated among certain Tutsi clans and lines, and partly free since the king would be chosen by means of elections, the introduction of a constitutional hereditary monarchy and the strengthening of absolute monarchy. Munyangaju and Gitara opted for the second solution, Bwanakweri appears to have favoured first the second solution and then the third, the politicians' wing of the old coalition favoured the third, and the fourth was undoubtedly that endorsed by the ultra-conservatives. The attitude of Kayibanda is as yet unknown to us.

The death of the *Mwami* was announced over the radio on Saturday evening. The public for the most part learned of it on Sunday 26 July through the announcement made at the Sunday morning Masses. The reaction in the Astrida region was a defence reflex. Everyone was immediately aware of the extent of the crisis. All stayed at home and there was no one to be seen in the town. When the body was carried past there were very few spectators. There were few spectators also when the funeral cortege reached Nyanza. Those who were there showed neither grief nor anger.

The observations made in the course of Tuesday have been recorded in a special report. To sum them up, it may be said that there were numerous highway incidents, that the bulk of the population was afraid and stayed at home or went out armed, even at Astrida, that the Hutu leaders were going to ask for a republic, and that a small group of Tutsi would propose Ndahindurwa. This group included the *Biru*, the guardians of custom, a priest who claimed to have received the oral testament of the deceased, and the vice-president of the High Council of the State. These made contact with a number of chiefs and members of the High Council, but we do not know whether those people were simply asked for their agreement to the name of the person chosen by the *Biru* or whether some of them were asked to spread propaganda. We do not yet know the names of all of them. Outside this group, it is possible that among other Tutsi chiefs and leaders some support was beginning to form for a given candidate, but this was not clear.

The group supporting Ndahindurwa was in a very strong position. It met the wishes of the population, it claimed to be the custodian of the last wishes of the deceased, it based itself wholly on custom, it backed a candidate acceptable to all except republicans, it would, by acting rapidly, prevent political anarchy and internecine struggle, and it would relax tension. Objectively speaking, its action was very good for the country. The only thing that may be held against it is that it did not dare to confide in the European Government. These people knew that their candidate would be acceptable, and yet they did not propose him earlier. It would seem that they feared some manoeuvres by the Hutu republicans. To make matters clearer, we wish to point out that the republican leaders were also at Nyanza, and that their activities there were far more noticeable than in the rest of the country.

In the last analysis, any other solution would have been impossible. It would have necessitated the use of force to stamp out the various foci of incipient insurrection. It would have aroused a hatred against Europeans where none had existed

before. It would have led to a political impasse. Any other candidate proposed by the Administration would have been regarded as an usurper. Continued delay would have encouraged the formation of rival factions and in the long run none of the competing candidates would have been able to command unanimity. Lastly, the proposed candidate was certainly very acceptable from the European point of view.

The high point of the day was the burial of *Mwami* Mutara at Mwima. It is not yet clear to us whether what happened was premeditated or not. It is our impression that Mr. Kayihura had hesitated but that Mr. Rukeba persuaded him to act. In that particular situation, the only possible line of conduct was not to ratify the choice *hic et nunc*, while preserving the possibility of doing it later. For, as we have said, the choice was excellent. The decisions taken were precisely the right ones. The result was that the crowd scattered and that *Mwami* Kigeli V could be proclaimed the same evening without any loss of prestige on the part of the Administration in the eyes of Ruanda chiefs.

154. The political parties of Ruanda were officially formed and began their activities in August and September 1959. One of them was the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), officially constituted on 3 September 1959. Its chairman was Mr. François Rukeba,²⁴ a business man at Kigali, who was neither a chief nor a Tutsi, but who, as described above, has played an outstanding part in the naming of the new *Mwami*, at Mutara's burial. By a judgement of the Ruanda court-martial of 22 January 1960, Mr. Rukeba was to be sentenced to six years' imprisonment for arbitrary arrest and bodily torture committed during the incidents of November 1959.

155. According to some sources, Mr. Rukeba represented the emotional and "prophetic" element of the party, whereas some of the important Ruanda chiefs constituted its "brain trust"; these included Mr. Michel Kayihura, Chief of Bugoyi, Mr. Pierre Mungulurire, Chief of Bwanacyambwe, Mr. Chrysostome Rwangombwa, Chief of Ndurwa, and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, Secretary of the High Council of the State (all four now self-exiled to Tanganyika).

156. The party's programme was set out in a document entitled "Manifesto of the political party 'Abashyirahame b'Urwanda'" at the party's first meeting held at Kigali on 13 September. This document, which incidentally was communicated to the Trusteeship Council,²⁵ called for "the union of all Ruandese for the purpose of achieving true progress in all spheres in Ruanda". It was addressed to all Ruandese of goodwill, without ethnic, social or religious distinction. The objective was internal self-government in 1960 and the independence of Ruanda in 1962. The proposed form of government was a hereditary

constitutional monarchy, with responsible ministers. The legislative organs would be elected by direct universal adult male suffrage. The judicial power would be separated from the executive power. The manifesto also sketched out an economic and social programme and called for a revision of the agreement with the missions concerning education and a broader participation by the country in the organization and administration of education. As regards human relations, the party intended to combat any incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination between whites and blacks or among Ruandese. Thus, the party meant to achieve its aim—the emancipation of Ruanda—in peace and order, without resorting to violence and in maintaining full legality and respect for the authorities.

157. The first meeting of UNAR, held at Kigali on 13 September 1959, was, according to the report of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960, attended by a crowd estimated at 2,000 persons. The Chairman, Mr. Rukeba, spoke first, proclaiming his love for the *Mwami* and reading out the party's programme. There were nine speakers, including Mr. Michel Rwagasana, Secretary of the High Council of the State, and Chiefs Mungulurire, Rwangombwa and Kayihura. Generally speaking, the speeches lasted about ten minutes each, except those of Mr. Rwagasana, Mr. Rwangombwa and Mr. Kayihura, which were longer. Their main theme was an appeal to all Ruandese to unite. Mr. Rwagasana's speech dealt with future political development and with the effects of self-government and independence; he also drew attention to old abuses which had to be remedied and accused the whites and the missionaries of having divided the country.

158. Mr. Mungulurire appealed to the Ruandese to unite and stated that he was in favour of political reform. Mr. Rwangombwa devoted particular attention to relations between races (Ruandese and Europeans or Asians) and between peoples (Ruandese and aliens) and denounced any discrimination between Europeans and indigenous inhabitants. Mr. Kayihura, for his part, lauded patriotism, the beauty of the country and its national traditions and advocated the study of the history and institutions of ancient Ruanda and the need for the country to take its youth in hand.

159. After the singing of a song which was called the national hymn, Mr. Rukeba spoke again to stress the love he bore, and everyone should bear, for the *Mwami* and criticized the party hostile to the *Mwami*. He brought the meeting to a close by urging everyone to join UNAR.

160. In its report of January 1960, the Commission of Inquiry remarked that it was not easy for persons who were strangers to Ruanda to judge the real implication and the emotional value of the phrases that had been uttered, for the following reasons:

(a) UNAR and its opponents were in disagreement even on the actual words spoken. There was a hectorated French text of the speeches which had been

made public by UNAR during October and November; the supporters of UNAR maintained that this text corresponded faithfully to what had been said, whereas its opponents failed to find in it some of the excesses they claimed to have heard;

(b) The speeches were made in Ruandese, which it is extremely difficult to translate into French if all shades of meaning are to be rendered;

(c) The Ruandese are fond of hints and innuendoes, so that words which might seem harmless to anyone not familiar with Ruanda assume a very different meaning to anyone who knows local contitions;

(d) A written report cannot convey the atmosphere of a meeting and—whatever may have been said at Kigali—it is common knowledge that at a public meeting speakers are often carried away and say more than they really mean.

161. However that may be, UNAR protested against the account of the meeting published in the newspaper *Temps nouveaux d'Afrique* and drafted a "correction" in which it denied that speakers at the Kigali meeting had expressed any anti-foreign, anti-Belgian or anti-Catholic sentiments and registered formal and unqualified disapproval of recourse to violence and constraint.

162. The Commission of Inquiry, in its comments on the origins of UNAR, said that UNAR, trusting in its strength, hoped that the forthcoming elections would give it an overwhelming majority making it really the "single party", all-powerful in Ruanda. In order to achieve that goal, UNAR had to take an ultra-nationalist attitude and discourage possible opponents. This second reason is the explanation for the violent tone at the meetings, a violence which was unusual in this State where the ruling class (Tutsi) is highly civilized and courteous, and for the intimidation campaign of October 1959.

163. The Commission of Inquiry felt that the Kigali meeting had made a strong impression in Ruanda and that those present had been particularly impressed to see influential representatives of the customary authority attack the Trusteeship Administration or at least provide cover for those who launched the attacks. After the first UNAR meeting, there was certainly a great deal of confusion in people's minds. The Hutu referred to the meeting of 13 September 1959 as the "UNAR declaration of war".

164. Other UNAR meetings were held, at Astrida on 20 September and at Gitarama on 27 September. A large number of APROSOMA supporters went to the Astrida meeting to organize a counter-manifestation against the UNAR leaders. They even attempted to give a display of folk-dancing at the meeting place. That was the first occasion on which the Hutu had publicly opposed an action of Tutsi notables.

165. On 14 September, a new party, the *Rassemblement démocratique ruandais* (RADER) was officially founded. This party also intended to fight

²⁴ In the past, Mr. Rukeba had had some difficulties with the Belgian Administration. He submitted a petition to the first Visiting Mission of the Trusteeship Council in 1948 (text in document T/217, pp. 113-115). At that time, the Administering Authority explained that Mr. Rukeba's difficulties with the law in 1944 had arisen because he had been guilty of altering entries in a judgement register and that a transportation order was issued against him in 1947 (T/217, p. 119). Later he submitted his views to the 1954 Visiting Mission (T/1168, paras. 89-90) expressing some criticism of the *Mwami* and the chiefs. T/1957 Visiting Mission also received a memorandum from Mr. Rukeba.

²⁵ T/PET.3/100, annex 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, annex 4.

for "the establishment of a social, economic and cultural order based on authentic democracy in harmonious relationship with the various constituent groupings of the Ruandese people". It declared itself in favour of the election by universal suffrage of chiefs, sub-chiefs and councillors, for land reform, for internal self-government by 1964 and for the independence of Ruanda by 1968. It favoured a constitutional monarchy, affirmed its friendly feelings towards Belgium and gave its full support to the spreading of the Gospel in Ruanda. Its committee chairman was Chief Prosper Bwanakweri, who had been transferred in 1954 for having displeased *Mwami* Mutara over the question of setting up a democratic political party.

166. The fact that several of its members were officials of the Trusteeship Administration led to the accusation that RADER was a party created and supported by the Administering Authority. In fact RADER was to play a minor role in the political agitation which preceded the November disorders.

167. On 9 October 1959, a fourth party, the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), which developed from the Mouvement social Hutu, published its manifesto. The party's aim was to end the Tutsi hegemony and the feudal regime. Ruanda could not attain independence until it had been democratized. It accepted the constitutional royalty of the *Mwami* but called for reforms ensuring the separation of powers, the access of the Hutu to education at its various levels, the recognition of individual landed property, and, in general, an end to the malpractices of the ruling classes. The most prominent figure in the party is Mr. Grégoire Kayibanda.

168. In September and October 1959, the Catholic Church of Ruanda, represented by its two bishops, Mgr. Bigirumwami, Apostolic Vicar of Nyundo, and Mgr. Perraudin, Apostolic Vicar of Kabgayi, made their position known by means of two confidential circular letters to all Catholic priests of the State.

169. The first circular, dated 24 September 1959, was a warning against the UNAR party, which, according to the letter, wished to have a monopoly on patriotism and represented a trend closely resembling national socialism. It wanted to remove the schools from mission influence on the pretext that they would be better administered by the State, and it had plans for enrolling young people in some sort of national service, thus removing them from the influence of the family and church. Lastly, the bishops drew attention to alleged pro-communist and pro-Islamic influences in the party.

170. The letter of 11 October circulated by the two bishops was a warning against APROSOMA, whose statements they felt displayed unchristian feelings of race hatred. The two bishops also reproached the party for distorting certain remarks regarding the Kalinga (the royal drum of Ruanda). It might be noted that the publication of the circular was followed by a letter of apology and the resignation

of Mr. Joseph Habyarimana Gitera as chairman of APROSOMA.

171. It should be observed that Mgr. Perraudin, who has since become the Archbishop of Kabgayi, transmitted these texts to the Visiting Mission in order to demonstrate the impartiality and neutrality of the Catholic Church of Ruanda and to refute the accusations levelled against it. The Mission found, nevertheless, that a large part of the population felt that the situation was not quite so simple. Many thought that the Archbishop of Kabgayi was the central figure in the support given to the Hutu parties, which explains the leaflets attacking him personally. On the other hand, Mgr. Bigirumwami of Nyundo, who is a Ruandese and a Tutsi, has the reputation of sympathizing with UNAR.

172. On 9 October, *Mwami* Kigeli V was sworn in at his investiture at Kigali, a matter which had given rise to certain difficulties.²⁷ When called upon to sign the act of investiture at Kigali on 6 October, in the presence of the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Kigeli V insisted that the ceremony be conducted in the presence of the members of the High Council of Ruanda and also that the oath of office be altered to include the promise which he had made to reign as a constitutional *Mwami*. The ceremony was postponed for three days and the *Mwami*'s wishes were finally complied with.

173. During the month of October, the political tension in Ruanda increased. Aside from the activities of the newly created political parties, there was a series of incidents during the month which assumed the nature of a campaign of intimidation. False rumours of all kinds were in continuous circulation. One rumour, for example, had it that injections and vaccinations produced sterility, and this seriously hampered the anti-tuberculosis programme in Ruanda. Expectation of the Belgian Government's statement on Ruanda-Urundi also served to aggravate the tense situation.

174. On 10 October, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi issued an order prohibiting political meetings in the hope of restoring a measure of calm and of preventing the general tension from reaching explosive proportions.

175. The chairmen of the Hutu parties of Ruanda, together with some Hutu *évolués* of Urundi (see para. 341 below) expressed their distress in a letter addressed on 14 October to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. They stated their fear that the internal autonomy under consideration for Ruanda would in practice mean the return of exclusive power to the Tutsi clan. "We become enraged at the thought of seeing our people fall once again under the merciless yoke of the Tutsi and their racist ideology." They voiced their apprehension at the formation of political parties like UNAR, which were established and supported by the Tutsi authorities, parties that were nationalist, totalitarian, anti-democratic, anti-western and reactionary but which, in spite of this, gained influence over the

ignorant Hutu masses. They expressed their fear that these parties might win elections in many areas "owing to the ignorant or terrorized support of the people" and consequently they implored the Belgian Government "not to terminate its trusteeship until the Hutu people were sufficiently emancipated to be able to defend their rights effectively".

176. At the same time, in a letter of 29 October 1959 addressed to the Trusteeship Council,²⁸ UNAR asserted that the Administration was utilizing the "Hutu-Tutsi question" as a means of delaying the emancipation of Ruanda. They also complained that UNAR was encountering all kinds of difficulties raised by the local administration.

177. During the entire month of October, while UNAR complained of attacks by the Hutu parties against the Tutsi and against the institution of monarchy and asserted that those parties enjoyed the tacit support of certain officials and missionaries, the Hutu parties and RADER maintained that UNAR was carrying on a veritable campaign of intimidation. A long list of terrorist acts perpetrated by UNAR was drawn to the attention both of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960 and the Visiting Mission.

178. The acts consisted of publicly uttered threats against people's lives, made mainly by the Swahili (Moslems), of violence against and assault of individuals (some notables who were not members of UNAR were victims), of crimes against property (banana plantations felled, shops pillaged or boycotted, cows mutilated, vehicles damaged, etc.).

179. According to the Commission of Inquiry, these were apparently intended to induce those still hesitant to join UNAR and to frighten opponents and moderates. The terrorist campaign was certainly effective, the Commission found. Thus, when the Administration sent a circular letter to all chiefs and sub-chiefs in which it defined the extent to which they might engage in political activities, the customary authorities of several districts refused to acknowledge receipt for fear of reprisals.

180. The campaign of intimidation appears to have at first been directed against the Tutsi notables who did not belong to UNAR, and principally against those who sympathized with RADER. The outcome, according to sources hostile to UNAR, was that in order to defend themselves from the danger, "almost every member and supporter of RADER is going over to the UNAR camp". Subsequently, Hutu leaders, too, were attacked—particularly those of APROSOMA.

181. On 25 October 1959 an anonymous leaflet was posted on trees in the Nyanza district. It read: "These are the enemies of Ruanda, of the kingdom and of the Kalinga." It then listed the names of ten RADER and Hutu leaders, saying that their chief was Mgr. Perraudin of Kabgayi. The leaflet continued: "People of Ruanda, all these are traitors to Ruanda. It is they who want to keep us in slavery under the

Belgians, they who have gathered at Kabgayi under Mgr. Perraudin to plot the death of H.M. Kigeli V and the overthrow of the kingdom in Ruanda in order to make us slaves. ... People of Ruanda, let us unite our forces and, whatever the cost, seek out these enemies of Ruanda and their offspring and purge Ruanda of this bad seed. Let us march forward and exterminate all these snakes, the enemies of Ruanda."

182. On 27 October, a RADER delegation handed to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi and to the *Mwami* of Ruanda a note entitled: "Grave political situation in Ruanda: Terrorism." The note, after citing various cases of attacks on people and property, concluded as follows: "The gravity of this situation should not escape the notice of the Government. The lack of any effective reaction on the part of the Administration is highly encouraging to the terrorist campaign. We whose persons and belongings are threatened feel bound to notify the Government that in these circumstances, the members of the other political parties will be constrained, out of self-defence, to resort to the same methods."

183. In a letter to the Governor, dated 3 November 1959, UNAR protested vigorously against the allegations that it was responsible for the incidents which had occurred in Ruanda. The letter added that such allegations were part of a systematic campaign of slander against the party.

184. Whereas some observers view this period of mutual intimidation and terrorism in October as one of the immediate causes of the November disturbances, mention should also be made of another occurrence which appears to have contributed to the tension in Ruanda. The issue concerned action taken by the Administration against three chiefs who had taken part in the first meeting of UNAR at Kigali on 13 September 1959. The action and the circumstances in which it was taken are described in the report of the Commission of Inquiry.

185. The Administration regarded as inadmissible that chiefs, who were members of the customary administration, should attack it at a public meeting or should take part in meetings mainly intended for propaganda against the Administering Authority. It accused these chiefs of having, by virtue of their presence, condoned what was said at the meetings through their prestige and authority, the more so since it had been established that these chiefs, seated in places of honour, had applauded the passages hostile to the Administering Authority and had thus roused the audience to enthusiastic response.

186. The Administration therefore decided, on 12 October 1959, to transfer the Chiefs Michel Kayihura, Pierre Mung'alurire and Chrysostome Rwangombwa to other chiefdoms by way of disciplinary action. These chiefs were, however, popular personages who headed important chiefdoms and who moreover expected to hold important positions in Ruanda: Kayihura was vice-president of the High Council of Ruanda, a member of the permanent deputation of the High

²⁷ T/PET.3/100, annex 5.

²⁸ Ibid., annex 2.

Council of Ruanda-Urundi; Rwangombwa and Mungalurire were members of the High Council of Ruanda; the former was also a member of the permanent deputiation of the High Council and the latter was an alternate member of the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. All three were moreover held in repute and had stood high in the estimation of the Belgian Administration.

187. It was not, however, until October, that is, one month after the Kigali meeting, that the Administration published its circular letter relating to the membership and participation of chiefs, sub-chiefs, and the staff of the courts in political parties. The letter said that chiefs and sub-chiefs were not prohibited from joining a political party as private persons, but in the exercise of their functions or in connexion with them, they were not allowed to engage in any action or propaganda on behalf of a political party. It was recalled that chiefs and sub-chiefs were not permitted to associate themselves with actions or speeches designed to provoke resentment or hatred against the Administering Authority, nor were they allowed to collaborate with a party whose programme or habitual propaganda tended to discredit the Administration of the Territory or attack the honour of Belgium.

188. On 15 October, the three chiefs who had been transferred addressed a letter to the Governor in which they protested against the charges made against them. They denounced the local administrative authorities, accusing them of bias and declaring that their own conduct had been irreproachable, that they had been victimized by arbitrary action and that, as a result, they preferred to give up their administrative career rather than abjure their political opinions. They ended their letter by saying: "We now have an advantage over the local trusteeship administration since we now know that it uses force to pervert justice and that it must therefore be weak. If you do not provide a remedy, this policy may lead to a disastrous breach, resulting in a stinging defeat for Belgian policy in Ruanda."

189. On 16 October, Mwami Kigeli V addressed a note to the Governor in which he accused the Resident of Ruanda and his deputy of having founded a political party and of agitating against the dynasty and pointed out that any attack on Chief Kayihura was an attack on the Mwami himself. He declared the action taken against the chiefs to be illegal and after remarking that the country was customarily in mourning until the new Mwami was enthroned, he ended his letter as follows:

I must accordingly warn you that the combination of all these circumstances can only lead to a continuation of this period of mourning, until law and order have been restored.

The enthronement festivities which were being prepared will not now take place, in view of the state of mind prevailing in the country... I shall be enthroned when people of all opinions in Ruanda are in a position to take part in the rejoicing.

To guard against misinterpretation, I shall explain my action to public opinion in Ruanda, in order that my people may know the reasons which have led me to continue the period of mourning.

190. These documents were sent to the Governor at Kigali, where he had summoned the chiefs, on 17 October 1959.

191. The report of the Commission of Inquiry describes the events of 17 October and the following days in these terms:

Despite a prohibition of assembly, two or three hundred people met before the residency, where the interview between the Governor and the chiefs was to be held. The crowd eulogized Chief Mungalurire and demanded an abrogation of the measure. The Governor agreed to receive a delegation of four. He also informed the chiefs that their resignation had not been accepted and that he would give them eight days to think things over.

The crowd returned in the afternoon. Some of the demonstrators were very excited; apparently, they had been drinking. After some hesitation, the police were called upon to scatter the demonstrators. They refused to disperse and some stones were thrown; when one of the soldiers was wounded in the head with a billhook, the police used tear-gas grenades and then some explosive grenades. Four people were wounded, and one of them died in the hospital.

Other mass demonstrations, during which the crowd proclaimed its devotion to its chiefs, also took place at Nyanza (Rwangombwa's chiefdom) and at Bugoyi (Kayihura's chiefdom) but there were no serious incidents.

Another meeting with the three chiefs was held on 24 October 1959. It took place without any incidents, since security measures (reinforcements of gendarmes) were taken. At this meeting the decision to reinstate the original chiefdom was maintained, but it was decided between the Governor and the three chiefs to postpone for several weeks the second part of the disciplinary action (taking over their new chiefdoms), pending the results of current negotiations with the Mwami concerning the statement he was to make. Meanwhile the sub-chiefs of the Bugoyi of Kisenyi territory (Kayihura's chiefdom) submitted a collective resignation.

While thus partially reversing his decision, the Governor outlined to his administration the attitude it should adopt vis-à-vis the political parties. The Chief Administrative Officer warned his officials against the tendency to ask for too much; they should make greater efforts to hold aloof from the parties and should plan their action less on the basis of party programmes than of the methods used by the parties. He warned them against systematic hostility against UNAR, for it was essential to maintain negotiations, if only to help this party to understand that its present methods were reprehensible. Finally, he recommended extreme vigilance in maintaining order during the forthcoming weeks.

After the meeting of 24 October, the pressure exercised by the customary authorities on the trusteeship authority to withdraw the disciplinary measure continued. After 24 October, the Mwami sent another letter to the Governor. (It was then that the note of 16 October was returned without any amendment.) The Governor maintained his decision, but agreed to postpone until after the governmental declaration the appointment of the new candidates to the three chiefdoms deprived of their customary authority. (The "three chiefs" were supposed during that period to stay away from their original chiefdoms.)

192. UNAR has described the "dramatic events at Kigali on 17 October 1959" in its communication of 11 November to the Trusteeship Council.²⁹ It was repeated in that document that nothing which was said at the Kigali meeting of 13 September 1959 was hostile

to Belgium and that UNAR was only concerned with Ruanda's interests. It pointed out that other chiefs and officials had taken an equally active part in other political parties and therefore the measures against the three chiefs were unjust and should be revoked. Others, however, criticized the Administering Authority for its lack of firmness and considered that once involved in a trial of strength it should have acted more vigorously.

193. It is undeniable that the affair of the three chiefs was a decisive turning point indicating a break between the Administration and UNAR. It led to the voluntary exile of the three chiefs and made it extremely difficult for talks to be resumed.

THE DISTURBANCES OF NOVEMBER 1959

Introduction

194. In November 1959 a series of violent incidents occurred in Ruanda which have been compared to an incipient civil war between two sections of the population. The causes and course of these incidents were naturally the subject of many interviews held by the Mission. It was provided with copious and detailed information on the matter. Before the Mission arrived in the Territory, it was presented with the report of the Commission of Inquiry set up by the Belgian Government in January 1960. On arriving at Usumbura, the Mission received from the Resident-General's offices numerous documents on the course of the incidents, the measures taken by the Administration to restore order and the proceedings of the judicial authority, including judgements given by the Military Court. The Mwami and the chief political parties have given the Mission detailed reports on the causes and course of the incidents which have also been the subject of many petitions.

195. The different documents submitted to the Mission vary in significance. The findings of the Military Court and the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry offer some guarantee of objectivity. But the reports of the political parties are by their very nature partisan documents. Moreover, in spite of the abundance of information supplied there are still many gaps. In this long series of dramatic events many points have not yet been cleared up and may never be, in spite of investigations. The Mission did not wish to devote all its time to the problem since there were questions concerning the future of the Territory which seemed to need the greater part of its attention.

196. In the following sections, the Mission has tried to describe the course of the incidents as concisely as possible. They contain not so much a chronological explanation as an analysis of a tragic and complicated episode in the history of Ruanda. From the bulk of the information received the Mission has only selected those items which it seemed possible to consider as reasonably objective. When opposing groups have advanced divergent views on some important points it has thought fit to mention them.

The Hutu attacks

198. The first serious incident which led to general disorder occurred on 3 November 1959. On 1 November at Byimana, in Ndiza (Gitarama district), Dominique Mbonyomutwa, one of the few Hutu sub-chiefs at that time and a leader of PARMEHUTU, was attacked by a band of young Tutsi. The attack on Mbonyomutwa caused great agitation among the local population, which is mainly Hutu. The next day groups of Hutu began to demonstrate at Gitarama in front of the quarter of the Swahili, who were known to be supporters of UNAR. Other groups attacked the house of Chief Haguma, destroying his banana and coffee plantations. The following day, 3 November, when the false rumour went around that Mbonyomutwa had died, a crowd of Hutu gathered in front of the house of Chief Gashagaza to protest: an affray ensued during which two Tutsi notables visiting the Chief were killed and several others wounded. The same day another band of Hutu pillaged the house of Tutsi sub-chief Biriguza of Ndiza after beating him and several Tutsi who were in his house. The next day another Tutsi, sub-chief Ruhinguka, was attacked and killed in the neighbouring chiefdom of Marangaza.

199. The various versions of how these first incidents took place more or less tally, but they do not agree as to the immediate cause. UNAR and the Mwami maintained that the Mbonyomutwa affair had been contrived by the Hutu leaders in order to incite attacks against the Tutsi. According to the report of the UNAR regional committee of Astrida, Mbonyomutwa had himself asked close friends to circulate on 2 November a rumour of his death. This version is denied by the Hutu leaders, and particularly by Mbonyomutwa himself, who pointed out that the violent popular Hutu reaction on hearing of the attack on Mbonyomutwa was perfectly natural, as Tutsi leaders had been spreading the rumour since 29 October that the Hutu sub-chief would not live to see the end of the week and that all the Hutu fighters would die with him. They also maintained that the Hutu had attacked the house of chief Gashagaza because one of the Tutsi sub-chiefs at his house had provoked them first.

200. Whatever the truth of the matter, this first explosion of violence was the signal for a long series of incidents in which Hutu hordes pillaged and set fire to thousands of huts belonging to the Tutsi. The first fires were observed in Ndiza in the night of 3 to 4 November 1959, and soon spread to neighbouring chiefdoms. After reaching on 4 November Marangaza and Rukoma (Gitarama district) and Bumbugo (Kigali district), the fires spread on the next day to Kingogo,

²⁹ T/PET.3/100, annex 6.

Kanage and Bushivu (Kisenyi district) and Kibali (Ruhengeri district). On 6 November fires were observed in the chiefdoms of Buberuka, Bugarura and Bukonya (Ruhengeri district) and those of Bwishaza and Budana-Nyantango (Kibuye district). The following day the incendiaries were operating in the Bugoyi chiefdom (Kisenyi district) and going on from Ruhengeri were invading the Biumba district. Finally on 8 November the fires spread to Mulera and Rwankeri (Ruhengeri district) in the extreme north of the country.

201. It is impossible to describe the incidents of this phase in orderly sequence—the information collected is too confused and incomplete—but an attempt may be made to point out certain characteristic features. In some areas like Rukoma the incendiaries were soon halted by the Tutsi who, when they recovered from the surprise of the attack, had time to organize their defence. Elsewhere, however, in chiefdoms in the north and north-west where the Tutsi were in a minority and their ascendancy only recent, fires continued for days until there was not a Tutsi hut left. Except for certain isolated cases, the last big fires were observed on 13 November.

202. The operations were generally carried out by a fairly similar process. Incendiaries set off in bands of ten. Armed with matches and paraffin, which the indigenous inhabitants used in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses they passed on their way and set fire to them. On their way they would enlist other incendiaries to follow in the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, would give up and return home. Thus, day after day fires spread from hill to hill.

