

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen

CRYPTOFAX TRANSMITTAL

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY; IMMEDIATE DELIVERY; IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

To: The Secretary-General

PAGE 1 OF 4

Copy: Goulding/Annan/Gharekan (New York)
Akashi (Zagreb)

From: Thorvald Stoltenberg (Geneva)

Date: 5 July, 1994.

Subject: Contact Group Recommendations to Ministerial Meeting

Attached is a draft Ministerial text prepared by the Contact Group for the meeting of Foreign Ministers this afternoon. Also attached are draft guidelines prepared by the Contact Group for the use of Ministers.

Both documents could be changed. Only portions of the draft Ministerial text are expected to be made public. The part on incentives and disincentives is not expected to be made public.

Following the Ministerial meeting this afternoon, the Contact Group is expected to meet with the two parties on Wednesday morning in Geneva.

CG 5 July 99 (12:15)

Draft Ministerial Text

Ministers welcomed the map agreed by the Contact Group and instructed the Group to present it to the parties. Ministers took the view that the territorial arrangements incorporated in the map represented a reasonable balance and they instructed the Contact Group to make clear to the parties that a response was needed within two weeks at the latest, i.e. 19 July. Ministers urged the parties to accept the proposed map or to present mutually agreed amendments.

Ministers confirmed their support for a settlement that keeps Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Union within its internationally recognized borders and which continues the international legal personality of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Constitutional arrangements will define the relationship between the Bosniac-Croat and the Bosnian Serb entities. The human rights specified in the principal international and European instruments are to be observed. Constitutional arrangements may be revised once the territorial settlement concerning Sarajevo has been concluded.

Ministers agreed that the parties should observe the cease-fire and refrain from military action. The objective is the earliest possible signature by the parties of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities as a first step in implementing an overall settlement.

Ministers agreed that the Contact Group should also set out to the parties certain incentives and disincentives as follows:

If on this basis both parties agree to the map:

Incentives for the Federation:

- International assurances for implementation of the territorial settlement:
- Assistance with reconstruction
- Resettlement fund for refugees

Incentives for the Bosnian Serbs:

- Suspension of sanctions geared to implementation of the territorial settlement. Preparation of a draft UNSC Resolution for Geneva III to be introduced immediately after Bosnian Serb acceptance of the map

- Phasing of Suspension of sanctions would include clearing applications in the UN sanctions committee and opening Belgrade Airport for civilian passenger service immediately on acceptance of the map. Completion of withdrawal would lead to suspension of other sanctions.

If the Federation refuses but the Bosnian Serbs agree:

Disincentives for the Federation:

- Loss of international support. Proposed reconstruction assistance for Bosnia put in jeopardy.
- Easing of sanctions on the Serbs as described above.
- Continuation of the arms embargo and its rigorous enforcement.
- Exclusion of Federation military from territory from which the Bosnian Serbs withdrew in accordance with the Contact Group map.

If the Federation agrees and the Bosnian Serbs refuse:

Disincentives for the Serbs:

- Measures to tighten existing sanctions and preparation in time for Geneva III of a new UNSC Resolution on extending sanctions to be introduced after rejection of the map.
- Extension and strict enforcement of exclusion zones.

If despite these measures, the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the map [disagree], a decision in the UNSC on the lifting of the arms embargo could become unavoidable. There will be consequences for the presence of UNPROFOR.

CC - 5 July '94 (11:20)

Press Guidelines

- We commended and approved the substantive preparations done by the Contact Group following its meetings with the parties in accordance with the instructions given at the last Geneva ministerial Meeting.
- We welcomed the territorial proposal developed by the Contact Group and have directed the Group to present it to the representatives of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs.
- This effort is strongly supported by all the governments involved in the Contact Group as a reasonable basis for an immediate political settlement.
- We are urging the parties to consider it favorably and to give us their responses within two weeks.
- It would form part of a settlement that preserves Bosnia and Hercegovina as a single union within its internationally recognized borders, while providing for constitutional arrangements that establish the relationship between the Bosniac/Croat and Bosnian Serb entities.
- We also express once again our firm support for a settlement which provides for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.
- Our proposal represents an important moment of opportunity, which may not come again. Those of us gathered here are united in our belief that the war can be ended now.
- We believe the consequences of failing to do so would be grave.
- With peace, however, the international community stands ready to begin implementing a settlement and rebuilding Bosnia. We urge the Bosnian parties to respond quickly and positively to our offer.
- In the meantime, the parties should observe the ceasefire and refrain from military action.
- We agreed to meet again on July [20].
- We also discussed the wider situation in the former Yugoslavia. We urge mutual recognition between all states within its boundaries. In Croatia we urge the immediate resumption of internationally sponsored talks.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



