

(9 CONFIDENTIAL)

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51002</u>
BOX	<u>133</u>
FILE	<u>7</u>
ACC.	<u>PPB/0723</u>

UN RESTRICTED

90PS\9-024

See Distr

9 Para Sqn RE  
OP GABRIEL  
BFPO 615

14 Sep 94

ROUTE RECCE, KIGALI > NUNGA

## References:

- A. REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE Map (1:250000).  
 B. Series Z723, Edition 1, Sheets 17, 18, 24, 25, 33 & 34 (1:50000).

1. General. The route is 67Km long. The route is in three distinct sections:

- a. Section 1 - KIGALI > GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA). Road surface: Blacktop  
 b. Section 2 - GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA) > GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge). Road surface: Unmetalled road in poor condition.  
 c. Section 3 - GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge) > GR 309566 BLK GASHORA. Road surface: Unmetalled road in well maintained condition.

2. Detail. Detailed descriptions by sections are:

- a. KIGALI > GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA). Good blacktop road 11Km long, 7m width with camber and drainage. Surface is breaking up in places but currently the road can handle Military Load Class (MLC) 60.  
 b. GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA) > GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge). This section is rutted dirt track 16Km long, varying from 7m to less than 3.5m width. No maintenance work has been done on this section of track. There is no camber or effective drainage which has resulted in heavy rutting of the surface. Realistically the MLC of this section is 12, less in the wet season although NGO vehicles greater than MLC 12 have been seen trafficking the route. The use of this road by overweight transport should be discouraged because it will speed up the degradation of this route. The surface is already poor and will become impassable in places during the wet season.  
 c. GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge) > GR 309566 BLK GASHORA. This section of track is 40 Km long. This unmetalled road has been well maintained in the past. It has been graded

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wetted and rolled to produce a good well cambered road surface. The road has graded cambers with ditches either side for drainage and a carriage width of 7m. Currently the MLC of this section is 30, but without maintenance during the rainy season this road will deteriorate and may become impassable in places.

3. bridges. There are the 8 bridges along the route, descriptions of which are:

a. GR 258790 BLK. This is a 3m simply supported concrete slab which has a road width of 3m. Both abutments are sound. There is a sharp Right Hand (RH) bend in the route immediately on the Southern end of the bridge limiting manoeuvring space. Because of the dimensions of the bridge and tight exit the bridge should be classed as MLC 12.

b. GR 263716 BLK BICUBI bridge. This is a single carriageway, 10 bay, 'Double Single' (DS) heavy girder type bridge. There is a sign at the Northern end stating a load class of 30T. Due to the poor state of the wearing surface this bridge should be classed as MLC 12.

c. GR 263712 BLK BUGASERA II bridge. This was a single carriageway, 3 bay, 'Single Single' (SS) heavy girder type bridge. The design load class is 30T, but due to the poor state of repair of the wearing surface a MLC 12 is recommended.

d. GR 263709 BLK BUGASERA I bridge. This was a single carriageway, 3 bay, SS heavy girder type bridge. The design load class is 30T, but due to the poor state of repair of the wearing surface a MLC 12 is recommended.

e. GR 285562 BLK. This was a Single Carriageway, 3 bay, SS heavy girder type bridge. During the war the bridge was attacked with explosives rendering it unusable. The remains of the bridge are in the gap. cursory inspection indicates that very few if any panels can be recovered. The concrete abutment walls are intact although the earth abutments have been bulldozed into the gap to create a temporary MLC 12 carriage way. The carriage way has been built in a seasonal marsh and will soon become impassable to vehicles in the wet season.

f. GR 293563 BLK. This was a Single Carriageway, 3 bay, SS heavy girder type bridge. The design load class is 30T, but due to the poor state of repair of the wearing surface a MLC of 12 is recommended.

g. GR 301565 BLK. This was a Single Carriageway, 3 bay, SS heavy girder type bridge. The design load class is 30T,

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but due to the poor state of repair of the wearing surface a MLC of 12 is recommended.

h. GR 309566 BLK. This is a Single Carriageway, 2 span, 19 bay, DS, steel decked, Bailey bridge. Is capable of greater loads than 30T but is limited to MLC 12 by virtue of the other bridges on route.

4. Culverts. There are many culverts along entire route. All are sound but will require regular maintenance if trafficked in the wet season.