203. Generally speaking the incendiaries, who were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them. The most serious incidents involving tragic wounding and death occurred when the Tutsi were determined to fight back, or when there were clashes with the forces of order. Thus on 6 November in the Ruhengeri district, the sub-chief Nkundiye was killed trying to defend his home. On 8 November at Mabanza a troop of gendarmerie had to use force to disperse a band of incendiaries; two people were wounded and two died. On the same day in the Nyondo region where the Tutsi had organized their defence, skirmishes took place resulting in six deaths and several persons being wounded. The most serious incident was on 7 November at Rubengera, in the Kibuye district. The day before a band of about 200 Bakiga (Hutu dwelling in the mountainous regions of the Congo-Nile crest) launched an attack on the neighbouring chiefdom of Bwishaza, burning and pillaging all the Tutsi huts they found on their way. From Bwishaza the incendiaries, operating in groups of three to six persons, arrived at dawn on 7 November near Rubengera where the local population, Hutu and Tutsi, warned of their approach, had prepared their defence under the orders of the Tutsi chief. Surprised by the attack of the local population and weighed down with booty captured, they could only put up a sporadic resistance. More than fifty-eight incendiaries were therefore massacred.

204. It seems that the incendiaries were in most cases people of simple mentality who committed the worst excesses without realizing what they were doing. They burned and pillaged because they had been told to do so and because the operation did not seem to involve great risk and enabled them to seize loot in the victims' huts. Many of them genuinely believed they were acting in the name of the *Mwami* who, according to the rumours spread, was being kept a prisoner by the Tutsi and had ordered their huts to be burned in order to drive them out of the country. For that reason some of the incendiaries sought him out on his tour of the country after the disturbances and asked to be paid for the work they had done for him. Furthermore, when the military reconnaissance aircraft flew over the scene of the disturbances to track down the incendiaries the latter thought the *Mwami* was in the aircraft and that its course indicated the direction in which they were to start more fires. Others of them believed they were acting with the approval of the Belgian authorities. In certain places they went to the administrator of the district to ask him for paraffin. On 7 November at Kingogo, when a military patrol arrested a band of incendiaries and loaded them on its truck they were convinced that it was in order to take them further away to start more fires.

205. A great number of cases in connexion with the fires have already been tried by the Military Court. In most cases the Court gave the accused the benefit of extenuating circumstances because it concluded that they were people of simple and primitive mentality who had unthinkingly executed orders given by certain leaders, and had been influenced by the tension and general excitement prevailing in the country at the disturbances.

206. If it was established that these outbreaks were not largely spontaneous but that the incendiaries acted on orders, the question would arise as to who gave those orders. UNAR accused the Hutu leaders and even certain officials of the Administration of having incited the Hutu population to burn the Tutsi huts. Such an accusation was denied by the persons incriminated and the judicial authorities in their very searching inquiries did not think the charge sustained.

The Tutsi reaction

207. From 6 November onwards, the Tutsi leaders took a series of counter-measures to stop the revolt of the Hutu. The Hutu parties maintain that those measures were part of a plan of attack prepared as far back as October to decapitate the Hutu movements and that operations were directed by the principal leaders of UNAR whose headquarters are in the *Ibwami* (the *Mwami's* palace) at Nyanza, and by the *Mwami* himself. UNAR on the other hand claimed that the Tutsi reaction was an act of legitimate self-defence. It pointed out that at the beginning of the riots the *Mwami* had asked the Governor to take steps to restore order or failing that to authorize him to do so himself. The Governor's reply, however, was slow to arrive

and in the meantime the disturbances were taking a more and more dangerous turn. The population therefore, tired of waiting for action by the Belgian authorities that failed to materialize, decided to take the necessary defence measures and reprisals. This version corresponds for the most part to the views expressed by the *Mwami*. In this connexion the Resident-General stated in his speech of 3 March 1960 that the UNAR leaders had apparently wished to seize an opportunity of taking some striking action in order to impress the common people and to neutralize movements hostile to UNAR policy by attempting to deprive them of their most valuable representatives and spokesmen.

208. From 6 to 10 November 1959, a number of commando raids were organized to arrest or kill certain Hutu leaders. On 6 November, Secyugu, a Hutu trader known to be a supporter of PARMEHUTU, was attacked and killed in his house near Nyanza by an armed band led by the Twa Chief Rwevu. During the two succeeding days a number of other Hutu, among them Nsokana, Habarugera, Barekeraho, Tririzibwami, Gatabazi, Nebuzishi, Ntagobwa and Callixte Kabayisa were assassinated in similar circumstances in the Nyanza and Gitarama districts. On 8 November, the riots spread to the Astrida district, where a councillor of APROSOMA, Innocent Mukwiye Polepole, was attacked and killed, while in the Nyanza district several other Hutu leaders were killed, including "monitors" Sindibona and Munyandekwa. On 10 November, the same fate befell Joseph Kanyaruka, secretary and treasurer of APROSOMA, who had fled the day before with his family and livestock to take refuge with a relative, Elias Renhazo, residing in Urundi near the Ruanda boundary. An armed band, raised in the chiefdom on the borders of Ruanda, crossed the boundary and after encircling the house where Kanyaruka had taken refuge, killed him and his relative Renhazo with spears.

209. At the same time, other commando parties were carrying out arrests of Hutu who were taken to the *Mwami* at Nyanza. Some were immediately released at his orders, others were detained by him for several days. The Hutu parties alleged that the prisoners had been arrested in order to be questioned by the popular tribunal established by UNAR, that they were submitted to inhuman torture there and had been forced to sign forged documents intended to stultify possible judicial inquiries. UNAR, in its turn, affirmed that the prisoners were members of APROSOMA, or of PARMEHUTU, whom the population had spontaneously arrested and brought before the *Mwami*, that the latter had immediately sent the accused to the District Administrator, except for a few whom he had kept at his house to protect them from popular reprisals. It must be added that some arrested persons had themselves asked to be taken to the *Mwami* to prove that they were not his enemies, and that others went there of their own accord to seek protection.

210. The culminating point in the Tutsi reaction may be taken to be 10 November, the date of the attack on the Savé hill, in Astrida district, on which the head-

quarters of APROSOMA and the house of its president, Mr. Joseph Habyarimana Gitera, were situated. That day, some thousands of persons divided in different columns were to carry out a converging attack on the hill in the hope of destroying the nest of APROSOMA. Their leaders had informed them that the attack had been ordered by the *Mwami* to punish APROSOMA members or even that the latter were keeping the *Mwami* prisoner at Savé. As the various columns reached the approaches to the hill at different times the District Administrator accompanied by a small group of soldiers was able to block the way of each column of attackers and to turn them back, assisted greatly by the use of a megaphone. Indeed, by speaking to them through the megaphone, he was able to convince the attackers that the *Mwami* had given no order to attack Savé and that on the contrary he had declared himself to be above political parties. The attackers then retreated without causing any more damage than the burning of a few huts. Unfortunately, after the Belgian authorities withdrew their forces another incident occurred on the hill during which six of the local Tutsi were killed by the Hutu. The attack of Savé was the last important incident of the second phase. After 10 November the repression organized by the Tutsi was quickly checked by the military action undertaken by the Belgian authorities.

211. The Tutsi attacks were fairly clearly a series of organized actions. At the very beginning of the disturbances, the customary authorities had collected armed troops totalling several thousand men around the *Ibwami* at Nyanza in order to guard and protect the *Mwami*. Such a measure was justified, according to UNAR, by the failure of the Administering Authority to take action against Hutu violence and the threats of death to the *Mwami* announced by Hutu leaders. The majority of commando groups which took part in the attacks against the Hutu were formed of those armed troops. Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons or more, and included a majority of Hutu, but the leaders were generally Tutsi or Twa. The group would set off on mission with very definite instructions. In other cases, emissaries were sent out from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to bring back or kill certain persons, and permitting them to appeal to local authorities for armed forces to be assembled on the spot to help them in their mission. It seems to be an established fact, moreover, that in many cases a commando group set out with orders only to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because he resisted arrest or because some attackers had the instinct to kill.

212. The Mission has already mentioned the different theories concerning the origin and nature of the attacks and the persons who must be considered responsible for them. The Mission was informed that in these incidents, as in those of the Hutu phase, the majority of the attackers thought they were acting in the name of the *Mwami*. The episode of the Savé hill is revealing. Many assailants arrested stated that they had received orders to attack from the highest customary authorities and in that connexion gave the

name of several UNAR leaders. The Military Court found that the evidence collected was sufficiently serious for it to proceed on that assumption, and in many cases it imposed heavy penalties on UNAR leaders for having provoked attacks without necessarily having taken direct part in them. Thus Chief Hormisdas Mbanda was sentenced to death for having ordered the assassination of Kanyaruka. In two less serious cases, François Rukeba, president of UNAR, was sentenced to six years' penal servitude in the case concerning Secyugu and Chief Michel Kayijura, vice-president of the same party, was sentenced to nine years' penal servitude in the case concerning Sindibona and Munyandekwa.

Measures taken by the Administering Authority

213. In normal times the Ruanda security forces include five police platoons of fifty-one men each and seven sections of thirteen men each. The officers in charge of the platoons are Europeans; the soldiers and non-commissioned officers are of Congolese origin. Three of the platoons are stationed at Kigali, and the two others at Ruhengeri and Astrida respectively; the seven sections are distributed among the chief towns of the other districts. It can be argued that these forces were barely adequate to maintain public order in normal circumstances. Some time before the disturbances, the military authorities drew up a five-stage plan of action, under the title "general disturbances", for use in the event that difficulties occurred. The first stage would make available to the commandant of Ruanda three mobile units; each unit would include a score of men and some jeeps and would be commanded by a European platoon leader. Two of these units were to come from Usumbura and the third from the Belgian Congo. In the second stage, the platoons stationed at Kigali would be deployed and sent to the places where disturbances were reported. In the three latter stages, reinforcements were to be transferred from the Belgian Congo and placed at the orders of the military authorities; two platoons and a light aircraft would be transferred in the third stage, a company reinforced by a reconnaissance unit in the fourth stage and another reinforced company in the fifth.

214. The first stage of the plan was put into force on 24 October. From that date on patrols were circulating on the main roads. A platoon was sent from Kigali to Gitarama on 2 November, following the attack against sub-chief Mbonyumutwa.

On the evening of 3 November, a District Administrator from the Residency of Kigali went to Gitarama to survey the situation. After he had moved about the area all night, he stated that, in view of the darkness and communications difficulties, it was impossible to apprehend the arsonists and the disturbances might become generalized. The following day the Administration put into effect simultaneously the second, third and fourth stages of the military plan. On 5 November it decided to put the fifth and last stage into force. During the night of 6 November

the last reinforcements arrived in Ruanda, bringing the strength of the security forces to seventeen platoons.

215. However, in the early days of the disturbances the security forces available proved inadequate to restrain the arsonists. At each alarm administrators went to the disturbed areas with the soldiers they had available. They dispersed the crowds that formed on the hills, erected road blocks to stop the spread of the disturbances and at the same time sought to quiet the uprising by meeting with the Hutu leaders and by exhorting the people to be calm. But such efforts were often vain: the police road blocks were easily evaded and, although the crowds dispersed without resistance at the first demand, they reformed immediately after the departure of the security forces to continue setting fires. Thus, the acts of arson spread rapidly from Ndiza to the neighbouring chiefdoms, particularly towards the north and north-west of the country.

216. During this period the *Mwami* had not been inactive. As reported above, the tribal authorities of Nyanza assembled armed troops around the *Ibwami* at the beginning of the disturbances. On 5 November the *Mwami* issued a proclamation condemning the riots and affirming that he was the *Mwami* of all nationals of Ruanda without distinction. On the same day, in an interview with the Governor at Nyanza, the *Mwami*, pointing out that the Administering Authority had hitherto failed to stop the burning of the Tutsi dwellings, requested permission to have the tribal authorities establish order. This permission was refused.

217. It may be worthwhile to digress here to mention an incident which occurred after the interview and which shows how dangerous the state of tension had become. When the Governor, accompanied by the Resident of Ruanda, reached his car, a large crowd surrounded him and asked him either to guarantee that order would be restored or to permit the tribal authorities to restore order. When the Governor refused to give the requested permission (some allegations have been made that the Resident made an unfortunate reply), the crowd became threatening and began to ransack the official car. The *Mwami* had to intervene in order to rescue the Governor and the Resident and to drive them in his own car to Kigali.

218. During the night of 6 November, the last formations provided under the military plan had arrived in position, but the military authority was unable to send the reinforcements provided into the northern areas to check the burnings. As the Tutsi reaction had just been unleashed, a large part of the available forces then had to be used to meet this new danger.

219. On that day the *Mwami*, in a telegram sent simultaneously to the King of the Belgians, the Belgian Parliament and the Governor, repeated his demand for permission to restore order by his own methods. The Governor again categorically rejected his demand and took additional steps to ensure order in Ruanda. He issued a decree placing the entire country in a state of

"military operation" (*opération militaire*) and put all the civil and military authorities under the command of Colonel Guy Logiest. The proclamation of military operation entailed a ban on all gatherings, restriction on road traffic, application of a curfew between 6 p.m. and 5.30 a.m., pacification of the interior by the security forces, and authorization for these forces to use arms, after warning has been issued, against violators of the above measures. The population was acquainted with this order on 9 November by a joint proclamation of the Governor and the *Mwami*; at the same time they appealed to the people to cease the fratricidal struggle. Furthermore, the Governor decided to reinforce the units already on the spot by four new companies transferred from the Belgian Congo, including two companies of Belgian paratroopers. Lastly, by an order of 11 November 1959 the Governor declared a state of emergency (*état d'exception*) in all the district of Ruanda and appointed Colonel Logiest as Military Resident in place of the Resident. The state of emergency gave the Military Resident certain emergency powers, including authority to order day and night searches, to place persons under surveillance, to ban associations, publications and meetings, and to suspend the dispatch and receipt of the post. As a result of these measures, the intensity of the disturbances began to diminish rapidly, and on 14 November it could be said that quiet had been restored in the country.

220. The Administration's attitude during the disturbances was severely criticized by UNAR. This organization charged the district authorities and the security forces with having been present and done nothing during the first Hutu attacks on the Tutsi and asserted that, because of their failure to act, the burnings had been allowed to spread and to reach the numbers they had. The same authorities, on the other hand, had used force to combat the Tutsi crowds when they took counter-measures to defend themselves. In particular, UNAR accused the Belgian authorities of having machine-gunned crowds that were on the defensive, made arbitrary arrests and tortured arrested persons. The Hutu parties, on the other hand, approved the action taken by the Administration to suppress violence. They had been disappointed at the weakness shown by the Administration during October in the face of what they considered as UNAR intimidation and terrorist acts. The forceful measures taken in November had restored their confidence in the Administration.

221. On this question the Commission of Inquiry felt that the military action had been carried out with the greatest possible rapidity, precision, coolness and effectiveness, and that it reflected a firm desire to avoid any bloodshed. The Commission believed that, although the country was very unsuited to military action, mountainous and with few means of communications, and although the lack of co-operation by a part of the population raised obstacles, the Force publique had succeeded within several days in putting an end to the disturbances with a minimum loss of human life. It had the clear impression that everything possible had been done to avoid needless brutality.

222. Lastly, the Commission noted that the Force publique had never made arrests on its own authority, save against looters, arsonists, and gang-leaders caught in the commission of crime, that during the pacification period arrests had always been made in the presence of a judge or criminal-police officer, and that prisoners had never been examined by the army but had been immediately handed over to the judicial authorities responsible for investigations.

Outcome of the disturbances and of subsequent events

223. For nearly two weeks Ruanda was torn by extremely violent fratricidal struggles, the exact results of which will undoubtedly never be known. According to the information received, approximately 200 persons were killed. The actual figure is surely much higher, for the people, when they can, prefer to carry off their dead and bury them silently. An official communiqué issued on 23 November stated that at that date the number of persons wounded in the disturbances who were hospitalized or given first aid in hospitals had reached 317, but probably many wounded had left without seeking attention. The account of the damage, which includes dwellings burned, plantations sacked, livestock killed and personal goods pillaged, is still being prepared and probably will never be fixed exactly.

224. Many problems inherited from the November crisis relating to prosecutions, refugees, interim tribal authorities and maintenance of order are particularly urgent. They are considered in the following sections.

(a) Prosecutions

225. Under Legislative Order No. 081/225 of 12 November 1959, in areas under martial law all persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the Military Court. With respect to non-military persons, the Military Court applies only the criminal laws enacted for civilians. Its decisions are not subject to appeal, except when the death penalty has been pronounced. The Governor called on professional magistrates, who were also reserve officers, to preside over the Military Court. Thus, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Lamy was appointed Chief Judge, and Major J. Guffens Deputy Judge.

226. One thousand one hundred and forty-three persons were arrested during and after the November disturbances. The number of cases brought reached 207. The Military Court declared itself without jurisdiction to deal with twenty-eight of them. By 30 March 1960 135 cases involving 1,013 defendants had been decided. About 85 per cent of these cases involved pillaging and arson, and the remainder were murder cases. Two death sentences have been pronounced.

227. In an interview with the Mission, Lieutenant-Colonel Lamy declared that the Military Court, which had sat continuously for four months, had insisted on examining all the cases in the most meticulous manner. The defendants had been provided with all safeguards.

In serious cases they had had the benefit of legal aid. Moreover, care had been taken always to use two interpreters, one Hutu and one Tutsi, to have the interpretation supervised by a European. A commission of the League for the Rights of Man had come to investigate and had found the procedure adopted satisfactory.

228. It must be noted that some UNAR leaders fled to Tanganyika and Uganda to avoid prosecution. Several of them have been sentenced *in absentia* by the Military Court. After the disturbances the Military Resident, using the emergency powers invested in him under the state of emergency, placed a certain number of people under a system of prescribed residence. As at 22 March 1960, forty-two people were under these restrictions.

(b) The refugee problem

229. More than 5,000 dwellings were burned during the disturbances. The inhabitants of these dwellings, almost all of them Tutsi, had to seek refuge in missions and administration buildings. The number of these refugees rose to more than 7,000, most of whom were in the Ruhengeri district. In some areas they were able to return to their homes once the height of the disturbances had passed, and sometimes the local Hutu even agreed to help them rebuild their dwellings. In other areas, particularly in the Ruhengeri district where the Tutsi were only a very small minority of the population and had been established only recently, the Hutu population was, on the contrary, fiercely opposed to their resettlement.

230. In his speech of 3 March 1960 the Resident-General explained the steps which the Administration had taken to meet this problem. He said, in substance, that the Administration was not able by military force to re-establish hundreds of Tutsi in their lands when thousands of peasants, who had expelled them, clearly showed a fierce will to prevent their resettlement. First, the Administration gave the refugees who were temporarily housed in the missions food, blankets and medical care. Then, it decided to establish a reception centre outside the disturbed areas. Thus, at great cost and with much care, a shelter camp was constructed at Nyamata, 20 km. to the south of Kigali, and all the refugees who voluntarily expressed the wish to go there were transported by lorry. The Resident-General announced that, as the third stage in the refugee rehabilitation operation, steps had been taken since the beginning of the year to open two settlement zones in the areas that had been reserved since before the November events for a programme which was to be financed by the European Economic Community. The refugees would receive special assistance in resettling there, while in the chiefdoms they came from steps would be taken to ensure the recovery of their livestock, the transfer under official supervision of the lands and harvests they had abandoned and compensation of the damages they had suffered.

231. Unfortunately, the refugee problem, far from improving, continued to deteriorate still more during

and after the Mission's visit. During March the Hutu again began to burn the huts of the Tutsi in the Biumba and Kisenyi districts. During the week of 10 to 16 April, following a dispute between the Hutu and the Tutsi, another succession of Tutsi hut burnings was reported in the Astrida district. The number of refugees increased substantially as a result of these fires.

232. At the Mission's request the Belgian Administration submitted a report to it on the refugee situation as at 19 April 1960. According to this report, there were at that date 22,000 refugees distributed approximately as follows:

Kigali: 5,000 installed in the Nyamata camp; 1,000 at large;
Biumba: 8,500 distributed throughout the district;
Kisenyi: 1,500 concentrated at Nyondo; 500 at large;
Astrida: 3,000 in the process of being assembled at Mugombwa;
Gitarama and Nyanza: 2,000 at large.

233. Steps have been taken by the Administration to place the refugees in reception centres such as the one at Nyamata, or, whenever it has proved feasible, to help them resettle in the area from which they came. Supervisory committees have been set up in the affected areas to facilitate the resettlement of refugees. Unfortunately these steps have not yet brought entirely satisfactory results.

234. The Administration has attributed this lack of success to the hostile attitude of the Tutsi leaders. It has pointed out that the refugee problem had been "made political" everywhere and that this problem had remained acute because the Tutsi leaders had wished it so for political reasons. In the view of the Administration, it was absolutely certain that if the Tutsi leaders and the *Mwami* changed their attitude the great majority of refugee cases would be closed without delay by installation at Nyamata or by resettlement in the area from which they came. The district authorities throughout the country were making sustained efforts to find those who would lead the way and would induce others to follow their example. Some initial success had just been reported at Astrida, where in one day the district administration had succeeded, in co-operation with the tribal authorities, in resettling 1,200 of the 3,000 refugees in the area. The Administration stressed that this had been possible because, before negotiations were undertaken, the ringleaders had been separated from the mass of refugees.

(c) The problem of interim authorities

235. During the Hutu revolt many Tutsi chiefs or sub-chiefs, particularly in the north and north-west of the country, had been driven from their posts. During the Tutsi reaction, many other chiefs and sub-chiefs took part directly or indirectly in attacks against the Hutu; those chiefs were killed in encounters with the security forces or arrested by the judicial authorities. Others were removed from office by the Administration

others resigned voluntarily in the face of opposition from the local Hutu population.

236. In filling the vacant posts, the Administration chose Hutu by preference. The following table gives the number of chiefs and sub-chiefs in Ruanda as at 1 November 1959 and 1 March 1960, respectively:

	1 November 1959	1 March 1960
Total number of chiefdoms	45	45
Vacant chiefdoms	2	1
Tutsi chiefs	43	22
Hutu chiefs	—	22
Total number of sub-chiefdoms	559	531 ^a
Vacant sub-chiefdoms	—	17
Tutsi sub-chiefs	549	217 ^b
Hutu sub-chiefs	10	297

^a Twenty-eight sub-chiefdoms disappeared when they were merged in November with neighbouring sub-chiefdoms.

^b Two of the 217 sub-chiefdoms are Swahili.

237. In justification of Administration policy regarding the replacement of tribal authorities, the Resident-General stated in his speech of 3 March that, in driving the chiefs and sub-chiefs from office, the population of certain areas had created a practical situation which sprang from the very depths of popular will. Hence the Administration had to regard the abandoned posts as at least temporarily vacant and had to fill these posts provisionally. These were not final appointments but solely interim replacements; the future of the sub-chiefs would be decided in the communal elections and the future of the chiefs in the general reform now under way.

238. In answer to criticisms that the interim appointments were made practically on the basis of racial predominance, the Resident-General explained that the Administration could not do otherwise in the present excited state of public opinion. It considered that an interim Hutu appointee imposed by the district authorities would have been physically unable to exercise his functions in an area under strong Tutsi influence. In a solidly Hutu area, where a rising had just occurred, the sounding of the preferences of the inhabitants had very naturally led to the choice of Hutu interim appointees. Thus, when public opinion was once more calm, the free play of democratic institutions would have to be relied on to restore the balance best suited to maintain the harmonious interracial policy of Ruanda. The Resident-General concluded, however, that while awaiting the next elections the method followed by the Administration had the advantages of allowing some 200 Hutu the chance to show their aptitude for political office, and yet of not making commitments for the future since the elections could always right any unfortunate choices.

(d) The maintenance of order

239. Although it could be said on 14 November 1959 that order had been restored in Ruanda, an

atmosphere of great tension continued to reign throughout the country. During the next few days, the security forces continued to patrol all roads. The judicial authorities actively pursued their inquiries to discover the instigators of the disturbances and made a very large number of arrests. Although no serious incident occurred, there were many malicious acts, such as the sabotage of bridges and mutilation of cattle. On 17 November, seeing that tension was mounting, the Military Resident decided to prohibit all meetings, whether public or private.

240. However, towards the end of November, a slight slackening of tension enabled the Administration to relax some of the security measures. Two companies of paratroopers left the Territory on 27 November and three days later the curfew was lifted and freedom of movement was restored. In a special *communiqué* dated 5 December, the Governor announced the Belgian Government's decision to place Ruanda under a "special resident system" and to appoint Colonel Logiest Special Civilian Resident. In that connexion, the Governor stated that a series of measures had been decided upon in order to end as soon as possible the exceptional Military Resident system, while ensuring the special administrative conditions required by the circumstances for the maintenance of order and the preparations for the elections and the new institutions announced in the government statement. Belgium's intention to organize immediately a progressive programme for the self-government of Ruanda and Urundi implied immediate and radical changes in the powers of all the members of the Administration. The transformation of the Residents' role as a result of these reforms would be one of the most radical in the whole re-organization plan. The Governor said that the disturbed situation in Ruanda made it undesirable that there should merely be a restoration of the *status quo* when the Military Resident system came to an end. In view of the fact that the Resident at that time was to go on his regular leave in March 1960, it was deemed advisable in order to facilitate the establishment of the new institutions and the negotiations to be held before the 1960 elections, that a temporary special resident system should be instituted and that the Resident should continue to exercise his extraordinary powers under the emergency régime currently in force for as long as was necessary.

THE PLAN OF REFORMS AND THE POLITICAL EVENTS AFTER NOVEMBER 1959

241. On 10 November 1959, just as the disturbances in Ruanda were reaching their peak, the Belgian Government published a statement on its future policy in Ruanda-Urundi. It will be remembered that the Working Group set up by the Belgian Government on 16 April 1959 to study the political problems of Ruanda-Urundi had submitted a very detailed report on 2 September 1959 which was published on 10 November. The Working Group concluded that it was necessary to effect radical political and administrative reforms in the Territory and made a certain number of proposals. The government statement was largely based on the

Working Group's report. In fact, all the Working Group's proposals were approved by the Government, with the exception of those relating to a community comprising Ruanda and Urundi.

242. The programme of reforms outlined in the government statement (see T/1502) is based on the following ideas. The Belgian Government would first establish, taking into account the separate and distinct characteristics of the two States, a system of government for each State which would be given a progressive measure of autonomy subject to the general control of Belgium, exercised by the Resident-General and Residents. Next, while reiterating its conviction that it was essential to establish a community of the two States, the Belgian Government did not wish to define the terms of that community, but would merely propose to invite the two States to organize it, with Belgian assistance.

243. Having set out these guiding principles, the statement went on to define the political organization within each State as follows:

(a) The enlarged sub-chiefdoms and the extra-tribal centres, which would be reintegrated into the administration of the country, would become communes, the only basic decentralized political entities below the national level. A mayor and a communal council would constitute the organs of these communes. A transition period would be necessary before the communes were set up in their final form. In the meantime, the existing sub-chiefdoms, extra-tribal centres and urban *circonscriptions* would become provisional communes which would in all probability elect their councils by universal suffrage during the first half of 1960. The Government was of the opinion that in principle both men and women should have the right to vote, but realized that material circumstances connected with the data at which the first elections would have to be held might oblige it to organize them on the basis of male suffrage only. These councils might elect one of their number as head of the provisional commune;

(b) The present chiefdoms would no longer be political entities and would become administrative *circonscriptions*. The present chiefs might be integrated into the general administration of the country, thus becoming officials with no political mandate. A transition period would have to be allowed for in this field also;

(c) At the state level, a new state council would be established and would exercise, jointly with the *Mwami*, the local legislative powers which would be progressively assigned to it. The great majority of the members of the state council would be elected by indirect suffrage—i.e., by an electoral college composed of the councils of the provisional communes. The Government expected the elections to take place early enough for the Council to take office in the second half of 1960. The state councils would function during the transition period, at the end of which other systems better suited to the wishes of the people might be adopted if desirable. Alongside each state legislature, a government would be set up whose head and departmental heads would be appointed or removed from office by the

Mwami by agreement with the Resident. The *Mwami*, the constitutional head of the State, would remain outside the government and above parties. He would not govern and his public enactments would have to be countersigned by the government;

(d) With regard to the judicial power, the Administering Authority would exercise special supervision in this matter to ensure the independence, competence and integrity of the judiciary. Should a community be set up, the administration of justice should be one of its functions;

(e) Government reform at the state level should imply the rapid fusion of the so-called tribal administration and the general administration. The result would be that many responsible offices would be entrusted to indigenous inhabitants; every effort would be made to ensure that this Africanization was effected with an eye to quality.

244. The statement dealt also with the institutions for the Trust Territory as a whole which must continue to function pending the establishment of the future community. This question is considered below.

245. The political organization of Ruanda-Urundi, the reform of which was announced in the government statement, was the subject of an interim decree dated 25 December 1959.³⁰ This decree described the organs of the provisional communes, the interim chiefdoms and the States. Lastly, it laid down certain guiding principles for the election of the members of the different councils and defined the Trusteeship to be exercised by Belgium over the administration of the Territory and the States. As indicated by its title, the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 was essentially provisional in character. In a speech to the people of Ruanda-Urundi on 19 January 1960, the Resident-General emphasized that this decree showed Belgium's determination to act promptly for reform and, in order to bridge the gap between the past and the future, to work out arrangements which would answer the needs of the present and that its purpose was to make immediately changes, some of which might be lasting if they worked out well and others would be adjusted, amended or completely replaced, if, after agreement with the elected spokesmen of the people, the Administration deemed that desirable.

