Subject file
Kamina (General)
Correspondence and Reports

27/08/1960 - 20/02/1964

1/2

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
CC
PHOTOGRAPHS

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-0788
BOX 2
FILE 7
ACC. DAG13/1.6.5

20 February 1964

Dear FT

Herewith attached is a copy of letter addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, concerning the Bukama incident.

Please note that this is an undated letter which refers to an incident which is alleged to have taken place sometime ago, as to date there is no mention. I recall that you brought this matter to my attention about 6 weeks ago, and this particular letter refers to the same incident. At that time, I verified the facts with HQ Sec Kamina as Bukama was within their sector of responsibility. There has been no long range patrol to Bukama from Kamina since early December, and the last patrol report we have from that area, had nothing special to report. It is quite possible, as for supervision, this sector was handed over to 20 Bn ANC in early Dec, that the incident reported is of their doing rather than ONUC's.

The Swedish Bn was in the habit, when Bukama fell under their direct supervision, to patrol jointly with 13 ANC Bn. The only occasion at which Kamina Sector operated in conjunction with 20 ANC was to carry out a search in Kaminaville.

This is the only information I have on this matter. I trust it will enable you to concoct an appropriate answer.

JAC

JADEX
COS

File

KITWIT

Message téléphonique de Monsieur De Pooter, de la Fédération des entreprises con claises, reçu à 10 h.40 AM le 24 janvier 1964.

A IDIOFIA, ~~province~~ à l'Est de Kikwit, la population européenne demande l'évacuation urgente. Ce message a été reçu de l'OTRACO.

Léopoldville, le 24 janvier 1964.

N° 681

L'Ambassade de Belgique à Léopoldville présente ses compliments à l'Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo et - se référant à la conversation qui a pris place durant l'audience que Monsieur le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général a bien voulu accorder au Chargé d'Affaires a.i. de Belgique - a l'honneur de lui exposer ce qui suit.

La situation dans la région d'Idiofa Kwilu est devenue tragiquement inquiétante à la suite des progrès faits par les mouvements subversifs de jeunesse qui se sont constitués en "maquis". Les divers postes de la région se trouvent complètement isolés par suite des destructions routières et de la coupure des ponts et des bacs, ce qui empêche leurs occupants de la quitter par les voies terrestres normales pour échapper à la menace qui pèse sur eux.

L'Ambassade de Belgique assure dès aujourd'hui, par avion, l'évacuation des enseignants belges stationnés à Idiofa ainsi que des autres ressortissants belges qui exprimeront le désir d'être évacués.

Toutefois, une série de petits postes de l'intérieur où résident des enseignants belges ne possédant pas de piste d'aviation, ne pourront bénéficier de l'opération.

Dans ces conditions, et étant donné l'état pressant de danger où se trouvent ses ressortissants, l'Ambassade de Belgique serait vivement reconnaissante à l'Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo, de bien vouloir faciliter l'évacuation, notamment par hélicoptère, des enseignants belges stationnés dans les postes suivants :

- Awilambongo : un professeur et son épouse.
- Kosimbanga : un professeur.
- Laka : quatre professeurs.
- Mateko : deux professeurs et l'épouse de l'un d'eux.
- Ipamu : deux professeurs.

../...

- Kelo (au nord-ouest de Ikwit près de Djuma) : 4 oeufs et 2 pères.
- Tetshi (entre Ikwit et Dungu) : 1 père.

L'Ambassade de Belgique saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Organisation des Nations - Unies au Congo, l'assurance de sa haute considération.

à l'Organisationdes Nations Unies
Léopoldville.

FILE

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

9 November 1963

TO : Force Commander

FROM : Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Issue of orders to Commanders in the Field

Referenee joint cable n° KA 116 sent to Kamina. I have received a personal signal from Col Hederen which says :

"Re KA 116 regarding relationship to ANC.
In Para 3 is pointed out that Dorsinville's cable supersedes all previous ones regarding relationship to Kasongo Niembo. The cable ought to have been sent to me as well as it concerns me to a great extent. Eye had in this case previously received orders from FC to guard Kasongo Niembo's house. FC then ought to annul this order. The annulment of military orders normally goes to the unit concerned and not to civilian authorities."

I am inclined to agree with Col Hederen's statement in the last sentence. This is why I have always stressed the need for military matters to be dealt with purely from a military point of view. The system whereby joint cables are sent to Commanders in the field is not an ideal one. I have no objection to joint cables being sent to New York but I must stress that the correct procedure is for any instructions to be passed on to military commanders in the field to be done through the Force Commander, thus making sure that such instructions are received by the commanders concerned.

The instance quoted in Col Hederen's signal is an example of where deviating from correct military procedures is likely to create confusion. I have checked and confirmed that the previous Force Commander did in fact send a cable to him guaranteeing Kasongo Niembo's safety, and since such a signal was sent by the Force Commander any annulment must be sent by the Force Commander and not by the Officer-in-Charge through a civilian to the commander in the field.

Brig
(B.A.O. Ogundipe)

Gm 11/1-e

M E M O R A N D U M

28 September 1963

TO : Chief of Military Operations

FROM : Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Kamina Base

Reference your memorandum n° 3303/10/Mil Ops dated 27 September 1963.

Your recommendation noted. No action will be taken to send advance party to Kamina until a reply as to whether the Swedish Government would allow the retention of a reinforced Swedish Coy in Kamina Base is received from New York.

(B.A.O. Ogundipe) Brig

cc: MA/FC

File

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

JMH/FL

20 September, 1963

To : Force Commander

From : Major Roger Hubert

Subject: Visit to Kamina 19 Sep 63

Notes on points discussed

1. General. During this visit we had short briefings on the following subjects:

   a. Political situation by Mr. Postma

   b. Military situation by Major Petersen and Lt Col Palmquist (Air)

   c. Problems of responsibility and command within Sector by Colonel Hederen

   d. Closing down of Kamina by Mr. Postma and Major Tornerhjelm.

2. Difficulties with 20 ANC Bn

20 ANC Bn is considered to be a serious problem to ONUC in that they act without prior consultation or warning to ONUC HQ. Two main points discussed were the confiscation by 20 ANC Bn of vehicles of military pattern and the setting up of road blocks.

   a. Confiscation of vehicles

   20 ANC Bn apparently on orders from ANC HQ in Leo confiscated a large number of military pattern vehicles from civilians, particularly large farms in the sector. This brought about the need of ANC for transport and the fact that captured vehicles in Sector Kamina have not yet been turned over to ANC (some of these captured vehicles are presently being used by ONUC). Another very important aspect of this question

../...2

is that farms need these vehicles in order to operate.

b. Setting up of road blocks by ANC

Apparently 20 ANC sets up road blocks in Kaminaville region and collect fees from those who have to go through. (The fact that charges are being levied still has to be confirmed). However, they do not put any restriction on movement of UN personnel.

These two points bring about a very serious problem of Command and control within the Sector which has an adverse effect on UN who cannot do anything about this sort of thing.

N.B. Force Commander said he would take up the question with Mr. Dorsinville.

The fact that captured vehicles should be turned over to ANC as soon as possible was mentioned by Force Commander.

3. Air Base Control

About 15 men will be required to keep the Air Base in operation (Technical personnel).

4. Base protection

Mr. Postma mentioned that in order to retain the Congolese employees and guard vital installations, it would be imperative to retain at least one reinforced Coy on the Base. Otherwise most of the employees would simply quit and it would be impossible to operate. He mentioned that there are about 5,000 Congolese living in the Base area. (It must be noted that the Base area covers an approximate area of 500 square kilometers). Mr. Postma will make a formal request to ONUC HQ Leo.

Roger Hubert Major

(Roger Hubert) Major
Military Operations

CONFIDENTIAL.

MIL INFO BRANCH
HQ ONUC
LEO

11 SEP 63

TO: Force Commander.

FROM: Lt.Col. Mayer LO UN/ANC

SUBJECT: The situation at Kamina.

1. In the past few weeks I have watched with interest and concern the gradual deterioration of relations between ONUC and ANC in the Kamina area.

2. This situation has, I am informed, been caused by the attitude of the ONUC Commander there towards the ANC, particularly towards Major Demole the CO 20 Bn ANC.

3. From what the ANC have told me, I would quote one expression of opinion "he treats us like dirt because he thinks we are dirt and does not hide his thoughts".

4. Some time ago I was told by the C of S to tell the ANC that they would receive four to six M.8 armoured cars from the Swedish Bn at Kamina. I passed this on to the C of S ANC who in turn told Major Demole. In due course Major Demole reported that obviously the CO Kamina had no intention of handing over these cars and that he had stated that if he were forced to hand them over, he would first render them useless.

5. This report may be a strange coincidence but it is exactly what CO Kamina told our C of S that he wanted to do. (See signal from Hedemen Secret COS 568 - 22 JUL 63).

6. Our C of S then told CO Kamina to hand the cars over in their present condition. So far and this is over a week ago, the CO Kamina has not done this.

7. As a result of this delay, HQ ANC received from Major Demole a request for permission to enter Kamina Base and take these vehicles, if necessary by force. I advised the C of S ANC to send a reply to Major Demole forbidding him from taking any action except as ordered by HQ ANC. This has been done.

8. However there is such a strain on relations at Kamina at present and such an obvious display of antaganism towards the ANC that I honestly am afraid that unless quick action is taken, we may be faced with a disasterous situation and possibly shooting.

9. I therefore recommend that

a. OC Kamina Base be ordered at once by you to hand over to the ANC the M.8 Armoured Cars.

b. That these vehicles be handed over in the present reconditioned state.

c. That no cannabilation take place of any of the vehicles or equipment to be handed over to ANC.

d. That the Commander Kamina be reminded at once that the ANC are our allies and our equals and are to be treated as such.

e. That the ANC Officers be treated with respect due to their rank and status by all concerned.

..... 2

f. That CO Kamina Base be made aware of the distinct possibility of armed clash between the Swedish Bn and 20 Bn ANC, unless quick action is taken to repair the already sagging relations between the two.

g. That CO Kamina Base be made to realise that the letter which he wrote to Major Demole was almost bordering on insult. (Copy of this letter is held by Chief Mil Info).

h. That CO Kamina be made aware that a copy of this letter is now at HQ ANC where it is received with complete disgust and considered to be unworthy of one senior officer writing to another.

IO. I beg to draw your attention to these unfortunate circumstances so that trouble that appears inevitable may be averted at Kamina.

P. A. Mayer. Lt.Col.

LO UN/ANC

ROUTING SLIP

TO

MA to Force Comdr

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE	X	YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

DATE	FROM
10/8/63	Mil Pers

Gm x/F c

QG SECTEUR KAMINA
7 AOUT 1963

Ordre du secteur no 45 F

Sujet: Repris de commande

1. Le commandant du secteur le Colonel O. Hederén en vacances depuis le 3 août 1963.

2. J'ai pris la commande à partir de cette date.

Carl-Olof Ahlang
LtCol
CO Secteur Kamina

Jan E. Eklund
Jan E. Eklund
COS

Subject: Change of Command

1. The Commander of Sector Kamina Colonel O. Hederen proceeded on leave 3 August 63.

2. I have assumed command wef this date.

29 July 1963.

Col. O.Hedersn
O.C. Section
KAMINA.

Yours of the 29 July refers. I am deeply perturbed that any discussions held here at ONUC H.Q. with G.O.C. Katanga Area could have led to the climate of misunderstanding which has now developed. At no time has anyone in authority expressed the view that you did not want to cooperate with Katanga Area. If G.O.C. Katanga Area formed the opinion, which he expressed to you, he did so because of some misinterpretation on his part.

I am confident that your recent offer of assistance to G.O.C. Katanga Area will prove to him your readiness to cooperate at all times and will help to dispel the erroneous opinion which he formed on his last visit to Leo, even if it did arise from a misunderstanding. I am sending a copy of this letter to the G.O.C. Katanga area to clear the air.

Kebede Guebre, Lt. Gen.
Force Commander.

cc: G.O.C. Katanga Area.

Col. O.Hederán
O.C. Section
KAMINA.

Yours of the 25 July refers. I am deeply perturbed that any discussions held here at ONUC H.Q. with G.O.C. Katanga Area could have led to the climate of misunderstanding which has now developed. At no time has anyone in authority expressed the view that you did not want to cooperate with Katanga Area. If G.O.C. Katanga Area formed the opinion, which he expressed to you, he did so because of some misinterpretation on his part.

I am confident that your recent offer of assistance to G.O.C. Katanga Area will prove to him your readiness to cooperate at all times and will help to dispel the erroneous opinion which he formed on his last visit to Leo, even if it did arise from a misunderstanding. I am sending a copy of this letter to the G.O.C. Katanga area to clear the air.

Kebede Guebre, Lt. Gen.
Force Commander.

cc: G.O.C. Katanga Area.

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

Kamina July 25 1963

To Force Commander Lieutenant General Kebbede Guebre
HQ ONUC
Leopoldville

Sir,

On July 23 and 24 I visited HQ KAT AREA. In the evening on the 23rd I was invited to a party in connection with the Etiopian national commemoration day.

On the 24th I discussed with the Chief of Staff and Head of Branches the possibilities to interfere in South Katanga from Kamina in case of need. I then pointed out that if order should come from Force Commander I will be able to interfere in the directions of Kolwezi and Elisabethville with motorized military forces with two companies as the maximum. We also discussed the problems in such a situation about the command, signals, supply etc.

From HQ KAT AREA was reported that most of the cars in the Etiopian brigade were off road. I then suggested that I send down some help from the swedish workshop at Kamina at first hand to repair the swedish APC:s, which was greatfully agreed to. I then talked to the GOC. At my surprise I was told that GOC at his last visit to Leopoldville was informed that I did not want to cooperate with KAT AREA. I find this information remarkable. I have never rejected any cooperation with KAT AREA, at the contrary, I have tried to bring about the best possible cooperation with both military and civilian authorities. GOC was very content with the cooperation that has been established and for me it was disappointing to hear this opinion from Leopoldville.

Yours sincerely,

C. Hederén

C. Hederén
Colonel
CO Sector Kamina

23 July 1963

Confidential

To : Col. Hoderen, HQ Sector Kamina

From : Lt.Col. Kebbede Guebre, Force Commander, Leopoldville

With reference to your signal COS 567 of 20 July.

I appreciate your concern regarding Lt. Sabu's presence at KAMINA. However, it would at this stage be very difficult to request the removal of Lt. Sabu from the 20th ANC Bn. Officially it has never been accepted that the ANC was responsible for shooting down the DC3 on September 20, 1962. Furthermore as no protest was made against Lt. Sabu's actions when Larsen and Van Vayern were threatened, it would be very difficult to incriminate Sabu at this stage. I believe that if we raise this matter with the ANC HQ we will only succeed in creating further misunderstanding. I can only suggest that you make the best of the present situation in the interest of harmony between ourselves and the ANC.

I am sure you will accept the foregoing reasons for my reluctance to take up this matter with the ANC HQ and that Sabu's presence at KAMINA can be ignored by all who are not happy with his presence.

Translation

GMA/FC

HQ of ANC

Section G1

Leopoldville, 18 July 1963

To the Force Commander
ONUC - Leopoldville

My dear General,

I have been informed of the incidents which have taken place on 1 May 63 between the PM of KAMINA BASE and 4 military from 13th Bn.

According to the version which has been given to me, it appears, in the circumstances that the PM has proved himself, to say the least of it, guilty of excessive brutality.

In effect, I think, that a patrol composed of one platoon PM has enough strength to force a group of 4 military to conform to their injunctions without, nevertheless, having to beat them up.

It is difficult for me to believe, as has been suggested to me, that the incidents which occurred represent a sort of reprisal by the platoon PM to avenge a Sergeant PM who was beaten up in April 63, by the military of the 13th Bn.

If that is the case, this incident, which I consider to be serious, takes on particular gravity.

I would like to hope, My dear General, that you have already taken the necessary steps to avoid the repetition of similar incidents and I am .....

For the Commander in Chief
COS Lt.Col. EBEYA,E.

LtCol Mayer gave a copy of this with a view to getting the background & then for the F.C. to send to Hodson

Gm n/FC

Kamina, July 18, 1963

To Force Commander

From Col O. Hederén

Subject: 2C. ANC Bn

On account of general Mobutu's behaviour during his visit in Kaminaville and as he probably will accuse ONUC for bad cooperation I wish to inform about what has been going on since the 2C. bn arrived at Kaminaville.

The battalion arrived with a company completely unannounced. The only information received was that a liaison officer was coming to Kamina. Therefore the reception was kind of hard.

The battalion is under direct command of the ANC HQ in Albertville, I have no right of command over it. The activity is to be grounded on cooperation. For our part this has been that we have organized briefings that take place every week, when we give and receive various informations. We have also worked out rules for the behaviour. The patrol activity is based only on mixed patrols. This is an agreement fully accepted by the 2C. bn. In its whole the patrol activity has been satisfying.

But soon afterwards the 2C. bn wanted to act on its own. They then took an armoured car that had been captured earlier during the combats and that earlier belonged to Kasongo Niembo's battalion. This armoured car was filled with ANC soldiers and then driven back and forth through the streets in Kaminaville. The car was still marked with the Katangese signs and on the sides was painted Kasongo Niembo's battalion. I told the battalion commander how very unpsychological this behaviour was. The population thought it was conquerors who had come to Kaminaville. At the parade June 30 it ended with this car full of ANC soldiers under enthusiastic cheering passed by the tribune of honour where the district commissary and Kasongo Niembo received the parade. Now this car is broke and cannot be used any more.

As to the arms search a detailed program proposal was worked out at the HQ Sector Kamina. This was discussed with the commander of the 2C. bn who agreed fully to everything. It was then decided that I should direct this operation with units from 13. and 2C. ANC bn and from 2C. Swedish bn. In spite of this agreement personnel from the 2C. ANC bn started their own search that was, however, stopped. Also ANC patrols went after the search was over into some houses and behaved according to informations improperly. A couple of days later the commander of the 2C. bn made a speech in front of the policestation in Kaminaville and accused ONUC for meddling in Congo's internal business. He is said also to have mentioned that he was going to start a search in the villages where ONUC shall not take part. The result is that people are frightened and a sort of "flight" from the town has been reported.

A couple of days ago there was an incident in a restaurant in town where a party from Albertville, part of Ilunga Prospèr's suit, were asked to leave some tables in the restaurant as they were occupied. At the intermezzo then arising the hotelowner called the Swedish detachment for help. This was of course wrong, he should have called the police. The Swedish detachment was told there was a fight at the restaurant but when the patrol arrived and saw what it really was they returned immediately. It should be mentioned though that at a later moment ANC soldiers forced

the hotelowner by threat to give them his shilled beer.

