

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]  
R#176 APR 2009

UNARCHIVES  
SERIES 51062  
BOX 7  
FILE 3  
ACC. 1998/0282



KIGALI, 11 February 1995

Dear Minister

Subject: REPATRIATION OF FRENCH WEAPONS

At the conclusion of Operation Turquoise, the departing French Force transferred six weapon systems to the Franco African Battalion which remained in Rwanda as part of UNAMIR.

It transpired that these weapons were surplus to the Franco African Battalion requirement. Consequently, the weapons were further transferred to UNAMIR for safe keeping and disposal action. Enclosures 1 and 2 are evidence of these transactions. Since, UNAMIR has been directed by UN HQ to facilitate the repatriation of these weapons to the French Government.

Action to date has included preparation of the weapons for shipment and the provision of advice to the Chief of Customs (enclosure 3) of UNAMIR's proposal to consign the weapons as directed by UN HQ. Accordingly, I now seek your approval to dispatch the consignment.

Please accept, Dear Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency, Major General P. Kagame  
Vice President and Minister for Defence  
Office of the Vice President  
Kigali

cc: Chief of Staff of the RPA

Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie

Enclosures:

1. Transfer voucher
2. Transfer voucher
3. Letter to Chief of Customs

1

FROM: SECTOR 4B HQ FRAFATT//LOG O

TO: UNAMIR HQ / - CSS

SUBJECT: ISSUE VOUCHER OF WEAPONS.

1		PERCEPTION		2		Unité Intéressée		Série : 1594	
AVIS de (supprimer la mention inutile)		PERSONNEL		MINUAR II				Numéro : 01	
Repère	Numéro de Nomenclature	DESIGNATION DU MATERIEL (et numéro matricule s'il y a lieu)						Quantités	
1	1154 71	MIT 50 42HB FL VEH. NNR 168 F 31 - 184 854						5	
2		184 854. 194 127.						04	
3	1155 21	AFFUT TRE M3 NNR 4386. 4005. 2546. 62 076						06	
4	2631 13	GRENET LOT 7 NNR 233 01447. 643 1212.						02 -	
5	2800 31	GRENET LOT 5 M3 NNR 2930 697						01	
6									
7	Ces matériels devant servir à l'issue								
8	de l'opération.								
8		Motif du mouvement		9		L'Officier comptable des Matériels du Corps		10	
		Matériel Prêté Pour la MINUAR II				Date : 16. 08. 1994 (1) ALC HART. G.I.A.R.		Date : 17-08-94 CAF BOUSACHA BENOISTE (1) OFF ADA GENEVALAS	
		Voir au verso, les prescriptions particulières relatives à l'exécution du mouvement (s'il y a lieu).				(1) Grade, Nom et Signature.		11	
								Visa du Commandant d'Unité après exécution du mouvement	

B. DEMBELE  
MAJOR  
LOG O  
11233

FROM: SECTOR 4B HQ FRAFATT//LOG O

TO: UNAMIR HQ / - CSS

- G3 PLAN

SUBJECT: ISSUE VOUCHER OF WEAPONS.

1

AVIS de  
(rayer la mention inutile)

PERCEPTION  
VERSEMENT

2

Unité intéressée

BAT AF

Série : 94

Numéro : AMM

Repère	Numéro de Nomenclature	DESIGNATION DU MATERIEL (et numéro matricule s'il y a lieu)	Quantités
1	M 63 <sup>30</sup> 21	M0 81 M44 MNR 2121 / 2441	2
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			

8

Motif du mouvement

Prêt MAT BAT AF  
MAT 13DBLE

Voir au verso, les prescriptions particulières relatives  
à l'exécution du mouvement (s'il y a lieu).

9

L'Officier comptable  
des Matériels du Corps

Date : 20-08-94  
MCH UNTEREINER  
(1) Grade, Nom et Signature.

10

Reçu les matériels  
ci-dessus désignés

Date : 20-08-94  
(1) CAR B. DEMBELE  
OFF LOG SN

11

Visa du  
Commandant  
d'unité après  
exécution du  
mouvement

B. DEMBELE  
MAJOR  
LOG O  
11233

T: 2855B



2 February 1995

Dear Sir,

Trans-shipment of weapons


We have been requested by the United Nations, New York to return weapons which belong to the French forces in Central African Republic and Djibouti.

Please find attached a list of the serial numbers of each weapon, together with the weight and dimensions of the crates in which they are packed. Please note that the breech blocks are packed separately from the heavy machine guns.

We wish to request your authorization to transport the above weapons to Nairobi on the UNAMIR flight on Saturday, 4 February.

Many thanks for your assistance.

Yours sincerely,

  
L.C. Ouattara  
Chief  
Air Ops/Movcon

Chief of Customs  
Kigali International Airport  
Kanombe

*Have changed as  
special authorization  
needed from Nbo.*

*3/2/95.*

Dimensions and weights of weapons crates  
and serial nos. of weapons

DJIBOUTI

1.	Length	54"	81mm mortar	
	Width	20"	<u>Serial no.</u>	124 kg.
	Height	12.5	2121	
2.	Length	54"	81mm mortar	
	Width	20"	<u>Serial no.</u>	124 kg.
	Height	12.5"	2441	
TOTAL WEIGHT				248 kg.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

3.	Length	41"	Heavy machine guns (HMG) (2)	
	Width	25.5"	<u>Serial nos.</u>	96 kg.
	Height	11"	191127/484679	
4.	Length	41"	Heavy machine guns (2)	
	Width	25.5"	<u>Serial nos.</u>	96 kg.
	Height	11"	1848574/697731	
5.	Length	55"	HMG tripods (4) and barrels (8)	
	Width	21.5"	<u>Serial nos.</u>	215 kg.
	Height	14"	7386/2546/4005/62076	
6.	Length	9"	HMG breech blocks	
	Width	6"	<u>Serial nos.</u>	12 kg.
	Height	12"	191127/484679/1848574/697731	
TOTAL WEIGHT				419 kg.

## ROUTING SLIP

## FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:  
A: FCFROM:  
DE: ED

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

11/2

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

You will note that  
there are two letters.  
The one to the minister  
was sent after Mr.  
Nkusi's letter following  
the advice of H2 New York.  
Mick  
11/2

Noted  
JH  
11/12

10 February 1995

Excellency,


We are writing to inform you of our intention to commence broadcasting operations of the U.N. radio station in Rwanda.

In view of the fact that the Ministry of Information granted UNAMIR a license to broadcast on 14 January 1995, and in light of our conversation yesterday with Mr. Sam Nkusi, the Director-General of Rwandatel, during which he informed us of his approval of our radio frequencies requested and assured us that we were authorised to begin broadcasting immediately, we wish to inform you that Radio UNAMIR will begin broadcasting on Monday, 13 February 1995 at 16:00.

We appreciate the cooperation extended by members of your Government with regard to obtaining the necessary approvals for broadcasting.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

  
Abdul Hamid Kabia  
Executive Director

His Excellency Jean Baptiste Nkuliyingoma  
The Ministry of Information  
Kigali

cc: Her Excellency Madame Immaculee Kayumba  
The Minister of Transport and Communications  
Kigali

Mr. Sam K. Nkusi  
Director-General  
Rwandatel, S.A.  
Kigali

P2/2  
MIR 553

③ File  
Dircon  
12 Feb 95

② Noted  
JH  
11 Feb 95

©





10 February 1995

Dear Mr. Nkusi,

It was a pleasure meeting with you yesterday and I am glad we had the opportunity to resolve any possible misunderstandings concerning our efforts to operate a UN Radio Station in Rwanda.

We appreciate the information you gave us with regard to the allocation of the radio frequencies needed for the commencement of our broadcasting operations, and specifically, that the frequencies have been approved and formal authorization would be transmitted to us within a matter of days.

In view of your assurances that we can immediately start broadcasting, we would appreciate a meeting with you and our Radio staff team to resolve outstanding issues of mutual interest before we go on the air.

We look forward to receiving the formal notification of approval of the frequencies requested at the earliest.

Yours sincerely,

  
Abdul Hamid Kabia (Dr)  
Executive Director

Mr. Sam K. Nkusi  
Director-General  
Rwandatel, S.A.  
Kigali

cc: Force Commander & Acting Head of Mission, UNAMIR

Director-General  
Ministry of Transport and Communications  
Kigali, Rwanda



Date : 24/01/1995 .

Ref.: CIVPOL/Letter/4/95.

Monsieur le Ministre

Objet: Formation de 100 agents de la Police Communale pour la Préfecture de Kigali

Comme suite à ma correspondance CIVPOL/Letter/1/95 du 17 Janvier 1995 par laquelle je vous transmettais deux projets de lettre relatifs au recrutement et à la formation des agents de la Police Communale, j'ai l'honneur de vous proposer de bien vouloir autoriser dans un premier temps la formation de 100 agents de la Police Communale au niveau de la Ville de Kigali.

La formation de policiers dans les autres préfectures du pays pourra se faire dans un second temps sur la base de l'expérience vécue et des ressources disponibles.

Pour cela je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir me recevoir le plus tôt qu'il vous sera possible pour dégager les modalités pratiques de cette formation.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Le Chef de la Police Civile  
de la MINUAR

  
C.O. Diarra

S.E. Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur  
et du Développement Communal  
Ministère de l'Intérieur  
Kigali (Rwanda)

cc: - S.E. Monsieur le Représentant Spécial ✓  
du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies  
  
- Bureau de Liaison SRSG/CIVPOL



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Date: Kigali, 17 janvier 1995  
Ref: CIVPOL/LETTER/1/95

Monsieur le Ministre,

D

OBJET: Deux projets de lettre relatifs au recrutement et à la formation des agents de la Police Communale.

Pièces jointes: Deux projets de lettre

Comme suite à notre entretien, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre haute appréciation les deux projets de lettre cités en objet.

Il s'agit là de projets, donc susceptibles de subir tous amendements que vous jugerez nécessaires.

Dans l'espoir que ces deux textes répondront à votre attente, je vous prie de croire Monsieur le Ministre en l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Le Chef de la Police Civile  
de la MINUAR

*C.O. Diarra*  
C.O. Diarra

S.E. Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur et  
du Développement Communal  
Ministère de l'Intérieur  
Kigali (Rwanda)


cc: - S.E. Monsieur le Représentant Spécial  
du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies

- Bureau de Liaison SRSG/CIVPOL

② Note'

- deux projets liés  
valables

- Au dossier S.V.P.



*19.1.95*

*Le Ministre de l' Intérieur et du Développement Communal  
à tous -Préfets  
-Bourgmestres*

*Objet: Formation des Agents de la Police Communale*

*Suite à la requête du Gouvernement Rwandais, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies par sa Résolution S/994/965 du 30 Novembre 1994 a décidé d' assister notre pays à la mise en place et à la formation d' une nouvelle force de police nationale.*

*A cet effet, la MINUAR va procéder très prochainement au déploiement dans les Préfectures d' Observateurs Policiers de CIVPOL chargés entre autres de la formation d' agents de Police Communale. Ces Observateurs de CIVPOL en accord avec les autorités locales procéderont à:*

- la sélection des agents de la Police Communale*
- la mise en place de la Police Communale*
- l' élaboration d' un programme de formation des agents de police communaux*
- la formation des policiers communaux dans les différents centres au niveau des préfectures.*

*Ainsi le volet formation des agents de la Police Communale constituera à n' en pas douter l' axe principal des activités des observateurs de CIVPOL.*

*Compte tenu du fait que la mise en place d' une Police Communale est un facteur de renforcement de la sécurité publique, les éléments appelés à accomplir une telle mission doivent nécessairement acquérir au cours de leur formation de solides connaissances professionnelles et techniques les rendant aptes à l' exercice de leur futur métier. En outre lorsqu' ils seront convaincus de tout l' intérêt que revêt pour vous leur formation et l' impact positif que celle-ci peut avoir sur vos administrés et partant sur la vie de la Nation, ils comprendront toute l' importance de leur rôle dans la commune.*

*En conséquence, je vous invite à vous investir auprès des Observateurs de CIVPOL déployés dans vos circonscriptions respectives pour la réussite du programme de formation des Agents de la Police Communale en faisant preuve de votre disponibilité entière et de votre soutien moral à leur endroit.*

## AVIS

*Le Ministre de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal communique:*

1. *Il est ouvert dans toutes les Préfectures du Rwanda un concours de recrutement d'élèves agents de la Police communale*
2. *Peut faire acte de candidature, toute personne remplissant les conditions suivantes:*
  - *être de nationalité rwandaise*
  - *être âgé de 18 ans au moins et de 25 ans au plus*
  - *Savoir lire et écrire couramment dans l'une des langues reconnues officielles au Rwanda*
  - *être physiquement apte*
  - *être de bonne moralité*
  - *être de l'un des sexes*
3. *Toute personne intéressée par le présent communiqué devra adresser sa demande de candidature à la Préfecture du lieu de sa résidence accompagnée des pièces suivantes:*
  - *une copie de l'acte de naissance ou d'un jugement supplétif tenant lieu*
  - *un certificat de résidence*
  - *un certificat de scolarité attestant de son niveau d'instruction*
  - *un certificat de visite et de contre visite*
  - *un extrait du casier judiciaire*
4. *La date limite de dépôt des candidatures est fixée au .....*
5. *Les épreuves qui seront notées de 0 à 20 porteront sur les matières suivantes:*

- <i>Narration=</i>	<i>Durée 2h = coefficient 2.</i>
- <i>Dictée et questions=</i>	<i>Durée 2h = coefficient 4</i>
- <i>Histoire=</i>	<i>Durée 1h = coefficient 2</i>
- <i>Géographie=</i>	<i>Durée 1h = coefficient 2</i>

*Les modalités de déroulement du concours feront l'objet d'un communiqué ultérieur.*

UNAMIR- MINUAR

January 17, 1995  
REF: CIVPOL/LETTER/1/95

Mister Minister,

SUBJECT: Two letter drafts concerning  
the recruitment and the training  
of Communal Police Agents

Attached papers : Two letter drafts

With reference to our talk, I have the honour to submit to your high appreciation the two letter drafts mentioned in the subject.

These are drafts susceptible to undergo any amendment if you judge it necessary.

Best regards.

Chief of the UNAMIR Civil Police

C.O DIARRA

H.E. Minister of Home Affairs  
and Communal Development  
Ministry of Home Affairs  
KIGALI( RWANDA)

CC :

- H.E. Mister the Special Representative  
of the United Nations Secretary General
- Liaison Office SRSG/CIVPOL

Minister of Home Affairs and Communal Development

To all - Prefects  
- Burgomasters

SUBJECT: Training of Communal Police Agents

With reference to the request of the Rwandese Government the UN Security Council, through its resolution S/9994/965 of 30 November 1994, has decided to assist our country in the creation and the training of a new national police force.

In this respect, UNAMIR will proceed very soon to the deployment in the prefectures of CIVPOL Police Observers in charge, among other things, of the training of Communal Police Agents. These CIVPOL observers, in collaboration with local authorities, will proceed to:

- the selection of Communal Police Agents
- the creation of Communal Police
- the elaboration of a training programme for communal police agents
- The training of communal police persons in different centres at the prefectural level.

This training of communal Police Agents will undoubtedly constitute the main axis of the activities of CIVPOL observers.

Due to the fact that the creation of Communal Police is a reinforcing factor to the public security, the elements designated to accomplish such a mission must necessarily acquire, during their training, solid professional and technical knowledge for them to fit their future job. In addition, when they will be convinced of any importance of their training and the positive impact that this can have on the people under your jurisdiction and on the national life in general, they will understand the importance of their role in the commune.

Consequently, for the success of the training programme of Communal Police Agents, I invite you ensure to the CIVPOL observers deployed in your respective areas, your total availability and your moral support.

## ANNOUNCEMENT

The Minister of Home Affairs and Communal Development communicates:

1. In all the prefectures of Rwanda, a test of recruitment of Communal Agent students is opened.
2. To be candidate, one must meet the following conditions:
  - to be Rwandese by nationality
  - to be aged between 18 and 25
  - to know how to read and to write in one of the officially recognized languages in Rwanda.
  - to be physically apt
  - to have good behaviour
  - to be female or male
3. Any person interested in this communiqué should present his request to his residential prefecture office with the following papers:
  - a copy of the birth certificate or a copy the suppletive judgement replacing the birth certificate
  - a residential certificate
  - a school certificate certifying the level of instruction
  - a certificate of visit and against visit
  - a copy of police record
4. The final date to submit candidatures is fixed on.....
5. The tests which will be graded from 0 to 20 and will include the following matters:

- Narration =	Duration 2h =	coefficient 2
- Dictation and questions =	Duration 2h =	coefficient 4
- History =	Duration 1h =	coefficient 2
- Geography =	Duration 1h =	coefficient 2

Modalities of the development of the test will be communicated later on.





File

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE  
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA  
(UNREO)

Mr Seth Sendashonga  
Minister of Interior  
Kigali

Subject: Use of information surrounding Buzanze incident

Dear Minister,


It has been brought to my attention that there may be some misunderstanding arising out of the release of certain information obtained from UNREO in relation to the recent unfortunate incident at Buzanze Camp. You will be aware that, as the organisation responsible for coordinating the humanitarian relief effort in Rwanda, UNREO receives a very large amount of information covering a wide range of subjects on regular basis.

I am concerned that an unsubstantiated report, prepared by one of our field officers following the Buzanze incident was released to the RPA liaison officer at UNREO and may now be the subject of apparent antagonism between the Government and MSF. I must assure you that the information contained in the subject report was provided by a large number of sources and merely reflects the perceptions of those sources at the time. Furthermore, it is underscored that this report remains unsubstantiated and does not claim to be authoritative. None of the information contained in the report is attributable to MSF, and UNREO takes full responsibility for the contents of the report.

Accordingly, this office regrets that any misunderstanding may have arisen amongst representatives of your Ministry.

I trust that this matter will not adversely affect the most cordial working relationship currently enjoyed between UNREO, the humanitarian community and the Ministry.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Charles Petrie  
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator  
UNREO Kigali

cc. MGen Paul Kagame, Vice President and Minister of Defence  
Mr Jacques Bihozagara, Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration  
Mr Alphonse Nkubito, Minister of Justice  
Mr Shaharyar Khan, SRSG  
MGen Guy Tousignant, Force Commander  
Mr Nicolas de Torrenté, MSF Coordinator



Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur  
République Rwandaise  
Kigali

Kigali, le 11 janvier 1995

Monsieur le Ministre,

Médecins sans Frontières a l'honneur de vous faire parvenir la note d'information ci-jointe concernant l'incident de Busanze du 7 janvier dernier.

Cette note présente l'intégralité de l'information dont MSF dispose à ce sujet et doit être considérée comme la seule présentation des faits attribuable à MSF.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Ministre, à l'expression de ma plus haute considération.

Nicolas de Torrenté  
Coordinateur  
Médecins sans Frontières au Rwanda

cc:

Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense,

Monsieur le Ministre de Réhabilitation et de l'Intégration Sociale,

Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice,

Monsieur le Représentant spécial du secrétaire général Nations Unies,

Monsieur le Commandant en chef de la MINUAR.



**Note d'information**  
**Camp de déplacés de Busanze, Préfecture de Gikongoro**

Le 7 janvier 1995 au matin, MSF est informé d'un incident qui se sera déroulé dans la nuit du 6 au 7 janvier dans le camp de Busanze et de la présence de morts et de blessés. Un médecin MSF est dépêché sur place afin de prendre en charge les blessés.

Arrivé au centre de santé de Runyombi à 10h30, il constate qu'une trentaine de blessés y ont été transférés, parmi lesquels 6 seront évacués vers Kigali, 5 seront évacués vers Kibeho, et 4 seront évacués vers Butare. Les blessés présentent des plaies par balle et par arme blanche.

Le médecin se rend ensuite sur le camp de Busanze où un représentant de la MINUAR et des observateurs militaires lui signalent la présence de 12 corps.

Il identifie 12 cadavres: 3 jeunes hommes entre 15 et 20 ans, 3 femmes adultes et 6 enfants de moins de 12 ans.

Un examen individuel rapide des corps lui permet de faire les constatations suivantes.

- Les cadavres ne portent aucune trace de coups: pas d'échymoses, pas de contusions, ni de trace apparente de traumatisme par suite de viol.

- Les impacts d'entrée et de sortie des balles apparaissent de taille sensiblement identique et une douille de gros calibre a été retrouvée dans les vêtements d'une des victimes.

- Les victimes présentent des lésions et des plaies par balles et armes blanches:

- \* il y a 1 ou 2 impacts de balle par victime au niveau des jambes ou de la tête ou de l'abdomen ou du thorax,

- \* il y a quelques plaies linéaires profondes au niveau du cuir chevelu ou de la nuque,

- \* la seule victime qui ne présente pas d'impact de balle est un enfant de sexe féminin âgé de 1 à 2 ans présentant un crâne éclaté.

Cette note basée sur l'examen médical sommaire des corps des victimes a pour but de présenter la totalité de l'information dont MSF dispose sur cet incident. Il constitue la seule présentation des faits attribuable à MSF au sujet de cet incident.

Médecins sans Frontières  
Nicolas de Torrenté  
Coordinateur général



File

Major General Paul Kagame  
Vice President  
Broad Based Government of National Unity  
KIGALI  
Rwanda

9 January 1995

*Excellency*

It has been reported to me that today one of my UNAMIR helicopters overflew your President's Residence. The incident occurred during a maintenance flight by the commercial operator, Canadian Helicopters. Although this was not an operational UNAMIR flight, and had not been authorised by me, I take responsibility for its movements.

I apologise for any concern and inconvenience that the overflight may have caused and hope that you will accept that this incident was an unfortunate misunderstanding. You have my assurance that my aircraft will not knowingly overfly any sensitive government installation.

Thank you for your understanding in this matter.

*G-C Tousignant*

G-C TOUSIGNANT  
Major General  
Force Commander

cc SRSG



File

Mr Pasteur Bizimungu  
President  
Broad Based Government of National Unity  
KIGALI  
Rwanda

9 January 1995

*Excellency*

It has been reported to me that today one of my UNAMIR helicopters overflew your Residence. The incident occurred during a maintenance flight by the commercial operator, Canadian Helicopters. Although this was not an operational UNAMIR flight, and had not been authorised by me, I take responsibility for its movements.


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Thank you for your understanding in this matter.

*G. C. Tousignant*

G-C TOUSIGNANT  
Major General  
Force Commander

cc SRSG





Kigali 23 December 1994

Dear Vice President General Kagame,

On the ninth of January the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, General deChastelain will be visiting his troops in UNAMIR. I would like to invite you to a private dinner at my residence for this occasion.

Rest assure that this gathering is very private an its intent is for a friendly exchange in a relaxing atmosphere. It would be an honour to have you attend this small reception.

Yours sincerely,

Mgen G. C. Tongniant  
Force Commander

Mgen P. Kagame  
Vice President  
Ministry of Defence  
Kigali



Kigali 23 November 1994

Dear Minister,

Please find enclosed a summary of incidents that have been reported to my staff involving the RPA for the period 15 November - 20 November 1994.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Totsignant', written over a horizontal line.