5. Summary.


a. The route between KIGALI > GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA) is MLC 60.

b. The route between GR 255823 BLK (KABUGA) > GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge) is MLC 12. This MLC is governed by the bridge at GR 258790 BLK. Substantial route maintenance works are required if this section is not to deteriorate below MLC 12 during the rainy season.

c. The route between GR 263713 BLK (BICUBI bridge) > GR 309566 BLK GASHORA is MLC 12. As in Section 2 the MLC is governed by the state of repairs of the bridges, not by the quality of the track. The critical section of this route is the improvised crossing on the seasonal marsh at the demolished bridge at GR 285562 BLK as it will soon become impassable in the wet season.

d. All wooden decked bridges along the route need their wearing surfaces replacing to bring them up to their design loading of 30T. The concrete slab bridge at GR 258790 BLK will need totally replacing, and the track will need re routing if the KIGALI > NUNGA route is to be up graded to accommodate vehicles upto 30T.

e. Currently the BRITCON Engr Fd Sqn does not have the plant machines or the materials in theatre to maintain the current MLC of this route during the wet season. A stores bid is attached at Annex A for the restoration of this route to take 30T vehicles.

  
P T FULLER  
Capt  
for OC

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Annex:

A. Stores list required to upgrade KIGALI > NUNGA route to accommodate 30T vehicles.

Distr:

External:

Action:  
HQ UNAMIR Engr Desk

Info:  
HQ UNAMIR Ops  
ZOA Netherlands

Internal:

Info:  
File

STORES LIST ROUTE RECCE, KIGALI > NUNGA

SER	ITEM	UNIT	QTY	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	100 x 100 mm SC3 timber	m	120	Spacer, spiking
2	200 x 100 mm SC3 timber	m	3300	Decking
3	150 x 150 mm SC3 timber	m	140	Decking
4	200 x 200 mm SC3 timber	m	300	Ribands
5	Bolts 350 mm	No	220	Hold down ribands
6	Timber Dogs 200 mm	No	100	
7	Nails 200 mm	No	500	
8	3 Bay SS Heavy Girder Bridge complete	No	One	



RESTRICTED

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO PRIORITY	DATE - TIME GROUP <del>0750</del> 101516 Z SEP94	SIC/ORIG NO E3L/140/OPS 138
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: AUSMED  To: HQ UNAMIR II (FOR COO AND FMO) INTERNAL: MED COY LOG SPT COY RIFLE COY CO (FOR CO DIARY) OPSO DUTY OFFR FILE PREV MED SECT		

300.1 (07)  
R-5

## SUBJ: OPORD 03/94-DEPLOYMENT OF DENTAL AND PREV MED ELMS TO KIBUYE

A. AUSMED MINUTE IO03/94 DATED 5 SEP 94

1.SIT.

A. OPFOR. AS PER OPS MAP. OP WILL BE CONDUCTED IN SECTOR 4B, A UNAMIR CON AO. SECTOR CURRENTLY INTERGRATING ELMS OF RWANDAN GOVT(INCL RPA) IAW UNAMIR OPORD 19.RPA ELMS CFM LOC KIBUYE.

B. FR.

(1)HQ.FRAFBATT AND MILOB HQ LOC VIC GR 278715 (KIBUYE).

(2)AUSMED CONDUCTED A SPEC MED RECON TO KIBUYE DURING THE PD 29 AUG -2 SEP94, WHICH IDENT A REQ FOR 35 FOLLOW-UP DENT PATIENTS AND SIGNIFICANT PREV MED WORK TO BE CONDUCTED IN SPT TO FRAFBATT.THIS OUTSTANDING REQ WAS DETAILED IN REF A.

C. CIV. GEN SIT IN SECTOR 4B IS CALM. NO SIGNIFICANT MOVT OF DISPLACED PERS IN THE SECTOR. NGO AND MILOB INVOLVED IN RELOCATING LOCALS BACK TO FORMER HOME AREAS, WITHIN SECTOR.

2.MISS. PROV DENTAL AND PREV MED SPT TO FRAFBATT FROM KIBUYE AREA.

3.EX.