At the airfield the 20. bn had, without consultation, started to search passangers and cargo at the arriving airplanes. As the battalioncommander had no permission from any authority to do this he was told to stop it. He promised this but did not keep his promise. I therefore stopped the search.

When the general visited Kaminaville the 20. bn had not been notified about his arrival. He had a talk with the battalion commander and as I can understand the battalion commander has given accusations about ONUC. When the general left the airfield I talked a couple of minutes with him but he did not want to bring up any vital questions. But he said that ONUC was here at the request of the Congolese Government and not to protect the european people in Kaminaville. I find it most surprising that a general is able to say such things without having heard both parts in question. Now he had only had informations from the 20. bn. The general also thought we use our armoured cars too much. With armoured cars he meant our armoured transport vehicles. I explained to him that these vehicles are normal transport vehicles for the Swedish platon and are not to be taken as armoured cars.

I am and will always be willihg to cooperation but I insist upon the other part acting as per agreement. Like now when I have tried to get the 20. bn to follow an agreement already made, to be accused for bad cooperation prove a very bad perception and I think that a general should clear out the matter before he accuses ONUC for bad cooperation.

O Hederén

O Hederén Col

CO Sector Kamina

cc Mil Info

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

Kamina le 17 juillet 1963

Pour le Général Mobutu
Léopoldville

Mon Général,

Je regrette que vous n'ayez pas été reçu ici à la Base de Kamina d'une manière qui correspond à votre position. J'avais l'impression que vous visiteriez seulement le 20. bataillon. On avait promis de me donner les détails de votre visite. Le 20. bataillon, avec lequel j'ai pris contact le 15 juillet, m'a communiqué que vous étiez à Kolwezi et que vous viendriez peut-être le jour suivant ou peut-être le jour après celui-là.

Ce n'est pas par malveillance que nous n'avons pas organisé une réception digne en votre honneur. Ici à Kamina nous n'avons jamais manqué de recevoir les visiteurs distingués avec le respect dû à leur rang. Je pense que dans cette occasion tout a resulté des informations incomplètes. Dans le télégramme d'Elisabethville concernant votre voyage Kamina n'était pas mentionné et je n'ai reçu l'information de votre arrivée que quelques minutes avant votre atterrissage.

Je trouve que c'est très ennuyeux d'entendre ce que vous avez dit de la mauvaise cooperation du côté de l'ONU et que l'ONU n'est pas ici pour protéger la population européenne de Kaminaville. Je peux vous assurer que ce n'est pas le cas. L'ONU à Kamina est très coopérative et l'a toujours été.

Comme vous n'aviez pas le temps de discuter les questions avec les autres parties lors de votre visite j'espère que ces questions seront abordées et complètement mises au point la prochaine fois que vous visitez la Base de Kamina. N'avez-vous pas l'occasion de venir le 1 août?

Je vous prie d'agréer, mon Général, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus distingués

Hederén

O Hederén
Colonel
Commandant du Secteur Kamina

FC for information

22nd July, 1963

To : Officer in Charge

From : Force Commander

I agree in principle that we should permit Air Congo to use Kamina Base as terminal.

2. Before we commit ourselves to make firm recommendations to New York, it is necessary to know to what extent Air Congo would expect the UN to provide services and facilities and to what extent Air Congo themselves propose to arrange for such services and facilities at Kamina. I suggest that Air Congo be invited as a first step to send a representative to Kamina to discuss the requirements with the Air Base Commander who was informed of this possibility during his visit to Leopoldville last week.

3. When the requirements are known, we could make recommendations to New York accordingly.

(KEBEDE GUEBRE) Lt. Gen.
FORCE COMMANDER

[illegible] 317

ROUTING SLIP

TO

FORCE COMMANDER

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

ATTACHED is DRAFT MEMO TO MR. DORSINVILLE

DATE 22/4 | FROM [signature] Air CDR

ROUTING SLIP

TO

AIR COMMANDER

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

The F.C. has directed me to pass the attached to you as a result of your discussion with him.

DATE 20 Jul.

FROM [illegible]/FC

AIR CONGO

Leopoldville, 19 July 1963

Mr. Dorsinville
Representative of
UN Secretary General in Leo

Excellency,

Hereby, I solicit through your goodwill the authorisation for our aircraft Douglas DC4 and DC6 to land regularly at the airport of KAMINA BASE for the liaison between LEO-EVILLE.

In effect, the passanger traffic as well as the freight having increased considerably during the past months and the KAMINAVILLE airport which we use at present can only accept aircraft Douglas DC3, we regret that it is impossible for us to meet the recuirements of transporting the merchandise for the straightening of our National Economy.

For your information I state that before the events of July 60 our aircraft landed at flying-ground of KAMINA BASE 3 times a week.

A. GILLIS
General Manager Deputy

Léopoldville, le 19 juillet 1963

C. 24023

Monsieur DERSINVILLE

Représentant du Secrétaire Général
des Nations Unies à Léopoldville

Excellence,

Par la présente, je sollicite de votre haute bienveillance l'autorisation pour nos appareils Douglas DC4 et DC6 de pouvoir atterrir régulièrement à l'aeroport de la Base de Kamina sur les liaisons LEOPOLDVILLE - ELIZABETHVILLE.

En effet, le trafic tant passagers que frêt ayant considérablement augmenté ces derniers mois et l'aéroport de Kamina ville, que nous utilisons actuellement, ne pouvant accepter que des appareils Douglas DC3, nous nous trouvons, à notre grand regret dans l'impossibilité de repondre aux demandes de transport de marchandises vitales au redressement de l'économie nationale.

A toutes fins utiles, je vous signale qu'avant les évènements de juillet 1960, nos appareils atterrissaient à l'aérodrome de

.../...

Air

Port - Léopoldville - R. C. 24023

AIRCONDITIONNÉS

votre réf.:
votre réf.:

annexe:

... de Kamina Base à une fréquence de trois fois par semaine.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

A. GILLIS

Directeur Général Adjoint

AIR CONGO

Leopoldville, 19 July 1963

Mr. Dorsinville
Representative of
UN Secretary General in Leo

Excellency,

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In effect, the passanger traffic as well as the freight, having increased considerably during the past months and the KAMINAVILLE airport which we use at present can only accept aircraft Douglas DC3, we regret that it is impossible for us to meet the requirements of transporting the merchandise for the straightening of our National Economy.

For your information I state that before the events of July 60 our aircraft landed at flying-ground of KAMINA BASE 3 times a week.

A. GILLIS
General Manager Deputy

M E M O R A N D U M

SECRET 17 July 1963

TO : Chief of Military Information

FROM : Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Ratissage

With reference to your secret memo dated 16 July 63, it is regretted the request contained in para 5 cannot be agreed to, as this has not been confirmed as legal by the Legal Adviser. Until confirmation as to the legality of such actions by the United Nations is affirmed, we cannot authorise the Commander, Sector Kamina, to carry out searches of houses where he has been informed there are dumps of ordnance and ammunition.

Brig
(B.A.O. Ogundipe)

cc: MA/FC

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

18 July 1963

TO : Chief of Military Information

FROM : Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Ratissage

Further to my memorandum of 17 July 63, the Force Commander directs that Commander Sector Kamina should in future invite the CO ANC Bn to arrange the ratissage jointly. He also directs that - unless Col Hederen has good reasons for not wanting to include police in search - the ratissage operation should be carried out, as is done at present in Elisabethville, i.e; jointly with ANC/UN/Civilian Police.

(B.A.O. Ogundipe) Brig

cc: MA/FC KG

Gmatt

ROUTINE

FROM : ONUC LEO

TO : HQ KAT AREA EVILLE
HQ 4 ETH BDE EVILLE
HQ KASAI SECTOR LULU
HQ SECTOR KAMINA
3 COY BBI INF BDE AVILLE
MANONO STATION ONUC MANONO

UNCLAS. MIL OPS 0356. REF OUR MIL OPS 0322 OF 22 JUN. KAMINA BASE AREA IS NOW REDESIGNATED AS SECTOR KAMINA AND WILL BE KNOWN AS SUCH WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

KA

TIL 9707

Drafted by - Major ISHAQ

Authorised - Chief Mil Ops

Date - 9 Jul 63

cc

Lists B and C

FC

FC
Major/KC

ROUTINE

FROM: ONUC LEO

TO: HQ KATANGA AREA EVILLE
HQ 4 ETH BDE EVILLE
HQ KASAI SECTOR LULU
HQ SECTOR A AVILLE
HQ SECTOR C KAMINA
KANONO STATION ONUC KANONO

UNCLAS. MIL OPS 0322. REDESIGNATION SECTOR C. AREA PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS HQ SECTOR C IS HEREBY DESIGNATED AS "KAMINA BASE AREA". NEW DESIGNATION WILL BE USED IN ALL FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE WITH EFFECT FROM 24 JUNE 63.

Drafted by - Major KR MIRZA
Authorised - Chief of Mil Ops
Date - 22 Jun 63

cc:
List B and C

PRIORITY
No 3301/103/MIL OPS
19 APR 63

To : Mr BAICH A, EM
Head of Public Works Department

Mr BOSKOVIC, N
Senior Consultant Communications and Transport

From : Chief of Military Operations

Subject: Operational fitness of railway line - PORT FRANCQUI-KAMINA

1 A querry has been raised by UN HQ NEW YORK as to when would the railway line PORT FRANCQUI - KAMINA become fully operational.

2 Please let this Branch know your assessment of the time required for this task to be completed.

Cable Nif 2903 Refers

Lt Col
Chief of Military Operations

cc

Force Comdr
Dy Force Comdr
Chief of Staff
Chief Mil Info

HQ Sector C
Kamina
No 18/311
22 Dec 1962

SECRET

Com

FM HQ SEC C KAM

TO HQ ONUC LEO FOR FORCE COMDR AND AIR COMDR.

INFO HQ KATAREA ELI
(FOR GOC)

Subject: Progress report, aircraft pens

I refer to the numbers on the inclosed photos.

1: The walls of drums are ready.
Remains: Walls of earth and platform of either concrete or PSP.

2: The walls of drums are ready, and walls of earth have been started. There is an old platform of concrete, which can be used for the time being.
Remains: To complete the work with the walls of earth and in the future to build a new platform. The pen can be used temporarily.

3: See number 2 except that the old platform, which is made of concrete bricks hardly will be used even on a temporary basis.

4,5 and 6: All drums delivered to the places. Some of them have been opened. 5 and 6 have platforms made of asphalt.
Remains: All the walls and for number 4 a platform made of either concrete or PSP.
Close to those pens there are old uncompleted pens which are used on a temporary basis.

7 and 8: Planned positions where some drums have been delivered.

1-8: No camouflage work has been carried out, since we have no such materials.

11: The walls of drums are ready and almost the walls of earth. The platform of reinforced concrete is also ready. The pen is now used.
Remains: To complete the walls of earth and to cover them with grass.

12: The walls of drums are ready and almost the walls of earth. The platform of reinforced condrete is ready to one fourth (1/4).
Remains: To complete the walls of earth and to cover them with grass. When we receive cement complete the platform. I have ordered for 60 bags of cement = 3 tons (our restd mil ops 160 for Mr Cooper on 11th of dec refers).
No cement has yet arrived.

11 and 12: No camouflage work has been carried out of the same reason as above.

13,14 and 15: Planned positions of aircraft pens.

21 - 26: These pens consist only of platforms made by PSP and connection roads. The protection is given by natural possibilities to camouflage the places and by a lot of close houses which will make an eventuall attack difficult. All the places are now ready and can be used. Only one short connection road demands more work. Only S 29 and J 29 can use these places, as the roads are not permanent and must be maintained.

Notes: 1/ The bulldozer is now fixed and is working for civil purposes and will be used on aircraft pens soonest after Christmas. Since we are demanded to carry out a lot of military work and the bulldozer is really meant for civil purposes and as every breakdown makes it stand at least 4 weeks, I must repeat my requirement for at least one more bulldozer in order to be able to carry out the works in a proper way.

2/ No cement.

3/ Conclusion: Ref. to the above notes it is still not possible to proceed with the important works of the walls of earth and the platforms and it has neither been possible for several weeks.

4/ All PSP have been used in the positions of number 21 - 26 and were enough to bring this job to an end.

O. Hederén Col.
CO Sec C

C. Falk i/Lt
Assistant
Mil Ops

Kamina Base
1:50 000
N
1
2
3
4
6
7
11
12
14
15

Confidential

17 December 1962

To : Mr. A. W. Cooper, Chief Procurement Officer

From : Air Commodore J. C. Varma, Air Commander

Subject : Rockets - Kamina Base

1. Recently a check was conducted by Air Base Kamina to determine the actual quantity of 2.75" R.F. (used by F-86 Fighters) held there. Information reveals that a total 200 Rockets of this type are at Kamina Base.

2. Will the Procurement please confirm that two-hundred quantity of this type were procured. If additional quantity was obtained then detailed information as to where it is stored or to whom it was handed over may please be furnished to enable further investigation to be conducted.

3. In the meantime, Air Base Commander, Kamina, is being approached to find out from the Ethiopian Airforce personnel who are still at Kamina whether they would know anything about these additional Rockets.

4. An early reply will be appreciated.

(J. C. VARMA) Air Commodore
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander
Air Base Commander, Kamina

30 November 1962

To : Dr. Ralph Bunche, United Nations HQ, New York

From : Lt-General Kebbede, Force Commander, ONUC

Subject : Air-to-ground firing practice range at Kamina

1. It is strongly recommended that an Air-to-Ground firing range be opened at Kamina.

2. The object scope of having this range is to:-

i) Keep aircrews in firing practice against ground targets.

ii) To check guns and gun sights under live conditions.

iii) To enable ground crews to familiarise themselves for combat conditions.

3. The amount of ammunition and rockets proposed to be expended on the range as envisaged up to March 1963 is as follows:-

a) 20 mm rounds - Approximately 12,000

b) 6.3 cm training rockets - Approximately 120

c) 1 set fittings for training rockets

4. The cost of these stores may be ascertained from procurement agencies in New York. Since Swedish J-29 Jet Fighters are the only force, it is suggested that these stores be obtained from Sweden through normal channels.

.../5.

5. The map showing the range area, danger limits and other known information is attached as Appendixes. The size of the planned Air-to-Ground range will ensure adequate safety to all concerned.

6. An early approval may please be given.

(KEBEDE GUEBRE) Lt-General
Force Commander

cc: Air Commander

30 November 1962

To : Dr. Ralph Bunche, United Nations HQ, New York

From : Lt-General Kebbede, Force Commander, ONUC

Subject : Air-to-ground firing practice range at Kamina

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6. An early approval may please be given.

(KEBBEDE GUEBRE) Lt-General
Force Commander

cc: Air Commander

A

ROUTING SLIP

TO MA to FC

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

Lifting of PSPs has been completed today.

To Kam & Ernie?

DATE 4/12

FROM CLO

ROUTING SLIP

TO

CLO

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

Thanks for info.

Did PSP go to Kam or Eli or both?

Have we any news as to whether the quantity is sufficient

DATE 6/12. FROM BM MA

ROUTING SLIP

TO: MA to F

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

1. 369 pieces of PSP are been lifted to Kamuria.
2. We need 150 pieces more which procurement is expediting.

Mr Prakash

DATE	FROM
7/12	CLO

30 November 1962

To : Dr. Ralph Bunche, United Nations HQ, New York

From : Lt-General Kebbede, Force Commander, ONUC

Subject : Air-to-ground firing practice range at Kamina

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.../5.

5. The map showing the range area, danger limits and other known information is attached as Appendixes. The size of the planned Air-to-Ground range will ensure adequate safety to all concerned.

6. An early approval may please be given.

(KEBEDE GUEBRE) Lt-General
Force Commander

cc: Air Commander

Kaw

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

No. 4215/6/LOGS

23 November 2.

HQ Sector L, Leopoldville
Chief Logistics Officer, HQ ONUC
Collection of PSP (Perforated Steel Plates)

Reference telephone conversation Major Jabbar/ Major Talwar of date.

1. The undermentioned quantities of PSPs are lying in NDJILI Airport:

Opposite American Hangar	-	113
Opposite Control Tower	-	252
Near Fuel Dump	-	26
		391

2. Please arrange to collect these PSPs from the various locations mentioned above and dump them near the loading bays in the Airport. Manpower and transport required for this job will please be arranged by you.

3. These PSPs belong to Interocean Airways. Please contact Mr. Cunningham of Procurement Branch this HQ, who will accompany your representative and meet the officials of the Airways Company before the PSPs are collected by you.

4. As these PSPs are urgently required to be flown out to a field station, please make all efforts to complete their collection by 1200 hrs on 24 Nov 62. This HQ should be informed as soon as the collection job is completed so that necessary airlift can be arranged.

FC
24/11

(V.A. MAJOOR) Lt. Col.
Chief Logistics Officer

cc: Air Commander
Chief of Staff
MA to the Force Commander
Chief Procurement Officer

KAM

21 November 1962

To : Lt-Colonel V. S. Kapoor, Chief Logistics Officer

From : Air Commodore J. C. Varma, Air Commander

Subject : Availability of PSP

1. The Force Commander discussed the above subject with me and would like an investigation to be made from various places in the Congo whether certain amount of this item is lying in the Congo.

2. I suggest Procurement be advised to investigate thoroughly and also signals could be sent to places like Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Albertville, Kitona, Coquilhatville etc., asking them to investigate. They may not understand what is "PSP", so it could be explained to them that Pressed Steel Plates were used extensively during the last war for making emergency Runways and taxi tracks. They are normally of three-and-a-half meters by fifty centimeters in dimension.

3. If any place advises the availability, they should be asked to advise the quantity with dimensions available.

(J. C. VARMA) Air Commodore
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander
Chief Procurement Officer

FC
22/11

Kam

15 November 1962

To : Mr. Ben T. Twigt, Chief Administrative Officer

From : Lt. Gen. Kebbede Guebre, Force Commander

Subject : ref. my memo dated 8 November 1962

On the subject of the terms of reference of the EME Battalion at Kamina, I am grateful to you for drawing my attention to the mistake in the 3rd line of my memo. This has now been corrected.

Com Lt Col for.
Ltd. Gen.

Kebbede Guebre

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

Inter-Office Memorandum

13 November 1962

To: Lt.Gen. Kebbede Guebre, Force Commander

From: Ben T. Twigg, Chief Administrative Officer

Please refer to your memorandum dated 8 November 1962. on the subject of the terms of reference of the EME Battalion at Kamina. The word Base Commander appearing in the 3rd line of your memorandum should read Base Administrator.

KAM

13 November 1962

To: Col. Garneau

From: Lt.Col. Mattimoe

Re Mil. Info. 0642.

1. Instructions have been issued to GOC Katanga to conduct a full inquiry into the statement that ANC soldiers wearing UN beret did not belong to 2 Congolese Battalion and also that it appears that some other ANC units are holding UN equipment.

