

UNAMIR

CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS

29 NOV 1994-2 FEB 1995

(RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP)

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TO: Ms. Isel Rivero UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda	FROM: F. Barrillon-Pomés United Nations New York DPA - RM 33 41
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Please find herewith enclosed the report of the second meeting of the Rwanda operational Support Group held in Geneva on 17 January by the US Mission as well as the agenda.

Un abrazo.

Keut to the head of the mission
et al.

4/1/95

RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
US MISSION, GENEVA
Tuesday 17 January 1995

1. The second meeting of the Group held in Geneva was chaired by Ambassador Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Ambassador Friedman, Rwanda Coordinator at the State Department was also present.

2. The following countries were represented: Belgium (Mr. Van Daele of the MFA), Canada (Mr. Dussault, Canadian Special Envoy for Central Africa), France (Amb. de Bonnecourse and Bernadette Lefort of the MFA), Germany (Mr. Ganns of the MFA), Japan (Mr. Okubo of the MFA), Netherlands (Mr. Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation), Spain (Mr. Lopez of the MFA), Sweden (Mr. Oljelund of the MFA), Tunisia (Amb. Ennaceur) and UK (Mr. McLennan, head of Africa Dept). The European Commission and the OAU were also participating.

3. On the UN side, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Amb. Khan, USG Hansen, the High Commissioners for Refugees and for Human Rights, DPA, Judge Goldstone's aide Donato Kiniger-Pasigli, the Regional Director for Africa of UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, WHO and the ICRC participated.

4. Attached is the agenda of the meeting which lasted from 2 to 6 p.m.

Preview of the UNDP Round-table

5. Mrs. Sirleaf indicated that a total of 764 million dollars had been requested for the rehabilitation program and she pointed out that it was aimed at the population within Rwanda. She described the various components of the plan and said that an overlap of over 100 million dollars had been discovered when the Round-table document had been compared with DNA's consolidated appeal.

6. Mr. Hansen confirmed such overlap and explained that his appeal covered short term emergency needs. 228 million dollars were requested for Rwanda itself and 502 millions for the needs of the neighbouring countries.

7. Amb. Khan mentioned at this point the existence of the Trust Fund which had been set up to "jump-start the operation". He referred to the 5 million contribution of Netherlands which was being used to fund a program carried out by Habitat (housing for refugees and repairs). Thank to that donation, 500 houses were built for the refugees, buildings including the National Assembly were repaired, ministries received the necessary equipment. The Trust Fund provided great flexibility and helped cover the immediate needs of the country, concluded Amb. Khan.

8. Ambassador Moose recalled the role played by the World Bank and indicated that since the arrears were almost paid, a 50 million dollars credit would soon be made available to the government, in addition to a 15 million project. Significant progress had therefore been achieved since the Group's last

meeting, he concluded.

9. Ambassador Friedman noted that the figures of both the Round-Table and the Consolidated Appeal were simply "staggering" and sent troubling signals to the Group. The donor countries knew that those amounts of money would not be forthcoming. One needed therefore to be realistic.

10. The representative of Netherlands agreed that the figures were staggering. He was relieved to hear that there was an overlap. The representative of Japan expressed concern that the government was considerably short-staffed and not really equipped to absorb that kind of aid. The representative of UK stressed the need to know what the priorities were. The representative of Belgium echoed him and also stressed the need for a better coordination among agencies of the UN system: the existence of an overlap of over 100 million dollars showed that a lot of progress still needed to be done. Belgium thought that UNDP was the most adequate mechanism to coordinate international aid in Rwanda. Although Belgium had not given its 5.2 million dollar contribution to the Trust Fund, it was convinced of its importance.

11. The representative of Germany sought clarification about the figures of the Round-Table: some projects lasted more than a year. He warned that some donor countries might be prepared to pledge only part of these programs. In the same vein, some figures might appear bigger than they really were.

12. The representative of Canada, who was coming back from his 4th trip to Rwanda, agreed that the figures were high but 6 months after the war had ended everything had to be done. Tension was rising in the country and he feared that if the international community waited another 6 months the price it would have to pay would be much higher.

13. The representative of France pointed out that the high figures fitted with the reality of the situation which was alarming. He also expressed concern about the lack of absorption capacity of the government. For its part, France would link its aid to the evolution of the political situation. Last week, a Rwandese delegation had visited Paris and the French Government had seized that occasion to stress the importance it attached to the return of the refugees.

14. Mr. Hansen pointed out that the needs of the country were "tremendous". He assured the participants that DHA could coordinate its appeal closely with UNDP. He agreed that prioritization was definitely an area which needed improvement.

15. Mrs. Sirleaf proposed to discuss, after the meeting, with the governments the ways to lessen the figures. As to the capacity of the government, she pointed out that many activities would be implemented by international agencies, NGO's and the private sector.

16. While the representative of Sweden stressed the need for priorities, the representative of Spain said that the high

figures contained in both documents showed that coordination was needed even more. As an example, he mentioned that he had recently visited Rwanda and had come back with 3 different brochures. For the governments it would obviously be more convenient if the programs described could be implemented in one year. In Spain, he added, the pressure of the public opinion had been exceptionally significant regarding Rwanda. Never before the Spanish population had expressed such concern and solidarity. It would therefore monitor the use of every peseta contributed by the government. His question was: what is the position of the Government vis-à-vis the Church?

17. Amb. Moose suggested to address that question under the item dealing with the promotion of dialogue.

The International Tribunal

18. Mr. Ayala-Lasso announced that Judge Goldstone now had a Deputy Prosecutor (from Madagascar) who would open an office in Kigali today if it had not been done already. During a period of transition, the office of Mr. Ayala-Lasso would be put at the disposal of Judge Goldstone. As far as the human rights observers were concerned, they now amounted to 76. 7 regional offices had been established, out of the planned 12. When the accord with the European Union would be signed, over 100 observers would be deployed throughout the country. The Government was happy with the work already done which it thought was important for the normalization and the return of the refugees. As a matter of fact, the Government wanted Mr. Ayala-Lasso to deploy 300 observers. In all fairness the Office of the High Commissioner had also been criticized because the observers lacked training. To remedy that problem, seminars had been organized both in Geneva and Kigali. Finally, Mr. Ayala-Lasso recalled that his Office had prepared a program of technical assistance. Regarding his budget, the High Commissioner recalled that he had launched two appeals in the past and had collected only 1.8 million dollars (out of the 4.1 million pledged). He had therefore greatly appreciated the 3 million dollar donation of DHA. The situation was still alarming and Mr. Ayala-Lasso needed to survive 10 million dollars. He concluded by stressing that the morale of his staff in the field was now high and their work was deeply appreciated.

19. Mr. Donato Kiniger-Pasigli (Judge Goldstone's aide) said that Judge Goldstone had appointed a Director of Investigations, Mr. Colin Port (UK). Mr. Port was present in Geneva and would leave next week for Kigali. Meanwhile the search for the seat of the Tribunal, most likely in a neighbouring country, was continuing. Mr. Kiniger-Pasigli pointed out that, in contrast with its vote in the Security Council, Rwanda had now full confidence in the Tribunal and would cooperate closely with it. He also indicated that a budget proposal (\$5 million dollars to start) had been submitted to the ACABQ.

- 4 -

20. Amb. Khan underlined the psychological impact of the Tribunal on the Rwandese people, which he said was enormous. At first, it was negatively perceived but the excellent visit of Judge Goldstone, in December, had redressed the situation. Mr. Khan said that the Tribunal would help the process of reconciliation and the deployment of human rights observers would improve security throughout the country. The OAU had volunteered to help rebuild the judicial system, but it needed financing. Naturally, he concluded, Rwanda would soon need the assistance of foreign magistrates.

21. Mr. Tauxe (ICRC) mentioned the problem of the detainees. In August they were 38, today their number reached 16,000. The Government clearly did not have the means to take care of all those prisoners. Solutions to that problem were therefore urgently needed since arrestations were continuing and about 1,000 persons per month, accused of having participated in the genocide, were put in jail.

22. The representative of Japan stressed the need of coordination between UNAMIR, UNHCR, the Tribunal and the h.r observers. Amb. Moose echoed his preoccupations and the aide of Judge Goldstone took the floor to clarify the procedure (ACABQ and then Fifth Committee) and the shopping list of the Tribunal. He underlined the phased activities of the Tribunal. Mrs. Sirleaf added that figures for the rehabilitation of the judicial system were included in the document of the Round-Table.

23. Summing up the discussion of that item, Amb. Moose mentioned that the US, in addition to its direct contribution, was making efforts to raise funds. He made a reference to the Open Society Institute located in Washington (see attachment) and expressed the desire to co-chair that exercise with any Member State which might be interested. He also said that the detention of people outside of Rwanda was a key element to the work of the Tribunal, adding that this problem would be discussed at a later stage.

Security in the camps and repatriation

24. Amb. Khan summed up the situation. Concerning the IDP's he recalled that they were one million according to the French (in fact 850,000) and that number had, since August, decreased to 350,000. The majority of the displaced persons had gone home. Some had gone to other camps (Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi). The major preoccupation of UNAMIR was Operation Retour on a voluntary basis. The mistakes made previously had been corrected: now all the agencies and the NGO's were working together with the Government. The Ministry of refugees was involved in that exercise. UNAMIR had been able to dissuade the Government from forcefully closing those IDP camps. Recently, up to 1,500

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persons were leaving each day. The incident of last week, when 30 Rwandese were killed by indisciplined members of the RPA (the Government had arrested 3 officers) had, of course, had a negative impact on the Operation, but Mr. Khan was confident it would recommence soon. As far as the refugees were concerned, 1.2 million had crossed the borders. The success of Operation Retour would definitely reflect on the return of the refugees. Of course, the fact that refugees had been harassed on their way home, and, when reaching their villages, had found their homes and properties illegally occupied, did not help. They had returned to the camps more depressed than ever. UNAMIR was trying to correct the situation with the help of the Government. For instance a member of the RPA was placed in front of each convoy to avoid harassment, h.r observers and blue berets were waiting for them in their villages to ensure a minimum of security. The other obstacle was, of course, the intimidation by the militia in the camps. That problem had to be addressed very seriously. Amb. Khan recalled that he had visited Zaire and Tanzania to discuss that problem. In both capitals, he had found a political will to send the refugees home (they raised internal difficulties with the local population at a time when the governments were facing elections). Amb. Khan concluded that, in his view, Operation Retour and the control of the militia in the camps had to be carried out simultaneously. In Nairobi, he had been impressed that all participants were sharing that view. Finally, Amb. Khan had to refer to what he considered "half an obstacle": was the capacity of the Government to reabsorb the refugees reliable? Can the government deliver justice to all of them?

25. Mr. Hansen took the floor to say that Operation retour was the perfect example of an integrated humanitarian operation. He recalled the options offered by the Secretary-General to deal with the problem of the security in the camps, he stressed that the Secretariat had approached about 60 countries and only one had volunteered to help.

26. Mrs. Ogata recalled that the HCR had had extensive consultations with DPKO on that issue. Various options had been envisaged and finally the Secretary-General had concluded that he could not undertake any of them (for lack of resources). As a last resort, he had asked Mrs. Ogata to go back to the initial, modest option she had proposed last October, that is the monitoring of a Zairean force made available by Kinshasa. The HCR was not looking to separation. The eventual of a private firm would be limited to the training of the Zairean force. In her view, the international community could no longer wait. Something needed to be done in the camps now. She was therefore turning, once again, to Member States so that they second commanding officers. DPKO would also help. She hoped that this formula would work. Meanwhile, Mrs. Ogata recalled that a WFP/HCR mission had visited the camps in Zaire to seek ways to distribute the food aid without using the militia. Registration

- 6 -

in the camps would help redress the situation and it would start soon. The HCR, she concluded, was fully prepared to start that exercise.

27. Amb. Moose recalled that the Group, at its last meeting, had urged the UN to come up with proposals. What had been done? He expressed his frustration and disappointment that the UN was now going back to square one and putting the operation on the shoulders of the HCR. He sympathized with Mrs. Ogata and regretted very much that ideas had not been shared with the Group before a decision was taken.

28. The representative of Belgium congratulated the HCR for the success of Operation Retour. He recalled the Belgian idea that the repatriation ought to start with the refugees in Burundi. He too regretted that the UN had gone back to square one and that the ball was once again in the HCR camp. That option, unfortunately, did nothing in terms of the strategy for the return of refugees. Its effect would be limited. He therefore urged the Secretary-General to reconsider certain elements of the equation. There ought to be a middle way solution between the \$1000 per day needed for each soldier of a peace-keeping operation in the camps and the \$14 given to the Tanzanian policemen ensuring security in Ngara. He also thought that the quota for the "monitors" of the Zairean force was insufficient and could be improved. He understood from a conversation with Mr. Salim Salim that certain African countries had expressed their readiness to provide such an encadrement. Perhaps the 60 countries which were approached by the UN would have accepted to provide that encadrement. Mr. Van Daele wished to be assured that those two elements had been carefully reviewed. He wanted the UN to re-examine them "de manière approfondie".

29. The representative of Germany wanted to know: a) how the problem of the illegal occupation of houses and properties had been solved b) how what had been described as an isolated incident (in a IDP camp) could happen despite the efforts of UNAMIR c) how the way the Government punished the authors of that incident could be controlled by the international community. He also wondered whether the role of intimidation played by the militia had been exaggerated by the media. Lastly, he suggested that the operation of rapatriation should be conducted in a phased way so as to enable the government to absorb the refugees little by little.

30. The representative of France stressed that the Ogata option was a temporary one. Such option had to be chosen because of the lack of reaction of Member States. Still, the Secretary-General had failed to offer a neat and precise option. He therefore agreed with the Belgian comments.

- 7 -

31. The representative of Canada interjected that while Mrs. Ogata's suggestion was "perspicace" when she had tabled it in October, it was premature. At that time the position of the neighbouring countries was not clear and there was a lack of political consensus within the international community. Her suggestion was now timely. Today, Mrs. Ogata enjoys the full political support of the community. In all likelihood, she will therefore probably succeed.

32. The representative of UK felt a sense of déjà vu. The international community ought to limit itself to the doable. Yes, there was room for hybride arrangements but action was needed now, he concluded. The representative of Sweden, who mentioned that the issue had been discussed by the Secretary-General during his recent visit to Stockholm, seconded Mr. McLennan.

33. The representative of Spain recalled that his people in Rwanda had suffered numerous attacks since the beginning of January. The Belgian idea was interesting but one could not help having reservations about the total incompetence of the Zairean forces. In Nairobi, President Mobutu had not deemed necessary to show up. Kengo had no authority whatsoever. Anything without the agreement of what he called "le coffre-fort volant" (Mobutu) was vain. He concluded by stating that the participants of the Group should not leave the room without having elaborated a plan for now.

34. Amb. Moose referred to new and disturbing reports emanating from the US volcanologists regarding the dangerous situation in Eastern Zaire.

35. Amb. Khan mentioned the difficulties encountered by the Government to accommodate the IDP's. The situation was made more difficult by the emergence of old caseloads. Even though the prefects were trying their best, it was difficult to help the displaced to recover their illegally occupied properties. The prefects were willing to rescue the IDP's but they did not even have a car at their disposal to do so ! Addressing the concerns expressed by the representative of Germany, he also pointed out that UNAMIR had immediately reacted to the incident mentioned above. A full inquiry was under way. The reality was that UNAMIR could not be everywhere at all times. The camp in question was a small one. Amb. Khan agreed that a phased return would be desirable, but the situation in both Zaire and Tanzania was getting more and more alarming (even though Tanzania had now raised the number of its gendarmes in the camps to 2,000). UNAMIR was now deployed throughout the whole country. As a consequence, security had improved and the humanitarian agencies and NGO's felt much better.

- 8 -

36. Addressing Amb. Moose's acerbic remarks, Mr. Hansen pointed out that it was not as if the Secretariat did nothing during the last 4 months. He recalled the various options tabled by the Secretary-General, the Security Council presidential statement, the fact that DPKO had approached Member States and practically none had volunteered to do anything in the camps.

37. Very diplomatically, Mrs. Ogata said she was encouraged to hear that Member States would continue to explore other options. Referring to the HCR activities in Tanzania, she underlined that her organization would indeed have to work with the Zaireans. It was not as if the HCR did not have a strategy for the return of the refugees. Both operations were closely linked. The return of the IDP's was an important prelude to the one of the refugees. She encouraged to hear Amb. Khan. Still, one had to be realistic about the absorption capacity of the Government: citing the examples of similar operations in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mozambique, she said that in her view repatriation would take at least one year. Would the international community have the patience to wait? As far as the volcanoes in Eastern Zaire were concerned, she informed the participants that the HCR did have contingency plans (moving the camps to the north), but she pointed out that the population of Goma could not be abandoned and also needed the help of the international community.