020/8

Office of the Co-Chairmen

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

PAGE 1 OF 5

COPY: GOULDING/ANNAN/GHAREKHAN, New York
AKASHI, Zagreb

FROM: THORVALD STOLTENBERG, Geneva

DATE: 5 July 1994

SUBJECT: RESULTS OF MINISTERIAL MEETING

Further to my earlier cable sending the text of the Contact Group's recommendations, please find attached the final Ministerial text and the final press guidelines.

The press guidelines were apparently read out at the Ministers' press conference. The Ministerial text, however, is confidential.

Ministerial Text

Ministers welcomed the map agreed by the Contact Group and instructed the Group to present it to the parties. Ministers took the view that the territorial arrangements incorporated in the map represented a reasonable balance and they instructed the Contact Group to make clear to the parties that a response was needed within two weeks at the latest. Ministers urged the parties to accept the proposed map or to present mutually agreed amendments.

Ministers confirmed their support for a settlement that keeps Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Union within its internationally recognized borders and which continues the international legal personality of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Constitutional arrangements will define the relationship between the Bosniac-Croat and the Bosnian Serb entities. The human rights specified in the principal international and European instruments are to be observed. Constitutional arrangements may be revised by mutual consent once the territorial settlement concerning Sarajevo has been concluded.

Ministers agreed that the parties should observe and prolong the cease-fire and refrain from military action. The objective is the earliest possible signature by the parties of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities as a first step in implementing an overall settlement.

Ministers agreed that the Contact Group should also set out to the parties certain incentives and disincentives as follows:

If, on this basis, both parties agree to the map:

Incentives for the Federation:

- International assurances for implementation of the territorial settlement:
- Assistance with reconstruction
- Resettlement fund for refugees

Incentives for the Bosnian Serbs:

- Suspension of sanctions geared to implementation of the territorial settlement. Preparation of a draft UNSC Resolution for Geneva III to be introduced immediately after Bosnian Serb acceptance of the map

- Phasing of Suspension of sanctions would include clearing applications in the UN sanctions committee and opening Belgrade Airport for civilian passenger service immediately on acceptance of the map. Completion of withdrawal would lead to suspension of other sanctions.

If the Federation refuses but the Bosnian Serbs agree:

Disincentives for the Federation:

- Loss of international support. Proposed reconstruction assistance for Bosnia put in jeopardy.
- Easing of sanctions on the Serbs as described above.
- Continuation of the arms embargo and its rigorous enforcement.
- Exclusion of Federation military from territory from which the Bosnian Serbs withdrew in accordance with the Contact Group map.

If the Federation agrees and the Bosnian Serbs refuse:

Disincentives for the Serbs:

- Measures to tighten existing sanctions and preparation in time for Geneva III of a new UNSC Resolution on extending sanctions to be introduced after rejection of the map.
- Extension and strict enforcement of exclusion zones.

If despite these measures, the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the map, a decision in the UNSC on the lifting of the arms embargo could become unavoidable. There will be consequences for the presence of UNPROFOR.

- We commended and approved the substantive preparations done by the Contact Group following its meetings with the parties in accordance with the instructions given at the last Geneva ministerial Meeting.
- We welcomed the territorial proposal developed by the Contact Group and have directed the Group to present it to the representatives of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs.
- This effort is strongly supported by our governments as a reasonable basis for an immediate political settlement.
- We are urging the parties to consider it favorably and to give us their responses within two weeks.
- It would form part of a settlement that preserves Bosnia and Hercegovina as a single union within its internationally recognized borders, while providing for constitutional arrangements that establish the relationship between the Bosniac/Croat and Bosnian Serb entities.
- We also express once again our firm support for a settlement which provides for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.
- Our proposal represents an important moment of opportunity, which may not come again. Those of us gathered here are united in our belief that the war can be ended now.
- We believe the consequences of failing to do so would be grave.
- With peace, however, the international community stands ready to begin implementing a settlement and rebuilding Bosnia. We urge the Bosnian parties to respond quickly and positively to our offer.
- The Contact group will be presenting Ministers' views tomorrow to the parties. Without going into details there are important incentives for the parties if they accept the proposed map;
 - for the Bosnian government we are ready to assist in the implementation a territorial settlement and to help with reconstruction;
 - for the Serbs, sanctions will be suspended geared to their pullback to the lines indicated on the map