2. The Force Commander directs that you pursue inquiries at this end and ascertain the true facts concerning these statements.

Military Assistant to the Force Comdr.

KAMINA

10 November 1962

To: Air Commander

From: Force Commander

Subject: Air to Ground Firing Practice at KAMINA

1. I approve Air to Ground Firing Practices at KAMINA.

2. Before implementing your recommendations however it will be necessary for a variety of reasons to obtain clearance from New York.

3. Please therefore prepare a submission for New York and include - the object and the scope of the practices, the amount of ammunition and rockets it is proposed to expend with an estimate of cost. Also included should be a map showing the range area, danger limits etc. together with full safety precautions.

4. This matter will be pouched to New York.

KG

Lt.Gen.
Kebbede Guebre

Kam

A

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

8 November 1962

To : Lt-General Kebbede, Force Commander

From : Air Commodore J. C. Varma, Air Commander

Subject : Air to Ground Firing Practice at KAMINA

1. No. 22 Swedish Squadron have made a request to allow them to carry out air-to-ground (guns and rockets) firing in Kamina. Enclosed please find a letter together with Appendix 1 and 2 giving the sketch of the proposed firing range.

2. The firing range is proposed to be set up within the Kamina Perimeter area. This area is occasionally used by the Army for their practice firing.

3. It is advisable and necessary that fighter pilots do carry out air-to-ground firing practice to improve the standard of accuracy. As it is a policy matter, your decision on the matter is requested.

(J. C. VARMA) Air Commodore
Air Commander

Ret to Air Comd 15/11/62

KAMINA

8 November 1962

To: Mr. B. T. Twigt
Chief Administrative Officer

From: Lt. Gen. Kebbede Guebre
Force Commander.

Referring to yours of 6 November (Terms of reference EME Battalion, KAMINA), I agree that the EME Battalion should function under the direction of the Base Commander with the proviso that priority will be given to all requests involving operational necessity emanating from the Base Commander. I also agree that the title of this group be changed from EME Engineering Battalion to "UN Technical Team".

I shall have promulgated the necessary orders concerning he status of the Group and its change in designation.

Lt. Gen.
Kebbede Guebre

DRAFT BRIEF 25 October 1962

Bn

NEW ESTABLISHMENT FOR HQ SECTOR 'C' KAMINA

1. a) KAMINA BASE a very large number of units which includes three Infantry Battalions, one Engineering Battalion, three Fighter Sqn plus detatchments of all ancillary units, signals, ordinance, military police etc.

b) There is no HQ provided in the establishments to administer those units. At present the base is run by an ad hoc HQ drawn from Swedish Battalion. This is a far from satisfactory arrangement.

c) A properly organised HQ is essential for the efficient administration of this Base.

2. Proposed Establishment - HQ SECTOR 'C' KAMINA

a) Officers

Lt. Col or Senior Major Ops/Officer - Fr/Eng. speaking. Preferably Swedish
Mil. Info " - FR/Eng "
Logs " - Fr/Eng. "

L.O. to 2 Cong. Bn - Fr/Eng.

b) Clerks

a) Mil. Ops. - 1
Mil.Info. - 1
Mil.Pers. - 1
Logs. - 1

b) One should be French speaking.

A1

KAM

ROUTING SLIP

TO Force Commander

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

Enclosed report for your perusal. I don't think any action is considered now.

J. [illegible]
Air Cdr
Air Commander

DATE 28/11/62 FROM

To: Air Commander HQ Leopoldville.

From: Fighter Ops Controller Kamina.

Subject: Departure of 1th Sqd.

Last week I heard from CO 1th Sqd, capt Assefa that the Sabre aircrafts might fly home for inspection at the same time crews rotation took place. The matter was under consideration by the Ethiopian Air Staff, that was to take direct contact with Air Commander HQ Leo after having made up their minds. As far as I understood capt Wobisat Fighter Ops HQ Leo was informed these thoughts by capt Assefa when he was here as a member of the board of inquiry. Anyway there were no definite plans to inform Air Staff about.

Thursday 25 October No 1 Sqd should have carried out the ordinary mission , shared by the 1th and 22nd Sqd. At the same time he was to check the newly mounted extra drop tanks.

At about 1030E to day I visited No 1 Sqd's office to see capt Assefa about the flight. I then was informed by capt Woldegebrid, the Maintenance Off of 1th Sqd, that the aircrafts had flown to Ethiopia, that he was acting Comd Off and that capt Assefa had instructed him to send cable to Fighter Ops Leo. I saw this cable and found that the Ethiopian fighters had taken off at 0700 local time.

Interrogating capt Waldegebrid why I had not been informed, who had given orders and so on, he only refered to the cable and did not know anything.

From one of the NCO's I have found that order arrived from Ethiopia 0100 local time the same morning.

Checking with ICAO about the flight I have found that the Tower was told that the flight should be a local one in the vicinity of the base last 2 hrs and 15 min. As usually one of the Ethiopian pilots was on watch in the Tower. When a/c overdue, the controller started action but was then informed that the a/c had landed Entebe 25 min ago

Kamina 25 October 1962

FOR AIR BASE CO

Anders Fornell (Yes)

B.T. Flodén
Lt/col

FC
28/10

AO/no/10

FC
5/10

ROUTING S P

TO

MA to FC

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

We cannot provide such an officer from our resources. I suggest we first obtain the recommendations of GOC and then put up a case to NY for acceptance.

DATE 5/7

FROM J. Lew Brig COS

ROUTING SLIP

TO MA.

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE	X	FOR ACTION

In view of the following facts:—

a/ The strength that we have at sector 'C' being of an Inf. BDE.

b/ The BNS. being of 3 different Nationalities.

c/ The Logistics/Administrative problems will be increasing—

P.T.O.

DATE 4 Oct. 62

FROM FC. KG. Lt. Gen.

Therefore, I accept in principle that we must consider the case of a HQ. staff for "C" sector.
GOC. Kat. area have to be notified to forward his proposal ~~on the~~ the organization of the HQ. "C" sector staff.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

NO. 3230/COS

To Lt Gen Kebbede Guebre, Force Commander, ONUC HQ, LEO

From Maj Gen D Prem Chand, GOC KATANGA Area, E'ville

Subject STAFF REQUIREMENTS FOR SECTOR 'C'

Date 28 September 1962

..... 1. I am forwarding at Appendix 'A' attached an extract from a bi-monthly Administrative/Logistics Report from Sector 'C' of 19 September 1962. I fully support the case that the Logistics Branch of Sector 'C' should be strengthened and would strongly recommend that the necessity of an Assistant Logistics Officer be accepted by Force HQ and an officer stationed at HQ Sector 'C' at an early date. His primary duties would be to look after the Logistics/Administrative problems in connection with the ANC Battalion. The officer should be French speaking.

2. In addition to the above, I would recommend consideration of a case for a small HQ for 'C' Sector. Three Infantry Battalions, one Engineer Battalion, Three Fighter Squadrons and some smaller units are at present located at KAMINA, the total number of personnel being around 2,200. No separate HQ exists and the existing HQ is organized on an ad hoc basis, consisting entirely of members of the Swedish battalion staff. A statement of case on the composition of the HQ will be forwarded, if this is accepted in principle.

D. Chand

MAJ GEN
GOC KATANGA AREA

APPENDIX 'A'

Extract from Administrative/Logistics Report for period 1-15 Sep 1962
HQ Sector 'C', Kamina.

General.

The arrival of the ANC-battalion has increased the amount of work on the Logistics side of HQ Sector C up to a level where the work cannot any more be properly fulfilled. HQ Sector 'C' consists entirely of members of the Swedish Bn staff and the work of the Base Logistics Officer is done by a captain who is also the only Logistics Officer of the Swedish Bn and who now also has to act as Administrative/Logistics Adviser to the ANC Bn. When it was dedided that the 2nd ANC Bn should be transferred to Kamina Base, HQ ONUC Leo requested Commander Sector 'C' to "detail out of your own sources a French-speaking officer at the rank of major to take care of the Administrative/Logistics problems of the Special Bn and who is also capable to - when necessary - act as tactical adviser to the Bn-commander". To this request Commander Sector 'C' could only answer that as no such officer existed within his sources a Swedish French-speaking captain had temporarily been assigned to the Special Bn as Liaison Officer to HQ Sector 'C'.
The request for a French-speaking officer to take care of the Logistics/ Administrative problems remains with from day to day increasing strength. The officer concerned should be provided by HQ ONUC.

Le 27 octobre 1962

Mon Général,

Me référant à l'avion des Nations Unies F86 dont nous sommes sans nouvelles depuis le 14 octobre, il est possible que le pilote, se trouvant en difficulté avec son appareil, ait réussi à se poser en parachute et qu'il soit encore en vie.

Nous avons été informés par les autorités katangaises que l'avion avait été aperçu volant au nord de Bukama. Il est donc possible qu'il ait continué plus au nord et qu'il se soit écrasé dans la région de l'ANC.

S'il devait en être ainsi, nous apprécierions vivement que vous demandiez à toutes les unités de l'ANC qui se trouvent dans l'ensemble de cette région de faire faire des enquêtes localement auprès de toute la population pour essayer d'obtenir des renseignements sur le pilote et l'avion disparus et d'en rendre compte aux autorités les plus proches des Nations Unies.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de toute l'influence que vous pourriez exercer auprès de l'ANC et par leurs bons soins sur la population régionale pour les inciter et encourager à venir en aide au pilote si ce dernier devait être par chance retrouvé vivant.

Je ne pourrais assez vous remercier de toute l'assistance que vous voudrez bien nous prêter dans cette affaire.

Veuillez agréer, Mon Général, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Lt-Général

Kebbede Guebre
Commandant des Forces de l'ONUC -

Translate

DRAFT LETTER TO GENERAL MOBUTU

Mon Général,

With reference to the F86 UN aircraft which is missing since 14 October, there is a possibility that when the plane got into difficulties the pilot used his parachute to make a successful landing and may therefore be still alive.

It has been reported to us by Katangese authorities that the aircraft was observed flying North of BUKAMA. It is therefore possible that it could have gone further north and crashed in the ANC Zone.

In view of these circumstances, it would be greatly appreciated if you would issue instructions to all ANC Units in that general area to institute inquiries among local people with a view to eliciting information about the missing pilot and aircraft, and reporting it to the nearest UN Authorities.

I should also be grateful if the ANC and through them local people could be encouraged to render all possible assistance to the pilot, should he be lucky enough to have survived the crash and be found alive.

Any assistance which you may be able to give in this matter will be deserving of my sincere thanks.

~~With every good wish~~, Cordially,

~~Yours sincerely, etc.~~

K G

26 October 1962

To : General Kebbede, Force Commander

From : Swedish Liaison Officer

Subject: Documentary Film - Visit to Congo of Major Hultén and Photogra

Reference Dr. Bunche's memorandum of 17 August 1962 to Mr. Gardine
..... copy attached, and New York cable 7568.

The object of this documentary film is to build-up the good will the UN Mission in the Congo to the public opinion of Sweden. The produc is sponsored by the Swedish Government and the film is made by the Swed: Defense Staff. In order to back up the increased relatively big effort asked for by the Acting Secretary General, it is necessary to give the Swedish public information on the Mission and thereby increase the rec: of volunteers. Because all military participants in the Congo Mission to be volunteers due to Swedish Federal law it is necessary to intensi recruitment if Sweden shall be able to fulfill its commitment undertake with the number of qualified personnel required. Therefore, it is fr public relation point of view very important to show not only the dut: but also other interesting parts of the country which might be visite leave in the future. It is known that at least one commercial TV Tes has been given similar assistance hereby requested.

On the above mentioned facts I respectfully ask you, Sir, to again approach HQ New York for a reviewed decision.

Olof T. Carlsson
Colonel Carlsson
For Swedish Liaison Off

23 October 1962

To : CAO

From : Force Commander

KAMINA BASE
CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY - BASE COMMANDER/ADMINISTRATOR.

1. I should be grateful if you could be ready to discuss the following important matters at our next weekly meeting on Thursday 25 October.

2. There is a necessity to clarify the sphere of authority and of responsibility as between the Base Commander and the Base Administrator in KAMINA. To avoid misunderstandings, it will be necessary to issue terms of reference which clearly set out the functions of the Base Commander and of the Base Administrator.

3. Engineer battalion KAMINA.

The Base Administrator KAMINA claims that the Engineer battalion is a civilian unit under his command. The Base Commander considers this battalion to be a military unit and as such to be completely under his command. There is however no difference of opinion as to the administrative tasks to be performed by the Engineer battalion.

4. Vehicle situation at KAMINA.

a. The Base Administrator holds that all transport at KAMINA Air Base should come under him for allotment with the exception of that belonging to Swedish, Ghanaian and ANC battalions, which he feels should remain under the control of the Base Commander.

b. The Base Commander contends that transport belonging to all military units, and this includes the Swedish Engineer battalion, should come under his control. He agrees that civilian Headquarters should retain their own transport.

5. In view of these rather wide differences of opinion on the foregoing important matters, it is very desirable that those issues should be clarified as early as possible.

Kebbede Guebre
Lt-Gen.

Kebbede Guebre
Force Commander - O N U C.

23 October 1962

To : CAO

From : Force Commander

KAMINA BASE
CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY - BASE COMMANDER/ADMINISTRATOR.

1. I should be grateful if you could be ready to discuss the following important matters at our next weekly meeting on Thursday 25 October.

2. There is a necessity to clarify the sphere of authority and of responsibility as between the Base Commander and the Base Administrator in KAMINA. To avoid misunderstandings, it will be necessary to issue terms of reference which clearly set out the functions of the Base Commander and of the Base Administrator.

3. Engineer battalion KAMINA.

The Base Administrator KAMINA claims that the Engineer battalion is a civilian unit under his command. The Base Commander considers this battalion to be a military unit and as such to be completely under his command. There is however no difference of opinion as to the administrative tasks to be performed by the Engineer battalion.

4. Vehicle situation at KAMINA.

a. The Base Administrator holds that all transport at KAMINA Air Base should come under him for allotment with the exception of that belonging to Swedish, Ghanaian and ANC battalions, which he feels should remain under the control of the Base Commander.

b. The Base Commander contends that transport belonging to all military units, and this includes the Swedish Engineer battalion, should come under his control. He agrees that civilian Headquarters should retain their own transport.

5. In view of these rather wide differences of opinion on the foregoing important matters, it is very desirable that those issues should be clarified as early as possible.

Kebbede Guebre
Lt-Gen.

Kebbede Guebre
Force Commander - O N U C.

By GOC

ASPECTS TO BE DISCUSSED BY BRIG. NORONHA
DURING HIS VISIT TO LEOPOLDVILLE - 22 OCT.

Comd and Cont KAMINA. Division of Responsibility Mil + Civ

1. COMMAND

The division of authority between Base Commander and Base Administrator at KAMINA is not clear.

KAMINA should be regarded as a military base. Base Commander therefore should have full authority over military installations.

At present there appears to be no firm Terms of Reference for Base Commander and Base Administrator regarding division of authority.

Please clarify.

2. ENGINEER BN. KAMINA

Base Administrator KAMINA claims that the Engineer Bn is a civilian unit and under his command.

Base Commander is of the opinion that the Engineer Bn is a military unit and should be completely under the command of the Base Commander.

Base Commander and Base Administrator however to agree on administrative tasks to be performed by the Engineer Bn.

GOC agrees with the Base Commander's opinion. Please clarify.

3. VEHICLE SITUATION AT KAMINA.

(a) The Base Administrator KAMINA has stated in correspondence to HQ ONUC LEO (Chief of Transport and Communications) that all transport at KAMINA Air Base should come under him for allotment. He feels the only transport that the Base Commander should control is that of 18 Swedish Bn, 2nd Ghana Bn and ANC Bn.

(b) It is the feeling of this HQ that Base Commander should control the transport for all military units, including Swedish Engineer Bn. The Civilian Headquarters can retain their transport. Base Commander can then appoint a Base Transport Officer whose tasks would be :

(1) Allotment of transport to units in accordance with availability, not necessarily according to scale.

(2) Supervision of maintenance and repair of vehicles.

(3) Control of transport to insure it is being usefully and fully employed. If not, then the reallocation of that transport.

(c) At present there appears to be no firm Terms of Reference for Base Administrator or Base Commander regarding the transport policy at KAMINA Air Base.

HQ Sector C
Kamina
No 1225
1 Oct 1962

To: Maj General Dewan Prem Chand HQ Katanga

From: Colonel S.-E. Nauclér HQ Sec C Kamina

Subject: Items of news from "Essor du Katanga"

Much to my astonishment I have found that the newspaper referred to of 24 September pretends that I am of the opinion that the a/c C 47 with the designation "ONU 202" should have been "shot down by the ANC".

Hence can be concluded that I have uttered this at a conversation with Kasongo Niembo. The allegation is fundamentally wrong.

In this connection may be mentioned that at a routine talk with Kasongo Niembo the latter declared he had no knowledge as to an aircraft having been shot down. He wished, however, to investigate the matter and returned later on with the statement that he had got a report that they had observed an aircraft being fired upon by the ANC East of Kabongo near the Gend positions and then crash, enveloped by smoke, in ANC dominated area. His adviser Mahouden confirmed the statements. Later on information was given regarding the exact position where the plane had crashed. This was at this moment already known by us after a search with two J 29 ordered by me at 1530 on the 20th September. Nor is the allegation true that I should have requested help from Kasongo Niembo's troops to literate the area of the crashed a/c. On the other hand Kasongo Niembo was asked if he was prepared to put personnel at the disposition for the investigation if demanded. To this he replied, we could count upon his help.

In this connection I want to emphasise that all talks with Kasongo Niembo are done the medium of an interpreter whether it concerns the purchasing of beer or other matters and carefully discussed beforehand between me and the Base Adm Mr Postma. Thereafter the questions are drawn up and also noticed by the interpreter, a Swedish lieutenant named Jacobsson. It is controlled that the questions are fully and correctly understood. On this special occasion, regarding the shooting down, Jacobsson was reminded not to take anything for granted or make any conclusions as to the shooting down of the aircraft.

Jacobsson was questioned on the 28th September and confirmed by oath not having made any declarations or allegations as pretended by the newspaper in question.

The talks with Kasongo Niembo are always performed in Mr Postma's office in most cases in his secretary Mrs Gordon's precence, Mrs Gordon speaks swahili fluently. They are quite convinced that the allegations are false.