A.GEN OUTLINE. SPEC MED GP WILL MOV BY RD TO KIBUYE ON 11 SEP 94, WITH AN INF PROT ELM, ESTB WORKING FACY AND BEGIN TREATING PATIENTS/CONDUCTING HEALTH

PAGE NO 1		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE S.C.GOULD (OPSO)				PHONE ASO		REF FILE NO 613-2-2	
NO OF PAGES 3		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE (OPSO)		BRANCH/UNIT HQ AUSMED		SIGNATURE			DATE
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED									

WORK FROM 12 TO 15 SEP 94. A SMALL HQ WILL ENSURE THAT COMMS ARE MAINT WITH ASO IN KIGALI. SPEC MED GP WILL RTN BY RD BY NLT 161200B SEP 94.

B.GP:

- (1) DENT DET OF THREE PERS - STORES MTD IN TCV;
- (2) PREV MED DET OF THREE PERS - STORES IN LR GS AND TLR;
- (3) HQ COMPRISING THE SC IN FFR; AND
- (4) PROT ELM COMPRISING ONE INF SECT MTD IN 6\*6.

C.TASKS:

- (1) COMPLETE THE OUTSTANDING DENTAL AND HEALTH WORK DETAILED IN REF A;
- (2) PROV HUMANITARIAN SPT, SHOULD THE GP HAVE SPARE CAPACITY; AND
- (3) MAINT COMMS WITH HQ AUSMED.

D.COORD INSTR:

(1) TIMINGS:

- |                                      |   |                |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------------|
| (A) ALL VEHS TRANSFERED TO UC        | - | 101100B SEP 94 |
| (B) ALL STORES PREP                  | - | 101900B        |
| (C) DEPART BKS                       | - | 110830B        |
| (D) ESTB COMMS WITH HQ AUSMED BY NLT | - | 111400B        |
| (E) TASKS COMPLETE AND RTU BY NLT    | - | 161200B SEP 94 |
- (2) BDYS - AS MARKED ON OPS MAP. NO MOVE OUTSIDE SECTOR 4B WITHOUT ASO CLEARANCE.
  - (3) ROUTES - KIGALI, GITTARAMA, KIVUMU, MABANZA, KIBUYE (ROUTE 2).
  - (4) ROE - STATUS YELLOW.
  - (5) OFOF - AMBER CARD.

4.ADMIN AND LOG.

A. GEN. THE GP IS TO BE SELF SUFFICIENT FOR RATS, WATER, FUEL, ACCN AND SPEC STORES FOR THE DURATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT. RESUP BY OPDEM.

B. DRESS. MARCHING ORDER, INCL BLUE HELMETS AND FLAK JACKETS IN SECTOR 4.

C. MED. RAP LOC HQ FRAFBATT. SECOND/THIRD LEVEL SPT AT CHK. EVAC COORD BY HQ AUSMED USING CASEVAC FORMAT. ALL MBRs TO CONT TO TAKE DOXY TABS AND SLEEP UNDER NETS.

D. REP AND RECOV - BY EMEFIX. FRT TO BE DEPLOYED FROM HQ AUSMED

5.COMD AND SIG.

A.COMD:

- (1) OC - LEUT D.ROBERTS, RAN;
- (2) 2IC - WO1 REIDY; AND
- (3) INF SECT COMD TO CON THE MOV AND ALL ASPECTS OF PROT.

B.SIGS:


- (1) MAINT COMMS ON AUSMED VHF(PRI)/HF(ALT) CON NET AS C/S AS2.
- (2) ALL ELMS DEPLOYING AWAY FROM GP HQ ARE TO HAVE VHF/UHF COMMS. SC TO PROV SOI/COMMS DIAGRAMS.

C.RPTS AND RTNS:

- (1) LOCSTATS: ONCE STATIONARY IN NEW LOC. INCL ELMS DEPLOYED AWAY FROM GP HQ.

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3		AS ABOVE (OPSO)		HQ AUSMED					
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									OPERATOR
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION									
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9300-1 (Ops O)

1 CDHSR (Rwanda)  
Amahoro Stadium  
Kigali, Rwanda

13 September 1994

DCOS Ops, UNAMIR HQ

FORCE COMMANDER'S POLICY DIRECTIVE  
ACCESS TO UNAMIR FACILITIES

Reference: A. Force Commander's Policy Directive: Access to  
UNAMIR Facilities 6 September 1994  
B. Minute to Ref A (Attached)

1. Capt Price, OC D&S Pl, has reported that the Force Comd's Policy Directive at ref is unworkable. The RPA LO, Lt Joseph, has refused to abide by the direction concerning unloading of weapons, stating that this direction would be binding only if it came from a senior RPA officer.

2. I ask that you act on our behalf to clarify the procedures to be followed. It is our belief that you really do not wish to have a fire fight to prove this point.

