

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 6

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0282

Sent with Code Cable
N° 1330 of 11/7/94
by SRSG

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**CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF
UNAMIR FORCE SITUATION**

1. SITUATION

a. Fighting Factions

(1) For the first time, the situation has changed to a great extent since the death of Mr Juvenal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda. The situation in and around KIGALI in particular and in RWANDA in general has improved remarkably. This change is being felt by the military as well as the political fronts. The RPA has captured more than 3/5th of the country, holding the entire eastern and mid region, including the capital KIGALI which fell on 04 July 1994. It also controls provincial cities such as GITARAMA and BUTARE. The RGF has withdrawn to the north-western part, presently holding less than 1/5th of the country. Notable cities controlled by RGF are GISENYI and RUHENGARI. The French troops, which entered on 23 June 1994 under UN mandate (Security Council Resolution 929) for a humanitarian assistance mission, are currently operating and controlling the remaining 1/5th of RWANDA'S south-western part. They control cities like CYANGUGU, KIBUYE and GIKONGORO (see annex A).

(2) At present all warring parties appear to be tired and neither the RGF nor the RPA are eager to continue fighting any more. The cease-fire talks were last held on 17 June 1994 and have not been resumed because the RPF assessed the determination

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of the RGF to reasonably implement any of the conditions as poor and half-hearted and thus considered any agreement with them to be without conviction. The RPF speak of a unilateral cease-fire, the continuation of which would be subject to certain conditions. Results in the near future are expected, but the reaction of the RGF to the conditions that will be attached to the cease-fire by the RPF are not expected to be readily accepted. On the other hand, the French troops are also seemingly limiting their role to humanitarian assistance only; this, apart from the fact that they are said to have traditional and historical ties with the majority Hutu population and therefore the French presence was expected to enhance the morale of the Government troops. However, the RGF and the Interim Government are now realising that the French-led coalition is not here in any reinforcing role but is working instead at controlling tasks, specially in the Humanitarian Protection Zone. The RPA continue to consolidate their gains and are advancing in the north-west (south of RUHENGARI) in order to adopt a better defensive posture. As a result of the above, a general "calm" is currently prevailing in RWANDA though tensions are enormous in the RGF zone and the situation is uneasy in the Humanitarian Protection Zone.


b. UNAMIR Forces

(1) During the thick of the battle, it was decided to thin out UNAMIR forces to a residual strength under the adjusted mandate of 21 April 1994


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← ①

ANNEX C



← ②



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(Security Council Resolution 912). The total strength of UNAMIR is presently at about 650 personnel, due to the recent reinforcement of the GHANBATT by 1 1/2 coys and support elements. Present formed-troops strength is in the order of three companies.

(2) The current force structure is based on a very limited self-defence capability of UN installations, including the airfield, monitoring displaced persons camps in Kigali, liaison with all factions and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks. The new forces coming on theatre have no mechanized training and only 10 APCs are functional in Kigali. Maintenance, driving and mechanized collective training will be on-going as of 11 July 1994 for the next 3 to 4 weeks at the coy level on rotation.

2. MISSION. The mission of UNAMIR forces is to pursue a cease-fire implementation and assist in the security and support of the humanitarian efforts in RWANDA, in cooperation with local authorities.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Five Infantry bns supported by an Engr Coy, a Helicopter Squadron, UNMOs and UNCIVPOLs will be deployed to concurrently monitor a cease-fire and to also assist in humanitarian and security tasks. Each bn will be structured in three-line coys each and a combat-support coy which is to include a mortar platoon, an assault pioneer platoon and a recce platoon with snipers. The bns

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will be deployed in five geo/administrative sectors (depending upon the availability of bns) (see Annex B). It is presumed that we may not receive adequate composite bns. Instead some independent coys may arrive from contributing countries. Bns however will deploy in coy locations throughout their respective sectors and be employed in peripheral humanitarian security tasks. CIVPOL will command their Sector HQs. All Sectors will be commanded by Bn Commanders, except for Sector 1 which will be commanded by the MILOB Sector Comd. Sector 4 will be commanded by MILOB Sector Commander until a Bn is deployed. The priorities of the deployment effort will continue to be the enhancement of GHANBATT for KIGALI and Sector 2, the rapid build-up of the motorized Bn for Sector 4 and the mech Bn into Sector 5 (the RGF zone).