As I have not been questioned in the matter I presume that the article has been already contradicted. If not it is important that this can be effected soonest.

copy: Force Commander
Swed LO

S.-E. Nauclér
Col OC Sector C Kamina

A-to NY
by cable
FC
3/10

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

No. 4431/6-ORD
Logistics Branch
HQ ONUC
18 Sep'62

To: MA to Force Commander

From: Chief Ordnance Officer

Subject: Tour Notes of the Force Commander to KAMINA on 7 September, 1962

In connection with Para 7 of the minutes action has already been taken vide our Signal No 1516 of 13 Sep'62.

Lt Col
Chief Ordnance Officer
(MOHAMMAD YAQUB)

Rana

~~Orig minutes not~~ not OK. You were to bring forward original minutes in this case to see if all points had now been covered.

Bm
19/9

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

No 4404/1-ORD
Logistics Branch
HQ ONUC
17 Sep'62

To: MA to Force Commander

From: Chief Ordnance Officer

Subject: Tour Notes Pertaining to Visit of Chief Ordnance Officer to Kamina Base on 11 Sep'62

The following action has been taken on the points concerning this branch and are submitted for the information of the Force Commander.

POINT S.No	ACTION TAKEN
1.	The stores have since been issued to 2 RGR vide ONUC Base Ordnance Depot Issue Voucher No 6649/GSçC of 20.8.62 and 6184/GSçC of 20.8.62.
4.	Scarves neck are now available and dues out being cleared.
5.	As regards the trousers OG these are still not available. Requisition has already been placed and the supplies are expected by the first week of Nov'62. Due Out will be cleared immediately on receipt.
6.	Unit asked to furnish their present authorization/holdings to bring them in conformity to the authorized scales vide our letter No 4404/1-ORD dated 15.9.62.
7.	Vide this letter No 4404/1-ORD dated 15.9.62 the unit has been requested to provide us the requisite information and further action will be taken on receipt of reply from them.
8.	Action is in hand.
9.	Officer Commanding Ammunition Platoon has been instructed vide our letter No 4404/1-ORD dated 15.9.62 to provide them all possible assistance in the preparation of the list of surplus Ordnance Stores, Further progress will be submitted in due course.

Seen thank you
HQ,
Lt Gen,

OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

11. A list of stores since issued to ANC Bn is enclosed herewith. Dues out for the items presently not available with the depot are being maintained and will be issued on materialization.

13. Approval of the Operations Branch is still awaited. Ammunition Platoon will be instructed to undetake the job on receipt of aforesaid approval. ?

Points Given by Logistics Officer Katanga Area

1. The position has since been clarified vide amendment NO 1 to SOP No 5 forwarded under this HQ letter No 4404/1-ORD of 5 Sep'62.

2. HQ Katanga Area in their signal No Log 1178 of 28 Aug'62 had not mentioned the unit demand/depot control No, in the absence of which it was not possible to proceed with the issue action and as such they were asked to forward details vide our signal No 1485 dated 30.8.62. ?

5. Position with regard to MT Spares Parts is under review and further progress will be reflected in the next report.

9. a) (i) Cots Folding : Repair of 2200 repairable Camp Cots is being undertaken at Kitona. Also repair of approximately 1800 Cots is being undertaken by Swedish Engr Bn at Kamina.

(ii) Blankets : Issued vide ONUC Base Ordnance Depot Issue Voucher No 3558/GSçC dated 20.6.62.

(iii) Bed Sheets: Not available in ONUC Base Ordnance Depot. A requisition for 68000 Bed Sheets has been raised by the ONUC Base Ordnance Depot and the date of supply is not known.

b) Demand Np 02/62 is not traceable, the unit is being asked to send a copy of the demand.

c) Stores issued vide ONUU Base Ordnance Depot Issue Voucher No 4052/GSçC dated 6.7.62.

Lt Col
Chief Ordnance Officer
(MOHAMMAD YAQUB)

Saleem/

Copy to: Chief Logistics Officer.

ISSUE ORDER ISSUED FOR NO 2 ANC BN for the U/Mentioned Items

Ser No.	Nomenclature	Qty released	Qty issued by BOD	BOD IVr No&Date
1.	Radio Set AN/CRC-9	2	2	IV/1365/E&S of 27/8/6
2.	Radio Set AN/PRC-10	8	8	IV/1365/E&S of 27/8/6
3.	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	20	20	--do--
4.	Dynemo DY88GRC-9	2	2	--do--
5.	Guy GY 12 GRC-9	4	4	--do--
6.	Microphone T-17	5	5	--do--
7.	Insulator In 127	5	5	--do--
8.	Key J-4	4	4	--do--
9.	Loudspeaker Ls-7	1	NA	
10.	Reel RL-29 4	4	4	IV/1365/E&S of 27/8/6
11.	" "-28	2	2	--do--
12.	Fuse 30 A	20	NA	
13.	Fuse 20 A	10	10	IV/1365/E&S of 27/8/6
14.	Fuse 10 A	20	20	--do--
15.	Fuse 5 A	10	10	--do--
16.	Battery Dry BA-317	192	192	--do--
17.	" " BA-279	100	100	--do--
18.	" " BA-270	300	300	IV/1366/E&Sof 27/8/6
19.	" " BA-30	100	100	--do--
20.	Tube 1 R 5	10	10	--do--
21.	Tube 1 S 5	10	10	--do--
22.	Tube 3 Q 4	10	10	--do--
23.	Tube 3 A 4	10	10	IV/1366/E&Sof 27/8/6
24.	Tube 2 E 22	10	10	--do--
25.	Tube 2 G 21	10	10	--do--
26.	Tube 3 B 4	10	10	--do--
27.	Tube 5672	20	20	--do--
28.	Tube 5676	20	20	--do--
29.	Tube 5678	20	20	--do--

Contd---2/

30.	Battery Dry BA-1293	50	50	IV/1366/E&S of 27/8/62
31.	Pliers	4	4	--do--
32.	Screwdriver	2	2	--do--
33.	Tourches Hand	8	8	--do--
34.	Jeep Willy CJ-5	5	5	
35.	Trailor 1/4 Ton	5	5	
36.	Tents 160 Lbs	40	40	
37.	Tents Marquee	1	1	
38	Herican Lamp	50	50	
39.	Badges Arm U/N	1650	1650	IV/6360/GS&C of 23/8/62
40.	Badges Cap U/N	550	550	--do--
41.	Berets Blue	550	550	--do--
42.	Cap Field Blue	550	550	--do--
43.	Shirt Cotton OG	1100	550	--do--
44.	Trousers Fd OG	1100	NIL	--do--
45.	Towel Hand	1100	1100	--do--
46.	Pillows	550	550	IV/6361/GS&C of 23/8/62
47.	Sheets Bed	2200	~~125,527~~ 652 Hosp	--do--
48.	Slip Pillow	1100	1100	--do--
49	Net Mosquito	550	139	--do--
50.	Camp Cots	100	NA	
51.	Camp Cots Repairable	500	-	
52.	Blankets	1100	-	

Bm
19/9

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

14 September 1962

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Tour Notes Kamina dated 11 September 1962

1. Reference is made to items 3 and 8 of your recent tour notes on Kamina Air Base.

2. On item 3, please find attached report on the subject from the Chief of Air Transport.

3. Regarding item 8, the matter has been discussed with the Chief Administrative Officer. Since we agreed to a cut-back of $4.00 per day in food allowance for the headquarters officers, the same amount will be paid to the air detachment. The Chief Administrative Officer agreed to continue to pay this amount.

(JOHN RYG) Major-General
Air Commander

CFF File

13 Sep 62

To : Air Commander

From : Chief Air Transport Officer

Subject : SE CFF Flight to Kamina on 29 August 1962

Ref. : Hqs Sector Kamina Ops 048 30 August;
Chief Air Transport AO 9139 16 May;
Transair letter 3 September;
Duty Air Ops memo 3 September;

1. On receipt of the above noted signal from Kamina, an investigation was carried out by the Chief Air Transport Officer to determine the reasons for SE CFF's return to Kamina on 29 August without cargo. CFF had been placed on detached duty at Kamina Air Base to carry out any special recce missions as required by the Army Commander and in addition, a stand-by search and rescue role for the fighter squadrons.

2. It would appear from the evidence on hand that on 25 August CFF was ordered by Col Hansson/Col Floden of Kamina Air Base to return to Leo where Transair would complete an engine change. CFF departed Kamina and arrived Leo late in the evening of 25 August without any information reaching the Chief Air Transport Officer or the duty operations controller on shift. Additionally, Transair was not aware that CFF was proceeding to Leo on that date. On Monday, 27 August, Mr.Larsen of Transair informed the Chief Air Transport Officer that the aircraft was undergoing an engine change and that he expected the aircraft to be ready for air tests on Tuesday, 28 August. He further advised that if the aircraft was found serviceable on the air test, it would be ready for a return trip to Kamina the following morning, 29 August. At 0730 hours on 28 August, Mr.Larsen telephoned the duty Air Operations Officer and advised him that CFF had been ordered to return to Kamina and would be

...../2

departing within the hour. At the same time, Mr.Larsen asked if any cargo was available for Kamina and the duty Air Operations Officer asked him to stand by and that he would check with the Chief Movement Control at ONUC Headquarters. Mr.Larsen stated that he would contact Movement Control and see if there was cargo for Kamina. Mr.Larsen telephoned the Movement Control Section at N'djili Air Base to determine if a load was available for Kamina. Unfortunately, the Movement Control Section at N'djili load aircraft with cargo presented to them by the Chief Movement Control Officer. Therefore, they are not aware of the supplies and materials for Kamina Air Base which are located in storage warehouses in Leo. When Mr.Larsen received a negative reply from Movement Control N'djili, he immediately despatched CFF to Kamina.

3. The attached correspondence from Mr.Larsen and the Air Operations Officer fully outline the sequence of events as I have described above. From the above, the following facts have been determined :

a. It is quite obvious from this information that SE CFF flew from Kamina to Leo and returned on the instructions of Col Hansson/Col Floden, who have neglected previous Air Division's instructions regarding utilisation of SE CFF in Air Ops A09139 of 16 May.

b. Mr. Larsen of Transair erred in not abiding by normal channels in obtaining cargo for shipment to ONUC air bases. By directly contacting Movement Control N'djili, he received a truthful reply from the personnel on duty that no cargo was available for Kamina in the Movement Control Section. Since Mr. Larsen also believed that SE CFF was under contract to the Swedish Air Force, he acted on the unauthorised orders from Kamina Air Base and sent the aircraft to Kamina empty.

...../3

c. Both the Chief Air Transport Officer and the Movement Control were aware that supplies were in warehouses in Leo for Kamina. Therefore, if the duty Air Operations officer had contacted either of the above individuals as he originally planned, he would have been advised that a full load could have been made available for CFF's trip to Kamina. However, Mr. Larsen's decision to personally inquire for cargo is where the error has been made.

4. In this particular case, the responsibility for SE-CFF's return to Kamina without cargo can be placed on both Transair, Mr. Larsen and Col Hansson/Col Floden of Kamina. At no time during this incident were regulations and instructions regarding the utilization of ONUC transport aircraft considered. In addition Kamina Air Operations failed to advise Air Ops Leo of the proposed departure of SE CFF nor did any messages pass through Air Operations regarding the above orders for SE-CFF.

5. Unations in NY have advised that SE-CFF is under contract to ONUC and not the Swedish Air Force. In this regard some discrepancies exist as neither Transair or the Swedish Squadron have received notification of a new contract from the Swedish authorities. In the intermin Transair have been notified by the Chief Air Transportation and in the future SE-CFF will not be assigned missions without approval of this office.

(J.C. McCARTHY) WLC
Chief Air Trans Ops

N

N 1962 AUG 30 PM 2:12
O.N.U.C.

1400

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UC100

RUC93---022

SS 4UC90 4UC75 ZBB3

DE 4UC93 14/30

39008

FM HQ SECTORUV KAM

TO COS HQ ONUC LEO

INFO MOV CONTROL LEO

AIR OPS LEO

COS HQ KAT AREA ELI

BT

UNCLAS 300745Z AUG MIL OPS 048. CFF ARRIVED KAMINA 291134Z FM LEO WITHOUT CARGO. AS WE KNOW THAT CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF GOODS DISTINATED TO KAMINA ARE STORED IN LEO WE ARE SURPRISED AT THIS EMPTY FLIGHT. WE CONSEQUENTLY REQUEST AN INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER

BT

CFN300745Z MIL OPS 048/291134Z

30/0850Z AUG 4UC93

W/C

3

5 13

NNNN

Transair

W/C J.C. McCARTHY

Air Operations
UN Headquarters
Loepoldville

Leopoldville, September 3,62.

Dear Sir,

Regarding our aircraft SE-CFF on contract to Swedish F22 Squadron at Kamina

Reference is made to telephone conversation between yourself and our Mr Larsen in which you asked what happened when above-mentioned aircraft left Leo for Kamina on Tuesday August 28. This aircraft is hired by the Swedish airforce and consequently under order of colonel Hansson/colonel Floden. It was on their instruction the aircraft left Kamina for Leo and back to Kamina.

However, in this particular case the aircraft was positioned to Leo in order to change the right engine, a work which undertook three days. We were not advised in advance about the departure from Kamina and consequently we here in Leo were not in the position to offer any load for U.N. Whilst the aircraft was on ground in Leo Air Operations were informed every day about the position and they were also verbally told that the aircraft was due to go back on Tuesday last.

On Tuesday morning we were advised from Kamina that Colonel Hansson wanted the aircraft back as soon as possible in order to make a flight from Kamina to Goma. We then immediately called Air Operations H.Q. and Movement Control, N'Djili, asking whether some load was available for Kamina. From both parties concerned we received a negative reply and the aircraft took off empty from Leo to Kamina. We are fully aware of the fact that the aircraft was rushed out of Leo and due to the time limit it must have been impossible to take any load unless it was ready at the airport.

Hoping thet the above clearifies any problems in this matter we remain, Dear Sir,

Yours sincerely,

SIGNED: S LARSEN CHIEF ADM OFF TRANSAIR SWEDEN AB

3rd September, 1962.

To : W/C J.C. McCARTHY, Chief Air Transport Operations

From : Capt. J. Gjerdrum, Duty Ops Officer, 29 Aug 62.

Subject : CONCERNING TRANSAIR CFF TO KAMINA ON 29 AUG 62.

At approximately 0730 hrs on 29 Aug 62 the Transair, MR. Larsen informed me that CFF was going to Kamina in 30 minutes to one hour. He asked if we had any load to Kamina and I answered just stand-by and I will check with MC." Mr.Larsen then replied that he could do it for me and I said O.K.

Since I could not find the CFF on my flight log for that date, I asked him if this was a flight outside normal UN flights. The reply was that this aircraft was to stay with the Swedish Units at Kamina.

Signed/-

(J. GJERDRUM) CAPT.
DUTY AIR OPS OFFICER.

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY

S V C Service		F F F F F Routine		S S S S S Priority		PRIORITE NATIONS	

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limit d.

CODE

N R

Address(es) FROM: AIR COMMANDER ONUC

TO: SWEDISH FIGHTER SQN KAMINA

INFO: KATANGA AREA HQ ELISABETHVILLE

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

A09139 16 MAY. ONUC AIR TRANSPORT OPS HAVE QUIRED UTILIZATION OF AIRCRAFT SE-CFC WITH FIELD SERV NEW YORK. FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE OF FIELD SERV REPLY. OUR 2458 GAVE NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION SE-CFF FOR SE-CFC. FORMER THEREFORE CAME UNDER TERMS OUR CONTRACT WITH TRANSAIR AND ANY FLIGHTS NOT AUTHORIZED BY YOU SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE SUBSTITUTION MADE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CHARGED AGAINST OUR CONTRACT 111/60. QUESTION OF WHETHER REIMBURSEMENT IS TO BE MADE TO SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FOR THIS AIRCRAFT WHILE FLYING IN SUPPORT OF FIGHTERS NOT YET SETTLED. MEANWHILE, SHOULD BE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THAT AIRCRAFT NOW UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE USED FOR LEAVE FLIGHTS OR ANY OTHER UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY YOU. UNQUOTE IN VIEW OF ABOVE THE USE OF THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE CONFIRMED TO MISSIONS DETAILED BY THIS HQS THRU AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

Signed: JCMcCarthy W/C
Chief Air Trans Off
16 May 1962.

cc - CAO

2500 x 200 — Imp. Plateau 11267

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :
Authorized :
Date :

Kamina Bgn

Bm 16/9

12 September 1962

To: Force Commander
Deputy Force Commander
Chief Administrative Officer
Air Commander
All Heads of Branches

From: Chief of Staff

Subject: TOUR NOTES - VISIT OF COS TO KAMINA 7 SEPTEMBER 1962

..... The above-mentioned tour notes are attached hereto for your information and necessary action.

Brigadier
Chief of Staff
(J. GUHA)

S E C R E T

12 September 1962

TOUR NOTES - VISIT OF CHIEF OF STAFF TO KAMINA 7 SEPT 62

Ser No.	Item	Action	Info
1.	The revised Command and Control setup of Sector 'A including MANONO, is to be intimated.	Mil Ops	Air Comdr Chief Mil Info
2.	The Air Base Comdr at EVILLE has stated that all other air detachments in the Congo are still in receipt of food allowances. If so it is recommended that the air detachment at EVILLE continue to draw this allowance. Alternatively suitable arrangements can be made for café service at the airport to cater for such personnel. An early decision is requested.	Air Comdr Chief- Mil Pers	CAO
3.	PX supplies at EVILLE, particularly cigarettes, beer and soft drinks, continue to be in short supply. If arrangements cannot be made to supply these from LEO, the possibility of obtaining stocks in Rhodesia and flying them to EVILLE should be considered.	CAO Air Comdr CLO	Chief Mil Pers
4.	Cigarettes, beer and soft drinks are also in short supply in KAMINA. There are approximately 1800 military personnel at the base and one beer per day per man is a safe planning figure. The arrival of the Congolese contingent has added to the problem.	CAO CLO Air Comdr	
5.	Under existing instructions EVILLE is to have a GS reserve of one month. So far no GS reserve is available and even 15 days maintenance stock has also been depleted. Action should be taken to arrange for at least 15 days maintenance stock and 15 days reserve. Recent experience has proved that surface means of communication from Rhodesia are not dependable. Hence there is no alternative but to resort to air supply.	CAO CLO Air Comdr	

S E C R E T

Cont'd/...