38. Summing up the discussion of that particular item, Amb. Moose said that Member States were eager to work with the UN to find a practical solution to the security problems in the camps. "Other viable options deserve our attention", he concluded.

Regional conferences

39. Mrs. Ogata gave the floor to Mr. Kamel Morjane (Directeur du bureau régional pour l'Afrique) who attended the Preparatory Committee in Addis Ababa. Mr. Morjane informed the Group that the meeting was well attended and at a high level. It had been decided that approximately 50 countries would be invited in Bujumbura and that the arrangements would be as follows: first, a committee of experts would meet from 12 to 14 February to consider the Plan of Action and all aspects of the refugee problem (including a Belgian paper and the communiqué of Nairobi). The Summit itself would take place from 15 to 18 February. At the PrepCom, a budget of \$288,000 had been suggested for the Conference. Firm pledges had already been received from countries such as Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands.

National reconciliation and dialogue

40. The representative of Belgium said that it would be desirable that, at the Bujumbura Conference, the Rwandese Government seize the opportunity to state "haut et clair" its position regarding the reconciliation.

- 9 -

41. Mrs. Sirleaf interjected that this problem had been extensively discussed by UNDP with the Government, while preparing the Round-Table. The Prime Minister was in town. She suggested that Member States contact him while he was in Geneva and raise that issue directly with him.

42. Amb. Khan noted that if the dialogue became sour in Addis Ababa it was because of Nairobi where the Government had felt on the defensive. The only subject which raised difficulties was the reconciliation with the MRND. The Government was underlining that the MRND had not only refused to distance itself from the genocide but had not expressed the slightest regret about it. In Nairobi, participants urged the Government to extend its hands towards the former régime but it felt that they were asking a little bit too much under the circumstances ! This had resulted in a heated debate but eventually the problem was resolved and the efforts of the Government were duly recognized. Amb. Khan said that, in his view, the process of national reconciliation ought to be seen at several levels, including at the grass-root level. As positive signals, he pointed out the fact that 2000 soldiers and 80 officers of the former army had recently undergone training and were about to be integrated in the new army. A ceremony would take place in Kigali on 23 January. Amb. Khan had recently visited them at the camp where the training was taking place. The Commandant of the reunification unit had left the room to leave Khan and the trained soldiers alone, thus allowing a frank exchange of views. That process was well under way and ought to be encouraged, concluded Amb. Khan who also stressed that Radio UNAMIR would soon function. He had signed the agreement with the Government just before leaving Kigali for Geneva.

43. The representative of France then took the floor to announce that her country was thinking about using the services of a francophone reputed African personality, mandated by the OAU and working closely with the UN, to promote the dialogue between the two regimes. She pointed out that France's aide to Rwanda was linked to the progress of national reconciliation.

44. The representative of Germany interjected that mid-February would definitely be too soon to ask the Government to publicly state its policy vis-a-vis national reconciliation in Bujumbura. Such an important and delicate issue should, in his view, be discussed on a bilateral basis and not publicly. He seconded the French proposal, adding that the idea ought to be discussed further by the UN with the OAU.

45. The representative of Belgium suggested to urge the Rwandese delegation to seize the occasion of the Conference to explain what it had already done in terms of military integration, land policy and reconciliation. Perhaps it should organize a national debate ? He too seconded the idea of a go-between mandated by the OAU.

- 10 -

46. The representative of Canada stated that, in Nairobi, the Rwandese Government felt like in the lion's den. Member States should understand that they are here to help Rwanda. As far as Canada was concerned, it would attend the Bujumbura Conference as a partner of Burundi and Rwanda, not an enemy.

47. Concluding the meeting, Amb. Moose announced that he would meet with the Prime Minister of Rwanda in a few minutes. He suggested that the next meeting of the Group ought to take place within the framework of the Bujumbura Conference. Meanwhile, the Group could perhaps meet in New York to examine the various options which could still be considered for the security in the refugee camps. The representative of Belgium expressed the agreement of the Group and it was so decided.

Florence Barrillon-Pomés
Geneva, 20 January 95

cc: Mr. Goulding
Mr. Kouyaté
Mr. De Souza
Mr. Mosha
Mr. Annabi
Mrs. Isel Rivero (Kigali)
Mr. Ould Abdallah (Bujumbura)

Revised

MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
Geneva, January 17, 1995

AGENDA

- 1400-1410 Welcome
- 1410-1500 Assistance to Rwanda
- Preview of UNDP Roundtable Meeting
 - Review of Consolidated Aid Matrix - Areas of Cooperation/Gaps in Coverage
- 1500-1545 Status Report on:
- The International Tribunal
 - Human Rights Monitors
- 1545-1600 Break
- 1600-1700 Status Report on Camp Security and Repatriation
- Report on UN Assessments/Options/Mandate
 - Report on UNAMIR Radio
 - Update on Internally Displaced Persons Camps
- 1700-1730 The Regional Refugee Conference
- Results of Preparatory Conference
 - Status of Preparations for February Conference
- 1730-1750 Ideas for Promoting Dialogue
- 1750-1800 Closing Remarks/Next Meeting



UNITED STATES MISSION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

As of 17 January 1995

Please submit changes
to U.S. Mission personnel

RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP

U.S. Mission, Geneva, Switzerland
Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Attendance List

Belgium: Mr. Frans Van Daele, MFA Brussels, Director General
for Political Affairs
Ambassador Willems, Permanent Representative, Geneva
Ambassador Van Craen, Ambassador, Bujumbura
Mrs. S. Gerlo, Chief of Cabinet-Secretary of State
for Development Cooperation
Mr. De Schoutheete, Deputy PermRep, Geneva
Mr. M. Deneer, Attache-Cabinet Development Cooperation
Mr. B. Fontaine, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Ms. Deneffe, Belgian Mission, Geneva

Canada: Mr. Bernard Dussault, Canadian Special Envoy for
Central Africa
Mr. Bruno Herbert, Director General for Africa,
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Ms. Francine Gagne, Analyst, East & Central Africa,
CIDA
Mr. Denis Potvin, Canadian Mission

France: Ambassador de Bonnacourse, Permanent Representative,
Geneva
Mme Bernadette Lefort, Deputy Director of African
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Alain Sortais, Deputy PermRep, Geneva
Ms. Maryse Daviet, French Mission, Geneva

Germany: Mr. Ganns, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Peter Schoof, German Mission, Geneva
Mr. Peter Bauer, German Mission, Geneva
Mr. Werner Daum, German Mission, Geneva
Mr. Sebastian Paust

- 2 -

Japan: Mr. Okubo, African Affairs, MFA, Tokyo
Mr. Kisbo, MFA, Tokyo
Ambassador Endo, Permanent Representative, Geneva
Mr. Naito, Deputy PermRep, Geneva
Ms. Miyoshi, Japanese Mission, Geneva

Netherlands: Mr. Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation
Ambassador Hofstee, Permanent Representative,
Geneva
Mr. Peter Van Wulfften Palthe, Deputy PermRep,
Geneva
Ms. Paula Sastrowijoto, Netherlands Mission, Geneva

Spain: Antonio Lopez, Director General, Institute for
Development Cooperation, MFA
Carmen De La Pena, Sub-Director General for Sub-
Saharan Africa, MFA
Amb. Fernando-Martin Valenzuela Marzo, Permanent Rep.,
Spanish Mission, Geneva
Ricardo Martinez Vazquez, Counselor, Spanish Mission
Juan Manuel Gonzalez De Linares, Counselor, Spanish
Mission

Sweden: Mr. Olgelund, Deputy Director, Political Department,
MFA, Stockholm
Ambassador Norberg, Permanent Representative, Geneva
Mr. Per Sjogren, Swedish Mission, Geneva

Tunisia: Ambassador Ennaceur, Permanent Representative, Geneva
Mr. Koubaa, Tunisian Mission, Geneva

United Kingdom: Mr. David McLennan, Head of Africa Dept., FCO
Ambassador Williams, Permanent Representative,
Geneva
Ms. Jill Helke, UK Mission, Geneva

- 3 -

United States:

Ambassador Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Ambassador Spiegel, Permanent Representative, Geneva
Ambassador Friedman, Rwanda Coordinator, State Department
Ambassador Rawson, Kigali
Mr. John Hicks, Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID
Ms. Leslie Gerson, Deputy PermRep, Geneva
Mr. Myron Golden, Director, USAID Rwanda/Burundi
Mr. John Lange, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Mr. Peter Eicher, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Ms. Malaika Stoll, Office of East African Affairs, USAID
Ms. Kate Farnsworth, DART/Rwanda, Kigali
Mr. Luis Arreaga, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Ms. Paula Lynch, Office of Policy, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, State Department
Mr. Terence McCulley, Office of Central African Affairs, State Department

European Commission: Mr. Andre Molard, EC Delegation, Geneva
A representative from Brussels

Organization of African Unity:

Ambassador Bensid, Permanent Observer, Geneva
One other representative

Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda:
Ambassador Shahryar Khan

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:

Mr. Donato Kiniger-Pasigli, Outreach Liaison
Mr. Colin Porter

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs:

Mr. Peter Hansen, Under Secretary General, New York
Mr. Martin Griffiths, Director, Geneva
Mr. Randolph Kent, Head, UNREO, Kigali

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights:

Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso, High Commissioner

UN High Commissioner for Refugees:

Mrs. Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner
Mr. Gerald Walzer, Deputy High Commissioner
Mr. Kamel Morjane, Director, Regional Bureau for Africa

UN Development Program:

Ms. Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, Regional Director for Africa

- 4 -

World Food Program:

Mr. Daan Everts, Deputy Executive Director, Operations
Mr. Yohannes Mengesha, Regional Manager for Eastern Africa

UN Children's Fund:

Mr. Daniel Toole, Representative, Rwanda
Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Chief, Africa Section, New York

World Health Organization:

Mr. Charles LaMunier, Senior Advisor for External Relation
and Coordination
Dr. Diego Buriot, Special Coordinator, Rwanda

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

UN Department of Political Affairs:

Ms. Florence Barrillon-Pomez

International Committee of the Red Cross:

Mr. Jean-Daniel Tauxe, Delegate General, Africa Zone

Interpreters: Ms. Marguerite Englehorn

Ms. Vivienne Fadeev-Marchant

Dorier Technicians for Interpretation Equipment:

Mr. Richard Gagnebin

Mr. Jesus-Manuel Gonzalez

INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
Washington, November 22, 1994

AGENDA

- 1030-1100 Registration
- 1100-1115 Opening Remarks
- Timothy Wirth, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, "Purposes of the Rwanda Operational Support Group: Support for a Strategy of Reconciliation and Repatriation"
- 1115-1230 Security in the Refugee Camps, as Part of a Larger Regional Strategy
- Camp Security: Practical options
 - Role of UNAMIR
- 1245-1400 Working Lunch
Topic of Discussion: UN and Bilateral Coordination
- 1400-1430 Preparations for the Regional Refugee Conference
- 1430-1515 Human Rights and Accountability
- Expediting Deployment and Supporting the Monitors
 - Support to the International Tribunal/Investigations
- 1515-1530 Break
- 1530-1600 Assistance to the Rwandan Government
- Assistance in the Judicial Sector
 - Other multilateral and bilateral aid efforts
- 1600-1630 Efforts at Political Reconciliation
- Restarting the dialogue
 - Military integration efforts
- 1630-1700 Burundi: Reinforcing peace and stability

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Seen thanks.
Nothing much
can't out. if
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REUNION INAUGURALE DU GROUPE DE SOUTIEN OPERATIONNEL
POUR LE RWANDA

22 novembre, Département d'Etat, Washington

Présidence: Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires globales,
Timothy Wirth

Liste des participants: Du côté américain: Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les affaires africaines George Moose; Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les réfugiés Phyllis Oakley; Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint pour les droits de l'homme John Shattuck (également présent l'Ambassadeur américain à Kigali David Rawson). Belgique: Directeur politique au ministère des affaires étrangères Frans van Daele; Canada: Vice-Ministre adjoint pour l'Afrique et le Moyen Orient au ministère des affaires étrangères Marc Perron; France, Ambassadeur à Washington Patrick Villemur (remplacé l'après-midi par un Conseiller de l'Ambassade Brigitte Collet); Allemagne: Directeur pour les affaires africaines au ministère des affaires étrangères Harald Ganns; Union européenne: chef de la section pour le développement, délégation à Washington Amos Tincani; Japon: Représentant permanent adjoint de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies Shunji Maruyama; Pays-Bas: Directeur adjoint de la section d'aide d'urgence au ministère des affaires étrangères Susan Blankhart; Suède: Directeur politique adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères Anders Oljelund (remplacé après 16h par Lena Sundh de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies); Tunisie: (en tant que président en exercice de l'OUA), Directeur pour les affaires africaines à l'OUA Youssef Mokadden; Royaume-Uni: chef du Département de l'Afrique équatoriale au Foreign Office, David McClennan; Nations Unies: Peter Hansen, Ambassadeur Dillon, Florence Barrillon-Pomés, Major-Général Baril, Ian Jessen-Petersen, Daphna Shraga.

Ordre du jour: cf. annexe

Introduction

1. Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat Wirth spécifie que le groupe qui se réunit aujourd'hui pour la première fois à Washington, à l'initiative de son Gouvernement, n'est pas un groupe de contact ni un groupe politique. Il est évident que c'est le Conseil de sécurité qui prendra une décision à la lumière du rapport que le Secrétaire général vient de lui soumettre au sujet de la sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés. C'est donc essentiellement un groupe de soutien qui a été constitué pour apporter son soutien aux efforts que le Secrétaire général et les Nations Unies déploient non seulement au Rwanda mais au Burundi. Il ne s'agit pas non plus d'un groupe "d'amis du Rwanda", ce genre de groupes étant

- 2 -

réservé au Secrétaire général lui-même. Le groupe se réunit ici pour échanger des idées à propos du Rwanda et du Burundi (dernier point de l'ordre du jour). M. Wirth demande aux participants de s'abstenir de faire des remarques préliminaires, ceci pour économiser du temps.

2. Malgré cela, M. Villemur (France) tient à souligner qu'il faut agir et agir vite au Rwanda; qu'il appartient à l'ONU et à l'OUA de coordonner les efforts de la communauté internationale; et que le Groupe ne réussira que si le Secrétariat de l'ONU et les pays africains y sont étroitement associés. En ce qui la concerne, la France soutiendra et participera aux travaux du Groupe.

3. Sur ses traces, le Représentant de la Belgique, M. van Daele (qui a pris la peine de préparer et de distribuer aux participants deux documents de travail, l'un sur le problème des réfugiés en Afrique centrale et l'autre sur le Burundi, cf. en annexe) déclare que c'est seulement en avançant sur tous les fronts que l'on arrivera à régler le problème du Rwanda: retour des réfugiés et des déplacés, sécurité dans le pays, démocratisation, réconciliation nationale etc.... Il préconise entre autres que les premiers retours des réfugiés s'organisent à partir du Burundi.

4. M. Mokaddem (OUA) ajoute, non sans faire remarquer qu'il est flatté d'être le seul représentant d'un pays africain autour de la table, qu'il faudrait discuter des termes de référence de ce Groupe de soutien et y associer le Rwanda et le Burundi (nécessité de flexibilité). Il rappelle également que l'OUA joue un rôle important au Burundi.

5. M. Hansen indique qu'il est d'accord que tous les problèmes se tiennent les uns aux autres et il faut avancer sur tous les fronts à la fois. Il met cependant l'accent sur la nécessité, pour le gouvernement, de fonctionner. Ceci dit, le Secrétaire général, dans son rapport, offre au Conseil de sécurité des options, de la plus modeste (entraînement et formation de policiers étrangers comme l'a recommandé le HCR) à la plus ambitieuse (une force d'environ 12.000 hommes qui séparerait les dirigeants, les milices et les soldats de l'ancien régime du reste des réfugiés). Une équipe technique s'est rendue récemment au Zaïre pour étudier les moyens de mener à bien une telle séparation (il faudra établir des camps loin de la frontière et l'opération sera longue et coûteuse). Entre les deux, la solution qui consiste à instaurer, progressivement, des conditions de sécurité dans les camps pour permettre aux organisations humanitaires de faire leur travail et aux réfugiés de rentrer chez eux sans menaces.