246. The Royal Interim Order of 25 January 1960 laid down a series of measures of application concerning administrative organization and opened the way for a fusion of the tribal administration and the general administration. It provided that the Residencies of Ruanda and Urundi should be replaced by States of the same name and that except for powers connected with general trusteeship, the Resident-General should regulate the provisional transfer to the Government of the States of such administrative powers of the Residents and of the Vice-Governor-General as were only of regional interest.

³⁰ The text of the interim decree is to be found in document T/1501.

247. The organization of communal elections in Ruanda is dealt with in Ordinance No. 221/73 of 10 March 1960. The Interim Decree laid down certain principles regarding the electorate, eligibility and the distribution of seats and stipulated, in particular, that in the communal elections lists of candidates should be elected on the basis of proportionate representation. However, it left the Resident-General free to decide whether to limit suffrage to male voters and to determine the practical rules for the organization and conduct of elections. Under Ordinance No. 221/73, suffrage was restricted to male voters. The elections would be held from any time after 7 June 1960, the precise date at which they would take place in each *circonscription* being decided by the administrator of the district. The electoral lists were to be closed on 5 May 1960; an appeal against inclusion or non-inclusion on the lists might be made not later than 10 May to the administrator of the district, who should take a decision within ten days of receiving the complaint and at the latest by 20 May.

248. On 26 February, the Belgian Government proposed the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the Trusteeship Council of an item concerning the possibility of sending a United Nations observer group to supervise the elections to be held in June.

249. Ordinance No. 221/51 of 6 February made some of the provisions of the Interim Decree applicable to Ruanda and stipulated that the High Council of that State and its permanent delegation to the General Council should be dissolved and that, until new institutions were established, the powers devolving upon those bodies were to be exercised by a provisional special council composed of six members appointed by the Resident-General. The membership of this provisional special council was later to be increased to eight so as to allow each of the four principal parties to have two representatives on it.

250. A permanent representative of the *Mwami* participates in the work of the provisional special council without the right of vote. The council has no chairman but its debates are directed by a Belgian official, who must remain strictly neutral; he also has no right of vote. The inauguration of the provisional special council of Ruanda took place at Kigali on 4 February 1960, in the presence of the Resident-General. The *Mwami* was not present at the ceremony.

251. The provisional special council proved itself to be extremely active from the outset. In February, it studied and prepared a convention which was later signed between Ruanda and the Government to enable the Belgian Congo National Institute for Agronomic Studies (INEAC) to carry out experiments with pasture land in the Bugesera. The council made a trip to the ten districts of the State in order to examine the proposals prepared by the district administrators and the chiefs for the establishment of communes for the elections and, in collaboration with the local authorities, it worked out the details of the re-organization of the 544 existing sub-chiefdoms into 229 com-

munes. On the same trip, it also discussed with the local authorities some financial problems connected mainly with the *ibisigati* (grazing estates), the *ibikingi* (pastoral fiefs) and the *ubukonde* (the right to clear forests). On its return to Kigali, the council, in collaboration with *Mwami* Kigeli V, drew up a circular which was published on 28 February in which the *Mwami* recognized the legality of the four big political parties and appealed for calm.

252. Among the events of the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, one should mention that, during the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Fourth Committee granted a hearing on 9 November 1959 to Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representing UNAR.³¹

253. At the end of December 1959, the Belgian Government established a Commission of Inquiry composed of three Belgian personalities (Mr. F. Peigneux, Honorary Provincial Governor; Mr. G. Malengreau, Professor of the University of Louvain and Mr. S. Frédéricq, Advocate at the Court of Appeal of Ghent) and requested it to report on the events of November in Ruanda. This Commission visited Ruanda from 7 to 17 January 1960 and submitted to the Government on 26 February a detailed report which was communicated to the Visiting Mission on its way through Brussels on 29 February. The Mission had the opportunity of meeting the three members of the Commission in Brussels on 1 March.

SITUATION IN RUANDA AT THE TIME OF THE MISSION'S VISIT

General

254. When the Visiting Mission arrived in Ruanda, the Belgian Administration had already begun making preparations for the communal elections to be held in June. Instructions had been sent to all those who were responsible for organizing them, an information campaign was being carried on to make the ordinary people familiar with the various electoral processes and the register of voters was being prepared.

255. The atmosphere in the country was still very tense. Memories of the November atrocities were still fresh in people's minds. Widows and orphans were still mourning their dead. Refugees, many of whom were in precarious circumstances, presented a very difficult problem which had to be solved quickly. Many people, arrested after the disturbances, had received heavy sentences, others were awaiting in prison their turn to be tried. A number of political leaders had gone into exile abroad, others were under house arrest.

256. The supporters of UNAR and those of the Hutu parties were still aggressively antagonistic to one another. The Hutu leaders and the *Mwami* distrusted one another. Moreover, the supporters of UNAR felt that the local administration was treating them as if

³¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Fourth Committee, 944th meeting.

they were enemies and would not hesitate to use every possible means to prevent them from participating in the political life of Ruanda. Lastly, while official relations were correct, the *Mwami* and the Administering Authority were deeply suspicious of each other, which made very difficult that co-operation which was so necessary for the smooth running of the country's public affairs.

257. The government statement of 10 November 1959 was partially accepted by some of the population and rejected by others, and had not resulted in the hoped-for reduction in tension. Many of the Ruandese felt that they had not been associated with the preparation of the statement and the measures to be taken to implement it even if they had had an opportunity to state their views to the Working Group in the preceding months. Many felt that it was not an acceptable compromise and did not feel in any way bound by it. The statement, moreover, was open to conflicting interpretations. In failing to bridge the gulf separating the two groups in the population it had in no way succeeded in lessening the atmosphere of tension and mistrust. In order to preserve public order, the Belgian Administration had retained the emergency regulations which it had promulgated in Ruanda during the November disturbances under the title of the Special Residence system.

258. The Belgian Government's decision, taken in January 1960 during the Round Table Conference for the Belgian Congo, to grant independence to that territory on 30 June 1960 came as a shock to people in Ruanda. By giving some grounds for hope and others cause for deep anxiety it had inevitably caused increased political tension there. Lastly, the announcement of the arrival of the Visiting Mission also seemed to have played its part in increasing the general tension. In this country which is so susceptible to false reports, rumours of all kinds were in circulation: it was said that the arrival of the Visiting Mission was a victory for UNAR, because it was coming to hold an inquiry into the incidents which had occurred in November, to pass judgement on the Belgian Administration's action, to bring back the exiled leaders, to resettle the evicted Tutsi or to end the Belgian Trusteeship. Other rumours insisted that the Mission's visit foreshadowed massacres of the Hutu and the expulsion of the Belgians. In contrast, still others expected that it would proclaim the deposition of the *Mwami* and the establishment of a republic or the division of Ruanda into separate areas for Hutu and Tutsi. While awaiting the arrival of the Mission, the political parties assembled their supporters and prepared to organize mass demonstrations to show their strength. Fearing new outbreaks of violence and since there were no reinforcements of African police available in the Belgian Congo, the Administration brought a battalion of Belgian paratroopers from the Congo to assist the forces on the spot in maintaining order and protecting the Mission.

259. In its conversations with the Minister, Mr. De Schrijver, at Brussels on 29 February 1960, and with the Belgian authorities in the Territory at Usumbura

in the first days after its arrival in the Territory, the Mission made a point of making perfectly clear its attitude towards the precautionary measures taken by the Administering Authority. While recognizing that the Administration was responsible for maintaining peace and public order in the Territory and that it was incumbent on it to take all necessary measures to that end, the Mission did not wish to be associated with the military precautions which had been taken. It did not feel that it needed protection and hoped that having decided what was required for the maintenance of order, the Administration would reduce security measures to the bare minimum necessary for that purpose.

260. The Special Resident for Ruanda informed the Mission that, according to the information which had reached him, the political parties intended to organize mass demonstrations during the Mission's stay and that these demonstrations might well cause disturbances, the more so as UNAR was endeavouring to prove that the Belgian Administration was incapable of maintaining order. He also indicated that certain groups of demonstrators intended to erect barriers across the Mission's route. At the request of the Mission, he agreed to reduce military precautions to a bare minimum and not to have the Mission's convoy escorted by military vehicles. However, he considered it necessary to have the roads on the Mission's itinerary patrolled and to control the movement of people in the urban centres when the Mission was passing through them. In an endeavour to make the maintenance of order easier, the Mission decided to issue an appeal (see annex I) to the public requesting it to remain calm and to avoid gathering in crowds. It also stated in the appeal that it wished to grant a hearing to everyone who wanted to meet it but asked people to come in groups of no more than ten persons.

261. Further, the Resident-General gave the Mission a categorical assurance that everyone who wished to see the Mission would be free to do so. When the Mission left Usumbura for Ruanda, he addressed a message to the people, reminding them that anyone could freely contact the members of the Mission and that there was absolutely no reason for them to be afraid that they would be harassed because they had done so (see annex II).

262. In point of fact, there were numerous mass demonstrations along the Mission's route. Tens of thousands of persons were massed along the roads which the Mission traversed. The Administration simply asked the supporters of opposing groups not to assemble in the same places or at least to range themselves on opposite sides of the road. It prohibited, however, the population, with the exception of delegations and individuals in possession of a *laissez-passer*, from entering certain urban areas where the Mission was staying.

263. The Mission none the less has no reason to believe that any individual or group which wanted to get into touch with it was prevented from doing so. At each place where it stopped the Mission received a very large number (frequently several hundred) of

requests for a hearing. If it had had to hear all the petitions separately, it certainly would not have been able to do so in the relatively short time at its disposal. It was found with the co-operation of the members of the provisional special council which accompanied the provisional special council which accompanied the Mission during its tour of Ruanda. Since most of the petitioners requesting a hearing were members or supporters of the principal political parties, the Mission asked the members of the special council, who are the representatives of these parties, to arrange them in groups according to their parties and to request each group to appoint ten representatives to lay the group's views before the Mission. Further, there were no restrictions preventing anyone who wished to submit written documents to the Mission from doing so. This procedure proved to be perfectly satisfactory. Not only were the representatives of all the political parties able to state their views in detail, but the Mission also had time at each place where it sat to hear representatives of the churches, members of non-political organizations and many private individuals, both European and African. Thus, the Mission was able to obtain the views of the most qualified representatives of the population on all the questions which were exercising their minds.

264. The Mission also had long discussions with the Resident-General and officials of his Administration. It likewise had many conversations with the *Mwami* and the tribal authorities in the localities which it visited. It received from all these sources a great deal of information which was extremely useful in the preparation of its report.

Political parties

265. Before indicating the views of the representatives of the various sections of the population on the problems facing Ruanda, something must first be said about the political parties, which, although only recently formed, are now playing an important part in moulding public opinion in Ruanda. All along the route followed by the Mission, large crowds gathered to demonstrate their support for the views of one or other of the political parties and handed the members of the Mission tens of thousands of documents, letters and pamphlets. These demonstrations were obviously inspired by the political leaders.

266. There are now four main political parties in Ruanda which fall into three groups: the Union nationale ruandaïse (UNAR), the Rassemblement démocratique ruandaïse (RADER) and two parties, the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA) and the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), whose aim is the advancement of the Hutu. All the indications are that UNAR, on the one hand, and the group of Hutu parties, on the other, have a great hold on the people. As to RADER, it certainly has a remarkably capable and active executive committee but it does not as yet seem to have any great influence on the

mass of the people. Lastly, to complete the picture, attention is drawn to the fact that a number of small local political parties have been established very recently, among which are the Union des masses ruandaïses (UMAR) at Rutongo, the Mouvement pour l'union ruandaïse (MUR) at Shangugu, the Association des Bahutu évoluant pour la suppression des castes (ABESCA) at Rulindo, the Mouvement monarchiste ruandaïse (MOMOR) at Kisenyi, the Union des Aborizi africains du Ruanda (UAARU) at Gatsibu, the Union des intérêts communaux du Kinyaga (UNINTERCOKI) at Shangugu and the Alliance des Bakiga (ABAKI) at Kisenyi.

267. For greater clarity it is worth recalling briefly the general arguments advanced by the different parties as they were explained to the Mission on countless occasions.

268. The Hutu parties, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU, stated that, whereas the Hutu constituted approximately 85 per cent of the total population, at the beginning of November 1959 there was not a single Hutu among the forty-five chiefs, only ten Hutu sub-chiefs out of a total of 449, and only one Hutu among the thirty-three members of the High Council of the State. In secondary schools less than 30 per cent of the children were Hutu and in higher educational institutes less than 10 per cent. Of the African auxiliary staff in the Administration barely 12 per cent were Hutu. This disproportion was not the result of chance but of actual discrimination, giving the Tutsi oligarchy the monopoly of all the strategic positions providing stepping-stones to power and designed to ensure the continuance of the "Tutsi feudal system" and the enslavement of the Hutu. The Hutu wanted a democratic régime to be established which would do away with all privileges based on class, a genuine democracy which would only be brought about by a revolution—preferably peaceful—of the oppressed peasant classes. In principle the Hutu parties would accept—although on this point their views underwent a change during the Mission's visit—a constitutional monarchy provided the *Mwami* was not the symbol, the instrument or the prisoner of the reactionary Tutsi oligarchy. Otherwise, the establishment of a republican régime would have to be considered.

269. In the opinion of the Hutu parties, the only chance the Hutu had of achieving their aims lay in the continuation for some time of Belgian Trusteeship, in which the Hutu parties had confidence despite the fact that in the past the Administration had given their support to the Tutsi. It was only after all the country's institutions had become democratic, after free elections had been held, judicial reforms and radical changes in the land tenure system had been effected, and the economic, social and cultural advancement of the peasant masses had occurred that there could be any question of self-government and thereafter of independence. Thus democracy would have to precede independence. Premature independence would only ensure the permanent supremacy of the

Tutsi and their continued exploitation of the Hutu. No confidence could be placed in the promises and statements of the Tutsi, who were past masters in the art of hypocrisy, deceitfulness and intrigue. If it should prove impossible to come to terms with them, the country could, through population transfers, be divided into predominantly Hutu and predominantly Tutsi areas within a federal system. The Hutu parties claimed that they spoke for all the Hutu, in other words for 85 per cent of the population, not only for those who were politically conscious and organized, but also for those who through ignorance, fear, servility and tradition, or because of the high repute in which they held the institution of Mwami, were supporting the old régime either passively or actively.

270. The RADER party felt that the Hutu people, comprising 85 per cent of the population of Ruanda, were justified in their desire for emancipation and that their social claims were understandable. But it opposed the racism on which it considered some other claims are based. It criticized the present attitude of the Hutu parties and the Administration which it alleged had since November 1959 been systematically favouring the Hutu at the expense of the Tutsi—for instance in the nomination of chiefs and sub-chiefs, which had been done without taking into account the merits, training or experience of the candidates. RADER was strongly opposed to the division of Ruanda into Tutsi and Hutu areas. It advocated a constitutional monarchy but had some doubts about the Mwami personally since he appeared to be the prisoner of a political party. It had thought that beginning in 1964 internal self-government could gradually be introduced in Ruanda and that the Trusteeship Administration could probably be terminated in 1968. Later it expressed the view that the country might become independent in 1963. It had confidence in Belgium.

271. UNAR described itself as a traditionalist, monarchist and nationalist movement, which was neither feudal, reactionary, xenophobe, anti-catholic nor anti-Belgian. That the ruling classes in Ruanda were mainly made up of Tutsi was due not only to historical factors but also to the action of the Administering Authority. It constituted a social, economic and political problem which could be solved through the democratic development of the country. UNAR alleged that the Administration, certain dignitaries of the Catholic Church and certain Europeans had cunningly stirred up the Hutu against the Tutsi and tried to make the problem into a racial problem in order to delay the country's progress towards independence. The great majority of the Hutu were, moreover, loyal to the Mwami and to the traditions of Ruanda. UNAR was in favour of democracy and the constitutional monarchy, on which question it would moreover agree to the holding of a referendum. It stood for universal suffrage and the election of the country's legislative and executive organs. It had called for self-government in Ruanda in 1960 and independence in 1962. Since the incidents in November, however, the party had lost all confidence in the Administration and wanted

immediate independence and the termination of Belgian Trusteeship.

272. UNAR also asked for a general amnesty for all political prisoners, the return to the country of its exiled leaders, the lifting of the emergency regulations, the resettlement of the refugees in the areas from which they had been driven out, the presence in Ruanda of a United Nations commission until the proclamation of independence and the formation of a provisional government or an executive council with indigenous and European members.²²

Questions raised by political parties

273. The main questions which now divide the people of Ruanda and their leaders can therefore be divided into two groups—one relating to the disturbances in November 1959 and the other the future of the country. They are dealt with in greater detail in subsequent sections.

(a) Questions relating to the disturbances in November 1959

274. The questions relating to the disturbances in November 1959 which have been most frequently raised before the Mission concern the causes of the disturbances and the responsibilities of the different groups therefore; the problem of the refugees; the provisional administration and lastly the exercise of political freedoms. For greater clarity the views of the political parties on each of these questions are set out separately.

(i) Causes of the disturbances and responsibilities thereof

275. For the Hutu parties, the underlying cause of the disturbances in November was the Hutu-Tutsi problem, which the Mission has already described, and the immediate cause was provocation and acts of terrorism on the part of UNAR. The Belgian Administration, according to them, is trying to put the existing state of affairs right but is encountering opposition on the part of the Tutsi leaders. Because of this opposition, the Hutu, who are the great majority of the population, are still ruled by a Tutsi minority. The Tutsi leaders have established a political party whose aim is to strengthen their traditional supremacy and whose methods are terrorism and the extermination of the Hutu leaders. To prove their point the Hutu parties quoted the words allegedly used by the leaders of UNAR at the meeting organized by the party at Kigali on 13 September 1959, the numerous pamphlets distributed by this party insulting and threatening the Hutu leaders—in particular a blacklist of ten persons who were to be eliminated as enemies of the Mwami—and, lastly, the numerous acts of terrorism perpetrated by UNAR during the months of September and

²² After the Mission had left the Territory, UNAR held a congress at Kigali on 17 and 18 April 1960. The resolutions adopted by the congress are contained in document T/PET.3/L.19.

October. They stated again that although the Mwami may have said that he was above political parties he had never stopped supporting UNAR and that in face of this coalition the Administration had shown a disquieting lack of firmness. Because of this weakness the rumours started by UNAR to the effect that the Belgians were soon going to depart and leave the Hutu at the mercy of the Tutsi were making the people more and more uneasy. In the last days of September, a fresh rumour had spread through the hills to the effect that the expected government statement was going to proclaim the immediate independence of the country. The anxiety of the Hutu was thus at its height. They were convinced that after the Belgians had left the Tutsi were going to massacre all the Hutu leaders and restore the feudal system. In these circumstances the only solution remaining open to them was to fight like madmen. Such was, the Hutu parties came to the conclusion, the general atmosphere created in Hutu political circles by the policy of UNAR on the eve of the disturbances. The attack on Mbonoyumutwa was considered by them as the immediate cause of the incidents.

276. The views of the Hutu parties were shared by RADER. This party also felt that it was the Hutu masses' fear of falling under Tutsi domination again which caused the outbreak of violence against the Tutsi. It considered that this fear was absolutely justified both because of the acts of terrorism committed by UNAR, not only against the members of the Hutu parties but also against the Tutsi in RADER, and because of the lack of firmness displayed by the Administration in the face of these acts of terrorism.

277. UNAR, for its part, regarded the "policy of division" carried out by the Administration as the main cause of the November crisis. It was not a popular uprising. If there was a Hutu-Tutsi problem in Ruanda, and moreover it was a social rather than a racial problem, it was because the Administration had refused to adopt the right solutions at the appropriate time. As soon as the "Statement of views" and the "Manifesto of the Bahutu" appeared it should have arranged for discussions between the two opposing groups so that they could have worked out together such reforms as were needed for the emancipation of the country. That was possible because, in spite of their differences, the two documents had a common aim in view, that of the emancipation of the country. But instead of looking for the common points the Administration had emphasized their opposing views. To delay the moment of emancipation, it had made the Hutu parties believe that the Tutsi were against the introduction of democratic ideas in the country and that the only way for the Hutu to liberate themselves from their former servitude was to do so under the Belgian Administration. Encouraged and protected by the Administration, the Hutu leaders had set up organizations based on racial hatred and had engaged in violent attacks on the Tutsi in general and the Mwami in particular. This policy had also been supported by some of the Catholic missions whose newspapers, such as *Temps nouveaux d'Afrique* and *Kinyamateka*, continuously

exhorted the Hutu to resist the Tutsi. When UNAR had been established the Administration had engaged in a systematic persecution of this party. Whereas the other parties were never harassed, it prohibited or sabotaged the meetings organized by UNAR and continuously persecuted its members or supporters, as in the affair of the three chiefs. This attitude encouraged the Hutu leaders to resort to violence to achieve their political aims.

278. The UNAR account agrees with that given by the Mwami to the Mission in several conversations and in the report which he submitted to it on this subject.

279. The Resident-General refrained from expressing an official opinion on the immediate causes of the disturbances, but officials in the Belgian Administration with whom the Mission spoke did not hide their sympathy with the opinions expressed by the Hutu parties.

280. As to the Catholic missions, they seemed to be divided on the subject. While the official attitude of the Church might appear favourable to the Hutu parties on questions of social reform, several influential Catholic dignitaries were in sympathy with UNAR, as were most of the representatives of the Protestant missions.

(ii) The refugee problem

281. The refugee problem, as it appeared on the Mission's arrival in the Territory, has been outlined above. The following are the views of the political parties on this matter.

282. UNAR protested strongly against the transfer of refugees to the Bugesera, which it considered an inhuman step. It maintained that these refugees wished to return to their homes where their neighbours were preparing to welcome them and assist their resettlement. The Administration had, however, prevented them from doing so and had forced them to go to an arid region infested with tsetse flies, making them believe that they would be massacred by the Hutu if they stayed behind. UNAR recommended solving the problem by the immediate and general resettlement of the refugees.

283. The Hutu parties considered that there was no need to reintegrate the Tutsi refugees. When the Hutu people had expelled the Tutsi from their homes and occupied their lands it had simply recovered the property which the Tutsi conquerors had taken from them by force in the past. If they now had to accept the return of the Tutsi the Hutu people would be compelled to resort to new acts of violence.

284. RADER, like UNAR, requested the Administration to resettle the refugees on their lands. While admitting that there was a land tenure problem between the Hutu from certain regions and the Tutsi who had settled there during the last few decades, it considered that the Administration had no right to look on passively at acts of injustice even if caused by a political situation which was unfair towards a particular social class. RADER requested that, in addition to the resettlement

of the refugees, the persons who had committed acts of pillage and theft should be punished and that property taken from the Tutsi should be restored to its rightful owners.

285. The Mission has set forth above the reasons given by the Resident-General to justify the Administration's policy with regard to the refugee problem arising from the November disturbances. It has also explained how this problem has been aggravated following new outbreaks which occurred in the districts of Bumba, Kisenyi, Gitarama and Astrida in March and April.

(iii) *The problem of the interim authorities*

286. As stated above, many chiefs and sub-chiefs were killed or driven from their areas at the time of or following the November disturbances. Others have resigned and still others have been removed from office by the Administration. To fill the vacant posts the Administration appointed interim authorities of whom the majority are Hutu.

287. UNAR asserted that the appointment of the interim authorities was a proof of the policy of persecution which the Administration was carrying out against it. It pointed out the removal of chiefs and sub-chiefs had been aimed almost exclusively at members of UNAR and its sympathizers whereas those replacing them were always in favour of the Hutu parties. Moreover, the most highly regarded chiefs and sub-chiefs were among those removed from office. UNAR considered that this inconsistency in its judgments proves that the Administration did not carry out the reorganization in a progressive spirit.

288. RADER was also perturbed by the Administration's policy in the appointment of chiefs and sub-chiefs. It considered that by appointing Tutsi in the predominantly Tutsi areas and Hutu in the predominantly Hutu areas, the Administration was likely to encourage division between the two races and to sow the seeds of future troubles. RADER recommended a progressive policy which would give at least 50 per cent of the appointments to Hutu before the next elections and replace all Tutsi chiefs who are inefficient or too old to adapt themselves to the present development of the country. It also considered that the best chiefs and sub-chiefs who had been deprived of their positions should be reinstated on condition, however, that they would not be subject to legal proceedings.

289. On the other hand, the Hutu parties approved the Administration's policy in the appointment of new chiefs and sub-chiefs. They held that, since the Hutu comprised 85 per cent of the population it was only proper that the same proportion of chiefs and sub-chiefs should be Hutu. They protested against the *Mwami's* refusal to approve the appointments of the interim authorities and regarded his refusal as indicating a desire to perpetuate Tutsi domination.

(iv) *The exercise of political rights*

290. The political parties put before the Mission a certain number of questions concerning the exercise

of political rights. The most important of these questions concerned the emergency regime, alleged acts of persecution committed by the Administration against UNAR members, alleged acts of terrorism or intimidation by UNAR, and lastly the question of an amnesty.

291. UNAR accused the Belgian Administration of conducting a policy of persecution against members of the party or its sympathizers. It stated that since November 1959 many leaders of the party have been imprisoned or placed under house arrest; others have had to flee abroad in order to escape persecution; lastly, many chiefs or sub-chiefs have been transferred or removed from office because they belong to UNAR. It protested against the continuance of the state of emergency in Ruanda and alleged that the Administration was using the exceptional powers it possessed under the emergency in order to prevent the free exercise of political rights. It requested the immediate cessation of the state of emergency and the proclamation of a general amnesty.

292. At the time when the Mission was about to begin its visit to Ruanda UNAR protested against the security measures taken by the Administration and alleged that the aim of these measures was to prevent the inhabitants, and particularly UNAR sympathizers, from having contact with the Mission.

293. The Hutu parties were opposed to the cessation of the state of emergency. In their view, UNAR alone was responsible for the state of tension in the country. They accused it of spreading confusion among the population by circulating all kinds of false rumours and committing acts of intimidation and terrorism against those who opposed it. They also complained that the *Mwami*, though he had several times stated that he was above party politics, gave full support to UNAR. The Hutu parties expressed their conviction that the country would never be able to return to normal conditions if UNAR, with the *Mwami's* backing, was allowed to continue its evil activity. They therefore requested the dissolution of UNAR and the dethronement of the *Mwami*.

294. More recently several Hutu leaders suggested that the country should be divided geographically into separate Hutu and Tutsi areas to allow the country to return to normal conditions. While recognizing the disadvantages of a geographical division of the country, they pointed out that there was no other solution if UNAR was not to be dissolved.

295. RADER also protested against the intimidation policy of UNAR and pointed out that this policy was not only directed against the Hutu but also against the Tutsi members of RADER. RADER was also against the return of the exiled UNAR leaders to Ruanda and suggested that the condemned UNAR leaders should be sent to prison far away from Ruanda.

(b) *Questions concerning the political future of Ruanda*

296. During meetings of the Mission with the political parties and other groups in Ruanda, four ques-

tions concerning the political future of the country were constantly raised: the question of the communal elections to be held in June, the Belgian Government's plans for reforms, the monarchy and independence. Although these questions are closely connected, the Mission proposes, for greater clarity, to set forth the views of the political parties on each question separately.

(i) *The communal elections*

297. The Belgian Government's plan of reforms rests on the constitution of provisional communes. The organization of communal elections was laid down by the Resident-General's Ordinance of 10 March 1960, according to which the elections would take place from 7 June onwards. Moreover, the Belgian Government, in its letter of 26 February 1960, requested that the Trusteeship Council consider the supervision of these elections by the United Nations.

298. UNAR stated that it was opposed to the holding of elections under the conditions prevailing. It argued that Ruanda was in a state of emergency and that the Administration was taking advantage of the excessive powers granted it under the emergency conditions to carry on its policy of discrimination and persecution against the members of UNAR. It alleged that, on the pretext of organizing elections, the Special Resident was conducting a propaganda campaign against UNAR and gave as an example Official Statement No. 7 which he had published on 8 February 1960 concerning the elections, in which he had made comments which seemed to attack UNAR and defend PARMEHUTU. UNAR considered that, before holding elections, it was essential to put a stop to this policy of discrimination and persecution and to take certain steps such as ending the state of emergency, proclaiming a general amnesty for political acts and reintegrating refugees. Lastly, it requested that when the elections could be held in satisfactory conditions they should be supervised by the United Nations.

299. RADER considered that in view of the antagonism between the Tutsi and the Hutu the communal elections to be held in June should be postponed because if held in present conditions they would take place in an atmosphere of racial hatred and might provoke new disturbances. It considered that a minimum period of six months would be necessary to prepare these elections and asked for a round-table conference to be called before they took place.

300. The Hutu parties stated that they wanted the communal elections to take place on the date planned. They thought, however, that for these elections to be held in good conditions UNAR should first be dissolved and the *Mwami* dethroned because they were convinced that UNAR, with the support of the *Mwami*, would do everything possible to disturb the atmosphere and sabotage the elections, and that the abuse of the *Mwami's* prestige with the masses and terrorism carried out in his name would distort the results. With regard to United Nations supervision, the Hutu parties did not think that it was really necessary but were not opposed to it.

(ii) *The plan for reforms*

301. The Belgian Government's plan for reforms, announced in the Government's statement of 10 November 1959, was put into effect by the interim decree of 25 December 1959 and the interim royal order of 25 January 1960. This plan was not discussed in full detail at the time of the Mission's conversations with the political parties, because when it visited the Territory the parties' attention was concentrated on the immediate step in the implementation of the plan—namely, the communal elections to be held in June.