Mgen G. C. Totsignant  
Force Commander

Mr. Seth Sendashonga  
Minister of Interior  
Kigali

cc: SRSG  
Mgen P. Kagame

RPA ACCESS

Page No. 1  
11/21/94

DATE 11/15/94 LOCATION GIKONGORO  
SOURCE GHANBAT GRID 5227  
REPORT SITREP 150001-160001 NOV INCIDENT RPA

ACTION

NOTES

GHANBAT REPORTED ON 15 NOV THAT A GHANBAT MP WAS DIRECTING TRAFFIC IN FRONT OF THE RPA BN HQ AT 150915 HRS NOV. RPA GENDARME ORDERED THE MP TO LEAVE - HE RESISTED AND THE RPA FIRED A WARNING SHOT. GHANBAT SUSPECT THAT THE RPA DISLIKE THE PRESENCE OF UNAMIR TROOPS AT THAT PARTICULAR LOCATION. THEY INTEND TO SEEK A COMPROMISE WITH THE BN COMD.

DATE 11/18/94 LOCATION AKAGERA  
SOURCE MILOB GP HQ GRID  
REPORT SITREP 180600-182200 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

ACTION

NOTES

THE RPA DENIED ACCESS TO A MILOB SECTOR 2 PATROL INTO THE AKAGERA AREA ON 18 NOV. NFD.

DATE 11/19/94 LOCATION RUHENGRI  
SOURCE TUNBAT GRID 5934  
REPORT SITREP 190001-192200 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

ACTION

NOTES

A TUNBAT PATROL WAS STOPPED ON 19 NOV BY AN RPA COL WHO TOLD THE PL COMD THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO USE APC'S AND THEY SHOULD GIVE UP THESE TYPES OF PATROLS IN ORDER NOT TO PROVOKE THE LOCAL POPULATION. NFD.

DATE 11/19/94 LOCATION RWERERE  
SOURCE TUNBAT HQ GRID 2722  
REPORT SITREP 190800-191600 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT HQ REPORTED THAT THE RPA DENIED ACCESS TO A PATROL AT RWERERE GR 2722 AT 190930HRS. THE PATROL WAS OBLIGED TO CHANGE ITS ITINERARY.

DATE 11/19/94 LOCATION MUTURA  
SOURCE MILOBS 5 GRID 3223  
REPORT SITREP 181700-191700 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

ACTION

NOTES

MILOBS SECTOR 5 REPORTED A TEAM WAS STOPPED BY THE RPA AT A CHECKPOINT NEAR MUTURA GR 3223 ON 19 NOV. THEY WANTED TO TRAVEL TO MUTOVA GR 3029 TO INVESTIGATE A REPORTED INCIDENT FROM TUNBAT WHERE THE RPA HAD KILLED A CIVILIAN ON 18 NOV. THE TEAM ATTEMPTED TO REACH MUTOVA THROUGH RWERERE GR 2822 BUT WERE STOPPED THERE AGAIN BY THE RPA WHO SAID THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO PATROL THAT AREA IN FUTURE BUT THE RPA WOULD DO IT. A MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED WITH THE RPA BN COMD.

DATE 11/20/94 LOCATION RWERERE  
SOURCE TUNBAT GRID 2822  
REPORT SITREP 200800-201600 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED THEIR PATROL WAS DENIED ACCESS BY THE RPA AT RWERERE GR 2822 ON 20 NOV. THEY ATTEMPTED ANOTHER ITINERARY BUT THEY WERE STOPPED AGAIN.



Page No. 2

11/21/94

DATE 11/19/94

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

REPORT SITREP 190001-192359 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION RUSAMBU

GRID 9030

ACTION

NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 19 NOV THAT ON 16 NOV AN RPA SOLDIER KILLED A MAN NAMED HADUNGNA RUKU ADENAMUNDAY AT RUSAMBU GR 9030. LOCALS CLAIM THAT THE SOLDIER ARRIVED IN THE VILLAGE AND WAS TOLD HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN KILLED. THEY THINK THE SOLDIER THEN KILLED THE MAN IN REVENGE. AFTER THE KILLING THE SOLDIER ALLEGEDLY TOOK 10 000 R FRANCS. LOCALS STATED THAT THEY WERE TOLD TO TELL NO ONE ABOUT THE KILLING. ETHIOBAT FEEL THIS WAS CONFIRMED ON 19 NOV AS THE SPOT WAS IMPOSSIBLE(!)

DATE 11/19/94

SOURCE MILOB 4B

REPORT SITREP 181800-191800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION MUSANGATI

GRID 3290

ACTION

NOTES

MILOBS 4B REPORTED 19 NOV THAT THE RPA ALLEGEDLY BEAT 3 HUTU MALES AT MUSANGATI GR 3290 ON 16 NOV. THEY ARE BEING TREATED AT THE LOCAL DISPENSARY.

DATE 11/19/94

SOURCE TUNBAT HQ

REPORT SITREP 190800-191600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION KABUHANGA

GRID 2931

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT HQ REPORTED 19 NOV THAT A GROUP OF 40 PEOPLE FROM MBURAMAZI GR 2929 ARRIVED AT THE TUNBAT HQ ON 19 NOV TO LODGE A COMPLAINT AGAINST RPA SOLDIERS. THEY REPORTED THAT ON NIGHT 18 NOV RPA SOLDIERS TRIED TO STEAL COWS FROM A MR KABUTUMWA IN KABUHANGA GR 2931. WHEN HE REFUSED THE RPA KILLED HIM WITH A BAYONET AND BY SHOOTING. THEY CONFIRMED THE BODY WAS STILL AT THE HOUSE. MILOBS TO INVESTIGATE.

DATE 11/20/94

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

REPORT SITREP 200001-202359 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION RUSIZI 1

GRID 7624

ACTION

NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 20 NOV THAT THE RPA FIRED 40 SHOTS AT BOATS APPROACHING RUSIZI 1 GR 7624 FROM ZAIRE. THEY CONFISCATED 2 BOATS. NFD.



Kigali 5 December 1994

Dear Minister,

Please find enclosed a summary of incidents that have been reported to my staff involving the RPA for the period 21 November - 02 December 1994.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant', is written over a horizontal line.

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mr. Seth Sendashonga  
Minister of Interior  
Kigali

cc: SRSG  
General P. Kagame

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR

03 Dec 94

MA to FC

LIST OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING RPA ARRESTS/ATTACKS AND DENIAL OF  
ACCESS TO UNAMIR PERSONNEL

1. Please the find the above list attached for the period 21 Nov 94 - 02 Dec 94.
2. The G2 database of all reported incidents in RWANDA is now operational and has allowed the list to be produced in the attached format.
3. Some incidents involve more than one type of RPA activity ie. an arrest and a killing. Where this has occurred and the incident has been reported twice one of the reports has been struck out. Reports which include the names of informants have had the names deleted to reduce the risk of retribution on the part of the RPA.



S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
For FC

Page No. 1  
12/03/94

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION GITARAMA  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 7270  
REPORT SITREP 201800-211800 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR 3  
ACTION

## NOTES

SECTOR 3 HQ REPORTED THAT ON 20 NOV THE RPA IN GITARAMA TOOK OFF THE UN FLAG FROM A MILOB TEAMS VEHICLE AND HANDED IT TO THE MILOB SAYING THEY DID NOT LIKE TO SEE THE UN FLAG. ON 21 NOV THEY BEGAN TAKING OFF THE FLAG AGAIN BUT DID NOT AS THE RPA LO APPEARED. THE RPA LO STATED THAT THE RPA BDE CMD HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A UN FLAG ON MILOB VEHICLES.

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION MYABIMAGA  
SOURCE FRAFBAT GRID 1351  
REPORT SITREP 210001-212200 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR 4B  
ACTION

## NOTES

FRAFBAT REPORTED 21 NOV THAT THEIR PL INITIALLY LOCATED AT NYABINAGA GR 1351 HAD BEEN MOVED TO MUBUGA GR 2463 AND ANOTHER, INITIALLY LOCATED AT BWAKIRA GR 5162 HAD BEEN MOVED TO BIRAMBO GR 4768. REASON GIVEN WAS THAT THE RPA REFUSED THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN THE INITIAL AREAS.

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION BUTARE  
SOURCE MILOB GR HQ GRID 7012  
REPORT SITREP 210001-212200 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR  
ACTION

## NOTES

MILOB HQ REPORTED THAT THE RPA WERE THOROUGHLY SEARCHING UNMOS VEHICLES IN THE BUTARE AREA ON 21 NOV. NFD.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION BUTARE  
SOURCE AUS MED GRID 7212  
REPORT VERBAL INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR  
ACTION

## NOTES

AUSMED VEHICLE WAS FIRED ON BY THE RPA IN BUTARE ADJACENT TO A ROAD BLOCK ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE TOWN AT APPROX 1345 HRS 22 NOV. A COLONEL HAD ALIGHTED FROM THE VEHICLE TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH OF A DEMOLISHED BUILDING. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE RECEIVED A NOD FROM AN RPA SOLDIER, HOWEVER ANOTHER SOLDIER APPROACHED AND DEMANDED THE CAMERA. THIS WAS REFUSED. THE INFANTRY SECTION 21/C INTERVENED AND TOLD THE VEHICLE TO DRIVE ON. AS IT DID THE RPA SOLDIER FIRED AT A REAR WHEEL, HITTING THE RIM. HE THEN FIRED ANOTHER, APPARENTLY AIMED AGAIN AT THE REAR WHEEL AND HIT THE TAILGATE. THE VEH CONTINUED TO TAC HQ. THE RPA CLAIMED THAT AUSMED FIRED FIRST. ALL WITNESSES, INCL MALAWI COY, GHAN SUPPLY PL AND LOCALS AGREED THAT ONLY TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION NYAKINAMA  
SOURCE MILOB GP HQ GRID 5925  
REPORT SITREP 220600-222200 NOV INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR  
ACTION

## NOTES

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED 22 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD DENIED ACCESS TO A HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM TO VISIT MISS UWAKIMWE USENGIYUMVA WHO RPA TROOPS HAD BURNED WITH FUEL AT NYAKINAMA GR 5925. THE RPA LATER TRANSFERRED THE PATIENT FROM MSF HOSPITAL TO THEIR OWN HOSPITAL AT RUHENGRI. RPA MEDICAL STAFF TOLD THE TEAM THAT THE PATIENT WAS RESPONDING WELL TO TREATMENT.

Page No. 2

12/03/94

DATE 11/22/94

SOURCE GHANBAT

REPORT SITREI 210001-220001 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION GIKONGORO

GRID 5827

INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR 4A

ACTION

GHANBAT REPORTED 22 NOV THAT THE RPA FIRED ON 2 CANADIAN MILOBS AT A CHECKPOINT NEAR GIKONGORO AT 2215HRS NOV. GHANBAT STOPPED THE TENSION. NFD.

DATE 11/23/94

SOURCE MILOB HQ

REPORT SITREI 210001-220001 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION MUKAMIRA

GRID 4621

INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR

ACTION

MILOB HQ REPORTED 23 NOV THAT A MILOB TEAM ATTEMPTED TO INTERVIEW A PRISONER AS PART OF AN INVESTIGATION AS NEARBY. GRID 4621 IS LOC. THE RPA DENIED ACCESS TO THE PRISONER.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE MILOB 1

REPORT SITREI 211800-221800 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION GITI (SECTOR 1)

GRID 2302

INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR 1

ACTION

MILOB SECTOR 1 REPORTED 25 NOV THAT THE RPA IN RUATARE GR 1908 DENIED ACCESS TO A MILOB TEAM TO GITI. THEY HAD APPARENTLY PREVIOUSLY DENIED ACCESS TO NGOs TO THE SAME AREA. THE MILOB TEAM TRIED AN ALTERNATE ROUTE AND VISITED GITI. THE TEAM DISCOVERED AN RPA CAMP APPROX COY STRENGTH 0.5 KM FROM RUATARE. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR PREVIOUS DENIAL OF ACCESS. THE PRISONER HAD NOT RECEIVED RELIEF FOR MONTHS. THE RPA HAD NO OTHER QUALIFIED STAFF FOR THE PRISONER.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE FRANK

REPORT SITREI 211800-221800 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION

GRID

INCIDENT

SECTOR

ACTION

SECTOR

ACTION

FRANK REPORTED 25 NOV THAT THE RPA IN RUATARE GR 1908 DENIED ACCESS TO A MILOB TEAM TO GITI. THEY HAD APPARENTLY PREVIOUSLY DENIED ACCESS TO NGOs TO THE SAME AREA. THE MILOB TEAM TRIED AN ALTERNATE ROUTE AND VISITED GITI. THE TEAM DISCOVERED AN RPA CAMP APPROX COY STRENGTH 0.5 KM FROM RUATARE. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR PREVIOUS DENIAL OF ACCESS. THE PRISONER HAD NOT RECEIVED RELIEF FOR MONTHS. THE RPA HAD NO OTHER QUALIFIED STAFF FOR THE PRISONER.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE TUNBATE

REPORT SITREI 211800-221800 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION

GRID

INCIDENT

SECTOR

ACTION

SECTOR

ACTION

TUNBATE REPORTED 25 NOV THAT THE RPA IN RUATARE GR 1908 DENIED ACCESS TO A MILOB TEAM TO GITI. THEY HAD APPARENTLY PREVIOUSLY DENIED ACCESS TO NGOs TO THE SAME AREA. THE MILOB TEAM TRIED AN ALTERNATE ROUTE AND VISITED GITI. THE TEAM DISCOVERED AN RPA CAMP APPROX COY STRENGTH 0.5 KM FROM RUATARE. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR PREVIOUS DENIAL OF ACCESS. THE PRISONER HAD NOT RECEIVED RELIEF FOR MONTHS. THE RPA HAD NO OTHER QUALIFIED STAFF FOR THE PRISONER.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE MILOB

REPORT SITREI 211800-221800 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION GISENII

GRID 1712

INCIDENT ACCESS

SECTOR 1

ACTION

MILOB REPORTED 25 NOV THAT THE RPA IN RUATARE GR 1908 DENIED ACCESS TO A MILOB TEAM TO GITI. THEY HAD APPARENTLY PREVIOUSLY DENIED ACCESS TO NGOs TO THE SAME AREA. THE MILOB TEAM TRIED AN ALTERNATE ROUTE AND VISITED GITI. THE TEAM DISCOVERED AN RPA CAMP APPROX COY STRENGTH 0.5 KM FROM RUATARE. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR PREVIOUS DENIAL OF ACCESS. THE PRISONER HAD NOT RECEIVED RELIEF FOR MONTHS. THE RPA HAD NO OTHER QUALIFIED STAFF FOR THE PRISONER.

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12/03/94

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

REPORT SITREP 300001-302359 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION KAMEMBE

GRID 7823

SECTOR 4C

ACTION

ETHIOBAT REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT A UNHCR AIRCRAFT WAS DETAINED FOR MORE THAN ONE HOUR AT KAMEMBE AIRPORT GR 7823. THE REASON GIVEN FOR DETENTION WAS THAT NO INFORMATION HAD BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING THE LANDING.

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 300800-301600 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION CYAMBARA AREA

GRID 3520

SECTOR 5

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT THEIR PATROL HAD BEEN STOPPED AT AN RPA CHECKPOINT AT GR 3520 AND WAS ORDERED TO REMOVE THE UN FLAG FROM THE VEHICLE.

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE MILOB 5

REPORT SITREP 291700-301700 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION GISENYI

GRID 1712

SECTOR 5

ACTION

MILOB 5 REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT ON ITS ARRIVAL FROM KIBUYE, THE RPA DETAINED THE UNAMIR BARGE AND ARRESTED ITS OCCUPANTS. THE RPA BATTALION COMMANDER IN GISENYI INSISTS THAT HE WILL NOT ALLOW THE BARGE TO OPERATE WITHOUT WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. SEVEN PERSONNEL ARRESTED INCLUDED ONE CANADIAN LTCOL MILOB AND SIX BROWN AND ROOT DRIVERS.

MILOB GP HQ ON 1 DEC REPORTED THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF THE BARGE WERE NOT IN FACT ARRESTED BUT CHOSE TO STAY ON THE BARGE. THE BARGE WAS RELEASED 1 DEC.

DATE 12/01/94

SOURCE MALAWI COY

REPORT SITREP 301800-011800 DEC INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION BUSORO

GRID 6605

SECTOR 3

ACTION

MALAWI COY REPORTED 1 DEC THAT THEIR PATROL WAS DENIED ACCESS BY THE RPA IN THE AREA BUSORO 6605 AS THEY HAD A UNIT IN THE AREA.

DATE 12/01/94

SOURCE MILOB GP HQ

REPORT SITREP 010001-012200 DEC INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION GISENYI

GRID 1712

SECTOR 5

ACTION

MILOBS GP HQ REPORTED 1 DEC THAT THE UNAMIR BARGE DETAINED BY THE RPA AT GISENYI SINCE 30 NOV HAD BEEN RELEASED ON 1 DEC. THE MILOB COMD AND 6 BROWN AND ROOT DRIVERS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA IN FACT CHOSE TO REMAIN ON THE BARGE - THEY WERE NOT ARRESTED OR FORCED TO STAY ON THE BARGE.

DATE 12/01/94

SOURCE AUSMED

REPORT SITREP 010001-012200 DEC INCIDENT ACCESS

NOTES

LOCATION KIGALI

GRID

SECTOR 6

ACTION

AUSMED REPORTED 1 DEC THAT AN RPA BN COMD HAD VISITED AUSMED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE USE BY AUSMED OF TRACKED APC'S - HE CLAIMED THEY WERE BANNED. HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE BAN HAD BEEN REVOKED AND WE HAD CLEARANCE TO

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Page No. 1  
12/03/94

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION RAMBA  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 5414  
REPORT SITREP 201800-211800 NOV INCIDENT ATTACK

SECTOR 3  
ACTION

## NOTES

SECTOR 3 HQ REPORTED THAT 8 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 4 INJURED IN RAMBA GR 5414. THE INJURED WERE MEDIVACED BY UNAMIR EFFORT. NFD. COMMENT. RAMBA HAS FEATURED IN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS SINCE MID OCT 94. GASASA, THE SCENE OF THE MACHETE MURDER OF 11 PEOPLE ON 21 OCT IS 2 KM FROM RAMBA. ON 6 NOV LOCALS CLAIMED THAT TUTSI CIVILIANS LIVING IN RAMBA ASSISTED RPA SLODIERS TO STEAL CATTLE ETC FROM SURROUNDING AREAS. END COMMENT.

GHANBAT REPORTED IN THEIR SITREP THAT THE INJURED HAD BEEN EVACUATED TO KIGEME HOSPITAL.

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION KARAMA  
SOURCE ETHIOBAT GRID 8232  
REPORT INCIDENT REPORT 211415NOV INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

## NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED THAT THE RPA, AT ABOUT 210400 HRS NOV KILLED 12 PEOPLE AND WOUNDED ONE IN KARAMA VILLAGE GR 8232 (SECTOR 4C). THE RPA CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD KILLED THEM BECAUSE THEY HAD FIRED SHOTS AND THREW A GRENADE AT THE RPA. LOCALS CLAIMED THE VICTIMS WERE LOCAL DWELLERS AND NOT ARMED. COMMENT. KARAMA VILLAGE IS IN THE KAMEMBE COMMUNE WHERE THE RPA SHOTAND KILLED 5 PEOPLE ON 27 OCT - OSTENSIBLY FOR INJURING AN RPA SOLDIER. END COMMENT.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION GIKENDAMVURA  
SOURCE ETHIOBAT GRID 9309  
REPORT SITREP 220001-222359 NOV INCIDENT REFUGEES

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

## NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 22 NOV THAT OF THE 5000 BURUNDI REFUGEES ONLY 503 ARE IN RWANDA, 6 ARE DEAD OF HUNGER. THE RPA ARRESTED 6 BURUNDI REFUGEES AND HANDED THEM OVER TO BURUNDI SOLDIERS. TWO WERE KILLED BY BURUNDI TROOPS, ANOTHER RAN AWAY AND 3 ARE IN JAIL.. THE REST HAVE LEFT FOR HOMES IN BURUNDI.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION KAMEMBE  
SOURCE MILOB GP HQ GRID 8232  
REPORT SITREP 220600-222200 NOV INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR  
ACTION

## NOTES

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED 22 NOV THAT THE RPA THREW A GRENADE AMONGST A CROWD AS THEY WERE TRYING TO ARREST A SUSPECT IN CYANGUGU GR 7824. DTG OF INCIDENT NOT GIVEN. 12 PEOPLE WERE REPORTED KILLED.

ON 24 NOV MILOB SECTOR 4C REPT THAT ALL DESEACED VICTIMS SHOWED SIGNS OF BULLET WOUNDS AND NO SIGNS OF FRAGMENT WOUNDS. INCIDENT OCCURRED 202000 NOV94



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12/03/94

DATE 11/23/94

LOCATION KANGAZI AREA

SECTOR 4C

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

GRID 7834

ACTION

REPORT SITREP 230001-232354 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 23 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD KILLED TWO CIVILIANS IN THE AREA OF GR 7834. (POSS KANGAZI AREA) THOSE KILLED WERE RUSAUNGA GUGA AND TUGAGNURA GUGA)

DATE 11/23/94

LOCATION KAMEMBE

SECTOR

SOURCE MILOB HQ

GRID 8232

ACTION

REPORT SITREP 230001-232200 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

THIS REFERS TO INCEDENT NO 540,  
MILOB HQ REPORTED 23 NOV THE RESULT OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO AN INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED 21 NOV IN KAMEMBE GR 8232  
LOCALS CONFIRMED THAT 13 PEOPLES WERE KILLED ON 21 NOV 94.  
THEY WERE RETURNING FROM A BAR WHEN THEY WERE AMBUSH BY THE RPA.  
THE RPA CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLES WERE BANDITS WHO HAD KILLED 5 RPA SOLDIERS IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS BETWEEN RUSIZI 1 AND 2. INVESTIGATION CONTINUES.

DATE 11/24/94

LOCATION NEMBA

SECTOR 5

SOURCE TUNBAT

GRID 7619

ACTION

REPORT SITREP 240001-242200 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED 24 NOV 94 THAT THE RPA HAD GONE TO AN ORPHANAGE AT NEMBA GR 7619 IN ORDER TO KILL THE CHILDREN. A TUNBAT TEAM WAS DESPATCHED TO PROVIDE SECURITY. MILOBS WERE INFORMED AND WENT TO INVESTIGATE.

DATE 11/26/94

LOCATION BUSHENGE

SECTOR 4C

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

GRID 8729

ACTION

REPORT SITREP 260001-262359 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 26 NOV THAT A RICH MAN NAMED KAMARUCHRIBUNA WAS FOUND KILLED NEAR BUSHENGE GR 8729.. HIS RELATIVES CLAIM THAT THE RPA KILLED HIM. 2 000 R FR WERE STOLEN BEFORE KILLING HIM AND 2 000 000 AFTERWARDS. THEY CLAIM THEY CAN POINT OUT THE KILLER AMONGST THE RPA IN THE AREA.

DATE 11/27/94

LOCATION KINYAGA

SECTOR 4C

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

GRID 8235

ACTION

REPORT SITREP 270001-272359 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

ETHIOBAT REPORTED 27 NOV THAT ON NI 26 NOV THE RPA FIRED ROUNDS AGAINST TWO BOATS WHICH WERE LEAVING RWANDA TO ZAIRE THROUGH KINYAGA GR 8235. ETHIOBAT CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NINE DEAD AND ONE INJURED FROM THE FIRST BOAT. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE TEN FROM THE SECOND BOAT IS UNKNOWN.

ETHIOBATT REPORTED 28 NOV CORRECTIONS TO ABOVE , TODAY THEIR PATROLS REPORTED THAT THEY HAD ONLY FOUND TWO BODIES AND THE ONE WOUNDED SPENT THE NIGHT AT THEIR HQ. LOCALS REPORTED THAT THE RPA KILLED 20 PEOPLE IN TWO BOATS, HOWEVER NO EVIDENCE WAS FOUND TO SUPPORT THIS.