3. Please advise.

M.J. Springer  
Maj  
for CO

Attachments: 1

② COS

As per my previous memo,  
I continue to be concerned  
about their reluctance to unload  
etc. eventhough they (and us) are  
regr to do so in their  
buildings etc.

*[Signature]*  
DCOS Ops  
14.9

Sir,  
original copy  
handover to  
COS, nh.

14.9.94

3080.15 (OPS)  
12-2

(1)

To: Distribution List  
From: Force Commander  
Date: 6 September 1994  
Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S POLICY DIRECTIVE:  
ACCESS TO UNAMIR FACILITIES

1. The following procedures will be applied, with respect to who may or may not be authorized access to a UNAMIR facility. As stipulated in the legal binding agreement between the UN and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the status of UNAMIR, the UN alone may consent to the entry of any government officials or of any other person not a member of UNAMIR to such premises.

2. In all cases, the Officer in Charge, or an appointed delegate, of any specific UNAMIR facility has the authority vested in him from the Force Commander to decide who may or may not enter his respective facility. In general, the following guidelines will be followed at all times unless the Officer in Charge of a particular facility feels there are overriding circumstances that warrant a deviation from the general practice.

#### RPA SOLDIERS

3. RPA soldiers requesting access to any UNAMIR facility must be accompanied by an RPA Liaison Officer (RPA LO). If the RPA LO is not present the soldiers are to be instructed to contact an RPA LO at UN HQ (Amahoro Hotel) and request the LO to accompany them. Only when the RPA LO is accompanying the soldiers and he produces his identification pass, may they seek authorization from the Officer in Charge, or his delegate. Should access be granted, an escort shall be provided. All RPA soldiers will abide by the rules and regulations pertaining to each respective facility ie. unloading of weapons, denied access to restricted areas, etc.

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*Cps O*  
*I talked to the LO (Lt Joseph) and gave him a copy of this. I explained to him the FC direction not to have a weapon status. He refuses to have a weapon status and comply to this direction. He receives his direction from his command and is not to be UNHQ to aid them only. If DES pl's are not this without clarification to the RPA command it is most probably be an incident. J. F. CAPT (x-DES)*

#### RPF OFFICIALS


4. RPF officials (ie. government dignitaries - the President, Vice President, Ministers) do not require an RPA LO to accompany them when requesting access to a UNAMIR facility. Often, these personnel will travel with an entourage of RPA soldiers. Again, access will be granted or denied by the Officer in Charge of the facility, or his delegate, and an escort will be provided.

#### VISITORS

5. Any person who is not in possession of a pass (ie. UN pass, local worker pass, media/NGO or contractor pass) is considered to be a visitor. If it is determined that the visitor has a legitimate cause to visit the facility, the Officer in Charge, or his delegate, shall be sought after to decide whether access should be granted. If access is granted, the visitor will be given and shall wear a visitor pass (if the facility has incorporated the production of visitor passes), an escort shall be provided and the visitor must abide by all rules and regulations applicable to the facility.

#### PERSONNEL WITH PASSES

6. All personnel with a pass (as listed at paragraph 5) will be allowed access only if the photograph identification is a positive match to the person wearing the pass. Personnel shall wear their passes at all times and only visit areas where they have a need to do so. At times, with the case of media and contractors, an escort may need to be provided.



Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

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	CMPO	



3000.15 (95)  
2-8

(1) 250 BED HOSP EXISTS IN KIBUNGO BUT IS POORLY STAFFED- NO DOCTOR, NO SURGEON, LIMITED NURSING SPT FROM INT MED CORPS (IMC).

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D.REP AND RECOV. BY EMEFIX. FRT CON BY HQ AUSMED.

5.COMD AND SIG

A.GEN. SMO WILL DETERMINE MANNING FOR EACH CLINIC AND WILL ADVISE OPSO 24 HRS PRIOR. OPSO WILL LIAISE WITH CA MED PL REGARDING MED PERS SPT. SMO WILL DETERMINE DEPLOYMENT OF SURGICAL DET, ON ADVICE FROM PREVIOUS CLINIC. DEPLOYMENT OF SURGEONS WILL BE STAFFED THROUGH FMEDO, FOR CLEARANCE.

B.COMD:

(1) OC - SNR MED OFFR PRESENT; AND

(2) CON MOV - PROT COMD.