If the parties do not agree they can expect more pressure to be applied. In particular, existing UNSCRs concerning safe areas will be rigorously enforced. The necessary planning is being undertaken.

As a last resort decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable. That would have consequences for the presence of UNPROFOR.

- In the meantime, the parties should observe and prolong the ceasefire and refrain from military action.

- The parties are required to give their answer to this proposal in two weeks.

- We agreed to meet again before the end of July

- We also discussed the wider situation in the former Yugoslavia. We urge mutual recognition between all states within the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. We urge the immediate resumption of talks between the Croatian government and the local Serb authorities.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Geneva 5 July 1994

CODE
MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Akashi, Zagreb ONLY

Info: FC, Gen de Lapresle, Zagreb ONLY

From: Stoltenberg, Geneva

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Thor Stoltenberg".

Subject: Meeting with the Contact Group


As you probably are already aware, I am sending BrigGen Pellnäs to Zagreb to-morrow to give you personally a briefing on the outcome of the endeavours of the Contact Group.


Since we have discussed the solution of the Brcko problem I attach to this fax the maps on Brcko which were to-day agreed upon by the members of the Contact group.

Best regards

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BOUNDARY OF THE FEDERATION

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LINE OF DEMILITARIZATION






The road from Point A to Point B shall be a clearway.
No vehicles may stop between the points, and no personnel
can be stationed on the ground between them.

BOUNDARY OF
THE FEDERATION
LINE OF DEMILITARIZATION



It will be a clearway.
No military installations, and no personnel
in them.



The road from Point A to Point B sh
No vehicles may stop between the p
can be stationed on the ground betw

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BORBA, 14 June 1994
by B. Mitrovic & G. Rosic

Reactions to Contact Group's maps

NOBODY SATISFIED, PARTICULARLY SERBS

According to the reactions by all sides to the conflict in BH, nobody is satisfied with the maps on territorial delimitation produced by the Contact Group. True, the level of dissatisfaction varies. The most unsatisfied are representatives of the Serb authorities.

RS Minister of Foreign Affairs **Aleksa Buha** said that the Serbs had lately been told in Geneva that 49 per cent of the territories envisaged for the Serbs was just the base. "This is a double-edged sword, which means that, in order to have a compact territory, the Serbs can obtain additional one to two per cents of the territory and that some more territories can be taken away from us. The second variant is more realistic for the negotiators have mostly not taken into consideration Serb requests", Buha said. He said that the most acceptable borders for the Serbs were those from the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, "which was the most correct solution for everybody". "This plan [Owen-Stoltenberg] was also accepted by the Herzeg-Bosnia and even Alija Izetbegovic had been supporting it until he went to the US where he was told to reject the plan. Izetbegovic received the same order from Germany", Buha said.

According to certain unofficial information, the new maps do not envisage Serb exit to the sea although, according to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan and later during the negotiations, it was said that it would be possible through arrangement with Croatia. The new proposal does not include what the EU proposed as a solution for Sarajevo - the creation of two separate towns. According to *Borba's* information, the plan mentions neither the gradual lifting of the sanctions [against the FRY] nor the independence of the RS.

The new Contact Group's proposal contains the so-called "gray zones" which would encompass towns currently under the Serb control and in which UN Police would be deployed. Commenting on the "gray zones", RS Vice-President **Biljana Plavsic** said that they had been invented to have the Muslim population back. "This is out of the question", Dr. Plavsic said categorically.