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12/03/94

DATE 11/27/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 270800-271600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION RUKORE

GRID 3625

INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR 5

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED ON 27 NOV THAT THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED A CHILD NAMED BURAHANDA ON 25 NOV AT RUKORE GR 3625. THREE OTHER PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON THE SAME DAY. THEIR NAMES ARE GIHANAJEAN, MUSABY AND MANA.

AT MUHILIMA GR 3225 A WOMAN REPORTED THAT HER HUSBAND AND HER SON HAD BEEN ARRESTED 3 MONTHS AGO. NAMES ARE NZTIABAKUZE OUZEL AND SINDAYIGAYATHE OPHILE.

ANOTHER MAN NAMED HATEGE GUIMANA HAD BEEN ARRESTED 3 WEEKS EARLIER IN THE SAME AREA.

DATE 11/28/94

SOURCE GERMAN CIV

REPORT VERBAL 27 1715 NOV

NOTES

LOCATION RUTONGO

GRID 0494

INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR

ACTION

C GERMAN CIV [REDACTED] REPORTED TO THE DUTY OFFICER ON THE 28 NOV 94 THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY KILLINGS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF RUTONGO (0494) AND MUGAMBAZI (0403), SECTOR 1. IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THESE KILLINGS BEGAN SINCE A NEW RPA COMMANDER MOVED TO THE AREA FROM MBOGO (9604) IN SECTOR 5. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE WERE TWO MASS GRAVES NEAR THE CHURCH IN RUTONGO.

DATE 11/28/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 280800-281600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION MUTOVU

GRID 2929

INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR 5

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED 28 NOV THAT ONE WEEK AGO AT MUTOVU (2929), THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED 3 PEOPLE WHO ATTEMPTED TO CROSS INTO ZAIRE.

DATE 12/01/94

SOURCE ETHIOBAT

REPORT SITREP 010001-012359 DEC INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION NYAMASHEKE

GRID 9841

INCIDENT RPA

SECTOR 4C

ACTION

C ETHIOBAT REPORTED 01 DEC THAT THE RPA HAD KILLED 3 WOMEN AND 1 CHILD AS THEY TRIED TO CROSS TO ZAIRE IN THE NYAMASHEKE AREA GR 9841. THE RPA CLAIMED THAT PROPER ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN NFD.

DATE 12/01/94

SOURCE MILOB 4A

REPORT SITREP 301800-011800 DEC INCIDENT REFUGEES

NOTES

LOCATION MUKO

GRID 3840

INCIDENT REFUGEES

SECTOR 4A

ACTION

MILOBS 4A REPORTED 1 DEC THAT THE BURGERMEISTER OF MUKO GR 3840 HAD WARNED THE REFUGEES THAT THE CAMP MUST BE CLEARED BY 5 DEC AND THAT THE CAMP WOULD BE BURNED ON THAT DAY. REFUGEES TOLD MILOBS THAT THE BURGERMEISTER HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE CAMP WILL BE BURNED AND THE RPA WOULD DO IT AND KILL REFUGEES.

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12/03/94

DATE 11/21/94 LOCATION MUHEHWE  
SOURCE MILOBS 4C GRID 8609  
REPORT SITREP 201800-211800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

MILOBS 4C REPORTED 21 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED TWO BANDITS IN THE MUHEHWE GR 8609 AREA. REPORTED TO BE MEMBERS OF A LOCAL CRIMINAL GANG.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION KAREBA  
SOURCE TUNBAT GRID 4023  
REPORT SITREP 220800-222200 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

SECTOR 5  
ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED 22 NOV THAT A RWANDAN NURSE WORKING FOR MSF REPORTED THAT HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN ARRESTED AT KAREBA 4023 ON 19 NOV. HE WAS TAKEN IN AN UNKNOWN DIRECTION.

DATE 11/22/94 LOCATION NKUMBA  
SOURCE MILOB GP HQ GRID 6639  
REPORT SITREP 220600-222200 NOV INCIDENT RPA  
NOTES

SECTOR  
ACTION

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED 22 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD SURROUNDED ONE MR BRIZIMA AT NKUMBA GR 6639 AS HE WAS SUSPECTED OF POSSESSING A GRENADE. (NO DTG GIVEN). A SEARCH REVEALED NOTHING BUT HE WAS TAKEN TO KIDAHU MILITARY CAMP AND TIED WITH ROPES. HE WAS LATER RELEASED BUT HAD HIS TWO ARMS AMPUTATED WHEN HE WENT TO THE MSF HOSPITAL IN RUHENGIRI.

DATE 11/23/94 LOCATION KIBARE  
SOURCE ETHIOBAT GRID 0142  
REPORT SITREP 230001-232354 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

ETHIOBATT REPORTED 23 NOV THAT THE RPA ARRESTED 8 PEOPLE ON SUSPICION OF BEING RGF AT KIBARE GR 0142,

DATE 11/23/94 LOCATION NYAMASHEKE  
SOURCE ETHIOBAT GRID 9841  
REPORT SITREP 230001-232354 NOV INCIDENT RPA  
NOTES

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

ETHIOBAT REPORTED ON 23 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD "BEATED ONE CIVILIAN AND ARRESTED ONE WOMAN AT GR 9841" (NYAMASHEKE AREA) NFD.

DATE 11/24/94 LOCATION VUNGA  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 8659  
REPORT SITREP 231800-241800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

SECTOR 3  
ACTION

MILOB SECTOR 3 REPT ON 25 NOV THAT 17 PERS ARE BEING HELD PRISON AT VUNGHA. MOST PERS ARRESTED BY RPA. PRISONERS CAME FROM TAMBWE 7653 AND NYAMABUYE GR ? COMMUNES,

DATE 11/24/94 LOCATION GISAKURA  
SOURCE ETHIOBATT GRID 9829  
REPORT SITREP 240001-242359 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

SECTOR 4C  
ACTION

ETHIOBATT REPT ON 24 NOV THAT RPA SOLDIERS IN GISAKURA 9829 ARRESTED 2 CIVILIANS WITH THEIR VEHICLE (MERCEDES) FOR AN UNKNOWN REASON.

Page No. 2

12/03/94

DATE 11/24/94

SOURCE ETHIOBATT

REPORT SITREP 240001-242359 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION NYAGATARE

GRID 8124

SECTOR 4C

ACTION

NOTES

ETHIOBATT REPT 24 NOV THAT AT NYAGATARE DP CAMP 8124 A SUSPECTED EX RGF SOLDIER THOPUGHT TO HAVE TAKEN PART IN GENOCIDE WAS HANDED OVER TO THE RPA IN THE PRESENCE OF UNHCR. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE LOCAL RPA OFFICE IN KAMAMBE 7826 FOR INVESTIGATION.

DATE 11/24/94

SOURCE INDBAT

REPORT SITREP 231800-241800 NOV INCIDENT ATTACK

LOCATION KIGALI

GRID 0483

SECTOR 6

ACTION

NOTES

INDBAT REPORTED 24 NOV THAT A GRENADE WAS LOBBED INTO A MOVING VEHICLE NEAR THE UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI AT 241620 HRS. RPA FIRED ONE ROUND AND ARRESTED THE CIVILIAN.

DATE 11/24/94

SOURCE MILOB GP HQ

REPORT SITREP 240600-242200 NOV INCIDENT POLITICAL

LOCATION KIGALI

GRID 0483

SECTOR

ACTION

NOTES

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED 24 NOV THAT THE HUTU RESIDENTS OF KIGALI COMPLAINED OF HARASSMENT AND ARBITRARY ARRESTS. AND EXPRESSED FEAR AND INSECURITY DUE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RPA IN KIGALI.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ

REPORT SITREP 241800-251800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION KIGOMA

GRID 7750

SECTOR 3

ACTION

NOTES

SECTOR 3 HQ REPORTED ON 25 NOV THAT 5 WOMEN REPORTED TO MALI PATROL AT RUHANGO GR 7754 THAT THEIR HUSBANDS HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA IN KIGOMA GR GR 7649 ON N1 OF 23/24 NOV.

DATE 11/25/94

SOURCE MILOB 4B

REPORT SITREP 241800-251800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION RWAMATAMU

GRID 1557

SECTOR 4B

ACTION

NOTES

MILOBS 4B REPORTED 25 NOV THAT 3 TEACHERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA IN RWAMATAMU COMMUNE GR 1557 ON 14/15 NOV. THEY WERE DANIEL NKUNDUNUKI (RWAMATAMU), AUGUSTIN BURARIYO AND ALEX RUTIJANWA (VIRA GR 1658)

DATE 11/27/94

SOURCE GHANBAT

REPORT SITREP 270001-280001 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION BUSANZE

GRID 451912

SECTOR 4A

ACTION

NOTES

GHANBAT REPORTED 27 NOV THAT THE CHIEF DE CAMP OF BUSANZE GR 451912 REPORTED AT 271730 HRS THAT THE RPA HAD ABDUCTED A COUNCILLOR NAMED NSEGIMANO CLAVE. THE RPA WERE CONTACTED AND DENIED THE ALLEGATION.

DATE 11/27/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 270800-271600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

LOCATION RUKORE

GRID 3625

SECTOR 5

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED ON 27 NOV THAT THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED A CHILD NAMED BURAHANDA ON 25 NOV AT RUKORE GR 3625. THREE OTHER PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON THE SAME DAY. THEIR NAMES ARE GIHANAJEAN, MUSABY AND MANA.

AT MUHILIMA GR 3225 A WOMAN REPORTED THAT HER HUSBAND AND HER SON HAD BEEN ARRESTED 3 MONTHS AGO. NAMES ARE NZTIABAKUZE OUZEL AND SINDAYIGAYATHE OPHILE.  
ANOTHER MAN NAMED HATEGE GUIMANA HAD BEEN ARRESTED 3 WEEKS EARLIER IN THE SAME AREA.

DATE 11/27/94 LOCATION ZAIRE SECTOR 5  
SOURCE MILOB 5 GRID ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 261700-271700 NOV INCIDENT REFUGEES

NOTES

MILOBS 5 REPORTED 27 NOV THAT THE HANDOVER OF 37 RWANDANS WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN ZAIRE BECAUSE OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT IN KATALE REFUGEE CAMP. HANDOVER IS IN PROGRESS AT GISENYE/GOMA BORDER POST. UNHCR AND ICRS IN ATTENDANCE.

DATE 11/27/94 LOCATION BUSANZE SECTOR  
SOURCE MILOB GP HQ GRID 4591 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 270001-272200 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

NOTES

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED ON 27 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED 5 PEOPLE FROM THE BUSANZE DP CAMP GR 4590 AT A VILLAGE NEARBY. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

DATE 11/28/94 LOCATION GIHORWE SECTOR 5  
SOURCE TUNBATT GRID 3425 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 280800-281600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

TUNBATT REPORTED 28 NOV THAT A CHILD IN GIHORWE (3425) REPORTED THAT HIS FATHER BIGIRIMANA ALPHONSE WAS ARRESTED BY THE RPA 3 WEEKS AGO.

A MAN NAMED [REDACTED] WENT TO TUNBATT AND REPORTED THAT AT 271400 NOV 4 RPA SOLDIERS TOOK HIS SON THEOGENE AGE 20 FROM HIS COMMUNE KANAMA (2812) TO UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

DATE 11/29/94 LOCATION RUNYINYA SECTOR 3  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 6012 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 281800-291800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

SECTOR 3 HQ REPORTED 29 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF THE RGF AND INTERHAMWE IN THE RUNYINYA COMMUNE GR 6012 AND WERE CONDUCTING TORTURE NIGHTLY.

DATE 11/29/94 LOCATION REMERA SECTOR 4A  
SOURCE GHANBAT GRID 4292 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 290001-300001 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

GHANBAT REPORTED 29 NOV THAT AT 291200 HRS NOV A MRS ELIZERBERTH OD REMERA GR 4292 REPORTED TO A GHANBAT PATROL THAT HER HUSBAND WAS ABDUCTED BY RPA SOLDIERS. GHANBAT SECURED HIS RELEASE AND DISCOVERED IT HAD BEEN A CASE OF EXHORTION.

Page No. 4

12/03/94

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE ZAMBATT

REPORT SITREP 292100-302100 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION KIYUMBA

GRID 5729

SECTOR 4A

ACTION

NOTES

ZAMBATT REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT [REDACTED] OF KIYUMBA GR 5729 REPORTED THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED [REDACTED] MR LUJENGAMANZI ZHADAMANSEL ON 29 NOV FOR AN UNSPECIFIED REASON. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 300800-301600 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION MUTURA

GRID 3223

SECTOR 5

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT [REDACTED] FROM CYAMBARA GR 3619 REPORTED TO TUNBAT HQ THAT MASUKOMBO HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY TWO ARMED SOLDIERS.

DATE 11/30/94

SOURCE MILOB 5

REPORT SITREP 291700-301700 NOV INCIDENT ACCESS

LOCATION GISENYI

GRID 1712

SECTOR 5

ACTION

NOTES

MILOB 5 REPORTED ON 30 NOV THAT ON ITS ARRIVAL FROM KIBUYE, THE RPA DETAINED THE UNAMIR BARGE AND ARRESTED ITS OCCUPANTS. THE RPA BATTALION COMMANDER IN GISENYI INSISTS THAT HE WILL NOT ALLOW THE BARGE TO OPERATE WITHOUT WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. SEVEN PERSONNEL ARRESTED INCLUDED ONE CANADIAN LTCOL MILOB AND SIX BROWN AND ROOT DRIVERS.

MILOB GP HQ ON 1 DEC REPORTED THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF THE BARGE WERE NOT IN FACT ARRESTED BUT CHOSE TO STAY ON THE BARGE. THE BARGE WAS RELEASED 1 DEC.

DATE 12/02/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 020800-021600 DEC INCIDENT ARREST

LOCATION KANAMA

GRID 2812

SECTOR 5

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED 2 DEC THAT A WOMAN [REDACTED] REPORTED TO TUNBAT THAT [REDACTED] TUROGEN DACRITONENE FROM THE KANAMA COMMUNE GR 2812 HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON NOV 27 AND TAKEN TO UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

ANOTHER WOMAN NAMED RIRO DAFROUZ FROM MUTURA GR 3223 HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON 30 NOV AND TAKEN TO U/K DESTINATION.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali 7 November 1994

Dear Minister,

Please find enclosed a summary of incidents that have been reported to my staff involving the RPA for the period 29 October - 6 November 1994.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant', is written over a horizontal line.

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mr. Seth Sendashonga  
Minister of Interior  
Kigali

cc: SRSG

RPA INCIDENTS 29 OCT 94 - 06 NOV 94.

A. THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE RPA HAVE BEEN REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD AND HAVE BEEN EXTRACTED FROM THE UNAMIR DAILY SITREP.

(1) ON 301100B OCT 94 MILOBS REPORTED THAT THE RPA AT NYAMBISAZI (GR 5649) SHOT AND KILLED AN UNKNOWN FEMALE WHEN SHE DROVE THROUGH A CHECKPOINT. A HAND GRENADE WAS FOUND IN THE VICTIMS LUGGAGE.

(2) ON 291850B OCT 94 THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED A MAN IN MASANGO (GR 6253). MILOBS REPORTED THAT THE MAN WAS SHOT WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE.

(3) FRAFBATT REPORTED THAT THE RPA BURNED SOME TENTS DOWN IN THE BIRAMBO DP CAMP BECAUSE SOME PEOPLE HAD REMAINED IN THE CAMP WHICH WAS OFFICIALLY CLOSED ON 29 OCT 94.

(4) LOCALS OF NDAGO GR 5201 COMPLAINED OF CONSTANT HARASSMENT BY RPA. THEY REPORTED ON SIX PEOPLE KILLED AT RUKO GR 5200. UPON INVESTIGATION BY A PTL FROM MALAWI COY, IT WAS CONFIRMED 4 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, ONE MAN WAS SEVERELY BEATEN WHILST HIS HANDS WERE TIED AND ONE 10 YEAR OLD BOY WAS SHOT IN THE ARM. THE INJURED BOY WAS TAKEN TO BRITCON CLINIC. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT TWO RPA SOLDIERS IN UNIFORM ATTEMPTED TO ABDUCT THE WIFE OF ONE OF THE DECEASED AND TWO CHILDREN BUT FLED INTO THE HILLS AFTER AN ANGRY CROWD FROM THE DPs CAMP TRIED TO ATTACK THEM. LOCALS IN THE CAMP VOWED NEVER TO RETURN TO THEIR VILLAGES AS LONG AS RPA REMAIN IN POWER AND THAT THEY WILL DEAL WITH ANY TUTSIS THEY SEE IN THE AREA.

(5) MILOBS REPORTED THAT AN RPA OFFICER CUT OFF POWER LINES WITHIN BUTARE AT GR 6913 FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

(6) A PATROL FROM MALAWI COY ESCORTING ELECTROGAZ WORKERS REPAIRING POWER LINES WITHIN BUTARE WAS STOPPED AT GR 6913 BY AN RPA OFFICER, HE TOLD THE PATROL NOT TO ESCORT NGO'S CLOSE TO RPA LOCATIONS, THEY SHOULD TRAVEL ON THEIR OWN.

(7) RPA WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ARRESTED 4 PERSONS AT RUBONA GR 1022. NAMES OF PERSONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARRESTS UNDER INVESTIGATION.

(8) AT KIRAMBO GR 0444, A RPA SOLDIER WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SHOT AND KILLED A CIVILIAN ON THE BANK OF LAKE KIVU ON 01 NOV 94.

(9) RPA TROOPS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE ARRESTED AND BEATEN ONE MSF WORKER AT KANAMA GR 2713 ON 01 NOV 94.



(10) RPA ARRESTED 3 UNIDENTIFIED PERS IN THE NDAHO AREA IN SECTOR 3 FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

(11) THE RPA STILL CONDUCTING TRAINING OF RECRUITS AT KIBUYE TRAINING CAMP.

(12) RPA IN GITARAMA ARRESTED 3 CARITAS DRIVERS AND 2 OTHERS WHO ARE FRIENDS OF THE MENTIONED DRIVERS ON THE NIGHT 3 NOV 94. FATHER VIERO OF CARITAS REPORTED THAT THE 3 DRIVERS ON ROUTINE FOOD TRANSPORT MISSION FROM BUJUMBURA TO KIGALI STOPPED TO SEE THEIR FRIENDS IN GITARAMA. RPA ARRESTED THEM ON ALLEGATION THAT, THEY HAD FIRED SOME SHOTS WHILST THEY HAD NO WEAPONS. THEIR TRUCK WITH 20 TONS OF FOOD AID WAS CONFISCATED AND CURRENTLY BEING HELD BY RPA.

(13) RPA CONDUCTED CORDON AND SEARCH OPS AT GIKOMDAVURA GR 9309 AND ARRESTED 21 MEN (ALL BURUNDI NATIONALS). THEY WERE ACCUSED OF ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO RWANDA. RPA LATER CLAIMED THEY HAD RELEASED ALL THE ARRESTED PERS.

(14) MILOBS IN SECTOR 3 INVESTIGATED REPORTS THAT RPA SOLDIERS HAD ROBBED A SHOP IN NTONGWE (GR 9157) ON 05 NOV 94. RPA PROVOST TROOPS HAVE ARRESTED AN RPA SECTION COMD IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFENCE.

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR


07 Nov 94

G2/7000

MA to FC (through G3 Ops)

RPA INCIDENTS 29 OCT 94 - 06 NOV 94.

1. Please find attached the list of incidents involving the RPA for the period 29 Oct 94 - 06 Nov 94.
2. The list is drawn directly from the HQ UNAMIR sitreps for the period.
3. The lack of dates on a number of incidents is a reflection of the standard of reporting in the command and has been addressed (again!) at the Ops Officers conference today.

  
S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
For FC

Enclosure:

1. List of RPA Incidents 29 Oct 94 - 06 Nov 94.

②

G.

Pse produce a cover letter (one was done last week - just need to change the details etc) to the Interior Minister.  
A 7/11 MA

RPA DEPLOYMENT IN HQ SECTOR 5

UNIT	LOCATION	GRID	NAME OF CO	REMARKS
301 BRIG	RUHENGERRI		COL WILLIAMS BRGIRE	HQ
17TH BAT	RUHENGERRI		MAJ DAN GAPFIZI	HQ
COY	KINIGI	541404		HQ
COY	NDUBI	476384		HQ
COY	RUHENGERRI	594346		HQ
BATTALION	BIGOGWE	3421	LT COL FRED KAREBA	DESIGNATION UNKNOWN
BATTALION	MUKAMIRA	4621	MAJ KAZUNGU	DESIGNATION UNKNOWN
"B" MOB FORCE	GISENYI		COL CHARLES KAYONGA	HQ
COY	RWERERE	2722	CAPT ROBERT MGABO	HQ
COY	MUTURA	3023		HQ
"C" MOB FORCE	GICYE	5112	LT COL CAESAR	HQ
COY	RUTSIRO	3183	LT CHRIS	DCO
BATTALION	NGORORERO	5995		BELONGS TO 304 BRIG
LIAISON OFFICER	GISENYI		LT PETER	
LIAISON OFFICER	RUHENGERRI		LT LAURENT	

G2  
Poc action  
A.

NO DATE 1

RPA INCIDENTS 29 OCT 94 - 06 NOV 94.

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(14) MILOBS IN SECTOR 3 INVESTIGATED REPORTS THAT RPA SOLDIERS HAD ROBBED A SHOP IN NTONGWE (GR 9157) ON 05 NOV 94. RPA PROVOST TROOPS HAVE ARRESTED AN RPA SECTION COMD IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFENCE.

RPA ARRESTS

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11/21/94

DATE 11/14/94 LOCATION KIGEME  
SOURCE GHANBAT GRID 4726  
REPORT SITREP 140001-150001 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

ACTION

NOTES

GHANBAT REPORTED 14 NOV THAT 7 PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN KIGEME GR 4725 AND MUDASOMWA GR 4222 ON SUSPICION OF PARTICIPATION IN GENOCIDE. LOCALS IN THESE AREAS ARE APREHENSIVE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RPA.

DATE 11/14/94 LOCATION SECTOR 5  
SOURCE TUNBAT GRID  
REPORT SITREP 140800-141600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

ACTION

NOTES

TUNBAT REPORTED THE FOLLOWING ON 14 NOV:

A WOMAN CAME TO TUNBAT AND REPORTED THAT ON SAT 12 NOV 3 RPA SOLDIERS TOOK AWAY HER HUSBAND FOR AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

A MAN REPORTED TO TUNBAT THAT 3 RPA SOLDIERS TOOK AWAY HIS PARENTS ON WED 9 NOV FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

LOCALS IN MUCACA GR 4833 ARE VERY AFRAID AND VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY.

2ND COY TUNBAT REPORTED THAT THE RPA HAD FORBADE THE LOCALS TO HAVE CONTACT WITH UN SOLDIERS.

DATE 11/15/94 LOCATION NTONGWE  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 9057  
REPORT SPEC REPORT 150938 NOV INCIDENT RPA

ACTION

NOTES

SECTOR 3 HQ REQUESTED GUIDANCE (ON 15 NOV) FROM HQ UNAMIR ON THE SITUATION IN NTONGWE GR 9057 WHERE 24 LOCALS HAVE RECENTLY SOUGHT PROTECTION OF UNAMIR FROM THE RPA. THEY ARE ALSO RECEIVING LARGE NUMBERS OF REQUESTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF RELATIVES ARRESTED BY THE RPA THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

THE RPA HAS INSISTED THAT MALI COY HAND OVER THOSE "CRIMINALS" CURRENTLY BEING PROTECTED BY MALI COY. MALI COY REFUSES TO DO SO AND THERE FORE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ARE POOR.