C.SIG. CLINIC IS TO MAN AUSMED VHF CON NET AS C/S AS 3. ANY ELMS MOV FROM CLINIC LOC ARE TO MAINT COMMS WITH C/S AS3. RSO IS TO ENSURE THAT SUFFICIENT VHF MANPACK, INCL BATTRIES, ARE ISS.

D.REPTS AND RTNS:

(1) LOCSTATS ONCE FIRM OR WHEN ELMS LEAVE CLINIC LOC;

(2) ADVISE WHEN MOV;

(3) LOG RTNS AS REQ; AND

(4) HARD COPY RTN OF ACTY UNDERTAKEN, ON RTU. TO BE INCL IN DAILY MED SITREP.

6.ACK

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NO OF PAGES		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE		BRANCH/UNIT		SIGNATURE		DATE	
3		AS ABOVE (OPSO)		HQ AUSMED		<i>[Signature]</i>		10 SEP 94.	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR
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									RESTRICTED

FILE - 073

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UNAMIR  
Force HQ  
Ops Branch

To: See distribution  
From: Force Commander  
Date: 10 September 1994  
Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE  
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 9: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE  
NO. 02  
Reference: Operational Directive No. 2 dated 22 Jul 94

1. In order to simplify and clarify the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement, effective forthwith paragraphs 7, 24 and 26 are to be amended as follows:

A. AMEND PARA 7 TO READ:

"AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

7. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons systems will be authorised as follows:

a. Force Commander or His Delegate:

(1) heavy support weapons (i.e. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and

(1) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20 mm etc.).

b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:

(1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)

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(2) light machine guns; and

(3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.

c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorised as follows:

(1) Sector Commanders:

(a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M 60, etc.),

(b) light machine guns; and

(c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.

(2) Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat:

(a) personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality."

B. AMEND PARA 24 AS FOLLOWS:

"Rule No. 5 Intervention and Warning Shots

a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.

b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process."

C. AMEND PARA 26 AS FOLLOWS:

"26. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in the directive subsequent to Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.


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NOTE: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorised by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status."

2. Contingent Commanders of all contributing nations are also directed to obtain the appropriate national authority and concurrence for these amendments in order to achieve uniformity among all UNAMIR personnel.

3. Furthermore, Contingent Commanders are directed to ensure that all subordinate personnel are properly briefed and that ROE, aide-mémoires are amended accordingly.



Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

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9OPS\9-021

9 Para Sqn RE  
OP GABRIEL  
BFPO 615

See Distr

10 Sep 94

ROUTE RECCE, KIGALI > NUNGA

References:

- A. REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE Map (1:250000).
- B. Series Z723, Edition 1, Sheet 24 (1:50000).

1. General. The route is 15Km long. The route is in two distinct sections ranging from blacktop to rutted dirt track:

- a. Section 1 - KIGALI > GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU).
- b. Section 2 - GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU) > GR 095723 BLK.

2. Detail. Detailed descriptions by sections are:

a. KIGALI > GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU). Good blacktop road 3Km long, 7m width with camber and drainage. Surface is breaking up in places but currently the road can handle MLC 60.

b. GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU) > GR 095723 BLK. This section is rutted dirt track 12Km long, varying from 7m to less than 3.5m width. No work has been done on this section of track at all. There is no camber or drainage resulting in heavy rutting of the surface. Realistically the MLC of this section is 12, less in the wet season although NGOs have been seen to traffic the route with greater. The surface is already poor and will become impassable in the wet season very quickly.

3. Bridges. There are the remains of 3 bridges on the route, all have been destroyed with explosives:

a. GR 096735 BLK. This is a 6m masonry arch and 6m simply supported concrete slab side by side to give a road width of 8m. The abutment on the Southern end of the bridge has been destroyed with explosives creating a crater 4x7x2.5m. The force of the explosion has also cracked the masonry arch. Before the bridge was attacked it was MLC 30, it is now less than MLC 12 and ideally needs overbridging or replacing.

b. GR 096733 BLK. This is a 9.1m masonry arch and 9.1m

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3000.15 (OP)  
R-3



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b. GR 096733 BLK. This is a 9.1m masonry arch and 9.1m simply supported concrete slab side by side to give a road width of 8m. The abutment on the Northern end of the bridge has been destroyed with explosives creating a crater 14x10x2.5m. The force of the explosion has dropped the Northern end of the slab into the gap and also cracked the masonry arch. Before the bridge was attacked it was MLC 30, it is now unusable.

c. GR 095723 BLK. This was a three span DS Bailey bridge. It has been attacked with explosives in two places resulting in 2 spans dropping into the gap. The 3rd span appears intact as do all the piers. Some of the tresses and steel decking could be salvaged from the 2 spans that are in the gap if another Bailey was to be constructed.