302. UNAR's criticisms of the Government statement are set forth in a petition which it addressed to the Trusteeship Council on 11 January 1960. (I/PET.3/111) UNAR first of all criticized the statement for its vagueness regarding the independence of the country, for proposing reforms which were too timid and, in general, for being inspired by the desire to maintain Belgian domination over the Territory. Turning to a study of the details of the proposed reforms, it considered in particular that it would have been preferable to choose the chiefdom instead of the sub-chiefdom as the basic political entity because the former constituted a viable budgetary unit; that the principle of direct universal adult suffrage should have been adopted for elections at all levels; that there should have been a clearer separation of executive and legislative powers; and that the powers retained by the Administering Authority, particularly in connexion with the general trusteeship matters, were excessive. During the Mission's meeting with the leaders of UNAR at Astrida, the latter requested the calling of a round-table conference to adopt or reject the interim decree.

303. The Hutu parties expressed their partial satisfaction with the proposed reforms. However, they felt that these reforms gave too much power to the *Mwami* and in particular they were opposed to the provisions giving him the power to appoint and to remove from office members of the future Government of the State.

(iii) *The question of the monarchy*

304. Some Hutu leaders asked for the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by a republican régime. However, the majority of those whom the Mission met were in favour of a less radical solution which would consist in keeping the monarchy but with an elected *Mwami*. They also demanded the dethronement of the present *Mwami*, Kigeli V, because they maintained that he had supported the Hutu massacres during the recent outbreaks, that Hutu had been tortured in his house and that, despite his declarations of neutrality, he had in fact become the president of UNAR. However, as a compromise, they proposed the following procedure for the election of the new *Mwami*: a list of four or five candidates would be drawn up, including the present *Mwami*, and the people would be asked to choose one of these candidates. They made it clear that this elections should take place before the communal elections planned for June and under the supervision of an impartial commission.

305. RADER was convinced that the people remained attached to the monarchy. It observed, however, that there was a cleavage between the Administration and the *Mwami* Kigeli V and as a result the country was cut into two. RADER declared that, for peace to be restored to the country, one of them should withdraw; if Kigeli V had to withdraw, he should be replaced by one of his brothers who was more favourable to national reconciliation and to co-operation with the Administration.

306. UNAR professed unreserved loyalty to the person of the *Mwami* and to monarchic institutions. It stated that for the immense majority of the population the *Mwami* remained the only source of legitimate authority and that opposition to him was merely the work of a few political groups without real influence. UNAR accepted without reservation that Ruanda should henceforth develop on the lines of democracy and constitutional monarchy, but considered that it would be dangerous to build the future democracy and allow uncertainty to persist concerning the question of the monarchy. It therefore suggested a referendum based on universal adult suffrage to settle this question once and for all.

307. The Mission was informed that there was some discussion in the provisional special council concerning this question of a referendum, an idea accepted in principle by the *Mwami* in a memorandum addressed to the Mission. It was understood that no agreement was reached on the timing of such a referendum, if indeed it were agreed that one should be held.

308. The provisional special council of Ruanda had prepared, with reservations from certain of its members on some points, a programme of seven proposals to be submitted to the *Mwami*: the constitution of a cabinet of four members, with a representative from each party; the regulation of court protocol; the *Mwami's* residence to be established in Kigali instead of Nyanza; recognition by the *Mwami* of the interim authorities; prior approval of enactments of the *Mwami* by the special council; speedy signature by the *Mwami* of documents approved by the special council; replacement of the *Kalinga* (drum) by a flag, and the abolition of the *Biru* (college of custodians of the esoteric traditions of the dynasty). After the departure of the Visiting Mission these proposals were to be discussed again in the provisional special council in the presence of the *Mwami*, but he refused to attend the meeting of the council and sent it a note of 23 April concerning these proposals. Three of the four political parties represented in the special council considered that this reply was tantamount to a refusal to co-operate with the council. They transmitted the following telegram to the King of the Belgians and to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi:

"*Mwami* Kigeli refuses co-operation with Ruandese people. Relations broken off with Kigeli. Demand appointment of provisional head of State. Ruanda-Urundi round-table refused. Demand ministerial decision. Common front of RADER, PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA."

(iv) The question of independence

309. The question of independence is in the background of all recent political events in Ruanda. The UNAR political programme, if extremely compressed, is reduced to "immediate independence", or in brief "independence"; in the same way, the ideas of the Hutu parties can be reduced to the slogan "democracy before independence" or in brief "democracy". Cries of "independence" on one side and "democracy" on the other resounded all along the Mission's journey through Ruanda. The great intensity of these cries was a measure of the antagonism between the two sections of the population.

310. From the time it was formed in September 1959 UNAR has raised the question of independence. In the party's manifesto it demanded internal autonomy by 1960 and independence by 1962. Following the November disturbances, UNAR revised its programme and demanded immediate independence. During meetings with the leaders of the party at Astrida the Mission asked them to clarify the meaning of the expression "immediate independence" and they replied that "immediate independence" should not be taken in its literal sense. By "immediate independence" they meant "independence in the very near future" and more precisely they wanted independence immediately after free elections supervised by the United Nations, which should be held as soon as possible. In this connexion, they also requested the convocation of a round-table conference consisting of representatives of the four political parties, the Administrative Authority and the United Nations in order to prepare the elections.

311. On its formation in September 1959 RADER drew up a programme providing for internal autonomy in 1964 and independence in 1968. But it, too, revised its programme and considered in its memorandum of 14 March 1960 that the country might become independent towards the end of 1963.

312. On the other hand, the Hutu parties declared themselves strongly opposed to independence for the time being. After recalling that the Tutsi had kept the Hutu in slavery for centuries they expressed their conviction that UNAR was asking for immediate independence in order to ensure their enslavement. They therefore rejected a fictitious independence which did not guarantee *de facto* equality between the Tutsi and the Hutu in the exercise of civil rights, the administration of justice, educational opportunity and the free disposal of lands. They wanted it in a democratic system and not under a dictatorship.

313. The Administering Authority's position was explained by the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in a conversation with the Mission at Brussels. The essence of his statement was that Belgium, which had agreed to give independence to the Belgian Congo on 30 June 1960, had no interest in remaining in Ruanda-Urundi. Its decision to continue to bear responsibility for administering the Territory for a cer-

tain time was based on purely humanitarian considerations.

II. Urundi

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF URUNDI UP TO 1959

Urundi before the German occupation

314. The ethnic composition of the population of Urundi is similar to that of Ruanda, but the proportion of the Tutsi is lower: 1.13 per cent of the population is Twa, 86.48 per cent Hutu, 12.39 per cent Tutsi (see para. 65 above). Socially and politically, however, a fourth class should be added and these are the *Ganwa*, belonging to the Tutsi physical type. They are the princes of the blood royal.

315. The *Bami* of Urundi upon their accession to power receives, in the following order, one of the four following dynastic names: Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, Mwambutsa. Their descendants bear the following names respectively: Batatare, Bezi, Bataga and Bambutsa. They are called (Ba)Ganwa, which means princes of the blood royal, until such time as a new *Mwami* bearing the same name as his eponymous ancestor accedes to power; thereafter, they are referred to as *Bafasoni*, a less elevated honorary title. The *Ganwa* hold almost all the executive posts in Urundi. This is so true that the word *Ganwa* is also in turn employed to designate the chief of the chieftdom, and the Tutsi who are not *Ganwa*, while still regarded as aristocrats, have accordingly much less prestige than the Tutsi in Ruanda.

316. In Urundi the king was in theory as absolute as in Ruanda, but often he was regarded as *primus inter pares* among the *Ganwa*. Each prince had his court and his own army and could not easily be removed from office. The fact that the central government had been unable to control military power as effectively as in Ruanda explains the far less centralized character of the political organization of Urundi. Instead of the policy of splitting up land endlessly, which was pursued by the *Bami* of Ruanda, the *Bami* of Urundi sought on the contrary from time to time to bring together large tracts of land into a homogeneous area for their children. The sons for their part were so far as possible sent out to the distant provinces and were the firm supporters of the *Mwami*, as much against foreign enemies as against possible revolts by princes of older branches.

317. The history of Urundi is still little known, mainly because the court maintained no court historians or official scribes and the kingdom was less centralized and less absolutist than Ruanda; the atmosphere was thus not conducive to the development of an abundant and detailed oral tradition. Urundi was for a long time at war with Ruanda. The king was surrounded by a number of counsellors who were not grouped officially into a council. The threefold organization of power at the local level which exists in Ruanda (chief of pastures and shepherds, chief of lands and farmers and chief of the armies) does not

seem to have existed in Urundi. The *Mwami*, although of divine origin, does not represent the State in his person. It is his drum *Karyenda* which represents royalty and he is subordinate to it religiously.

318. There existed in Urundi a system of cattle-holding similar to the *ubuhake* in Ruanda: this was the *ubugabire*, but it seems that its provisions were less strict and that it was in fact less binding than its equivalent in Ruanda.

319. As in Ruanda, the number of Tutsi varied in different parts of the country, from 2.63 per cent in the Bubanza district to 28.93 per cent in the Bururi district. The physical characteristics of the Tutsi and the Hutu are, however, less marked than in Ruanda, at least among a large number of their members. This may mean that there has been a greater degree of blood mixture. In Urundi there are more poor Tutsi than in Ruanda and they are reputed to be less arrogant and proud of their race. There is a tradition in Urundi that the early *Bami* were from the Hutu and not the Tutsi.

Urundi under the German régime

320. In 1892, Dr. Baumann reached the heart of Urundi and in 1897 the Germans established a military station at Usumbura. The first Catholic missions were founded in Urundi in 1898. In 1912, the seat of the residency of Urundi was transferred from Usumbura to Kitega. On the eve of the First World War, a report by Governor Schnee stated that the history of Urundi since its occupation by Germany had unfortunately been unsatisfactory and was in contrast with the peaceful and pleasant state of affairs in Ruanda. While relations between the *Mwami* of Ruanda, Yuhli Musinga and the German authorities were relatively peaceful, the situation was not the same in Urundi where constant struggles and rivalry brought the *Bami* Mwezi Gisabo (who died in 1908) and Mutaga (1908-1915) into opposition with their great feudal lords. The Residents von Grawert, von Beringe and Langenn, among others, sided sometimes with the *Mwami* and sometimes with the dissidents, pursuing extremely incoherent policies frequently inconsistent with the instructions sent to them by the Governors of German East Africa. When the Belgian troops reached Urundi, they found the country in a state of dissension and the young *Mwami* Mwambutsa, who had just succeeded Mutaga, the butt of court intrigue.

Urundi under the Belgian régime

321. Belgian policies in Urundi were the same as in Ruanda. Readers should therefore refer to the section of this report dealing with that State (see paras. 80-109 above).

322. The *Mwami* of Urundi, Mwambutsa, who became king when he was two years old, was until 1930 assisted by a council of regency consisting of three members. A council of the *Mwami* was re-established in 1938. On page 75 of the Belgian Government's

annual report for 1933 it is stated that at the outset it had to be admitted that the indigenous organization of the State in Urundi was less developed than in Ruanda.³³

323. On pages 34 and 35 of the Belgian Government's report for 1939-1944 it is stated that the European administration, at the instigation of the *Mwami* himself, was obliged after many years of patience to set aside several chiefs and sub-chiefs who were unable to comprehend ideas of moral or social progress and who by the abuses which they committed stirred up discontent among the people under their authority.³⁴ The report continues by stating that it might be asked why such individuals were not removed earlier; it explains the situation by saying that the administration had always sought to avoid, for as long a time as possible, removing the notables it had found in power when it had occupied the country, and to cease collaborating with them only when, after constant advice and warnings, it was clear that they absolutely refused to co-operate.

324. None the less, as had been pointed out by the Working Group, the problem of abuses perpetrated by

the customary authorities had not taken on the social and racial characteristics which it had in Ruanda. Those holding power under the customary system were not all considered as representatives of a dominant race or class but rather as members of favoured families, and in so far as there were protests of a social nature it was not a question of complaints by the Hutu against the privileges of the Tutsi, but of protests by the Tutsi and the Hutu against the almost exclusive access of the Ganwa to public office. It is difficult to know if the reason for that situation is the existence of more harmonious ethnic relations or a lesser degree of awareness on the part of the mass of the peasantry.

325. The personal influence of the *Mwami* Mwambutsa, whose popularity amongst the people is very great, has been beneficial. His letters to the chiefs and sub-chiefs have for several years acted as a restraining influence against the abuses of a fraction of the ruling class.

326. Some, however, consider that the feudal and racial problem in Urundi is basically the same as in Ruanda, that the Tutsi-Hutu question is potentially just as explosive, and that the elements for a civil war exist in Urundi also.

327. It is interesting to note that the results of the indirect elections in 1953 and in 1956 for the sub-chiefdom councils were not greatly dissimilar to results in Ruanda and showed similar trends. The figures given in the following table refer to Urundi without Usumbura.

	Total	Tutsi	Hutu	Twa	Swahili and Congolese
1953					
Electoral colleges in sub-chiefdoms (designated electors)	7,285	2,524 (34.65%)	4,761 (65.35%)	—	—
Sub-chiefdom councils (elected members)	3,789	1,504 (39.7%)	2,285 (60.3%)	—	—
Chiefdom councils (members)	372	273 (73.4%)	99 (26.6%)	—	—
District councils (members)	140	140 (80.7%)	27 (19.3%)	—	—
High Council of State (members)	30	26 (86.7%)	4 (13.3%)	—	—
1956					
Electoral colleges in sub-chiefdoms (elected electors)	43,155	9,644 (22.35%)	33,483 (77.59%)	6 (0.01%)	22 (0.05%)
Sub-chiefdom councils (elected members)	3,904	1,664 (42.6%)	2,240 (57.4%)	—	—
Chiefdom councils (members)	386	301 (78%)	85 (22%)	—	—
District councils (members)	140	120 (85.7%)	20 (14.3%)	—	—
High Council of State (members)	30	28 (93.3%)	2 (6.7%)	—	—

328. There are two factors which should be noted which have differentiated Urundi from Ruanda in recent years. Firstly, the elimination of the *ubugabire*

which was decided upon in 1955 occurred almost unperceived in Urundi, while the elimination of *ubuhake* in Ruanda in 1954 had far-reaching repercussions and

was applied on a large scale: on 31 December 1958, some 218,000 head of heavy cattle had been subject to property division in Ruanda while in Urundi the equivalent number was only 700.

329. Secondly, the question of the extra-tribal centres had always greatly excited opinion in Urundi. The four extra-tribal centres in Ruanda-Urundi (Usumbura, Kitega, Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge), all situated in Urundi, were endowed with a special régime. That fact was interpreted by the High Council of Urundi and by many Urundians as proof that the Belgian Administration had intended to separate Usumbura from the rest of Urundi and from the authority of the *Mwami*. In 1952, there had been concern over the nationalization of land which had been made necessary by the development of the town of Usumbura. When in 1957 the question arose of providing Usumbura with a statute similar to that given to towns in the Belgian Congo, there was such opposition that the Administration preferred to withdraw the project. This problem was already noted by the 1957 Visiting Mission³⁵ and has lost none of its acuteness since then.

POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1959 AND THE BEGINNING OF 1960

330. At the end of December 1958, Mr. André Ndabibona, speaking to the *Mwami* on behalf of the sub-chiefs of Urundi, complained about certain chiefs whom he accused of treating the sub-chiefs as slaves and of committing numerous abuses. He requested that the status of the sub-chiefs be defined, that their remuneration be improved and that they be assured of representation in the High Council of the State.

331. In January 1959, a note signed "Hutu and Tutsi of Kitega" was sent to the *Mwami* protesting against the monopoly of the Ganwa in nominations to positions of authority in the chiefdoms.

332. But it was mainly the arrival of the Working Group in April 1959 which provoked considerable political activity by the customary authorities and in particular by the High Council of the State. In his speech of 23 April 1959, made on the occasion of the Working Group's visit, *Mwami* Mwambutsa, introducing the draft constitution for Urundi, began by recalling that the States of Urundi and Ruanda were entirely separate and that each must be allowed to develop according to its own aspirations. He protested against the United Nations recommendation that the Administering Authority must try to merge the two States into a single entity and maintained that such a course was impossible at the present time. Urundi desired internal autonomy but, he added, would still require Belgian assistance for a long time and the trusteeship system should not be abolished. The *Mwami* then appealed for the reintegration of the extra-customary centres under his authority. On the same day, Chief Barusasiyeko, on behalf of the High Council of the State, impressed upon the Working Group the

importance of the question of extra-customary centres. He pointed out the reasons why that problem was more important than any other. Subsequently, he introduced the draft constitution drawn up by the High Council.

333. The text, based on the Belgian Constitution, comprised 123 articles. It stated that Urundi is a constitutional monarchy, indivisible and democratic. It would establish a Urundi nationality and, in that respect, the High Council considered that, if such a status—so essential for the formation of the nation and State of Urundi—did not yet exist, it was not the fault of Belgium but indeed of the United Nations which, by establishing a trusteeship system, had created the concept of persons under the jurisdiction of Ruanda-Urundi (*ressortissants du Ruanda-Urundi*) without dissociating the inhabitants of Urundi from those of Ruanda from the legal point of view.

334. The draft constitution would establish the principle of the fundamental freedoms, individual freedom, right of ownership, freedom of conscience, of education, of the press, of assembly, of association, of petition, etc. The principle of the separation of powers would be recognized. The legislative power would be exercised collectively by the *Mwami*, the High Council of the State and the Legislative Council. These two councils would be composed, on the one hand, of representatives elected from the chiefdom councils by members of the sub-chiefdom or chiefdom councils, and, on the other hand, of co-opted members. The executive power would be in the hands of the *Mwami*, who would appoint a leader to form a team of ministers. If the ministers raised the question of confidence and did not obtain a majority in one of the two councils, they would submit their resignations to the *Mwami*. The government might be composed of Urundi and Belgian ministers. The Urundi ministers would be assisted by Belgian experts and the Belgian ministers would be assisted by Urundi secretaries of State. As the Urundi officials became capable of taking the place of the Belgians, their numbers in the government would gradually increase.

335. The judiciary power would rest with the courts. Judges would be appointed for life by the *Mwami*, either directly or from lists submitted by the High Council and the courts of appeal. Judges and magistrates might not simultaneously hold other public offices.

336. The sub-chiefdom councils would be elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage and the sub-chief would be appointed by the *Mwami* from among council members. The chiefdom councils would be elected by direct vote from among members of the sub-chiefdom councils. The chiefs would be appointed and dismissed by the *Mwami*. The functions of the chiefdom and sub-chiefdom councils would pertain to all matters. It would be laid down that, as long as Belgian Trusteeship is exercised, there would be no distinction to be made between the Belgian officials and magistrates of metropolitan status and Urundi officials. Upon termination of the Trusteeship system,

³⁵ Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 3, paras. 89-96.

a convention between Urundi and Belgium would regulate the questions of administrative and technical assistance which would enable Belgian officials, magistrates and experts of metropolitan status to continue to serve Urundi with certain guarantees regarding their future.

337. Pending the results of the Working Group's visit, the relations between the Urundi customary authorities and the Belgian Administration remained excellent, in contrast with the situation in Ruanda. When the Governor returned from leave in Belgium on 30 September 1959, he was welcomed at the airport with remarkable cordiality by the *Mwami* of Urundi and many chiefs and notables of Urundi, with drums and dances, whereas no notables from Ruanda could be observed. Certain persons interpreted this as a discreet but deliberate gesture by Urundi to dissociate itself from the unrest in Ruanda.

338. In November 1959, the King of the Belgians invited the *Bani* of Ruanda and Urundi to go to Brussels for an audience on 9 November, the day before the government statement on Ruanda-Urundi was issued. The *Mwami* of Urundi accepted the invitation and left Usumbura on 7 November for a month's stay in Belgium. The *Mwami* of Ruanda, however, felt that, in view of the local situation, it was his duty to stay with his people and to renounce the visit to Belgium.

339. On 13 November, the Resident of Urundi decided to place several chiefdoms in the north of Urundi under "military operation" (*opération militaire*) to protect Urundi against attacks by armed bands operating from Ruanda in the frontier regions. It may be remembered that on 10 November, a Hutu leader of APROSOMA who had taken refuge in Urundi was assassinated there by persons from Ruanda (see para. 208 above).

340. The earliest political parties of Urundi date back to September-October 1959. The first manifesto of the Parti de l'unité et du progrès national du Burundi (UPRONA) (originally known as Union nationale progressiste (UNAP), or *Abadasigana d'i Burundi*) demanded internal autonomy by January 1960 to pave the way for independence, the establishment of democratic institutions within the framework of a hereditary monarchy, elections on the basis of universal suffrage, the economic development of the country, the promotion of social welfare, the advancement of education with larger state participation in its organization and policy, and the creation of a University of Urundi. The party proposed also to campaign vigorously against any form of incitement to racial hatred both among the Urundi population itself or between whites and coloured. The party proclaimed a single aim—the well-being of the Urundi nation—and proposed to secure it legally and by peaceful means. It would continue to respect authority but wished to be consulted on any matter affecting the future of Urundi. It felt that the preliminary draft of the Belgian Government's statement on the future of the State should first be submitted to the responsible local political organs. A few weeks later, UPRONA published a second mani-

festo, deploring the civil war in Ruanda, emphasizing the calm in Urundi as well as the attachment of its people to the *Mwami* and the dynasty. The manifesto also stressed the importance of recognizing individual land ownership. At the same time the Union nationale du Ruanda-Urundi (UNARU) came into being.

341. Between November and December 1959 a controversy developed in the press. On 14 October 1959 the chairmen of the Hutu parties of Ruanda and some advanced Hutu of Urundi had sent a letter (see para. 175 above) to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi expressing their anxiety lest internal autonomy lead to Tutsi absolutism and requesting the extension of the Belgian Trusteeship. A letter published on 13 November in the newspaper *Temps nouveaux d'Afrique* disputed these views in so far as they concerned Urundi. It was implied that in fact there were no nationals of Urundi among the signatories of the original letter and that, since castes did not exist in Urundi, the Hutu-Tutsi problem did not arise. On 27 November, the newspaper published a letter from Mr. Maus asserting that the Hutu-Tutsi problem existed in Urundi, just as in Ruanda, and expressed the hope that "the Belgian and Urundi authorities were not awaiting a second civil war to open their eyes and would introduce with good grace in Urundi the drastic reforms which were now being carried out in Ruanda under the threat of blood and fire". On 4 December, Ganwa Louis Rwagasore, the son of the *Mwami* Mwambutsa and one of the leaders of UPRONA, attacked Mr. Maus in an open letter stating, *inter alia*: "Your work has borne fruit in Ruanda. Must Urundi go through the same experience before you are fully satisfied?" He continued, "There is a problem, that of the small and weak and they have no race." In his turn, several days later, Mr. Maus, repeated his point of view that "the rich are nearly always the Tutsi and the poor are nearly always the Hutu".

342. In December 1959, a group of Urundi representatives from Usumbura called on the *Mwami* and made suggestions for the maintenance of peace in the State and for the avoidance of the ill-feeling between the Hutu and the Tutsi, which existed in Ruanda. In particular, it was proposed that an extraordinary national council should be convened to examine the influence in Urundi of the recent disturbances in Ruanda and that the attention of political parties and leaders should be drawn to their duties and responsibilities.

343. On 5 January 1960, in a circular letter addressed to the population of Urundi, *Mwami* Mwambutsa launched an appeal for unity and stated that "it would be incomprehensible if the people of Urundi were to become divided at the very time when the country was choosing its future political path."

344. In January 1960 there came into existence the Parti du peuple de l'Urundi (PP), and in February the Parti démocrate chrétien du Burundi (PDC), the Mouvement progressiste du Burundi, (MPB) and other parties to be mentioned later.

345. The reform plan described in the government statement of 10 November 1959 and the provisions of

the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and of the Royal Interim Orders of 26 January 1960, which have been mentioned above, dealt with Urundi on the same basis as Ruanda. As regards Urundi more particularly, the statement announced that the extra-customary centres would have the same structure as the other communes which had grown out of the sub-chiefdoms. The same régime would apply to Usumbura subject to the police rights which the Administration considered it must be entitled to exercise in the locality of its headquarters.

346. The government statement at first caused hardly any reaction in Urundi. The High Council of the State set up on 22 December a political committee composed of its own members to examine the statement and this committee, which was also to take note of the Interim Decree after it had been published, drew up a memorandum which was unanimously approved by the Council on 20 January and sent to the Presidents of the Belgian Legislative Chambers with copies for the United Nations (T/PET.3/L.15) the Resident-General and the Resident of Urundi.

347. The memorandum of the High Council was extremely unfavourable. The Council upbraided the Administering Authority for not having taken into account the wishes which the Council had expressed on behalf of the population for the drawing up of the reform plan. In particular, it criticized the plan on the following points:

(a) *Internal autonomy*: The Council stated that, instead of granting a large measure of internal autonomy to the country, Belgium was imposing upon it a form of trusteeship very similar to the colonial system; it described the Interim Decree as "a decree of domination";

(b) *Urundi nationality*: The Council reproached the Administering Authority with not having recognized Urundi nationality; it felt that the right to vote and the right of being elected should be granted only to Urundi nationals and those who had obtained Urundi naturalization by an order of the *Mwami*;

(c) *Democracy*: The Council felt that the Interim Decree favoured a truncated democracy; it requested that all political authorities should be elected by the population and be subject to appointment by the *Mwami*;

(d) *Africanization of the civil service*: The Council considered that the form of Africanization envisaged by the Administering Authority in fact meant Europeanization because the most able indigenous civil servants would be automatically withdrawn from the direct indigenous administration and transferred to the indirect European administration;

(e) *Chiefdoms*: The Council protested against the abolition of the chiefdoms which constituted political entities as ancient as the State itself. It proposed, on the contrary, that the chiefdoms should be enlarged and designated provinces with elected provincial councils and that the heads of provinces should be elected from such councils and nominated for appointment by the *Mwami*.

The High Council also criticized the provisions of the Decree concerning the General Council.

348. The views of the High Council were opposed by the Parti du peuple in a petition addressed to the United Nations on 23 January 1960 (T/PET.3/L.14).

349. On several occasions, the Resident offered to the High Council the assistance of the services of the Administration to explain the statement and the Interim Decree, and the government plans concerning specific projects which would emerge from those texts. He later suggested the establishment of a mixed committee consisting of members of the Council and representatives of the Administration for the purpose of examining the text of the memorandum. The Council nevertheless maintained its position and rejected the Resident's proposal. On 30 January, the Resident-General received the *Mwami* and the members of the Council's political committee at Usumbura and repeated the Resident's proposal, but his offer was again refused.

350. However, when it became aware of the Belgian Government's decision to grant independence to the Belgian Congo on 30 June 1960, the High Council took an even more decisive position. On 3 February 1960, it adopted a motion demanding independence for Urundi by 21 June 1960 and the holding before that date of a round-table conference grouping the leading representatives of Urundi opinion, as well as the representatives of Belgium and the United Nations, in order to pave the way for independence. In that motion, the Council proposed also a time-table for independence in the following six stages:

(a) Electoral campaign and detailed arrangements for elections;

(b) Provincial elections and elections for the constitution of the Lower House;

(c) Elections for the constitution of the Upper House;

(d) Formation of the government;

(e) Meeting of Parliament and proclamation of independence;

(f) Transfer of public powers.

351. This motion was adopted by 21 votes with 1 abstention—that of Chief Ntindendereza, who felt that independence was premature at the present stage.

352. The High Council's three-year term of office expired on 17 February 1960. Meanwhile, the Resident-General decided, by Ordinance No. 221/60 of 27 February, to establish, pending the setting up of the new institutions prescribed in the Interim Decree, a five-member interim committee presided over by the *Mwami* with the task of exercising the functions of the High Council so far as was necessary for the completion of current business and the examination of urgent problems.

353. To assist the interim committee, the Resident General also set up by Ordinance No. 221/79 of 17 March three special committees—namely, an electoral committee, a social and educational committee and a committee dealing with finance, economic development

and natural resources. The electoral committee was to include among its members a representative of each of the political parties legally constituted at the date of entry into force of the ordinance.

354. Although, by an Ordinance of 10 March 1960, the Resident-General had decided that communal elections would take place in Ruanda from 7 June onward, no decision had yet been taken regarding the timing of the elections in Urundi at the time of the Mission's visit. The Resident stated that the interim committee and the electoral committee were actively examining, in collaboration with the Administration, problems concerning the preparation and organization of those elections and that the Administration had already begun a campaign of information with a view to explaining to the population the various electoral operations.

SITUATION IN URUNDI AT THE TIME OF THE MISSION'S VISIT

355. The situation in Urundi during the Mission's visit presented marked differences from that in Ruanda as well as many points of similarity. Although the atmosphere of excitement and uneasiness which hung over Ruanda was absent from Urundi, some tension was nevertheless to be felt there.

356. Ruanda and Urundi are endowed with similar geographic, ethnic, social and economic characteristics, and having much the same political organization, what occurred in one could not leave the other indifferent. The November disorders which had cast so tragic a pall over Ruanda aroused deep disquiet in the people of Urundi, for they felt that the factors which had caused those disorders also existed in their country. If Urundi had escaped violence it was because the socio-political problem was not yet as acute there as in Ruanda, and because the *Mwami* Mwambutsa, who had reigned for forty-three years and whose prestige and authority were uncontested, fortunately constituted a stabilizing element.

357. As a result of the position adopted by the High Council with regard to the government statement, the Council's relations with the Administration had greatly deteriorated and this state of affairs naturally had a very deleterious effect on the course of the State's public affairs. The Resident-General's decision to replace the High Council, at the expiration of its term, by the interim committee was not well received in some quarters. Part of the population sided with the High Council and another part with the Administration.