DATE 11/15/94 LOCATION NYAMASHEKE  
SOURCE MILOB 4C GRID 9841  
REPORT SITREP 141800-151800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

ACTION

NOTES

MILOB 4C REPORTED 15 NOV THAT A CIVILIAN NAMED RWAMUGARA OF KIRAMBO GR 0444 WAS SHOT BY THE RPA ON 12 NOV WHILST TRYING TO ESCAPE THEIR CUSTODY.

ON NIGHT OF 14/15 NOV RPA SOLDIERS WERE REPORTED FIRING TOWARDS LAKE KIVU AND NYAMASHEKE AREA GR 9841.

ON 15 NOV THE RPA ARRESTED 30 PERS IN THE NYAMASHEKE AREA AND TOOK THEM TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

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11/21/94

DATE 11/15/94

SOURCE MALAWI COY

REPORT INCIDENT REPORT 160015NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION RUNYINYA

GRID 6012

ACTION

MALAWI COY REPORTED AT 160015 NOV THAT THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED IN THE COMMUNE BETWEEN 151925-151930. MALAWI PL WENT TO INVESTIGATE. RPA REPORTED THAT 7 PEOPLE FROM KIBEHO GR 5007 CAMP HAD BEEN SEEN BY LOCALS IN THE COMMUNE AND RECOGNISED THEM AS KILLERS IN THAT COMMUNE. THE RPA ARRESTED THEM. AS THEY WERE BEING TAKEN TO THE GUARD ROOM ONE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE AND WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY THE RPA..

DATE 11/17/94

SOURCE MILOB 4A

REPORT SITREP 161800-171800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

NOTES

LOCATION MUSEBEYA

GRID 3933

ACTION

MILOB 4A REPORTED 17 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED THE BOURGEMEISTER OF MUSEBEYA GR 3933. PANIC STILL EXIST AMONGST THE DP'S IN THE CAMPS.

DATE 11/17/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 170800-171600 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION KAREBA

GRID 4023

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED 17 NOV THAT THE RPA CONTINUE TO KIDNAP PEOPLE IN KAREBA. LAST WEEK 5 LOCAL MEN DISAPPEARED. THE POPULATION HAS ASKED FOR PROTECTION AND SECURITY.

DATE 11/18/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 180001-182200 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

NOTES

LOCATION RUHENGRI

GRID 5934

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED 18 NOV THAT AMERICAIR HAD REPORTED ONE OF THEIR LOCALLY EMPLOYED CIVILIANS HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED BY THE RPA. AFTER TWO DAYS HE WAS MOVED TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. NFD.

DATE 11/18/94

SOURCE TUNBAT

REPORT SITREP 180800-181800 NOV INCIDENT ARREST

NOTES

LOCATION SHYORONGI

GRID 9694

ACTION

TUNBAT REPORTED 18 NOV THAT 3 PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN SHYORONGI GR 9694 BY THREE PEOPLE IN UNIFORM.

DATE 11/19/94

SOURCE GHANBAT

REPORT SITREP 181800-191800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION KIGEME

GRID 4725

ACTION

GHANBAT REPORTED 19 NOV THAT A LOCAL BUSINESSMAN GASANA VENNSTE FROM KIGEME GR 4725 WAS ARRESTED AND DETAINED AT GIKONGORO PRISON AND IS NOW DEAD(!) NFD.

DATE 11/19/94

SOURCE MILOB 5

REPORT SITREP 181700-191700 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

LOCATION GISENYI AREA

GRID 175094

ACTION

MILOB 5 REPORTED 19 NOV THAT THEY FOUND 18 SUSPICIOUS LOCALS SOUTH OF GISENYI AT GR 175094. THEY WERE JUMPING A FENCE AND CLAIMED THEY HAD BEEN HIRED BY A LOCAL RPA MAJOR TO REPAIR A BOAT. THE LEADER OF THE

Page No. 3  
11/21/94

GROUP WAS TAKEN BY THE RPA DOCTOR FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION.

DATE 11/20/94 LOCATION NTONGWE  
SOURCE SECTOR 3 HQ GRID 9056  
REPORT SITREP 191800-201800 NOV INCIDENT ARRESTS  
NOTES

ACTION

SECTOR 3 HQ REPORTED 20 NOV THAT THE RPA HAVE ARRESTED A FEW LOCALS IN NTONGWE ON 20 NOV.NFD.

DATE 11/20/94 LOCATION KAREBA  
SOURCE MILOBS 5 GRID 4225'  
REPORT SITREP 191700-201700 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

ACTION

MILOBS INVESTIGATED THE ARREST OF FOUR LOCAL STAFF OF MSF AT KAREBA GR 4225. THEY ESTABLISHED THAT 4 WERE ARRESTED NI 19/20 NOV BY THE RPA. THREE WERE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING MORNING AND THE 4TH PERSON REMAINED IN PRISON BECAUSE A PISTOL HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN HIS LUGGAGE. "HE WAS SUSPECTED FORMER MEMBERSHIP OF MRND"

DATE 11/20/94 LOCATION BUTARE  
SOURCE TAC HQ GRID 7211  
REPORT SITREP 192200-202200 NOV INCIDENT ARREST  
NOTES

ACTION

TAC HQ REPORTED 20 NOV THAT A LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF MSF WAS ARRESTED BY THE RPA AT 201500 HRS NOV. HE WAS A DRIVER AND HAD BEEN POINTED OUT BY A LOCAL AS THE KILLER OF HIS FATHER DURING THE WAR.



RPA ATTACKS

Page No. 1  
11/21/94

DATE 11/14/94 LOCATION GASARENDA  
SOURCE GHANBAT GRID 4122 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 140001-150001 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

GHANBAT REPORTED 14 NOV THAT THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED A YOUNG MAN AT GASARENDA GR 4122 AT 141600 HRS NOV. HE HAD RESISTED ARREST AND HAD ATTACKED THE RPA SOLDIERS WITH A MACHETE. RPA CLAIMED HE WAS SUSPECTED OF INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITIES.

DATE 11/14/94 LOCATION NYAGIATOVU  
SOURCE MILOB 4B GRID 3078 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 131800-141800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

MILOBS 4B REPORT 14 NOV THAT THE RPA KILLED PEOPLE IN NYIGIATOVU GR 3078. NFD.

DATE 11/14/94 LOCATION MUDASOMWA  
SOURCE MILOB 4A GRID 4222 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 131800-141800 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

MILOBS 4A REPORTED 14 NOV THAT THE RPA HAD SHOT DEAD A MAN WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM ZAIRE AND TWO WEEKS AGO THREATENED TO KILL THE BURGEMEISTER AND RPA PL COMD IN THE AREA WITH A CUTLASS. HE WAS REPORTED TO BE INTERAHAMWE. RPA SHOT HIM FOR RESISTING ARREST.

DATE 11/15/94 LOCATION RUNYINYA  
SOURCE MALAWI COY GRID 6012 ACTION  
REPORT INCIDENT REPORT 160015NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

MALAWI COY REPORTED AT 160015 NOV THAT THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED IN THE COMMUNE BETWEEN 151925-151930. MALAWI PL WENT TO INVESTIGATE. RPA REPORTED THAT 7 PEOPLE FROM KIBEHO GR 5007 CAMP HAD BEEN SEEN BY LOCALS IN THE COMMUNE AND RECOGNISED THEM AS KILLERS IN THAT COMMUNE. THE RPA ARRESTED THEM. AS THEY WERE BEING TAKEN TO THE GUARD ROOM ONE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE AND WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY THE RPA..

DATE 11/16/94 LOCATION BUREMERA  
SOURCE TAC HQ BUTARE GRID 7719 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 152200-162200 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

TAC HQ REPT 16 NOV THAT AN RPA SOLDIER NAMED VINCENT AT BUREMERA GR 7719 TOOK AWAY A TEACHER FROM HIS CLASS ROOM TOGETHER WITH ANOTHER WOMAN. BOTH WERE BEATEN AND THE TEACHER, JOHN PAUL WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD. MILOBS BUTARE CFM THE INCIDENT.

DATE 11/17/94 LOCATION NYAMUMBA  
SOURCE MILOB 5 GRID 2106 ACTION  
REPORT SITREP 161700-171700 NOV INCIDENT RPA

NOTES

MILOBS 5 WERE INVESTIGATING ALLEGED KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS BY THE RPA IN NYAMUMBA GR 2106 ON 27 SEPT AND KILLINGS AT KIVUMU GR 2403 IN AUG..



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali 31 October 1994

Dear Minister,

Please find enclosed a summary of incidents that have been reported to my staff involving the RPA during the month of October.

You will agree that these incidents are disturbing and do not serve to reassure the civilian population that they may yet live in peace in their country.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mr. Seth Sendashonga  
Minister of Interior  
Kigali

cc: SRSG

Enclosure: Incidents involving RPA October 94

INCIDENTS INVOLVING RPA FOR THE MONTH OF OCT 94

04 OCT 94

1. MILOBs in Sector 4B reported that a local doctor from the town of BIRAMBO was arrested. His "crime" was reported to be treating an injured man who had been shot by the RPA.

05 OCT 94

2. The RPA in SAVE (GR 7419) arrested 29 people on alleged charges of looting. The RPA have said that they will move the guilty parties to BUTARE.

3. MILOBs went to KIZI (GR 6120) to investigate claims that a boy had been "kidnapped" by the RPA. The mother of a 19 year old boy when contacted confirmed that her son was taken by the RPA on 27 Aug 94. She now believes her son to be in KIGALI prison.

07 OCT 94

4. MILOBs reported that locals in the KIVUMU area (GR 5073) have shown them some places in the hospital where they claim the RPA have dumped bodies.

5. The RPA arrested and beat up a night watchman from KIBUYE on the night of 11 Oct 94. He was arrested on suspicion of involvement in killings during the war. He was released after 2 hrs and received medical care from FRAFBATT. Name of person arrested BARIMENSMI Leonard.

13 OCT 94

6. People travelling to market in RWANDA from BURUNDI stopped using the RPA checkpoint at the AKABUGA border post. They used footpaths instead to avoid the checkpoint because of alleged widespread extortion of money and property carried out by the RPA.

7. Civilians in the area of GISORARA (GR 492913) reported that the RPA came into their homes at night and stole animals and extorted money from them.

8. MILOBs reported that the burgermeister of BUGERAMA was arrested by the RPA. It is believed that he was arrested for alleged crimes committed during the last war.

9. Locals in the villages of BISATE (GR 46390, SHINGIRO (GR 4835), NYARUGINA (GR 4738) and MUHINGO (GR 4733) reported that the RPA raped the women of the area and arrested people at night. A list of people alleged to have been taken away by the RPA was handed over to MILOBs.

15 OCT 94

10. MILOBs reported that the RPA arrested 1 person in MASANGO (GR 611544), alleged to be 1 of 3 people accused of throwing a

grenade at an RPA soldier. The other 2 people had earlier been killed by the RPA as they attempted to escape.

11 Population of BIRAMBO DP Camp (GR 4763) refused to assemble for an address by the local prefect. RPA opened fire killing one person. One RPA soldier was reported wounded.

16 OCT 94

12. MILOBs in Sector 4C reported that 2 RPA soldiers in NYAMASHEKE (GR 9841) had killed 4 fishermen after the soldiers had robbed them of their money at gunpoint. After the incident 1 of the soldiers shot and wounded the other soldier and stole the money. The wounded soldier was admitted to CYANGUGU hospital.

17 OCT 94

13. Sector 5 reported that the RPA had arrested a teacher and an agricultural assistant in GASHANGIRO (GR 5936).

14. SIBOMANA Lurent from KABOKOBA (in Sector 2 - no grid) reported that his son, Placid, was arrested and detained for interrogation by the RPA on 17 Oct 94. His crime was that he made an offensive statement to an RPA soldier during a quarrel.

15. On night of 17 Oct 94 French Canadian catholic priest from RUYENZI (GR 8132) was killed in his home. Fr Claude SIMARD was believed to have been killed with a hammer. His hands were tied behind his back. He had been accused of involvement in the massacres during the war but had strenuously denied the allegations. Perpetrators not known. Alleged involvement of RPA soldiers not confirmed or denied.

18 OCT 94

16. RPA attempted to gather the inhabitants of NDABA DP together for an address by the local RPA Bn Comd. The people refused to assemble and the RPA opened fire wounding 4 people. The names of the wounded were:

UWIHOREYE GODENCE	AGE 45	LEG INJURY
HABYSANTI AURESTE	AGE 4	LEG INJURY
NISEYNIMAMA THEONSTE	AGE 23	HAND INJURY
KANYENDE BANIFRIDA	AGE 34	LEG INJURY

19 OCT 94

17 RPA arrested SENGAMUNGU Francois in WISSOMU (GR 2247 Sector 4C). He is a director of a Swiss project. His arrest was reported by his wife.

20 OCT 94

18. ETHIOBATT in BUGARAMA reported that the RPA arrested their interpreter. The reason for the arrest is not known.

21 OCT 94

19. Sous-Prefect of KADUHA (GR 4643) was reported to have disappeared 3 days after attending meeting with RPA soldiers.

20. RPA soldiers looking for one NTAKO Bazagira in INAIHOMBO (GR 1554) were unable to find him. Instead they arrested his brother, NTAKO Ruimanaho, and shot him in the leg for refusing to answer questions about the whereabouts of his brother.

21. RPA conducted a cordon and search operation in GIKANDAMAVURA (GR 9307) and NYABITA (GR 9616). 10 locals were arrested. No reasons were given.

23 OCT 94

22. In KIGALI a Cpl from the Canadian Contingent was stopped at a junction while on his way to the airport. He was stopped by an RPA squad led by an officer who threatened to beat him after pointing weapons at him. No reason was given for this action.

23. GAHUNGA (GR 5763), 2 RPA soldiers and 1 man in civilian clothes attacked and beat up some locals and took away seven of their cows.

24. KIBUYE - RPA arrested one Mr KANEZA Jean Baptiste and transferred him to GITARAMA on 24 Oct 94.

24 OCT 94

25. RUSHUBI (GR 6141), 3 RPA soldiers attacked locals and beat them up. 2 women in a critical condition were evacuated to the MSF hospital in RUKONDO.

26. MWITO (GR 8634), RPA killed one Mr DONATGATABORIA Andra. RPA confirmed killing him and claimed that the victim had previously killed an RPA soldier.

27. The Bourgemestre of MASANGO (GR 6254) was reported to have been arrested by the RPA.

25 OCT 94

28. In GISOVU (GR 2952) and RUSHISHI (GR 2557), It was alleged that the RPA had killed an unspecified number of locals. MILOBs found 19 bodies but the RPA refused to allow them to investigate further.

29. KAMEMBE (GR 8131) RPA killed 5 locals close to the commune office. RPA claimed that all of those killed had previously wounded an RPA soldier.

29 OCT 94

30. In KIMIHURURA, KIGALI- A UNAMIR vehicle was taken away at gunpoint at 1915 hrs. The vehicle was being driven by a Lt Col

and was taken by RPA soldiers.

30 OCT 94

31. RPA ejected all DPs from camp at RUGABANO GR 4266 and burnt down their huts in accordance with ultimatum given to the DPs to vacate camp by 29 Oct 94.



NONCIATURE APOSTOLIQUE  
AU RWANDA

N. 163/94

Kigali, 9 janvier 1995

Monsieur le Ministre,

Nous avons l'honneur de nous adresser à Votre Excellence pour demander qu'une solution appropriée soit trouvée à certaines questions d'actualités y compris le problème de sécurité.

Nous venons à Votre Excellence dans l'unique désir d'offrir un apport constructif au redressement du Rwanda, ruiné physiquement et moralement. Au nom du Saint-Siège, nous invitons le Gouvernement Rwandais à faire en sorte que ne se répètent plus maintenant les mêmes actes commis avant et pendant la récente guerre, déjà condamnés non seulement par ce Gouvernement, mais aussi par l'Eglise Catholique.

Nous sentons aussi le devoir d'exprimer les préoccupations de cette Nonciature Apostolique devant certains tristes événements qui se déroulent ici, pour encourager le Gouvernement Rwandais à oeuvrer de telle façon que tous les Rwandais si éprouvés puissent retrouver rapidement l'espérance d'un futur meilleur dans leur Patrie aimée.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Alphonse Marie Nkubito  
Ministre de la Justice  
Kigali

C.I.:

- Présidence de la République Rwandaise
- Vice-Présidence de la République Rwandaise
- Primature
- Ministères: des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération; de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal; du Travail et des Affaires Sociales; de la Réhabilitation et de la Réintégration Sociale; de l'Environnement et du Tourisme
- Président du FPR
- Conférence des Evêques du Rwanda
- Ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
- Ambassade de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne
- Ambassade de Belgique
- Ambassadeur Envoyé Spécial du Canada au Rwanda
- Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
- Rapporteur Spécial de l'ONU pour les Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda
- Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'OUA
- Président du Conseil National de Développement
- Haut Commissaire aux Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda

## I. CONSTATATION DE CERTAINS FAITS

## 1. SIGNES ENCOURAGEANTS

Depuis la fin de la guerre, plusieurs secteurs du Gouvernement ont fait beaucoup d'efforts pour assister de nombreux orphelins et le Ministère de l'enseignement Primaire et secondaire a pu assurer le retour aux bancs de l'école à beaucoup de jeunes.

Le système de la santé publique se met progressivement en place. L'administration civile commence à fonctionner. La collaboration avec les Organismes caritatifs porte ses fruits.

En ce qui regarde certaines infrastructures de la vie sociale, le Gouvernement a obtenu de bons résultats dans le rétablissement des réseaux d'eau, d'électricité et de téléphone. Le service des Postes à la capitale marche bien.

## 2. SITUATION DU PEUPLE RWANDAIS

Pendant que des anciens réfugiés sont accueillis avec des faveurs et laisser-faire, plusieurs nouveaux, en bien des cas dépouillés de leurs biens, vivent en danger à cause des accusations et arrestations arbitraires. Beaucoup d'entre eux ont été emprisonnés innocemment, tout simplement parce que des gens les ont pointés du doigt par jalousie, haine, vengeance, ou pour se dérober de leur maison. Pas mal de gens ont trouvé la mort par des exécutions secrètes, peut-être dans des règlements de comptes. D'autres sont détenus jusque dans des endroits clandestins. Les gens qui ont survécu la hécatombe au Pays sont de plus en plus menacés dans leur vie, leurs biens et leur dignité.

Il est aussi très pénible de voir en prison des enfants en bas âge et les mères avec les nourrissons.

## 3. RÔLE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE

Tout en gardant son autonomie vis-à-vis du pouvoir du Gouvernement, l'Eglise Catholique au Rwanda garde sa place très importante dans la société rwandaise et lui offre son efficace collaboration. Elle fait partie de la société rwandaise qui souffre et qui désire recevoir son assistance spirituelle, morale et aussi matérielle. Elle est la porte-parole de ceux qui n'ont pas la voix pour crier tout haut leur détresse.



#### 4. SITUATION DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE EN GENERAL

La radio nationale et la presse proche du pouvoir accusent souvent et ouvertement l'Eglise Catholique d'avoir participé au génocide, avec le but de la dénigrer, de la discréditer vis-à-vis du peuple et de l'empêcher de jouer son rôle dans la société.

Ce n'est pas exclu que de telles accusations ont pour but de faire oublier les messages diffusés depuis très longtemps par la Hiérarchie de l'Eglise Catholique tant au Rwanda qu'ailleurs en faveur de la paix et de la réconciliation nationale, ou bien de masquer certains crimes commis contre la Hiérarchie et le personnel ecclésiastique.

Si jamais on arrive à vérifier que telle ou telle autre personne n'a pas bien accompli ses devoirs, il est pourtant tout à fait injuste de dire que toute l'Eglise était complice de ses manquements ou bien que l'Eglise a piégé les gens en quête de refuges dans les temples et dans les paroisses.

Il ne convient pas de maltraiter les autorités morales de la société, quand on désire vraiment relancer la morale dans la nation entière. Autrement le Gouvernement Rwandais pourrait perdre sa crédibilité.

Il faut d'ailleurs remarquer que pendant les massacres il y avait des prêtres, des soeurs et des laïcs qui risquaient leur vie pour protéger leurs compatriotes en danger sans poser des questions si ces gens appartenaient à telle ou telle ethnie. Leur témoignage exemplaire de la foi chrétienne est connue dans le monde entier et il faut aussi reconnaître que grâce à ces héros, les autres Pays, n'ayant pas encore perdu leur espoir d'un renouveau du Rwanda, veulent contribuer à un vrai relèvement du Peuple Rwandais.

#### 5. SITUATION DU PERSONNEL ECCLESIASTIQUE

Pendant la guerre et les massacres, trois Evêques, une centaine de prêtres et une autre centaine de soeurs, sans compter des milliers de fidèles ont été tués d'une manière à bouleverser le monde entier. Comme si cela ne suffisait pas encore pour décimer les membres de l'Eglise Catholique, on assiste depuis un certain temps après la guerre à des agressions brutales contre le personnel ecclésiastique.

Pour ne citer que quelques cas: un prêtre de la Congrégation de Sainte Croix tué atrocement; des Pères Dominicains et autres prêtres se trouvant ensemble avec eux, attaqués et menacés de mort d'une façon humiliante; Pères Blancs critiqués; deux prêtres et une soeur rwandais disparus; Pères Salésiens et Frères de l'Instruction

d'essayer de redémarrer le fonctionnement de leurs oeuvres en faveur des pauvres et des jeunes étudiants, désireux d'apprendre un métier pour gagner leur vie d'une manière honnête.

Deux prêtres, un grand séminariste et deux soeurs sont en prison sans évolution transparente des procédures judiciaires.

Certains bâtiments de l'Eglise Catholique, par exemple le Séminaire de Philosophie de Kabgayi, centres et bâtiments paroissiaux etc, sont occupés de façon à handicaper les activités de cette même Eglise. D'autres biens appartenant à la même Eglise, par exemple des véhicules, sont encore détenus par le pouvoir public et des militaires.

## II. REQUÊTES AU GOUVERNEMENT RWANDAIS

Dans le désir d'encourager les évangélistes à continuer le service que l'Eglise Catholique a commencé depuis le début du Catholicisme au Rwanda, nous voudrions demander à Votre Excellence de faire quelques gestes concrets qui pourraient traduire la bonne volonté du même Gouvernement dans la collaboration mutuelle pour le bien du Peuple Rwandais. Nous lui serons très reconnaissants, si Votre Excellence pourrait transmettre aux Ministères compétents des requêtes qui ne seront pas examinées par le Ministère de la Justice.

Nos requêtes concernent d'abord le Peuple Rwandais en général et ensuite l'Eglise Catholique.

### 1. EN FAVEUR DU PEUPLE RWANDAIS

#### a. Libération de prisonniers

En premier lieu nous demandons la libération des détenus dont le dossier ne présente aucun indice de culpabilité y compris les membres du clergé et des religieuses.

Nous demandons également la libération des détenus arrêtés sans aucune preuve de crime et l'accélération des procédures de libération pour ceux qui sont malades en prison.

#### b. Respect des droits de l'homme

Pour se rendre crédible et efficace devant les Nations, le Gouvernement Rwandais doit respecter scrupuleusement les Droits de l'Homme et privilégier une vraie gestion démocratique du Pays.