- 3 -

Sécurité dans les camps

6. Le Général Baril explique que le rapport du Secrétaire général brosse un tableau clair et malheureusement.. sombre de la situation dans les camps. Il se réfère en particulier aux camps de Bukavu et Goma où les conditions sont les plus difficiles en raison de la présence de 20.000 à 40.000 soldats de l'ancienne armée rwandaise à la fois furieux et dangereux. Ces soldats sont bien armés et bien nourris (par les organisations humanitaires). En face, la MINUAR dont les forces promises en mai dernier ne sont pas encore déployées et qui ne sont pas encore complètement équipées. Ses capacités sont donc limitées. La MINUAR ne peut donc servir que de point d'ancrage à l'opération envisagée au Zaïre. L'option nécessitant la présence d'environ 12.000 hommes prend sa source dans l'étude préparée par l'équipe technique qui s'est rendue au Zaïre. L'option intermédiaire n'est pas celle que le Secrétaire général préfère mais c'est la plus réaliste, celle qui peut garantir la sécurité aux organisations humanitaires dans les camps et permettre aux réfugiés de rentrer en paix chez eux. L'opération envisagée sera par conséquent limitée et devra être menée indépendamment de la MINUAR même si celle-ci lui servira de point d'ancrage. Elle pourrait être menée en deux phases et permettre, morceau par morceau, de rétablir des conditions de sécurité dans les camps. Des règles seraient fermement établies qui devront être respectées par tous (follow the rule or leave) et si les contributions en troupes ne sont pas suffisantes l'opération ne durera pas moins de deux ans. Bien entendu, conclut le Général, cette opération militaire devra être doublée d'une opération politique.

7. M. Hansen souligne la nécessité de rétablir un minimum de contrôle dans les camps (menaces dirigées contre les réfugiés, vols des dons d'urgence en espèces revendus au marché noir par les milices...). A tel point, ajoute-t-il, que le PAM songe à introduire un système d'aide directe (wet feeding, il est difficile de revendre au marché noir du porridge..) aux réfugiés pour couper l'herbe sous les pieds des milices et interhamwe. Mais, demande-t-il, les miliciens se laisseront-ils faire sans bouger un doigt ? Tous les problèmes sont donc reliés...

8. M^{me} Oakley fait valoir que les hutus sont prêts à recommencer la guerre au Rwanda. Si l'opération envisagée doit prendre un an au minimum, y a-t-il un risque de voir les revanchistes passer à l'action avant ? Si cette opération doit prendre autant de temps, comment peut-elle réussir ?

9. Le Général Baril répond qu'une telle intervention aurait un effet à la fois dissuasif et stabilisateur. Finalement le choix est simple: ou bien l'on s'attaque aux miliciens et on les tue, ou bien on essaie de les réintégrer dans la société rwandaise.

- 4 -

10. "Je parle de sécurité dans les camps", rétorque Mme Oakley qui pense qu'il faudrait donner un grand coup (give it a jump-start) pour empêcher que la situation ne se détériore davantage.

11. "Alors, ayons recours au Chapitre VII s'il faut prendre les grands moyens", répond le Général Baril.

12. M. Villemur (France) fait remarquer que de toute évidence l'opération sera longue. Il ne faut pas oublier la situation qui prévaut à l'intérieur du Rwanda. Il fait allusion, en particulier, au problème posé par le retour, depuis l'été, de 400.000 réfugiés tutsis au pays. Il faut donc agir vite. Il se demande à ce propos si le Secrétariat des Nations Unies a déjà contacté des pays contributeurs de troupes. Est-il possible de tirer avantage du fait que des opérations de maintien de la paix sont en train de toucher à leur fin au Mozambique et en Somalie ?

13. M. Hansen répond qu'effectivement des contacts ont été pris au niveau des gouvernements suite à la proposition du HCR (concernant des forces de police). A vrai dire les gouvernements n'ont pas réagi avec grand enthousiasme. Les perspectives ne sont guère encourageantes. On se rappelle les difficultés que le Secrétaire général a rencontrées pour former la MINUAR. A une question de M. Wirth demandant à quel point l'option des 2 bataillons bien équipés était réaliste, M. Hansen répond qu'il y a toujours l'option no. 1, celle qui consiste à renforcer la police zaïroise.

14. M. van Daele (Belgique) pense que les "mesures initiales" qui figurent dans le rapport du Secrétaire général constituent, certes, des éléments de réponse mais il faudrait y ajouter d'autres mesures, sans quoi on encouragera les réfugiés à rester dans les camps au lieu de rentrer chez eux. L'option requérant le recours au Chapitre VII n'a que peu de chances d'être choisie. Il ne faut cependant pas céder trop vite au pessimisme. Peut-être y aura-t-il des offres de troupes. Après tout, pour MINUAR II, les pays africains se sont offerts à condition qu'on les aide à équiper leurs troupes. La Belgique est prête à aider cette fois encore. Pour répondre à la question de Mme Oakley, tout se tient en effet et il faudra s'atteler à la réconciliation nationale, à la démobilisation des troupes de l'ancien régime (allusion à ce qui a été fait en Ouganda avec l'aide de la Banque mondiale).

15. Le représentant britannique, M. McClennan, pense lui aussi qu'il faut traiter les problèmes sur tous les fronts en même temps. Les 3 principaux volets du problème sont: le retour des réfugiés, la situation interne au Rwanda et, bien sûr, le Burundi. Il n'y a, bien évidemment, pas de solution facile mais il faut agir rapidement. Le problème de la distribution des aliments dans les camps doit être résolu (une allusion au wet feeding).

- 5 -

16. Le représentant du Canada, M. Perron, s'inquiète du facteur temps. Il y a des réfugiés depuis 50 ans, on accorde plus d'attention aux problèmes des camps à l'extérieur du pays qu'aux problèmes auxquels le gouvernement doit faire face à l'intérieur du pays. Il faut absolument éviter de donner un caractère permanent aux camps et, de ce point de vue, la communauté internationale doit faire passer un message clair: l'objectif est d'encourager le retour des réfugiés au Rwanda.

17. Le représentant de l'OUA, M. Mokaddem, pense que les réfugiés sont entre le marteau et l'enclume. Une double action est donc nécessaire: au Rwanda et au Zaïre. Avant d'envisager l'envoi d'une force militaire au Zaïre il faudrait peut-être voir avec les autorités zaïroises comment on pourrait désarmer les miliciens. L'expérience de la MINUAR II a souligné les difficultés de recrutement (des troupes). Le contingent tunisien a dû attendre lui-même deux mois avant de partir pour le Rwanda. Les pays africains seraient peut-être prêts à offrir des troupes mais, comme on le sait, ils ont besoin d'un soutien logistique. Peut-être également faudrait-il revoir et élargir le mandat de la MINUAR ? Il convient de réexaminer le rôle de la MINUAR au Rwanda avec la plus grande prudence, conclut-il.

18. A une question du Représentant de l'Union européenne qui demande s'il serait possible de démultiplier les sites réservés aux réfugiés, M. Hansen répond que l'équipe technique qui s'est rendue sur le terrain pour examiner cette question a conclu qu'une telle opération serait difficile et coûteuse.

19. L'Ambassadeur Ganns (Allemagne) rappelle les intérêts nationaux des pays représentés autour de la table: sécurité de leurs citoyens travaillant dans ces camps (de ce point de vue une force modeste devrait suffire) et solution globale de réconciliation nationale nécessitant une double action au Rwanda et dans les camps du Zaïre. L'Ambassadeur n'est franchement pas convaincu de la nécessité d'envoyer une force armée dans ces camps (qui conduirait à une guerre ensanglantée) et il pense que l'idée de séparer les soldats, miliciens et interhamwe du reste des réfugiés doit être résolument écartée. D'ailleurs il est pratiquement impossible d'identifier les miliciens. L'Ambassadeur se réfère en particulier au paragraphe 14 du Rapport du Secrétaire général: il estime qu'il est en effet impératif d'engager des consultations avec les dirigeants de l'ancien régime rwandais, tout en maintenant un minimum de sécurité dans les camps.

20. Mlle Susan Blankhart (Pays-Bas) résume: "nous sommes tous d'accord qu'une autre avenue doit être explorée. Cet après-midi, quand nous reprendrons le débat, il nous faudra être pragmatiques et choisir l'option la plus rapide.

- 6 -

21. L'Ambassadeur Oljelund (Suède) estime que les pays donateurs ont beau être lassés (de la multiplication d'appels), la situation est dangereuse et il faut agir rapidement. Malheureusement, il y a des chances pour que l'opération ne soit pas conduite aussi rapidement qu'il le faudrait. Il faut donc qu'un début de réconciliation soit amorcé, même si le mouvement de rapatriement des réfugiés est lent. Pour ce faire, le Gouvernement doit être prêt.

22. M. Maruyama (Japon) n'a pas de solution à offrir mais il se demande si cet exercice ne prête pas au dédoublement: ce genre de discussion n'est-il pas en train de se faire à New York en ce moment même ?

23. Ecartant ce détail, M. van Daele (Belgique) estime que le problème est immense: une nouvelle guerre pourrait éclater et s'étendre au Burundi. On ne peut le laisser s'infecter davantage. La proposition du Secrétaire général a le mérite de sortir du dilemme "tout ou rien".

24. M. Wirth pose alors une question concernant l'utilisation de firmes privées. Il aimerait avoir plus de renseignements à ce sujet.

25. M. Hansen répond que ce n'est certes pas l'option préférée du Secrétaire général mais elle doit être envisagée si sa proposition n'est pas suivie par les Etats membres. Une équipe technique se trouve en ce moment sur le terrain pour examiner cette possibilité mais elle n'a pas encore produit de rapport. Le Général Baril ajoute qu'en tout état de cause ses conclusions devront être tout d'abord partagées avec le Secrétaire général. On ne peut, de toutes façons, prédire quel sera le résultat de cette enquête. L'utilisation d'une société privée serait effectivement une première mais il ne s'agit, bien entendu, que d'une solution de dernier recours.

26. M. Wirth répond que les Etats-Unis s'intéressent de près à la question et seraient en faveur d'une telle procédure "si rien d'autre ne marche". Sur un autre registre, qu'en est-il de l'extension du mandat de la MINUAR ?

27. Le Général Baril répond que le prochain rapport du Secrétaire général sur la MINUAR sera probablement publié et examiné par le Conseil de sécurité la semaine prochaine. A son avis la situation est trop fragile pour modifier à ce stade le mandat de la MINUAR. M. Wirth indique que l'administration américaine souhaiterait que le Conseil adopte une résolution demandant à la MINUAR de préserver la stabilité au Rwanda.

28. Mme Oakley prend alors la parole pour spécifier que les organisations humanitaires désirent quitter le Rwanda pour des raisons d'éthique et non pas seulement de sécurité. Elles ont de

- 7 -

plus en plus de mal à accepter que, malgré elles, elles nourrissent les auteurs du génocide et les aident, dans un sens, à se préparer à envahir le pays pour reprendre le pouvoir.

29. M. van Daele (Belgique) fait valoir que la MINUAR doit continuer à jouer son rôle mais il convient en même temps de mettre l'accent sur les conditions de sécurité gouvernant le retour des réfugiés. A son avis, il faudrait commencer par les réfugiés qui se trouvent au Burundi. La tâche serait plus facile et servirait d'amorce au processus. Le corollaire c'est que "le point d'arrivée doit être bien géré". Il prône un déploiement des observateurs des droits de l'homme dans les villages frontaliers du Burundi.

30. Pour conclure le débat de la matinée, M. Hansen souligne la frustration du gouvernement rwandais: 80% de l'aide alimentaire est concentrée en dehors du pays et les personnes déplacées, à l'intérieur donc du pays, sont démunies. M. Hansen indique aussi qu'il est en parfait accord avec Mme Oakley en ce qui concerne les frustrations des ONG. Cependant, il faut savoir que 90% de l'aide internationale est distribuée aux réfugiés, y compris les femmes et les enfants: les agences n'ont donc pas grand choix.

Déjeuner de travail

31. Le déjeuner restraint, offert par M. Wirth, aux chefs de délégation, tourne autour des problèmes de coordination "UN and bilateral". Y assistent M. Hansen, le Général Baril et l'Ambassadeur Dillon. Pendant ce temps, le reste de la délégation onusienne discute avec les aides des participants de questions telles que l'utilisation de firmes privées, la restructuration du bureau du Représentant spécial etc.....

32. Avant d'entamer le prochain point à l'ordre du jour, M. Wirth explique que les questions de coordination ont été débattues lors du déjeuner de travail. Il demande où en est la mission de l'Ambassadeur Dillon. Ce dernier répond qu'il est en train de terminer une deuxième mission dans la région et soumettra la semaine prochaine un début de rapport au Secrétaire général. Il rappelle qu'au lendemain de sa première mission il avait formulé des recommandations. M. Wirth espère que le rapport de l'Ambassadeur Dillon sera prêt rapidement. Il souligne l'urgence du problème.

Préparatifs de la conférence régionale sur les réfugiés

33. M. Jessen-Petersen (HCR) explique, en matière d'introduction, que ce n'est pas la première fois que le HCR est saisi de la question. Depuis 1961, c'est la 6ème crise à laquelle il doit faire face. Le HCR, rappelle-t-il, était déjà au Burundi en 1962. Pour le HCR, les trois principaux volets du problème sont les suivants: a) la sécurité des réfugiés, b) le

- 8 -

retour et la réhabilitation des réfugiés, et, c) l'infrastructure nécessitée par les pays voisins d'accueil. La conférence envisagée pourrait, à son avis, apporter une contribution significative au processus de longue haleine, plus politique. Le HCR a été prié, par le Rwanda et par le Burundi, de l'organiser et de la considérer comme une mesure propre à augmenter la confiance (confidence-building measure). Cette conférence pourrait servir de prologue à une conférence élargie, plus politique. Elle ne peut pas attendre davantage. D'ailleurs un comité préparatoire se réunira à Addis Abeba du 10 au 15 décembre. La conférence elle-même devrait se tenir à Bujumbura vers la fin mars. Y participeront les Etats membres de l'OUA, les pays observateurs du processus d'Arusha, les pays de l'Union européenne y compris les pays nordiques, les Nations Unies et les organisations non gouvernementales.

34. **Mme Oakley** exprime le soutien des Etats-Unis pour cette conférence. Mais qui se penchera sur la question délicate du droit à la propriété (land-tenure) ? Il faudrait encourager le gouvernement à régler cette question. Elle ajoute qu'elle était présente à la cérémonie du 50ème anniversaire de la Convention des réfugiés à Addis Abeba, en septembre dernier: elle est persuadée que les deux conférences (réfugiés et politique) se renforceront l'une l'autre.

35. **M. Mokaddem (OUA)** ajoute que la conférence sur les réfugiés nécessite une bonne préparation et facilitera le processus de réconciliation nationale. Il précise cependant que la participation n'a pas encore été finalisée. La conférence pourrait être placée sous la double égide OUA/ONU. Tout cela n'a pas encore été décidé et le sera sans doute à Addis. En attendant l'aide de la communauté internationale serait la bienvenue pour les préparatifs de cette conférence.

36. **M. van Daele** met en garde contre un ordre du jour trop spécialisé. Il faut examiner le problème dans un contexte plus global et plus politique. Il réclame un ordre du jour dès à présent. **M. Wirth** ayant demandé si cela était possible, **M. Jessen-Petersen** répond que c'est le comité préparatoire d'Addis qui en décidera. Il rappelle que le Secrétaire général a clairement indiqué son intention de procéder, en priorité, à la solution du problème de la sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés. Cette question doit être réglée en premier.

37. Tandis que le Représentant du Canada insiste sur l'urgence de convoquer cette conférence, la Représentante de la France prêche pour une approche globale. S'il doit y avoir deux conférences, alors il faut un lien entre elles. Le Représentant de l'OUA estime que la conférence sur les réfugiés ouvrira la porte de la conférence politique. Le calendrier est cependant difficile à déterminer dans les circonstances actuelles. Mais, ajoute-t-il, le Conseil des ministres de l'OUA se réunira en

- 9 -

janvier et alors on en saura sans doute plus. Le Représentant du Royaume-Uni estime, pour sa part, que la conférence doit avoir lieu, même si la question de la sécurité dans les camps n'a pas été d'abord réglée. Le Représentant de l'Union européenne pense, lui aussi, que les deux conférences doivent être étroitement liées. Celui des Pays-Bas pense que le plus vite sera le mieux pour organiser la conférence sur les réfugiés mais le Représentant de l'Allemagne exprime des doutes sur l'objectif final de la conférence.