358. The Belgian Government's decision regarding the independence of the Belgian Congo came as a shock, and, by arousing hope in some and anxiety in others, increased the general tension. Lastly, the announcement of the forthcoming visit of the United Nations Visiting Mission created great excitement among the political leaders and those who aspired to become leaders. The leaders of the existing political parties made preparations to prove to the Mission the rightness of their programmes and the influence their parties exer-

cised over the masses, while other leaders prepared to form new parties.

359. In this political atmosphere, some of the parties accused others of engaging in manoeuvres of intimidation and acts of terrorism, and false rumours similar to those which had circulated in Ruanda soon began to spread, in particular concerning the Mission's terms of reference and intentions, the *Mwami*'s sympathies for a particular party or the Administration's machinations against that party. In an effort to put an end to some of those rumours, the *Mwami* on 8 February sent a message to the people in which he said that, since he was the *Mwami* of all, he intended to remain above political parties and did not authorize any party to claim his endorsement. Three days later, he issued an appeal to the population exhorting them to remain calm and to co-operate with the Belgian Government.

360. This was the atmosphere the Mission found in Urundi when, after having visited Ruanda, it arrived at Kitega on 21 March 1960. An incident, fortunately not very serious, had taken place on that same day. According to the Resident of Urundi, a group of about 500 UNARU agitators, most of whom were detribalized persons from Usumbura, after demonstrating before the Mission, had attempted to invade the Kitega post. The forces of order had shown great coolness, and had succeeded in driving them back without inflicting any casualties.

361. On its arrival at Kitega, the Mission discussed with the Resident, the *Mwami* and the members of the interim committee questions relating to the maintenance of order and the right of petition. The Resident said that he expected incidents between the political groups and that some of those groups had expressed a fear of being attacked. That was why he had considered it necessary to prohibit the entry of vehicles into the Kitega post during the Mission's stay and to take steps to ensure the security of the Mission's offices. He assured the Mission, however, that every precaution would be taken to enable the population to communicate with it. In that connexion, it should be pointed out that several days earlier, on 15 March, the Resident-General had issued a message to the population of Urundi identical with the one he had already sent the people of Ruanda (see annex II) recalling that everyone had the right to communicate freely with the members of the Mission and that they need naturally have no fear because of such an action.

362. As in Ruanda, the Mission has no reason to believe that everyone who wished to communicate with it was prevented from doing so. The hearing of petitioners was, moreover, not so difficult a problem as in Ruanda, because there were far fewer requests for hearings. The Mission was able to satisfy all the requests made to it in every locality it visited. Thus is heard representatives of all the State's political parties, of several non-political groups of a number of individual petitioners, both European and African.

363. The political parties of Urundi are of very recent origin. At the end of 1959, there were only two

parties. In the first two months of 1960, six new parties were founded, one of which, APRODEBA, dissolved itself shortly after its foundation because it had only two members. In March, during the Mission's stay in the Territory, three other parties were founded.

364. There were therefore, when the Visiting Mission left the Territory, ten political parties:

- (i) The Union nationale africaine du Ruanda-Urundi (UNARU);
- (ii) The Unité et progrès national (UPRONA);
- (iii) The parti du peuple (PP);
- (iv) The Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC);
- (v) The Mouvement progressiste du Burundi (MPB);
- (vi) The Union démocratique paysanne (UDP);
- (vii) The Voix du peuple murundi (VPM);
- (viii) The Démocratie nationale du Burundi (DNB);
- (ix) The Parti démocratique des jeunes travailleurs du Burundi (PDJTB);
- (x) The Parti démocratique rural (PDR).

365. The situation with respect to Urundi's political parties is still very fluid. It is probable that some of them will disappear for lack of members or funds, as happened in the case of APRODEBA, and that other parties will be founded. It is therefore impossible to determine what influence the present ten parties have over the mass of the population. However, there are many signs that two of these parties have already acquired considerable importance. These are UPRONA and the PDC. UPRONA, which seems to have adopted an attitude of hostility towards the Administration, has called for immediate independence for the State, while the PDC desires the maintenance of Belgian administration and the establishment of democratic institutions before independence is granted. The antagonism between these two parties could stem less from ideological differences than from clan rivalries, between the *Bezi*, who are members of the present ruling family, and the *Batare*, who belong to the former ruling family. The latter are supported by the PDC and the former by UPRONA.

366. These two parties were very active during the Mission's stay in Urundi. On the route followed by the Mission and in the places where it held its hearings, large crowds gathered with posters and banners or handed it petitions in order to demonstrate their support of one or the other party. Competing cries for "independence" and "democracy" were heard everywhere in Urundi, as in Ruanda, but for different reasons, since this was not a case of antagonism between Tutsi and Hutu, but of a rivalry between political parties supported by two clans.

367. A third party, UNARU, was also active during the Mission's stay. Many members or supporters of this party demonstrated before the Mission at Usumbura and at several posts in the interior of Ruanda. According to the Resident, this party is made up largely of Swahili and Africans from Uganda. Its influence is confined to the town of Usumbura, but on the occasion of the Mission's passage many of its members came by truck to demonstrate before it at Kitega and other places

in Urundi. UNARU has adopted the same position as UPRONA on the question of independence; it should also be added that, according to its name and its statute, this party intends to operate in both States, but that so far its activities have been confined to Urundi.

368. The Mission was able to confer with the leaders of the other political parties, who also submitted written documents to it, at Usumbura or Kitega. They confined their activities to these contacts. The oldest of these parties is the PP, which was founded on 10 January 1960. This party seeks the support of the people, that is, the unprivileged, whether they are Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, and has set as its goal their liberation from the *Ganwa* yoke. The other parties seem to follow less clear-cut lines of action. On the question of independence, some have adopted a position close to that of UPRONA, others to that of the PDC.

369. In giving this first survey of the situation in Urundi as regards political parties, the Mission has not gone into the details of ideologies and programmes, since many of these parties were still feeling their way at the time of the Mission's visit.

370. During the month of March three congresses were held by the political parties of Urundi. A first conference, attended by the seven parties then in existence (MPB, PDC, PP, UDP, UNARU, UPRONA and VPM) took place early in March. It was unable to reach agreed conclusions: UPRONA and UNARU withdrew in its first days.

371. Since then, the various parties have grouped themselves, according to their sympathies, into two congresses: one made up of the five parties which continued to take part in the first conference, the MPB, the PDC, the PP, the UDP and the VPM; and the other made up of UPRONA, the VPM and two new parties, the DNB and PDJTB.

372. On 19 March 1960 the five-party congress adopted a joint programme, of which the principal points are as follows:

(a) Right to vote and eligibility for election

The congress expressed the wish that only Urundi nationals should enjoy the right to vote and of eligibility for election. On this point the PP expressed a reservation: it considered that non-nationals should also enjoy these rights under certain conditions and stated that in practice it was prepared to accept the conditions provided for in the Interim Decree.

(b) Preparation of elections

The congress noted that the atmosphere prevailing was still saturated with feudal tendencies and that the personal influence of the chiefs and sub-chiefs could not fail to have a decisive influence on the elections. In order to ward off this danger it proposed that the chiefs and sub-chiefs should exchange posts during the electoral period and that control commissions should be established in order to ensure that the transferred chiefs and sub-chiefs did not commit abuses in the *circonscriptions* to which they had been temporarily trans-

ferred and did not return to their own *circonscriptions* in order to carry out propaganda activities there. The congress also demanded that the *Mwami's* son, the Ganwa Rwagasore, and his sons-in-law, should be kept out of the disputes of political parties, and decided to lodge a complaint against anyone who, for the purposes of party propaganda, used the name of the *Mwami* or engaged in any other unfair practice punishable by law. On this point, the VPM pointed out that Rwagasore must be kept out of politics as the *Mwami's* son, not because he was a member of the Bezi family or a chief.

(c) Independence

The congress expressed the wish that a period of democratization should precede independence and serve as a preparation for it. It considered that it would be unwise, and indeed impossible, to fix a date for accession to independence immediately.

(d) Round-table conference

The congress expressed the wish that a round-table conference should be held immediately after the elections so that all points of view regarding accession to independence might be sifted. The choice of delegates to the round-table should not be based solely on the results of the elections; the delegations should rather include representatives of all tendencies in the State as reflected by the political parties. The conference should send its conclusions to the United Nations, which would thus have all the facts before it when the time came to take a decision concerning the date of independence.

373. The four-party congress set out its conclusions in a letter sent to the Mission. This letter was undated, but was probably signed a few days after the five-party memorandum. The four-party congress's conclusions deal with the same questions as those of the five-party congress. In summary, they are as follows:

(a) Right to vote and eligibility for election

The congress agreed that the right to vote and to be eligible for election should be granted only to indigenous Urundians, but it requested that the *Mwami* and the interim committee should be empowered to fix the conditions in which aliens might enjoy the political rights of indigenous inhabitants. It also asked that indigenous inhabitants should be given the right to vote at their places of residence on registration, without a minimum-residence requirement of six months, and that they should have the right to run for office at the place of their choice, whatever their commune of origin or residence.

(b) Preparation of elections

After stating that accession to independence should be preceded by elections under universal suffrage, the congress requested that those elections should be supervised, beginning with the electoral campaign, by a commission made up of representatives of the political parties and Belgian career magistrates at the provincial

level, and by the United Nations at the national level. It also requested suspension of the activities of the territorial and tribal authorities until the end of the elections, in order to ensure that they did not influence the choice of the electorate. It considered that the elections should be preceded by an electoral campaign by the political parties lasting at least two full months. Lastly, it considered it absolutely necessary that a circular from the *Mwami* explaining the elections should be the only official document guiding the population, and that the *Mwami* and the Resident should have such a circular distributed widely by a group of independent persons of impartiality and integrity.

(c) Independence

The congress called for independence in the near future. It considered that it was unthinkable that Urundi, which was a Trust Territory, should remain outside the concert of African countries which had attained independence or were on the point of doing so. However, it recognized that it would be impossible to accede to independence without preparation. Among the basic reforms most urgently needed, it listed the pensioning of the old chiefs and sub-chiefs who had deserved well of the country but could no longer keep up with current developments, and their replacement by new chiefs elected by the people and invested by the *Mwami*. It also requested that public order should be ensured immediately before and after independence by an international force which would remain in the State until the constitution of a police force made up exclusively of Urundian nationals.

(d) Round-table conference

The congress requested that after the elections a round-table conference bringing together representatives of the political parties, qualified spokesmen for public opinion in Urundi and representatives of the Administering Authority should be held to discuss the date of independence, elections to establish a lower and an upper chamber and new democratic institutions to legislate for the new state.

374. In that connexion, the congress proposed a timetable for independence which it said was based not only on its feelings, which would brook no delay, but also on logic and the reality of the situation. This time-table included the following points:

(a) if the communal elections took place in June, the preparation and work of the round-table conference might occupy all of July and August;

(b) the electoral campaign for the elections to the lower and upper chambers would be held throughout September;

(c) the elections to the two chambers might be held throughout October;

(d) in November, the government would be formed and preparations made for the State's accession to independence;

(e) the date of accession to independence should be made coincident with the traditional holiday of *Umuganure* on 27 December 1960.

Lastly, the congress suggested that the political round-table conference should be followed, in September, by an economic and financial round-table conference.

375. UNARU took part in the four-party congress but refused to support its conclusions regarding the voting rights of aliens. It should also be pointed out that the VPM endorsed the conclusions of both congresses. The two conferences were held on dates which, though close to each other, were separate, which explains how this party was able to take part in both.

376. Lastly, the PDR, which had been founded at the end of March, was unable to participate in either of the congresses. Before the Mission's departure from the Territory, this party submitted to it a memorandum setting out its programme. It considered that the right to vote and to be eligible for elections should be reserved for Urundians alone, and that the country should accede to independence at a not too distant date. It advocated a conference of representatives of Urundi, Belgium and the United Nations, after the formation of the future government of the State, to determine the means and timing of the State's accession to independence. This conference should, in its opinion, be held before the end of 1960. However, if the establishment of democratic institutions was delayed for unavoidable reasons, the conference might take place, at the latest, in the middle of 1961.

377. After it had left the Territory, the Mission was informed that the *Mwami* had visited all the districts of Urundi, accompanied by the Resident and the interim commission. He was welcomed enthusiastically by the population to whom he stated that he was above political parties; that he recognized them all on an equal basis and that no one party was authorized to claim to be the "party of the *Mwami*". The *Mwami* also emphasized that each national of Urundi was free to join the party of his choice or to refrain from joining any party if he so chose. During the mass meetings which took place, the Resident mentioned to the population the *communiqué* published by the Mission on 31 March 1960.

III. Ruanda-Urundi

ORGANIZATION OF RUANDA-URUNDI BEFORE DECEMBER 1959

378. It should not be forgotten that, despite the differences in situation apparent from the foregoing chapters, Ruanda and Urundi constitute a single Territory, the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi.

379. The organization of this Territory up to the end of 1959 has already been described to the Trusteeship Council on many occasions. The highest legislator for Ruanda-Urundi was the Belgian legislative power. Every year it passed the budget of the Territory and it could intervene in all matters, but in fact such intervention was exceptional. The laws (in the strictest sense of the word, this means the laws enacted by the Belgian Parliament) of the Belgian Congo were *ex officio* applicable in Ruanda-Urundi. The King of the Belgians, assisted

by the Colonial Council, was normally the legislator for the Territory, and issued decrees counter-signed by the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi (who used also to be the Vice-Governor-General of the Belgian Congo) had emergency legislative powers.

380. Decrees and legislative ordinances of the Belgian Congo applied to Ruanda-Urundi only when that was expressly stated in the text, or when they had been rendered enforceable by an ordinance of the Government of the Territory.

381. The executive power was vested in the King of the Belgians. It was delegated to the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, who exercised it by means of ordinances.

382. The General Council, which in 1957 had replaced the former Council of the Vice-Government-General, was an advisory body which examined proposals concerning the budget, discussed matters submitted to it by the Governor and motions introduced by not less than three members. It could also express wishes to the Government.

383. It consisted of forty-five members with deliberative powers, distributed as follows:

Nine *ex officio* members: the Governor, who acted as president, the *procureur du Roi*, the two Provincial Commissioners, the Provincial Secretary, the two Residents and the two *Bami*;

Four representatives of rural communities, two for Ruanda and two for Urundi, chosen by the High Councils of the States from amongst their own members;

Six representatives of industrial and commercial companies, appointed by the Governor on the nomination of industrial associations and chambers of commerce representing industrial and commercial companies;

Six representatives of the independent middle classes, appointed by the Governor on the nomination of middle class representative groups, including the chamber of commerce representing individual undertakings;

Six representatives of labour, five appointed by the Governor on the nomination of occupational associations of workers and employees in the public and private sectors, and one on the nomination of the workers' members of the Commissions on Labour and Indigenous Social Progress;

Six notables chosen by the Governor on the basis of their ability and independence of mind;

Four representatives of extra-rural communities, chosen by the Governor;

Four persons belonging to neither the general nor the indigenous administrations, chosen by the Governor.

384. The General Council met at least once a year. In fact it held two regular sessions (the ordinary session and the budgetary session) and extraordinary meetings.

385. The General Council has not been convened since the budgetary session in June 1959. Some of the European members, not in the public service, have expressed their disapproval of the fact that the Council had not been convened since, when normally it should have met in December. This omission was criticized all the more because serious incidents occurred in Ruanda during the second six months of 1959, and the entire

future of the Territory was at stake. The Governor, on the other hand, thought that, in view of the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959, the constitution of a new General Council should be awaited.

386. Ruanda-Urundi is in administrative union with the Belgian Congo. There is also a customs union between the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The Governor of Ruanda-Urundi was the Vice-Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and of Ruanda-Urundi. He had under his orders officials (who may be Europeans or Africans since the introduction of the single set of regulations from 1 January 1959) who dealt either with the general services (chiefs of services, etc.), or the local services, divided into two Residencies (Ruanda and Urundi) which were in their turn divided into nineteen districts.

387. The two Residencies (Ruanda and Urundi) were the counterpart of the two customary States (Ruanda and Urundi) each ruled by a customary Mwami and divided into chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms. Accordingly, there were two administrations existing side by side, one customary and the other general, a survival of the indirect administration to which the Mission has already referred.

THE REFORMS OF LATE 1959

388. The statement of the Belgian Government of 10 November 1959 (T/1502) lays down the principle that the way should be prepared for definitive decisions by preliminary discussions. It declares that Belgium, which brought this region out of its isolation, may look forward confidently to leading the two States, Ruanda and Urundi, along the road to self-government and ultimately to self-determination and the choice of the type of independence they prefer, possibly involving an association that would not exclude any links which either of the countries may wish to forge with Belgium.

389. The proposed reforms and the measures taken to insure decentralization of the Territory to the state level, and consequently progressive self-government for Ruanda and Urundi in all regional matters and the merging at one level of the general administration and indigenous administration, have already been explained (see paras. 241-150 above).

390. The statement of the Belgian Government provides that the King of the Belgians will continue to exercise ordinary legislative powers by means of decrees, enacted after consultation with a Legislative Council and the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. This Legislative Council will replace the present Colonial Council as soon as a law can be passed to that effect and representatives of the Trust Territory will be called upon to sit on this Council.

391. The General Council, set up by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 (T/1501) will consist of forty to fifty elected members, an equal number for each State, elected by indirect suffrage. The heads of the provisional communes and the members of the councils of the provisional communes are to be electors.

There will also be five representatives of industrial and commercial companies, five representatives of the independent middle classes, five representatives of labour and five notables appointed by the Resident-General.

392. The new General Council has obviously not yet been constituted, because the elections for the provisional communes have not yet taken place. It may never be constituted as the entire structure set up by the Interim Decree is supposed to be considered at the conference envisaged by the Belgian Government.

393. The Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 provides that Belgian Trusteeship shall be exercised by the Resident-General over the administration of the Territory, over the States and over the subordinate authorities.

394. The Interim Royal Order of 25 January 1960 prescribes that the Vice-Governor-General administering Ruanda-Urundi shall take the title of Resident-General and exercise executive power in the Territory together with all functions conferred on the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo by royal decrees and orders, and that he shall correspond direct with the Belgian Government to which he is required, *inter alia*, to submit the budget of the Territory and the annual report on its administration.

395. The services of the former Vice-Government-General are divided into two groups. The first group comprises the general Trusteeship services—i.e., the functions which the Belgian Administration thinks that it should reserve to itself in order to discharge its duties, in particular (a) internal and external security of the Territory, (b) political, administrative and financial control over the administration and public autonomous bodies, (c) political development, and the preparation and execution of reforms, (d) the administration of justice, (e) protection of individuals and minorities, human rights and fundamental freedoms, (f) external affairs in so far as they do not come directly under the Belgian Government; these services are gathered together under the authority of a Commissioner-General.

396. In the second group, under the authority of a secretary-general, are the general administration services for which the government of the community of Ruanda-Urundi, as soon as that may be established, would be responsible (secretariat, economic development plan, judicial affairs, administration and religious affairs, social affairs, information, labour, finance, economic affairs, land and mines, agricultural and stock-breeding, veterinary service, public works, communications, medical service, education).

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUANDA AND URUNDI

397. As the Working Group established in April 1959 by the Belgian Government pointed out, the trend of Belgian policy (which did not, however, wish to impose anything by force), and the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council have always looked towards the constitution of Ruanda-Urundi into a single State.

398. Despite the resemblance between the populations, their language and their social, economic and political structures, efforts at unification by the Belgian Administration have met with obstacles based on historical and emotional considerations and have not succeeded in wearing down the opposition of the two countries and the particularism of their populations. Ruanda and Urundi in fact have for many years been independent entities endowed with a very strong political organization and system of land tenure, and directed by different dynasties. They have frequently been at war with each other in the past and have maintained a very strong national feeling, a sense of their own separate personality, some rivalry and a natural propensity to oppose each other.

399. According to the Working Group, the feeling of the populations concerned is strongly and definitely opposed to political development within the framework and the ways of a single State. The sense of "nationhood" is wide-spread amongst the inhabitants of both Ruanda and Urundi, and the people of each of the States have a feeling of belonging to separate units. Their national consciousness has recently been manifested in the use of the spelling "Rwanda" and "Burundi" (in conformity with usage in their own language) rather than "Ruanda" (Europeanized spelling) and "Urundi" (a Swahili form). These are facts whose importance cannot be ignored. Accordingly, an appropriate institutional organization of the States should enable each one to express its own character, the development of which is indispensable if the community of interests binding them together is to prosper. Thus the Working Group recommended the organization of a "community" of Ruanda-Urundi, with a Resident-General at the head, representing the Administering Authority, and acting as chief of the administration of the community, a General Council elected for the most part at the second degree by an electoral body appointed by universal suffrage, and a smaller council of the community, consisting of appointed and co-opted members, which would also represent the regions. The community would have the task of laying down rules applicable to the Territory as a whole, improving and co-ordinating their application in the States and itself putting them into execution in connexion with all action proposed solely at its level or within its competence.

400. The statement of the Belgian Government of 10 November 1959 (T/1502) did not take up those proposals in detail. While reiterating its conviction that the two States would be condemning themselves to a most unpromising future if they did not unite in pursuit of higher aims, the Belgian Government did not actually wish to define the terms of that community which it regarded as essential. It merely recalled that above the two States stood the *de facto* community constituted by the present Government of the Territory, and that Belgium had set as its goal the building of the future community by means of judicious consultations and with the co-operation of the reorganized States. Meanwhile, the present institutions must continue to function. A Resident-General would continue in charge

of the Territory. A General Council set up in accordance with the same principles as those governing the State Councils would assist the legislative authority in an advisory capacity until an agreement was reached on other arrangements, such as the organization of a legislative and an executive for the community, as proposed by the Working Group.

401. In his broadcast speech of 11 November 1959, commenting on the statement of the Belgian Government, the Governor pointed out that the future union of Ruanda and Urundi in one community would be left to the free choice of the representatives of those States, both as regards its existence and its final form.

402. In his speech of 3 March 1960, the Resident-General stated that, at the level of the Territory as a whole, Belgium agreed with the Trusteeship Council in urgently recommending a union of the two States. Being, however, aware of the considerable reservations felt by the population on that subject, Belgium had abstained from imposing any measure even on a provisional basis, and even from proposing specific formulae.

403. In the past, the United Nations had considered that the future of Ruanda-Urundi should be envisaged as that of a single State. But the 1957 Visiting Mission had thought that the common future of those two States might well be conceived in terms of a federation, or some other form of decentralization under which each region would be able to retain as many of its own institutions as possible.

404. The populations of Ruanda and Urundi have in fact always considered themselves as foreign to each other; in the past they were enemies and hostile to each other, now they are generally indifferent or distrustful. Since the European occupation, they have accepted certain common institutions on condition that these did not go too far and were not imposed from outside. Thus the High Council of Ruanda stated in its conclusions, prepared in April 1959, for the Working Group: "The future relations of Ruanda and Urundi will be enduring only in so far as they are based on free and deliberate acceptance by the parties themselves. Hence the need for negotiation concerning this important problem between acceptable representatives of both States. The political Commission of Ruanda for its part recommends a confederation of the two States, following on the internal autonomy desired by each. The prospect of this autonomy will make it possible to institute forthwith the possible differentiation of the structures and institutions postulated by the legitimate wishes of both peoples. The admission of that principle will eliminate the concern always to introduce all kinds of reforms simultaneously, as has been done hitherto, when they may be needed here and premature elsewhere and vice versa." The Commission concluded by requesting the decentralization of certain services from Usumbura to Kitega and Kigali, so that only the services strictly necessary to the association would be maintained in the federal capital.

405. As far as Urundi is concerned, the desire to resist the imposition of too close an association with

Ruanda is even more marked. Some say that this is due in part to the fact Urundi has always had an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* Ruanda. The question of the special status of the extra-customary centres and the status of the town of Usumbura, mentioned above, continues to be one of the major concerns of Urundi particularism, which is not willing to let any part of the soil of Urundi be detached from the authority of the *Mwami* and placed under a special regime, even a federal one. The High Council of Urundi has also insisted on the establishment of a distinct Urundi nationality in order to "banish the spectre of the establishment of a single State of Ruanda-Urundi, which would disregard both history and existing facts.... With a view to preparing for the future, the Urundians request Belgium to recognize Urundi's right, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, to form a country distinct from that of Ruanda. Urundi will, if the circumstances warrant, study the possibility of federating either with Ruanda or with other neighbouring countries." Thus it was that the High Council of Urundi expressed dissatisfaction with the proposals set forth in the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 with a view to the establishment of a Ruanda-Urundi community, tentative and provisional though they were. In its memorandum of 20 January 1960 addressed to the Belgian legislature, the High Council of Urundi, referring to articles 63 and 64 of the Interim Decree establishing the joint General Council for Ruanda-Urundi, stated that "Urundi has always protested against the imposition of unification with Ruanda. While Urundi realizes that it cannot live in isolation it nevertheless considers that it has the right freely to choose the country with which it is to be associated.... The General Council (provided for in the Interim Decree) is, after all, a council of the community. The establishment of this Council is contrary to the internal self-government desired because it obliges the nationals of one of the States to express their views on a question concerning the other. This can only widen the breach between the two countries and stand in the way of the establishment of the proposed community."

406. Not all the views expressed, however, were thus categorically opposed to close relations between Ruanda and Urundi. In their letter of 14 October 1959 addressed to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, the chairmen of the Hutu political parties of Ruanda and certain Hutu *évolués* of Urundi expressed the fear that internal self-government granted prematurely to Ruanda and Urundi respectively would perpetuate the traditional domination of the Tutsi in each country and affirmed "that they are convinced that the unitary character of Ruanda-Urundi is the best guarantee that the tutelary function of the Belgian Administration will continue to be exercised efficiently in all fields;... why not postpone the separation of Ruanda and Urundi until such time as the population as a whole is sufficiently emancipated to express its views on this point?"

407. In Ruanda, UNAR, which in its manifesto of September 1959 proposed a confederation freely agreed to, under a supra-national authority, stated in a

declaration of 31 March 1960 addressed to the Visiting Mission at Dar es Salaam by the "exiled" leaders that there could be no question of weakening, still less of breaking, the bonds existing between Ruanda and Urundi, which should, on the contrary, be consolidated, and that it was for this reason that UNAR was in favour of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi as a unitary State with a single legislature and a single executive.

408. On the other hand, an influential and *évolué* Ruandese notable told the Mission: "At present, our two States are being governed by similar laws, but the people themselves have never been under pressure to start any form of union. The Union is an artificial one, symbolized by the Resident-General, whereas, in reality, the two States are absolutely separate. Since the past history of the two kingdoms rules out the idea of a federation, the qualified representatives of the two sides should be asked to draw up the principles of a confederation. Thus, Ruanda and Urundi should remain quite separate internally, each with its own government and its head of State, while, for purposes of foreign relations, the two kingdoms will constitute a single entity."

409. UPRONA, in Urundi, proposes that consideration be given to a free confederation for Urundi and Ruanda with a supra-national authority, the composition of which shall be determined by the councils of the two States. The Parti du Peuple favours the establishment of a Ruanda-Urundi community to the extent compatible with the particularism and dignity of Urundi. The Parti démocrate chrétien of Urundi advocates a policy of federation with Ruanda, the means and extent of which would be settled by negotiations between the two States. The Mouvement progressiste of Urundi advocates the administrative separation of Urundi and Ruanda, but hopes consideration will be given in future to alliances freely entered into.

410. The *Mwami* of Urundi, in a letter to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, stated as early as January 1959: "Urundi and Ruanda should develop separately within the framework of Belgian Trusteeship. The policy of the Belgian Government should not be to seek to make a unified State of the two States, but to set in motion the means which would eventually enable them, if they so desired, to enter into association within a federation which would ultimately include other neighbouring States."

411. The Visiting Mission cannot but note that there is a strong feeling in the Territory that the separate personalities of Ruanda and Urundi should be respected. The disturbances in Ruanda in November, which raised concrete problems in that State such as the aggravation of the Hutu-Tutsi problem, changes in Ruanda and not in Urundi in the policy of the Administering Authority concerning indigenous affairs and, what is more, the emergence of nationalist movements and demands for immediate self-government and independence, have strengthened that particularism. These feelings sometimes go very far. For example, recently, when the question of establishing a separate currency

for Ruanda-Urundi, distinct from that of the Belgian Congo, came up, there was a demand in some quarters for separate currencies for Ruanda and Urundi.

412. However, there are very clear indications that the majority of Africans of the two territories, especially among the educated classes and leaders of political parties, wish to maintain more or less close relations between Ruanda and Urundi, provided that they feel that those relations are freely entered into and not imposed from outside.

413. The sensitivities of the people cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Visiting Mission therefore feels that it would be a mistake for the United Nations to attempt to impose unification of the two States prematurely. In that respect, it shares the view of the Administering Authority that the problem of relations between the two States should be settled by the representatives of Ruanda and Urundi without outside pressure. Even if round-table conferences were held separately for Ruanda and Urundi to settle the problems connected with the communal elections, any comprehensive round-table conference should discuss the mutual relations between the two States. The Mission is confident that the Ruandese and Urundian leaders will be able to find an area of agreement concerning future co-operation and association between them. Accordingly the Visiting Mission, in its *communiqué* of 31 March 1960 (see para. 454 below) has expressed the hope that the meeting planned for August would examine the possibility of establishing a Ruanda-Urundi community. While it might be tactless for the United Nations to make more specific recommendations in this field, there is little doubt that in the long run the interest of Ruanda and Urundi would be better served by any arrangement which would avoid splitting up the Trust Territory into smaller units.

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUANDA-URUNDI AND THE BELGIAN CONGO

414. Much has been written in the past about matters relating to the administrative union between the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and they have been studied at length by the Committee on Administrative Unions of the Trusteeship Council.