4. Culverts. There are many culverts along entire route. All are sound.


5. Tip Site. There is a tip site at GR 113805 BLK which has resulted in a lot of rubbish and glass on the route. This could be a hazard to vehicle tyres.

7. Summary.

a. The route between KIGALI > GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU) is MLC 60.

b. The route between GR 115828 BLK (GASHARU) > GR 095723 is MLC 12. Substantial works are required to upgrade the route from MLC 12 to MLC 60. The culverts will require attention if the route is not to deteriorate below MLC 12 during the rainy season.

c. All the bridges along the route need replacing or over bridging in the case of the bridge at GR 096735 BLK. Currently there is not the Bailey bridge in theatre to replace the bridge at GR 095723 BLK. This makes the route unusable, therefore no further action is recommended.

  
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Capt  
for OC



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To: See distribution  
From: Force Commander  
Date: 10 September 1994  
Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE  
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 9: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE  
NO. 02  
Reference: Operational Directive No. 2 dated 22 Jul 94

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1. In order to simplify and clarify the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement, effective forthwith paragraphs 7, 24 and 26 are to be amended as follows:

A. AMEND PARA 7 TO READ:

"AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

7. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons systems will be authorised as follows:

a. Force Commander or His Delegate:

(1) heavy support weapons (i.e. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and

(1) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20 mm etc.).

b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:

(1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)

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- (2) light machine guns; and
  - (3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.
- c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorised as follows:
- (1) Sector Commanders:
    - (a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M 60, etc.),
    - (b) light machine guns; and
    - (c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.
  - (2) Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat:
    - (a) personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality."

B. AMEND PARA 24 AS FOLLOWS:

"Rule No. 5 Intervention and Warning Shots

- a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process."

C. AMEND PARA 26 AS FOLLOWS:

"26. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in the directive subsequent to Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.


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NOTE: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorised by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status."

2. Contingent Commanders of all contributing nations are also directed to obtain the appropriate national authority and concurrence for these amendments in order to achieve uniformity among all UNAMIR personnel.

3. Furthermore, Contingent Commanders are directed to ensure that all subordinate personnel are properly briefed and that ROE aide-mémoires are amended accordingly.



Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

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BFPO 615

*7* Sep 94

ROUTE RECCE, KIGALI > KIBUYE

References:

- A. REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE Map (1:250000).
- B. Series Z723, Edition 1, Sheets 12, 21, 22, 23 & 24 (1:50000).

1. General. from Reference A we know the route is 139Km long. The route is in three distinct sections ranging from blacktop to rutted mountain dirt track:

- a. Section 1 - KIGALI > GR 720710 BLK (GITARAMA).
- b. Section 2 - GR 720710 BLK (GITARAMA) > GR 581697 BLK.
- c. Section 3 - GR 581697 BLK > KIBUYE.

2. Detail. Detailed descriptions by sections are:

a. KIGALI > GR 720710 BLK (GITARAMA). Good blacktop road 48Km long, 7m width with camber and drainage. Surface is breaking up in places but currently the road can handle MLC 60.

b. GR 720710 BLK (GITARAMA) > GR 581697 BLK. This section of road was being built by a major international contractor at the outbreak of the civil war, and as such is compacted sub base 24 Km long, 7m wide with camber and drainage. All cut and fill has been completed, along with landscaping of cuttings and embankments. Further work needs to be done in the form of laying and compacting of the road base, followed by the laying of a blacktop wearing surface. Currently the surface is firm and relatively smooth being MLC 60. However with heavy rain (due to incomplete drainage) and heavy traffic the surface will deteriorate quickly.

c. GR 581697 BLK > KIBUYE. Rutted dirt track 64Km long, varying from 7m to less than 3.5m width. No work has been done on this section of track at all, except at the plant park in the area of MABANZA (GR 3473 BLK). There is no camber or drainage resulting in heavy rutting of the surface. This section also winds through the mountains

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
having steep gradients and tight left and right bends, many of which are blind. The MLC of this section is 12, less in the wet season. The surface is already very poor and will become impassable in the wet season very quickly. The scale of the works required to rectify this section alone is beyond the capability of the Squadron in it's time in Rwanda.