On pourrait opiner que le régime politique précédent a perdu le soutien international surtout à cause de son atrocité; par conséquent, on ne serait pas loin de la vérité, si on pense que la même tactique conduite par n'importe quel Gouvernement, le mènera aussi à sa destruction, même sans être attaqué par des forces extérieures.

#### c. Mise en place des conditions de sécurité pour la rentrée des réfugiés

Il s'avère très urgent de mettre en place des conditions de sécurité qui rassurent des Rwandais réfugiés (dont le personnel ecclésiastique) qui veulent regagner le pays. Il est nécessaire de cesser immédiatement toute élimination physique de personnes humaines, créées à l'image de Dieu. Ces faits se perpétuent sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

Il faut engager un dialogue direct avec des réfugiés rwandais, sinon on va retomber dans les mêmes erreurs que les Gouvernements passés. Il est à noter que le dialogue n'écarte pas nécessairement la justice.

Nous remarquons ici que l'arrestation immédiate du personnel ecclésiastique venu spontanément et rapidement de l'exil à l'appel de l'Episcopat, encouragé par le Gouvernement, a freiné, et pour longtemps encore, le retour de tous les autres réfugiés en jetant ainsi un doute sérieux sur la bonne volonté du pouvoir public.

### 2. EN FAVEUR DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE

#### a. Contrôle rigoureux de la teneur de la propagande officielle

Il s'avère très urgent de contrôler la radio nationale et certaine presse en ce qui regarde les attaques gratuites visant à diffamer l'Eglise Catholique, laquelle depuis bientôt 100 ans a servi ce Peuple et veut encore rendre service dans le domaine religieux, dans la formation de la conscience, très importante pour une saine reconstruction du Pays et une véritable réconciliation.

Il est nécessaire de savoir que l'Eglise Catholique est animée tout simplement de l'esprit de service, sans aucune intention de s'immiscer dans les compétences du Gouvernement Rwandais, tout en se réservant le droit de porter l'évaluation éthique des affaires publiques.

b. Garantie et protection du personnel ecclésiastique

Nous demandons aussi que les Evêques, les prêtres rwandais et non-rwandais, les soeurs et les fidèles laïcs jouissent des garanties pour leur travail et de protection pour leur vie. Leur oeuvre est une nécessité que le Peuple Rwandais a droit d'avoir.


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
Le début de ce Nouvel An est une occasion propice pour un nouvel effort vers une bonne entente entre le Gouvernement Rwandais et l'Eglise Catholique, en vue de s'engager dans une véritable réconciliation nationale.

Le Saint-Siège souhaite fort que la paix véritable règne dans ce Pays, que chaque Rwandais puisse se réconcilier avec son proche pour rendre ce Pays prospère dans tous les domaines et hospitalier surtout envers ses propres enfants, et que la collaboration de l'Eglise Catholique avec les autorités locales dans le respect des différentes compétences et finalités puisse aboutir à une bonne reconstruction morale et civile du Pays.

En espérant recevoir un bon écho de la part du Gouvernement Rwandais sur tout ce que nous avons exposé plus haut, nous implorons l'assistance divine pour tous ceux qui veulent redonner la vie à ce Pays et en même temps nous assurons Votre Excellence de notre franche collaboration.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, l'expression de notre très haute considération.

  
P. Henryk Hoser  
Visiteur Apostolique  
au Rwanda

  
Mgr Pierre Nguyễn Văn Tôt  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
de la Nonciature Apostolique  
au Rwanda

COPY

Harry and Terry Mannion  
49, Branksome Hall Drive  
Darlington  
Co. Durham  
England DL3 9SR

Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu  
Prime Minister of Rwanda  
Republic of Rwanda  
BP 1334  
Kigali  
FAX: 001-212-963-3090

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

We are most grateful for your prompt reply to our request for news of the fate of our only son, the Very Reverend Brother Chris Mannion, FMS -- Councilor General of the Order of Marist Brothers.

We are sad and bereft to hear that he is dead and buried in Rwanda and pray that the sacrifice of his death and that of his Marist Brothers may, by God's grace, help to bring peace and stability to your country.

Our only wish now is for his body to be brought home so that we may bury him and find peace. We realize that tragedies happen during war by accident, fear and misunderstanding. We are not looking for vengeance -- Chris was a man filled with the love of God, mercy, and justice and peace were his watchwords.

Among the military personnel involved in the battle at Save on July 1, someone must know where his body lies. Let them disclose this information without fear of reprisal or recrimination so that they too may find peace and reconciliation.

Peace begins with forgiveness -- we forgive. God bless Rwanda and her people.

Yours respectfully and hopefully,

*Terry & Harry Mannion*

cc: Vice President Paul Kagame; Mr. Warren Christopher, Mr David Rowe,  
Brother Sean D. Sammon. FMS

*Original sent  
to Prime Minister.  
S.  
13/9/94*

So 3 G 2

1. This is not for our action;  
it is a letter from Messrs Mannion  
to the Rwandan PM.

2. Of note though is the mention of  
SAVE, where a mass grave has  
recently been found. A 14/9 MA  
FYI



# Maristen-Schulbrüder FMS

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MARISTENKOLLEC  
Champagnatplatz 1  
Telefon 08261-1775

INTERNAT  
Champagnatplatz 4  
Telefon 08261-5088

Vice President Paul Kagame  
Republic of Rwanda

Kigali - RWANDA

Dear Mr. Vice President,

*Noted  
JLFC  
25.9.94*

RPA L.O.

*to be passed to VP  
A. K. M.*

This letter comes to seek your help in an urgent matter. As you know, Brother Chris Mannion, a top official of the Marist Brothers - a Roman Catholic religious order serving in 72 countries including Rwanda - was killed in your country on July 1st 1994. Bro. Mannion was 43 years of age and a British national.

On August 26th the Mannion family and the Marist Brothers received a FAXed letter from Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, Rwanda's Prime Minister, stating that Brother Chris was "dead and buried". As you can imagine, his death is a great loss to both his family and his religious Order. Bro. Chris worked for ten years as a missionary teacher in Cameroon, led the Order's efforts in Great Britain, and was elected last October to a position on its central governing council. It is always difficult to understand how such a promising and young life can end so tragically.

Mr. Vice President, I realize that you have reported that Forces of the FPR were responsible for Chris' death and that of another Brother, Joseph Rushigajiki, who was riding in the car with him when it came under fire. As you indicated, both Brothers Chris and Joseph drove into an ambush that was not intentionally set for them during the course of the battle for Kigali. I want to point out that Chris was in Rwanda on a humanitarian mission: he was trying to negotiate the release of two of our Tutsi Brothers held in custody by the country's previous government. Since we lost more than ten percent of our Rwandan Brothers in the slaughter that has swept across your country since early April, the death of these two additional men was a real tragedy.


Mr. Vice President, since learning of Chris' death, the Marist Order has been trying to secure his remains so that they can be taken back to Britain and buried in the Brothers' cemetery. Although Bro. Chris' family and the Marist Order have asked for his body, almost four weeks have passed without any response from the Rwandan Government.

From the Order's perspective there is a very straightforward solution to this dilemma, one with which I agree. Knowing of your reputation for integrity during the civil war in Rwanda, and your desire to establish a new government on principles of justice, I ask you to approach the Commander of the FPR troops on the ground in Kigali on July 1st. Please ask him to talk with his troops and ask for the location of Bro. Chris Mannion's body. Chris was slain by FPR troops, they buried him, so they can direct us now to his remains.

Mr. Paul Whiteway, the British Government's representative in Kigali, visited the site in Save where the car was found in which both Brothers Chris and Joseph were traveling the day they were killed. Unfortunately, no follow-up visit has been scheduled. Lady Linda Chalker was also supposed to make a personal appeal to your government for Chris' body. None of these efforts have apparently borne fruit.

Mr. Vice President, I urge you in the strongest terms to take action in this situation; the solution appears quite straightforward and would bring relief to a grieving family and religious Order. The world community is in fact watching closely, and hoping that your efforts at governance bring justice and a lasting peace to the people of Rwanda.

Sincerely,



F. H. Schmitz  
F. H. Schmitz

F. H. Schmitz

F. Ramanus Noshop

F. Ramanus Noshop

F. B. Weber

G. Johann M.



Housetop  
39 Homer Street  
London W1H 1HL

Date: 23 September 1994

Your ref:

Our ref: 23/RU/8H

Fax

Re: The death of Brother Chris Mannion in Rwanda

C Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a member of the staff of Housetop, a firm which makes Christian videos for adult education and faith development. Our main office is in the centre of London and we co-produce with 26 other countries throughout the world.

According to reports, a colleague of ours, Chris Mannion, was killed in Rwanda about the 1st July. Since that time we have been given very little assistance, from any of the embassies or Governments concerned, to recover the body or even to find any information surrounding the circumstances of this death.

We would be grateful for any information that you can give us.

With kind regards,

yours sincerely

C *Henry T. Jackson*

Br. Henry T. Jackson

Registered in England and Wales as  
HOUSETOP SERVICES LIMITED  
(no 2628878) at the above address

Telephone: 071-402 4674  
Telefax: 071-723 2668



REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE  
MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR ET DU  
DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAL  
B.P. 446 KIGALI

Kigali, November 3th 1994

No. 356 104.04.01/3

/ Major General G. C. Toussignant  
Force Commander, UNAMIR  
KIGALI

①

Dear Force Commander,

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter dated 31th October 1994 forwarding a summary of incidents reported to your staff involving the RPA during the month of October 1994.


We will investigate these and forward our comments as soon as possible. It would also help our investigation process if incidents could be known to us as soon as they are brought to your attention so that they are investigated while they are still fresh.

Assuring your for our best cooperation, I remain

Yours sincerely

SETH SENDASHONGA


Minister



② NTF  
I am told that the  
Minister of Defence  
may have reservations  
about us providing this info.  
G.C. Toussignant  
Major General  
Commandant  
11 Nov 94

CC:

- His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali
- His Excellency the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Kigali
- His Excellency the Prime Minister, Kigali
- The Minister for Justice, Kigali
- The Chief of Staff, Rwandese Patriotic Army, Kigali
- The Chief of Staff ai Gendarmerie, Kigali



FRATELLI MARISTI DELLE SCUOLE  
Piazza M. Champagnat, 2 - Cas. Post. 10250  
I - 00144 - ROMA

Tel. (06) 592 44 56  
Telegr. EURMARISTI  
Fax (06) 547 38 08

COPY

*Original was sent  
to the Prime Minister  
(with copy to Vice-  
President & Min. of Defense)*

*S. S. S.  
29/8/94*

25 August 1994

Faustin Twagiramungu  
Prime Minister of Rwanda  
Republic of Rwanda  
B.P. 1334  
Kigali  
FAX: 001-212-963-3090

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letter of August 18th, 1994 addressed to Terry and Harry Mannion, the parents of Brother Chris Mannion, and to the Marist Brothers. We are grateful for the investigation that you undertook into the disappearance of Brother Chris. As you can imagine, this period has been one of heartbreak for his family and his religious order.

Mr. Prime Minister, sad as the news is I am grateful that you have told us that Brother Chris is "dead and buried." Since he was in Rwanda on an errand of mercy, attempting to win the freedom of two of our Tutsi Brothers in the hands of the then existing government, and is a British citizen we would like to bury him in England in the Brothers' cemetery there. His religious vocation had its beginnings on the property and it is near his parents home and the communities of many of his Brothers.


I ask you to use the authority of your office to assist us in arranging for the transfer of Brother Chris' body from Rwanda to England. We would like to do this immediately. You can well imagine that during this time of great suffering for his family and religious community, we need somehow to make our peace with what has happened to Chris.

At a later date I will write to ask more about the circumstances of Brother Chris' death. He was only 43 and a member of the General Administration of our

6000 member order. We also lost five Rwandan Brothers during the past four tragic months in Rwanda; one of them, Joseph Rushigajiki, was traveling with Chris at the time he apparently was slain.

Thank you for your assistance; I look forward to hearing from you so that we can get Brother Chris' body moved as quickly as possible. Blessings.

Sincerely,



Brother Sean D. Sammon, FMS  
Vicar General

cc: Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame



Kigali, le 23 août 1994

Monsieur le Ministre,

Objet: DEMANDE DE RECHERCHE

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint, pour attribution, le Procès verbal d'audition de Madame MUGAMBIRA, Marie-Yvonne, à propos de la disparition de son mari, Monsieur NITYAMIRA, Jean-Paul, survenue le lundi 8 août 1994, à Kigali.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Alphonse NKUBITO  
Ministre de la Justice  
République de Rwanda  
Kigali

copie: UN Centre for Human Rights

Pièce jointe: Procès verbal d'audition

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
U N A M I R

PROCES-VERBAL

L'an mille neuf cent quatre vingt quatorze et le treize du mois d'Août;

Constatons que se présente devant nous à notre bureau de CIVPOL à 10 Heures la Dame MUGAMBIRAMARIE YVONNE née le 21 Octobre 1968 à Nyarugenge à Kigali, fille de MGAMBIRA SEDECIAS et de NYARABYENDA ANNE MARIE, Employée à la MAGERWA domiciliée à Kanombe, mariée deux enfants.

Laquelle nous fait, la déclaration suivante: " le lundi 8/8/1994, aux environs de 10 Heures, mon mari du nom de NITYAMIRA JEAN PAUL m'a quittée pour se rendre à la Croix Rouge à Rungunga en quête d'un emploi. Je l'ai attendu toute la journée du 8/8/94, et même pendant toute la nuit. Le lendemain j'ai commencé à faire des recherches. C'est ainsi que je me suis rendue à la Communauté Internationale de la Croix Rouge où travaille son grand frère du nom de NARCLE UHIGUMUGADO pour lui faire part de mon inquiétude. Je me suis également rendue chez ma belle soeur du nom de YVONNE MABWIRE pour m'enquérir des nouvelles de mon mari. Ces deux démarches n'ont rien donné. Je suis donc retournée à la maison. Là, le petit frère de mon mari m'a fait savoir que le domestique de ma belle soeur du nom de ALEXIS a rencontré une femme qui lui a révélé qu'il a rencontré en ville à Biryoogo vers 14 Heures des militaires du FPR avec mon mari dans une voiture. C'est ainsi que moi, mon beau frère et ma belle soeur nous avons fait toute les brigades de Gendarmerie à la recherche de mon mari mais en vain.

Enfin j'ai déposé une plainte auprès du Procureur Général de la République à Kigali ainsi qu'auprès de la MINUAR. JE vous précise qu'avant la guerre mon mari était Bourguemestre de la Commune de Kanombe et juste au début de la guerre il a pris la fuite suite aux exactions que faisaient les militaires dans la Commune (tueries de Tutsis et opposants du Régime).

Il n'a pas voulu adhérer à ces massacres et s'est retiré à Gitarama avec toute sa famille. Là, les militaires de l'ancien régime et les Interahamwes sont venus le rechercher en vain.

Entre temps pendant la guerre nous sommes retournés à Kigali au mois de Juin. C'est en ce moment qu'il a été remplacé à son poste par un nouveau Bourguemestre. A la fin de la guerre il a pu s'en fuir avec la population jusqu'à Goma. Là il a décidé de retourner à Kigali où il est arrivé début Août. Il circulait en ville comme tout le monde et avait la conscience tranquille jusqu'au 8 Août où il a été arrêté par les militaires du FPR. Avant que mon mari ne revienne à Kigali, je vous signale que vers le 13 Juillet, j'ai rencontré à Réméra un militaire du FPR qui m'a amenée dans un bureau à Ndéra pour m'interroger à propos des nouvelles de mon mari. Ce militaire s'appelle DESIRE MUGWIZA. Après une longue discussion il m'a libérée et m'a même accompagné au domicile de mes parents. J'ai demandé au militaire en question d'attendre l'arrivée de mon mari pour l'interroger au sujet des massacres dont est accusé mon mari. Je précise que le Samedi, le même militaire a rencontré mes belles soeurs sur la route de Réméra et leur a dit qu'il sait que mon mari est de retour à Kigali. Je

vous signale qu'il y'a un autre militaire du FPR originaire de Kanombé du nom de KIZUNGU qui cherchait mon mari pour des raisons que j'ignore.

SIR: Mon mari est Hutu, mais il n'a jamais participé aux massacres, c'est pourquoi l'ancien régime n'était pas content de lui.

C'est tout ce que j'ai à vous dire. J'ajoute que je veux savoir où se trouve mon mari et m'enquérir de son état de santé. Le même cas a été soumis au Ministère de la Justice. Je n'ai plus rien à vous dire. Lecture faite, persiste et signe le présent PROCES-VERBAL.

# Proce Verbal

L'an mille neuf cent quatre Vingt sept  
Et le treize des mois d'Aout,  
Constatons que se présente devant nous à notre  
bureau <sup>de l'Etat</sup> la dame MUGAMBIKA MARIE  
Yvonne, née le 21 octobre 1968 à NYARUGENGE  
à Kigali, fille de MUGAMBIKA SEJECIAS et de  
NYIRABYENGA Anne Marie, employée à la NAGERWA  
domiciliée à KANDABE, mariée 2 enfants.

Laquelle nous fait la déclaration suivante  
Le lundi 8/8/94 aux environs de 10H, mon mari du  
nom de NTIYA MIRA Jean Paul m'a quitté pour se rendre à  
la Croix Rouge à RUGUNGA en quête d'un emploi.  
C'est l'ai attendu toute la journée du 8/8/94, et même pendant  
toute la nuit. Le lendemain j'ai commencé à faire  
des recherches. C'est ainsi que je me suis rendue à la Com  
munauté Internationale de la Croix Rouge où travaillait son grand  
frère <sup>de nom</sup> Marcel UHIGAMUGABO pour lui faire part de  
mon inquiétude. Je me suis également rendue chez  
ma belle sœur du nom de Yvonne ~~MA MABWIRE~~ MABWIRE  
pour m'enquérir des nouvelles de mon mari. Les deux démarches  
n'ont rien donné - Je suis donc retournée à la maison.  
Là, mon le petit frère de mon mari m'a fait savoir que  
le domestique de ma belle sœur du nom de Alexis a rencontré  
une femme qui lui a révélé qu'il a rencontré la veille à BIRYOBO  
vers 14 heures, ~~par~~ des militaires du FPR avec mon mari dans  
la voiture. C'est ainsi que, moi, mon beau frère et ma belle  
sœur nous avons fait toute la brigade de Gendarmerie à la  
recherche de mon mari, mais en vain -

Finalement j'ai déposé une plainte auprès du Procureur Général de la République à Kigali ainsi qu'à la RINUAR.

Je vous précise qu'avant la guerre, mon <sup>était</sup> père Bouzamelte de la Commune de KANOMBE et juste au début de la guerre il a pris la fuite suite aux exactions que faisaient les militaires dans la commune (tueries de civils) et le pillage des biens. Il n'a pas pu revenir à Kanombe car il était malade et il est resté à Butembo.







Kigali 3 December 1994

N/Ref: 1000/1 (FC)

Dear

*Minister*

I am presenting to you, the minister of Justice for all of Rwanda, one of two copies of a rather large petition received at my office from Canada. The sponsor of this petition Mr Robert Hazel. He describes himself as a former professor of Mr Sibomana from The University of Montreal, Canada where he was a student some twenty years ago. Mr Hazel is convinced that Mr Sibomana is being held against his will and without due process of law. He and the cosigners are in favor of the release from custody of Mr Antoine Sibomana.

I have assured Mr Hazel by correspondence that I would forward their concerns to your office and to the local branch of Commission of Human Rights. I also advised them that the international tribunal which takes its seat soon will examine the case of Mr Sibomana and others without prejudice. Please accept these documents for your action by your office.

Your personal attention in the matter of Mr Antoine Sibomana is sincerely appreciated.

*G.C. Tousignant*

G.C. Tousignant  
Major General  
Force Commander

Mr Alphonse Marie Nkuhito  
Ministre de la justice  
Hôtel du gouvernement  
République rwandaise  
Kigali, Rwanda



Kigali 3 December 1994

N/Ref: 1000/1 (FC)

Dear

*Mr. Clarence*

I am presenting to you, as the Chairman of Human Rights organization here in Kigali, one of two copies of a rather large petition received at my office from Canada. The sponsor of this petition Mr Robert Hazel, from The University of Montreal, Canada is convinced that Mr Sibomana is being held against his will and without due process of law. He and the cosigners are in favor of the release from custody of Mr Antoine Sibomana.

I have assured Mr Hazel by correspondence that I would forward their concerns to your organization and to the Minister of Justice. I also advised them that the international tribunal which takes its seat soon will examine the case of Mr Sibomana and others without prejudice. Please accept these documents for your action.

Your office's attention to the matter of Mr. Antoine Sibomana is sincerely appreciated.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major General  
Force Commander

Mr Bill Clarence  
Human Rights, Kigali  
E.T.C. Building  
c/o American Embassy  
Kigali, Rwanda



Kigali 3 Décembre 1994

N/Ref: 1000/1 (FC)

Cher Monsieur Hazel,

J'accuse réception de votre lettre de même que la pétition en faveur de M. Antoine Sibomana. Il me fait plaisir de transmettre en votre nom ces documents aux autorités indiquées comme le souhaite votre requête.

J'apporte aussi à votre attention le fait qu'un tribunal international siègera incessamment au Rwanda pour entendre les causes comme celle de M. Sibomana. Je me suis donc permis de faire parvenir votre pétition au Haut Commissaire des Droits de la personne à Kigali. J'inclus son adresse dans le cas éventuel où vous aimeriez entrer en contact avec son bureau:

Human Rights, Kigali  
Building E.T.C - C/o American Embassy  
Kigali, Rwanda  
Tel: 72 894 - 72939

Je vous remercie de l'intérêt que vous démontrez envers M. Sibomana et je vous prie d'accepter mes sincères salutations.

le Major Général  
G.C. Tousignant  
Commandant de la MINUAR

M. Robert Hazel  
Université de Montréal  
Faculté des Arts et des Sciences  
Département d'Anthropologie  
Case postale 6128, succursale A  
Montréal (Québec), Canada  
H3C 3J7

Fax de 3 pages

Le 30/11/94

A: Major-général Tousignant ✓  
Commandant de la MINUAR  
Kigali, RWANDA  
fax: 212/363-3090

C Cher Major-général,

On m'avait confié une pétition à transmettre au ministère de la justice du Rwanda, sachant que je devais rencontrer le Major-général Dallaire samedi dernier. Plutôt que le courrier militaire, ce dernier a conseillé le fax.

Sup faire transmettre les pages qui suivent (une lettre + pétition venant de l'Université de Montréal) au ministre Nkurubito

avec copies au président Bizimungu  
au vice-président Kagame  
au premier-ministre Twagiramungu

En vous remerciant pour ce service (SUP vous assure  
que tout est transmis en mains propres)

PS pour me contacter  
= fax 514/875-6469

Robert Hazel (Robert Hazel)  
Montréal  
diplôme du Dept d'anthropologie  
Université de Montréal

Département d'anthropologie  
Université de Montréal

Montréal, 23 novembre 1994

M. Alphonse-Marie Nkubito  
Ministre de la Justice  
Hôtel du gouvernement  
République rwandaise

Monsieur le ministre,


Je suis professeur au Département d'anthropologie de l'Université de Montréal, et comme mes collègues, nos étudiants et l'ensemble de la population canadienne, j'ai été fort ému, par la guerre civile qui a affligé le Rwanda au printemps dernier. Nous avons appuyé les initiatives tant publiques que privées destinées à venir en aide aux centaines de milliers de victimes, blessés et personnes déplacées. En même temps, nous apprenions avec stupeur l'arrestation, en août dernier, de M. Antoine Sibomana, bourgmestre de la commune de Mbazi. De nombreux professeurs de l'Université de Montréal connaissent Antoine qui fut notre étudiant il y a vingt ans et qui a laissé ici le souvenir d'un homme intelligent et d'une personnalité chaleureuse et attachante. Selon le témoignage, tout à fait digne de foi, de M. Yvan Patry, cinéaste canadien qui a rencontré M. Sibomana, ce dernier a été emprisonné dans des conditions extrêmement pénibles, pour ne pas dire inhumaines, et il a été privé d'une alimentation suffisante et des soins nécessaires à son état de santé (il est diabétique et doit prendre régulièrement de l'insuline).