TOUR NOTES - Visit of COS to KAMINA 7 Sept 62 (Cont'd)

Ser No:	Item	Action	Info
6.	The lack of transport at MANONO especially with the commitment at PIANA, has made the position extremely difficult. As adequate vehicles are not available, a helicopter should be made available twice a week to airlift supplies for the company in MANONO. In addition 6 3-ton vehicles must be moved down from AVILLE to MANONO. If arrangements for maintenance of the company cannot be made, the strength at PIANA will have to be reduced.	Air Comdr CLO	Chief Mil Ops
7.	The Ghana Bn at KAMINA is experiencing great difficulty with its mail. Since the arrival of the Bn on 7 Aug 62, only two deliveries of mail from home have been received.	Nigerian L O.	
8.	2nd Bn ANC KAMINA has no Medical Officer. Arrangements should be made for adequate medical cover for this Bn.	Chief Med Officer	
9.	In accordance with directions issued from this HQ, all leave outside the Congo was stopped, except in special cases. Force Routine Order Serial No.40 of 15 Dec 60 authorises national Contingent Commanders to approve leave for members of their contingents. As the situation has eased since then, it is recommended that the order to stop leave be relaxed.	Chief Mil Pers	Mil Info

.....

ROUTING SLIP

TO: DA to the Force Commander.

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

References attached.
Please refer to
Letter No. 4404/1-Ord
dd 17 September 62
addressed to you by
the Chief Ordnance
Officer.

M.

DATE	FROM
18/1/62.	CLO

ROUTING SLIP

TO MA.

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
✓	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

DATE	FROM
17 Sept. 62	FC. KG. Lt-Gen.

ROUTING SLIP

TO

C L O

	APPROVAL	X	NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE	X	FOR ACTION

FC most anxious to know earliest what action has been taken quote "on those urgent and serious matters" unquote

DATE 4/9

FROM Om MA.

Force COMMANDER 4404/1 - OK
Leo 11 September 1962. 19/9

Tour Notes Pertaining to Visit of Chief Ordnance Officer to Kamina Base

1. The Chief Ordnance Officer visited the 2nd Royal Ghanaian Regiment, the 16 Swedish Battalion, the Swedish Engineer Battalion and the special ANC Battalion. During this visit he was accompanied by the Logistics Officer, Katanga Area and the Logistics Officer, Kamina Base. The following ordnance and other logistical points were brought up by the various units.

2. 2nd. RGR. The CO brought to the notice of the Chief Ordnance Officer the outstanding demands Nos. 2GR/QM/10 dated 7 August and 2GR/QM/24 dated 25 August in respect of cleaning material which is urgently required by the unit. He also brought up the question of the supply of MT spare parts on account of which a number of vehicles were off-road. The Chief Ordnance Officer explained in detail the general situation and difficulties regarding the procurement of MT spares. He however pointed out the best efforts are being put in to improve upon the situation.

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

3. Mail. The Ghana Battalion is having trouble with receipt of their private mail in that the CO pointed out that since their arrival in Kamina Base on 7 August they have received only two deliveries. The CO requested that the problem should be looked into and necessary action should be taken to ensure the timely receipt of mails by them at Kamina Base. In this respect he also suggested that a junior officer from his Battalion may be attached to HQ ONUC to take care of the unit's mail and other logistical problems. This, he said, would be of great assistance as they did not have any permanent Liaison Officer at ONUC HQ.

(For action by Logistics Branch)

4. Clothing. The Ghana Battalion also brought up the urgent requirement in respect of trousers and scarves. The Chief Ordnance Officer said that the necessary cloth has been received and the manufacture of scarves has been arranged by the Procurement Branch. Consequently the dues out will be cleared very shortly.

5. As regards the supply of trousers, the Chief Ordnance Officer intimated that supply of trousers is expected sometime in the beginning of November.

Swedish Engineer Battalion

Vehicle holding - Swedish Engineer Battalion

6. In view of the fact that the Swedish Engineer Battalion is holding a lot of surpluses in various types of vehicles, the COO requested the Logistics Officer, Swedish Engineer Bn

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to put up their proposal regarding the actual authorized scale for the working of their unit. This would enable the Ordnance to ascertain the total number of surplus vehicles held by this unit and effect transfers to make up the deficiencies of other units. The CO Engineer Bn agreed to do so.

(For action by Engineer Bn and Ordnance Branch)

Lawn Mowers.

7. Referring to the requirement of 12 lawn mowers and 3 rotary grass lawn mowers, the Chief Ordnance Officer requested the CO to furnish the necessary details regarding the types of mowers required, i.e. self-propelled or drawn by tractor, etc., and also to give the details of the total area for which these machines were required. The CO Engineer Bn agreed to furnish these necessary details. The COO also pointed out that to economize, the requirements should be considered on the basis of a central pool system.

Spare Parts for Generators and Tools

8. The question of furnishing the exact details with specifications, etc. in respect of spares required for generators and other tools was discussed at length by Mr. Elms, the Chief Procurement Officer, U.N., with the Technical Officer of the Engineer Bn. After some discussion it was decided to return these requisitions to the Engineer Bn for furnishing the required details to enable the Procurement Branch to go ahead with the purchase of these items.

(For action by Ordnance Branch, Engineer Bn)
(Info Procurement Branch)

Ordnance Stores

9. The Engineer Bn is holding all sorts of ordnance stores and presumably surplus to their requirements. The COO decided to have a list prepared of all these items to enable him to take suitable action for their disposal. The OC Ordnance Amn Platoon presently located at Kamina Base will give all possible assistance to the Engineer Bn in this respect.

(For action by Engineer Bn and OC Ordnance Amn Pl)

16 Swedish Battalion

10. There were no major points pertaining to any logistics aspect. There were, however, few minor points which were settled on the spot.

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Special ANC Battalion

11. A special conference was held with the CO of the 2nd ANC Bn which was also attended by the Deputy Chief of Military Information, Major Garneau. A list of all requirements pertaining to MT, stationeries, clothing, etc. was presented by the CO of the Bn. As regards the issue of vehicles, in view of the excessive demands put in by the unit the Chief Ordnance Officer explained in detail the procedure followed for laying down the authorizations for various units at HQ ONUC. He further added that on finalization of this authorization the vehicles would be issued to make up their deficiencies subject to the availability of stocks. In order to meet their immediate requirements regarding storing of water and cooking stoves, the Chief Ordnance Officer promised to look into the whole matter at ONUC HQ and issue the maximum number of water trailers and other containers for storing water, subject to the availability of stock. He also pointed out the non-availability of gas stoves for cooking and possibility of issue of a limited number of gas-rings. He further proposed that until the necessary arrangements are made to provide them with the total requirement of gas stoves they should resort to open fire cooking. The necessary provision for firewood will be made by the Supply and Transport Branch of HQ ONUC. The requirements were submitted in French which have been passed on to the Branch concerned for translation and distribution to the Branches concerned.

(For action by Ordnance, Ops and Supply and Transport Branches)

PX Stores

12. It was pointed out that beer, cigarettes and soft drinks continued to be in short supply at Kamina Base. At the present the total strength of military personnel has gone up to 1800 which is excluding the ANC Bn and it was suggested that a fair share of the above-mentioned items should be supplied regularly from Leo.

(For action by Chief PX Officer)

Proofing of S.A.A.

13. The firing range in existence at Kamina Base is quite suitable for proofing of the S.A.A. This job can be taken on by the Ord Amn Pl (Section) located at Kamina Base subject to Ops Branch approval.

(For action by Ops Branch and Ordnance Branch)

14. In addition to the above-mentioned points pertaining to Kamina Base, the Logistics Officer, Katanga Area, handed over to the Chief Ordnance Officer a list of points pertaining to logistics in respect of Elisabethville and Manono, which are attached herewith, for action by the various Branches concerned.

Lt Col
Chief Ordnance Officer.
(MOHAMMAD YAQUB)

ELISABETHVILLE

1. Local Purchase Spare Parts

Our letter 4654 EME dated 22 August 62 refers. SOP 5 authorizes local purchase of spare parts. Adm Order 25 states no local purchase of spare parts is permitted. Request clarification.

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

2. Requirement for Tyres

Our message Logs-1178 dated 28 August 62 refers. There are a number of vehicles of Irish Bn off the road due to tyre condition. It is understood the BOD at Leo has recently received a shipment. Request information as to date of shipment and number of tyres forwarded.

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

3. Food Allowance for Air Base

Our message Logs-1188 dated 28 August 62 refers. Air Base Commander here states other air detachments in the Congo are still in receipt of food allowance (380 Fr. daily). If so, recommend Elisabethville air detachment continue with the allowance; alternately arrangements can be made for cafeteria service at airport to cater to unit personnel.

(For action by Chief of Military Personnel)

4. PX Supplies

Our letter 30028/PA/LOGS dated 28 August 62 refers. Beer, cigarettes and soft drinks continue to be in short supply here. This could become a serious problem and stocks should be built up at once with supplies being forwarded regularly.

(For action by Chief PX Officer)

5. MT Spare parts

Lack of spare parts has seriously hampered unit operational roles. BOD should review all demands from Elisabethville and process immediately. If parts are not available, request authority to procure locally by Chief Procurement Officer. A number of parts are of minor cost, but if obtained, would put the vehicle back on the road.

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

6. Supplies

B. Request that a reserve of at least 15 days maintenance stock be held in ONUC Depot here. This stock would assure resupply for all Sectors in Katanga Area.

(For action by Supply and Transport)

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MANONO

7. Accommodation

Accommodation is at a premium at this station. Urgent indent is being submitted to BOD at Leopoldville for bedding and 10 large tents to alleviate the situation. Request immediate shipment of these stores.

(For action by Chief Accommodation Officer)

8. Helicopter

Our message Logs- 1161 dated 22 August 62 refers. The transport situation is desperate here due to lack of spare parts and driver inexperience. Some EME assistance is now on the station and this will improve the situation.

The resupply of PIANA by vehicles is not satisfactory and the use of a helicopter twice per week would be of great benefit in the resupply. Failing this, GOC is attempting to cut daily delivery down to not more than 3 times per week and we have requested 'A' Sector to move two large refrigerators to PIANA. Also are recommending reduction in strength at PIANA.

9. Bedding and Personal Clothing

This unit is isolated with no source of supply. It is essential that demands from the Ethiopian Bn be given priority attention. Outstanding demands dated 1 June 62 are:

(a) DEMAND NO. 01/62

Cots Folding	716
Blankets	1432
Bed Sheets	1293

(b) DEMAND NO. 02/62

Office Equipment and Mess Furniture

(c) DEMAND NO. 05/62

Personal clothing (Urgent)

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

ALBERTVILLE

10. Tyres and MT Spare Parts

This station also has an urgent requirements for spare parts. BOD should review all demands for this sector and forward shipment soonest.

(For action by Ordnance Branch)

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

Bm 13/9

SECRET

MAJ GEN D PREM CHAND
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING

DO NO 3304/1/Mil Ops
HQ KATANGA AREA (ONUC)
ELISABETHVILLE

8 September 62

My dear General,

I am enclosing herewith a copy of notes taken at my meeting with Gen MOBUTU on Wednesday, 5 September. I am sure you will be glad to note that conditions there are now better as a result of improved relations and liaison between the U.N. and ANC authorities. Paras 7 and 10 of the notes are of particular interest.

May I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to you for your visit to KAMINA yesterday, as a result of which quite a few major problems will now be settled expeditiously. I would also like to thank you for your very kind words in connection with the functioning of Sector 'C', during your address to the Officers there. These will, I am sure, be most encouraging for All Ranks of the Sector, as they have been working hard to achieve good results in spite of quite a few problems.

I am awaiting such instructions as you may wish to send us in connection with the employment and training of the Congolese Battalion, further to the discussions we had with the Sector Commander yesterday. I would recommend that we give the Battalion adequate time to settle down in their new location and permit the Sector Commander to assess their capabilities for the next three weeks or so, as a result of which he can submit a report as on 1 October, prior to his handing over the Sector when he leaves for Sweden next month. Alternatively, I can issue the instructions from here, should you agree.

You had given us an indication of your revised leave policy yesterday and I am issuing instructions restricting leave to special cases until your revised directions are received. In the meantime the Swedish Battalion have requested for leave to small parties within the Congo and I have sent a signal today recommending your approval, as a special case, as they are to return Home shortly.

With my kindest regards and very best wishes,

Yours Sincerely
Prem

Lt Gen Kebbede Guebre
Force Commander
ONUC Headquarters
LEOPOLDVILLE

SECRET

NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN MAJ GEN D PREM CHAND - GOC KATANGA AREA AND LT GEN MOBUTU - C-in-C OF THE ANC IN THE CONGO - AT 1735 HRS ON WEDNESDAY, 5 SEPTEMBER

1 The following were present from UN:-

(a) Maj Gen D PREM CHAND, GOC KATANGA Area
(b) Lt Col KHALID, Commander Sector 'A'
(c) Mr GHALEB, Chief UN Civil Rep., ONUC A'VILLE
(d) Maj Comdt P NEIL, Chief Mil Info Katanga Area
(e) Capt PS VERMA, COS Sector 'A'.

2 The following ANC Officers were present:-

(a) Gen MOBUTU, C-in-C ANC
(b) Col MASIALA, Commander ANC troops NORTH KATANGA
(c) Six ANC Officers

3 The meeting was opened by Gen MOBUTU with a brief statement expressing his appreciation of the reception accorded to him at BUKAVU by the UN. Gen MOBUTU asked if the UN had any suggestions or points for discussion. The GOC stated that during his last visit to A'VILLE certain problems were discussed with Col MASIALA and the latter had since then been cooperating further with the UN and most of the problems appear to have been sorted out. Gen MOBUTU agreed that all previous problems had been resolved well.

4 The GOC informed Gen MOBUTU that ALBERTVILLE would now be under the MALAYAN Brigade Commander at BUKAVU and working directly under LEOPOLDVILLE. As the Congolese authorities had been requesting for a similar arrangement, he was sure that this would lead to even closer liaison at all levels.

5 The GOC then stated that while at KAMINA that morning he had inspected the 2nd Bn of the ANC and the men were in good spirits and working hard to settle down in their new location. At this Gen MOBUTU remarked that the troops had been given all instructions and orders to work well with the UN and maintain a good atmosphere. The GOC informed Gen MOBUTU that the troops had no problems.

6 Gen MOBUTU expressed his optimism about TSHOMBE's agreement but said he had his doubts about the Katangese view in their reply that all foreign elements should leave Katanga. He also wanted to know the extent to which he could rely upon UN troops as they were widespread all over KATANGA with a good network of security and communication system.

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SECRET

7 The GOC stated that there might well be quite a few difficulties with regard to implementing the plan, but that he was optimistic of the outcome. The UN plan was integration of the Katangese armed forces with the Congolese armed forces and all efforts would be made towards that end. Gen MOBUTU also agreed with the GOC on this point and said that integration was the only answer. He added that problems were likely to be created by the politicians, but he was confident that the Katangese Gendarmerie would not find it difficult to implement integration.

8 Gen MOBUTU made the complaint that his car was stopped by UN troops at a check post, in spite of Col MASIALA informing them that the C-in-C of ANC was travelling in that car. The GOC expressed his deep regret at the incident and said that the Sector Commander would be directed to look into the matter, to see who was responsible and to issue instructions towards avoiding any such inconveniences in the future.

9 Col MASIALA then suggested that this UN check post is at present located between the ANC Camp and the town and all ANC troops have to pass through it. If UN wishes to guard BUKAVU road, the check post can be shifted to the other side of ANC Camp. The GOC stated that this was a problem which Col MASIALA could discuss with the Sector Commander and he hoped that a suitable solution would be found.

10 Gen MOBUTU expressed his desire that when he is on tour in NORTH KATANGA next, he would be able to pass through KAMINA. He added that he would mention this desire of his at LEOPOLDVILLE.

11 The meeting ended at 1820 hrs B, having commenced at 1735 hrs.

13/9

MESSAGE FORM

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 4133/2/LOGS

FROM: ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

TO : HQ SECTOR 'C' KAMINA

INFO: HQ KATANGA AREA ELIZABETHVILLE
INDIAN INDEPENDENT BRIGADE GROUP ELIZABETHVILLE
BASE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER KAMINA BASE
ONUC BASE SUPPLY DEPOT LEOPOLDVILLE
ONUC SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE

SECRET

LOGS 1147

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPLY DETACHMENT AT KAMINA.

FIRSTLY. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A SUPPLY TRANSIT DETACHMENT AT KAMINA BY 20 SEP 62. FOR THIS PURPOSE ONE JCO AND TEN OR WILL MOVE FROM SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE TO KAMINA. ORDERS FOR IMMEDIATE MOVE FOR ONE JCO AND TWO NCOS HOWEVER HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED VIDE OUR SIGNAL NO ST 1244 OF 10 SEP 62. REMAINDER PERSONNEL WILL BE IN POSITION BY 20 SEP 62.

SECONDLY. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SUPPLY DETACHMENT WILL BE AS FOLLOWS.

ALFA. RECEIVE FRESH AND DRY SUPPLIES FROM OUTSTATIONS AND DISTRIBUTE TO UNITS ACCORDING TO THEIR ENTITLEMENTS AT THE AIR FIELD AS INTIMATED BY OC SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE.

BRAVO. RENDER TECHNICAL ADVICE TO UNITS LOCATED IN KAMINA.

CHARLIE. DEAL WITH PROBLEMS OF LOCAL PROCUREMENT IF ANY.

..2..

FC
13/9

DELTA. ANY OTHER PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH SUPPLY OF RATIONS AND POL TO UNITS.

THIRDLY. THIS SUPPLY DETACHMENT WILL NOT HOLD ANY RESERVE STOCKS OF RATIONS AND POL. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF DEMANDING RATIONS INCLUDING POL AND FRESH ON SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE/ PROCUREMENT OFFICER BY UNITS WILL CONTINUE.

FOURTHLY. ISSUES OF POL WILL CONTINUE AS PER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

FIFTHLY. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE.

ALFA. BUILT UP OR TENTED ACCOMMODATION FOR PERSONNEL AND STORES AT THE AIR FIELD AS THE PERSONNEL OF THIS SUPPLY DETACHMENT WILL BE ONLY OPERATING FROM THERE.

BRAVO. ADEQUATE TRANSPORT FOR FOLLOWING.

ONE. DEPOT DUTIES.

TWO. OC DETACHMENT FOR HIS NORMAL FUNCTION AND LIAISON WITH UNITS.

CHARLIE. SUFFICIENT LABOUR AS AND WHEN REQUIRED.

DELTA. ANCILLARY FACILITIES.

SIXTHLY. INDIAN INDEPENDENT BRIGADE GROUP ONLY. REFERENCE CONVERSATION COMMANDER/SSTO OF 9 SEP 62. REQUEST APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM YOUR COMPOSITE PLATOON TO ASSIST SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE.

SEVENTHLY. ONUC BASE SUPPLY DEPOT LEOPOLDVILLE ONLY. ENSURE SUFFICIENT STATIONERY TOGETHER WITH OFFICE AND DEPOT EQUIPMENT AND VARIOUS RATION SCALES ACCOMPANY THE DETACHMENT.

EIGHTHLY. ONUC SUPPLY DEPOT ELIZABETHVILLE ONLY.