- b. The critical element that must be maintained under constant monitoring is the French/RPA possible confrontation. Currently, the French-led coalition forces are conducting limited patrols and protection tasks in the RGF Zone (Sector 5) and are essentially remaining well west of RUHENGARI. Their deployment in the Humanitarian Protection Zone (Sector 4) is extensive but details are not forthcoming. The boundary of the Humanitarian Protection Zone has been brokered by UNAMIR according to French, RPA and UNAMIR inputs. The RGF have been informed but have not responded except verbally in a meeting between RGF Chief of Staff and FC with no particular comments. The RPA however have stated that they have crossed this boundary line near GIKONGORO and

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that they will give us their forward line soonest. We cannot order RPA back but we hope to reduce their advancing too close to the line. The critical element that must be maintained under constant monitoring is the French/RPA possible confrontation. The extensive deployment of UNAMIR LO teams between the French-led coalition HQs and the Force HQs, the daily personal contacts between Operation TURQUOISE and UNAMIR senior staff (OPS) and the commanders, the transparency of the relations between the French-led coalition and UNAMIR before the RPA, the timely passage and follow-up of operational and humanitarian information among us all through UNAMIR's pivotal role, the immediate deployment of UNMO teams in the Humanitarian Protection Zone (Sector 4) and the RGF and militia reactions in order to maintain and possibly influence the operational methods employed by the French-led coalition, the maintenance of even the tenuous links with the RGF through our Goma Liaison Teams, all these actions guide our near-term operations.

c. Deployment. The overall deployment will be conducted in three phases, of which Phases 1 and 2 are concurrent:

(1) Phase 1. The Ghanaian Bn (GHANBATT) would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with 50 x M 113 APCs provided by the US Forces. This unit will be deployed at the KIGALI city area as per Annex C (after confirming from ground recce). The Force Signal Squadron will deploy at Amahoro

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Complex. The Field Hospital will deploy at KIGALI Hospital and the Engineer Coy will deploy in BYUMBA. The Force Movement control will deploy at KIA. The Logistic Support will be through the civilian contact operating a logistics base in KIGALI with mission air heads at KIA and NAIROBI and ENTEBBE as the main site of entry.

(2) Phase 2. Phase 2 deployment will take place concurrently with Phase 1. Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized) and all the UNMOs and CIVPOLs is expected.

(3) Phase 3. Induction of the remaining two motorized battalions and the rest of the force support elements with the helicopter squadron.

d. The essence of the deployment is based on the flexibility of concentrating forces for the humanitarian security or support tasks and be able to monitor an eventual cease-fire. Protected sites will be constituted through armed/formed elements of the force at locations where Rwandese are in need of security, be they isolated pockets in and around built-up areas, or temporary displaced persons camps, or more permanent/settled refugee camps. The mobility and protection afforded the Bns and the inherent flexibility of the UNMOs and observation helicopters permit convoy escorts, quick re-deployments to threatening situations, temporary security at distribution points, secure transfer by

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vehicle or on foot of persons returning to their place of origin. These activities will be directed from either force level decisions or from within the Sectors, and in transit situations between sectors. Routine monitoring/patrolling will be implemented in each Sector in complete coordination between formed troops (Bns), MILOBs HQ, CIVPOL HQs, French-led Coalition Forces, RGF and RPA, dependant on threat.

4. The continued stated aim of the French-led coalition Operation TURQUOISE of conducting the Humanitarian Protected Zone in the west of RWANDA and of withdrawing as soon as possible, has been assessed as evolving very well. However, UNAMIR will not be in any position to effectively relieve the French-led Forces in the Humanitarian Protected Zone before mid to end August at the earliest, and most certainly will not be able to securely monitor a cease-fire in the RGF zone till early September. This situation is due principally to the late and not yet confirmed deployment of more UNMOs/CIVPOLs, as well as of the mechanized and the motorized Bns, to the tardy arrival of any useful levels of major operational and support equipments, to the integration training that will have to be conducted for these Bns (2 x week per coy, concurrently we hope) and to the already reticent if not obstructive method of deployment of the forces (FOD telling the Cdn Sigs Sqn to send only absolutely essential material and about 150 personnel by air now, and all the rest later with most of the equipment by ship, which will delay the troop/unit effectiveness on the ground by up to 10 weeks minimum).