Nous savons que la loi rwandaise ne permet pas la détention d'une personne pendant plus de quatre-vingt-dix jours sans que des accusations ne soient portées contre elle. Or, la détention de M. Sibomana a dépassé ce délai et il n'a toujours pas été libéré, bien qu'aucun chef d'accusation n'ait été retenu contre lui.

Nous demandons par la présente, avec la plus grande insistance, que M. Sibomana soit immédiatement remis en liberté, et qu'on lui permette de regagner en toute sécurité un endroit de son choix où il pourra être soigné et vivre en sécurité ainsi que les siens. Nous demandons que le même traitement soit accordé aux milliers d'autres prisonniers politiques présentement détenus au Rwanda. Nous comprenons que l'aide accordée par les organisations non

gouvernementales canadiennes et le gouvernement canadien est conditionnelle à l'établissement d'un état de droit, respectueux des droits démocratiques de ses citoyens. Nous insisterons auprès de notre gouvernement pour qu'il fasse toutes les pressions nécessaires afin qu'un système judiciaire normal, élément indispensable de la démocratie, soit rapidement instauré au Rwanda.

Veillez agréer, monsieur le ministre, l'expression de nos salutations distinguées



Pierre Beaucage,  
Professeur

cc M. Pasteur Bizimungu, président de la République rwandaise  
M. Faustin Twagiramungu, premier ministre de la République rwandaise  
M. Paul Kagame, chef des forces armées rwandaises



Université de Montréal  
Faculté des arts et des sciences  
Département d'anthropologie

### JUSTICE POUR ANTOINE SIBOMANA

Il y a eu génocide au Rwanda et bien d'autres crimes contre des civils. Les coupables devront être identifiés et jugés.



Ex-étudiant et diplômé du Département d'anthropologie de l'Université de Montréal (1972-1975), Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté sommairement par des nouvelles autorités du pays qui le soupçonnent d'avoir trempé dans le génocide contre les Tutsi.

Madame Monique Mijawamariya, militante des droits de la personne réfugié au Québec, revient d'une mission d'étude dans son pays. Selon elle, Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté injustement.

Nous demandons instamment au Ministre de la Justice du Rwanda de rendre public dès maintenant, s'il y en a, les chefs d'accusation qui pèsent contre Antoine Sibomana. Nous demandons, le cas échéant, qu'il puisse se défendre contre ces accusations. À défaut de tels chefs d'accusation, nous exigeons qu'il soit immédiatement libéré, compte tenu de son état de santé (diabète).

Par ces signatures, nous donnons notre appui à M. Antoine Sibomana.

NOM	ADRESSE	SIGNATURE
1. Vincent Gagnon	3295 Linton	V. Gagnon
2. Carolio Pascal	630 de l'Union ANTOINE	Carolio Pascal
3. MARIE LAURENCE	2350 EDWARD PETIT MONTREAL	Marie Laurence
4. <del>Stéphane Gauthier</del>	814 St-Jacques, MONTREAL	S. Gauthier
5. Guy DUBREUIL	3030 La Combe, MONTREAL	G. Dubreuil
6. <del>Yves Duroy</del>	1440 Montcalm, MTL	Y. Duroy
7. Pierre Beaucage	5371 Jean-Jacques, MONTREAL	P. Beaucage
8. Jeanne Duroy	1440 Montcalm, MTL	J. Duroy
9. M. Duroy	5371 Jean-Jacques, MONTREAL H3T 1T3	M. Duroy
10. M. Duroy	MONTREAL, P.C. Canada	M. Duroy
11. Lucien Gauthier	66 Nelson, MONTREAL	L. Gauthier
12. Daniel Duroy	1930 Edward-Petit, MONTREAL	D. Duroy
13. FLORENCE STORON	3334 NAKDAL	F. Storon
14. MICHELLE MORIN	2960 VAN HARBNE, MONTREAL	M. Morin

16. ~~FRANCOIS LEVIGY 9277E Canada HLL~~ 
17. ~~SAV BUNDTOWN 5444 27 AUG 81~~ 

P. 6126, succursale A  
Montréal (Québec)  
Canada  
BC 3J7

Téléphone: (514) 343-6909  
Télécopieur: (514) 343-2494



Département d'anthropologie de l'Université de Montréal

Par ces signatures, nous donnons notre appui à M. Antoine Sibomana.

NOM	ADRESSE	SIGNATURE
1. THIBAUT, Pierrette	3979 Lacombe	P. Thibault
2. CHAPDELAIN, CLAUDE	93 <sup>Macriale</sup> Montcalm CANADIAN	Claude Chapdelain
3. SAVARD, Rémi	5229 FAHRE MONTREAL	Comme Rémi Savard
4. FAGALAN, CATHERINE	3156 RD. MONTREUIL MTL	Cat Fag
5. UPPA C. PAULA	2825 Dugas Long	Paula
6. Le Collier Frédérique	12339 Ringer, Montreal	qui Centre Frédisque Le Col
7. PORTILLA, HILDA TOYCE	5105 RIVER MOUNT MTL	HILDA PORTILLA
8. NADON, Anne-Marie	427 De la Chapelle MTL	Anne-Marie Nadon
9. Celine Robert	1205 Gervais #309 MTL	Celine
10. La France, Suzanne	227, des Narcisses St Thérèse	Suzanne La France
11. JOAO LESPINOZA	1515 CAVALLI	SELENA
12. Cole, Honoré	4859 St. Denis, Montreal	Honoré
13. LIANE LEBLANC	635 DE GASTON MONTREAL	Liane LeBlanc
14. Julie COUTURE	3332 DE SECTEUR CATHEDRALE	Julie Couture
15. Claudia Vallancourt	3677 Ste-Famille MTL	Claudia Vallancourt
16. Denise Hays	442 CAYMAN	Denise Hays
17. Christian Boulay	7241 E. 4th Ave. #1	Christian Boulay
18. Marc - Andre SIMARD	6829 A St. Denis MTL	Marc - Andre
19. MARTIN ROY	4172 DORCHESTER WST	Martin Roy
20. DENISE KETH	2380 du Parc Jean-Jacques	Denise Keth
21. Pascal Gauthier	1060 Fairmount #4	Pascal Gauthier
22. Penelope Plagiac	4885 Queen Mary #36 Montreal	Penelope
23. LUDIA COTE	2302 A NOTRE-DAME	Ludvia Cote
24. CHARL LEBROS	5 VINCENT D'INDY 709	Charl LeBros
25. Joel Beauvais	32 du Canal St-Louis	Joel Beauvais
26. Christian Allard	12625 Ave-DANIEL EST	Christian Allard
27. Philipe Rivu	1542 Gifford MTL	Philipe Rivu

- 28. Marie Laure Gosselin 2849 Edmond St. Louis
- 29. Elizabeth T. H. 1 3201 St. Louis
- 30. \_\_\_\_\_



Université de Montréal  
Faculté des arts et des sciences  
Département d'anthropologie

# JUSTICE POUR ANTOINE SIBOMANA

Il y a eu génocide au Rwanda et bien d'autres crimes contre des civils. Les coupables devront être identifiés et jugés.

Ex-étudiant et diplômé du Département d'anthropologie de l'Université de Montréal (1972-1975), Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté sommairement par des nouvelles autorités du pays qui le soupçonnent d'avoir trempé dans le génocide contre les Tutsi.

Madame Monique Mujawamariya, militante des droits de la personne réfugié au Québec, revient d'une mission d'étude dans son pays. Selon elle, Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté injustement.

Nous demandons instamment au Ministre de la Justice du Rwanda de rendre public dès maintenant, s'il y en a, les chefs d'accusation qui pèsent contre Antoine Sibomana. Nous demandons, le cas échéant, qu'il puisse se défendre contre ces accusations. À défaut de tels chefs d'accusation, nous exigeons qu'il soit immédiatement libéré, compte tenu de son état de santé (diabète).

Par ces signatures, nous donnons notre appui à M. Antoine Sibomana.

NOM	ADRESSE	SIGNATURE
1. J. Chabot	9200 Ave. St. Jean	J. Chabot
2. Erick Dore	5800 Ave. St. Jean	Erick Dore
3. CARLOS AREL	668 Ave. St. Jean	Carlos Arel
4. CRISTINE TREMBLAY	5583 Ave. St. Jean	C. Tremblay
5. Paul Dore	1026 Ave. St. Jean	Paul Dore
6. Denis Dore	1145 Ave. St. Jean	Denis Dore
7. Jean-François Delisle Roy	3381 Ave. St. Jean	J.-F. Delisle Roy
8. Karine Duguay	2450 Ave. St. Jean	Karine Duguay
9. VERONIQUE TREMBLAY	5583 Ave. St. Jean	V. Tremblay
10. Ginette Paré	4515 Ave. St. Jean	Ginette Paré
11. Luc LAMIRIE	3867 Ave. St. Jean	Luc Lamiré
12. Ginette Tremblay	1628 Ave. St. Jean	Ginette Tremblay
13. <del>Henri Tremblay</del>		
14. Anne G. H. H. H.	6043 Ave. St. Jean	Anne G. H. H. H.

19. ~~1.2000 - 1.2000 40 100 1.2000 5~~

16. Lyette A. Laointe 333 Harechal

W. A. R. R. R.

17. Matthew Sassman 1825 Decettes

*[Handwritten signature]*

C.P. 6128, succursale A  
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Université de Montréal  
Faculté des arts et des sciences  
Département d'anthropologie

# JUSTICE POUR ANTOINE SIBOMANA

Il y a eu génocide au Rwanda et bien d'autres crimes contre des civils. Les coupables devront être identifiés et jugés.

Ex-étudiant et diplômé du Département d'anthropologie de l'Université de Montréal (1972-1975), Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté sommairement par des nouvelles autorités du pays qui le soupçonnent d'avoir trompé dans le génocide contre les Tutsi.

Madame Monique Mujawamariya, militante des droits de la personne réfugié au Québec, revient d'une mission d'étude dans son pays. Selon elle, Antoine Sibomana a été arrêté injustement.

Nous demandons instamment au Ministre de la Justice du Rwanda de rendre public des maintenant, s'il y en a, les chefs d'accusation qui pèsent contre Antoine Sibomana. Nous demandons, le cas échéant, qu'il puisse se défendre contre ces accusations. À défaut de tels chefs d'accusation, nous exigeons qu'il soit immédiatement libéré, compte tenu de son état de santé (diabète).

Par ces signatures, nous donnons notre appui à M. Antoine Sibomana.

NOM	ADRESSE	SIGNATURE
1. Jean-Louis Lacroix	5570 St-Jacques HtL	[Signature]
2. Lucie Chénier	1293 Belvoir HtL	[Signature]
3. STEPHAN RHOX	7204 Chénier	[Signature]
4. DOMINIQUE BOUTIN	4344 105e Ave HtL	[Signature]
5. U. B. H. H.	4870 Ave. HtL	[Signature]
6. Guy André Chénier	364 Ave. Fendall HtL	[Signature]
7. Lucie Chénier	5033 Bessier	[Signature]
8. Marie Perreault	5026 Rivard HtL	[Signature]
9. Pascal Desrosiers	4441 St. André HtL	[Signature]
10. Isabelle ANGUITA	4473 St. Louis HtL	[Signature]
11. Abdine Chantonnau	7510A D'Arlet	[Signature]
12. DANIEL ARLOFF	4871 Ferme-Haute	[Signature]
13. François Gauthier	6579 Cassette HtL	[Signature]
14. Lise Duplex	2435 St. Louis HtL	[Signature]
15. Richard Philiat	et Pauline Kizian	[Signature]

16. *Nicolas Bachard* 10015 Verville MTL *Nicolas Bachard*  
17. *Stéphane Dupont* 340 Montpetit MTL *Stéphane Dupont*

C. P. 6128, succursale A  
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H3C 3J7

Téléphone: (514) 343-8909  
Télécopieur: (514) 343-2494

Par ces signatures, nous donnons notre appui à M. Antoine Sibomana.

NOM	ADRESSE	SIGNATURE
1. CHRISTIAN-J. SAUVE	360 STONBROOK	Sauve
2. JEAN-JACQUES REY	434 Boul. A. Lavigne	Rey
3. STEWART HADY	5618 Chatelet	Stewart Hady
4. CHRISTINE FERGUS	20545-DESB	Fergus
5. Patrick Figeo	5724 Brossard	Patrick Figeo
6. Emma Lemer	3550 Nathalie	Emma Lemer
7. D. Eli	190 W. Howdall	D. Eli
8. V. Hefeneis	6710, Louis Hénou	V. Hefeneis
9. A. AGENAIS	526 Boul. St-Hilaire	A. AGENAIS
10. NZEYIMANA	Pidjiri 1015, Van Buren St.	NZEYIMANA
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Kigali 28 November 1994

Dear General,

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has recently written to the President, sending him a copy of a paper, written by one of the officers on my staff, dealing with the subject of Military Planning in the Demobilization Process. I enclose a copy of Mr. Khan's letter, together with the paper itself, for your information.

I believe that the paper could be of considerable value to you and your staff in the period ahead, not only in planning for demobilization but also in the very necessary work of establishing your national defence policy.

As always, we stand ready to assist where we can. I therefore repeat Mr. Khan's offer to make the author of the paper available to discuss it and related matters with you or members of your staff.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant', written over a horizontal line.

Mgen G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mgen P. Kagame  
Vice President  
Minister of Defence  
Kigali, Rwanda



**Shaharyar M. KHAN**  
*Special Representative of the Secretary General  
for Rwanda*

**DATE: 26 November 1994**  
**REF: OSRSG/1/94**

Your Excellency,

C We are both aware that, as part of the normalization process in Rwanda, your Government will soon have to address the matter of demobilization of some part of the armed forces. There will be many difficult decisions to be made as you try to balance the need to make the maximum savings in your defence budget against the maintenance of essential security throughout the country.

With this in mind, I hope the enclosed paper will be of some help to you. It has been prepared by a military officer on the staff of my Mission and describes some aspects of the processes which must be gone through if demobilization is to be successful from the military point of view. I also enclose a copy of the letter under which the paper has been distributed, so that you may understand the context in which it was written.

C The paper is not specific to Rwanda; nor does it attempt to describe in detail how the necessary work should be carried out. What it does set out to do, and I believe very successfully, is to explain to the donor community that there are vital military implications which any government has a duty to consider as part of the planning for demobilization; and that this work will take time. In doing so, it provides what I believe you will find to be a most helpful checklist of points to be examined and presents a logical sequence of work.

While the paper makes the point very clearly that your Government cannot rush into large scale demobilization, it also demonstrates that much preparatory work can be carried out almost immediately - for example, to find organizations which would be prepared to assist with the task of integrating discharged veterans into the civilian community and discuss outline plans with them.

The paper also identifies 2 groups, the disabled and underage soldiers, to whom priority attention should be directed.


H. E. President P. Bizimungu  
President of Rwanda  
Kigali, Rwanda

I am confident that you will find much food for thought in the paper. The author is available to discuss it with you or members of your staff; if you wish to do this, please let me know.

A separate copy of the paper is being sent to the Minister of Defence.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,



Shaharyar M. KHAN  
Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General for Rwanda



From: Col K P O'Kelly  
DCOS (Sp)  
HQ UNAMIR

Extn: 11109

To: Force Commander

File Reference: 4000.1/Log 28

Date: 25 Nov 94

Subject: DEMOBILIZATION PAPER

1. You will recall that you recommended that a copy of my paper on Demobilization should be sent to the President; SRSG has agreed this and asked that I draft a covering letter for his signature. A copy of the draft which I have passed to SRSG under a separate minute is attached.

2. I believe that you will wish to send a copy to the Vice-President and Minister of Defence and, therefore, have prepared a covering letter for you to send; this is also attached.

3. The paper is now being printed as a matter of urgency and should be ready next Monday. As I would like to send the President and Vice-President's copies as quickly as possible.

4. If your office can type up the letter, with any amendments you may require, and sign it, the paper can be despatched to the President immediately copies are received from the printers and I have a copy of SRSG's signed covering letter.

K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS (Sp)

DRAFT LETTER - SRSG TO THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA

We are both aware that, as part of the normalization process in Rwanda, your Government will soon have to address the matter of demobilization of some part of the armed forces. There will be many difficult decisions to be made as you try to balance the need to make the maximum savings in your defence budget against the maintenance of essential security throughout the country.

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The paper also identifies 2 groups, the disabled and underage soldiers, to whom priority attention should be directed.

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A separate copy of the paper is being sent to the Minister of Defence.

Copy to:

Force Commander

DRAFT LETTER  
FORCE COMMANDER TO VICE-PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations has recently written to the President, sending him a copy of a paper, written by one of the officers on my staff, dealing with the subject of Military Planning in the Demobilization Process. I enclose a copy of Mr Kahn's letter, together with the paper itself, for your information.

I believe that the paper could be of considerable value to you and your staff in the period ahead, not only in planning for demobilization but also in the very necessary work of establishing your national defence policy.

As always, we stand ready to assist where we can. I therefore repeat Mr Kahn's offer to make the author of the paper available to discuss it and related matters with you or members of your staff.



From: Colonel K P O'Kelly  
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters  
Kigali  
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 28

See Distribution

28 Nov 94

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

1. In situations such as those in which we find ourselves in Rwanda, there is often an understandable desire on the part of many to see an immediate move towards demobilization of the armed forces, in order to release resources from defence to what are perceived as more constructive activities. The armed forces themselves often share this aspiration, so that they can concentrate on their role of providing the best possible forces for the defence of the country against internal or external aggression.

2. In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of study into the demobilization process, leading to the publication of a number of papers. This literature concentrates on the economic and social aspects of the demobilization process, with much useful information on how veterans have been successfully re-integrated into the civilian community in a number of countries and, inevitably, examination of some less successful programmes.


3. As a soldier, I naturally share the concern that the veterans, recognized as a *specialty disadvantaged group*, receive as much appropriate assistance as possible in their transition back to civilian life. But it also concerns me that there is little or no published material available on the military aspects of demobilization; for the defence forces, it should come at the end of a long planning process and it is only as a result of that process that the numbers to be demobilized can be determined.

4. I suspect that the non-military community has little understanding of the issues which need to be considered in this process and why governments will see them as important; indeed, important enough to delay demobilization. I have, therefore, produced the attached paper with the aim of explaining what I see as the military considerations involved in demobilization. I must stress that the paper is a personal view and the views expressed should not be attributed in any way to UNAMIR nor to my own national authorities.

5. The paper does not include an executive summary as such but, as it is written in the form of a military service paper, a reading of the introduction, aim and conclusions sections will serve the same purpose.

6. I would be grateful if, as UNAMIR's link with the UN agencies and NGOs, you would circulate the paper to those organizations which you feel may have an interest in any aspect of the demobilization process, including the reintegration of veterans into the civilian community. I would also be happy to discuss any aspect of the paper with you or any other organization and can provide a limited number of further copies, if required.

7. The paper is not specific to any particular situation and certainly does not pretend to address the problems faced by the Government of Rwanda; none the less, I hope that it will be a useful contribution to the current debate on demobilization. In particular, I would draw attention to the need for close cooperation between the armed forces and other bodies which may be involved in the integration of veterans into the civilian community; this cooperation can, and should, begin well before it is possible to start calculating the numbers to be demobilized.

  
K P O'KELLY  
Colonel

**Distribution:**

**Action:**

**External:**

UNREO

**Information:**

**External:**

RPA Liaison Officer

**Internal:**

Office of SRSG  
Force Commander  
DFC/COS/CMO



**MILITARY PLANNING  
IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS**

by

**Kieran O'Kelly**

**November 1994**

**MILITARY PLANNING  
IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS**

by

**Kieran O'Kelly**

**November 1994**

Kieran O'Kelly is a serving officer in the British Army. Although primarily a logistician, he has held United Kingdom Ministry of Defence appointments concerned with the structure (size and shape) of the Army and in an officers' personnel (or manning) branch. He served two tours with the British Military Advisory and Training Team Zimbabwe, shortly after that country's independence, when many of the issues contained in this paper were topical. He has also visited Egypt as part of a team advising on manpower planning and manning policy issues. He is currently Deputy Chief of Staff (Support), with particular responsibility for personnel and logistics matters, in the Force Headquarters of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.

This paper uses some British terminology and outlines a number of British practices; they are explained where their meaning is not self evident. While the detail of the processes may vary from one country to another, the underlying principles remain valid for any particular situation.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be taken to represent the policy of either the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda or the British government.

## MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

### INTRODUCTION

1. There is a growing body of literature dealing with the demobilization process, based mainly on the study of exercises to reduce armed forces in countries which have recently passed through internal struggles. This literature appears to assume that the objectives of demobilization are purely social and economic, with the emphasis on the latter. Yet it is an implicit assumption in all this work that not every soldier will be demobilized and, ergo, the countries concerned will continue to have armed forces. None of the works reviewed addresses the issues relating to this aspect of the topic - other than a few passing references to *professionalization* of the remaining armed forces. It may be that, in countries which are emerging from internal security problems, of whatever kind, there is a reluctance on the part of the military authorities to discuss matters which they consider might compromise national security and this could explain why the literature pays scant regard to these topics.

2. Matters such as the appropriate role, size, organization, equipment and level of training of the armed forces for the circumstances of the country concerned are equally as important for future national security - in the widest sense as well as the narrow meaning of the word - of that country as the successful reintegration into society of those who are demobilized. Indeed, such matters must be addressed to some degree before detailed work on the demobilization process can begin because it is only from an examination of them that it becomes possible to begin to calculate how many soldiers are to be demobilized. This work is not only relevant to the demobilization process, it also forms the basis of coherent defence planning; the introduction of mechanisms necessary for planning demobilization will provide a firm framework for much subsequent work.

3. It is possible to identify and discuss the issues involved without reference to any particular situation and, hence, without addressing, still less compromising, the security of any particular state.

### AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider in outline the military aspects of demobilization of armed forces.

5. The context in which the paper is written is the newly emerging state in a troubled region of the world, a state which will be relying heavily on external advice and funding. But the processes described are essentially the same as those adopted by any state when it carries out a defence review.

6. It is hoped that this work will assist the economic and development communities by demonstrating that:

a. There are valid military concerns which have significance equal to that of the economic and social issues and, like those economic and social issues, their proper resolution is vital for the future well-being and stability of the country concerned.

b. It is essential that appropriate military planning staff are fully involved in the demobilization process.

c. While the processes involved are not difficult to understand, their application does require the use of specialized skills and techniques. It is as appropriate for institutions, aid agencies and donors to provide teams of advisors to assist in this work as it is in the areas in which advice is more traditionally given. Indeed, if such agencies are encouraging demobilisation, they may be considered to have a responsibility to fund that advice.