ALFA. DETACHMENT WILL CARRY 15 DAYS DRY RATIONS.

BRAVO. ARRANGE MOVE IN CONSULTATION WITH KATANGA AREA AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ELIZABETHVILLE.

CHARLIE. UNITS AT KAMINA WILL BE DEPENDENT ON YOU AS HITHERTO. ITEMS NOT AVAILABLE WITH YOU WILL BE SUPPLIED FROM LEOPOLDVILLE/ALBERTVILLE DIRECT TO KAMINA IN BULK ON DEMAND FROM YOU. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER INTIMATE BREAKDOWN BY UNITS TO SUPPLY DETACHMENT AT KAMINA IN ADVANCE. ENDS

c.c.

MA to Force Commander
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief of Military Operations
Chief of Military Information
Senior Supply and Transport Officer
Chief of Military Personnel
Chief Medical Officer
Chief Ordnance Officer
Senior EME Officer
Chief Procurement Officer

Colonel
Chief Logistics Officer
12 Sep 62

SECRET 11 September 1962

TOUR NOTES OF THE FORCE COMMANDER TO KAMINA - 7 SEPTEMBER 1962

S. No.	Item	Action	Info
1	A request has been made both by the Base Commander and the Base Administrative Officer to provide additional buses for Kamina to conserve the use of individual vehicles Four minibuses have been requested, but the Base Administrator has said that he will review the situation of the existing buses and will forward his firm demand to the Chief Administrative Officer in due course	CAO	COS CLO
2	The situation regarding POL at Kamina is far below the reserve to be maintained at all times. In addition, with the new Congolese Contingent at Kamina, the POL authorised is considered to be inadequate. The Base Commander is to indicate his revised requirements especially in view of additional commitments of patrolling	Base Commander, Kamina	COS CLO
3	The Base Commander indicated that the Swedish Fighter Sqn. C-46 CFF on completion of its maintenance at LEO returned empty to Kamina. The crew of the aircraft prior to departure reported to Movement Control, N'Djili, for any load that was to be carried to Kamina. It is reported that Movement Control, N'Djili, intimated the crew of the aircraft that no load for Kamina was outstanding. Necessary investigation is to be carried out and a report submitted to the Force Commander	CLO	COS Air Commander Chief Movement Control Officer
4	The Congolese Contingent at Kamina has a strength of approximately 620 personnel. No further reinforcements are to be sent until otherwise ordered by the Force Commander	ANC L.O. Please inform Gen.Mobutu of this position.	COS CMP CLO

S.No.	Item	Action	Info
5	Storage of ammunition at Elisabethville is unsatisfactory. Action should be taken to construct shelters for this ammunition. Commander, Sector 'B', to contact the local Administrative Officer at Elisabethville to progress this case.	GOC, Katanga Area. Commander, Sector 'B'	COS CLO Chief Ord.Officer
6	No medical cover can be provided to the Congolese Contingent at Kamina from local resources. Arrangements to be made by the Chief Medical Officer to provide a Regimental Medical Officer to this Contingent. A representative from the Medical Branch from HQ ONUC, Leo, should also visit this Contingent.	CMO ADMS, Katanga Area	GOC, Katanga Area. COS Commander Sector 'C'
7	A certain number of Butane gas cylinders has been sent to Kamina for the Congolese Contingent but no gas stoves are available locally. Fourteen gas stoves are to be issued by this unit and a total of 28 gas cylinders.	CLO	COS Commander Sector 'C'
8	The question of food allowance for the Air Detachment at Elisabethville was raised by GOC, Katanga Area. He was of the opinion that the Air Commander should be requested to examine the position and if all Air Detachments in places other than Elisabethville are in receipt of food allowance, this allowance should continue in so far as the Air Detachment at Elisabethville is concerned.	Air Commander	CAO COS CMP
9	Of the 16 3/5 ton vehicles being brought down to Albertville from Goma/Bukavu, 6 are to be sent by rail and barge to Manono leaving a balance of 10 at Albertville to be airlifted to Elisabethville.	CLO	GOC Katanga Area COS Chief of Mil Ops

S. No.	Item	Action	Info
10	As 19 3-ton vehicles belonging to the Indian Independent Bde Group have been handed over to the Congolese Contingent and only 10 are now being sent to Elisabethville, the deficiency of 9 3/5-ton vehicles is to be made up either from surplus vehicles at Stanleyville or Luluabourg.	CLO	Commander Sector 'B' COS Chief of Mil Ops
11	As no second-line transport is available at Elisabethville, arrangements should be made to repair at least one Platoon worth of second line transport from surplus vehicles available at Luluabourg/ Stanleyville for eventual airlifting to Elisabethville.	CLO	GOC, Katanga Area COS Chief of Mil Ops Air Commander

ROUTING SLIP

TO MA KFC

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

Please retain or destroy, as desired.

JL
12/9

DATE

FROM

ROUTING SLIP

TO Brig J. Guha

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

The attached draft has been typed on a stencil and circulated to individuals concerned, as per your instructions.

DATE 12/9/62 FROM Anne Garabedian

ROUTING SLIP

TO

Alice

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

A stencil of att — for circulation to Branches concerned

DATE 10/9

FROM Om MA

ROUTING SLIP

TO Brig. Guha, C.O.S.

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE	✓	FOR ACTION

DATE 10 Sept. 62

FROM FC. KG. Hq.

S.No.	Item	Action	Info
	the crew of the aircraft that no load for Kamina was outstanding. Necessary investigation is to be carried out and a report submitted to the Force Commander.		
4.	The Congolese Contingent at Kamina has a strength of approximately 620 personnel. No further reinforcements are to be sent until otherwise ordered by the Force Commander.	ANC L.O. Please inform Gen. Mobutu of this position.	COS CMP Chief of Mil. Pers. CLO
5.	Storage of ammunition at Elizabethville is unsatisfactory. Action should be taken to construct shelters for this ammunition. Commander, Sector 'B', to contact the local Administrative Officer at Elizabethville to progress this case.	GOC, Katanga Area. Commander, Sector 'B'	COS CLO Chief Ord. Officer CAO
6.	No medical cover can be provided to the Congolese Contingent at Kamina from local resources. Arrangements to be made by the Chief Medical Officer to provide a Regimental Medical Officer to this Contingent. A representative from the Medical Branch from HQ ONUC, Leo, should also visit this Contingent.	Chief Medical Officer CMO ADMS, Katanga Area	General Officer Commanding GOC, Katanga Area. COS Commander, Sector 'C' CA

SECRET

TOUR NOTES OF THE FORCE COMMANDER TO KAMINA - 7 SEPTEMBER 1962

S.No.	Item	Action	Info
1.	A request has been made both by the Base Commander and the Base Administrative Officer to provide additional buses for Kamina to conserve the use of individual vehicles. Four minibuses have been requested, but the Base Administrator has said that he will review the situation of the existing buses and will forward his firm demand to the Chief Administrative Officer in due course.	CAO Chief Administrative Officer	COS - Chief of Staff CLO Chief Logistic Officer
2.	The situation regarding POL at Kamina is far below the reserve to be maintained at all times. In addition, with the new Congolese Contingent at Kamina the POL authorized is considered to be inadequate. The Base Commander is to indicate his revised requirements especially in view of additional commitments of patrolling.	Base Commander, Kamina	COS CLO
3.	The Base Commander indicated that the Swedish Fighter Sqn. C-46 CFF on completion of its maintenance at LEO returned empty to Kamina. The crew of the aircraft prior to departure reported to Movement Control, N'Djili, for any load that was to be carried to Kamina. It is reported that the Movement Control, N'Djili, intimated	CLO	- COS - Air Commander - Chief Movement Control Office

Draft typed
PMC

SECRET

8 Sept 1962

Return
12/9

To: Force Commander

From: Chief of Staff

Sub: Tour Notes to KAMINA

A draft tour notes of your tour to KAMINA are attached for your approval.

Brig
Chief of Staff
(J GUHA)

SECRET

S.No.	Item	Action	Info
7.	A certain number of Butane gas cylinders has been sent to Kamina for the Congolese Contingent but no gas stoves are available locally. Fourteen gas stoves are to be issued to this unit and a total of 28 gas cylinders.	CLO	COS Commander, Sector 'C'
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9.	Of the 16 3/5 ton vehicles being brought down to Albertville from Goma/Bukavu, 6 are to be sent by rail and barge to Manono leaving a balance of 10 at Albertville to be airlifted to Elisabethville.	CLO	GOC, Katanga Area COS Chief of Mil Ops

S.No.	Item	Action	Info
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11.	As no second-line transport is available at Elisabethville, arrangements should be made to repair at least one Platoon worth of second-line transport from surplus vehicles available at Luluabourg/ Stanleyville for eventual airlifting to Elizabethville.	CLO	GOC, Katanga Area COS Chief of Mil Ops Air Commander

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 17 August 1962

FILE NO.:

TO: Mr. Robert Gardiner
Officer-in-Charge
ONUC, Leopoldville

THROUGH:

FROM: R.J. Bunche
Under Secretary

SUBJECT: Swedish documentary film - Visit to Congo of Major Hultén and photographer

The Swedish Mission have asked for and received authorization for Major Hultén and photographer Edlund to visit the Congo in October 1962 for the production of a documentary film on the participation of Swedish Forces in ONUC. They will arrive with the new Swedish Battalion in October 1962. They should be given the necessary facilities and transport while in the Congo and, if necessary, should be given space on the United Nations Northstar flight to Pisa at the end of their mission, which is expected to last for one month.

C O P Y

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service		FFFFF Routine		SSSSSSSS Priority		PRIORITE NATIONS	

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

NR

SECRET

Address(es)

HQ SECTOR 'C' KAMINA

18/8/62

INFO: HQ KAT AREA, EVILLE

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix &/or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

COS 57. FROM GOC FOR COL NAUCLAER.

PERMISSION ACCORDED FOR YOU TO VISIT LEO ON TEMPORARY DUTY FOR DISCUSSION WITH ONUC COS. SIGNAL COS ONUC YOUR ETA UNDER ADVICE TO HQ KAT AREA.

cc: CHIEF OF MIL OPS

CLO

MIL INFO

SWEDISH LO

C. 81471

T.O.R.

T.O.D.

BY:

Drafted by : BRIG J GUHA

Authorized : COS

Date : 18/8/62

Kamina

ROUTING SLIP

TO ~~AP~~ MA to FC

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

We are waiting reply from KAMINA. Info you when we received.

DATE	FROM
27/8	Negga

ROUTING SLIP

TO C. Mil Ops

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

FC wishes you to enquire what is the present position in regard to road blocks in the area mentioned. with special ref to whether or not NEW rd blocks have been set up

DATE 23/8 | FROM Cm 22/8

ROUTING SLIP

TO: Force Commander

	APPROVAL	✓	NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE	✓	YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

J Zuh Berg

DATE	FROM
21/8	COS

ROUTING SLIP

TO

COS

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE	✓	YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

DATE	FROM
20/8	Negga

HQ Sector C
Kamina
No 997
17 Aug 1962

Bm 27/8

To Chief Mil Ops
HQ ONUC LEO

Subject: Patrols and relations with gendarmerie, Kamina Base.

On 12 Aug a patrol consisting of 2 APCs and 1 jeep went to the roadbarrier placed there by the gendarmerie on the base boundary-road Sungu Mowga intersection. This point is some 9 miles (as the crow flies) NE of Kamina Air Port. It was found that a second roadblock had been constructed 200 yards on the gendarmerie side of the first barrier. A letter was found nailed to the first roadblock, which is quoted in extenso:

"Dear ONUC:

You are hereby told that it is strictly forbidden for us to see you pass this barrier. You have already repaired the bridge, and this is within your authority because it is in your part of our region.
You may not go longer than the bridge with your patrols. If you do before we have got a message about reconciliation from Elisabethville, it will no doubt mean war. You are entitled to come here if you get this message and in such case we might celebrate it in some way

Signed: not eligible

The roadblock was then removed and a passable gate was substitued with the following message nailed on:

"Dear Sirs we thank you for your kind letter. We are just a Police Force aimed to survey the safety of the inhabitants of the Congo. The police do not make war. Your barrier has been removed because it is disturbing the free flow of ordinary traffic. We will inform Kasengo Niembo about this.
Yours sincerely: T. Lange, Maj Chief of Staff. -

On 15 Aug another patrol again with two APCs went to the same spot and then met the gendarmes manning this outpost. The force consisted of one platoon commanded by Lt Shabanea 4 Coy, 32 Bn. Approx strength: 400 extremely cordial relations were established and future meetings arranged

HQ ONUC
20 AOUT 1962
Military Operations Branch

Bm 20/8

for Capt Hwargard

G.F.V. KLEEN CAPT
C MIL OPS, SECTOR C

A
FC
22/8

ROUTING SLIP

TO

Force Consul

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

You had asked me to send an opn off to KAmsia & make an application to determine the minimum str. required to garrison KAmsia. My B Hall's appointment is a lot. I have studied it and agree with his views - To gen n/o + decision please

DATE

FROM

J G Hale 2nd cpo

SMA/ebb

C/PER 430/8
C/FIN 530/2(MIL)

8 September 1

TO: Chief Logistics Officer

FROM: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: Kamina Mess

1. Since writing my memorandum of 8 September 1961 to you, I have learnt by signal KALEO 1286 of 7 September from the Acting Base Administrative Officer (which has been copied to you), that the Canadian Signals, Indian Signals, Austrian Medical team and Hospital Officers have all elected to continue using the existing mess facilities.

2. This makes it all the more urgent to place the operation of the mess on a proper military basis under military supervision and with several military cooks. I should be grateful if the necessary steps could be taken with the Military Personnel Branch to assign the necessary military personnel to Kamina, obtaining them in the first instance, to the extent possible, within the existing resources of ONUC.

3. I should appreciate your informing me of the arrangements made.

cc: Chief Finance Officer
Chief of Military Personnel

Encl 14/8

APPRECIATION FOR TROOPS REQUIRED TO GARRISON KAMINA BASE

AIM

1. To determine the minimum force required to garrison KAMINA Base.

FACTORS

2. Relative Strength

ANC

The ANC are approximately 1200 strong in KAMINAVILLE. They are armed with FN rifles and have a troop of armoured cars.

Own Troops

There is one Swedish Coy-strength approximately 120. They are armed with FN rifles.

The Irish Gp (HQ and two Coys) approximates 340. They are armed with FN rifles and have an organic MMG pl and Mor tp. They also have anti-tank weapons in the Coy.

There are approx 170 Congolese Police who can take over administrative guard duties at the base, thus relieving troops for combat. These duties are as follows:

Guard Duties by Police

Air Port - 1 NCO, 3 men
Officers Mess - 1 NCO, 3 men
Med Sup Hangar 1 NCO, 3 men
Water Plant - 2 NCOs, 6 men
Supply Depot - 2 NOCs, 6 men

The troops will however have to perform the following guard duties:

Guards by Tps

Airport 1 NCO, 3 men - by night only
Base Magazine, 2 NCO, 6 men
Supply Depot, 2 NCOs, 6 men - by night only

3. Deductions

(a) A composite inf group of three companies is adequate to match the ANC strength in this area.

(b) A troop of armoured cars is required to offset the balance of forces.

/.....

4. Vulnerable Points

a. Kilube - This is the electrical power station approx 36 km from Kamina. It can easily be held by a platoon but in view of its isolation and distance from the base, it is not sound to hold it with less than a Coy, supported by a Sec of MMG and a sec of mors.

b. Airfield - The size of the airfield necessitates a company for its protection.

c. Amn Dump and Supply Depot - A pl is adequate to defend this area, as there are other ancilliary units working here who can be used in a defensive role in an emergency.

d. The Base - This is so extensive that it is not physically possible to defend it without having a very large body of troops. As there are no vital installations except living accommodation, the ends of security would be met by armoured car patrols. Failing the availability of armoured cars, jeeps with LMGs mounted on them could be used. For this latter role, a Coy would be sufficient.

e. The Railway KAMINA - KABALO - If it is necessary to keep this open and trains are to be escorted, then a Company is necessary for this task. Anything less would hinder administration, rest and relief. This company would serve as the Base Commander's reserve in case of hostilities breaking out.

5. Deductions

a. The minimum requirement of troops is a composite infantry gp of three coys and a troop of armoured cars or, preferably,

b. A inf bn of four coys, including MMGs and mortars.

6. Nature of Threat

The locals and the ANC have been friendly throughout in this area, and no incidents have been reported. In view of the existing good relations, there appears to be no threat. It is therefore not necessary to garrison the base with a large number of troops. In case of an emergency, the Inf Gp with a troop of armoured cars or the Inf Bn can easily defend the airfield and the vital installations of the base till such time as reinforcements arrive from E'VILLE in 2-3 hours, or LEO within 4 to 5 hours.

7. Deductions - as for para 5.

/.....

CONCLUSION

8. It is recommended that a composite Inf Gp of three coys with one tp of armoured cars be stationed at KAMINA. If this is not possible, the alternative is to have a composite Inf Bn of four coys.

Operations Officer
(B. P. BHALLA)

No. 1001/51/NS

8 August 61

Chief Administrative Officer
Acting Chief of Staff
Messing Arrangements - Kamina Base Hospital - Medical Officers

1. The Senior Medical Staff Officer has reported that there is great dissatisfaction amongst the Medical Officers at the Kamina Base Hospital, due to lack of proper messing facilities and the refusal to pay ration allowance in lieu of such services. I note that you have already received a letter on the matter from Major Joerring on 21 July.

2. As the Force Commander intends to visit Kamina this week, I would like if you would let me know what steps are being taken to ameliorate living conditions of the Officers involved.

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

cc: Force Commander ✓
SMSO

Commander UN Force

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 601-Mov
Date 14 July 1961

To: Lists A, B, C and D

From: Chief Movement Control Officer

Sub.: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TROOPS COMING INTO KAMINA BASE

A copy of ONUC Kamina Base Administrative Circular No. 67 dated 11 July 1961 is forwarded herewith for information of all concerned.

Major
Offg. Chief Movement Control Officer
(SHAH DAD)

Dr Rennell.

O N U C

KAMINA BASE

11 July 1961

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 67

FROM: G. Caprario, Base Administrator

TO: All military staff

SUBJECT: Instructions for troops coming into Kamina Base

FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT KAMINA BASE

The following facilities are available at Kamina Base for all military personnel. Unit Commanders will bring this information to the notice of all new arrivals.

(a) MESS

The Nigerian contingent have their own messing arrangements. There is a transient military mess at the airport where transient military men may receive their food entitlement in kind. It is open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. local time. Transient military men who want to avail themselves of this service will have to show their movement order and their military identification card and sign the bill that will be presented to them.

(b) LAUNDRY

A laundry exists and is in operation in the RRR. Houseboys where provided are able to do laundry.