The Muslim side is also not happy with the delimitation on 51 to 49 per cent principle. Muslims are most dissatisfied with the solution for eastern Bosnia, for their wish is to incorporate the whole Podrinje into the Federation. But, the Contact Group has accepted Izetbegovic's idea that certain towns, which do not belong to the Muslim-Croat Federation, should be declared "gray zones". Such towns are Rogatica, Visegrad, Zvornik, Brcko and Doboj. If this comes true, the Muslim-Croat side will just in another way have its request for 58 per cent of territories met, for Muslim and Croat population would have the right to return to their homes.

According to the Contact Group's map, the Serb corridors between Semberija and Krajina on one hand and the Romanija-Jahorina area and the towns of Srinje, Cajnice and Rudo, on the other hand, would become even narrower; while Kupres, Srbobran, Jajce, Derventa, Brod, Odzak and Samac would be taken away from the Serbs.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 3

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020/81

4117
Contact group

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB *S. J. M.*

DATE: 6 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z-696

94 MAY -6 13:05

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

SUBJECT: ATTACHED REPORT FROM THE CONTACT GROUP

1. Attached is the report of the Contact Group, given to me by David Ludlow at Zagreb airport.
2. Following my conversation with Marrena, can you please pass it to the Co-Chairmen and to the Greeks for immediate distribution as a coreu.
3. Steiner and Nikiforov are remaining in Zagreb for flights tomorrow. The others are leaving in different directions now.

ENDALL

MOST IMMEDIATE

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CONTACT GROUP REPORT 3

BOSNIA: MEETINGS WITH KARADZIC AND IZETBEGOVIC - 5 MAY

1. Karadzic, who was in a fairly cocky mood, offered nothing new when the group met him in Pale on 5 May, and resorted to replaying the now familiar gramophone record regarding sanctions. Despite being told in no uncertain terms that expecting sanctions to be suspended before talks began was unrealistic and unachievable, Karadzic and Krajisnik devoted almost two hours to arguing that this should be the case. Their suggestion was that the Serbs would implement a general cessation of hostilities, which they were willing to negotiate now, without preconditions, and in return, without prompting from the Serbs, the international community would suspend UNSC 820. There had to be such a gesture of goodwill from the international community. Talks on a political settlement could then begin, though there was no question of a 51-49% distribution of territory. Karadzic as usual used the excuse of having no mandate from his assembly to negotiate. The one slight chance that we might get progress is that the assembly meets on 10 May and the group urged Karadzic and Krajisnik to work to change their position. But they gave no undertaking that they would attempt to do so. The group emphasised the need for urgency, and noted that there would be a ministerial meeting next week. The Serbs should take positive steps to influence the meeting. Their current position represented a refusal to enter negotiations on the diplomatic track, at least for the time being.

2. On return from Pale, the group met Izetbegovic, Silajdzic and Ganic, who were in an emotional state, though how much of this was theatre is hard to judge. Izetbegovic said that the change for peace, which had existed two weeks ago, had gone. They berated the UN, and in particular Akashi and Lapresle, for allowing Serb tanks to transit the Sarajevo TEZ en route from Gorazde to the Foca/Konjic area, and indeed escorting them, without any consultation with the Bosnian authorities. These tanks would be used in future Serb attacks. Because of this, they had called publicly for Akashi's resignation, and would no longer deal with him, or Lapresle. UNPROFOR was basically conniving with the Serbs, and failing to implement UNSCRs, and the NATO ultimata, notably over Gorazde, where there had still been no progress. Under such circumstances, they could not enter negotiations for the present. Ganic, predictably, was particularly vociferous about the failure of UNPROFOR to make use of NATO air power. The group said these were serious allegations, about which they did not have the facts. They would have to follow them up.

3. Although at the last meeting Izetbegovic had appeared ready to put a map proposal on the table, the mood had changed and he was back to the formal position of two conditions - integrity of external borders, and no Muslim or Croat territory in a Serb entity, whatever form that entity might take. Silajdzic insisted that 3 points be clarified before they revealed any more of their hand:

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- What happens if Serbs refuse to enter negotiations?
- What happens if negotiations start, but are dragged out fruitlessly?
- What happens if agreement is reached, but there is a failure to implement?