Les droits de l'homme

38. M. Shattuck rappelle la position américaine: le besoin d'observateurs des droits de l'homme se fait sentir depuis longtemps. Le but était d'en déployer une centaine. Il croit cependant comprendre que seulement 15 observateurs sont actuellement dans le pays. La coordination, le manque d'appui logistique et d'équipement présentent des problèmes. Le mandat de ces observateurs n'est pas non plus clairement défini. A qui doivent-ils faire rapport ? Genève ou New York ? Les Etats-Unis qui ont mis de côté près d'un million de dollars pour faciliter le déploiement de ces observateurs ont besoin de réponses à toutes ces questions.

39. M. Hansen comprend les préoccupations américaines. D'après les informations toutes fraîches qu'il a reçues, à peu près 60 observateurs seraient déjà déployés à Kigali et dans les provinces où un 7ème bureau vient d'être ouvert à Kibuye. L'Espagne, la Norvège et la Suisse ont mis à la disposition de l'ONU des experts. 35 observateurs sont en passe d'être recrutés à Genève. En plus, l'Union européenne a offert 50 observateurs. Au total, il y a aura donc d'ici la fin de l'année à peu près 135 observateurs au Rwanda auxquels il faut ajouter 25 volontaires. Donc, total, 150 observateurs d'ici la fin 1994. A une question de M. Wirth relative au "back-stopping" de cette opération, M. Hansen répond qu'à l'origine Genève avait été choisie mais maintenant c'est la Division des opérations hors-siège (FOD), qui relève elle-même du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix, qui assumera cette responsabilité.

40. M. van Daele rappelle que la Belgique a déjà offert son aide financière et est prête à continuer. Les observateurs constituent définitivement un facteur de stabilisation. Le Représentant de la Suède se demande, pour sa part, dans quel genre d'environnement ces observateurs oeuvreront. M. Hansen répond qu'il n'est pas en possession d'indications précises à ce sujet mais il offre de donner la liste des villes dans lesquelles les observateurs seront déployés. En tout état de cause, ces observateurs agiront dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles. Le Représentant du Canada dit aussi que son pays a déjà aidé et est prêt à faire davantage selon les besoins.

- 10 -

41. M. Moose pose la question de la coordination entre les observateurs et la MINUAR. M. Hansen répond que la MINUAR offre son aide logistique aux observateurs. Le Représentant de l'Allemagne, se référant aux observateurs de l'Union européenne vraisemblablement mieux équipés, se demande s'il n'y aura pas de frictions entre observateurs.

42. M. Shattuck suggère soit que l'on s'aligne sur l'opération du Cambodge où le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général était le coordonnateur, soit que la coordination soit assurée par les bureaux des droits de l'homme à Genève. Mais il se demande si le bureau de M. Ayala Lasso étant relativement nouveau et celui de M. Fall étant sous-équipé, Genève est la solution. Ne vaudrait-il pas mieux avoir recours au PNUD ?

43. Le Représentant du Royaume-Uni réclame des instructions précises et claires pour les observateurs tandis que celui de l'OUA a besoin de savoir si ces observateurs proviennent essentiellement des pays donateurs.

44. M. Hansen explique que l'approche choisie est mixte. Le Bureau de M. Ayala-Lasso à Genève a une liste de candidats. Les standards de recrutement sont les mêmes pour tous les observateurs, y compris ceux de l'Union européenne (pour répondre aux préoccupations de l'Allemagne), qui viennent de tous les pays (pour répondre à la question de M. Mokaddem). En ce qui concerne la coordination, M. Hansen rappelle qu'il avait pris la liberté d'organiser une rencontre à ce sujet entre Mme Ogata et M. Ayala-Lasso. Entre-temps, il a été décidé que FOD ferait la liaison avec les observateurs. Mais il est d'accord avec les orateurs qui viennent de prendre la parole: il y a un manque évident de stratégie. Il continuera d'en parler à M. Ayala-Lasso.

45. M. Wirth fait valoir que la question deviendra épineuse quand le Tribunal international commencera son travail. Qui s'acquittera de la coordination ? Ne conviendrait-il pas de nommer un adjoint à M. Khan pour assumer cette responsabilité ?

46. "La question est à l'étude", répond M. Hansen, et l'Ambassadeur Dillon l'a discutée avec M. Khan. Aucune décision n'a été encore prise.

47. M. Wirth revient à la charge : "cela fait un bon moment que nous attendons. Il faudrait maintenant prendre le taureau par les cornes. Je dois pouvoir donner une réponse à Jesse Helms. Comme vous le savez, nous sommes sous pression. Je crains que si cette affaire des droits de l'homme n'avance pas, notre aide ne soit retardée".

48. "Vous pouvez dire au Sénateur Helms que d'ici la fin de l'année plus de 100 observateurs seront déployés, avec toute l'aide logistique dont ils auront besoin. Cela n'a rien à voir

- 11 -

avec la question de savoir s'il faut nommer un Représentant spécial adjoint ou non", rétorque M. Hansen.

La question du Tribunal international

49. M. Shattuck résume les urgences: a) il faut commencer les enquêtes le plus rapidement possible; b) il faut que le Procureur agisse dès maintenant; c) l'aide financière est cruciale.

50. Mlle Blankhart (Pays-Bas) rappelle que si le siège du Tribunal est à La Haye, de nombreuses sessions devront avoir lieu à Kigali même. La Représentante de la France estime que le tribunal est un élément essentiel du processus de réconciliation nationale mais pour cela la coopération du gouvernement du Rwanda et du gouvernement du Zaïre est indispensable. Le Représentant de l'OUA souligne le caractère d'urgence du tribunal et rappelle que le gouvernement rwandais a voté contre la résolution du Conseil de sécurité. En ce qui concerne l'OUA, elle préférerait que le tribunal siège quelque part en Afrique. M. Shattuck rappelle qu'en dépit de son vote, le Rwanda promis de coopérer avec le Tribunal. Pour le Représentant de la Belgique, le tribunal doit siéger là où il est le plus efficace.

51. A une question de M. Wirth concernant l'intérêt exprimé par une demi-douzaine d'Etats membres pour faciliter la remise sur pied du système judiciaire au Rwanda, M. Hansen répond qu'une mission d'évaluation, comprenant des représentants du PNUD, du Bureau des droits de l'homme, de certaines ONG, de l'USAID et de la Suisse, se trouve actuellement sur le terrain pour voir comment on pourrait mettre en oeuvre un programme d'action durant les six mois à venir. En attendant le rapport de cette mission, M. Hansen peut confirmer que les conditions existant actuellement dans les prisons sont épouvantables.

Assistance au gouvernement rwandais

52. D'emblée, M. Wirth rappelle qu'il faut absolument travailler avec le gouvernement de Kigali, qu'on l'aime ou pas.

53. Le Représentant de l'Union européenne indique que l'Union a quelques expériences à son actif en matière de coordination de l'aide. Il se réfère au cas de la Palestine. Les trois volets de cette aide: aspect humanitaire; réhabilitation; et aspect institutionnel. La coordination se fait officiellement autour de la table ronde. De façon moins formelle, pour le Rwanda, on peut compter sur 5 à 6 principaux bailleurs de fonds.

54. M. Wirth ayant demandé des détails sur le programme d'aide, M. Hansen répond que DHA prépare en ce moment un appel consolidé pour janvier 1995. Entre-temps, le PNUDF prépare une Table Ronde qui aura lieu les 14 et 15 décembre à Genève. L'idée est de

- 12 -

réorienter cette Table Ronde d'une discussion sur les questions de "gouvernance" et l'avenir du Rwanda en une conférence plus économique et plus concrète. D'autre part, le PNUD prépare le budget d'aide pour 1995. Il faut trouver 100 millions de dollars pour payer les soldats et les fonctionnaires et couvrir les dépenses courantes et 400 autres millions pour couvrir les autres dépenses. Le problème est que l'ONU ne peut pas continuer à faire face à l'énorme fossé qui sépare l'aide convoyée à l'extérieur du pays et le manque absolu d'aide au gouvernement lui-même. M. Khan a préparé un programme de réhabilitation (RENP) couvrant les besoins immédiats: réouverture des hôpitaux et des écoles, établissement de la radio, programme de déminage, réparations des infrastructures etc...

55. Le Représentant de l'Allemagne indique que le Conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne se réunira cette semaine pour discuter l'affaire du Rwanda. Son Ministre des affaires étrangères plaidera pour une opération de réhabilitation du pays immédiate. L'Ambassadeur Ganns met l'accent, en particulier, sur les besoins de logement qui sont immenses.

Le Représentant du Canada estime qu'il faut tirer les leçons du passé et rassembler tous ces exercices (conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne, Table Ronde du PNUD, etc...). On se trouve face à un cercle vicieux (egg and chicken). L'argent est là, la Banque mondiale est prête à débloquer 200 millions de dollars immédiatement à condition que les arriérés du Rwanda soient réglés. Ce dont la communauté internationale a besoin c'est d'un véhicule commun: le Fonds d'affectation spéciale qui existe déjà à l'ONU. La Représentante des Pays-Bas, se référant à la récente visite de son Ministre Pronk à Kigali, confirme qu'effectivement ce Fonds existe qui pourrait servir à couvrir les dépenses courantes du Gouvernement. Le Japon, quant à lui, limitera son aide à l'assistance d'urgence et humanitaire. Il a des doutes quant à l'aide bilatérale: il s'agit d'un gouvernement de minorité dont la stabilité est loin d'être confirmée; comment ce gouvernement traite les réfugiés de retour au pays? enfin, il s'agit d'un gouvernement qui a déposé par la force (?) le régime précédent.

56. M. Hansen confirme que le Fonds d'affectation spéciale a été créé en juin 1994 et n'a reçu, jusqu'à présent, que de modestes sommes (à peu près 200.000 dollars). Grâce à la récente contribution de 5 millions de dollars des Pays-Bas, il va maintenant pouvoir devenir opérationnel. Sur le terrain, l'aide sera gérée par le PNUD mais sur les conseils du Représentant spécial. Le groupe des pays qui aident le gouvernement rwandais doivent encore trouver 500.000 dollars pour parvenir à régler les arriérés de la Banque mondiale. 200 millions de dollars pourront alors être débloqués dont 40 serviront à couvrir les dépenses immédiates.

- 13 -

57. Le Représentant de la Suède, qui doit malheureusement se rendre à l'aéroport pour prendre son avion de retour, promet d'essayer de convaincre l'électorat de son pays de la nécessité de transférer l'aide aux réfugiés au gouvernement. "A situation exceptionnelle, mesures exceptionnelles", conclut le Représentant de la Belgique qui résume les priorités: aide permettant au gouvernement de fonctionner; retour des réfugiés pour relancer l'agriculture.

58. A ce stade, le président de la réunion, M. Wirth, se rend compte qu'il ne sera pas possible, par manque de temps, d'en finir avec l'ordre du jour. Il propose que le Groupe se réunisse à nouveau pour le compléter. Mais où ? Genève ou New York ? En attendant la prochaine réunion, il fera parvenir à tous les participants un résumé de la session. M. Moose suggère que la prochaine réunion ait lieu à New York la semaine suivante. M. Wirth indique que l'Ambassadeur Spiegel à Genève aura des discussions similaires avec ses homologues. M. Hansen fait remarquer qu'il existe déjà à New York un "High Liaison Group" (HLG), présidé par la Suède et il faut peut-être éviter d'en créer un autre. La Représentante de la Suède ayant précisé que le HLG se penchait surtout sur les questions qui occupent la Deuxième Commission (aide d'urgence mais pas sous un angle politique), il est décidé que le Groupe se réunira donc une autre fois.

59. Répondant à la suggestion de M. Moose, M. Wirth annonce qu'une réunion des représentants permanents des pays en question aura peut-être lieu à New York la semaine suivante. Y a-t-il des volontaires pour assumer la présidence ? Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à passer le flambeau. Devant l'absence totale de réaction, M. Wirth annonce que c'est son pays qui prendra l'initiative de réunir à nouveau le Groupe. M. Hansen fait valoir que d'ici là le HCR et le PAM auront eu le temps de voir comment un nouveau système de distribution d'aide alimentaire dans les camps pourrait être mis en œuvre. La Représentante de la France prend la parole pour dire qu'elle préférerait que le Groupe se réunisse à New York plutôt qu'à Genève.

60. M. Wirth conclut que la prochaine réunion du Groupe aura lieu en janvier.

61. Non sans perversance, le Représentant de la Belgique, apparemment déçu que la question du Burundi ne puisse être débattue à Washington, tient à souligner que Bujumbura a besoin, plus que jamais, de l'aide de la communauté internationale.

62. M. Wirth ayant promis de reprendre la discussion là où elle a été interrompue, déclare que la session est close.

F B P
Florence Barrillon-Pomés, DPA
Le 28 novembre 1994

Burundi: A Geographic Profile of A Potential Crisis Area

Key Findings

Information available as of 20 October 1994 was used in this report.

Burundi, with an ethnic composition and a history of turmoil similar to that of Rwanda, is showing signs of renewed ethnic tension and may experience a fresh wave of unrest and large-scale population movements. If this occurs, it would add to the already large population of refugees and displaced persons.

- o Since independence in 1962, Burundi has been periodically plagued by ethnic tensions between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis; some 200,000 Burundians have been killed, and thousands have fled the country.
- o Some 1 million displaced Burundians and Rwandan refugees are now receiving humanitarian assistance within Burundi.
- o Civil strife and drought in the past year have reduced Burundi's food production by at least 25 percent; this will necessitate 180,000 metric tons of food aid through the end of 1994. Additional population movements would increase dependency on food aid and disrupt the agricultural sector, as would a resumption of ethnic violence.

Although Burundi has a well-developed transportation network by African standards, it is already under heavy use by humanitarian relief efforts in the region.

- o Logistic problems and the coming rainy season will challenge relief efforts. In addition, Burundi's communications network could be disrupted by a major outbreak of violence.

In the long term, Burundi faces numerous problems that will require international assistance if the economy is to keep pace with population growth.

- o Agricultural productivity is leveling off; yields will have to increase if output is to keep up with population growth. Increasing demands for firewood--the country's most important source of fuel--could further deplete Burundi's remaining forests.

Introduction

Like Rwanda, Burundi continues to be troubled by ethnic tensions between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. Indeed, since 1962, major outbreaks of interethnic violence have occurred six times. The most recent of these took place in October 1993 and precipitated large-scale population dislocations that necessitated a response from international humanitarian assistance organizations.

Recent tension may erupt into a new wave of violence. This would derail relief efforts in the area, produce new refugees and displaced persons, and disrupt Burundi's agricultural economy, because most of the displaced would probably be farmers. Burundi--typically self sufficient in food--would become increasingly dependent on international aid. Because Bujumbura already serves as the hub for relief efforts in the area, a major increase in the number of people in need might overload the transportation system.

Population Characteristics

Burundi had a population of some 6.1 million people as of mid-1994, according to the US Census Bureau's International Programs Center. The population is increasing at a rate of 2.3 percent per year, and the high fertility rate--women of childbearing age average nearly seven children each--will sustain growth for some time. Population density is 245 people per square kilometer (km); indeed, because of the violence and flight from Rwanda, Burundi has displaced its northern neighbor as Africa's most densely populated country. Some 95 percent of the population lives in rural areas, according to a recent United Nations Human Development Report. Bujumbura--the capital--holds 75 percent of the urban population, according to the World Bank. The other major urban areas are Gitega, Rumonge, and Ngozi.

Ethnic Rivalry

Burundi--like Rwanda--has long been plagued by ethnic tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Hutus compose 85 percent of the population, Tutsis make up 14 percent, and the remaining 1 percent are Twas--possibly the last survivors of the aboriginal pygmies, according to an academic source. The Hutus are primarily farmers whose ancestors migrated into Burundi 800 to 1,000 years ago. The Tutsis are pastoral people who apparently migrated from Ethiopia several hundred years after the Hutus. According to an academic study, most of the wealth was in the hands of the Tutsis, and for several centuries they, much like feudal lords, granted the use of cattle and land to Hutu cultivators in exchange for services and goods. Beginning in

1897, German and then Belgian colonial practices continued to keep the Hutus in a feudal state.

Ethnic conflict has occurred frequently since independence in 1962. In 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1991, ethnic conflict led to the killing of an estimated 200,000 Burundians and the flight of thousands to neighboring countries. More recently, the October 1993 coup attempt by elements of the Tutsi-dominated military led to the deaths of Burundi's first Hutu President and more than 50,000 Hutus and Tutsis; created over 600,000 refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire; and internally displaced about 1 million Burundians.

Despite ethnic differences between the Hutus and Tutsis, some similarities exist. The majority of both groups speaks the two official languages--Kirundi and French. Both are also predominantly Christian; 62 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, and 5 percent is Protestant. Most of the remaining one-third practice traditional African beliefs, although a small number are Muslim.