415. These questions have now to be considered from a different angle. The Belgian Government stated on 10 November 1959 (T/1502) that it was considering abolishing the arrangement by which Ruanda-Urundi is subordinate to the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and restricting the administrative union of these two Territories purely to affairs of customs and finance and to certain technical matters. It seems logical, therefore, that the law of 21 August 1925 establishing the administrative union with the Belgian Congo should be repealed. Meanwhile, the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the Interim Royal Order of 25 January 1960 have in fact already to a large extent divorced the administration of Ruanda-Urundi from that of the Belgian Congo. The senior official who is responsible for the Trust Territory now bears the title of Resi-

dent-General and exercises in the Territory not only the powers formerly bestowed upon the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi but also those conferred upon the Governor-General (of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi) through decrees and royal orders.

416. The measures enacted under texts (such as the law of 21 August 1925), which it is intended to annul, could be examined at length, but the fact that the Belgian Congo is to become independent on 30 June 1960 has changed the situation radically. There is no doubt that as a result of this, all the documents establishing an administrative union between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo will become obsolete. The Administering Authority may wish for time to revise all Ruanda-Urundi's legal texts so as to reflect in legislation this new factual situation. There are, however, certain immediate practical problems which require solution, if only provisionally, before 30 June 1960:

(a) Since law and order are maintained in Ruanda-Urundi by the police force (*Force publique*) of the Belgian Congo, what arrangements are to be made for the maintenance of law and order in Ruanda-Urundi after the Belgian Congo has become independent and until such time as Ruanda-Urundi has trained its own security force? (See paras. 433-436 below.)

(b) What provisions are to be made with regard to money and banking since Ruanda-Urundi uses the currency of the Belgian Congo and the Central Bank of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi serves both countries? (See paras. 507 to 509 below.)

(c) Is the Belgian Congo/Ruanda-Urundi customs union to be simply dissolved or is it to be maintained in some form or another? (See paras. 507 to 509 below.)

(d) Will any elements of the administrative union with the Belgian Congo be retained, for instance with respect to postal, telegraph and telephone services, public works, research institutions such as INEAC, and so on?

417. The Mission put these questions to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and for Ruanda-Urundi when it was in Brussels on 28 April 1960. No reply had been received by the date on which this report was adopted.

418. The only comments on relations between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo which the Mission heard were those made by the Resident-General in his statement of 3 March 1960:

It may be useful, at a time when the administrative union—which some have at times unjustifiably condemned—is about to come to an end, to offer a defence of it for a moment and even to draw attention to the dangers entailed in cutting the mooring ropes too fast and too thoroughly.

At innumerable technical levels Ruanda-Urundi has derived inestimable benefit through being able to make use of the extensive central services at Leopoldville and of the help of para-State institutions set up for the Belgian Congo.

Wherever the new administration of the Congo makes it possible, it seems to me that it would be wise to avoid persuading our Territory to give up such assistance needlessly.

The monetary union, like the economic and customs union, should undoubtedly be maintained, but we shall take advantage of the negotiations which will follow the dissolution of the

administrative union as a whole to try to secure an improvement in certain respects, particularly in the matter of the distribution of revenue, one with which the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi has frequently been concerned.

One question of very great importance in connexion with the dissolution of the administrative union is that of a security force.

All the necessary arrangements have been made with the Belgian and Congolese authorities to ensure that Ruanda-Urundi has at all times enough security troops.

At the same time there will be an intensified and accelerated recruitment and military training of inhabitants of the Territory.

419. The majority of the political parties and organs have expressed no very clear views about the future relations of Ruanda-Urundi with the Belgian Congo for they believe that this is a matter which cannot properly be settled until after the Congo, on the one hand, and Ruanda and Urundi, or Ruanda-Urundi, on the other, have attained their independence.

420. In its proclamation of September 1959, UNAR proposed that the economic union with the Belgian Congo should be maintained but that the administrative union should be dissolved. PARMEHUTU considered that there was nothing against the conclusion of commercial treaties with the Belgian Congo. UPRONA adopted a position similar to that of UNAR.

421. On the other hand, in Belgium certain groups of students from Ruanda and Urundi expressed the view that the question of the federation of Ruanda-Urundi with an independent Congo should be studied as soon as possible. Some of the leaders of Ruanda advocated the same solution, provided that the Congo itself assumes a federal or confederal form. A confederation of Ruanda-Urundi, they explained, could not be united at the political level with a centralized Congo because the latter country is too large and Ruanda-Urundi would in the end be absorbed. At the economic level, however, they suggested that the two kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi should remain united with the Congo and with the European Economic Community.

422. It is also interesting to note that most of those who expressed their views were agreed that Ruanda and Urundi, or the community of Ruanda-Urundi, should forge close links, primarily economic, with other African countries besides the Congo, especially Tanganyika and Uganda, and participate in a broad federation or community of African States.

423. With regard to any future relationship with Belgium after independence, it is generally felt by the political parties that this could not be defined until after Ruanda-Urundi had become independent.

AFRICANIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

424. The problem of the Africanization of the administration is common to Ruanda and Urundi, whatever the form of their association. It is a problem the importance of which is recognized by the Administering Authority as it is by all the African authorities and political parties.

425. In his statement of 3 March 1960, the Resident-

General said that the human problem of the Africanization of the administration could be resolved without difficulty if everyone approached it from the right angle psychologically, and with good will. The essence of the matter was, he thought, to find an ever-increasing number of inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi capable of holding public office under the new organization, and resolutely to entrust to them greater and greater responsibilities. Such persons should, he believed, be given official opportunities to complete or fill out their education. Training periods should be arranged for them during which they worked side by side with Europeans still provisionally in office and responsible for performing the duties which they would subsequently undertake; they should also be given, temporarily, in the early stages, a European adviser. These transitional phases, the Resident-General added, would demand of the novices great efforts at adaptation and application, untiring good will, and great patience.

426. According to a note by the Administration, the term "Africanization" covers:

(a) the transfer of the entire administration of Ruanda-Urundi to the care of an African Government, hence to African control;

(b) the replacement, gradually but as quickly as possible, of European civil servants by inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi in all administrative posts.

427. The first would be achieved by the political and administrative reform of which the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the Royal Orders of 25 January 1960 are the first indications. The significance of these instruments administratively can be outlined as follows:

(a) The administration of Ruanda-Urundi is divided into three parts:

(i) the first part will continue to be a general administration covering the entire Territory with its services located at Usumbura;

(ii) the second and third parts will become the administrations of Ruanda and Urundi respectively, and responsible to the Governments of those countries; the officials of those administrations, both European and African, will therefore be placed at the disposal of the two countries by the Government of the Territory;

(b) The services of the general administration located at Usumbura, which will still be responsible to the Resident-General, are themselves divided into two main categories:

(i) the Trusteeship services which will continue until the termination of Belgian Trusteeship over the Territory;

(ii) the administration services, which will either be gradually decentralized towards the capitals of the two countries and incorporated in their administrations, or if there is a federation or confederation of Ruanda and Urundi will become its services.

428. The second matter—the appointment of Africans to all administrative posts in place of European officials—is the object of a programme which is being carried out principally among the staff of the territorial,

agricultural, veterinary and medical services. In these four services there are at present nearly 290 officials of the fourth category of the public service and one of the third category who were born either in Ruanda or in Urundi. Belgian personnel in these four services on 31 December 1959 included 215 officials of the fourth category and 212 of the third category. Between now and the end of 1960, fifty further persons from Ruanda and Urundi will enter the fourth category.

429. Various measures are in preparation to speed up and intensify the process of filling the higher ranks of the administration with persons drawn from Ruanda and Urundi. These measures will enable the best qualified persons from lower categories to secure appointment to higher posts. Selective tests have already been conducted to discover the persons most suited for periods of theoretical and practical training, at the end of which there is a selective examination. Success in that examination allows immediate entry into the category for which these persons were prepared. This method will allow a large number of persons from Ruanda and Urundi to reach higher posts and even to enter the third category without going through the usual process of advancement.

430. The Resident-General's staff are at present contemplating a measure which would enable members of the customary authorities and the best qualified Ruanda and Urundi officials of the administration to take a training course which will allow them to fill posts of responsibility and authority. These courses would be in two parts: first, there would be a period of instruction on the general organization of the administration, and then a period of practical training in the appropriate sphere of activity. One trainee (a chief in Kibuye district) is at present undergoing a period of instruction. At the end of this pilot phase it will be possible to determine the principles which should govern the organization of subsequent courses.

431. In addition, a number of indigenous officials are at present engaging in courses of practical training (on the job); they are, that is, becoming acquainted with the day-to-day work of a civil servant of the fourth category of the single set of regulations now applicable to all civil servants.

432. Apart from these purely practical measures to speed up the process of Africanization of the administration, mention should also be made of the filling of the higher ranks with Ruanda and Urundi personnel which will take place upon the completion of various study courses now under way.

(a) *University studies*: 156 indigenous inhabitants are at present taking courses in Belgian and Congolese universities. When they have completed their studies they will enter the third category.

(b) *School of Administration of Astrida*: The purpose of this school, which opened in September 1959, is to prepare young persons who have completed the entire course of secondary-school studies under the metropolitan system, for career in the administration. After nine months' training, and if they are successful

in the terminal examinations, these young persons are appointed to posts in the fourth category. Thirty students are at present taking the course.

(c) *Special sections of the Astrida Groupe scolaire*: These train medical assistants, veterinary assistants, assistant agronomists and administrative assistants. Completion of these studies permits entry to the fourth category.

(d) *Secondary schools, collèges, athénées and lycées*: The Usumbura secondary schools (the *collège* and the *athénée*) have full ancient and modern humanities sections, leading either to university studies or to entry to the fourth category of officials of the administration. Classics students will be leaving the Nyanza *collège* in 1961 and from the Kigali and Kitega *collèges* in 1962 and 1965. The Kitega *athénée* will open in September 1960. In three years classics students will be leaving the Usumbura *lycée* for girls, but the girls' *lycée* at Kisenyi can as yet provide only the lower level of secondary-school studies. In addition to these establishments, which have metropolitan curricula, mention should be made of the six small seminaries which give secondary education according to an African syllabus. To complete the picture a reference should be made to such special schools as the schools for men and women teachers (*moniteurs* and *monitrices*), the schools for male and female nurses and midwives, occupational and handicraft schools, social schools, and so on.

(e) *Other projects*: As a result of the termination of the administrative union with the Belgian Congo it has become necessary to make provision for the opening of schools for telecommunications technicians, works foremen, topographers, and so on. These projects are under study and decisions will be reached in the coming months.

(f) *Training of administrative accountants*: A training course for administrative accountants is shortly to be begun and it will be open to persons in the lower categories. After periods of theoretical and practical training, they will enter the higher ranks of the public accountancy service.

433. Lastly, the Africanization of the higher ranks of the army and the police is also contemplated. With regard to the training and recruitment of officers, arrangements have been made to send six candidates (three from Ruanda, three from Urundi) to the Royal Military School at Brussels, at the beginning of April 1960. Their training will take three years and they are expected to return to Ruanda-Urundi in November 1963. The headquarters staff of the Belgian Congo's Force publique is similarly engaged in recruiting ten candidates, in principle five from Ruanda and five from Urundi, to attend courses at the Lulubourg Officers School (Belgian Congo) in September. Their training will take two years and they are expected to return to Ruanda-Urundi in August 1962.

434. With regard to the recruitment of non-commissioned officers, candidates are selected from among the new recruits. They are sent to the NCO school at Lulubourg (Belgian Congo) and their training takes

from two and a half to three years. It is expected that the first non-commissioned officers trained in this way will be back in Ruanda-Urundi in August 1962. The ranks of non-commissioned officers may be completely Africanized by the end of 1964.

435. As regards the recruitment of other ranks, it may be recalled that the Force publique formerly consisted entirely of Congolese soldiers and that there were no recruits from Ruanda or Urundi. This situation has now changed. In 1959 there were seventy recruits (35 from Ruanda and 35 from Urundi). It is expected that in 1960 there will be 140 recruits (70 from Ruanda and 70 from Urundi) and that in 1961 and subsequent years there will be 280 recruits. For the time being they are trained in the Belgian Congo instruction centres. There is, in addition, a plan to train 150 recruits every six months in Ruanda-Urundi at the Usumbura, Kigali and Kitega camps, together with 150 members of the police force who have had the same basic training.

436. If recruitment to the two forces proceeds at the same pace, their Congolese members may be completely replaced by the end of 1963. The Administration considers that the goal for Ruanda-Urundi should be the formation of two battalions—i.e., a total strength of 64 officers and 1,200 non-commissioned officers and men.

437. While it is clear that the Administration is taking steps to Africanize the Public Service, the Mission considers that this process should be accelerated, especially in view of the increasing demand for self-government and independence for the Territory. This would seem to call for a more intensive and comprehensive programme aimed at both training local civil servants for higher positions and expanding facilities for secondary, vocational and higher education. It is important during this period of transition for the Administering Authority to do what it can to ensure that the efficiency of the Administration is maintained.

438. The question of establishing a Force publique of Ruanda-Urundi completely staffed by local inhabitants is of particular urgency. As has been mentioned above, the Mission has not been informed of what steps are being taken with regard to the maintenance of peace and good order in the Territory between the time when the Congo becomes independent and the time when it will be possible to recruit the entire Force publique locally.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

GENERAL

439. Certain preliminary observations are called for. With reference to the essential problems of Ruanda's future, the observer must surely be surprised by the contrast between the declared policies of the various political parties and the tension which reigns throughout the country. Ruanda is, in fact, currently dominated by suspicion and fear, as a result of the events which occurred during the last months of 1959. Yet, on many principles the parties appear to agree, or at least their differences in policy do not appear to be fundamental.

440. For example, there appears to be a general desire to see the country progress towards democracy based on universal suffrage with equal opportunity for all. There does not appear to be any fundamental opposition to a constitutional monarchy. There are differences mainly with regard to the timing of self-government and independence. In all quarters there is agreement on the need for technical and economic aid from abroad. On the other hand, the opposing sides have a great distrust of the good faith of their adversary. For example, the Hutu and RADER parties assert that anything said or promised by UNAR and the Mwami is constantly contradicted by their deeds. UNAR is convinced that the Administration, while preaching impartiality, systematically persecutes them and supports the Hutu parties. It asserts, moreover, that contrary to their statements, the Hutu parties are racists and incite to violence and destruction. Meanwhile it seems that the general population, often misled by false rumours and with little idea of the real situation, is easily excited to violence.

441. The local administration is considered by UNAR to be totally biased against it, and by the Hutu parties as being a reliable but belated ally. While their formal relations remain correct, there is little real co-operation between the Mwami and the Administration. All political leaders save those of UNAR appear to regard the Mwami with considerable suspicion. Many Europeans support one or other of the parties and do not conceal the fact. Members of various religious missions are also regarded as having marked preferences. While all this raises difficulties which hinder successful discussion, mediation or compromise, it is clearly necessary to take steps towards general reconciliation.

442. During its stay in Ruanda, the Mission found responsible leaders who were eager to work out some constructive solution if possible. The events of November had impressed many Ruandese with the immediate danger of a real civil war. The Mission considers that, although the task presents many difficulties, national reconciliation is both essential and possible. Its achievement would seem to depend largely on creating an atmosphere wherein people would be willing to discuss their problems and agree on compromise solutions. It appears more likely to the Mission that the political leaders and the Administration might find it possible to have frank discussions if they were brought face to face in some neutral and favourable climate outside Ruanda. The idea of a round-table conference in Brussels, similar to the one held in January 1960 for the Belgian Congo, had already been put forward by several political parties and individuals. The Mission discussed the idea with other parties which, although at first rather reserved, came to endorse the suggestion.

443. The meeting of 14 March 1960 at Kigali, mentioned in the Mission's itinerary (see paras. 26 and 27 above) encouraged the Mission to believe that a round-table conference could be successful, given the necessary preparations. It may suffice to recall here that, at the Mission's request, the leaders of the four

political parties of Ruanda met in the presence of the Resident-General, the Special Resident, the Mwami and the members of the Mission to discuss the incidents which had recently taken place in Ruanda, and that, following this meeting, all the leaders agreed to issue a joint *communiqué* asking the population to remain calm and to assist in maintaining order. It was the first time that a formal agreement had been reached between the leaders of the political parties, the Mwami and the Administration, following a full and friendly discussion. The Mission thought that a round-table conference was most likely to be successful if it were convened as a matter of urgency so that advantage could be taken of the atmosphere created by the Mission's visit and as little opportunity as possible given for fresh outbreaks of violence which would cause a worsening in the relationship of the parties concerned.

444. Although it is primarily the situation in Ruanda that has led the Mission to believe that a round-table conference was desirable, it is felt that such a conference should deal with the whole Territory. It is, in fact, difficult to see how Urundi could be excluded from any extraordinary attempt at negotiation. In spite of its peaceful past history and the absence of recent disturbances there, Urundi is also the scene of increasing political agitation. Its traditional authorities reacted very strongly to the plans for Congolese independence, the High Council demanding the independence of Urundi by 30 June. Relations between the traditional authorities and the Administration have deteriorated. In spite of the fluidity in the political parties of Urundi and in their platforms, opinions have hardened into two main viewpoints which may be based less on ideological differences than on rivalry between two princely families. Although there has been no open conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu, some people are forecasting that, from that point of view, the situation in Urundi is potentially just as explosive as that in Ruanda. There is therefore some cause for concern regarding Urundi as well. Moreover the political parties of Urundi have also advocated a round-table conference.

445. Finally, all these questions to be discussed at the round-table conference, whether they relate to Ruanda, Urundi, or the community of these two areas, are related to the problem of establishing democratic institutions, attaining self-government, and agreeing on a programme for achieving independence for the whole Trust Territory. A meeting of the type envisaged would concentrate on the best methods of ascertaining the wishes of the people on these matters in an atmosphere of harmony and co-operation.

446. The reforms proposed in the Government statement of 10 November 1959 and introduced by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 are obviously an attempt towards solutions of these problems. As explained earlier, these reforms consist in the granting of a certain degree of autonomy to Ruanda and to Urundi, the maintenance of the *de facto* community of Ruanda-Urundi and over-all Belgian Trusteeship. Following the establishment of the new interim institutions, the Belgian Government planned to hold talks

with competent spokesmen designated as a result of direct and indirect elections, in order to decide on the ultimate future of the Territory.

447. In other circumstances, such a procedure might have been deemed wise and prudent. However, the Mission, in the light of the tragic events which had occurred in Ruanda, the disturbances which were still occurring there and the rising tension in Urundi, considered that discussions could not longer be delayed which might lead not only to long-term solutions and political programmes, but also to solutions of more immediate and delicate problems. Ruanda-Urundi is no longer an isolated island in an Africa in ferment, and with the Congo attaining its independence on 30 June 1960, it would be unrealistic to imagine that the Administering Authority still has many years in which to bring Ruanda-Urundi to the stage where it can decide its own future. A round-table conference, if held soon enough, would also calm the prevailing passions, besides providing evidence of the Administering Authority's willingness to initiate frank discussions on the future of the Territory.

448. The Mission came to realize that all sections of the population of Ruanda and Urundi expected from it, before its departure, if not comprehensive and immediate solutions to their difficulties, at least constructive suggestions which would make their ultimate solution possible. It was generally agreed that, if they were disappointed, the existing tension might be aggravated and might explode once more in violence. In order to do everything it could to prevent further bloodshed the Mission considered it essential to publish, before leaving Ruanda-Urundi, a *communiqué* indicating the suggestions which it intended to make concerning the future of the Territory. While it realized that previous visiting missions had not made their recommendations public at the moment of leaving a territory, the Mission considered that such an action was fully justified by the grave situation in Ruanda-Urundi.

449. With a view to preparing the proposed *communiqué*, the Mission had a meeting with the Resident-General on 24 March at Kitega. It informed him that it was concerned at the state of tension which existed in Ruanda and which was beginning to make itself felt in Urundi, and that it wished to do everything possible to contribute to the establishment of a better climate. The Mission felt that the provisions of the Interim Decree should not be implemented without first arranging a high-level meeting between the Administering Authority and the political leaders. It also considered that it might be dangerous to proceed with the communal elections in the current tense atmosphere. For these reasons, it wished to ascertain the views of the Belgian Government on the idea that it should convene, in Belgium, as soon as possible and prior to holding any communal elections, a round-table conference with representatives of all sections of the population. The Mission informed the Resident-General that if the Belgian Government agreed to convene a round-table conference, it would recommend that United Nations observers should be invited to attend that conference,

as the attendance of such observers had been suggested by various African groups. It also informed the Resident-General of its intention to recommend that elections by universal direct suffrage should be held early in 1961 for the purpose of forming national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi and that a United Nations mission should be sent to Ruanda-Urundi as soon as possible in order to assist in the Territory's development.

450. The Resident-General expressed certain reservations regarding the proposed timing of a round-table conference. In particular he drew the Mission's attention to the difficulty of finding representative spokesmen for the conference if the latter was to take place before the communal elections. This applied particularly in the case of Urundi where the process of organizing political opinions into political parties had only just commenced. Some sections of the population, moreover, would certainly be disappointed if the elections promised for the summer were delayed. However, he promised to transmit the Mission's proposals to his Government immediately.

451. Three days later, the Mission took advantage of the presence at Usumbura of Mr. Raymond Scheyven, Minister of Economic Affairs for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, to discuss its proposals further with him and with the Resident-General.

452. The Belgian Government's reply reached the Mission on 30 March. It accepted the formula proposed by the Mission and decided to convene a "meeting" on Ruanda and Urundi, in which popular representatives of the people would take part but which, for organizational reasons, could not take place before the month of August and could perhaps not be held at Brussels. Finally, the communal elections planned for June and July would be postponed to a date as soon as possible after the proposed meeting.

453. The Mission immediately summoned the representatives of the political parties of Ruanda and Urundi in order to discuss with them the Belgian Government's programme and the recommendations which the Mission intended to make in its report concerning the proposed meeting, the holding of general elections early in 1961 under United Nations supervision and the dispatch of a United Nations mission to assist in the Territory's development. All the parties noted with satisfaction the decision to convene a meeting of representatives of the inhabitants of the Territory, but they felt that the meeting should be held much sooner than August. Some of them regretted the postponement of the communal elections to a later date, while some stressed that there was considerable tension throughout the country and that the longer the meeting was delayed the greater would be the risk of further disturbances, particularly if certain urgent problems remained unresolved in the interim. This view was shared by the Mission.

454. Next day, on 31 March, on the eve of its departure from the Territory, the Mission issued a *communiqué*, the text of which is reproduced hereunder:

Under the Charter of the United Nations, one of the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System is "... to promote the progressive development of the inhabitants towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."

For a Trust Territory to attain independence, a certain procedure must be followed that requires approval by the United Nations General Assembly, which normally meets only late in each year.

The Trusteeship Council sends periodic visiting missions to the Trust Territories to make an on-the-spot study of political, economic, social and educational conditions. The Mission has also been invited to make a special inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the disturbances which took place in Ruanda in November 1959. It has also to take into account a resolution adopted in 1959 by the General Assembly, which requests Belgium to propose, after consultation with the representatives of the inhabitants, time-tables and targets for the attainment of independence by Ruanda-Urundi in the near future.

The Visiting Mission has heard the views of representatives of political parties in Ruanda and Urundi and of many personalities and individuals. It has also had consultations with representatives of the local administration.

The Visiting Mission has been gratified to learn that the Belgian Government has decided to convene, probably in Belgium, a meeting on Ruanda and Urundi, in which representatives of the inhabitants will participate. The Visiting Mission hopes that this meeting will enable the representatives of Ruanda and of Urundi to undertake, with the representatives of the Belgian Government, a comprehensive review of all questions relating to the future of Ruanda and of Urundi, and to propose solutions to problems concerning the future of these territories. It believes that this meeting should examine also the questions which will arise for Ruanda-Urundi as a result of the independence of the Congo.

The Visiting Mission endorses this initiative and sincerely hopes that the proposed meeting will dispel the atmosphere of agitation, fear and tension which has prevailed in the last months in Ruanda and that it will pave the way for national reconciliation. It also hopes that this meeting will relieve the present tensions in Urundi.

The Visiting Mission has learned that the Belgian Government intends to convene this meeting in August. However, it hopes that the Belgian Government will reconsider this decision and will be able to advance the date of the proposed meeting, as it believes it most important that the meeting should be held as soon as possible.

The Visiting Mission has been informed that preparations for the organization of this meeting, the composition of the delegations and the agenda will be discussed shortly in consultation with the representatives of the political parties and the leaders and eminent personalities of the States.

The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations that United Nations observers should attend this meeting.

The Visiting Mission notes that the communal elections which were to take place in June and July will be postponed until as soon as possible after the proposed meeting.

The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations General Assembly that elections by direct universal suffrage to national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi should be held early in 1961 and be supervised by the United Nations. It hopes that the meeting proposed for August will take this recommendation into account and will also study the possibility of establishing a Community of Ruanda-Urundi.

The Visiting Mission hopes that the assemblies resulting from these elections may draw up a constitution establishing democratic institutions.

The Visiting Mission hopes that Belgium will be in a position to ask the United Nations General Assembly to discuss, at its 1961 session, the question of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi.

The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations that a United Nations mission be sent as rapidly as possible to Ruanda-Urundi to assist the Administration in the development of the Territory.

The Visiting Mission appeals to all the inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi and to their leaders to maintain peace, calm and order throughout the Territory and to co-operate with the Belgian authorities to that end. It will be difficult for Ruanda-Urundi to plan a successful future for the Territory without calm, restraint and hard work on the part of its inhabitants.

The Visiting Mission is convinced that, under the aegis of Belgium and of the United Nations, Ruanda and Urundi will be able to ensure themselves a common, peaceful and progressive future in which all elements of the population without distinction may freely contribute to the welfare of their country. It also hopes that in the near future Ruanda-Urundi will take its place among the free nations of Africa.

In concluding, the Visiting Mission pays tribute to the Belgian Administration for its contribution to the development of the Trust Territory. Much remains to be done to ensure a happy and prosperous future for Ruanda-Urundi, but the Visiting Mission has confidence in the will and ability of the Banyarunda and Barundi, their *Bami* and their political leaders, as well as the other sections of the population, to work together to overcome all their difficulties.

455. At the same time, the Mission sent a cable to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi requesting him to consider the possibility of advancing the date of the proposed meeting. In that connexion, it expressed its fear that the delay in holding the meeting might lead to further disturbances in Ruanda and increase the tension in Urundi.

456. After its visit to Tanganyika and before returning to New York, the Mission held a final series of talks with the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and his associates at Brussels on 27 and 28 April. During these talks, the Mission was informed that, according to information received from the local administration, the Hutu parties of Ruanda and the population in general had been deeply disappointed by the Belgian Government's decision to postpone communal elections and that if this decision was maintained new disturbances might break out in the country. Furthermore, the Minister realized that the Mission had requested him to examine the possibility of advancing the date of the projected meeting because it feared that the country might become the scene of further outbreaks of violence. However, in view of the economic conference for the Belgian Congo which was being held at Brussels and of the numerous measures that had to be taken to prepare that Territory for assuming the responsibilities of independence on 30 June 1960, the Belgian Government found it materially impossible to devote so much of its time in the near future to the problems of Ruanda-Urundi. In order to meet that difficulty and at the same time give satisfaction to the

Mission and the local population, the Minister proposed to modify the previous decisions as follows:

(a) The Government would convene a small-scale meeting for Ruanda towards the end of May. The aims of such a meeting would be national reconciliation, the preparation and organization of communal elections, the study of possible changes in the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the preparation of more general discussions to be held later. A maximum of a dozen representatives would take part in the meeting which would be limited to about a week;

(b) Shortly after the Ruanda meeting the Government would convene a similar meeting for Urundi;

(c) After the two meetings the Government would hold communal elections, if possible as early as June;

(d) A larger meeting would be convened after the communal elections, perhaps in October, to discuss all questions concerning the political future of Ruanda and Urundi and to prepare the 1961 legislative elections.

457. The Minister also stated that his Government had no objection to the Mission's proposal for the holding of general elections in Ruanda and Urundi at the beginning of 1961 with direct universal suffrage and under United Nations supervision, nor to the proposal for the dispatch of a United Nations Technical Assistance mission to the Territory. In reply to a question by the Mission, the Minister also stated that his Government did not insist on supervision of communal elections by the United Nations and that it would take steps to have those elections controlled by Belgian magistrates and officials who did not belong to the local administration.

FUTURE OF RUANDA-URUNDI

458. The Mission hopes that the new plan of action which has been drawn up by the Belgian Government, and which to a certain extent takes into account the Mission's suggestions, will pave the way for a national reconciliation in Ruanda and a relaxation of tension in Urundi. It would have preferred a broader representation and a less restricted duration to the two pre-electoral meetings. The Mission hopes that all precautions will be taken to ensure that the most highly qualified political leaders are invited to these meetings and, in particular, that the representation of UNAR may not give rise to any difficulties. It also hopes that the enforced curtailment of these meetings will not prevent delegates from examining all the possibilities of bringing about a relaxation of tension in Ruanda and Urundi and that, if need be, the meetings may be extended. These views were explained by the Mission to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in Brussels.

459. The Mission notes the reasons which have induced the Belgian Government to hold communal elections in Ruanda as soon as possible. But while it is important not to disappoint the people by delaying the promised elections, it is even more important, in the Mission's opinion, that these elections should take place in an atmosphere of calm, freedom and confidence so that the results may not be contested. The Mission

considers it desirable that the work of national reconciliation should be well advanced before the elections are held. It hopes that the pre-electoral meeting of national political leaders will herald the first signs of a relaxation of tensions and that all parties will agree on the timing of the elections and the conditions under which they are to be held.