5. Unless the operational side of DPKO insists on rapid air deployment (expensive, yes) of the bulk of Phases 1 and 2 forces and equipment to RWANDA, this mission will not deploy


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in the Humanitarian Protected Zone nor in the RGF Zone for at least another 6 to 8 weeks. Its effectiveness at that time will be wholly dependent on the integration training of personnel and to be conducted here in KIGALI. The availability/effectiveness of the principal operational equipment and of the contracted arrangements support, as well as the sustainment capabilities by these same contractors once the force is in place are yet to be seen and assessed.

6. Currently, the RGF and militia have demonstrated a very hostile attitude towards all UNAMIR forces in the RGF Zone (confirmed again during the SRSG's visit to the Interim Government in Gisenyi last week). The situation in the Humanitarian Protection Zone will be assessed by our UNMO reconnaissance team this week. Such a confrontational attitude, born out of desperation on the RGF side, precludes any potential offensive/aggressive deployment of UNAMIR forces in both those zones unless we have guaranteed French protection, or unless we have the forces properly equipped, trained and determined to go in and implement our mandate. This situation does not augur well for any near-term cease-fire monitoring, particularly if it is an RPA unilateral cease-fire.

UNAMIR SECTOR BOUNDARY



MAP NO. 3717 UNITED NATIONS
DECEMBER 1992

ANNEX B

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/ONLY/CRYPTO

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: BARIL FOR ANNAN FOR UNATIONS, NEW YORK.	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI.
OUTGOING FAX NO: 250- 84265	DATE: 4 JANUARY 1993
ATTN: MAJOR MARTIN	PHONE: 250-84271 (DIRECT)
FAX NO: (212) 963-4879	FAX NO: (250) 84265
INFO: DA COSTA	DRAFTER: CMPO
FAX NO: (212)963-0664	FILE REF:
Internal Dist.: COS, CAO.	
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF MAJ P.K. AWADEY TO NEW YORK AND ACCRA.	
REFERENCE: FAX FROM BARIL DATED DEC 30, 1993.	

1. UNAMIR TRAVEL SECTION HAS MADE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS OF MAJOR AWADEY OF GHANA TO RECEIVE BRIEFING IN NEW YORK. PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING ITINERARY.

2. MAJOR AWADEY DEPARTING KIGALI ON JAN 4TH AT 19:50 HRS LT VIA AF 483, ARRIVING PARIS 0600HRS LT. WILL PROCEED TO NEW YORK ON AF 006 ARRIVING NEW YORK JFK AT 1510 HRS LT ON JAN 5TH, 1994.

3. MAJOR AWADEY IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART FOR ACCRA ON TUESDAY JAN 11TH, FOR ONE WEEK BEFORE REPORTING BACK TO KIGALI.

4. KINDLY MEET, ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION AND PLEASE CONFIRM MAJOR'S ARRIVAL.

BEST REGARDS.

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

23 0915z

DATE: 21 JANUARY 1994

KMF 81

TO: MATIWAZA\UNOMUR\KABALE	FROM: DALHAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: 256-486-23816	FAX NO: (250) 84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DETAILS	
ATTN: MATIWAZA\UNOMUR\KABALE	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

MISC-55

1. THIS CODE CABLE IS FORWARDED IN REFERENCE TO YOUR FAX OF 21 JAN 94, SITREP.

2. YOU ARE TASKED TO PROVIDE US WITH MORE PRECISE INFORMATION IN FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. PARAGRAPH IV : HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES.

THIS PARAGRAPH DOES TELL NOTHING ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE TRUCKS, WHAT VERIFICATIONS WERE DONE BY YOUR PERSONNEL, WHAT IS THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THESE SEEKS.

B. PARAGRAPH VII : MISCELLANEOUS

SEE UNDER A ABOVE.