#### **THE THREAT**

7. All military planning takes as its starting point 'the Threat' and the approach to demobilization can not be an exception. It is only by having a thorough understanding of the potential for aggression against the state, whether external or internal, that it becomes possible to start designing the forces necessary to counter that threat and, hence, calculate the numbers for demobilization.

8. Accurate identification of the Threat is fundamental to the success of the exercise yet inevitably involves a considerable degree of speculation, hypothesis and, less sophisticatedly, sheer guesswork, based upon information which may be of dubious accuracy. There is a tendency among some threat analysts to overestimate the Threat; they build in a safety margin so that future events cannot be worse than they have predicted. At the least, prudence demands that they err on the side of caution.

9. The Threat is also dynamic and must be subjected to continual review to ensure that the military planning which depends upon it remains appropriate to the developing circumstances. Once a demobilization programme has been established, however, the consequences of such reviews should result in minor adjustments to numbers rather than radical reappraisals unless, of course, there is a major change in international relationships within the region; such changes would be likely to affect programmes other than those which are essentially military-related and, hence, will probably precipitate policy reviews in other areas as well.

10. There are 2 elements to the Threat: capability and intention<sup>1</sup>. For example, if a neighbouring state has strong, well equipped and trained Armed Forces but enjoys excellent relationships with the country under consideration, considerable commonality of interest exists between the 2 states and there are no border disputes, the military might of that neighbouring country presents little threat. On the other hand, if the

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1 I am grateful to my British Army colleague, Captain Sean Moorhouse, for his assistance with capabilities and intentions.

neighbouring country has small, poorly equipped Armed Forces but there are fundamental policy disagreements, cross-border ethnic tensions and/or long-standing territorial disputes, the threat of a major attack, limited incursions or a counter-insurgency campaign is clearly greater than in the first example. Consideration of capability is naturally a matter in which the military staffs should lead while substantial political advice is necessary when intentions are being assessed; it needs always to be remembered that intentions are effectively limited by capability.

11. It is necessary to carry out a Threat Analysis for each neighbouring country and any other state within the region which might pose a strategic threat. The countries must be considered alone and in the form of potential alliances. It will also be necessary to consider internal elements who may wish to see changes in the constitution, borders or policy of the state. The work must clearly be soundly based in the present but, to have any value, it must make forward projections. It is suggested that for the purposes under consideration the optimal period for review is likely to be in the order of 5 years.

12. **Current Capability.** The assessment of current capabilities is the easiest element of the analysis, despite the fact that many details may be shrouded under a blanket of security. There are published data relating to the armed forces of all states and these may form a useful starting point. Further information will come from observation of a country's military training and ceremonial events and by monitoring the international arms trade to determine what military hardware a country has acquired.

13. **Future Capability.** Projections into the future are clearly more speculative but there will be information available from which inferences may reasonably be drawn. There is a link between perceived intentions and future capability, clearly demonstrating that the political and military aspects of this work are interdependent. The types of indicator which may be used to assess future capability include: the development of a manufacturing base with the potential to produce weapons, the signing of arms deals with other nations and the recruitment of weapons design specialists from more advanced countries.

14. **Current Intentions.** Current intentions may be explicit, such as a publicly announced aim, as in the case of territorial disputes, or they may be more subtle. Intentions are determined by the political leaders of a state but are carried out by the military staff. Purely military indicators which help to determine intentions include the build up of military forces in a particular area or the stockpiling of military materiel. Indicators of a political nature include the deterioration of diplomatic relations between states or the signing of an alliance with a hostile power.

15. **Future Intentions.** As with the assessment of future capabilities, the assessment of future intentions is speculative. Thorough research and an in depth knowledge of the surrounding countries, internally and in regard to the regional situation, is essential in order to produce an assessment of those countries' likely intentions. Given the political nature of intentions, any change of leadership, particularly if it occurs by force, will precipitate a review in this area.

16. **The Threat Document.** From consideration of these aspects of capability and intention, the Threat Document is synthesized. It will contain an assessment of the likelihood of armed aggression (and whether this is likely to be a major or minor incursion), insurrection or civil disorder against the state. It is unlikely that there will be an unequivocal statement of the Threat but, rather, the identification of a spectrum - a low threat best case up to the high threat worst case and, in between, implicitly or explicitly, a most likely worst case.

17. **Need for Regular Review.** The production of such a document involves a considerable amount of skilled and detailed work by many agencies and this needs to continue. It was previously noted that the Threat will change; even in a relatively stable environment, there will be changes of detail and emphasis. The current capabilities and intentions are no more than foundations on which the more important, and much more difficult, future capabilities and intentions are based and, no matter how skillfully the Threat is analyzed, it is unlikely that the Threat Document will be accurate in every detail. These considerations do not invalidate the work but they emphasize the need for regular reviews of the situation. Any fundamental, unforeseen change in the political environment affecting the state will force an immediate Threat Review to consider the new circumstances. While Intelligence staffs should constantly monitor the situation and note relevant information, there should not normally be full reviews more than once each year; even full reviews are unlikely to produce major, unexpected changes from year to year but there will inevitably be changes in detail which will need to be addressed. Ideally, these full reviews will be timed to precede the preparation of the defence element of the national budget by a sufficient amount to allow any changes in the Threat which may be considered sufficiently significant to affect the defence programme to be addressed as part of the budgetary process. It is important that non-defence agencies understand that this process may affect the numbers of soldiers to be demobilized over the planned programme and that this is not because the military planning was faulty; rather that the military decision makers are adapting their plan to meet developing circumstances.

#### **DESIGN OF APPROPRIATE ARMED FORCES TO MEET THE THREAT**

##### **SIZE AND SHAPE**

18. Once the Threat has been defined, it becomes possible to begin the design of armed forces capable of meeting it. The first step in this design, and all that is necessary for broad budget planning, is the so-called 'size and shape' or structure of the armed forces - size is self-explanatory but shape refers to the division between the branches of the service - navy, army and air force - and within those branches eg, for the army, the proportion which will be infantry, armoured, artillery, military engineers, logistic troops etc (called the capbadge split in many armies<sup>2</sup>).

19. States may be able to rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the support of allies or United Nations protection and this support may reduce the need for armed

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2 This is a convenient shorthand, used later in this paper, which derives from those armies in which different arms and services wear distinctive capbadges.

forces of their own. In considering this, it needs to be remembered that alliances may be transient and United Nations protection temporary. The defence of the homeland is both the right and duty of a sovereign state, some would argue that it is the primary responsibility; the Government must be allowed to devote adequate resources to this task.

20. It is not axiomatic that all the forces considered necessary need be fully-mobilized. The Threat Document will identify Warning Periods and it may be possible to mobilize reserve forces (ie civilians with a liability to be called up to full time military service) so that they can be ready where required within the Warning Period. This may also open the way to the employment of formed bodies of troops on non-Defence tasks. It should be noted that systems will be required to activate and deploy the reserve forces, they will be less militarily skilled than full time soldiers (although they may well bring additional skills into the armed forces and may particularly be a source of certain types of specialist), they will require planned training periods and there will be little saving in equipment costs. There are social and other wider matters to be considered (which fall outside the scope of this paper). Clearly, there are many issues to be addressed before this option can be adopted but it can be a valid approach to the provision of adequate defence at minimum cost.

21. It has been noted previously that there may be internal and external threats to security. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the extent to which the military will be involved in internal security matters. There may be political and presentational advantages in placing as much of this task as possible under the police and, hence, outside the defence budget.

22. The armed forces of developing countries tend to assume that defence capability should rely wholly on military personnel. In the developed world, the trend is in the other direction - military personnel are increasingly being used solely for tasks in which military training and experience are necessary, while civilians, employed directly or through a commercial contractor, are used to provide as much support as possible. Military personnel are generally more flexible than civilians but time spent on military activities reduces their productivity if they are engaged in technical activities; They also tend to be more expensive. Of course, in developing countries, there may not be the necessary pool of qualified civilians who could fill all of the posts appropriate for them. Here, too, there may be political and social considerations to take into account when the balance is struck between military and civilian staff.

23. Taking these and other factors into account, and from consideration of the Threat Analysis, it is possible to design armed forces capable of meeting and containing the Threat, together with all their necessary support functions. This is not a precise science and considerable judgement is required but there are a number of yardsticks and military axioms which are available to assist. Two simple examples: if a well equipped, hostile neighbour has strong armoured forces, there will need to be an anti-tank capability; an attack is usually planned on a 3:1 ratio - a defended position occupied by 100 soldiers will need not less than 300 soldiers to seize it and it follows that if a divisional attack (> 10,000 troops) on the country is considered probable, a minimum of a brigade (ca 5,000 troops) will be needed to resist, although qualitative comparisons will also be necessary.



24. It is not necessary in this paper to explain the detail of how the process is carried out, but it will be appreciated that it is inevitably long and detailed, requiring a high level of military expertise and judgement, together with a sound understanding of the forces to which the process is being applied and the personnel and logistic support functions which will be necessary to support those deployed in the field.

25. The development of a size and shape is inevitably an iterative process. It is almost a foregone conclusion that the first attempt will produce a design - probably providing ample capability to deal with at least the realistic worst case - which will far exceed anything which can remotely be afforded and so it will be necessary to apply judgement, compromise and take considered risks. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply profligacy to be inherent in the military planning process; rather that military staffs are entrusted with substantial responsibilities for the defence of the homeland and, like most other professionals, do not wish to fail; indeed, they recognize that failure on their part would be more drastic than is the case in many other professions. This first, as it were ideal, design is a necessary part of the work as it is only by constant reference back to it that a sensible view can be taken on the compromises and risks necessary and acceptable to bring the design within budgetary reality.

26. Once developed, the size and shape of the armed forces provides a detailed basis on which a wide range of more specific planning can take place, much of which will have wider, social implications as well as affecting the defence budget. In many cases, some preparatory work can be carried out in parallel with the Threat Analysis and structural work but it cannot be finalized until that has been completed. For example:

- a. An operational concept and tactical doctrine - produced in conjunction with the Threat Document to describe how the armed forces will operate in the field.
- b. Detailed organization tables for each unit in the armed forces, listing the number of personnel, by rank, capbadge and qualification, together with the major and minor equipment requirements. These may be different for peace and war, to reflect the use of reserves or the redeployment of troops which may take place on mobilization.
- c. An equipment programme - what equipment is required and in what quantity, including war reserves; phasing of purchase of that which needs to be procured to match budgetary planning; replacement parts, tools, test equipment etc for existing and planned equipments; disposal of surplus equipment etc.
- d. A training programme - individual basic military skills; collective training; functional training to reflect new roles for the armed forces, particularly if those forces have moved from fighting a liberation struggle to keeping the peace; technical and special to arm or equipment training;

e. An accommodation plan - how many troops and their equipment are to be housed, where they would best be located having due regard to likely threats and other considerations, policy on family housing etc.

f. A terms and conditions of service policy - pay and allowances, leave, welfare etc.

g. A manning plan - career patterns, postings, promotion, personal records, indeed, everything relating to an individuals career - the most important document in the demobilization context and thus now examined in more detail.

27. It should, however, first be noted that many of the areas of work are interrelated. The training plan, for example, will need to reflect the manning plan and to feed into the accommodation plan, which will also be affected by the conditions of service policy.

#### **THE MANNING PLAN**

28. From a consolidation of the individual unit organization tables, the total military manpower<sup>3</sup> requirement is produced, showing the numbers of troops required under each capbadge, by rank and qualification. This becomes one of the foundations of the manning plan. Before declaring this as the size of the armed forces, it will be necessary to consider the need for additional manpower:

a. **Working Margin.** The Working Margin provides a small reserve of manpower which is available to meet new or temporary commitments.

b. **Supernumerary Allowance.** The Supernumerary Allowance provides manpower cover for personnel who, for whatever reason, are not filling established posts. During a handover/takeover period, for example, both the incumbent and his relief are effectively filling one post and there is only the cover for one. Unless some recognition of this is made in the overall manpower plan, effective handovers will only be possible by creating manning gaps elsewhere in the organization. Other situations covered by this allowance include attendance on long courses, long term sickness and travelling time on posting.

3. It may be helpful to explain that, in this paper, manpower and manning have distinctly different meanings:

Manpower Planning relates to personnel in the abstract - how many are required and where they are to be employed, ie size and shape or structural issues.

Manning, on the other hand, relates to the filling of the posts listed in the structure by suitable individuals and their career management as they move through those posts.

29. The total manpower requirement, by capbadge, rank and qualification, is collected together in a Manpower Conspectus, the basic document on which all manning matters are based.

30. In parallel with all of the Threat Analysis and size and shape work, a manning policy should be developed, although it is one of the many policies which cannot be finalized until the processes above have been completed. It is unlikely that the manning policy will be contained in one, simple document; for example: there are likely to be separate policy considerations affecting officers and other ranks; certain specialists may require different treatment from the majority, and so on.

31. A number of considerations arise when the manning policy is being considered. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure that all authorized posts are filled by suitably qualified and experienced personnel, while ensuring that those individuals have a satisfying career in the armed forces, during which their abilities are developed and rewarded, leading to their eventual discharge back into civilian life as useful citizens with skills which will be of value to the community.

#### **THE RECRUITING AND REDUNDANCY APPROACH**

32. In the context of this paper, the most important decision to be made is whether, and to what extent, there will be a flow of personnel into the armed forces, through the ranks and back into civilian life; in other words, will positive efforts be made to recruit and train new soldiers, with a compensating redundancy programme (affecting say 5% of the post-demobilization armed forces each year) becoming a feature of the manning policy for a number of years<sup>4</sup>? This will obviously affect the resettlement activities in a necessarily extended programme. While the recruiting and redundancy approach may be more expensive but has a number of social, political and military advantages:

a. Post-revolutionary armed forces, and particularly armies, tend to consist of predominantly young men, indeed often children, whose education has probably not been completed and who are thus not ideal material for military service. Among those who are not demobilized, there will be little natural retirement on grounds of age; natural opportunities for promotion will not arise, meaning that merit will not be rewarded and individuals will become frustrated. A resentful army is not an ingredient for stability within the country. Alternatively, if promotions are manufactured, the armed forces will become over-ranked and more expensive to no useful purpose, without the individuals gaining the enhanced job satisfaction which should come from filling appointments of greater responsibility on each successive promotion.

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4 Although not in the situation covered by the context of this paper, Nigeria has adopted this approach in its current Revitalization Programme. In 1989, the Nigerian Army was some 100,000 strong and, under the programme will reduce to about 60,000 by 1995.

b. The age profile will lead to the armed forces becoming less effective over time. Although the level of military expertise might increase, staleness is a potential problem. More seriously, while there is a place for older men within the armed forces, it is not appropriate for infantry riflemen to be in their late 30s as would happen 15-20 years after the establishment of the armed forces in this context.

c. There will come a time, perhaps some 20 years downstream, when a large proportion of the armed forces will reach retirement age within a short period. Assuming that they will need to be replaced - and if they do not they should previously have been demobilized - this will result in a huge recruiting and training programme. The armed forces will have little or no experience in the management of such activities and there will obviously be considerable turbulence, leading to the formation of essentially new, inexperienced armed forces.

d. Simultaneously with this development, the retiring veterans will all be precipitated onto the job market within a short period. Despite the comments on the aim of the Manning Policy including the return of useful citizens to civilian life, the low level of education of the majority of the veterans will mean that expensive education and resettlement programmes will be necessary, ideally throughout the period of their service but certainly as it nears its end. Even with such programmes, the market may not be able to absorb so many at one time, leading to a potentially destabilizing situation; indeed, a repetition of just the problem which demobilization itself would cause if not carefully managed in the manner described in the literature.

e. The adoption of a recruiting and redundancy policy could, itself, become a destabilizing influence. This disadvantage would be negated if it became clear that those discharged as redundant received the best possible preparation for discharge. This should include remedial education, vocational training and social skills.

f. Having the processes in place will allow the structure of the armed forces to be conveniently and easily adjusted as the work described above is refined and in the event of any significant change in threat.

g. Armed forces should reflect the society which they serve and from which they are drawn, yet in almost all countries they tend to be alienated, or at least set apart, from that society. There are many reasons for this (outside the scope of the paper) but a constant flow of new blood into the armed forces and a steady rate of discharge of personnel into the civilian community would foster greater mutual understanding and prevent the development of the dangerous situation of a military clique or sub-society within society as a whole.

33. Once this basic decision is taken, it becomes possible to complete the development of the manning policy itself. This should lead to the construction of simple mathematical models which will indicate ideal or target age, rank and length of service profiles for the numbers contained in the manpower conspectus.

34. It is typical of liberation armies that administration is at best informal. An essential tool in the administration of the personnel of the armed forces is basic personal documentation and the capture of the necessary data must be achieved as quickly as possible. This will take the form of personal profiles of every soldier, including educational background, previous careers etc, which when collated, will provide much useful management information on which many planning activities can be based.

35. Not only will this provide a basis on which selections for demobilization can be made, the requirement is more fundamental than that. It is only by collecting and collating the data that it will become possible to determine the current size of the armed forces and hence, in due course, how many are to be demobilized. But more immediately, and with significant security implications, it allows for the proper administration of pay (including a reduction in the potential for fraud by paymasters and commanders).

#### **DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING**

36. It is only when all of the work described above has been completed that it becomes possible to start addressing the quantitative aspects of the demobilization policy. The following basic information should have become available:

- a. The number of personnel within the armed forces, together with at least basic personal details about each individual.
- b. The number required for the long term, by capbadge, rank and qualification, with an indication of the target age, rank and length of service profiles.
- c. Hence the number to be demobilized immediately.
- d. An estimate of the numbers to be declared redundant in any follow up programmes, such as long term recruiting and redundancy, and the time scale over which this will take place.

37. It would be facile to pretend that a liberation army, converting into a conventional force, will have the infrastructure and experience necessary to carry out this planning process, and certainly not to do it quickly enough to satisfy the donor countries and organizations which will be wanting to see speedy progress towards demobilization. This gives rise to the following considerations:

- a. The work which needs to be carried out to prepare for demobilization will be necessary to produce the design for appropriate, balanced and properly structured forces to meet the legitimate security concerns of the country. Demobilization considerations may force the pace but many other issues will be resolved through the process.
- b. In reality, even developed nations with much experience of similar processes do not complete them quickly - and they have a corpus of policies

covering all the key areas, rather than having to start ab initio.

c. The provision of suitable advisors will thus be essential. They will necessarily become privy to much information which will rightly be regarded as vital to the security of the state. If they are to be effective, they must be acceptable to and trusted by the government; and the command group and strategic and corporate planning elements of the armed forces. Clearly they will need to be selected with care.

d. The development of the necessary policies will be iterative. It will be necessary to first carry out crude analyses of the various issues - thus allowing some broad estimates to be made - and then refine the policies, leading to more accurate figures of those to be demobilized. This strengthens the case for the adoption of the long term recruiting and redundancy approach discussed above, as its adoption would provide the means of adjusting numbers over the long term if the estimates were found to be wildly inaccurate.

e. The start of demobilization does not, however, need to wait for almost any of this work to be completed. There will be priority cases - individuals who should be discharged regardless of the outcome of the full planning process.

#### **PRIORITY CASES**

38. There are 2 obvious categories who demand priority treatment: the disabled and underage soldiers. While all veterans may be regarded as belonging to 'a specially disadvantaged group'<sup>5</sup> these 2 groups present particular problems and challenges. In addition, veterans' dependents have also been identified as a special/vulnerable group,<sup>6</sup> but consideration of them falls outside the scope of this paper. In any event, dependents need to be considered at the same time as the heads of their families and they are not, in themselves, priority cases.

39. **Disabled Veterans.** The literature contains much comment on the manner in which disabled veterans might be treated on demobilization and whether they should attract a priority above that of war-disabled civilians. For the purposes of this paper, suffice it to note that these personnel have no long term future within the armed forces, regardless of the overall numbers to be discharged, and it might be beneficial to them to be released ahead of the able-bodied, as soon as they can be supported by appropriate rehabilitation programmes.

40. **Underage Soldiers.** A feature of modern liberation struggles is the youth of many of the combat hardened soldiers - fighters as young as 10 or 12 are not

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5. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel - Case Studies, Chapter VIII, The Case of Uganda, paragraphs 9 and 10. Nat Colletta and Nicole Ball, World Bank; date not shown.

6. World Bank Discussion Paper: Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies. World Bank, October 1993.

uncommon; many of them are actually or effectively orphans and the army has become their family. It is not clear whether any demobilization exercises have addressed the particular needs of underage soldiers but they obviously represent a group which needs to be demobilized quickly so that their education can be resumed, psychological damage can be repaired and they can be taught social skills and attitudes different from the inappropriate ones they may have acquired during their service. If it is not possible to demobilize all of them, special attention must be directed at the needs of those who remain; perhaps some form of partial demobilization in which military activity is combined with a programme of education and vocational training. Given the recent UNICEF initiative on the employment of underage soldiers<sup>7</sup>, donors might be particularly well disposed to fund the necessary programmes for this group as a matter of urgency.

#### **SELECTION FOR DEMOBILIZATION**

41. For the balance, it will be necessary to consider which individuals are to be demobilized. On 5 Jun 92 the Ugandan Army Council published the criteria which they had adopted for their demobilization programme:

- a. 'Voluntary resignation is accepted from all officers and men. The Army reserves the right to retain anybody for his or her skills, profession or special talent.
- b. Age as contained in the terms and conditions of service.
- c. Non-citizens.
- d. Services no longer required; this will cover all those who are undisciplined, malingerers, incompetent ones, drug abusers etc.
- e. Local defence units: Those interested in the army must be on active service now and have contributed to counter-insurgency operations for at least one year. They will be screened, like the rest of the army, and taken on provided there is room in the establishment. Those found unfit for health reasons shall be discharged.
- f. There are officers and men seconded to institutions outside the army. Whereas the secondment of officers will continue, they shall however cease to depend on all army resources. Only officers and specialists will be seconded. those affected [who] are interested will report back to the army for screening.'<sup>8</sup>

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7. Details not yet to hand.

8 'Army Council Issues Criteria for Reducing Army', Kampala Radio, 5 Jun 92, reproduced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-AFR-91-110, 8 Jun 92, p11.

42. A number of useful points arise from these criteria:

a. In general, any soldier who wishes to be demobilized should be allowed to do so. The armed forces will, however, invariably reserve the right to retain individuals with particular qualifications for which they foresee a need, in order to prevent the depletion of necessary skills, in order to allow the new armed forces to remain effective. Many of the skills likely to be under consideration will be those for which there is a ready market, and high pay, in the commercial sector; it will be necessary to ensure that the terms and conditions of service policy allows for those with such qualifications to be adequately rewarded within the armed forces. In considering the retention of skilled personnel, it may be appropriate to take account of whether the individuals gained their qualifications before or after joining the armed forces.

b. Underage soldiers have previously been considered as priority cases for demobilization. While the age criterion was absolute in the Ugandan demobilization exercise, ie governed by the terms and conditions of service policy, the ideal Manning profiles will also tend to indicate groups of personnel who become prime candidates for redundancy on grounds of age.

c. In moving to smaller and, it is hoped, more professional armed forces, there is a natural and proper wish to remove non-effective personnel and the Ugandan criteria indicate the type of individual who has little to offer the armed forces. These and similar groups are easily identified and should be discharged.

d. There may be auxiliary forces associated with the armed forces who will need to be considered; this will clearly depend on circumstances and any roles they perform will need to be considered as part of the size and shape processes. If, however, such forces are to be demobilized, it is unlikely to be acceptable for all their members to be discharged and, anyway, doing so would eliminate a potential source of the good quality personnel required for the new armed forces.