3. Bridges. There are 2 bridges on the route:
  - a. GR 581697 BLK. This is a three span DS Bailey bridge. All 3 sections are simply supported, being a 4 - 9 - 4 bay MLC 30 design. All trusses look sound but wearing surface needs replacing, realistically limiting bridge to MLC 12.
  - b. GR 304704 BLK. This is a 4 bay SS Bailey MLC 30 design. Again due to the poor state of the wearing surface limit is realistically MLC 12.
4. Culverts. There are many culverts along entire route. All are sound in sections 1 & 2, but many in section 3 require immediate work. Again this realistically limits the route to MLC 12.
5. Plant. There are substantial stockpiles of machines belonging to the "Chinese Society" and ASTALDI at 2 sites along the route. The first, belonging to ASTALDI, is Section 2 on the Eastern end of the bridge at GR 581697. The other is in Sector 3 at MABANZA and belongs to the "Chinese Society". The equipment is a mixture of heavy plant, compressors, cranes and dumper trucks. The makes vary but the bulk are CATAPILLAR and Chinese equivalents. All the equipments had been vandalised, detailed fitter recce is required to establish if any of the plant is recoverable.
6. Road Construction Materials: at the MABANZA plant site there is a considerable stockpile of road construction materials including ARMCO culverts and gabions. All of these items would be useful to the engineer effort around the country.
7. Summary.
  - a. The route between KIGALI > GITARAMA is MLC 60.
  - b. The route between GITARAMA > KIBUYE is MLC 12. Substantial works are required to upgrade the route from MLC 12 to MLC 60. The bridges and culverts will require attention if the route is not to deteriorate below MLC 12 during the rainy season.



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c. The improvements and route maintenance task itself is far beyond the capabilities of the Squadron, and at this time no further action is recommended.



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Force HQs  
OPS Branch

To: Distribution List  
From: Force Commander  
Date: 6 September 1994  
Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S POLICY DIRECTIVE:  
ACCESS TO UNAMIR FACILITIES

1. The following procedures will be applied, with respect to who may or may not be authorized access to a UNAMIR facility. As stipulated in the legal binding agreement between the UN and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the status of UNAMIR, the UN alone may consent to the entry of any government officials or of any other person not a member of UNAMIR to such premises.

2. In all cases, the Officer in Charge, or an appointed delegate, of any specific UNAMIR facility has the authority vested in him from the Force Commander to decide who may or may not enter his respective facility. In general, the following guidelines will be followed at all times unless the Officer in Charge of a particular facility feels there are overriding circumstances that warrant a deviation from the general practice.

RPA SOLDIERS

3. RPA soldiers requesting access to any UNAMIR facility must be accompanied by an RPA Liaison Officer (RPA LO). If the RPA LO is not present the soldiers are to be instructed to contact an RPA LO at UN HQ (Amahoro Hotel) and request the LO to accompany them. Only when the RPA LO is accompanying the soldiers and he produces his identification pass, may they seek authorization from the Officer in Charge, or his delegate. Should access be granted, an escort shall be provided. All RPA soldiers will abide by the rules and regulations pertaining to each respective facility ie. unloading of weapons, denied access to restricted areas, etc.

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#### RPF OFFICIALS


4. RPF officials (ie. government dignitaries - the President, Vice President, Ministers) do not require an RPA LO to accompany them when requesting access to a UNAMIR facility. Often, these personnel will travel with an entourage of RPA soldiers. Again, access will be granted or denied by the Officer in Charge of the facility, or his delegate, and an escort will be provided.

#### VISITORS

5. Any person who is not in possession of a pass (ie. UN pass, local worker pass, media/NGO or contractor pass) is considered to be a visitor. If it is determined that the visitor has a legitimate cause to visit the facility, the Officer in Charge, or his delegate, shall be sought after to decide whether access should be granted. If access is granted, the visitor will be given and shall wear a visitor pass (if the facility has incorporated the production of visitor passes), an escort shall be provided and the visitor must abide by all rules and regulations applicable to the facility.

#### PERSONNEL WITH PASSES

6. All personnel with a pass (as listed at paragraph 5) will be allowed access only if the photograph identification is a positive match to the person wearing the pass. Personnel shall wear their passes at all times and only visit areas where they have a need to do so. At times, with the case of media and contractors, an escort may need to be provided.



Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

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