The Population in Need

Within the country, some 700,000 to 1 million drought-affected and displaced Burundians are currently in need of assistance. An estimated 571,000 displaced persons are in camps, and dispersed in the countryside, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Larger concentrations are in Muyinga, Ngozi, and Kirundo, which are also where Rwandan refugees are located. As of early September, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 450,000 Burundians who fled during the October 1993 coup attempt have returned; these are probably in greatest need, because they have no land to farm or secure place to live. Meanwhile, some 40,000 Burundian refugees remain in Tanzania, 135,000 are in Zaire, and 6,000 are in Rwanda.

In addition to the displaced Burundians, some 200,000 Rwandan refugees are currently in Burundi, according to UNHCR. At the beginning of the Rwandan crisis in April, some 80,000 Tutsis fled from Rwanda to Burundi; most of these have returned, according to press reports. The remaining Rwandans are mostly Hutus who fled in mid-July when the Rwandan Patriotic Front captured Kigali and the southern town of Butare. Except for some 10,000 spread out along the northern border, all are in camps.

Humanitarian Relief Efforts

Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are working in Burundi to assist the large refugee and displaced populations. UNHCR, the lead coordinator for refugees, works with several NGOs to provide comprehensive humanitarian aid. The World Food Program (WFP) plans resources and logistics support, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is in charge of camp management and food distribution. In addition, Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) organizations from Belgium and France are responsible for providing health and sanitation services, and Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) is providing transport and distribution of food and other goods. The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), International Action Against Hunger (AICF), and the Burundi Red Cross Society, among others, are also providing assistance.

For the displaced Burundians, the situation is different. There is no coordinating agency responsible for overall camp management. In addition, while the WFP distributes food with the help of Catholic Organizations for Charitable and Social Action (CARITAS), there is relatively little aid available to the displaced populations, according to USAID. Some nonfood aid is provided by other NGOs.

Violence continues to interrupt relief deliveries to the displaced persons and refugees. Incidents in mid-August caused UNHCR relief workers in Kirundo Province to temporarily leave the area after one of their workers was fatally shot. According to press, UNHCR feels its job is becoming more difficult in the northern provinces; its biggest fear is that Rwandan refugee camps will get caught up in the spiraling unrest. In August, a WFP official voiced a concern that continued violence in Bujumbura might halt food convoys to southwestern Rwanda and disrupt aid into Zaire.

Both nonrefugee and refugee populations are in poor health because of inadequate sanitation, a lack of potable drinking water, and disease. Some 70 percent of the rural population lacks adequate sewage treatment, according to the World Bank, and even in Bujumbura, only 11 percent of the people have access to sewer systems. In addition, about 45 percent of Burundi's population lacks access to safe drinking water, according to the UN. As a result, waterborne diseases account for more than 70 percent of all endemic diseases, according to the World Bank. Annually, tuberculosis affects 367 people per 100,000--or 67 percent more than in other Sub-Saharan African countries, according to the UN Human Development Report. There are 27 AIDS cases per 100,000 Burundians; the World Bank estimates that 15 percent of the urban population carries the HIV virus. Diarrhea, hepatitis, and cholera are also common causes of illness and

death. Furthermore, the infant mortality rate--115 per 1,000 live births--is high. Malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory infections remain the biggest problems within the refugee and displaced persons camps, according to MSF, although deaths rates are comparatively low.

Agriculture and Food

Agriculture is the most important sector in the Burundian economy.¹ Although food production has generally kept up with rapid population growth, allowing Burundi to be one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that is usually self-sufficient in food, production this year will be about 2.9 million metric tons--more than 25 percent below average. Dry weather and ethnic clashes reportedly forced a quarter of the country's small land holders to leave their farms and disrupted the planting of the first season crops. Despite good rainfall and the return of some farmers during the second season, production was still significantly below normal because many farmers remained displaced and there were shortages of seeds and other inputs. Because of favorable weather, the small third season crop harvested in October should be near normal in the limited area where it has been planted. Nevertheless, Burundi will probably need 180,000 metric tons of food aid through the end of the year.

Table 1
Burundi Labor Force, 1991

Economic sector	Total number of people	Percent of work force
Total	1,900,000	
Agriculture	1,767,000	93.0
Government	76,000	4.0
Industry and Commerce	28,500	1.5
Services	28,500	1.5

¹ Agriculture provides about half the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)--one of the largest shares in the world--and employs over 90 percent of the labor force.

Table 2 Thousand metric tons
Burundi Estimated Agriculture Production, 1986-1991

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Bananas	1,436	1,440	1,480	1,608	1,547	1,580
Sweet Potatoes	611	626	619	659	664	680
Cassava	554	579	567	648	569	580
Beans	313	327	320	187	149	170
Maize	164	174	206	138	168	140
Rice (Paddy)	20	28	27	37	40	39

Table 3 Metric tons
Burundi Cash Crop Production

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Coffee	31,260	37,260	35,312	32,451	34,925	34,205
Tea	3,597	4,382	3,721	3,858	4,044	5,325
(dry)						
Cotton	3,116	3,071	2,959	2,869	2,192	2,905
(lint)						

Burundi's climate allows the year-round cultivation of a various food crops. Beans, bananas, and cassava are the principal crops, while sweet potatoes, corn, and sorghum are also grown. According to the United States Department of Agriculture and academic studies, beans and corn are usually planted in October/November and harvested in January/February, closely followed by the planting of sweet potatoes and sorghum, which are harvested in June/July. Various crops are grown during a short third season between July and October. Bananas and cassava are grown throughout the year and provide some measure of food security during droughts--which led to their increased cultivation following several dry spells in the 1980s, according to the World Bank. The popularity and marketability of bananas stem from their widespread use in making banana beer.

The agricultural sector is dominated by small land holders who cultivate food crops mostly for their own consumption. About 40 percent of the land area is cultivable, and virtually all of this--including many steep hillsides--is cropped. Most farming is by traditional low-yield methods using primitive tools--sticks, hoes, and machetes. Women do most of the farming, while men tend the livestock.² In the agricultural heartland of

² Although important as symbols of wealth and prestige, livestock are not a major source of food or income. Nevertheless, some 70 percent of the nation's livestock was killed during the October 1993 coup attempt, according to press.

central and western Burundi, erosion and loss of soil fertility have become the biggest threat to agricultural productivity. The Belgians implemented programs to build contour ridges and terracing to control torrential runoff, but since independence much of this work has fallen into disrepair. Chemical fertilizers are used infrequently because most farmers cannot afford them. Manure is not commonly used either, because herds are usually grazed away from fields and manure is not collected.

Climate and Terrain

Burundi occupies some 27,800 square kilometers (km) on the Great East African Plateau and is roughly the size of Maryland. Its wet season usually begins in late September and lasts until May. Thunderstorms occur on average six to 10 days per month and account for most of the rainfall; the heaviest rains, during March and April, occur 20 days a month. The dry season lasts from June to September.

The country has three natural geographic zones:

- o The Imbo plain. Tropical and 800 meters above sea level, this plain stretches along the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika and north to the Ruzizi River valley along the Great Rift Valley. Temperatures average 21° to 23°C, and annual rainfall measures 750 to 1,000 millimeters (mm).
- o The Great Rift Valley mountains. Rising steeply to form the divide between the Congo and Nile Rivers, these mountains extend from south to north and generally average less than 6 km in width. The ridges range from 1,500 to 2,400 meters, with peaks not exceeding 2,600 meters. Temperatures average around 16°, and rainfall ranges from 1,300 to 1,500 mm in the upper elevations and almost 1,800 mm in the north near the Rwanda border.
- o The central and eastern plateaus. The plateaus, where almost half of the population lives, range from 1,500 to 2,000 meters above sea level. Average temperatures range from 18° to 19° and rainfall from 1,000 to 1,400 mm. The plateaus slant toward the eastern border where hotter and drier savanna conditions prevail; temperatures here average 20° to 23°, and rainfall totals from 750 to slightly over 1,000 mm.

Fish are an important component of the Burundian diet, with about 95 percent coming from Lake Tanganyika. Production

decreased through the late 1980s--due partly to cheap imports from Tanzania--but has picked up in recent years. Most of the catch is sold fresh daily in the central market in Bujumbura, and the rest is dried and marketed throughout the country. Lakes in the north, which are being stocked with fry, should become more important producers in the future.

Cash crops--mostly coffee and some tea, cotton, and tobacco--account for most exports. If renewed turmoil resulted in major disruptions in the agricultural sector, foreign exchange earnings would be greatly reduced--as has occurred in Rwanda. Cash crops are grown on both state-run plantations and about half of the small farms in Burundi. The government, with donor assistance, has invested heavily in the development of the coffee industry over the last two decades, placing particular emphasis on increasing productivity and quality. As a result, output has increased by over 25 percent since 1979, and virtually all the coffee grown now is high-quality arabica, which commands a 10-to-15-percent premium on the world market. Coffee exports account for over 80 percent of Burundi's foreign exchange earnings.

Even if the current crisis subsides, Burundi's agricultural sector faces several obstacles to keep pace with population growth. Because there is little idle cultivable land, future production increases will have to come from improved yields, according to agricultural experts. This will require better erosion control, use of fertilizers, improved cropping techniques, and controlled grazing of livestock. In addition, the government will need to develop a food marketing system and improve agricultural extension services to smallholders.

Industry and Mineral Production

Burundi's industry is largely oriented toward production of goods for local consumption. Located primarily in Bujumbura, industry contributed only 20 percent of the GDP in 1992, according to the US Embassy. Agricultural processing--including beer and soft drink production and sugar mills--dominates the sector; cotton cloth, cigarettes, and other consumer goods are also produced. A coffee-processing industry prepares coffee for export. Most industrial facilities are operating well below capacity, according to an academic study. High transportation costs, a small domestic market, fluctuating world prices, and a lack of educated personnel constrain Burundi's industrial growth potential.

The mining industry, although small, could become an important contributor to the national economy. Production is currently limited to small amounts of tin and gold as well as a few locally important industrial minerals. Nevertheless, large deposits of nickel with associated copper, cobalt, and platinum-

group metals--located in a belt running from northeast to south--present promising possibilities for development.

Special attention is being given to the expansion of gold production--which currently is all small-scale operations--and development of a phosphate deposit. A recent gold mining study was sufficiently encouraging to spur the government to commission a detailed study of an area in the northeast. Drill testing for development of a phosphate fertilizer facility at the Matongo deposit has reportedly been completed, and the project is awaiting funding.

Transportation Infrastructure

Bujumbura is the hub for humanitarian relief efforts for needy Burundians and Rwandans in the country as well as in southwestern Rwanda and parts of eastern Zaire.

About one-fifth of the country's approximately 6,000 kilometers of road have bituminous surfaces. Main routes radiate from Bujumbura west to Zaire, north to Rwanda, and east to Tanzania. A modern two-lane highway links the north and south, while a network of dense--albeit undeveloped--roads reaches all areas of the country. These rural roads probably will be the weakest link in aid distribution should a widespread humanitarian crisis occur; this is especially the case in the rainiest months of March and April, when many roads are impassable.

Most bridges are short, one-lane structures, with the exception of some newer reinforced concrete single-span bridges. Rural roads have numerous fords; the few bridges on these routes usually have low capacities. The highway system has one known ferry crossing and no known tunnels.

Burundi has only three usable airfields: Bujumbura International, Gitega, and Kirundo; only Bujumbura has a hard-surfaced runway. Bujumbura's runway exceeds 3,000 meters and is capable of handling large transport aircraft. In addition, Bujumbura is the only field designated as an airport of entry. The two other airfields have virtually no support facilities.

The port at Bujumbura--the country's only developed port on Lake Tanganyika--is the center of the area's relief efforts. Aid commodities are routed by rail across Tanzania from the port at Dar es Salaam to Kigoma, and then barged up Lake Tanganyika to the port. Limited off-loading and storage capabilities hinder stockpiling, and the lack of transport vehicles--especially during the harvest seasons--and fuel hampers delivery and cross-border assistance, according to USAID. In early September, manpower and fuel shortages caused a 10,000-metric ton backlog of food in Kigoma and less than a one-week supply of food in Bujumbura.

Telecommunications

Burundi's telecommunication network primarily serves the urban areas and has some 8,000 telephone lines--1 line per 750 residents. Almost 90 percent of telephone subscribers are in Bujumbura. While direct dial service is available to many countries, only two lines are available for calling the United States, according to a USAID study. Should violence break out, the network would likely be disrupted, as occurred in Rwanda.

The country's radio and TV system broadcast only from the capital. Burundi National Radio broadcasts two programs out of Bujumbura on several frequencies in English, Kirundi, and Kishwahili. Burundi National Television broadcasts the national news in Kirundi and French, reaching some 75 percent of Burundi territory. In 1993, Burundians owned 50,000 radios and 4,500 televisions, according to an academic source.


Fuel and Energy

Some 90 percent of the subsistence sector and 80 percent of all households rely on wood and charcoal for energy. Refugee and displaced populations are also dependent on firewood for fuel. This situation could hasten Burundi's already rapid deforestation. Forests have dwindled to only 7 percent of the land area--about 220,000 hectares--according to academic reports. About three-quarters of the forest is in plantations, and the rest is protected natural forests.


Hydropower is the main source of electricity; Burundi has no known petroleum or natural gas reserves. In 1991, over 90 percent of the electricity was produced by hydroelectric plants at Mugere and Rwegura. The Ruzizi plant--jointly owned by Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire--13 smaller hydroplants, and diesel-powered plants provide the remainder. The country has 55 megawatts of generating capacity. The largest transmission lines--extending south from Ruzizi and Rwegura towards Bujumbura--are 70 to 110 kilovolt (kv) lines, the remainder of the network is mostly 30 kv lines.³ The state electricity company, Regideso, now supplies electricity to all major towns. By 1992, electricity consumption was 142 million kilowatt hours, according to an academic study. Nevertheless, fewer than 5 percent of Burundi's population has access to electricity.

³ For purposes of comparison, 132 kv lines are common in the United States, serving smaller towns throughout the Midwest and South; 456 kv lines are among the largest in the United States.

Refugees and Displaced Persons, Mid-October 1994



Major Agricultural Areas



Belgian views on the refugee problem in Central Africa

Because of the succession of dramatic events which have been hitting Burundi and Rwanda for more than a year, Central Africa is now facing the worst refugee problem in the whole of Africa. The refugee and displaced persons problem in Rwanda, Burundi and the neighbouring states is one of the main factors of political instability in Central Africa.

Armed gangs are hampering aid work in refugee camps and preventing the return of refugees. According to observers, the many refugee camps are hotbeds of all kinds of extremist tendencies. Inside and around the camps, as well as in Rwanda and Burundi, military and para-military units are being reconstituted, and large numbers of weapons are circulating freely throughout the region.

Refugees seem to find the signals coming from Kigali too weak to restore their confidence and encourage their return.

Many observers, working for the UN as well as for aid organizations, are warning that signs indicate a new explosion of violence is only a matter of months: renewed fighting in Rwanda would now inevitably spill over into Burundi and would precipitate the Central African countries into a new tragedy.

They urge the international community to join forces with the governments concerned so as to act preventively while there is still time and to strike at the very roots of the refugee problem.

Belgium is of the opinion that the many international and local initiatives should be combined with a view to a rapid international effort of preventive diplomacy in Central Africa.

Belgium wishes to offer the following suggestions as a contribution to current discussions. These suggestions are meant to support the initiatives already taken, including those taken by the governments concerned as well as the OAU. Belgium hopes its ideas might contribute to efforts aimed at convening a Regional Conference on refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible.

Belgium is particularly thankful for the American initiative aimed at creating an Operational Support Group and for inviting a number of countries to Washington on November 22 1994 to this end. The following suggestions represent the Belgian contribution to this meeting.

The Belgian views on the matter can be described as follows:

- the refugee problem is one of the main sources of regional instability in Central Africa, which has to be tackled in an integrated and comprehensive manner;
- a simultaneous, yet gradual and case-specific approach is required according to the different locations in the countries concerned;
- finding a solution will only be possible if the Rwandan authorities give political signals strong enough to convince the refugees they are committed to pursue a policy of national reconciliation - with the assistance of the international community - a.o. by enforcing significant measures in the field of personal security and internal judicature;
- a rapid and coordinated international approach is necessary to prevent any further deterioration of the situation and, by doing so, secure economies of scale.

Belgium believes that the following steps can be considered:

1. The return of the refugees.

The starting point of the Belgian government is that, as far as possible, all refugees must be able to return to their countries of origin and that all displaced persons must be resettled in their own country.