(c) PX

A PX is in operation at Kalunga.

(d) BARBER

The Barber is in the PX building. Hours:

Monday to Friday	0800 - 1200 hrs 1400 - 1800 hrs
Saturday	0800 - 1200 hrs.

(e) TAILOR
COBBLER : House No. 111 near PX.

(f) DINING HALL
AND CANTEEN

These exist for private soldiers in the CTB.

O N U C

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11 July 1961

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Dy Comd UNFORCE

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 601-Mov
Date 14 July 1961

To: Lists A, B, C and D

From: Chief Movement Control Officer

Sub.: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TROOPS COMING INTO KAMINA BASE

A copy of ONUC Kamina Base Administrative Circular No. 67 dated 11 July 1961 is forwarded herewith for information of all concerned.

Major
Offg. Chief Movement Control Officer
(SHAH DAD)

No. 10253/3/Ops

1 July 61

Chief Movement Control Officer
Acting Chief of Staff
Return of Nigerian Coy to Kamina

You will make arrangements for the return to Kamina within the next few days of the 136 Nigerians who came here for duty at Lovanium University. They are returning to Kamina to be available at 24 hours notice for a move back to Léopoldville when required. The Nigerian Coy will leave behind in Léo a party of one officer, Major Imo, one NCO and three men so that when the Coy returns they will be in a position to brief the Coy on their tasks quickly.

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

cc: Force Commander ✓
Deputy Force Commander
Mil Ops
Mr. Ahmed
Mr. Poujoulais
Mr. Hazou
Chief Logistics
Nigerian LO

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

25 April 1961

A: Force Commander

DE: Chief Operations Officer

OBJET: Kamina Base

With the concentration of Dogras at Kamina, Lt. Col. M. G. Hazari, CO 1 Dogra, who is senior to Lt. Col. S. S. Maitra, CO 3/1 Dogra Rifles, has been instructed to assume the appointment of Commander, Kamina Base.

Lt. Col.
S. N. Mitra

cc.: Mr. Abbas
Deputy Force Commander
DCOS

SNM/jm

Mod. 6072/A — C. 78323

Kamina Base

20 April

Gen. Sean MacEoin, Force Commander

S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

Stationing of Indian Brigade at Kamina

According to the information we have just received from Kamina the reactivation of the Base to accommodate the Indian Brigade would require the undertaking of construction works and the provision of materials and equipment as detailed in the attached statement. You will note that sufficient construction material is not available at the Base to meet the construction requirements and that some materials, estimates of which are being prepared at Kamina, will have to be procured from outside. As for water supply you will further note that we would either have to procure some pumps and tanks or lay out a new pipeline from the water purification plant to the Lumwe area.

2. There is a general scarcity of plumbing and sanitary material in Congo and I estimate that it will take at least four weeks to procure the materials and equipment by air lift from outside Congo and to deliver it at Kamina. The most difficult parts of the requirements are the 42 refrigerators and 30 3-ton vehicles. Could the vehicles be flown in C119s?

3. There is also the question of timing. Since 3,000 troops of the Indian Brigade are apparently already in Kamina we do not know whether it would be possible for them to carry on for four to six weeks until the necessary construction works are undertaken and completed and the necessary equipment provided. I am cabling for advice from the Base Administrator on this point.

cc: Mr. Mekki Abbas
Col. J.J.Quinn
Col. N.N.Madan

Additional measures to be undertaken at Kamina to accommodate the Indian Brigade.

A. Kalunga Area

1. Conversion of two villas into kitchen and ration store rooms.
2. Building of four huts with corrugated roofs for same purpose.

B. Lumwe Area

(a) At Ecole Professionnelle

Construction of:
1. 4 kitchens with corrugated roofs.
2. 16 toilet seats.
3. 70 showers.

(b) At Airport Area

Construction of:
1. four kitchens with corrugated roofs
2. 50 toilet seats
3. 75 showers

C. Ntobe Area

At School Area

Construction of:
1. 7 huts with corrugated roofs
2. 90 toilet seats
3. 70 showers

Water Supply

Purchase of some pumps and tanks or possible laying of a pipe line from the water purification plant to the Lumwe area. Exact requirements still being examined.

Other Requirements

Camp cots for 3,000 men - 2,000 immediately and 1,000 in about one month.
42 refrigerators, 8 cubic feet each.
Repair of existing cold storage facilities to meet demand for 4,000 personnel
30 3-ton vehicles immediately

. . . 2

Some stores are available at the Base for the construction works needed. Estimates of the balance of the stores required are being prepared by the Base Administrator.

Kamina Base

File

CV° 123/med

11 April 1

Chief Administrative Officer

Senior Medical Staff Officer

Vaccination domestic animals - Kamina Base

The Congolese population at Kamina Base, I understand, is mpw about 7,500. Besides these civilian inhabitants there are about 1,000 military and civilian international staff.

Recently there has been rather an increase of infectious disease cases amongst the Congolese in Kamina Base. Although the Hygiene Section of the ONUC has been working industriously, there has been an increase in the number of insects and snakes at the Base. The local Belgians in Kamina have advised that it will be helpful if cats could be kept at the Base. I understand that this was the practice before and these cats somehow or other scared the snakes away. However, in and around Kamina Base I am given to understand that there have been a few cases of rabies. During the Belgian administration this was controlled by compulsory vaccination of all dogs and cats at the base. I think the necessity of vaccinating animals in the base should be taken up once again.

As there is no civilian administration in Kamina except what is done by the ONUC, I feel the responsibility of vaccinating animals shall have to be ours. I am not aware if we have any civil veterinarian who could do this job. May I have your advice.

Colonel
(B L Kapoor)
Senior Medical Staff Officer

Copy: MA to Force Commander for information of Force Commander

* LT Col Vad, SMO, Kamina

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

10 April 1961

A: DCOS

DE: Lt. Col. S. N. Mitra, Chief of Operations

OBJET: Kamina Base, etc.

The Personnel Officer of the Air Transport Wing has just returned from Kamina, bringing with him the following points:

(a) Balance of 34 Irish Bn. at Kamina Base and Luena

Comdt. Gill is of the opinion that he should move by road to Luena as early as possible with the rest of the 34 Irish, including armoured cars, still at Kamina. He would open up the bridge at Bukama, either by negotiation or force if necessary. Having joined up with the Irish at Luena, the whole column would move by road to Elisabethville. Both the Base Commander and the Base Administrator are in agreement with this. The Force Commander's decision is required on this point for onward transmission to Kamina Base.

There is an obvious risk involved but worth a trial. Je

(b) Irish detachment at Kitule

There are at present 40 Irish personnel guarding the power installation at Kitule, and they have been there for nine days now. The local population have made it quite plain that they are not prepared to accept the relief of this detachment by Indian troops - any other troops would be acceptable. The Base Commander, while he is fully prepared to carry out the relief notwithstanding the consequences, advises that this should be deferred for a while until he is able to establish a better relationship with the local people. The Base Administrator is in agreement with this. According to Comdt. Gill, the keeping of the Irish at Kitule would require about another 40 Irish personnel in Kamina for maintaining the Kitule detachment. In view of the necessity of getting the balance of the Irish as quickly as possible to Elisabethville, Comdt. Gill suggests that the Irish detachment at Kitule be relieved by a detachment of 20 Swedes, until such time as the situation is eased and Indian troops were able to relieve them. The Base Commander accepted responsibility for maintaining the Swedes, and the Base Administrator was in agreement with this suggestion. The Force Commander's decision is required on this point.

I suggest that this be left alone for present. Je

Do not agree. Je.

.... /

Mod. 6072/A — C. 78323

(c) Katangese reconnaissance aircraft

A message was sent by the Base Commander to Tshombé, strongly protesting against these low-level reconnaissance flights. Tshombé's reply was that this was his answer to UN helicopters flying low over Kaminaville. Apparently it was Comdt. Gill who had gone up in a helicopter to see the Irish troops, and the helicopter pilot had inadvertently flown low over Kaminaville. Comdt. Gill was prepared to apologize and assure that this would not be repeated. The Base Commander hoped that the Katangese aircraft would desist from flying over the Base.

Have asked NY for decision re firing on such aircraft. Do

(d) Demonstration against the Base by local population

It is understood that the desire was to collect some 50,000 local people and order them to proceed to the Base, where they would squat on the airfield. Evidently, yesterday afternoon, only 2,000 volunteers could be got together, and the demonstration was therefore called off. Tshombé was approached and denied any knowledge of the demonstration having been called off. Last night, the main entrance to the Base from Kaminaville was blocked and three Irish armoured cars under the command of Capt. WHYTE stood watch. Capt. Wright stated that even if the demonstration materialized along the pattern followed in Elisabethville, i.e., women and children leading, he would not hesitate in opening fire. The Base Commander, in his attempt to build up better relations with the local people, has ordered his troops to move about in the Base unarmed when off duty.

Have they left Kaw yet. Do.?

SNM/jm

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

CANADIAN CIPHER

FM ONUC KAMINA 101945Z

TO ONUC EVILLE

INFO ONUC LEO

AC Paraphrase NOT required. No unclassified reply or reference

BT

RESTRICTED. KALE063 DUMONTET KJELLGREN ABBAS AHMED MACEOIN FROM CAPRARIO WE ARE TOLD THAT SATURDAY KASONGO NYEMBO SENT WORD TO VILLAGES CANCELLING DEMONSTRATION. COMMANDANT GENDARMERIE HIMSELF FLEW OVER BASE TWICE TODAY BUT AS RUMOUR HERE IS TSHOMBE MAY SOON END ENMITY MEASURE. TENSION HAS SOMEWHAT SUBSIDED. NEVERTHELESS IMPOSSIBLE YETSEND INDIANS TO REPLACE IRISH AT KILUBI. KASONGO NYEMBO HAS CALLED ALL CHIEFS AROUND KILUBI FOR CONFERENCE. PLEASE CONTINUE KEEP US INFORMED OF NEGOTIATIONS THERE SO WE CAN INTERPRET THEIR MOVES HERE

BT

4/11/JLP/110700Z APR 61

RESTRICTED

ROUTING SLIP

TO: Force Commander

Your concurrence .....( )
See me, please .....( )
Your signature .....( )
Your approval .....( )
Please note .....( )
Your comments .....( )
Your information .....( )
For action .....( )
Please return .....( )

REMARKS:
As requested by Mr. Mekki Abbas I am sending you a copy of my memo on Kamina for your discussions of the issued involved during your forthcoming visit to the Base.

DATE: 3 / 4 / 1961
FROM: S. Habib Ahmed
Chief Administrative Officer

Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

3 April 1

Mr. Mekki Abbas

S. Habib Ahmed

Kamina Base

..... Reference attached cable from Mr. Caprario and Lt. Col. O'Neill.

2. At a meeting I had with Colonel Quinn and all heads of military branches at Headquarters on Saturday, I pointed out the extreme vulnerability of Kamina insofar as supplies were concerned and asked that we should be prepared at all times to supply our personnel at the Base by air.

3. I also stated that as a result of the decision taken by Headquarters in December the facilities of the Base had been stripped to an extent that it could now barely support the personnel of the Irish Bn. The stationing of the entire Indian Brigade would therefore strain the services of the Base - until of course the services and the equipment of the Base could be built up to the required level - to an extent as to make the support of the Indian Brigade an extremely difficult task.

4. The relations between the U.N. authorities at the Base and the Katangese authorities outside have never been pleasant. The Katangese authorities are in a position to impose an effective blockade on all surface supplies by rail and road and we do not have sufficient air transport to supply the Indian Brigade and the Irish Bn.

5. Of about 2,000 workers who live at the Base, nearly a thousand are Balubas who follow Kasengo Niembo, the Grand Chef of Kamina. These workers if incited by the Grand Chef, can cause a great deal of difficulty in the operation of the services of the Base.

. . . 2

5. I therefore suggest that negotiations with the Katangese authorities and particularly with Kasengo Niembo, the Grand Chef of Kamina, should be handled most carefully.

File

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

26 March 1961

TO: Mr. Carey Seward, Chief, Field Operations Service

FROM: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: Custodial Maintenance of Kamina Base

1. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the report submitted by Mr. Le Blanc whose services, you will recall, were engaged by us for a period of six weeks to advise on the personnel and procedures needed to carry out, in the most economical manner, the United Nations responsibility for the maintenance of the facilities and installations of the Kamina Base.

2. Mr. Le Blanc has given us only two copies of his report, but he was good enough to undertake to have additional copies mimeographed in his office in Canada upon his return, and to forward them directly to you. I have asked him to send to you 25 copies, of which we request that 10 copies be sent to us.

3. As you are already aware, United Nations civilian and military personnel entered Kamina Base on 1 September and took over its administration from the Belgian authorities. It was soon found, however, that ONUC did not have the necessary technical and administrative personnel in the Congo to take over the operation and maintenance of the complex installations of the Base, which correspond to the utilities and services of a modern town. Negotiations were therefore begun immediately with the Belgians for the temporary retention of a number of their experts and technicians at the Base until such time as they could be replaced by the personnel of the United Nations. Towards the end of October 1960 it was estimated that the services of some 200 Belgian experts and technicians were required over and above the technical personnel which could be provided by the United Nations from the available force. However, because of the necessity of accelerating the evacuation of Belgian military personnel from Kasina, the number of Belgian experts and technicians was gradually reduced despite the fact that adequate replacements were not available, and on 1 December 1960 notice was served on all remaining Belgians to evacuate the Base by the end of December 1960 in the hope that it would be possible to recruit by that time at least the minimum number of personnel required for essential operations and maintenance.

4. While negotiations were taking place with the Belgian authorities in Kamina for the evacuation of their experts and other technical personnel and job descriptions for the minimum number of essential personnel to be recruited by the United Nations were being prepared and submitted, consideration was being given at the same time to the policy question of

the future use of the Base by the United Nations for the economic and social benefit of the Congo. In December the Special Representative, after taking all factors into account, recommended that the previous plans for the utilization of the facilities of Kamina Base for the establishment of a large-scale civilian training centre, which had been recommended by the United Nations Committee consisting of Messrs. Plaza, Nwokedi and General Rikhye, be postponed and that the Base be brought down to custodial maintenance as soon as possible. This recommendation was approved by the Secretary-General.

5. As a result of the above policy decision, all plans for the development and full operation of the facilities of the Base were halted and steps were taken to reduce United Nations activities at the Base to the minimum and withdraw as many United Nations military personnel as possible, leaving only that amount of military personnel which was required for ensuring the security of the Base, the operation of the essential utilities for the support of the security force, and the general maintenance of the buildings and installations to prevent their undue deterioration. It was hoped to bring the Base to the state of custodial maintenance by the end of January 1961.

6. Pending the determination of the minimum operational and maintenance requirements of the Base in a custodial state, the recruitment of technical personnel to replace the outgoing Belgian experts and technicians, was temporarily deferred. It was hoped that the small team of Swedish and Norwegian engineers and technicians which formed part of the ONUC Ordnance services would be able to carry on at least the minimum operational maintenance of the Base until the final plans for custodial maintenance had been made and the minimum personnel requirements determined.

7. For purposes of custodial maintenance, two alternative proposals were considered. Under one proposal the maintenance of all engineering and technical services of the Base would be entrusted to a single engineering firm which would provide the personnel needed for the purpose. The alternative proposal was for the United Nations to recruit its own personnel and carry out the operation and maintenance of the facilities of the Base under its own direct supervision. The former proposal not having been found acceptable by Headquarters, a request was made to recruit immediately an expert to advise on the minimum scale of maintenance of the various installations and facilities of the Base. Mr. Le Blanc was engaged for this post.

8. The difficulties of maintaining and operating the services of the Base for lack of qualified staff have been explained in full detail in a report submitted by me when I was Base Administrator at Kamina. The United Nations did not have at any time even as much as one-tenth of the technical staff required for the proper operation and maintenance of the Base, and such staff as was available was handicapped by lack of knowledge of French, as a result of which they could not follow and make use of the Belgian practices and procedures which were all set out and maintained in French

for the Congolese personnel. Considering the difficulties of recruiting the large number of technical personnel required for operating the Base on the scale intended by the Plaza Mission, the decision to place the Base on custodial maintenance was, apart from other considerations, the best possible one. By this decision, the number of technical personnel to be recruited was considerably reduced, although of course not eliminated since it would still be necessary to operate the hydro-power generating plant, the water filtration plant, the sewerage disposal plant and other essential public utility services to the minimum extent necessary to support the United Nations security force of battalion strength plus such auxiliary personnel as is needed for operating and maintaining the technical and administrative services of the Base. Mr. Le Blanc's survey and recommendations are concentrated on the United Nations responsibility for the minimum maintenance and operation of the essential public utilities and the prevention of undue deterioration generally of the Base.

9. On completing his work in Kamina, Mr. Le Blanc stopped at Leopoldville for a couple of days when we had the opportunity of discussing his recommendations with him and with the Logistics Branch which is responsible for the technical services at the Base. Although I have not had myself an opportunity yet to examine the report in detail, I believe that the recommendations are generally reasonable and that we should now lose no further time in obtaining the services of the technical personnel necessary to prevent any further deterioration of the installations and facilities at the Base. In our view, it would be desirable to obtain the urgently needed technical personnel from military sources, first because it could more easily be integrated with the security force at the Base, and secondly because it would be possible to recruit military technical personnel in countries such as Sweden more easily and more quickly than civilian personnel. Accordingly, we asked the Liaison Officer of the Swedish Contingent to request the necessary personnel from his Government, and I understand from him that he has already passed on the request to Stockholm, subject to clarification of their entitlements in respect of local allowances, a matter which has been referred by me to you in my cable No. 1514.

10. After a detailed study of the report in the next few days, we shall forward to you such further comments as we may have and in the meantime we would welcome any advice which you might wish to send us after you have made a review of the report.

11. I should, in particular, wish to have your advice on the question of the treatment of expenditures on the operation and maintenance of the Base. As we have previously advised you, it was our intention to place the Base formally on custodial maintenance on 31 January 1961, but administrative difficulties at Kamina, of which you are already aware, made the implementation of this plan impossible. We hope to tie up the various ends at Kamina in the next few days and propose that 1 April might be considered as the official date on which the Base would be finally placed under custodial maintenance. Actually with the withdrawal of the Air

Transport Service from Kamina towards the end of January 1961, no operational activity of a continuing character has been undertaken there. Since then the Base has been used by UNOC only on two occasions for ad hoc purposes: (i) the temporary stationing of about 400 Moroccan troops pending their repatriation and (ii) as a point of transit for the food lift for Bakwanga. It would be difficult to separate the expenditure on these two activities from those incurred on the security and maintenance of the Base except by an ad hoc formula which might be worked out at the appropriate time, if required. Beyond 1 April, however, we propose that all expenditures incurred on the maintenance of the Kamina Base be kept in a separate custodial maintenance account. May we have your advice in this matter.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

20 April 1961

A Gen. Sean MacEoin, Force Commander

D S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

Subject: Stationing of Indian Brigade at Kamina

According to the information we have just received from Kamina the reactivation of the Base to accommodate the Indian Brigade would require the undertaking of construction works and the provision of materials and equipment as detailed in the attached statement. ..... It will be seen that sufficient construction material is not available at the Base to meet the construction requirements and that some materials, estimates of which are being prepared at Kamina, will have to be secured from outside. As for water supply you will further note that we would either have to install some pumps and tanks or lay out a new pipe line from the water purification plant to the [illegible] area.