43. It has been previously recommended that disabled veterans should be demobilized as priority cases but a health criterion might also be adopted for non-disabled personnel. The armed forces should have medical minimum standards; these might usefully be reviewed in preparation for the demobilization programme and enforced as a means of improving the overall standard of health of the forces. This will, in due course, lead to significant savings to the defence budget.

44. It is important to consider the extent to which is necessary or desirable to have ethnically mixed or balanced armed forces. This is essentially a political matter and beyond the scope of this paper but guidance must be obtained before any selection for demobilization can take place beyond those who fail to meet specified criteria.

45. Agreed criteria for selection for demobilization form the final requirement for the implementation of the demobilization plan. Certain groups will have been identified for automatic selection but it is unlikely that there will be sufficient volunteers to meet the balance of the total number required to be demobilized; compulsory demobilization



will be required. Although there is some evidence that, even shortly after leaving the armed forces, 'no matter how difficult economic circumstances may [have been], for both men and women, army life [no longer] seems attractive'<sup>9</sup> it is unrealistic to expect personnel to accept this ante facto. There will need to be an information campaign within the armed forces, stating the facts fairly and honestly, but in such a manner that it does not give rise to alarm or discontent; emphasis must clearly be given to the resettlement package. A published timetable will also be of assistance.

46. It will be necessary for selection boards to be convened to decide which volunteers are to be retained in the armed forces and to select personnel for compulsory demobilization. In the absence of comprehensive records of service, prepared to common standards, it will be difficult to achieve the levels of scrupulous fairness to which the armed forces of developed states would aspire during periods of military retrenchment. Nonetheless, great care should be taken so that the process is as fair as possible and this may be another activity in which the use of external advisors could be beneficial, not least in the presentational aspects of the programme.

#### **MANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION**

47. The scope of this paper is effectively bounded by the discharge of personnel from the armed forces, but the management of programmes for the re-integration of veterans into the civilian community is a subject in which the military authorities have a legitimate interest. The literature reviews the available options and concludes that such programmes are best conducted by private organizations and NGOs; further, the military authorities have much else to do and may consider that they would not wish to assume full responsibility for another major task. But the demobilization process is a continuum and it is clear that considerable coordination and cooperation between the military authorities and the organizations (for there will inevitably be more than one) which will carry out the subsequent work is a vital ingredient for success.

48. The coordination and cooperation cannot begin too early. As soon as the need for a demobilization programme is identified, contact should be established between the defence authorities and potential partners so that possibilities can be identified and appropriate research and planning commenced. There will need to be openness and mutual trust on both sides; they share a common aim.

49. Liaison between the authorities and the implementing organizations will need to continue throughout the demobilization process. This will include discussion of major policy issues, such as the timing of demobilization, management of the transition from military to civilian life, the types of vocational training to be offered, finance etc, but there will also be many minor administrative matters which will need close coordination. If the programme is to be a success, it is essential that discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation rather than one of suspicion.

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9 Preliminary Report on the Evaluation of the Uganda Veterans' Assistance Programme by the Evaluation Mission of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Kampala, 26 Jul 94, p13.

50. Once the selections for demobilization have been announced, the implementing organizations may need to have access to those concerned, in order to discuss their individual plans and aspirations.

51. If demobilization is to be carried out in phases (and, indeed, the implementing bodies may need to be involved in such decisions), there must be a system of feedback to the military authorities so that problems, which will inevitably arise, can be discussed frankly to identify how they can be avoided in subsequent phases. Information on the successes of the programme should be passed to those still serving to reassure them that life outside the defence forces is not as frightening as they may fear.

#### INTEGRATION OF PREVIOUSLY WARRING FACTIONS

52. It is perhaps unfortunate that, in the literature relating to demobilization, integration has 2 distinct meanings:

a. Generally, it refers to the reintegration (which is also used) of ex-military personnel into civilian life.

b. But it is a feature of post-independence struggles that at least a measure of integration of the previously warring armies takes place. This section of the paper considers this integration.

53. Integration is a powerful symbol of reconciliation and unity of the new state. It may be defined as the creation of military units which contain a balanced mixture of the previously warring factions, subsequent to a process in which all personnel have received training to the same standards and been inculcated with a common ethos of service and loyalty to the new government and the whole community.

54. The principle and scope of integration are essentially political matters (and hence outside the scope of this paper; indeed, topics worthy of a paper of their own) but from the military perspective, integration provides a greater pool of training, experience and expertise from which to draw for the new armed forces.

55. If integration is to take place, it is a joint political/military matter to consider its timing in relation to demobilization. From a narrow military position, it might be argued that it will be a waste of resources to bring people together for military training, only to discharge them shortly afterwards. But there are other aspects which should be considered:

a. It is clear from this paper that it will take some time before the armed forces will be in a position to declare who is to be demobilized and, probably before it will be possible to deliver resettlement packages. Integration should involve confidence building measures between the various factions and, if the programme is successful, it would be beneficial for some of those who passed through it to take that experience into the civilian community.

b. In the meantime, the integration programme provides a constructive activity in which the larger than now required armed forces can engage and gain a sense of purpose different from those previously held by the different factions. Even if one faction can be seen as having won, it is likely that there will need to be a change of ethos; from liberation army to servants of the new state, its community and, indeed, the country.

c. If one faction can be seen as having won, there will also be a losing side. Many fighters on that side will feel a greater loyalty to their country than to any particular cause and will wish to continue to serve that country in some way. Willing participation in the integration process provides them with an opportunity to demonstrate this, so that they may make a new beginning, whether their eventual post-war career is to be in the armed forces or not.

d. Government will not want the factions to remain apart any longer than necessary, particularly if they remain armed; the political imperative may therefore be to press on with integration so that one, unified defence force is created as quickly as possible.

e. The process of integration may allow better informed selection of individuals for demobilization as training to common standards allows more valid comparisons to be made. Appropriate assessment procedures must be included in the integration training package but this must not be taken to the extent that those passing through the programme come to believe that their performance during that period is the sole, or even main, determinant of their future. It will also be necessary to ensure that the assessments are fair and undertaken by a team in which all factions are represented.

56. It is considered that if the programme for the integration of previously warring factions is well designed and properly conducted, the balance of advantage lies in taking it forward independently of demobilization. This is not to imply that there is not a need for close coordination between the 2 programmes.

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

57. While economic and social benefits may result from a demobilization programme, the need for such a programme is primarily driven by military considerations. In the context of this paper, the Threat will normally have reduced and hence armed forces can be reduced commensurately.

58. Before it is possible to produce a definitive figure of personnel to be demobilized, the size and shape of the armed forces of the future need to be defined. This is a complex process and external, independent advisors may need to be provided. But the decision-making responsibility rests with the government as the final structure will be a compromise between perceived defence needs and budgetary reality.

59. In parallel with the design of the structure of the armed forces, a wide range of other policy matters will need to be addressed, although it is unlikely that this work can be concluded before an outline structure is developed. One of these is a manning plan, leading to the identification of target age, rank and length of service profiles for each capbadge within the defence forces.

60. A key decision to be made is whether planned redundancy will become a long term feature of military life.

61. It is important that formal personal documentation of all military personnel is introduced at the earliest opportunity. Inter alia, this will accurately identify the size of the defence forces.

62. Based upon the defined size and shape, it becomes possible to identify the future manpower requirement and, hence, the size of the demobilization programme.

63. Clear, well publicized criteria must be developed for the selection of those to be demobilized. The selection process must be as fair as possible, particularly if ethnic considerations are involved.

64. Fair and honest publicity will alleviate many of the worries felt by those vulnerable for selection for demobilization.

65. If the social aspects of demobilization are to be achieved, it is essential that a close, cooperative relationship is established between the military authorities and any outside organizations who will take on the work of reintegrating veterans into the community. Fundamentally, both sides share a commonality of interest.

66. Two particular groups, disabled veterans and underage soldiers, should be demobilized as soon as the necessary programmes can be put in place.

67. If there is to be an integration of formerly warring factions, this may better take place before demobilization. However integration is conducted, it must be carefully coordinated with the demobilization programme.

68. Demobilization programmes serve many interests and their success may be vital for the future well being of the country. It is essential that they are properly planned and conducted. Much military planning must take place before a programme can begin.

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE  
KIGALI.

28th November, 1994

Our Ref.: RPA /761/C/001

Your Ref. :1000.7 (DFC/G/4

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
KIGALI

Sir,


RE : RPA AND UNAMIR PRINCIPAL STAFF MEETING.

Reference to your letter 1000.7 (DFC) / G/4 dated 11th November, 1994, I hereby apologise for the delayed reply, the reason being my absence from the office for some days.

As it was suggested by our high authorities that we hold joint meetings on weekly basis, I take this opportunity to submit the names of RPA Officers who are to participate in the mentioned meetings :-

1. Col. Charles Muhire
2. Major Kamanzi Mushyo
3. Capt. Charles Karamba

I hope that those meetings will strengthen our usual co-operation.

  
SAM KAKA  
COL.  
Army Chief of Staff

cc : His Excellency the Vice-President  
and Minister of Defence.

①  
FC  
Sir,  
They have finally reacted  
to our letter even though we  
are already holding the meetings  
in the camps.  
29/11  
DFC/COS

② DFC/COS  
a. very well done!  
this is key to our  
future success  
in Rwanda.  
b. We must make the  
first meeting an  
event that they will  
want to repeat on a  
weekly basis.  
FC  
30/11



Kigali 25 November 1994

Dear General,

Reference our dining invitation at my residence on 28 November, I regret to inform you that General deChastelain has been forced to cancel his trip to Rwanda. Therefore, I would propose to postpone this event to a later date.

I am sorry for any inconvenience this change has caused you.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Tousignant".

Mgen G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mgen P. Kagame  
Vice President  
Minister of Defence  
Kigali



Kigali 23 November 1994

Dear Vice President General Kagame,

On the 28th of November the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, General deChastelain will be visiting his troops in UNAMIR. I would like to invite you to a private dinner at my residence for this occasion.

Rest assure that this gathering is very private an its intent is for a friendly exchange in a relaxing atmosphere. It would be an honour to have you attend this small reception.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant', written in a cursive style.

Mgen G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mgen P. Kagame  
Vice President  
Ministry of Defence  
Kigali



15/11

18 Nov 94



NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-94.013

November 12, 1994

**RPA SMALL ARMS FIRE HIT UN TROOP POSITION  
IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA**

KIGALI, RWANDA -- United Nations troop position sustained small arms fire from RPA soldiers who were attempting to force displaced people out of camps in south western Rwanda on Nov 10 1994.

The incident occurred when a platoon of UN soldiers from Zambia were surrounded by RPA soldiers in the displaced person camp of Musange in south western Rwanda. The RPA were attempting to move people out of the camp when they opened fire, killing seven people and injuring four more. Small arms fire hit the UN troop position as the crowd moved in panic towards the camp. No casualties were sustained on the part of the United Nations.

The Zambian United Nations troops re-established their presence in the camp yesterday by conducting foot patrols in Musange.

Although UNAMIR strongly encourages the return home of displaced persons, the Force Commander urges the RPA not to resort to violence in doing so. The normalisation of Rwanda is a slow process. Actions such as this do not help in any way the confidence building process currently under way in Rwanda and may lead to confrontations ~~between the RPA and the United Nations~~.

- 30 -

Note to editors: For more information, please contact the UNAMIR military public affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9574 ext 11123.



MA

1. This is new old news and probably of no interest.
2. I do not approve of the second release in its present form.

*YH*  
18 Nov 54

Greiner.

Damage control.

— clarify sit.



NEWS RELEASE

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NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-94.012

November 12, 1994

*to the rescue of RPA soldiers*

**BLUE BERETS ~~DISARM~~ RPA SOLDIERS  
IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA DURING SHOOTING INCIDENT**

KIGALI, RWANDA -- United Nations soldiers on duty in Rwanda *offered shelter*  
*to* ~~disarmed~~ soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army yesterday, in order to put an end  
to a shooting incident in the village of Musebeya.

As an RPA patrol was driving through the crowded village, several soldiers  
stepped out of the vehicle to move the crowd. The RPA soldiers shot warning  
shots in the air to disperse the crowd. The local reacted and began stoning the  
soldiers. At one point during the riot a grenade was thrown and the RPA then  
opened fire in the crowd killing seven people, seriously wounding 13 and injuring  
a number of others who managed to escape.

*amongst Blue Berets, ~~the~~ surrendered their arms*  
UNAMIR troops from Zambia were immediately dispatched to the scene to  
diffuse the situation. The Blue Berets ~~immediately~~ *disarmed several* RPA soldiers *found refuge*  
*were* and later escorted ~~them~~ back to their base in Muko. At no point during the incident  
did the UN soldiers have to open fire.

- 30 -

Note to editors: For more information, please contact the UNAMIR military public  
affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9574 ext 11123.



Kigali 19 November 1994

Dear General,

Major Frank Kamanze has spoken to me concerning the press reports of an incident that took place in the village of Musebeya near Gikongoro on 11 November. There has been a misunderstanding. The press report wrongly stated that your soldiers had been disarmed by my troops. The reality of the situation was that my Zambian soldiers offered your men protection from an ugly and escalating incident, which had already cost the lives of seven civilians. To diffuse the situation it seemed appropriate for your men to voluntarily hand over their weapons, just for the short period that they were under UNAMIR protection. They did this, and my Zambian troops escorted them safely away from the scene. After the incident, your soldiers reclaimed their weapons and continued on their duties.

I may remind you that in August, one of your patrols acted in a similar way with some of my British soldiers, who were invited to hand over their weapons to your troops. My troops' weapons were returned to them some time later.

I hope that this will clarify the position.

Please accept my best regards.

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Mgen P. Kagame  
Vice President  
Minister of Defence  
Kigali



Kigali 15 November 1994

Dear General,

When Ambassador Kahn and I visited you a few weeks ago, we discussed the manner in which the UNAMIR battalion based in Kibuye was resupplied. You explained that you had concerns over the use of a barge which we had used to convey supplies down Lake Kivu, from Gisenyi to Kibuye, and I agreed to examine other methods of resupply.

All available options have been examined and alternative means have been attempted without success. The ideal situation would be to be able to rely on the use of the road Kigali-Gitarama-Kibuye but experience has shown that the condition of the Gitarama-Kibuye section is such that, after rain, it becomes impassable to some of the vehicles which we need to move across it. Indeed, it was in anticipation of just this problem that we began the barge operation. You will understand that the necessary repair, still less the proper reconstruction, of this road is beyond the resources available to UNAMIR. While I understand that a number of agencies are coincidentally considering the funding of the work necessary to make this into a route on which we could rely, this will not solve the immediate problem of getting food and other supplies to our troops.

Routes to Kibuye from Kigali via Gisenyi or Cyangugu have been examined. You will know that they are far from ideal for heavy traffic and suffer from the same limitation as the Gitarama-Kibuye road; they cannot be relied upon to remain passable after rain.

I have therefore concluded that we have no option but to recommence the barge operation, with probable effect from the week beginning Monday 21 November 1994. You will recall that under Article IV.12 of the Status of Mission Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda, 'UNAMIR and its members shall enjoy, together with its vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement throughout the territory'.

As in other instances, we are prepared to cooperate with your authorities in an attempt to allay your concerns. Specifically:

- a. Notice of all barge operations will be provided to your local commanders, not less than 36 hours in advance.

b. Planning will be conducted on the basis that all barge operations will take place during daylight. Operating difficulties may, of course, prevent the achievement of this objective. You should be aware that the offer of this self-imposed condition will double the cost to the United Nations of conducting this operation.

c. A UNAMIR military officer will personally supervise all barge operations.


d. You will know that your Forces previously oversaw the loading and unloading operations of the barge; we have no objection to this continuing.

e. We are prepared for a maximum of three liaison officers to travel on the barge at all times that it is engaged in operations on our behalf. These observers are to be nominated in advance.

f. In conducting our operations with the barge, we had attempted to assist the Government in its attempts to return refugees to their homes by allowing them to occupy unused space on the barge. I would wish this to continue but will withdraw the facility if you so wish.

I shall now instruct my staff to meet your local commanders to discuss the detailed procedures which we will adopt for notification etc.

Yours sincerely,

  
MGen G.C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

MGen Paul Kagame  
Vice President  
Ministry of Defence  
Kigali

Copy to:

External:

Ministry of External Affairs  
RPA Liaison Officer

Internal:

SRSG

and silent copies to:

DFC/COS/CMO  
O/c Admin  
DCOS (Ops)  
DCOS (Sp)  
DCMO

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
Kigali  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/4

11 November 1994

COL SAM KAKA  
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE  
RPA HQ  
KIGALI

①

UNAMIR AND RPA PRINCIPAL STAFF MEETING

1. Following the meeting between the Force Commander, Maj Gen Tousignant and His Excellency the Vice President and Minister of Defence, Maj Gen Paul Kagame on 9 November 1994, it has been decided to hold regular meetings at the principal staff level between UNAMIR Force HQ and the RPA HQ. These meetings will be in addition to the meetings that I am already holding with you.
2. It is kindly requested that you submit to this HQ the names, particulars and locations of RPA principal staff officers who are responsible for operations and co-ordination of your activities.
3. It is suggested that the venue of these meetings alternate between the UNAMIR Force HQ and the RPA HQ. The frequency of the meetings will be decided upon by the two HQs but it is suggested that they be held on a regular weekly basis.






4. For your information the following are the particulars of UNAMIR Force HQ principal staff officers:

- a. Brig Gen HK Anyidoho - Dep Force Comd/Chief of Staff/Chief Mil Obs
- b. Col J Arp - Dep Chief of Staff - Ops
- c. Col KP O'Kelly - Dep Chief of Staff - Sp

5. Your early response would be greatly appreciated.

  
HK Anyidoho  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS/CMO

cc: SRSG  
FC  
Ex Director  
CAO

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KINSHASA

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
Kigali  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/4

11 November 1994

COL SAM KAKA  
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE  
RPA HQ  
KIGALI

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
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HK Anyidoho  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS/CMO

cc: SRSG  
FC  
Ex Director  
CAO

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
CABINET DU MINISTRE  
KIGALI

The Force Commander,  
United Nations Assistance  
Mission For Rwanda - KIGALI

Ref: DEF/624/T


Dear Sir,

RE : MAJOR MUHINDURA NSHURO

Reference to your letter of 8th November, 1994, Maj. Muhindura Nshuro currently studying to the US Army College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is welcome back to his country and will be integrated in the National Army.

Your assistance to him and his family in fulfilling their desire of participating in the rebuilding of Rwanda will be highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

  
Andrew RWIGAMBA  
Lt. Col.

DIRECTOR OF CABINET - M.O.D

ADK

ADK  
601

Please pass a  
copy of this letter  
to Gen Dallaire, and  
one to the Lt Col  
Fort Leavenworth 11/11/94



Government of Canada  
Gouvernement du Canada

ACTION  
REQUEST

FICHE DE  
SERVICE

To - À		Date
Genevieve		10 NOV 94
From - De		Time - Heure
MCP L BARTLETT		
Language spoken - Langue utilisée		Telephone No. - N° de téléphone
<input type="checkbox"/> English Anglais		<input type="checkbox"/> French Français
<input type="checkbox"/> Please call Prière d'appeler		<input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call Vous a rappelé
<input type="checkbox"/> Action Donner suite		<input type="checkbox"/> Will call again Vous rappellera
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Commentaires		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and return Noter et retourner
<input type="checkbox"/> As requested Comme demandé		<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply Projet de réponse
		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and forward Noter et faire suivre
		<input type="checkbox"/> Signature
		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and file Noter et classer
File No. - N° de dossier		Message taken by - Message reçu par

Genevieve

I mailed the original  
to Col A. Rwingamba. This  
is your copy for file.



Kigali 8 November 1994

Dear Lieutenant Colonel,

I recently spoke with Major General Dallaire who mentioned that he had just returned from a visit to the US Army College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During his visit he was approached by a Rwandese student, Major Muhindura Nshuro, currently studying at the College.

Major Muhindura requested the help of Major General Dallaire to reintegrate the Rwanda's Army and his country. He and his family are doing well in the USA and they have indicated their desire to participate in the rebuilding of Rwanda.

If UNAMIR can be of any assistance in relaying information, we would be happy to do so. Please advise us of your intention in this matter as we are prepared to help in any way we can.

Yours truly,

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

LtCol Andrew Rwingamba  
Chef de Cabinet  
Ministry of Defence  
Kigali

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE

UNAMIR - MINUAR

F.6  
AS/11 MM

Kigali, 5 November 1994

Dear General,

Subject: Operation RONDAVAL

C I am very sorry that you did not receive the letter from Dr Khan and myself of 1 November, on the subject of Op RONDAVAL. Due to a clerical error, of very serious consequence, it appears that it was not given to the Liaison Officer here on that day. Both Dr Khan and myself were under the erroneous impression that you had received it and were considering its contents; my urgent attempts to see you over the past few days centered on my need to discuss it with you.

Dr Khan and one of my officers, Major Mullarkey, will be presenting the outline of the plan to the Donor Countries and the Secretary General, in Geneva on Monday and Tuesday. Ideally, they would have been able to do so having first received your initial impressions - had they been favourable, I think that would have helped enormously. Under the circumstances, I feel that Op RONDAVAL should now be put to them as a strategic way ahead, which we support, but which is awaiting your concurrence. In this way, you will have the time necessary to consider it properly. We can then bring the Secretary General's views to our next meeting on the subject. I believe that this could be as early as 11 November, when Major Mullarkey will return; Dr Khan is not scheduled to return to Rwanda until 13 November.

C I am extremely sorry that there has been this error. However, if we use the time now available constructively, I do not feel that a major problem should result from it.

Yours sincerely,

G C Tousignant  
Major General  
UNAMIR Force Commander

His Excellency  
Major General Paul Kagame  
Vice-President and Minister of Defence  
Republic of Rwanda  
Kigali

② MA to FC  
FYI.

Seen  
Doo 808  
31-10

①

③ Noted  
JLH  
2 Nov 94

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR  
31 Oct 94

G2/3000

See Distribution

PROVISION OF REFUGEE INFORMATION TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT

Reference:

A. BRITCON consolidated refugee/displaced persons list dated 14 Oct 94.

1. UNAMIR has been asked by the Rwandan Government to provide them with information on refugees and displaced persons. Reference A has been used as the primary source of the information.

LOCATION/NUMBERS OF REFUGEES

2.	a.	ZAIRE	Goma	800,000
			Bukavu	320,000
			Uvira	190,000
	b.	TANZANIA	Ngara	300,000
			Karagwe	98,400
	c.	BURUNDI		179,500
	d.	UGANDA		15,000

NUMBER OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN SECTOR 4

3. The total number of displaced persons estimated to be occupying camps in the whole of Sector 4 is 900,860. The breakdown is as follows:

Sector 4A	775,360
Sector 4B	51,000
Sector 4C	74,500
TOTAL	900,860

NUMBER OF REFUGEES HAVING RETURNED TO RWANDA SINCE 17 JUL 94

4. It is not possible to answer this question as figures only began to be recorded on 28 Sep 94. The total number of refugees reported as having returned to RWANDA since 28 Sep 94 is 36,292.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES HAVING LEFT RWANDA SINCE 17 JUL 94

5. As with para 4 the figures on this subject are only available since 28 Sep 94. The total number of refugees recorded as having left RWANDA since 28 Sep 94 is 380.

6. UNAMIR has now established a system for the continued



reporting of timely and accurate information on the refugee and displaced persons situation. Updated figures will be available on request.



S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
SO3 G2

Distribution:

Internal:

Action:

G3 Plans - for onward transmission to Govt of RWANDA.

Information:

DCOS Ops