He suggested setting a timetable for the use of available leverage such as lifting of arms embargo, air strikes and was dismissive of the impact of sanctions. The group advised against underestimating the leverage offered by sanctions, and also pointed out the difficulties of establishing agreed parameters for such a timetable. The key issue was to get in to serious negotiations on the basis of 49-51% as soon as possible. A united international community was ready to put its weight behind a settlement, a change from the past, and this opportunity should not be missed. But there had to be cooperation from the Bosnian authorities.

4. There will be further talks over the weekend in Vienna between the Muslims and the Croats on implementation of the Washington agreement.

'84 19:29 FROM 30 SIGREST SARAJEVO

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Contact Group 1

sent by fax to TS

29/4

MAB.

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BY COREU

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN

CONTACT GROUP REPORT 1

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC: 28 April

1. Following a briefing on the current situation from General Rose, the Contact Group had an initial two hour meeting with Izetbegovic, Silajdzic and Ganic. The atmosphere was constructive, although there was the usual rhetoric, but there were no emotional outbursts.

2. The group explained the background to its mission, and set out its key short term objectives - a cessation of hostilities and restarting negotiations. They emphasised the importance ministers attached to making urgent progress, in the coming days and weeks, and stressed how the united front the group represented offered a possibly unique window of opportunity for reaching a settlement. This chance should not be allowed to pass. Izetbegovic, in the press conference following the meeting, welcomed the group's efforts and said it was the strongest group yet to enter the negotiating arena, representing as it did all the key players in the international community.

3. The Bosnian authorities were in favour of an overall cessation of hostilities in principle, but set some conditions. Complete Serb compliance with the exclusion zones agreement on Gorazde, which the group will raise with Karadzic tomorrow, was a sine qua non. Silajdzic argued strongly that the border with Serbia should be sealed to prevent men, equipment and supplies flowing across to the Bosnian Serbs. In addition, they sought guarantees that violations of the cessation of hostilities would be met with a suitable response, implying that there should be some form of exclusion zone arrangement, presumably with NATO backing, along the length of the confrontation lines. (These issues will need to be considered further.)

4. Regarding a wider settlement, Izetbegovic was in principle ready to enter negotiations, subject to a resolution of the Gorazde issue, on the familiar conditions that BiH should be preserved as a state, and that the all territory belonging to Muslims or Croats before the war should belong to the Federation. On maps, the group emphasised the general acceptance of the 51%-49% principle, and stated their hope of bringing the parties to proximity talks on this basis as soon

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FROM 30 SIGREGT SARAJEVO.

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as possible. Izetbegovic agreed to come up with a map over the next few days, but said this might be anywhere between 51-55%. Both Izetbegovic and Ganic made a point of emphasising that the Bosnian problem could not be tackled in isolation, and in particular raised the question of resolving the situation in the Sanjak. Silajdzic raised the question of lifting the arms embargo, but interestingly said the Bosnian government would not press the group for its lifting unless this negotiating effort failed.

5. The group will travel to Pale for a meeting with Karadzic tomorrow morning, and then return to Sarajevo for a further session with Izetbegovic.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



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CODED CABLE

GENEVA

FTN APR 26 10 53

SECRET

TO: Goulding, UN New York

PAGE 1 OF 2

FROM: Stoltenberg
Geneva

FAX NO:

(41-22) 917 0079

DATE: 26 April 1994

SUBJECT: CONTACT GROUP

Attached is the note on the above subject.

BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP

1. The Contact Group had its first meeting as scheduled this morning (26 April). The Americans were represented by Redman, the Russian Federation by Nikiforov, who was later joined by Churkin, and ICIFY by the team announced in Athens Coreu 868. The two and a half hour talks proceeded in a very constructive atmosphere.

2. The Group agreed that its main goals should be defining, through contacts with the parties, a fair settlement and to prepare future meetings at a higher level. There was an exchange of views on the main items of the agenda: cessation of hostilities, map/territorial problems, constitutional aspects and sanctions. All participants agreed on the need for urgent action, and so the Group will travel to Sarajevo and to Pale for meetings with the parties on 28/29 April.

3. During the next two weeks the Group will try to make urgent progress on the diplomatic track, in parallel with efforts to attain an overall cessation of hostilities, and attempt to clarify the current positions of both the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs. They agreed that the Bosnian Croats should also be kept informed of developments.