The main refugee camps are situated in Zaire (Goma, Bukavu, Uvira), Tanzania and Burundi. The return from these locations appears to be easiest to organize from Burundi and hardest to organize from Goma. Hence, we suggest concentrating the first safe return operations on refugees in Burundi, because of the parallels between Rwanda and Burundi and the ensuing risks of destabilization. Simultaneously, parallel actions need to be undertaken in other locations and countries in order to stabilize the situation and put an end to intimidations which contribute to prevent the return of refugees who wish to do so.

In Burundi, the organization of the return can proceed through the creation of small scale, temporary refugee accomodation centres on Rwandan territory. This requires a.o.:

- means of transportation;
- building small scale accomodation centres on Rwandan territory;
- a "chain of return" providing for the reintegration of returning refugees into the local life of their original communities.

In Tanzania, on the one hand, resettlement programmes for Rwandan refugees can be implemented in agreement with the Tanzanian authorities. On the other hand, the Tanzanian capability to enforce order in the camps should be increased.

Finally, in Zaire, it will probably be necessary to separate the former Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) from the Interahamwe and the rest of the refugees, while charging UNAMIR with maintaining order within the camps by means of a limited and selective extension of its mandate.

A negotiated separation of the former RAF (Rwandan armed forces) from the rest of the refugee population in the four camps in Zaire may necessitate either their reintegration into the Rwandan army (cf. the fusion of the armies as foreseen in Arusha), or their demobilization (cf. World Bank demobilization project in Uganda).

Supervising the security of aid workers in the camps in Zaire would require a (limited) extension of the UNAMIR-mandate. Moreover, it may be useful to examine, together with the Rwandan and Zairian authorities as well as the UNHCR, whether, in the light of the future position of the former RAF, some units might not play a role in maintaining order within these camps.

2. National reconciliation and re-establishing the rule of law in Rwanda.

Ultimately however, only the Government of Rwanda can create the conditions needed to restore the confidence of refugees sufficiently for them to return. In the recent past, the Government of Rwanda has repeatedly declared its intention to abide to a policy of national reconciliation, as would appear from the mass-meetings in Rwanda itself as well as the ministerial visits to the refugee camps in Burundi.

Belgium believes that the Government of Rwanda must give a sufficiently strong political signal that it intends to enter into a structured dialogue with the diaspora and will spare no effort to pursue national reconciliation within Rwanda. In the short term, this should lead to an improvement of personal security and the rule of law, including property rights.

Belgium would consider a dialogue with the former RAF and the Gendarmerie to be a significant first step towards this goal. This dialogue could cover several topics, such as the integration of the former RAF into the RPA and their contribution to maintaining order within the camps.

But Belgium is also of the opinion that it is the responsibility of the international community to assist the Government of Rwanda in creating the circumstances needed for a policy of national reconciliation to be respected.

The international community can contribute to this in different ways:

Enforcing order and the functioning of the armed forces

Having the army maintaining internal order can only be a emergency solution. An international programme, comparable to the World Bank demobilization programme in Uganda, combined with the creation of a new police force, may put us on the road to a solution.

International Tribunal

Putting the International Tribunal for Rwanda into action speedily may contribute to re-establishing confidence in Rwandan justice.

National judicature

Belgium believes that the international community must collaborate to the reconstruction of the Ministry of Justice in Rwanda. The lack of Rwandan judges and the number of cases awaiting judgement may make it necessary for foreign judges (Africans in the first place) to assist Rwandan justice temporarily. This would best be implemented within the framework of a programme set up by the OAU.

Economic recovery programme.

3. Burundi.

As long as the refugee problem is not solved, Burundi's political stability will remain under threat and continue to require the support of the international community.

This may be achieved through different initiatives, such as support for the National Debate (if this is the wish of the Government of Burundi), increased attention for the displaced persons in Burundi itself and continued support for the moderate forces in Burundi.

4. Coordination.

In order to implement such a comprehensive safe-return programme, international and local efforts will require a great deal of coordination.

Belgium supports the proposition to convene a Regional Conference on refugees and displaced persons, as advanced by the Government of Burundi and backed by the OAU Summit Meeting in Tunis (April 1994). Belgium believes this conference needs to begin as soon as possible and is of the opinion that, to be successful, such a conference will first have to tackle the concrete issues which make up the refugee problem, such as:

How to guarantee security and order within the camps ?

Which are the duties of the host-countries ?

Which are the duties of the countries of origin ?

How can safe-return plans best be put into practice?

The most appropriate formula would appear to be a technical conference with ministerial presence.

Moreover, and for several reasons, Belgium is of the opinion that such a conference would have to be held in Bujumbura, under the joint presidency of the Burundian initiators, the OAU and the UNHCR.

Belgium suggests that this conference should then be followed by an International Conference on "peace, stability and development", in order to examine durable mechanisms for stability in the region. Here, too, the OAU will play a central role, together with the UN.

In order to ensure the local coordination of such a comprehensive approach of the refugee problem, the capabilities of the Special Envoys of the Secretary General of the UN in Kigali and in Burundi might have to be reinforced.

Brussels, November 18, 1994

3 FEB, 1995

IASC-WG

NATIONS UNIES



UNITED NATIONS

DEPARTEMENT
DES AFFAIRES HUMANITAIRES

DHA-GENEVA

DEPARTMENT
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

FACSIMILE

A - TO: IASC Working Group
Members
(See attached list)

Ab: IASC
4/2/95

cc: Heads of Agencies
4/2/95

Palais des Nations
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Officer-in-Charge
Inter-Agency Standing Unit
DHA-Geneva

Telephone: + 4122 788 7019 / 788 1401

Facsimile: + 4122 788-6389 / 788-6394

Date: 2 February 1995

OBJET - SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL MODALITIES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, &
DRAFT CONCLUSIONS AND ACTION POINTS FROM THE IASC-WG MEETING
ON 27 JANUARY IN NEW YORK

Ref.: DHA-GENEVA FX - 95/0168

Account:

File(s): 231/1 IASCONC

Total No. of pages:

At the IASC Working Group XVIITH meeting of 27 January 1995 in New York, it was agreed that USG Peter Hansen's letter of 23 January 1995 to the UN Representative in Moscow on "Operational Modalities for Humanitarian Assistance" would be circulated to all IASC members. A copy of this document is attached for your information.

Also please find the *Draft Conclusions and Action Points* from the above meeting. Your comments, if any, would be appreciated by COB (CET), Tuesday 7 February.

Best regards .

95/004

JAN-24-1995 10:44 FROM UN-DHA-NY

TO: 921141227886387 P.01

24 JAN 95 15 46

DEPT 310 (RUS) 24

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
New York, N.Y. 10017

FACSIMILE

FILE COPY

To: Mr. Juan Amunategui
UNHCR/UN Representative, Moscow
Fax: 7 095 973 1960

From: Peter Hansen
Under-Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 23 January 1995

Subject: Operational Modalities for Humanitarian Assistance

Pages: 3

Further to my fax to you, dated 19 January 1995, I have been able to meet informally with several Agencies (UNHCR, WFP, WHO, including ICRC) concerning the crisis in Chechnya. We have also had discussions with UNICEF. We have discussed concerns over the progress of the UNHCR/UN mission and issues related to delivery of humanitarian assistance. We concluded that the UN organisations must establish a common position regarding the conditions under which humanitarian assistance can be delivered. In this regard, I have asked the Agencies to comment on the letter sent to myself from the Permanent Representative of the Federation of the Republic of Russia. We have attempted to consolidate the views of the agencies and of DHA into a set of guidelines that should be the basis of continuing discussions on this matter, which I have set out below.

1. The basic principles for delivery of humanitarian assistance must be insisted upon:

- a) fair and equitable distribution of assistance to all those in need, especially the vulnerable groups including children,
- (b) unimpeded access to the target population, and
- (c) involvement in the distribution of relief items and to directly monitor distributions.

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2. Cooperation between UN and Russian Government

The United Nations is prepared to collaborate closely with the Russian Government, in particular with EMERCOM, on the operational issues with regard to the shipment, delivery and distribution of relief supplies and other assistance. The United Nations understands, in particular, the need for notification and specification requirements of the Government with regard to shipments, identification requirements to issue visas, as well as the need to provide information allowing to identify the supplies, the vehicles transporting them, routes to be used and the members of the accompanying teams.

In order to carry out humanitarian work, the United Nations will expect that assurances will be given by the Russian authorities for the protection and security of UN Staff.

3. Operational requirements of the United Nations

Transparency on the above items will be duly observed. However, the United Nations operations also has to comply with the requirement of accountability vis-à-vis the donor community, which is observed in any situation involving emergency funding. This implies the following operational modalities:

a. Needs assessments: the United Nations should be able to assess the humanitarian situation by having access to the sites and the individuals which will allow its representatives to assess the humanitarian needs, estimate the number of beneficiaries, determine their location(s), identify the supplies and other assistance needed and evaluate the logistics and field presence required for the delivery and monitoring of humanitarian assistance. This is a pre-requisite for shaping an effective and credible programme. Without the ability to provide such information, the possibility for donors to authorize the release of emergency funding would be severely jeopardized.

b. The United Nations must ensure that its field presence is adequate in view of the requirements for assessing, delivering, monitoring and coordinating humanitarian assistance. As mentioned above, the United Nations will ensure full transparency with regard to this presence, and the need for close collaboration with the Russian Government and EMERCOM in particular will be fully observed. The United Nations will also expect that the fielding of personnel for the time and to the locations required, including the establishment of temporary UN field structures, will be facilitated by the Government. This also implies facilitation in the following:

- UN personnel movements to and within affected areas;
- Expediting visas for UN personnel involved in the emergency relief operation;
- Permission to use radio equipment and video taping;
- Waiver of landing fees for airlifts.

c. There is also a need to streamline the customs procedures and quality certification in order to ensure the speed and efficiency in

the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

d. In addition to monitoring punctual relief efforts, the United Nations should have the ability of gaining an overall picture on the relief operations of which the United Nations' efforts are an integral part. Access to locations identified for this purpose by the United Nations is an essential condition for meaningfully assessing the overall needs as well as the impact of its assistance.

e. The United Nations should be able to determine how UN inputs can be the most effective as part of the global humanitarian effort and to identify gaps in assistance. The United Nations will, therefore, seek to establish collaborative modalities with the federal and local levels as part of the framework of a genuine partnership between United Nations and the Russian Government. It will also expect to be provided the opportunity to support local systems which have borne the brunt of the IDP influxes and other requirements.

f. Also essential for the effectiveness of emergency assistance is coordination among the United Nations Agencies and between the UN and other international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Non-Governmental Organisations and other international and local partners who are or might be involved in the humanitarian effort. The United Nations will decide which type of representation is required for coordination and Government liaison purposes, and determine the roles at field level.

g. In order to make the above modalities possible and the procedures as smooth as the situation requires, the United Nations should be able to access Government entities and representatives incapacitated to address these various requirements. The United Nations will also expect to receive all the latest information relevant to its operations.

cc: Mr. J. Horekens, UNHCR
Mr. H. Narula, UNICEF
Mr. B. Szynalski, WFP
Mr. C.H. LaMunière, WHO

3/3

TOTAL P.03

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE
WORKING GROUP, XVIITH MEETING
27 January 1995, New York

DRAFT
AGREED CONCLUSIONS AND ACTION POINTS

1. OPENING CONCLUSION

It was agreed that in view of the several high level international conferences and the, events surrounding the celebrations for the 50th Anniversary of the UN, e.g. World Summit on Social Development, Fourth World Conference on Women, occurring in 1995, the IASC Working Group should identify major relevant humanitarian issues for the attention of the IASC, so that the Executive Heads in turn could actively advocate them at the highest governmental level.

2. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Chechnya

Coordination

The Working Group expressed its full support, in his role as Humanitarian Coordinator, to the UN Representative in Moscow, (who is also the UNHCR Representative), for the Russian Federation which covers Chechnya and the neighbouring region.

It was agreed that DHA would assume direct coordination of humanitarian activities by providing an experienced Senior Officer to work under the auspices of the UN Representative in Moscow and that operational issues would be dealt with at the field level.

It was further agreed that at the field level, UNHCR will be focal point for operational support of humanitarian activities and common support services, such as the establishment of joint communication facilities.

The Working Group took note of the recommendation by the NGOs of the assignment of a NGO focal point for the Chechnya crisis following the Rwanda model and, agreed that the recommendation be referred to the UN Representative in Moscow.

Appeal

It was agreed that a UN Joint Flash Appeal covering three months would be issued during the week 30 January to 3 February, to be finalized and launched by DHA at a meeting with donors in Geneva and New York.

It was further agreed that this appeal will be based on information already gathered, and that a full consolidated appeal would be issued at a later date.

Other Issues

The Working Group was informed that the Central Emergency Revolving Fund was available to help fund initial emergency requirements in Chechnya and the affected region.

Finally, it was agreed that USG Peter Hansen's letter to the UN Representative in Moscow of 23 January 1995 on "Operational Modalities for Humanitarian Assistance" should be circulated to all IASC members.

ii. Rwanda*Appeal*

The Working Group took note of the concern raised by UNHCR regarding the overlap between the Round Table and Consolidated Appeals. A letter to this effect had also been received by the Secretary-General from members of the donor community. It was agreed that the overlap had arisen from a lack of clarity between the distinct purposes and assumptions of the respective appeal processes.

Accordingly, it was agreed that specific guidelines would be developed by DHA, in consultation with UNDP, to be used in future situations where both such processes take place simultaneously.

It was noted that a unit had been established in Kigali which would be operational as of 29 January 1995. This unit would compile data available at the field level on contributions to both Round Table and appeal programmes. The DHA financial tracking function in Geneva will assist the unit by providing reports on response to the UN appeal.

Coordination

The Working Group welcomed the proposal to assign a civilian deputy to the SRSG. There were, however, differences of opinion with regard to the emphasis of the work of the deputy. Some members considered that

current efforts should concentrate on relief and immediate rehabilitation activities, including the work of NGOs. Others felt that the focus should be on longer term rehabilitation and development.

It was decided that the respective views should be submitted to the Secretary-General's Task Force and that the profile of the civilian deputy would depend on the position of the Task Force on this issue. The Working Group recommended that the Task Force should take a quick decision on the appointment.

Other Issues

The Working Group encouraged the NGO community to play a stronger advocacy role towards their respective governments on the issue of security in the camps, with a view to promoting the allocation of troops and other resources to address this problem.

The Working Group took note of the information provided by UNHCR that the Bujumbura Conference would take place from 15-17 February 1995, but there had been no decision as yet on the conference on regional political issues.

iii. Somalia

Taking into account the strong desire of Humanitarian Agencies to continue operations, the Working Group decided to request from the Humanitarian Coordinator a clear proposal for a common framework, including costing, for ensuring operational support, especially Security, Communications and Transport, for humanitarian activities in Somalia.

iv. Afghanistan

The Working Group noted the current problems in obtaining the funding necessary for the relief activities in Afghanistan. It was clear that like Afghanistan many other situations fell into the category of "forgotten emergencies". It was agreed that the issue of resource mobilization for these emergencies should be placed on the IASC's agenda.

v. Liberia

The working group noted the need to ensure effective humanitarian coordination for the countries affected by the Liberia emergency.

It further emphasized the need to conclusively resolve the issue of whether a national or regional approach to humanitarian coordination would be most effective. Accordingly, it was decided that, undertaking an analysis

of options and following consultations with the office of the Secretary-General and the SRSG, this issue should be placed on the agenda of the IASC.

Pending the outcome of this decision, the group noted its support for the efforts of UNDP to strengthen its in-country capacity for humanitarian coordination.

3. BUDDING EMERGENCIES

i. Sierra Leone

The Working Group noted with concern the deteriorating situation in Sierra Leone.

It was agreed that DHA would maintain close contact with DPA to obtain a political assessment of the situation, and together with UNDP, closely monitor the situation on the ground and present an updated assessment by the next meeting of the IASC or its Working Group.

ii. Southern Africa (drought)

Recognizing the important role of SADC, the Working Group encouraged DHA to maintain close contacts with SADC and emphasized the need to translate the outcome of the Malawi meeting into action starting with integrated UN assessments including non-food needs as well as continuing to support monitoring and preparedness at country level.

Some members raised concerns with regard to resource management. Others considered that the problem was principally related to the availability of grain at the global level and the need to ensure that affected countries would be in a position to purchase food stocks.

The Working Group noted that WFP was in the process of developing contingency plans to ensure that the required logistical support would be in place. WFP and FAO would jointly continue to monitor the situation, provide relevant information, and recommend action if required.

4. REVIEW OF THE IASC/IASC-WG WORK PLAN FOR 1995

The IASC-WG strongly recommended that agenda items for the IASC meetings be carefully selected and documents prepared, to justify a meeting of heads of agencies. Concern was raised as to the frequency of meetings scheduled for the year and DHA (IASU) was asked to review the possibility of further reducing the number.