460. As regards the electoral system, the Mission has noted that the communal elections organized by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 are based on a general list with proportional representation. This is a complex system, one of the characteristics of which is that, in a country where most electors are illiterate each of them must write the name of five candidates on his ballot paper with or without the help of a scribe. The counting of votes and the calculation of seat distribution are far from simple.

461. It may be too late to consider changing the electoral system for the communal elections. Nevertheless, the Mission hopes that, before deciding upon the electoral system for the 1961 legislative elections, the Administering Authority will pay close attention to the experience acquired during the communal elections as well as possibly to the experience acquired during the elections organized in recent years in the Belgian Congo. It also hopes that the Administering Authority will not hesitate to reorganize the system if it proves necessary and even perhaps to ascertain through the United Nations technical assistance authorities the practices adopted and the results obtained in other countries where the same difficulties had to be overcome.

462. The meeting to be convened after the communal elections will assume considerable importance for it will probably be called upon to examine all questions concerning the future of Ruanda-Urundi. With regard to the composition of delegations to this meeting, the Mission would like once again to stress the need for inviting the most representative political leaders of the two countries without any exception. It also feels that it would be advantageous if other persons besides representatives of political parties, for example, leading individuals in private life, were to take part in the work. Finally, it would emphasize that the idea has several times been put forward in the Territory that any meeting of this kind would have a greater chance of success if United Nations observers attended it. The Mission hopes that this consideration will not be lost sight of.

463. As part of the reform plan which will certainly be discussed at the meeting, the Mission recommends that elections with direct universal suffrage for the purpose of constituting national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi should take place at the beginning of 1961 and should be supervised by the United Nations. The Belgian Government has already indicated that it accepted this recommendation. The Mission suggests that the projected meeting should take this recommendation into consideration and should also study the possibilities of establishing satisfactory links between Ruanda and Urundi.

464. Still, as part of the reform plan for the Territory, the Mission hopes that the national assemblies set up as

a result of these elections may draw up constitutions establishing democratic institutions. It hopes that, as a result of the progress made in 1960 and 1961, the Administering Authority will be able to request the United Nations General Assembly at its 1961 session to discuss the question of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi.

465. The Mission also recommends to the appropriate authorities that a United Nations mission should be sent as early as possible to Ruanda-Urundi to help the Administration in the development of the Territory. Such a mission would be in harmony with the wish often expressed in the Territory that the United Nations should show its continuing interest in Ruanda-Urundi by some tangible assistance in the Territory. In the Mission's last talk with the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs attended, both stated that the Belgian Government had no objection in principle to the dispatch of a technical assistance mission and, at the time of adopting its report, the Mission learned with satisfaction that negotiations had begun concerning such a mission.

SEQUEL TO THE NOVEMBER DISTURBANCES IN RUANDA

466. Finally, the Mission believes it will be useful to review briefly a number of the problems arising from the November 1959 disturbances, the solution of which, whether by means of a round-table conference or other forms of negotiation or decision, is essential for the country's future peaceful development.

467. One of these problems is that of refugees. The Mission notes with grave concern that this problem has become considerably worse since November 1959 as a result of the new outbreaks in March and April 1960. It hopes that the Administration will take all the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. As regards the fate of the refugees, the Mission notes the reasons which have led the Administration to settle some refugees in new development areas. However, it feels that in spite of the precautions taken to ensure the welfare of displaced persons, the proposed solution can only be second best and that efforts should be made, as far as possible, to reintegrate refugees in their region of origin. The Mission fully realized that the success of such an undertaking depends essentially on the co-operation of the local Hutu populations and of the Tutsi refugees themselves. It hopes that the leaders of all the political parties will co-operate fully with the territorial authorities in order to facilitate the reintegration of refugees.

468. It is also urgent to solve the problem of provisional authorities. While noting the reasons given by the Administration for its policy in this matter, the Mission observed that the replacement of Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs by Hutu had caused bitterness among the Tutsi and consequently had not helped to diminish antagonism between the two races. Furthermore, the Mission was informed that often the new chiefs and sub-chiefs did not possess the competence of those they were called upon to replace. During one of the Mission's

final talks with the Resident-General, the latter, having explained the reasons for his policy, gave the Mission the assurance that the Administration would act extremely prudently in that field and would not proceed with new replacements except when absolutely necessary. The Mission takes note of this assurance and hopes that, with the introduction of the elective principle, the problem of provisional authorities will disappear.

469. Another problem arises from the existence in Ruanda of a régime under which extraordinary powers are held by a Special Resident. According to the explanations given by the Resident-General and set forth above, the Special Resident must retain these extraordinary powers as long as the situation requires. The Mission takes note of the reasons given by the Resident-General but believes that any unnecessary continuation of the Special Resident's power to suspend or restrict certain fundamental rights will in the long run not be conducive to reducing the political tension now reigning in the country. Furthermore, the existence of this régime cannot fail to provoke criticism concerning the validity of the proposed communal elections. For these reasons, the Mission sincerely hopes that the Administration will examine the possibility of ending the emergency régime as rapidly as possible.

470. There is also the problem of national reconciliation, including an amnesty. The Mission notes that, following the November disturbances, a large number of people were arrested and sentenced, while others went into exile in neighbouring countries in order to avoid legal proceedings. The Mission feels that it is politically highly desirable to adopt as soon as possible amnesty measures with regard to the events of November since it is convinced that without them national reconciliation will be difficult.

471. The Mission understands that the Administration is not opposed to the idea of amnesty measures if they could lead to the national reconciliation which is essential for the execution of the reforms that are envisaged. But the Administration stressed that such a reconciliation must be real and based on facts. It was also pointed out that certain conditions were prerequisites to the taking of amnesty measures. If the amnesty or the return of exiled leaders were interpreted as a victory

for UNAR, this might provoke new and even more violent incidents.

472. In this respect, the Mission recalls that one of the essential conditions for the success of a round-table conference or any other attempt at conciliation is the assurance that the participants in such negotiations should indeed be the true representatives of the political parties, even if they happen to be refugees abroad or involved in legal sentences or proceedings connected with recent disturbances in Ruanda. The UNAR leaders whom the Mission met at Dar es Salaam stated that they could not return to Ruanda where they were wanted by the judicial authorities, but they requested that some of them should be members of the UNAR delegation to the round-table conference in Belgium.³⁶ The Mission wishes to emphasize the desirability of reintegrating the UNAR leaders into the normal political life of the country, especially as UNAR is accepted by many as the nationalist party of Ruanda.³⁷

473. There are other important problems such as the Ruanda monarchy, the form of the future democratic institutions and the welfare of the peasant masses, upon which the Mission has not commented in detail. It feels that what is the most important is not so much the ideal solutions to these problems as the need to reach agreement on certain basic measures which will be in accordance with the wishes of the majority, which will be as far as possible acceptable to the whole population, and which will be directed towards the establishment of institutions through which the people can peacefully and constitutionally pursue their political, economic and social objectives. The Mission is confident that, once these institutions have been established, the people of Ruanda-Urundi will prove themselves competent to solve their own problems in their own way.

³⁶ See also T/COM.3/L.35.

³⁷ As the Mission was completing its report, it was informed that the Belgian Government had invited the members of the Provisional Special Council of Ruanda to attend a meeting in Brussels from 30 May to 4 June 1960. The Mission also learned that UNAR had instructed its representatives on the Provisional Special Council to withdraw from the Council and not to participate in the proposed meeting in Brussels.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS

I. GENERAL

474. It has already been explained above that the serious political crisis through which Ruanda-Urundi is passing and the number of people and groups of people who wished to have conversations with the Mission about the situation obliged the Mission to devote almost all its time to political questions.

475. The Mission is none the less fully aware of the

importance of economic and social problems in Ruanda-Urundi and regrets that it was unable to study them more thoroughly despite the fact that it received interesting information and documentation from the Administration on the subject. It is in the economic and social field that the Administering Authority considers that it has made the most remarkable achievements and those most likely to ensure a better future for the people of Ruanda-Urundi. The Mission would have

liked to devote more time to those subjects on the spot and to give them more ample consideration in its report, as previous missions have done. It hopes that the amount of time and space devoted to political questions in relation to that reserved for other questions will not be interpreted as meaning that it has failed to understand some of the fundamental problems of the Territory.

476. As has often been emphasized, Ruanda-Urundi is a poor and overpopulated country (more than 4.6 million inhabitants with a density of 86 persons per square kilometre for Ruanda-Urundi as a whole). The annual rate of increase of 2.8 per cent, which would double the population in thirty years, poses serious problems for which no solution can be seen for the moment.

477. Ruanda-Urundi has in the past experienced fearful famines, caused mainly by irregular rainfall. These famines, the last of which occurred in 1943-1944, have resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Government officials who remember these tragic periods are not entirely free of concern about the subject now. In their view, if political disorders were to continue and unfavourable climatic conditions were to occur at the same time, famines more terrible than ever before might occur. Indeed, events during the disturbed period in 1959 and the abolition in 1958 of compulsory food crops have resulted in a dangerous decrease in food reserves. The Resident-General pointed out that in 1956 each inhabitant could, if necessary, find an extra ration of 81 kilogrammes of cassava meal; by 1961 that extra amount would have fallen to 10 kilogrammes.

478. These observations should not, however, obscure the fact that some impressive progress has been made in the Territory: the introduction of new food crops less susceptible to drought, the extension and improvement of traditional food crops, the cultivation of marsh land, the protection of land from erosion, re-afforestation, the creation of peasant settlements (*paysanats*), the research in agricultural stations, the building up of food stocks, etc. A great part of the Administering Authority's efforts has of necessity been directed toward raising the level of the subsistence economy of the population.

479. Cash crops have also been successfully introduced in the Territory thanks to combined efforts of the Administration and farmers. Coffee export increased from some 150 tons in 1933 to 36,000 tons in 1959. This coffee is of excellent quality and in 1959 nearly 1,000 million Belgian francs (\$20,000,000) were paid directly to the African planters. Unfortunately, Ruanda-Urundi is highly vulnerable to the risks of the single-crop system. The Administration has encouraged the diversification of export crops wherever conditions permitted: cotton, castor-oil plants, pyrethrum, tobacco, palm oil and tea are being produced, but the importance of these crops is still only secondary.

480. The problems associated with stock-raising are well known and have been described on many occasions. The ownership of a cow in Ruanda-Urundi has a meaning of greater social than economic significance, and the Administration has for many years energeti-

cally attempted to convince stock-raisers that it would be to their advantage to transform their overabundant, unproductive and poor quality cattle into a source of wealth. The Administration has, however, succeeded in reducing animal and cattle diseases and has undertaken a long-term programme to improve cattle by crossing with better strains and improving stock-raising techniques.

481. Ruanda-Urundi has been provided with a basic road system of remarkable density for Africa. Impressive road works are under way in the country, whose mountainous and tortuous landscape make road building both costly and difficult. The port of Usumbura has been enlarged and modernized and the Territory has recently been provided with a new aerodrome. The Territory's mineral resources, consisting of some gold, tin, wolfram, and columbo-tantalite, are somewhat meagre and seem hardly suitable for large-scale development. Industrial activity is still at a low level.

482. Economic planning in the Territory is covered by a ten-year economic and social development plan for Ruanda-Urundi, which is financed by the Administering Authority; it was put into operation in 1952.

483. In the social field, note should be taken of the good results achieved in both curative and preventive medicine and public health. The Territory is served by a network of hospitals, dispensaries and health units. Tuberculosis is, however, still a major problem.

484. The Mission will confine itself to dealing with three subjects to which it gave particular attention in the economic and social fields: land tenure, public finance and education.

II. LAND TENURE

485. Problems connected with the land tenure system in Ruanda-Urundi are two-fold. First, the country is overpopulated and overstocked; the resulting lack of cultivable land and pasture land is all the more serious for the fact that most of the land is of poor quality. Secondly, the customary land tenure system is very complex and is the basis on which the social and political organization of the country rests; changes in it affect and are affected by the social and political development of the people. Many of the political problems referred to in the early part of this report would be incomprehensible without reference to the system of land tenure. The political development and economic future of Ruanda-Urundi therefore depend very much on a solution being found to land tenure problems. With this in mind the Working Group devoted many pages of its report to the subject.

486. The origin and development of land tenure problems are better known in Ruanda than Urundi, but they are of much the same nature in the two States.

487. Before the arrival of the Tutsi, the land tenure system was essentially clannish and patriarchal. The Hutu clans had taken possession of the land which they had cleared in the forest. With the increase in population, the forest disappeared and gave way to

crops, fallow land and pasture. The power and prestige of the chiefs of the clan who had in theory remained the owners of the land progressively declined. At the same time, the Tutsi pastoralists gradually imposed their political authority on the country, mainly through the *ubuhake* system, and land slipped little by little out of the hands of the clan to become the domain of the *Mwami*. "The *Mwami* has eaten the land" became an adage. The occupants enjoyed the fruits of the land only on a precarious basis, and to cultivate his land the peasant was obliged to fulfil any duties, including forced work and the provision of food contributions.

488. The evolution of land tenure from a clan system to a feudal system is at different stages in different parts of Ruanda. Large remnants of the former forest estates (*ubukonde*) subsist in Ruanda, mainly in the western chiefdoms on the Congo-Nile crest and in Bugoyi. The *ubukonde* raises problems by reason of the high rents which the principal *bakonde* (chief of families representing the old clans of settlers) demand from their tenants. In these regions, Tutsi chiefs and notables have in the past taken land for their own use or the use of the families of their clients and servants from central Ruanda. These families, some of which settled there two or three generations ago, recognize no obligation towards the *bakonde*, because they hold their lands with the approval of the *Mwami*. The *bakonde*, in turn, contest their right of occupation and seek to recover the land, which was one of the factors which brought the expulsion of the Tutsi from certain regions of Ruanda in November 1959.

489. An even more complex land tenure problem exists in central Ruanda, where cattle are extremely plentiful and land scarce. In the past, this region had been divided up by the *Mwami* into fiefs, for the benefit of the great vassals; some of these fiefs (*igikingi*, plural *ibikingi*) entailed political rights, while others seem to have been mere grazing concessions. After the 1931 reforms, the holders of the *ibikingi* lost their political authority over the indigenous inhabitants residing on their domains but retained their land tenure rights. Even today, a farmer settled on a *igikingi* owes certain customary services. These services are prejudicial to progress and the modernization of agriculture, and render even more acute the problem of the division of land between agriculture, which is mainly Hutu, and stock-breeding, which is mainly Tutsi.

490. At the same time, and for the same reasons of over-population and the shrinkage of vacant lands, the system of family agricultural holdings is gaining strength and developing towards quasi-ownership. Such a family holding, characterized by a hut, a kraal, a banana plantation and seasonal crops, is known in Ruanda as *isambu* and in Urundi as *itongo*. The Administration has encouraged this evolution towards greater respect for the right to land by opposing the once frequent depredations and by obliging the indigenous authorities to bring land disputes before their courts. In 1956, it was decided in Ruanda to vest the sub-chiefdom councils with the power to allocate holdings of an area not exceeding two hectares.

491. During recent years, the High Councils of Ruanda and Urundi have undertaken studies with a view to giving formal endorsement to the revision of the customary notions of land tenure and establishing new rules, through order of the *Bami*, especially regarding the elimination or redemption of outdated feudal services.

492. The recognition of the system of individual land ownership is regarded by some as an essential basis for the solution of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Hutu in Ruanda are also demanding the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the *ibikingi*, without redemption. They have contended that the High Council of Ruanda is neither objective nor competent in land matters; being composed almost exclusively of Tutsi, it is, in their view, a party to the delicate issues of which it is also a judge.

493. The conclusions of the Working Group were that the laws governing land tenure, which are the very basis of the life of every person in Ruanda and in Urundi, have been severely shaken by the development which those communities have undergone. Custom has become unsettled and erratic; faith in judgements has been deeply affected and the fact that a large majority of the judges belong to the dominant race (Tutsi) has only aggravated the situation. The High Councils of the States have been considering reforms but, despite their efforts, have not succeeded in reaching conclusions. It is therefore necessary, in the Working Group's opinion, to establish without further delay a preparatory committee composed of African judicial officers, assisted by Belgian jurists, whose task would be to prepare draft land legislation consistent with the demands of progress.

494. Since the November 1959 disturbances, the question of the necessary changes in the land tenure system has become even more urgent; the present position represents an obstacle to lasting peace in the country and impedes the rational utilization of land, without which agriculture and stock-breeding cannot properly develop.

495. The provisional Special Council of Ruanda has recently resumed the study of certain land questions, including the problems of the *ubukonde*.

III. PUBLIC FINANCE

496. During the Mission's visit to Brussels on 29 February 1960, the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi reminded the Mission that the administration of Ruanda-Urundi by Belgium required a constantly growing financial outlay by Belgium, and that the situation raised a serious problem which deserved to be brought to the attention of international bodies.

497. The ordinary budgets of Ruanda-Urundi had for many years been balanced or shown a surplus. Since 1954, however, and particularly since 1956, the ordinary budget has shown a deficit, and these deficits have been covered either by drawing on the surpluses

accumulated in the preceding years or by advances from Belgium or the Belgian Congo.

498. The figures of the ordinary budget in the last several years have been as follows (in millions of Congolese francs):⁸⁸

	Revenue	Expenditure	Deficit	Sum advanced by Belgium
1954	663	685	22	—
1955	681	694	13	—
1956	695	773	78	—
1957	810	956	146	—
1958	903	984	81	125
1959	1,010	1,217	207	270
1960 (estimates)	992	1,400	408	400

499. Among the factors making for increased expenditure should be especially noted the rise in educational expenditure (115 million in 1955, 349 million in 1960) resulting from the increase in the number of primary-school classes, the establishment and expansion of secondary, technical and agricultural education, the establishment of a Department of Agriculture at the University of Astrida, the increasing share assumed by the Government in the expenses of the subsidized private schools, and the increase in ordinary and overseas scholarships. There has also been an increase, although on a smaller scale, in the expenditure for other social services and in the public debt. Finally, public expenditure in Ruanda-Urundi has recently been affected in a marked way by the introduction of a single status in the Civil Service (elimination of previously existing measures of discrimination between indigenous personnel and expatriate officers) and the reclassification in a higher category of a number of indigenous officers. Political development is also regarded by the Administration as a factor in the increase in ordinary expenditure (decentralization of administrative services, expansion of the security forces, etc.).

500. Revenue has failed to maintain the same rate of increase as expenditure, particularly since 1956, and the Administration thinks that there is little hope of substantially improving the state of public finances by modifying the tax system. Revenue increases are sharply curtailed by the predominance of a subsistence economy among the indigenous inhabitants and the limited number of taxpayers—for the most part Europeans and Asians—who could be taxed on the basis of their actual individual capacity to pay taxes. The possibility of obtaining revenue from export duties was limited by the precarious state of the coffee market and the equally difficult situation with regard to the marketing of non-ferrous metals. Excise taxes on alcoholic beverages (mainly beer) and tobacco were already fairly high in relation to the value of the products concerned and the purchasing power of indigenous consumers.

501. The extraordinary budget of Ruanda-Urundi primarily covers the financing of the capital work and expenditure provided for under the Ten-year Plan.

⁸⁸ 1 Congolese franc = 1 Belgian franc; 50 Belgian francs = US \$1.

This expenditure has been in the region of 400 million francs a year: 466 million in 1958, 442 million in 1959 and 480 million francs in 1960. This budget is mainly financed from interest-free advances formally reimbursable, made by Belgium at the rate of 400 million francs a year since 1952. In 1958 and 1959 this advance was increased to 600 million francs and in 1960, to 750 million francs, but during the last three years, a proportion of these advances has had to be used to cover deficits in the ordinary budget. At the end of 1959, the public debt of Ruanda-Urundi stood at the figure of 4,630 million francs, of which 3,900 million francs were derived from interest-free loans made by Belgium. The state of the public finances of Ruanda-Urundi is therefore grave, and many problems will have to be faced in future if the Territory's economic and social development is not to be gravely handicapped.

502. The Visiting Mission is not in a position to make recommendations in this field, but it hopes that the United Nations mission, whose despatch to Ruanda-Urundi is recommended, will find it possible, either as a result of its own efforts or through the despatch of subsequent missions, to draw up not only a programme of economic development for the Territory, but a long-term projection of the public finances of the Territory, having regard to the contributions which Belgium is prepared to make and of other possible sources of financing.

503. At the request of the Belgian Government the Association européenne des sociétés d'études pour le développement has recently agreed to undertake an over-all survey with a view to the preparation of an economic and social programme for the development of Ruanda-Urundi. This study will be financed by the Development Fund of the overseas countries and territories of the European Economic Community. The Association, which was recently established, is composed of private and para-university organizations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

504. It should also be noted that Ruanda-Urundi will receive 500 million francs, in five annual instalments, from the Development Fund of the European Economic Community. The allocation is intended to promote investments of an economic or social character, and one of the proposed projects concerns the development of the Bugesera-Mayaga area. The Administering Authority reports that no political conditions are attached to this assistance and that the economic stipulations connected with it are strictly confined to expenditures undertaken in utilization of the sums supplied to the Territory by the Development Fund.

505. The General Council of Ruanda-Urundi had previously considered the influence of the administrative and customs union between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo on the budget and economy of Ruanda-Urundi, and some doubt had been expressed that this system benefited Ruanda-Urundi's public finances.⁸⁹

506. At the June 1959 session of the General

⁸⁹ See *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 3*, paras. 133 and 134.

Council (which is the last session the General Council held), the following statement was adopted:

In 1960 Ruanda-Urundi will unfortunately be obliged to depend on Belgian subventions for nearly half its ordinary and extraordinary public expenditures.

Yet ordinary expenditures will not exceed 325 francs *per caput* (compared with 1,170 francs in the Belgian Congo), whereas receipts will amount to approximately 15 per cent of the national product (compared with 24 per cent in the Belgian Congo).

If, instead of being merely connected by an administrative and customs union, Ruanda-Urundi was an integral part of the Belgian Congo, its direct and indirect allocations for ordinary expenditures would, in consideration of the size of its population and area, be increased in 1960 to 3,000 million.

The money income of the Ruanda-Urundi population may be estimated at 2,000 million a year; the public treasuries (government and indigenous *circumscriptions*) deduct at least 600 million through direct taxation. For the rural population the figures come to 900 million in money income and a minimum of 400 million in taxes.

In such serious circumstances, the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi must take vigorous steps to mobilize all the country's resources and to base Ruanda-Urundi's economic, financial, wage and social policies on priorities in the country's interests and resources.

During the past two years the General Council has often expressed its belief that subordination of the principles determining such policies to those prevailing in the Belgian Congo is making the situation more difficult.

Now it is obliged to note with deep concern that, although the appeals hitherto issued have led to some financial concessions, the response has not been very sympathetic, has been limited to denials without adequate explanation and has not succeeded in changing the basic situation.

There must be no delay in frankly examining these problems, for the situation is growing worse from year to year and progress in these fields has become practically impossible.

Accordingly, the General Council appeals solemnly to Belgium to grant the responsible authorities of this country, under the auspices of the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, the freedom to take decisions separate from those taken in the Belgian Congo in matters of economic policy, transport, supply, wage and social policy, and to seek agreements with the Belgian Congo concerning a reasonable division of receipts from customs and excise duties and a sharing of the burden of defense policy.

The General Council affirms its convictions that, in exercising this freedom, Ruanda-Urundi will not forget the duties which it owes to Belgian generosity or the legitimate influence which the economy and institutions of the Belgian Congo, with which it is connected by a customs union, should exercise on its future actions.

507. With the Belgian Congo's attainment of independence on 30 June 1960, any future relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi will be changed fundamentally. Ruanda-Urundi had been represented at the Economic, Financial and Social Conference on the Belgian Congo, held at Brussels from 27 April to 16 May 1960, by a delegation of seven observers, composed of two Urundians, two Ruandese and three Europeans—namely, the president of the Usumbura Chamber of Commerce and two officials.

508. At the conclusion of the Conference, a joint commission, which included the delegates of Ruanda-

Urundi, was set up to investigate legal measures for ensuring administrative continuity in the economic, customs and taxation fields and to consider the general problem of relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The text of the resolution No. 4 adopted on the relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi by this Conference is as follows:

The Conference:

Apprised of the wish expressed by delegations from both the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi to ensure the maintenance of a customs, economic and monetary association between the two countries,

Having regard to the fact that problems arising out of such association can be definitively settled only after the accession to independence of Ruanda-Urundi, pending which all solutions should be of a conservative and temporary nature,

Having regard also to the fact the existing *de facto* union becomes automatically null and void by virtue of the Congo's accession to independence,

Considering that the absence of any legal basis for the relationship between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi would be extremely prejudicial to the economy of these countries by removing all legal support from certain essential administrative departments,

Having regard to the need to ensure the continuity of the monetary system pending a new agreement between the Belgian and Congolese authorities,

Having regard also to the fact that problems connected with economic co-operation arising out of state-controlled organizations which exercise their activities in the territories both of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and of joint utilities and installations, are of lesser urgency seeing that the Congo Fundamental Law provides for the maintenance of the *status quo* until new arrangements have been made by the Congolese Government,

Recommends that:

A Joint Committee to include delegates from Ruanda and Urundi, acting under the legal responsibility of Belgium, be set up immediately following the conclusion of this Conference;

This Committee seek for the necessary legal basis to ensure essential administrative continuity in the field of joint taxation, customs and excise, and other branches of trade policy, and that it shall submit to the proper authorities, for immediate implementation urgent solutions which shall take into consideration the interest of both parties;

These solutions remain valid until the Government of the Congo or the future Government of Ruanda-Urundi expresses the wish to see them replaced by another agreement;

The Committee also examine the over-all problem of relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi so as to be able to apprise the Congolese Government, as soon as possible, of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative systems proposed;

The Ruanda-Urundi delegates participate in the work of the Committee entrusted with the study of forms of monetary co-operation and the new status of the Central Bank.

509. The delegation of observers from Ruanda-Urundi issued the following statement as a summary of its views concerning the immediate future:

I. General considerations

The joint commission will undoubtedly discuss a preliminary version of certain conventions on co-operation. A legislative measure based on this commission's recommendations will put into effect an extension of the *status quo* with the changes that

have been recommended. This legislative measure will go into force provisionally, to be replaced later by a convention between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi represented by Belgium. Should that convention not be in effect when the legislative measure expires, there will be no legal basis for the continuation of co-operation. The joint commission will undoubtedly make a proposal concerning the length of time the provisional legislation should remain in force. If contrary to all hopes and expectations, the discussions of the joint commission do not provide the basis for and outlines of a general agreement, Belgium as the Administering Authority will have to take the necessary measures before 30 June to assure the normal and lawful operation of Ruanda-Urundi's economy in the absence of specific technical ties with the Congo.

II. Special considerations

(a) Co-operation in customs and taxation

It is very much to be hoped that the terms and conditions discussed will take into account Ruanda-Urundi's desire to rectify the situation with regard to division of receipts. Indeed, while Belgium has heretofore assumed sole responsibility in this field, particularly with regard to supplying the deficiency in the budgetary receipts in Ruanda-Urundi, such a state of affairs was not very suitable in relations between two countries not linked by a common administration; as a matter of principle as well as for practical reasons, and particularly in preparation for the attainment of independence by Ruanda and Urundi, the first steps should be taken towards a negotiated division.

(b) Economic co-operation

The Congolese delegates were particularly reserved in their opinions in this field because of the broad level of discussion on economic policy that follows on such co-operation. It is difficult to see how economic co-operation can be achieved without this broad level of discussion.

Accordingly, the delegation of Ruanda-Urundi would favour the postponement of these negotiations in order to eliminate from the discussions a factor which is temporarily the subject of reservations on the part of our neighbours.

However, it might be difficult to consider practical measures on a single point of economic co-operation like import policy, while the general principle of economic co-operation is not established.

(c) Monetary co-operation

The Working Paper dealing with this subject indicates that the decision concerning Ruanda-Urundi will depend on which monetary plan the Congo chooses.

If the second alternative (National Institute for Issuance of Currency) is put into effect, preparations should be made to issue currency for Ruanda-Urundi alone.

If, on the contrary, the third alternative (continuance of the present Central Bank acting in collaboration with the Belgian National Bank with some amendments in their charters) is adopted, the joint commission will undoubtedly draw up a draft monetary convention safeguarding the interests of both Territories; this draft should provide the basis for a temporary legislative measure, which would prevent a break in continuity while ratification of the draft by the Governments concerned was awaited.

IV. EDUCATION

510. Despite the efforts made by the Administration and the missions and the progress achieved in this field since the beginning of Trusteeship, in 1957 the educational needs of the Territory were still very far from being met; as the Visiting Mission stated in 1957, an

enormous task remained to be done.⁴⁰ The number of pupils attending primary schools was less than 245,000, or less than half the school-age children. In addition, the wastage in school enrolment from each class to the one above was extremely heavy, as UNESCO had reported.⁴¹ The number of pupils engaged in secondary and technical education has not yet reached 5,000, that is to say, 1 per cent of the young people of post-primary school age. There was no university in the Territory.

511. At this time, in the light of new considerations, the Administration took the following measures:

(a) It slowed down the development of primary education in order to bring the main effort to bear on secondary education, as well as technical and higher education;

(b) It strengthened the curriculum in the majority of grades;

(c) It set up a central examining board empowered to confer lower- and higher- course certificates in intermediate education based on metropolitan syllabus;

(d) It established scholarships, fellowships for graduate study and travel grants in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian Congo and abroad;

(e) A survey of school conditions was conducted by three professors from the University of Liège, constituting the Mission of the University of Liège Foundation for Scientific Research in Central Africa (FULREAC).