2. Apart from a general scarcity of plumbing and sanitary material in Congo and [illegible] it will take at least four weeks to procure the materials and equipment by air lift from [illegible] and to deliver it at Kamina. The most difficult parts of the requirements are the 12 refrigerators and 30 3-ton vehicles. Could the vehicles be flown in C119s?

3. There is also the question of timing. Since 3,000 troops of the Indian Brigade are apparently already in Kamina we do not know whether it would be possible for them to carry on for four to six weeks until the necessary construction works are undertaken and completed and the necessary equipment provided. I am calling for advice from the Base Administrator on this point.

cc: Mr. Pekki Abbas
Col. J.J. Quinn
Col. K.N. Haden

Additional measures to be undertaken at Kamina to accommodate the Indian Brigade.

A. Kalunga Area

1. Conversion of two villas into kitchen and ration store rooms.
2. Building of four huts with corrugated roofs for same purpose.

B. Lumwe Area

(a) At Ecole Professionnelle

Construction of:
1. 4 kitchens with corrugated roofs.
2. 16 toilet seats.
3. 70 showers.

(b) At Airport Area

Construction of:
1. four kitchens with corrugated roofs
2. 50 toilet seats
3. 75 showers

C. Ntobe Area

At School Area

Construction of:
1. 7 huts with corrugated roofs
2. 90 toilet seats
3. 70 showers

Water Supply

Purchase of some pumps and tanks or possible laying of a pipe line from the water purification plant to the Lumwe area. Exact requirements still being examined.

Other Requirements

Camp cots for 3,000 men - 2,000 immediately and 1,000 in about one month.
42 refrigerators, 8 cubic feet each.
Repair of existing cold storage facilities to meet demand for 4,000 personnel
30 3-ton vehicles immediately

. . 2

Some stores are available at the Base for the construction works needed. Estimates of the balance of the stores required are being prepared by the Base Administrator.

Outgoing Code

To: Caprario Kamina

From: Ahmed

Date: 20 April 61

No.:

Thanks your Kaleo 72.

Since there is a general scarcity of building materials and plumbing and sanitary equipment in Congo and procurement from outside will take at least four weeks please advise what interim measures can be taken to maintain and support Brigade toops which have already arrived at Kamina. Meantime we await complete estimates of additional materials and equipment required.

cc: Force Commander
Col. J.J.Quinn
Col. N.N.Madan
Mr. C. Brackenbury

Please write to Amin Wahab

CONFIDENTIAL

22 April 1

Colonel N. N. Madan, Chief Logistics Officer
S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer
Kamina

. .. Attached is a cable I have received from Mr. Caprario in reply to my cable dated 18 April, of which I have already sent a copy to you. I find that Mr. Caprario's recent cable needs further clarification which I have just now
..... requested in my attached cable.

2. You will note that 2,000 camp cots are needed immediately at Kamina. I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to supply them.

✓cc: Force Commander
Mr. C. E. Brackenbury

Outgoing Code

To: Caprario Kamina

From: S. Habib Ahmed

Date: 22 April 61

No.: Leoka 116

We assume that showers and toilets for which you have given completion dates will be provided with material locally available and that no procurement from outside is required. Please confirm. Please also forward immediately list of all materials which must be procured from outside to complete remaining installations. I have asked Chief Logistics to take action in supplying 2,000 camp cots needed.

✓cc: Force Commander
Chief Logistics Officer
Mr. C.E.Brackenbury

RESTRICTED

KOMINE

CANADIAN CIPHER

FM ONUC KAMINA 211415Z

TO ONUC LEO

BT

RESTRICTED. KALE 075 AHMED FROM CAPRARIO

REUR UNNUMBERED OF 20 APRIL. ECOLE PROFESSIONNAL READY FOR RECEPTION OF 400 TROOPS, ROUTE ROYALE SCHOOL WILL BE EVACUATED BY 23 APRIL, SHOWERS READY 24 APRIL, TOILETS READY 26 APRIL, ELECTRICTY ONE WEEK AFTER ARRIVAL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEER WITH SOME INCONVENIENCE TROOPS CAN MOVE IN 24 APRIL. EPA, SHOWERS AND TOILETS READY 30 APRIL. EPA TROOPS ALREADY THERE. LUMWE CONGOLESE VILLAGE COMPLETELY EVACUATED BY 8 MAY WILL BE READY FOR OCCUPATION 10 MAY. THEREFORE SCHEDULE OUTLINED IN OUR KALE 072 CAN BE ADHERED TO WITH SOME INCONVENIENCE FOR TROOPS. 2000 CAMP COTS ARE NEEDED IMMEDIATELY, 1000 MORE WHEN TROOPS MOVE IN FROM LEO. OTHER FURNITURE NEEDS FOLLOW IN ANOTHER SIGNAL. CORRECTION TO OUR KALE 072 ICE BOXES SHOULD BE 11 AND NOT 8 CUBIC FEET

BT

1/AIP/AT/220515Z APRIL 61

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

20 April 1961

A: Force Commander

DE: Deputy Chief of Staff

OBJET: Kamina Base

Reference Mr. Ahmed's memorandum of 19 April 1961 re logistical and other problems at Kamina Base, I wish to state the following.

1. Mr. Ahmed is correct in stating that I requested on 29 March that steps be taken to get Kamina Base back to a state of readiness which would permit of the placing of the Indian Brigade there.

2. On 6 April I was informed by the Force Commander that due to negotiations going on in relation to Matadi that we would probably have to keep the Indian ~~Battalion~~ Brigade here in order to strengthen our hand in the negotiations. Therefore, I informed Mr. Ahmed that it would be necessary to go ahead with the accommodation arrangement for the Brigade at 17th Street which had been stopped. Nevertheless, I suggested that any arrangements made about Kamina should still go ahead as there might be a requirement at anytime for its use. For example, Mr. Ahmed stated that he had requested Swedish technicians for the Base and I understand that 14 of thosehave in fact arrived here in Léo yesterday (19 April).

3. From the 6th of April to the 11th of April, I asked each day for a firm decision about the location of the Indian Brigade but due to the situation in both Katanga and Léopoldville, it was not possible to get it. Meanwhile, from Staff checks it was apparent that the placing of 4,200 troops at Kamina was not logistically possible. Finally, in a ~~later~~ recent conversation between the Force Commander and Brigadier Rikhye, the matter came to a head and a decision was urgently required. The Force Commander made it clear that it was not possible to locate a Brigade at Kamina due to the logistical problem, but that it was the place he thought the Brigade should be located from the operational point of view. Brigadier Rikhye stated that this was his view and also that of the Secretary-General. The Force Commander requested that every assistance would be required to overcome the logistical problems involved.

Mod. 6072/A — C. 78323

4. On the evening of 12 April, I left Léo for Kamina and did not return to Léo until the evening of the 13th. Therefore, I could not have discussed the point with Mr. Ahmed on this date as suggested in his paragraph 4. I did, however, on or about the 10th of the month suggest to Mr. Ahmed that the Camp on 17th Street should go ahead irrespective of whether the Indian Brigade was being located there or in Kamina. The reason being that we have a constant requirement for billeting at Léo. Much of the villa-type accommodation is unsuitable and has been condemned by the Senior Medical Staff Officer. I cannot understand how Mr. Ahmed could construe this last point as meaning that the Brigade would be located here. I did inform him of the possibility of one Battalion being left here at 17th Street.

5. At the meeting on the 17th, Mr. Ahmed was informed that the logistical problem would be reduced somewhat by leaving one Battalion group plus some elements of the Indian Brigade HQ at Léo. This would mean that instead of having 4,200 troops placed at Kamina, there would be a requirement for 2,700. This was to be a temporary arrangement only. At this meeting it was also cleared that the question of rations and POL was capable of solution by an airlift, but that the question of water, housing, latrine facilities and cooking house facilities still remained and were in urgent need of solution. Under the circumstances, I think that all possible arrangements were made as quickly as firm decisions could be made. And even when such decisions were not forthcoming, we went ahead with whatever work could be undertaken both at Léo and Kamina without undue waste of money.

James J. Quinn

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
DCOS

cc: Colonel Madan
Colonel Mitra

F.C.

May I have your comments please?

H.A
19/4

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

19 April 1961

A: Mr. Mekki Abbas, Acting Special Representative

DE: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

OBJET: Kamina Base

Reference your memo dated 18 (APRIL) February.

2. Soon after the decision to send the Indian Brigade to Kamina was taken I attended a meeting called by Colonel Quinn which was attended by senior Headquarters military officers and Brigadier Raja. At that meeting I presented all the facts relating to the deficiencies of the Kamina Base but was told by Colonel Quinn that the decision concerning the assignment of the Indian Brigade to Kamina was final and that any discussion of the weaknesses of the Base to support the Indian Brigade was therefore fruitless.

3. On 6 April I was advised by Colonel Quinn that the previous decision to send the entire Indian Brigade to Kamina had been cancelled and that except for about 800 troops who would be stationed in Kamina the rest of the Brigade would be assigned to Leopoldville. Accordingly the construction of the camp in Leopoldville for the Indian Brigade which had been cancelled following the previous decision, was resumed.

4. On 13 April while discussing the question of the repatriation of surplus workers from the Kamina Base I learned from you that the Indian Brigade would be assigned to Kamina and that we should take into account the requirements of local personnel at Kamina with reference to the needs of the Indian Brigade before any surplus workers were repatriated. However, upon consultation with Col. Quinn I was advised that the construction of the camp for the Indian Brigade at Leopoldville should be proceeded with subject to the review in the light of later developments concerning the final assignment of the Indian Brigade.

. . . 2

5. On 17 April I was invited to a meeting by Colonel Quinn and was informed that it had now been definitely decided to assign the Indian Brigade to Kamina. At this meeting I again brought up the deficiencies of the Kamina Base for supporting the Indian Brigade and after full examination the meeting reached the conclusion that I should advise you directly of the problems of accommodating the Brigade at Kamina and Colonel Quinn likewise would advise General Mac Eoin. My memorandum of 18 April to you was the result of this meeting.

cc: Force Commander
Col. Quinn
Col. Madan
Col. Mitra

Mod. 6072/C — C. 73324

Force Commander

19 April 1

Mr. Mekki Abbas, Acting Special Representative
S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer
Kamina Base

Reference your memo dated 18 February.

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cc: Force Commander
Col. Quinn
Col. Madan
Col. Mitra

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

17 April 1961

A: Gen. Seon MacEoin, Force Commander

DE: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

OBJET: Custody of Stores at Kamina and Kitona

I have received an insistent request from the Base Administrator that a proper procedure be established for the handing over of stores when one unit takes over from another at short notice. He also reports quite a substantial loss of UN property.

There was no proper handover at Kitona when the Indonesians took over from the Sudanese, and I believe there was none at Kamina between the Irish and the Indians when the former were transferred to Elisabethville.

The situation at Kamina and Kitona differs from that obtaining elsewhere in the Congo in that "combat" troops are in charge of stores which they do not take with them when they are moved in the normal course of operations. I suggest that the provisions of Logistics Standing Operating Procedure No. 6 should apply to replacement of one unit by another at either of the bases.

While I appreciate that, for operational reasons, moves must sometimes be made at short notice, I think that, in view of the considerable value of the stores, we should ensure that a proper handover takes place. You will remember that the transfer of the Indian Supply Composite Platoon and the Pakistan Transport Coy were delayed to ensure a proper handover to the Irish.

As an alternative, perhaps it would be possible for a small ordnance party, which would not be subject to moves at short notice, to take the stores on charge. At each base, the party would be small because, at Kitona, the volume of stores is less than at Kamina and, at Kamina, the Engineering Battalion will be in charge of the Engineering stores anyway and the vehicle spares will be in the charge of the Ordnance Workshop team. The Air Wing will be responsible for the airfield stores. At Kamina, the main classes of stores would be:-

Hygiene
Quartermaster Stores
Welfare

It might also be necessary to take medical stores on charge as I think the Pharmacist's other duties prevent him maintaining proper stock records.

I would be grateful if one of the recently-established Ordnance Inspection teams could be sent to Kamina to make an overall report on the system of stores custody and inventory control. It would also be useful if the same thing could be done at Kitona.

Sgt

Associate with other papers on KAMINA

18 April 1

Mr. S. Habib Ahmed

Acting Special Representative

Kamina Base

I am in receipt of your memorandums of yesterday and to-day. I am sure you were well aware that we started sending troops to Kamina on 31 March. Therefore, I cannot see why the advice which you sent me on 18 April has not been given to me at the appropriate time. What use is it for me now that we already have some 3,000 Indian troops there?

I take it that the suggestions which were made on 17 April, if carried out, will meet the difficulties outlined in your memorandum. In any case, the Force Commander will inform you as to whether the Indian troops will always be stationed in Kamina or whether they will be stationed somewhere else.

cc. Force Commander
Col. Quinn
Col. Maden
Col. Mitra

File

18 April 1

Mr. Mekki Abbas

S. Habib Ahmed

Kamina Base

On 5 December I submitted a report to the Special Representative after a two-months' on the spot study of the possibilities and potentialities of the Kamina Base with reference to the requirements of the United Nations in Congo. The then Base Commander, Colonel V.P.Roy, was associated with this study. I quote for your information an extract from para 20 of the above report which represents the essence of the recommendations made by me at that time:

> "the Base Administrator would like to make it perfectly clear that in his view, Kamina Base is entirely unsuitable for any United Nations purposes whatever. The Secretary-General has said that the Base is unsuitable for use as a civilian training centre; in the Base Administrator's view it is equally unsuitable as a base for United Nations military operations in the Congo."

2. It was on the basis of the above report that the Special Representative recommended to the Secretary-General that the Base should be placed under custodial maintenance. He arrived at this conclusion after full consultation with General Rikhye. This recommendation, as you are aware, was accepted by the Secretary-General towards the end of December.

cc: General S. MacEoin
Col. J. J. Quinn
Col. N. N. Madan

Mr. Mekki Abbas

S. Habib Ahmed

Stationing Indian Brigade at Kamina

A meeting was held this morning with senior military officers at Headquarters and Brigadier Raja to consider the problems concerning the supply and support of the Indian Brigade at Kamina.

2. About 2,000 troops belonging to the Indian Brigade have so far arrived at Kamina and by tomorrow evening this number will grow to about 3,000. On the assumption that one Bn of the Brigade which is at present in Leopoldville will not move to Kamina immediately the meeting considered the supply and support of a total of 4,000 Indian personnel at Kamina for the present.

3. The Kamina Base was built by the Belgians as an air base and not as a military base. As a result, although the Base can accommodate a force of 2500 the accommodation available for military troops is limited to a maximum of 1000. The rest of the accommodation consists of villas and bachelors' quarters which can be used for accommodating air personnel but not military troops.

4. Towards the end of last year action was initiated to place the Base on custodial maintenance and by the end of March the furniture, equipment and miscellaneous stores of the Base were reduced to conform to the requirements of one Bn only which, under conditions of custodial maintenance, was considered to be sufficient for the security of the Base. The plan followed for cutting down the United Nations commitments at the Base was to close one sector of the Base (Luswe area) except for the airport and the essential ancillary facilities required therefor and to concentrate the bulk of the Bn, its supply, ordnance and transport operations to the Kalunga sector of the Base.

. . . 2

5. The location of 4,000 personnel of the Indian Brigade at Kamina raises the following problems:

(a) only a maximum ofabout 1,000 troops can be accommodated in barracks which are provided with kitchen, messing and sanitary facilities. The remaining 3,000 troops will have to be put up in tents as the available villas at the Base will be unsuitable for accommodating them quite apart from the fact that all the furniture and fixtures of the villas have already been removed and returned to the Belgians. The Indian Brigade has not brought with it sufficient tentage for accommodating 2,000 troops but the additional tents needed can be ordered and flown to Kamina in about a two weeks' period. Facilities for cooking and messing will have to be provided at the Base for which the necessary equipment has to be procured to make up the deficiencies in the equipment already available with the Indian Brigade. The building of the Officers' mess in the Lumwe area can be reopened but it has no equipment whatsoever either for cooking or for seating, all of which will have to be procured;

(b) the water supply in the Lumwe area of the Base had been presenting problems to the Belgians even before the United Nations took over the Base from them early in September. It is believed that the water mains in this area, which were laid in the first year of the construction of the Base, are worn out and are leaking at numerous points. It is not possible to locate the leakages as the soil is sandy and the water percolates downwards. The United Nations maintenance expert, Mr. LeBlanc, who visited the Base recently and examined its facilities told us that if it became necessary for the United Nations to use the Lumwe area of the Base again all water pipes in the area should be replaced by new ones which will cost approximately $80,000. Under these circumstances only a small number of Indian troops can be located in the Lumwe area. However the concentration of the majority of the troops in the Kalunga area might also create problems of water supply as the Kalunga area was also not built to meet the requirements of such a large personnel. Additional sanitation and sewage disposal facilities will also have

to be provided to meet the needs of some 3,000 troops which will have to be put up in tents in the open areas of the Base. Under the present conditions the undertaking of any construction work at the Base would present very serious problems. All construction material required for the purpose would have to be flown to Kamina because of the blockade of rail and road by the Katangese authorities. In any case it would take at least two months before the minimum facilities required for the stationing of the Brigade could be provided at the Base.

6. After taking into account the estimated air transport requirements for supplying food, aviation gasoline, ordnance etc. to meet the requirements of the Indian Brigade the meeting came to the conclusion that the United Nations air fleet would be able to cope with their requirements. However, the two factors concerning accommodation and water supply mentioned above constitute very serious obstacles to the maintenance of the Indian Brigade at Kamina and therefore call for reconsideration of the decision to make use of the Kamina Base for the stationing of the Indian Brigade.

7. The construction of the camp for the Indian Brigade at Leopoldville was resumed ten days ago upon advice that the Brigade would be stationed here. If it is finally decided to station the Brigade at Kamina and to build the necessary facilities there we would then discontinue the construction of the camp at Leopoldville which is estimated to cost 24 million francs.

cc: Force Commander ✓
Col. Quinn
Col. Madan
Col. Mitra