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print:edg@unhcr.org;cc:edg@unhcr.org 27/01/95



UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA
(UNREO)

MEMORANDUM


To: Heads of Agencies	Date:
From: Randolph Kent 	File:
Subject: <u>International Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi: Paper for Bujumbura Conference & Rwanda IDPs Paper</u>	


[1] Enclosed, please find a copy of the DHA paper on *International Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi* that will be presented to the OAU-UNHCR Regional Conference in Bujumbura. According to the covering fax that came with the paper from Geneva:

the paper is in two parts: a brief cover note to sum up the situation...and the last financial figures taken from the last appeal [vol.3], concerning the amount of humanitarian assistance spent in 1994 and the requirements of the UN system.

[2]. I assume that after our meeting at 3:30 pm, 7 February, in the Resident Representative's office, we will have all the final agency comments on the paper regarding IDPs in Rwanda. This means that later Tuesday, we should be able to finalise the paper for distribution by UNHCR for the Bujumbura meeting.

Best regards



P.S. Just received from Geneva, draft LTSC-W/ Minutes - Thinks you may find them as well as letter from US of Itensen to UN Rep in Moscow of interest - Best 

c/o UNEP • Conference West, room 202 • P.O. Box 30552 • Nairobi, Kenya
Tel.: (254-2) 62-2491 • Fax.: (254-2) 62-2084

INFORMATION PAPER

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI

The events that followed a failed coup attempt in Bujumbura on 21 October 1993 and the conflict in Rwanda six months later, caused one of the largest humanitarian crises in the history of the UN. Although the international community's response was extremely quick and generous, the size of human tragedy posed nearly unsurmountable problems.

In Burundi, close to one million people fled their homes in October 1993. Tens of thousands were killed and 670,000 Burundi Nationals left their country and sought asylum: in Rwanda, 375,000; Tanzania, 245,000; and Zaire, 248,000 between 1993 and 1994.

Following the deaths of both Presidents from Rwanda and Burundi, violence was exceptionally horrifying with about 500,000 unarmed men, women, and children murdered in Rwanda.

These events had significant effects on population movements in and out of the country. A massive exodus took place during the conflict. At the end of November 1994, the Rwandan refugee population in the neighbouring Zaire, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania was estimated at 1.9 million persons. Meanwhile, about 600,000 of the one million Rwandese who had been exiled for extended periods, some for as long as 30 years, returned to the country between April and November.

A large part of the population, as many as 1.8 million became displaced inside Rwanda. Together, refugees and IDPs have made up to nearly 50% of Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.75 million people.

In Rwanda shortly after the onset of the disaster, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) was established to ensure a coordinated response to the emergency under the supervision of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda. An Office was also set up in Bujumbura. The high level of cooperation between UN Agencies resulted in the launching of an Inter-Agency Flash Appeal to cover emergency needs through 31 May and then the development of a Contingency Plan for the same period. An International Pledging Conference was held in Geneva in July to mobilize resources under the Consolidated Appeal covering the period July to December 1994. A new regional Consolidated Appeal was launched on 18 of January, for the year 1995, amounting to US\$710,000,000.

The emphasis in the early weeks of the emergency was on shelter, food and nutrition, water, sanitation and health. Through humanitarian assistance, organizations will continue with these activities. However, widely disparate security status in different sections of the country have allowed for rehabilitation activities to commence in parallel with emergency programmes.

The flow of people out of Rwanda and Burundi showed that both access to a location of target populations might change rapidly, requiring a flexible and balanced relief response. Assistance must be provided to persons in need as soon as they can be reached, and it must follow them as they cross and recross as many as four international borders.

The speed and the size of the outflow from Rwanda posed difficult problems to the receiving countries and to the capacity of organizations to provide emergency assistance. Nevertheless, due to the rapid mobilization of humanitarian agencies and quick response from part of the international donor community, substantial assistance was provided.

The experience of large-scale cholera and dysentery epidemics in the camps during this period, which were controlled only after the death of thousands of refugees and at the expense of massive acute interventions, has led UN Agencies and NGOs to consider water supply, sanitation and hygiene education as one of the priority areas for future action, in addition to the continued supply of food and other relief assistance to the refugees. The months to come will also see enhanced efforts to create self-sufficiency among returnees and to bring schooling to the many children who fled Rwanda with their parents and relatives.

In 1995, the return of these children and their families to their country will be the ultimate objective of the humanitarian community. This goal will translate into an increased focus on activities which can prepare them for this return while meeting their immediate needs. In this respect, agencies are actively seeking to reduce the number of unaccompanied children in centres through active tracing, family reunification and prevention of child abandonment as well as support for foster care.

So far, an estimated 600,000 of those refugees who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1993 have returned to their country following the establishment of the new Government. However, the rate of return of the "new caseload" of refugees since April has been slow. Rumours - many of them orchestrated - regarding the poor prospects of resuming normal life in Rwanda have spread among the refugee populations in recent months, especially with regard to land tenure and property difficulties. This, along with the fear of retaliation and concern that the largely destroyed public services in-country will be inadequate to ensure their well-being, has discouraged most families from leaving the camps. Only around 70,500 refugees among the "new caseload" are estimated to have returned to Rwanda from the four neighbouring countries up until the beginning of November.

In Rwanda, the extensive efforts deployed by the humanitarian community and the Government during the latter part of 1994 to restore the most essential public services and the public campaigning of the newly established Government of Rwanda to encourage the return of "new" refugees have failed to affect significantly the rate of refugee return. Moreover, the grip of former political leaders, military and militia on the refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire have created a precarious security situation which continues to prevent the refugees from exercising their right to return and to hamper delivery of assistance.

The resources required to support the humanitarian efforts amounted to nearly US\$590,000,000 for Rwanda of which 91.5% were covered by the end of November.

In Burundi, substantial spontaneous repatriation movements occurred early in 1994, mainly from Tanzania. The start of civil war in Rwanda in April 1994 also precipitated the return of Burundi refugees from that country. As a result, only Tanzania and Zaire host significant numbers of Burundese refugees. The situation in Burundi continued to be of grave concern throughout 1994. At the end of December 1994, the number of Burundi refugees remains at approximately 6,000 in Rwanda, 40,000 in Tanzania and 248,000 in Zaire.

The events of October 1993 also resulted in a massive displacement of population inside Burundi. It is estimated that some 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled their "collines" and regrouped in different sites where their security could be ensured. While the IDP population in sites had decreased to 100,000 at the end of 1994, a considerable number of families have not yet decided to return home, due to the continued climate of insecurity in the country.

Around 574,000 Burundi returnees have regained their country of origin during 1994. Assistance to this population has often been disrupted by the lack of security in the areas of return and the sudden new influx of Rwandan refugees.

It is imperative that the international community, in collaboration with the relevant authorities, enhance its efforts to encourage the voluntary return of Rwandese and Burundese refugees to their country. Efforts initiated in 1994 to improve the conditions for return, on the part of UN Agencies in collaboration with the Government of Rwanda and Burundi as well as host-country authorities, will therefore be substantially strengthened during 1995.

The financial information pertaining to the Humanitarian Assistance provided to the victims in 1994 and the requirements of the UN system for 1995 are attached in the annex.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 1994

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

CASH SUPPORT FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS

Throughout the course of the 1994 Rwandese emergency, WFP has received cash donation towards the Rwanda Regional Emergency Operation which amount to some US\$ 30,041,486. A total of US\$ 24,884,867, including in-kind contributions for airlifts, staff and storage tents, has been committed through mid-December 1994, leaving a carryover of US\$ 5,156,619. The cash contributions towards this operation have been divided among the countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, to efficiently assist the Rwandese population dispersed throughout the region.

Logistics mobilisation accounts for the largest portion of 1994 cash expenditures. However, due to the rapid mobilisation of a trucking fleet at the beginning of the operation in July 1994, WFP was able to save on initial requirements of some US\$ 16 million for the deployment of aircraft alone to carry out food deliveries. Actual commitments towards airlift operations are substantially lower, at just over US\$ 4 million.

WFP currently uses two main transport routes into the region. The northern corridor consists of road or rail connection from the port of Mombassa to Kampala, from where commodities are then forwarded by road to Rwanda and Zaire. WFP is currently fortifying the southern corridor supply line via Dar-es-Salaam - Isaka - Kigali with the repair of rail wagons for the Tanzanian Railways Corporation (TRC) to further facilitate delivery of commodities to the region. A recent WFP logistics mission has estimated that the TRC can provide WFP with a share capacity of 30,000 MTs per month on the rail line. Moreover, favourable transport rates have been negotiated with both the Tanzania port authorities and the TRC.

The Dar-es-Salaam - Kigoma - Bujumbura - Uvira rail/lake route is the most economical for those destinations. However, poor port performance in Bujumbura coupled with erratic availability of lake transport capacity has rendered this approach less serviceable. To rectify this shortcoming, WFP has started implementing of a port and equipment rehabilitation and supply project. Total 1994 commitments for special logistics operations including Tanzania rail support, Burundi port equipment and lake operations amount to over US\$ 7 million.

Operation costs have been heavy in the region partly due to the purchase of vehicles, establishment of offices and communications equipment which were not available prior to the crisis. Support costs for these and others amount to some US\$ 7.5 million.

To ensure the smooth delivery of commodities, WFP has ensured that staff is positioned at every point of the food line. With over 100 international staff and almost 300 national staff working in the region, personnel costs have been also particularly high. International, local and UNV staff account for US\$ 6.3 million of 1994 overall expenditures.

RWANDA-BURUNDI REGIONAL EMERGENCY-FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Cash contributions, excluding food and food related contributions: all amounts relate to the regional emergency operation, i.e. costs of the operation in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.

SITUATION AS OF 8 DECEMBER 1994		TOTAL (US\$)
TOTAL CASH REQUIREMENT:		32,832,531
DONOR COUNTRY	CONTRIBUTION (US\$)	
Australia	918,397	
Belgium	500,000	
Canada	134,521	
European Community	816,982	
Finland	577,962	
France	177,619	
Germany	95,500	
Greece	63,649	
Netherlands	7,576,684	
Sweden	4,557,551	
Switzerland	435,587	
U.S.A	12,203,810	
United Kingdom	1,983,224	
TOTAL PLEDGES:		*30,041,486
TOTAL SHORTFALL:		2,791,045
COMMITMENTS, NON FOOD RELATED, JULY - DECEMBER 1994		
1. Personnel - International and national		5,165,945
2. Staff benefits		1,178,223
3. Equipment and Maintenance		3,268,977
4. Capital Purchases (Vehicles, comm.equip., etc.)		4,231,669
5. Airlift expenses		4,013,309
6. Truck mobilisation **		1,055,000
7. Other logistics related costs **		5,971,744
TOTAL COMMITMENTS:		24,884,867
BALANCE (Pledges - Commitments) ***		5,156,619

* Included in cash amounts are in-kind contributions for airlifts, staff and storage tents. Donors include Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA.

** Logistics Operations include Burundi Port Equipment, Tanzania Rail Support, Port and Lake Operations

*** The Balance reflects recent contributions which will be carried forward into 1995

FOOD

In spite of operating conditions which have often been extremely difficult, WFP has provided food and non-food assistance to over 3.4 million people in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire throughout the second half of 1994.

Operations in the regions as a whole have been dominated by emergency feeding programmes for refugee and internally displaced populations, requiring as much as 60,000 MTs of food per month. However, in Rwanda and Burundi, WFP and other agencies have actively sought opportunities to use food in order to promote rehabilitation. Programmes already initiated to foster agricultural self-sufficiency, rebuild infrastructure and strengthen government capacity are likely to become an increasingly prominent feature of operations in these countries.

Against a regional food requirement of 344,428 MTs for the period July-December 1994 (valued at US\$ 195,921,017), donor contributions to date amount to 328,094 MTs (valued at US\$ 184,944,571). This amounts to 94.4% of the overall food requirement. While this favourable overall resourcing picture was clouded in certain periods by difficulty in procuring certain commodities on regional and international markets, late shipments and consequent ruptures in the pipeline, WFP managed to maintain a strong schedule of deliveries to the majority of in-land destinations, using road, rail, barge and, where necessary, air transport.

WFP estimates that approximately 163,148 MTs of food for the region will be carried over for use in 1995. Reasons for this large carryover depend on a combination of factors such as late pledges, late shipments/late deliveries of regional purchases and/or logistics constraints.

Within Rwanda, the overall food aid requirement for 1995 as presented in Volume I is 115,816 MTs, valued at US\$ 66,871,973. WFP estimates a total of 41,591 MTs (representing approximately 36% of the needs) in carryovers of stocks and scheduled arrivals for 1995, and projects an overall shortfall of 74,225 MTs (valued at US\$ 46,064,860) still to be covered by new donor contributions.


Commodity	Pledges July - December 94 (MTs)	Total Food (FOB) Purchases (US\$)	Total Freight and ITSH Commitment (US\$)
CEREALS	42,003	6,384,456	11,886,849
PULSES	17,681	4,773,870	5,003,723
OIL	4,587	3,669,600	1,298,121
SALT	279	50,220	78,957
CSB	4,036	2,118,900	1,142,188
TOTAL	68,586	16,997,046	19,409,838
Carryover for 1995 *	41,591	9,036,860	11,770,253

* Carryover for 1995 includes 27,265 MTs for cereals, 12,316 MTs for pulses, 1,926 MTs for oil and 84 MTs for sugar.

For the sub-region (Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire), the overall food aid requirement for 1995 as presented in Volume II is 565,860 MTs, valued at US\$ 312,506,473. WFP estimates a total of 121,557 MTs in carryover of stocks and scheduled arrivals for 1995, and projects an overall shortfall of 444,303 MTs (valued at US\$ 238,713,164) still to be covered by new donor contributions.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND

In the five months which followed the issuance of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal on Rwanda, UNICEF received a total of US\$ 47 million in cash contributions (see chart below) and an additional US\$ 3 million in-kind contributions. This response to an appeal for US\$ 55 million is unprecedented for UNICEF. It was clearly due to the wide coverage of the horrors of the war and the tremendous public and governmental response to that coverage. UNICEF was thus able to provide substantial emergency relief assistance both within Rwanda and in the refugee areas in Tanzania, Uganda and Eastern Zaire.



Note that this chart does not include additional in-kind contributions valued approximately US\$ 3 million.

UNICEF is reporting comprehensively to each donor on the use of their funds and on implementation of projects according to the usual reporting procedures and in the agreed time frame.

Constraining factors in the implementation of UNICEF assistance in 1994 have been external and internal in nature: First, as far as external factors are concerned, the main problem was and still is the weak institutional, managerial and implementing capacity of Government at all levels (central, prefectures and communes); trained manpower is lacking (killed, displaced or having fled abroad); financial resources are limited and essential equipment and logistics are just not available; a second constraining factor has been the large resource and technical assistance requirements to assist a high number of beneficiaries and to repair damages made to essential infrastructures (public buildings, schools, health centres, water supply systems, power grid); third, continuing insecurity in certain areas, especially in the south west, still impacts on the mobility of the population and complicates field operations.

Internal factors also hampered the delivery of UNICEF assistance: First, many national staff members were killed and many other scattered to other locations; second, a totally new office had to be re-installed in Kigali as a result of the looting and mining of the old office, and additional sub-offices had to be set up in Gikongoro (Rwanda), Goma and Bukavu (Zaire) and Ngara (Tanzania); third, staffing was initially insufficient and characterised by high turnover; finally, operations procedures had to be accelerated to face the emergency.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION

Contributions reported by WHO between July and December 1994 totalled US\$ 2,191,117, in addition to US\$ 2,378,000 in pledges not yet received.

WHO activities in Rwanda during that period were as follows:

- Analysis of an assessment of the needs for rehabilitation of the health system, i.e. the recovery of the health infrastructure and, in particular, the need for equipment, financial and human resources.
- Support in re-launching the activities of the national anti-malaria programme and in the follow-up on the study of the resistance of "Plasmodium Falciparum" to chloroquine.
- Consultancy mission to elaborate a biannual plan to combat diarrhoeal diseases and a protocol for surveillance of the chemio-resistance of the germ *Shigella* dysentery.
- Strengthening the Central Laboratory of the Kigali Central Hospital to provide diagnostic information for diseases surveillance.
- Re-establishment of the national Acute Respiratory Infections programme, followed by training of health workers in the control and treatment of cases.
- Development of a plan for the resumption of anti-TB activities through the support of a consultant and the distribution of TB kits.
- Planning for a programme on the subject of maternity without risk.
- Consultative mission addressing the sectors of hygiene, provision of water supply and sanitation in the city of Kigali and other large towns, as well as in the IDP camps.
- Strengthening the capacity for epidemiological surveillance, especially by providing training to Ministry of Health staff. Establishment of a centralised health data system that will allow for the early detection of disease outbreaks and support decision-making at central and regional levels.
- Mission for the evaluation of the national essential drugs policy and its implementation.