512. This new policy has hastened the development of technical education and particularly of secondary education during the past three years, and led to the opening in 1958 of the first university establishment in the Territory, the Faculty of Agronomy at Astrida. However, the expansion of primary education slowed down; 244,689 pupils attended primary schools in 1958. He added that in view of the serious bud-

513. It appears that budgetary considerations necessitated the decision to slow down the development of primary education. From 1947 to 1957 the share of the ordinary budget absorbed by education continued to expand; in 1957 it reached 20.8 per cent, or 199 million francs, and in the budget estimates for 1958 21.7 per cent or 221 million francs. In the 1960 budget estimates the outlay for education will come to 25 per cent, or 349 million francs.

514. The education budget was the subject of an interesting debate in the June 1959 budgetary session of the General Council. During this debate the president of the Council pointed out that the Government and the Council had taken a serious risk in recommending that the *status quo* be maintained in primary education, for such a measure could not fail to arouse popular dissatisfaction. He added that in view of the serious budgetary situation, there were only two solutions: the restraint on the development of education could be relaxed with the result that the budget would soon be swamped, the financing of other public services prevented, and the country reduced to anarchy; the other

alternative was to run the risk of creating tension by a temporary limitation on expenditures, but at the same time to establish favourable conditions for the comprehensive solution of the education problem.

515. One of the Council members, Mr. Barusasiyeko, had said that the decision to delay the development of primary education would provoke a "violent hatred" of the Administration among those who would be deprived of the benefits of this education and might even subject the country to "blood and fire"; and he proposed that the indigenous inhabitant himself determine the education budget through his representatives. He was convinced that the indigenous inhabitant had so strong a desire to have his children go to school that he would accept sacrifices if the decision was left to him to make.

516. Mr. Barusasiyeko's proposal, which seemed to be supported by several members of the General Council, raised in turn the question of the convention⁴² regulating expenditures for education in Ruanda-Urundi, which the Administering Authority had concluded with the religious missions in 1948. It was suggested that the expenditures which were governed by the 1948 convention might very profitably be divided and separately regulated by a series of more limited conventions between the missions and the local authorities. It was pointed out, however, that the authorities in Brussels and Leopoldville, not the authorities in Ruanda-Urundi, were responsible for revising the 1948 convention. It should be noted that the idea of revising the 1948 convention had already been proposed by the High Council of Ruanda.

517. Lastly, in the text adopted by the General Council it was considered imperative not to provide for any new extension of education so long as such basic questions as the convention problem and the salaries of assistant teachers were not settled. The Council believed that the need to find a solution to these questions was extremely urgent in view of the tension and concern over them in the Territory, and that only an authorization to the competent local authorities to take all the necessary decisions at the local level would provide a basis for settlement.

518. The FULREAC mission, mentioned above, visited the Territory in March and April 1958 and submitted its conclusions in a detailed report. On the basis of a study of the psychology of the African child, the development of education in Ruanda-Urundi and the problems existing in this area, it put forward many detailed suggestions for a progressive teaching theory adapted to African conditions. While it would take too much space to reproduce all these suggestions here, it may be noted that, in its final conclusions, the FULREAC mission observed that there was still a large proportion of illiterates in Ruanda-Urundi, and that despite the enormous share of the budget allocated

to education, the number of schools was very inadequate in comparison with the school-age population. The report also stated that those who attended school received only limited benefits from their attendance, either because their social, family and biological conditions substantially limited their learning ability and capacity to advance, or because inadequate teaching methods prevented pupils from making the progress of which they were capable, or because the school programme and organizations imposed on them were based too much on European models and did not take African conditions sufficiently into account.

519. Referring to the work of the Education Commission of the General Council and of the FULREAC mission, the Resident General declared in his speech of 3 March 1960 that the general problem of the organization of education had been thoroughly studied to determine if structural reforms might not permit a better adaptation of education to the special needs and modest resources of the Territory. He announced that a week's seminar would be convened shortly to draw up a general draft which would be submitted for consideration to the State Councils as soon as they were organized. The reorganization would cover such varied sectors as the financing of primary classes at the commune level, the eventual remodelling of the curriculum, the salary scale for teachers and the greater strengthening of secondary and higher education, necessarily at the temporary expense of primary education.

520. As has been indicated several times already, the Mission was not able to devote much time to consideration of education in the Territory. However, it visited two interracial secondary schools at Usumbura, the Collège du Saint-Esprit and the Athénée royal. The buildings of the Collège du Saint-Esprit are splendid, but the Mission was struck by the large sums which were spent on them in spite of the fact that the country's budgetary condition is so critical. The Mission was informed that they cost 185 million francs, 148 million francs of which were provided by the Government. The buildings of the Athénée royal, which are adequate, cost only 63 million francs.

521. There is no need to stress the importance of the development of all levels of education of Ruanda-Urundi at a time when the Territory is moving rapidly towards independence. The difficulties arising from the need to hasten educational progress, on the one hand, and the need to balance the budget, on the other, are even more serious for Ruanda-Urundi than for many other countries, because of the limited resources of the Territory and the rapid growth of its population. The Mission was glad to observe that the Administration and the local authorities are aware of the problem and are trying to find ways to resolve the difficulties. In this connexion, the Mission recalls that the 1957 Visiting Mission had suggested the establishment of a special educational fund for Ruanda-Urundi.⁴³ As it seems difficult for

⁴⁰ Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement belge à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1948, Brussels, Etablissements généraux d'imprimerie, 1949, p. 173; Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 4, p. 24.

⁴¹ Ibid., para. 292.

⁴² T/1495, paras. 16-18.

⁴³ Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 3, paras. 293-295.

Ruanda-Urundi to meet the full cost of the intensive it may be expected to look to the Administering Authority and, possibly, to the international organizations for increased financial and technical assistance in this field.

522. During its visit, the Mission was informed of a suggestion that, in order to make it easier to retain or engage expatriate personnel after the independence of Ruanda-Urundi, an international school should be established at Urumbura; this school would be subsidized by the various countries from which the teachers came,

with the assistance or supervision of UNESCO or the United Nations.

523. After its departure from the Territory, the Mission learned that a meeting of experts and of representatives of Ruanda and Urundi would be held at Usumbura from 23 to 28 May 1960 to consider the draft basic education act which had just been prepared for the Belgian Congo and to decide whether its general lines and its detailed provisions were acceptable, *mutatis mutandis*, for Ruanda-Urundi.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

Appeal addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Mission on 8 March 1960

BANYARWANDA,

This appeal is addressed to you by the United Nations Visiting Mission.

We have come here in order to help the *Mwami*, the Belgian Administration and the political parties to come to an understanding, restore calm in the hearts of all the Banyarwanda and ensure happiness and peace in Ruanda.

We urgently request you to remain perfectly calm. Do not believe false rumours. Do not assemble in crowds.

The Mission is anxious to hear all those who desire a hearing, wherever they may be. But do not come in excessively large groups. Send us representatives whom you trust in groups of ten or so. We will listen to them with the closest attention.

Help the Mission. Remain calm. Avoid incidents.

The members of the Mission:

(Signed) MASON SEARS (United States of America), Chairman
PAUL EDMONDS (New Zealand)
MIGUEL SOLANO-LOPEZ (Paraguay)
OMAR LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)

ANNEX II

Message addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Resident-General on 8 March 1960 *

Usumbura, 8 March 1960

BANYARWANDA,

After once more expressing the great pleasure he takes in welcoming the United Nations Visiting Mission to Ruanda-Urundi and his hope that it will help to bring about a calming of minds and the reconciliation which are essential to the advancement of the Territory, the Resident-General takes the occasion of the Mission's departure for the interior of the country to remind you that any person may freely communicate with its members and that, of course, such person need have no fear that he will suffer in any way as a result of having done so.

(Signed) JEAN-PAUL HARROY
Resident-General

* An identical message was addressed to the people of Urundi on 15 March 1960.

ANNEX III

Appeal addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Mission on 14 March 1960

Kigali, 14 March 1960

BANYARWANDA,

The Mission has learned with deep regret that incidents have occurred in recent days in the Gitarama and Biumba areas.

The Mission repeats that it is here to help you to find a solution to your present difficulties. It cannot succeed unless peace and law and order prevail in the Territory.

Banyarwanda, remain calm, avoid provocations, help to maintain law and order. The Mission requests this of you.

The members of the Mission:

(Signed) MASON SEARS (United States of America), Chairman
P. K. EDMONDS (New Zealand)
MIGUEL SOLANO-LOPEZ (Paraguay)
OMAR LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)

ANNEX IV

Joint communiqué of the political parties of Ruanda

We, the leaders of the political parties of Ruanda, being met at the request of the United Nations Visiting Mission and in the presence of the Resident-General, the Special Resident for Ruanda, the *Mwami*, the members of the Special Council for Ruanda and the members of the Visiting Mission, have agreed to issue the following joint communiqué:

Taking note of the statement by the Visiting Mission that: (a) its task is to obtain information, not to make decisions; (b) it has come to Ruanda to study the situation in the country, to ascertain the freely expressed desires of the people, and to report to the United Nations; (c) the question of the Territory's future will be considered by the United Nations General Assembly, which will begin its work next September; (d) the Mission cannot carry out its task unless peace and law and order prevail in this country,

Considering the overriding interest of our country,

1. We solemnly condemn all use of provocation, intimidation and violence as political instruments;

2. We urgently request all our followers and sympathizers not to heed any incitement to threaten, molest or kill persons or to destroy houses and property;

3. We further request all our followers and sympathizers not to rebel against lawful authority and not to start or disseminate false rumours;

4. We request the competent authorities to deal severely, in accordance with the law, with any act endangering the maintenance of peace and of law and order;

5. We urge the people to co-operate with all organs of authority in this regard;

6. We request all Banyarwanda to be guided by the agreement which the leaders of the political parties have reached on the terms of this communiqué so that an atmosphere of mutual trust may be created which will make possible the free expression of all views.

DONE at Kigali, 14 March 1960

(Signed) J. GITERA HABYARIMANA (APROSOMA)
G. KAYIBANDA (PARMEHUTU)
P. BWANAKWERI (RADER)
J. RUTSINDTWARANE (UNAR)

SEEN AND APPROVED BY:

(Signed) J. P. HARROY, Resident-General
G. LOGIEST, Colonel (Brevet d'Etat-major), Special Resident

KIGELI V, *Mwami* of Ruanda

The members of the Special Council:

(Signed) I. NSEYIMANA (APROSOMA)
A. NDAYAMBAJE (APROSOMA)
A. MAKUZA (PARMEHUTU)
D. MBONYUMUTWA (PARMEHUTU)
L. NDZARO (RADER)
E. RWIGHEMERA (RADER)
E. KAREMA (UNAR)
X. NDOGOZABAHIZI (UNAR)

(Signed) M. SEARS, Chairman of the Visiting Mission

Maps of Ruanda-Urundi

(see opposite)

Resolution 2019 (XXVI) adopted by the Trusteeship Council on 30 June 1960

REPORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960

A

The Trusteeship Council,

Having examined, at its twenty-sixth session, the reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Ruanda-Urundi⁴⁴ and Tanganyika,⁴⁵

Having heard the oral observations made by the representatives of Belgium and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the reports of the Visiting Mission,

1. Takes note of the reports of the Visiting Mission and of the observations of the Administering Authorities thereon;

2. Expresses its appreciation of the work accomplished by the Visiting Mission.

B

The Trusteeship Council,

Having taken into account the observations, conclu-

sions and recommendations contained in the reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960,⁴⁶ as well as the observations of the Administering Authorities thereon, in formulating its own conclusions and recommendations on the conditions in the Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika,

1. Decides that it will continue to take these observations and conclusions into account in the future examination of matters relating to the Trust Territories concerned;


2. Invites the Administering Authorities concerned to take into account the conclusions and recommendations of the Visiting Mission as well as the comments made thereon by the members of the Council;

3. Decides, in accordance with rule 99 of its rules of procedure, that the reports of the Visiting Mission, the statements of the representatives and special representative of the Administering Authority for Tanganyika made at the 1100th meeting of the Council, and the text of the present resolution shall be printed.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Supplement No. 2, document T/1538; Supplement No. 3, document T/1551.

⁴⁴ Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 3, document T/1551.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Supplement No. 2, document T/1538.



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TO

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TR 140 EAAF-1960

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FILE NO.:

RECORDS CONTROL
20 May 1960

31 MAY 1960

TR 140 EFF 960

Sir,

.....

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 2009 (XXV) of 4 February 1960 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Tanganyika.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to members of the Trusteeship Council, withholding it from general release until 31 May 1960.

Mason Sean

Chairman
United Nations Visiting Mission to
Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960

for Reg. 1
JH

H.E. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

UNITED NATIONS



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NEW YORK

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FILE NO.:

20 May 1960

Sir,

.....

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 2009 (XIV) of 4 February 1960 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Tanganyika.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to members of the Trusteeship Council, withholding it from general release until 31 May 1960. . .

Chairman

United Nations Visiting Mission to
Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960

H.E. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

DRAFTER

Raport

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RAPOPORT

UN VISITING MISSION

USUMBURA (RUANDA URUNDI)

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RAPOPORT

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WARLINCOURT

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FEB 24 1960

ACTION

February 23, 1960

TO:	<i>Dr. Kottick</i>
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3	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Completed
<input type="checkbox"/>	Acknowledged
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INITIALS <i>AM</i>	

The Representative of the United States of

IC 140 ERAF - 1960

America to the United Nations presents his

compliments to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations and, with reference to his note

UN-3096/G of February 3, 1960, has the honor

to inform the Secretary-General that the

President of the United States has granted the

Honorable Mason Sears, who is United States

Representative on the Trusteeship Council, the

personal rank of Ambassador in his capacity as

Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission

to East Africa.

*linked on Disposition
date*

UN-3096/J

209

February 23, 1960

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note UN-3096/G of February 3, 1960, has the honor to inform the Secretary-General that the President of the United States has granted the Honorable Mason Sears, who is United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council, the personal rank of Ambassador in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa.

UN-3096/J

RECORDS CONTROL

18 FEB 1960

TR 140 EAAF-1960

19 February 1960.

Sir,

.....

I am enclosing, herewith, three copies of a photograph of three of the members of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960: Messrs. Loutfi (United Arab Republic), Edmonds (New Zealand) and Solano Lopez (Paraguay). Mr. Sears (United States of America), chairman of the Mission, who is ill at the present time, does not appear on the photograph, but I am enclosing three of his photographs dating back to 1955.

.....

.....

I am enclosing also biographical notes on the four members of the Mission.

Yours truly,

Jacques Rapoport,
Division of Trusteeship.

The Public Relations Officer,
c/o The Secretariat,
Dar es Salaam,
Tanganyika (East Africa).

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

18 FEB 1960

TR 140 *EAPF - 1960*

17 February 1960.

Sir,

Your communication dated 8 February 1960, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting the Visiting Mission to meet you in Uganda, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Visiting Mission.

The Mission does not believe that it will be possible to pass through Uganda, either on its way to Ruanda-Urundi or on its way back. It is therefore suggested that the representatives of the Abadshemuka could meet the Mission during its stay in Ruanda-Urundi.

The Mission is scheduled to arrive in Usumbura on 2 March, and will travel in Ruanda first, and Urundi afterwards. It will leave for Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, on 1 April. If you wish to communicate with the Mission between these dates, letters should be addressed to:

United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust
Territories in East Africa,
c/o the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi,
Usumbura (Ruanda-Urundi).

Very truly yours,

Jacques Rapoport,
Principal Secretary,
United Nations Visiting Mission
to Trust Territories in
East Africa.

Mr. Festus S.G. Higiyo, President,
Abanyarwanda and Barundi Abadshemuka,
P.O. Box 30527,
Kampala, Uganda.

RECORDS CONTROL

17 FEB 1960

TR 140 EAAF - 1960

17 February 1960.

X-6-FI100(1-1) VM-EAAF-1960

Dear Mr. Caston,

With reference to your note No.15133/43/60, dated 16 February 1960, concerning the forthcoming Visiting Mission to Tanganyika, I have the honour to confirm that, as already indicated to you over the telephone by Mr. Rapoport, the estimated cost of charter aircraft for transportation of the Mission in Tanganyika (£932) and for the flights from Usumbura to Dar es Salaam (£559) is acceptable to the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,



D. Protitch
Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

Mr. G.K. Caston,
c/o The United Kingdom Mission to
the United Nations,
Seventh Floor,
99 Park Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y.

RECORDS CONTROL

FEB 15 1960


TR.140 EAAF-1960

16 February 1960.

Sir,

With reference to my letter No.TR.140, dated
10 February 1960, I have the honour to inform you that
Mr. Guy de Warlincourt will accompany the United Nations
Visiting Mission to East Africa as administrative officer.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest
consideration.


D. Protitch

Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

His Excellency
Sir Pierson Dixon, G.C.M.G., C.B.,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
to the United Nations
Seventh Floor,
99 Park Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y.

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

1560

TR.140 *EAAP-1960*

Le 16 février 1960.

Monsieur le Représentant,

Suite à ma lettre No.TR.140, en date du 10 février 1960, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que M. Guy de Warlincourt accompagnera la Mission de visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale en qualité de fonctionnaire chargé des affaires administratives.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Représentant, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

D. Protitch
Sous-Secrétaire à la tutelle et aux
renseignements relatifs aux territoires
non autonomes

Son Excellence
Monsieur Walter Loridan
Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire
Représentant permanent de la Belgique
auprès des Nations Unies
Room 3001
630 Fifth Avenue
New York 20, N.Y.



RECORDS CONTROL

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

99 PARK AVENUE,
NEW YORK 16, N.Y.

Telephone
Murray Hill 2-6820

Replies should be addressed
P.O. Box 206
New York 16, N.Y.

15133/43/60

February 16, 1960.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter TR 140 of the 10th February, 1960, concerning the forthcoming Visiting Mission to Tanganyika.

Arrangements are being made to charter aircraft for the purpose of carrying out the itinerary within Tanganyika on the basis which has now been approved by the Mission. The estimated cost of charter aircraft is £932, to which should be added a further £559, which is the quotation for a charter flight from Usumbura to Dar es Salaam.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(G.K. Caston)

Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories,
United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS
RECORDS CONTROL

1960 FEB 16 PM 4:11

TO: DIRECTOR, RECORDS CONTROL

FROM: [illegible]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

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[illegible text]

RECEIVED CONTROL

16 FEB 1960

TR 140 *ERAF-1960*

Le 15 février 1960.

Monsieur le Gouverneur,

.....

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, trois photographies de trois des membres de la Mission de visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale, 1960: MM. Loutfi (République Arabe Unie), Edmonds (Nouvelle-Zélande) et Solano Lopez (Paraguay). M. Sears, président de la Mission, qui est malade en ce moment, n'apparaît pas sur la photographie; mais j'ai inclus une photographie de lui datant de 1955.

.....

.....

Je vous envoie également les notes biographiques des quatre membres de la Mission.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Gouverneur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Jacques Rapoport,
Division de la tutelle.

Monsieur le Gouverneur
du Ruanda-Urundi,
Usumbura,
Ruanda-Urundi.

RECORDS CONTROL

TR 140 EAAF - 1960

16 FEB 1960

Le 15 février 1960.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que M. Omar Loutfi, membre de la Mission de visite des Nations Unies dans les Territoires sous tutelle de l'Afrique orientale, ne pourra se rendre à Bruxelles, le 29 février prochain.

Il quittera Le Caire le mardi, 1er mars, à minuit 15 par vol SABENA 569 et arrivera à Stanleyville le même jour à 8.45 heures. Il quittera Stanleyville pour Usukuma le lendemain, mercredi 2 mars, à 9.05 heures par vol SABENA 529, retrouvant ainsi les autres membres de la Mission qui seront sur le même avion, venant de Bruxelles.

M. Loutfi séjournera donc 24 heures à Stanleyville. Je vous saurais gré s'il vous était possible de prier les autorités locales d'envoyer quelqu'un l'accueillir à son arrivée à Stanleyville, et qu'une chambre soit réservée pour lui à l'hôtel.

.../...

Son Excellence
Monsieur Walter Loridan
Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire
Représentant permanent de la Belgique
auprès des Nations Unies
Room 3001,
630 Fifth Avenue,
New York 20, N.Y.

.....

Je profite de cette occasion pour vous faire parvenir les notes biographiques des membres de la Mission.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.



D. Protitch
Sous-Secrétaire à la tutelle et aux
renseignements relatifs aux territoires
non autonomes

RECORDS CONTROL

TR 140

10 FEB 1960

10 February 1960.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa (Tanganyika), 1960, will be composed as follows:

Members

Mr. Mason Sears (Chairman)	United States of America
Mr. Paul K. Edmonds	New Zealand
Mr. Miguel Solano Lopez	Guatemala
Mr. Omar Loutfi	United Arab Republic

Secretariat

Mr. Ian E. Berendsen	Principal Secretary
Mr. Hyles F. Minchin	Assistant Secretary
Miss Monique de Gravelaine	Interpreter
(to be assigned)	Administrative Officer
Miss Denise Wynn	Secretary

I am transmitting to you, herewith, the itinerary of the forthcoming Mission approved at a meeting of members of the Mission which was also attended by representatives of the Administering Authorities concerned.

.../...

The Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations,
Seventh Floor,
99 Park Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y.

Arrival in Dar es Salaam from Usumbura	1 April 1960
Leave Dar es Salaam for Nairobi	22 April
Leave Nairobi for London	24 April
Leave London for Brussels	26 April

As far as the itinerary in Tanganyika is concerned, the outline communicated by the representative of the United Kingdom to the Mission on 9 February 1960 was considered as generally acceptable, and it is expected that the details will be worked out in co-operation with the local administration.

The Mission has expressed the hope that the population of the Trust Territory will be informed as early as possible of the date of arrival of the Mission in the Territory and of its itinerary.

It would be appreciated if the local administration could make all travel and accommodation arrangements for the members of the Visiting Mission and the Secretariat throughout the visit of Tanganyika, including the transportation from Usumbura to Dar es Salaam on 1 April and from Dar es Salaam to Nairobi on 22 April and the accommodations in Nairobi on 22 and 23 April.

It would be appreciated if an approximate estimate could be given, as early as possible, of the cost of local transportation in Tanganyika, including air charters within the Territory, as well as from Usumbura to Dar es Salaam.

It is intended that Mr. Berendsen and Mr. Minchin should arrive in Dar es Salaam on 26 or 27 March, with a view to making certain arrangements for the Mission prior to its arrival.

Mr. Rapoport and Mr. Liu, of the United Nations Secretariat, who will accompany the Mission in Ruanda-Urundi, may also accompany the Mission from Usumbura to Dar es Salaam on 1 April, and depart from Dar es Salaam after a few days. They will not be with the Mission during the visit of Tanganyika.

.../...

- 3 -

The Mission expects to be in London from 24 to 26 April and would appreciate it if interviews with the Secretary of State and officials of the Colonial Office or other interested persons could be arranged in order to discuss matters relating to Tanganyika.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



D. Protitch
Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

10 Feb 1960

TR 140

Le 10 février 1960.

Monsieur le Représentant,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître la composition de la Mission de visite des Nations Unies dans les Territoires sous tutelle de l'Afrique orientale (Ruanda-Urundi), 1960:

Membres

M. Mason Sears (Président)	Etats-Unis d'Amérique
M. Paul K. Edmonds	Nouvelle-Zélande
M. Miguel Solano Lopez	Paraguay
M. Omar Loutfi	République Arabe Unie

Secrétariat

M. Jacques Repoport	Secrétaire principal
M. F.T. Liu	Secrétaire adjoint
Mlle Monique de Gravelaine (à désigner)	Interprète
Mlle Denise Wynn	Fonctionnaire chargé des affaires administratives
	Secrétaire

Je vous communique ci-dessous l'itinéraire de la Mission de visite approuvé à la réunion des membres de la Mission à laquelle les représentants des Autorités administrantes intéressées étaient également présents:

.../...

Monsieur le Représentant permanent de
la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies,
Room 3001,
630 Fifth Avenue,
New York 20, N.Y.

Arrivée à Bruxelles, le lundi 29 février à 9 heures,
par vol SABENA 544 de New York

Départ de Bruxelles, le mardi 1er mars à 13.10 heures,
par vol SABENA 529

Arrivée à Usumbura, le mercredi 2 mars à 12.15 heures

Départ d'Usumbura pour Dar es Salaam, le 1er avril

Passage probable à Bruxelles, au retour du Tanganyika et
de Londres, du 26 au 28 ou 29 avril.

En ce qui concerne le séjour au Ruanda-Urundi, du 2 mars au
1er avril, le projet d'itinéraire qui a été communiqué à la Mission
par le représentant de la Belgique a été jugé acceptable dans ses
grandes lignes; les détails pourront, si besoin en est, être
modifiés sur place de commun accord entre la Mission et les
autorités locales.

La Mission a exprimé le désir que les populations du Ruanda-
Urundi soient informées dès que possible de la date d'arrivée de
la Mission dans le Territoire, et de son itinéraire.

Le service des voyages des Nations Unies prendra les
dispositions nécessaires pour assurer le transport par air de
New York à Bruxelles et de Bruxelles à Usumbura. Il se chargera
également de retenir des chambres à l'hôtel à Bruxelles pour le
29 février (Hôtel de l'Amigo).

La Mission serait heureuse si les arrangements pour le
transport et le logement au Ruanda-Urundi pouvaient être faits
par les autorités locales.

.../...

La Mission espère que des entrevues au sujet du Ruanda-Urundi avec le Ministre du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi et les hauts fonctionnaires ou autres personnes intéressées seront prévues lors de son passage à Bruxelles le 29 février. Il se pourrait également que des étudiants originaires du Ruanda-Urundi qui fréquentent des universités ou écoles belges désirent rencontrer la Mission.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Représentant, les assurances de ma très haute considération.



D. Protitch

Sous-Secrétaire à la tutelle et aux
renseignements relatifs aux territoires
non autonomes

UNITED NATIONS
TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL



Distr.
LIMITED

T/RES/2009 (XXV)
5 February 1960

RECORDS CONTROL

Twenty-fifth session
Agenda item 6

18 FEB 1960

RC 140 E.A.A.F.-1960

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

2009 (XXV). Terms of reference of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960

The Trusteeship Council,

Having decided to dispatch a periodic visiting mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa in 1960,

Having decided that the Visiting Mission should be composed of Mr. Mason Sears (United States of America) as Chairman, Mr. P.K. Edmonds (New Zealand), Mr. Miguel Solano López (Paraguay) and Mr. Omar Loutfi (United Arab Republic), assisted by members of the Secretariat and also by such members of the local administration as may be appointed by the latter,

Having decided that the Visiting Mission should depart in mid-February 1960, that it should visit the Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi and of Tanganyika in that order and that the duration of its visit should be approximately two months,

1. Directs the Visiting Mission to investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in the above-mentioned Trust Territories towards the realization of the objectives set forth in Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account the terms of General Assembly resolution 321 (IV) of 15 November 1949 and other relevant Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 1412 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the preparation and training of indigenous civil cadres in the Trust Territories, 1413 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories and 1419 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on plans for political reform for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;

2. Directs the Visiting Mission to give attention, as may be appropriate in the light of discussions in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly and of resolutions adopted by them, to issues raised in connexion with the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories concerned, in petitions received by the Council relating to these Territories, in the reports of the previous periodic visiting missions to these Territories and in the observations of the Administering Authorities on these reports;

3. Directs the Visiting Mission to make a special investigation of the conditions and causes of the recent disturbances in Ruanda-Urundi;

4. Directs the Visiting Mission to receive petitions and to investigate on the spot, in consultation with the local representative of the Administering Authority concerned, such of the petitions received as, in its opinion, warrant special investigation;

5. Requests the Visiting Mission to submit to the Council, in time for consideration by it at its twenty-sixth session, a report on each of the Territories visited containing its findings, with such observations, conclusions and recommendations as it may wish to make.

1048th meeting,
4 February 1960.

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

5 - FEB 1960

TR 140 VMEA 1960

4 February 1960.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.3/60/NU, dated 3 February 1960, containing the information that the Government of Paraguay has nominated Mr. Miguel Solano Lopez as a member of the 1960 Visiting Mission to East Africa.

This information has been transmitted to members of the Trusteeship Council by document T/1504.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

D. Protitch
Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

The Permanent Representative of Paraguay
to the United Nations,
Room 1610,
509 Madison Avenue,
New York 22, N.Y.

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

5 - FEB 1960

TR 140

EAAF 1960

4 February 1960.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.5/4/1, dated 3 February 1960, containing the information that the Government of New Zealand has nominated Mr. P.K. Edmonds as a member of the 1960 Visiting Mission to East Africa.

This information has been transmitted to members of the Trusteeship Council by document T/1504.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



D. Protitch
Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand
to the United Nations,
Suite 530,
630 Fifth Avenue,
New York 20, N.Y.

RECORDS CONTROL

5 - FEB 1960

4 February 1960.

TR 140 EAAF
1960

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.18, dated 2 February 1960, containing the information that the Government of the United Arab Republic has nominated Ambassador Omar Loutfi as a member of the 1960 Visiting Mission to East Africa.

This information has been transmitted to members of the Trusteeship Council by document T/1504.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



D. Protitch
Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

The Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic to the United Nations,
900 Park Avenue,
New York 21, N.Y.

RECORDS CONTROL

JR/dw

52 FEB 1960

TR 140

EAFF
1960

4 February 1960.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note verbale No.UN-3096/G, dated 3 February 1960, containing the information that the Government of the United States of America has nominated Mr. Mason Sears as a member of the 1960 Visiting Mission to East Africa.

This information has been transmitted to members of the Trusteeship Council by document T/1504.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



D. Protitch

Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories

The Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, N.Y.