FC

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 4 JANUARY 1994

TO: BARIH\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR\KIGALI <i>Dallaire</i>
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: RPF VERBAL PROTEST REGARDING TOGO CONTINGENT	
ATTN: MAJ MARTIN	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. THIS MESSAGE IS FORWARDED TO ADVISE YOU THAT BGEN DALLAIRE RECEIVED A FORMAL VERBAL PROTEST FROM THE RPF ON 2 JANUARY 1994 REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS FROM TOGO SERVING WITH UNAMIR.
2. BGEN DALLAIRE INFORMED RPF TO STATE PROTEST IN WRITING. WILL FORWARD TO YOU IF AND WHEN PROTEST IS FORMALLY TRANSMITTED IN WRITING.
3. REQUEST YOU CONSIDER AND ADVISE ON THIS MATTER AS TOGO CONTINGENT HAS ARRIVED AND IS BEING EMPLOYED AS UNMOS.
4. REGARDS.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 4 JANUARY 1994

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: 212-963-9070 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: LEAVE REQUEST FOR BGEN R. A. DALLAIRE FC UNAMIR	
ATTN: MAJ MARTIN	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. THIS MESSAGE IS FORWARDED TO REQUEST AUTHORITY FOR BGEN R. A. DALLAIRE TO TAKE LEAVE FROM 20 JANUARY 1994 TO 31 JANUARY 1994 IN QUEBEC CITY CANADA.

2. SO THAT TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE CONFIRMED REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL ASAP.

3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

1/3

081645Z

KYF-56

8 DEC. 1993

TO: ANNAN, UNHQ, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: BARIL	ORIGINATOR: LT COL GODSON ZOWONOO
FAX: 00 (1-212) 963-4879	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON PERSONNEL IN PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: 2	

MIR-203

1. REFERENCE YOUR CODE CABLE NUMBER 2301 OF 30 NOV 1993, THE MISSION IS IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING UP. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE STATE OF PERSONNEL AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1993.
2. AN EARLIER MESSAGE ASKING FOR INFORMATION ON FEMALE PERSONNEL IN PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS WAS REPLIED ON 16 NOV 1993 AS ATTACHED.
3. I REGRET ANY INCONVENIENCE THE DELAY MIGHT HAVE CAUSED.
4. REGARDS.

FC

1647Z

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UNAMIR

KYF-56 P2/3

CORRECTED UP TO -30 NOV 93

STATE OF MIL PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN POLICE BROKEN DOWN BY NATIONALITY

SRL	NATIONALITY	TROOPS		MILOB	CIV POLICE	GENDER	TOTAL
		OFFRS	ENLISTED				
1.	BANGLADESH	26	21	9	-	MALE	56
2.	BELGIUM	32	295	-	-	"	327
3.	CANADA	1	-	1	-	"	2
4.	CONGO	-	-	25	-	"	25
5.	FIJI	-	-	1	-	"	1
6.	GHANA	2	-	-	-	"	2
7.	GUYANA	-	-	-	2	"	2
8.	NETHERLAND	1	-	-	-	"	1
9.	POLAND	5	-	-	-	"	5
10.	SENEGAL	-	-	29	-	"	29
11.	TUNISIA	5	55	-	-	"	60
12.	URUGUAY	1	-	-	-	"	1
13.	ZIMBABWE	-	-	1	-	"	1
GRAND TOTAL		73	371	66	2		512

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KYF-56 P3/3

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1993

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK S.E.	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FAX NUMBER: 212.963.9070	FAX NUMBER: 250.76263
INFO:	ORIGINATOR: LCDR ZOWONOO <i>g/f</i>
SUBJECT: FEMALE PERSONNEL IN PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS	
NUMBER OF PAGES: 1	

1. REFERENCE ABOVE SUBJECT, I REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT UNAMIR HAS NO FEMALE PERSONNEL AT THE MOMENT.
2. THERE ARE PLANS TO RECRUIT LOCAL STAFF WHICH IS LIKELY TO INCLUDE FEMALES, BUT THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN ACTIONED.
3. BEST REGARDS.

17 (WED) - 11 - 1993 14:38

TRANSMIT TO :	212 963 9070	DURATION :	0'42"
MODE :	MR	PAGE(S) :	1
		RESULT :	OK