These activities have contributed to the tireless efforts of the Ministry of Health in its role of coordinating health and sanitation activities and have also helped to build up mutual confidence between the Ministry and WHO. Meanwhile, the Ministry organised a health seminar in October 1994 and identified five priority issues requiring urgent solutions in the short, medium and long terms.

The funds mobilised in response to the last Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal were insufficient for WHO, either to carry out its activities in the field of epidemiological surveillance or to provide technical support for health activities in Rwanda and in the refugee camps. A report on the use of funds is provided to the concerned donors upon completion of each project.

FUNDS RECEIVED OR PLEDGED - BREAKDOWN BY DONOR
(As of 30 November 1994)

FUNDS RECEIVED		FUNDS PLEDGED	
DONOR	VALUE IN US\$	DONOR	VALUE IN US\$
Japan	250,000	Italy	823,000
Italy	472,719	Spain	520,000
United Kingdom	649,254	Netherlands	285,000
World Bank	750,000	World Bank	750,000
Gabon	56,818	---	---
Misc., Private	12,326	---	---
TOTAL	2,191,117	TOTAL	2,378,000

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION

As a result of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal launched in July 1994, FAO received US\$ 8,084,078 in total contributions. These include:

- US\$ 800,000 to assist the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock in the coordination of emergency assistance and in the evaluation of the crop and the food supply situation. This assistance, funded by the Technical Cooperation Programme of FAO, initiated in August 1994 and will continue in 1995; funds for this activity are not appealed for in the present document.
- US\$ 7,284,078 for the provision of agricultural inputs. The operations planned for the September 1994-January 1995 farming season were carried out, and most of the funds have been utilised.

The status of FAO's emergency programme for 1994 is shown in the table below:

STATUS OF FAO'S 1994 PROGRAMME
(As of 30 November 1994)

DONOR	PROJECT TITLE	FUNDS ALLOCATED	TIMEFRAME
TCP/FAO	Evaluation of the food/agricultural situation and support	400,000	08/94 to 12/95
TCP/FAO	Logistics support for the rehabilitation of agricultural services	400,000	08/94 to 04/95
Sweden	Market-garden produce around displaced camps	125,000	08/94 to 01/95
UK	Market-garden produce around displaced camps	222,400	08/94 to 12/94
Italy	Emergency supply of seeds and agricultural inputs to displaced persons	231,049	08/94 to 12/94
Finland	Emergency supply of tools to displaced persons	150,000	08/94 to 12/94
France	Emergency supply of seeds and agricultural inputs to displaced persons	89,091	08/94 to 12/94
Austria	Emergency supply of seeds and agricultural inputs to displaced persons	193,811	08/94 to 02/95
World Bank	Emergency supply of agricultural inputs to affected farmers	4,000,000	10/94 to 12/95
Netherlands	Emergency supply of agricultural inputs to affected populations	2,272,727	10/94 to 07/95
TOTAL		8,084,078	

U.N. EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANISATION

In the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal issued in mid-1994, UNESCO's request for donor funding towards its emergency education proposals met with no support; however, with the strong personal commitment of the Agency's Director-General, an emergency budget of US\$ 477,000 was assigned to the Rwanda Operation, UNESCO-PEER (Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction) being at the forefront of that operation. By end December 1994, at least US\$ 202,000 will have been allocated by UNESCO for emergency education activities inside Rwanda.

While UNESCO-PEER has had an active presence inside Rwanda since the beginning of September 1994, its involvement with the Rwandan crisis actually began quite early: in May, at the PEER's regional centre in Nairobi, a team of international and Rwandese educators began to work upon the translation and adaptation of an emergency curriculum for the core subjects of Kinyarwanda and mathematics for the first four grades of primary school that was to become an integral part of the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP). The latter is central to the joint UNESCO-UNICEF emergency education programme for Rwanda.

With a clear prioritisation of the needs of basic education, the main features of UNESCO's intervention in the emergency phase of the Rwanda Operation thus far have been as follows:

- Establishment of a continuing presence of national and international expertise in order to furnish programme support and technical assistance;
- design, prototype-production, testing and production of educational materials (TEP, mine and cholera awareness);
- distribution inside Rwanda of educational materials (TEP, mine awareness);
- preparation of and logistics support for TEP-related "train-the-trainer" workshops at national and prefectural levels, plus follow-up, supervision and data collection;
- organisation of mine-awareness campaign workshops at national and prefectural levels;
- international consultancies (survey of primary schools rehabilitation needs; psycho-social/trauma education; planning);
- organisation of a national seminar on emergency assistance to and reconstruction of Rwanda's educational system;
- assessment of educational needs and available capacity vis-a-vis curriculum development, training, textbook production and educational statistics.

UNESCO also faced the following problems and constraints:

- Difficulties in distribution and logistics affecting the speedy and timely provision of TEPs and related training. These difficulties have arisen from the weakened infrastructure of the country, especially at communal and school-centre levels; as a consequence, the UNESCO-UNICEF programme has been forced to prioritise grades 1 and 2 for the distribution of TEP kits, whereas the original intention was to supply TEPs to the first four grades at least;

- the re-starting of schooling affected the programme by subtracting 75% of the national-level trainers, who were forced to resume their regular school duties;
- more broadly, the weakness of national structures and lack of governmental resources at central, prefectural and communal levels have handicapped the delivery of educational services.

PROVISIONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT (JULY-DECEMBER 1994)		
ACTIVITIES	US\$	%
Design, prototype production and testing of educational	60,000	29.7
Training (TEP, mine awareness), follow-up and data	25,000	12.4
National Seminar on Education	20,000	9.9
International and local staff	45,000	22.3
Consultancies	15,000	7.4
Assessment of educational needs and capacity	5,000	2.5
Transport and fuel	27,000	13.3
Various	5,000	2.5
TOTAL	202,000	100.0

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION FOR MIGRATION

Out of an estimated total of some US\$ 3.3 million spent under IOM's Rwanda operations in 1994, vehicle purchase, spare parts and insurance have accounted for approximately US\$ 1.7 million, while vehicle rentals for the year amount to some US\$ 350,000. Fuel costs for IOM-owned as well as rented vehicles during 1994 total US\$ 400,000.

Communications equipment purchased for IOM operations in 1994 cost around US\$50,000, whilst EDP equipment purchase, installation and operating costs total US\$ 150,000.

On average over 150 local staff have been employed over the year, mostly in transport operations, to a total cost of US\$ 120,000. Administration, rental and overhead costs of IOM's six Rwanda offices plus one in Goma, Zaire, total US\$ 150,000 while an allocation to headquarters for programme support has been made in the amount of US\$ 250,000.

Finally, salaries and related costs for IOM's international staff, both in Rwanda and at headquarters, amount to approximately US\$ 130,000 for the year.

The status of donor contributions/pledges for IOM is outlined in the table below:

FUNDS RECEIVED OR PLEDGED - BREAKDOWN BY DONOR
(As of 30 November 1994)

DONORS	VALUE IN US\$	DATE	
		PLEDGED	RECEIVED
Belgium	94,339	28-Jul-94	
Denmark	80,500	06-Sep-94	
Finland	98,000	01-Sep-94	07-Nov-94
Japan	100,000	17-Aug-94	26-Sep-94
Luxembourg	88,105	13-May-94	27-May-94
Sweden	510,918	26-Jul-94	29-Aug-94
Switzerland	390,625	12-Sep-94	12-Oct-94
United Kingdom	688,073	Aug/Sep 94	Aug/Sep 94
USA	1,000,000	31-Oct-94	
TOTAL (US\$)	* 3,050,560		

* Additionally, IOM has signed two separate agreements with UNHCR to implement transport operations in support of their repatriation programme for refugees, and for IDP's in the South West. In connection with this programme, UNHCR has agreed to fund IOM in the amount of approximately US\$ 2.4 million, of which to date US\$ 1,453,036 has been received.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

UNHCHR reports that out of a total of US\$ 4,153,100 in pledges, an amount of US\$ 667,136 has been received. Pending the receipt of sufficient contributions to initiate the field operation, the High Commissioner called upon US\$ 3,000,000 advanced from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). It is estimated that some US\$ 2,300,000 will have been committed by the end of December, leaving a balance of US\$ 1,367,136. Based on current staffing costs (estimated at US\$ 530,000 per month) as well as other requirements for non-post items, it is estimated that (at current deployment levels) the funds available would allow a continuation of the field operations for approximately two months.

FUNDS RECEIVED OR PLEDGED - BREAKDOWN BY DONOR
(As of 6 December 1994)

DONOR	VALUE IN US\$	PAYMENT EFFECTED	OTHER SERVICES PROVIDED
Australia	63,500		
Belgium	465,800		
Denmark	100,000	100,000	
Finland	75,600		1 Investigator (1 1/2 months)
France	233,100		
Germany - 1994	133,300		Office Building
Germany - 1995	86,700		
Ireland	79,500	79,548	
Israel	30,000	30,000	
Japan	200,000		
Netherlands	42,600 798,800	44,640	
New Zealand	29,600	29,598	
Norway	101,700		+ 2 Procurement Experts (3 months)
Spain			2 Forensic Doctors (two months) +1 prosecutor + \$208,000 for 8 UNV monitors
Sweden	129,500		
Switzerland			1 Criminal Investigator (3 months)
United Kingdom	383,200	383,155	+ 1 vehicle Land Rover in Kigali
USA	750,00		Airlif vehicles Kuwait to Kigali
UNDP	250,000		
OTHER ACCT	120,000		
OXFAM	80,000		2 vehicles land rovers in Kigali
Private, France	200	195	
TOTAL	US \$ 4,153,100	US\$ 667,135	

AIDE MEMOIRE

COOPERATION ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DU ZAIRE
ET LE HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES POUR
LES REFUGIES DANS LA RECHERCHE DE SOLUTIONS AUX
PROBLEMES DE SECURITE DANS LES CAMPS DES REFUGIES
RWANDAIS DES REGIONS DU NORD ET DU SUD KIVU.

1. A la demande du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et faisant suite aux discussions antérieures entre le Gouvernement du Zaïre et le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), les autorités zairoises et une délégation du HCR, ont examiné du 24 au 26 janvier 1995 les mesures de coopération visant à apporter un appui concret et immédiat aux efforts du gouvernement du Zaïre pour :

- i) améliorer l'ordre public dans les camps de réfugiés rwandais; *improving discipline in order*
- ii) éviter les intimidations et violences à l'encontre des candidats au rapatriement librement consenti; *eliminate intimidations*
- iii) protéger les installations et le personnel humanitaires; *protect humanitarian personnel*
- iv) fournir des escortes aux convois de rapatriement librement consenti depuis les camps de réfugiés jusqu'à la frontière rwandaise. *provide escort*

2. Cet appui sera dispensé dans le contexte des instruments internationaux relatifs aux réfugiés, du statut du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés et des procédures du HCR relatives à ses programmes d'assistance et de protection. Ces instruments, statuts et procédures mettent, entre autres, l'accent sur la responsabilité première des Etats pour le maintien de l'ordre et l'application des lois nationales aux réfugiés ayant reçu asile sur leurs territoires respectifs.

3. A cette fin, le gouvernement zairois déploiera 1500 agents de sécurité (militaires ou policiers) qui pourraient être répartis comme suit :

- a) Région du Nord Kivu: Goma: total 1000 agents de sécurité *N = 1000*
 - centre de commandement à Goma comprenant le personnel de commandement et d'appui ainsi qu'un groupe d'intervention rapide, soit 100 *[units]* agents au total;
 - trois postes de sécurité de 200 agents chacun couvrant les camps de Kayindo, Kibumba et Katale;

.../...

3 H 4

- un poste de sécurité de 300 agents couvrant le camp de Mugunga ainsi que les petits camps avoisinants.

b) Région du Sud Kivu : Bukavu : total 500 agents de sécurité

- centre de commandement : 50 agents
- sur l'axe Bukavu - Kabira : un poste de sécurité de 200 agents couvrant les grands camps de Inera et Kashusha ainsi qu'un poste de sécurité de 50 agents pour les autres camps.
- sur l'axe Bukavu-Cinianga : deux postes de sécurité de 50 agents chacun.
- sur l'axe Bukavu-Uvira : deux postes de sécurité de 50 agents chacun.

4. Le HCR s'engage à apporter aux autorités zairoises un appui constitué d'éléments suivants :

- i) un complément de salaire pour chacun des 1500 agents effectivement déployés pour des fonctions relatives aux objectifs du programme :
équivalent de US\$3 par personne/jour de travail US \$ 3 p.j.
p.f.
- ii) une assistance pour l'achat d'uniformes simples ainsi que pour l'établissement des postes de sécurité prévus dans le programme, soit deux centres de commandement et dix campements pour les effectifs décrits ci-dessus. Les composantes de cette assistance feront l'objet de discussions ultérieures entre le gouvernement et le HCR. financière
unif.
- iii) L'acquisition, l'entretien et la réparation des véhicules lourds et légers totalisant un maximum de 60 unités. 60 véhicules
- iv) les équipements radio HF et VHF permettant les communications entre les centres de commandement, le groupe de liaison du HCR, les postes de sécurité, les patrouilles et la cellule de crise à Kinshasa. télé.
- v) le matériel de base et les fournitures nécessaires de bureau. office
- vi) un appui sous forme d'équipement de base, de frais de fonctionnement et de déplacement à la Cellule de crise mise en place à Kinshasa. basics
expans
for an

.../...

3 1/6

5. En outre le HCR mettra en place un groupe de liaison composé de conseillers de sécurité. Ce groupe sera intégré aux sous-délégations du HCR à Goma et à Bukavu. Il assurera la liaison entre le HCR et le commandement militaire zairois, agira comme conseillers et apportera un appui dans les domaines de la formation, de la logistique, des télécommunications, des achats et de l'administration. Sous l'autorité des chefs de sous-délégations respectifs du HCR, ce groupe sera responsable de la gestion des équipements et des fonds fournis par le HCR.

Group. of
Security
Advisors

6. Pour assurer la réalisation des objectifs décrits ci-dessus, le gouvernement zairois s'engage à :

- i) mettre à la disposition du HCR des agents de sécurité possédant l'expérience, les plus hautes qualités de travail, de compétence et d'intégrité.
- ii) définir les modalités d'intervention des agents de sécurité en étroite coopération avec le HCR.
- iii) mettre en place un mécanisme de consultations rapides pour résoudre toute question de discipline.
- iv) apporter toute coopération au HCR et plus particulièrement aux groupes de liaison.
- v) donner les instructions appropriées aux autorités régionales et locales afin qu'elles prennent toutes les mesures administratives ou autres qui s'imposent.

selected
agents

7. Une première phase du projet couvrant une période de cinq mois (de février à juin 95) est évaluée à environ US\$13 millions en espèce et/ou en nature. Cette estimation budgétaire est indicative et sera revue par le Siège du HCR.

5 months
US\$13 m

8. Le programme pourrait être reconduit par périodes successives de trois mois mais ne devrait pas aller au-delà de décembre 95.

3 m extensions

9. Le financement de ce programme dans le cadre des opérations du HCR devra recourir à des contributions volontaires des Etats et à d'autres sources de financement habituelles des programmes. Le HCR dispose cependant de ressources suffisantes pour entamer la mise en oeuvre du programme dès la signature de cet aide mémoire entre le gouvernement du Zaïre et le HCR. Le HCR mettra tout en oeuvre par ailleurs pour assurer le financement complet du programme.

HCR
finances

.../...


3 HCR

page 4

10. En conclusion, le gouvernement du Zaïre et le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés ont réaffirmé le caractère humanitaire de la mission des forces de sécurité zairoises et de l'appui que le HCR apporte à celles-ci.


Fait à Kinshasa, le 27 janvier 1995

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT DU ZAIRE

Signature : 

Nom: M. le GRAND AMIRAL MAVUA MUDIMA


Titre: VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE,
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
NATIONALE.

Signature : 

Nom : Me KAMANDA WA KAMANDA

Titre : VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE
CHARGE DES REFORMES
INSTITUTIONNELLES,
MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE,
GARDE DES SCEAUX.

POUR LE HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES
NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES

Signature : 

Nom: M. CAROL FAUBERT

Titre: ENVOYE SPECIAL DU HAUT COMMISSAIRE
DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES.