

AMIR

FILE OF COLONEL S.N. YADPAU,
CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER

12 OCT 1995 - 7 MAR 1996

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Yo,

At- Col SN Yadan

Chief Op Off

UNAIR

KIGALI

BRIEFING NOTES - OPERATIONS

FORCE HQ - UNAMIR

INTRODUCTION

1. UNAMIR has gone through a great transformation since Oct 93 and this has led to a remarkable modification in the deployment and the operations of the Force.

AIM

2. The aim of this brief is to give a background history of RWANDA and UNAMIR since its inception in Oct 93.

SCOPE

3. The brief will cover the following:
- a. GENERAL INFORMATION.
 - b. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT.
 - c. FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT.
 - d. UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER 06 APRIL 94.
 - e. NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
 - f. IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR.
 - g. CONCLUSION.

GENERAL INFORMATION

4. Geographical Location. Rwanda is located in East Central Africa, having a relatively small area. The country is bounded on the North by UGANDA, to the East by Tanzania, to the South by Burundi and Zaire to the West.

5. Terrain. The terrain is rugged with steep hills and ridges. The North is dominated by a powerful chain of volcanoes known as the VIRUNGA. The highest is the KARISIMBI (Approx 4500 meters).

6. Vegetation. This varies from tropical rain forest in the West to savanna grassland in the East.

7. Ethnic Division. The population is made up of three ethnic groups: HUTU 85%, TUTSI 14% and TWA 1%.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

8. ZAIRE, RWANDA and BURUNDI have identical colonial past in that they were all under Belgian domination.

9. RWANDA and BURUNDI were both originally inhabited by the TWA tribe. Then came the HUTUs from the North, hundred of years ago followed by the Tutsis during the 18th century. Under colonial rule the Tutsis were exclusively given western education which made them dominant over the rest of the local population even though they did not form the majority. The Tutsi domination created problems in both countries. In Burundi the minority Tutsi tribe still controls the military, Civil Service and the economy of the country.

10. In 1959 the Tutsi domination of the majority Hutu in RWANDA was rejected through a rebellion which resulted in the overthrow of the ruling Tutsis. The rebellion led to the fleeing of over 160,000 Tutsis into neighbouring countries while an estimated 20,000 were killed. In 1961 a UN supervised referendum in the country brought victory to the Hutu led party known as the "Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARME HUTU). The power base in Rwanda therefore shifted to the Hutu majority from 1961.

11. The situation in Rwanda though tense was stable until Oct 1990 when an estimated force of about 10,000 men largely made up of exiled Tutsis crossed into North Eastern Rwanda from Uganda. The initial attack was repulsed by the RGF with the help of Zairian and French troops. The force which was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Force turned guerrilla with most of its attacks on Rwanda coming from the North and North West. The attacks continued with the RPF gaining territory until March 1993 when a cease fire agreement was signed between the Government and the rebels. Under the truce, the RPF gave up about half the territory it controlled to give way for the creation of a 19 KM wide demilitarized Zone. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and RGF under the aegis of the OAU signed the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT which called upon the UN to put in place an International neutral force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 5 Oct 93. At Arusha the warring factions agreed on the following:

- a. Install a Broad Base Transitional Government.
- b. Set up transitional institutions
- c. Deploy a neutral international force
- d. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.
- e. Deploy an RPF battalion in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.

- f. Integrate RGF and RPF into the National Defence Force.
- g. Protect expatriates and ensure the security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- h. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- i. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- j. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general election.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT

12. Based on the Arusha Agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 846 which sent a Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda on 17 Aug 93. The mission was assigned the task of assessing and reporting on the contributions which the UN could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of the peace agreement. It was also assigned the task of assessing the human and material requirements essential to the implementation of the peace agreement. On 5 Oct 93 the Security Council adopted Resolution 872 which gave UNAMIR a mandate for 6 months.

13. Prior to the arrival of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda, the OAU had an observer team of 104 officers and a sixty-man company from Tunisia to monitor the cease fire. These officers and men were absorbed by UNAMIR when it was established.

14. In order to execute this mandate, the UNAMIR force was deployed in 6 Sectors as follows:

- a. UNOMUR Sector. The UNOMUR Sector covered areas in northern Rwanda and part of southern Uganda. The Sector was patrolled by Military Observers.
- b. RPF Sector. The RPF Sector, referred to the area north of the DMZ. This included areas occupied by the RPF during the cease fire in 1993.
- c. The DMZ Sector. The DMZ Sector was a 19 KM wide "No mans Land" or buffer zone created to separate the warring factions. UNAMIR had the following forces deployed in the area:

- (1) Ghanaian Bn.
- (2) Bangladesh Engr Coy.
- (3) MILOB Teams.
- (4) Tunisian Coy (-)

d. The RGF Sector. The RGF Sector referred to the areas immediately south of the DMZ controlled by the RGF. MILOBs were responsible for monitoring the cease fire in that sector.

e. KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA). KWSA included areas immediately surrounding Kigali the capital, and it had the following units:

- (1) Belgian Bn (-).
- (2) Bangladesh Bn (-) comprising:
 - (a) Log Coy.
 - (b) Med Pl.
 - (c) Mov Con Pl.
 - (d) Tpt Pl.
- (3) MILOBs.

f. The Southern Sector. The Southern sector referred to the area south of the RGF Sector. The forces which operated there were largely MILOB Teams.

UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER APR 94.

15. After the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana under very suspicious circumstances, the Presidential Guard went on a rampage killing opponents of the government and all Tutsis they could lay their hands on with the assistance of the Interhamwe, a pro-government militia organisation. Their reasons being that the plane crash was the work of forces opposed to the government. The RPF in Kigali having been appalled by the systematic killing of their sympathizers, broke out of their confinement at Parliament House thus ending the cease fire reached with the former Government in March 1993. In order to stop the carnage by the Presidential Guards and the Interhamwe, the RPF in the North moved southwards to link up with those in Kigali and advanced in three fronts, a Western, a Central and an Eastern front. The main thrust of the RPF advance was concentrated on the eastern front which turned westwards after moving southwards from the east. The RPA leadership was resolute so was their advance, with the RGF, Presidential Guards and Interhamwe fleeing ahead of the RPF advance. The RPF advance only stopped when the French occupied the Sector 4, formerly known as the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). The HPZ thus provided a safe haven for both the RGF and Militia, majority of whom since the withdrawal of the French on 21 Aug 94 have fled to Zaire.

16. During the war the deteriorating situation led to the scaling

down of the UNAMIR force from 2517 to just under 500 and the tasks the small force undertook were as follows:

- a. Provided security to displaced persons in camps under UNAMIRs care.
 - b. Performed escort duties.
 - c. Provided Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons.
 - d. Monitored the activities of Non Government Organizations.
 - e. Ensured the security of personnel involved in Humanitarian Aid distribution. And finally,
 - f. Transfer of Rwandese from territory held by either the RGF or the RPF to the other.
17. After the war UNAMIR strength went up to 6,100 untill JUNE 95. Contributing countries were the following:
- a. Australia.
 - b. Britain.
 - c. Canada.
 - d. Ethioipia.
 - e. Ghana.
 - f. Malawi.
 - g. Nigeria.
 - h. Senegal, Chad, Congo, Niger, Guinea Bissau
(Chad, Congo, Niger and Guinea Bissau withdrew in February 95)
 - i. Tunisia.
 - j. Zambia.
 - k. India and Mali.

UNAMIR MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION
FROM 08 JUNE 94 TO 08 JUNE 95

18. UNAMIR mission was to assist and co-ordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries and NGOs with the view to bringing an end to the crisis in Rwanda.

19. The thrust of UNAMIR's effort was to bring back refugees and displaced persons and settle them in their respective home areas. Rwanda had therefore been divided into 6 sectors.

- a. SECTOR 1 - NIBATT AND MILOBS.
- b. SECTOR 2 - GHANBATT AND MILOBS.
- c. SECTOR 3A - MALAWICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 3B - MALICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 4A - ZAMBATT AND MILOBS.
- e. SECTOR 4B - SENBATT AND MILOBS.
- f. SECTOR 4C - ETHIOBATT with MILOBS.
- g. SECTOR 5 - TUNBATT with MILOBS.
- h. SECTOR 6 - INDBATT with MILOBS.

20. Due to the large IDP population after war the UNAMIR concept of operation aimed at:

- a. Stabilizing refugees and displaced persons in their various locations.
- b. Preparing the home communes for their return by helping to improve essential life supporting services with the assistance of NGOs.
- c. Then encouraging them to return to their home areas.
- d. Providing transportation, food, water, medical assistance on their way to their homes.
- e. Assisting the people to return to their normal life and finally,
- f. Handover in due course all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Government.

21. Based on the concept of operations some of the tasks performed by the formed troops included the following:

- a. Conduct of protective operations such as:
 - (1) Road blocks.
 - (2) Check Points (static and random).

- (3) Vital point protection.
 - (4) Observation posts.
 - (5) Cordon and search and
 - (6) Patrol.
- b. Provide security in large towns, villages and in refugee/displaced peoples camps.
 - c. Deny insurgent activity in their sectors.
 - d. Guard UN installations within the UNAMIR AOR.
 - e. Assist local authority in maintaining law and order in camps.
 - f. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.
 - g. Assist the NGOs in the distribution of food, water and medical support.
 - h. Assist in the coordination of all activities of NGOs.
 - i. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

- 22. UN Security Council Resolution 997 dated 9 JUNE 95 decided to:
 - a. Extend UNAMIR mandate until 8 December 95.
 - b. Reduce the Force level to 2,330 troops before 9 AUG 95, and to 1,800 troops from 9 OCT 95.
 - c. Adjust the UNAMIR mandate so that UNAMIR will:
 - (1) Assist the Government of RWANDA in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of RWANDA in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;
 - (2) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining.

(3) Contribute to the security in RWANDA of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for RWANDA, including full time protection for the Prosecutor's office, aswell as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need.

23. Based on the new mandate, which has shifted the focus of peace-keeping to a role of assisting in the normalisation and stabilization of RWANDA, the AOR has been therefore divided into five sectors:

- a. SECTOR 1 (KIGALI) : INDBATT AND GHANCOY WITH MILOBS.
- b. SECTOR 2 (KIBUNGO) : GHANCOY AND MILOBS.
- c. SECTOR 3 (GIKONGORO): MALICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 4 (SHAGASHA) : MALAWICOY AND MILOBS.
- e. SECTOR 5 (NYUNDO) : NICOY AND MILOBS.

24. As UNAMIR has been tasked to sustain a UN peace- keeping presence in RWANDA, mainly in KIGAKI, and to assist the govt of RWANDA in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction and in a promotion of a climate conducive to the stability and to the return of refugees, troops will perform the following:

- a. Continue occupying the existing sectors.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist where possible the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security fo the personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of the International Tribunal.

h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices,
where possible.

i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies
in case of need.

IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR

25. UNAMIR Occupation of the HPZ. On 22 Aug 94, UNAMIR took over the HPZ and the French Forces (less FRAFBATT) withdrew from Rwanda. It was at this point that the HPZ became known as Sector 4.

26. Operation FOXTROT. During the French occupation of Sector 4, a Gendarmerie was established which was not recognised subsequently by the newly established Rwandan Government. UNAMIR undertook to successfully disarm and demobilise this force.

27. Reintegration of Sector 4. The RPA was gradually reintegrated in Sector 4 in the Sep/Oct period. During this time, the Government policy of reconciliation was articulated by leaders and Prefect administration was re-established. RPA troops are now permanently deployed throughout the Sector.

28. Operation HOMEWARD. Operation Homeward was mounted in Sep. 94 to capitalise on the temporary availability of UNAMIR resources (principally transport and coordination expertise) to assist relief agencies to relocate IDPs to their homes. Although the operation was relatively limited in its success, it provided valuable lessons as precursor to Operation RETOUR.

29. Operation HOPE

a. Operation Hope was a cordon and search operation which was undertaken by UNAMIR in co-ordination with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO IDP camps (Sector 4) of criminal elements which were looting and committing acts of banditry and murder aimed at discouraging IDPs in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes. The operation was conducted from 13-15 Dec 94. A total of 1,552 UNAMIR troops, MILOBS and support staff participated in the op.

b. The RPA contributed two battalions during the op as the outer cordon troops. In addition, they provided a small number of liaison officers.

c. The operation was extremely successful, as several hundred weapons were confiscated and 44 suspected criminals were apprehended and handed over to the office of the

Prosecutor in GIKONGORO in the presence of Human Rights and ICRC representatives.

30. Operation RETOUR. This operation was aimed at an information campaign to create conditions in the Displaced People's Camps to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their homes while simultaneously gearing up the target communes to receive the returnees. The operation was conducted in three phases.

a. Phase 1.

(1) The preparation of home communes, ORCs, temporary shelters for IDPs;

(2) Information campaign in target camps.

(3) The establishment of conditions in the camp which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

b. Phase II.

(1) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and search procedures in marshalling areas.

(2) The safe movement of IDPs to ORC/home communes.

c. Phase III. Establishment of IDPs in their home communes.

31. Currently two camps have been officially closed by OP RETOUR, Cyanika and Rukondo. Over 35000 IDPs have so far been evacuated by vehicles to various sectors within the UNAMIR AOR.

CONCLUSION

32. UNAMIR since 6 Apr 94 has undergone very important changes. The force in the previous mandate vigorously pursued its mandate to return the country to normality. There was a steady influx of refugees and internally displaced persons to their respective homes in towns and villages across the length and breadth of the country due to the improved security situation in the country. The new mandate assigns to UNAMIR a role of assisting the Rwandese Govt in the normalisation and stabilization of the country, in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of the refugees, and in providing humanitarian aid. The military situation is at the moment stable and the government's policy of reconciliation if pursued diligently by the people and government of Rwanda will yield great dividends.

Date JULY 95

NDIAYE B.S
Lt Col

FINAL REPORT SECTOR 5

Historical Background.

1. General. Sector 5 comprised the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. As is well known these two prefectures were the stronghold of Hutu extremism. The former President of the country was a resident of Gisenyi. As the demography consists of 90 % Hutus the Sector was not as deeply effected during the genocide as the other prefectures. During the genocide less than three percent of the population in both prefectures were killed. These two prefectures also did not suffer large material damage during the retreat of FRGF to Zaire.
2. Importance of Prefectures. The Sector gains importance as Gisenyi is the main entry point being used by UNHCR to carry out organized repat. The refugees in the camps at Goma number approx 650,000. Almost every family in the sector has a member or a relative in the camps. The notorious trg camp which was used to train the Interhamwe at Bigogwe is a part of this Sector. Gishwati Forest in Gisenyi was used by the retreating FRGF as a sanctuary and leave behind a number of arms caches. These caches were used during the later part of 94 and in 95 by infiltrators to terrorize the locals and undermine the security sit in the country. Both the Prefectures have moderate Hutu prefects who have been successful in building a bridge between the local populace and the RPA.
3. The prefectures share borders with Zaire and Uganda and had developed good trade relations before the war. Gisenyi, a well frequented tourist spot, and Ruhengeri were established towns before the war. A large number of expats were living and working in Gisenyi. Tea gardens and Coffee plantations to the south of the prefectures were well developed industries. In addition the rich volcanic soil made the area ideal for a variety of vegetables, corn and banana plantations.
4. UNAMIR. Sector 5 was established with the arrival of two Milob teams to Gisenyi in Jul 94. At this time the Sector included both Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures. The Sector HQ was established in Gisenyi in the Meridian Hotel. Gisenyi Sector 5 has remained in that location to date.
5. Initially and upto Jun 95, Sector 5B Ruhengeri was considered a sub sector of Sector 5A Gisenyi and was subordinate to the Comd of Sector 5A. In Jul 95 Ruhengeri became a stand alone sector and the sectors were redesignated as 5A Ruhengeri, 5B Gisenyi and 5C Kibuye. Each sector was responsible for their operational and logistic needs reporting directly to Milob HQ at Kigali.
6. With the revision of the Mandate on 12 Dec 95 the sectors were

again reorganized. Ruhengeri and Kibuye sectors were closed down around mid Jan 96. Gisenyi again took on the responsibility of Ruhengeri Prefecture. The milob strength for the sector was increased to 28. The milobs left the sector finally on 08 Mar 96 for repat to their home countries.

7. TUNBATT HQ was located in Nkamira with its companies based at Gisenyi, Nyundo, Nemba and Nkamira. The Coy at Gisenyi was moved to Nyundo on the behest of RPA in May 95. TUNBATT was repat in Jul 95 during the downsizing of Form Tps. NICOY moved to Nyundo Camp from Byumba and continued to stay till the end of the Mandate providing lgs bases at Gisenyi and Cyangugu for repat of refugees.

8. The table below gives the details of strengths and deployment.

Date		Milobs		Form Tps	Remarks
From	To	Auth	Present		
Mid Jul 94		2 x Teams			First dply at Gisenyi.
Mid Aug 94					Canadian Fd Hosp est at Nkamira. British Fd Hosp reopens Ruhengeri Hosp later taken over by MSF (Holland).
Sep 94					End of UNOMUR.
Oct 94					TUNBATT HQ moves to Nkamira.
Nov 94	Jun 95		07		Est of Sect 5B at Ruhengeri part of Sect 5A.
Jul 95	Dec 96	28	24		Est of Sect 5B at Gisenyi.
			07		Est of Sect 5A at Ruhengeri.
Jul 95					TUNBATT replaced by NICOY.
Jan 96	Mar 96	30	28		Est of Sect 5 incl Ruhengeri.

Important Events

9. The Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were considered as the stronghold of Hutu extremism. A fair majority of the refugees across the border belonged to these two prefectures. Due to its proximity and long land/lake border with Zaire infiltrations were a usual occurrence. A variety of sabotage, mine and killing incidents were noted over the period with Gishwati being used as a sanctuary. The RPA with its meager force of five bns to look after

both prefectures were unable initially to stem the infiltrations. They attempted to sanitize the Forest area and were partly successful in reducing the number of incidents. Thus over a period of time with changed tactics, strict and sometimes harsh control measures the Sect noted a reduction of security related incidents. The capture of Ile Iwawa was a great morale boost for the RPA and Govt and put back the designs of FRGF leaders for a considerable period.

10. Due to the proximity of the refugee camps on the Zairian side, this Sector has had a decidedly operational slant to its activities. The relations with the RPA have definitely reflected the personality of the commanders either at Bde or unit level. At this time our relations are good and there is a free exchange of information regarding the activities of both organizations. The RPA LO attends our morning briefings as do representatives of all of the UN and NGO agencies operating within the Sector.

11. Certain significant events that have occurred during the UNAMIR Mandate are listed below :-

(a) Looting of WFP Trucks Feb 95. On the 18/ 19 Feb 95 several WFP and ICRC trucks carrying food items to refugees in Goma were attacked and looted. Milobs with armed assistance from TUNBATT in the form of APC's were able to remedy the sit. The looting began with active participation from the OCL from College reception centre with a hostile attitude that the trucks were carrying food for the 'Killers'.

(b) Anti UNAMIR Demonstration. In Apr 95 the locals mainly involving OCL from College reception centre were engaged in an anti UNAMIR demonstration. In the incident the angry locals forced entry into the Hotel complex. The milobs attempted to pacify the mob but were manhandled and two hand held motorolas were snatched from them.

(c) Forced Repat Aug 95. The Zairian Govt implemented their threat of carrying out forced repat of refugees as the figs for voluntary repat were small. Most of these refugees came from Mugunga Camp close to the border. From 20 Aug till the 23 Aug 5794 returnees arrived at the Gisenyi Border Post. The Sector Milobs had worked out a contingency plan with the UNHCR and other NGOS which was put into effect. The Milobs effectively monitored the border posts and transit camps during the period and were thus able to provide valuable real time info to the Milob Gp HQ and the NGOS.

(d) Kanama Massacre Sep 95. On ni 11/12 Sep a group of infiltrators were successful in ambushing a veh of the RPA near Kanama. A offr of the RPA was killed. The RPA in retribution conducted a mass killing in Kanama Commune 2712. Three sites were visited by the milob teams where a total of 101 persons of varying ages and sex were found killed. One grave was viewed and locals reported that an additional seven

bodies had been removed for burial. Milobs, Human Rights and CivPol were involved in the initial investigation. The locals reported the imposition of curfew. They also reported that many were afraid to sleep in their houses and take to the bush during the hours of darkness. The level of fear and mistrust remained high for weeks after the incident.

(e) Iwawa Island Nov 95. One Milob Team visited Iwawa Island on 07 Nov to view the results of the RPA mil action which took the Island from the FRGF. Seven bodies were seen and the RPA had 15 prisoners in custody. The island is mined therefore movement is restricted to the known cleared paths. A significant amount of equipment was captured including mines, HMG's, assorted small arms, explosives and det cord. It was reported that the action commenced the evening of 04 Nov and concluded on 07 Nov at approximately 0800 h. This island was considered a major training and staging base for infiltration to Rwanda. It was reported that the numbers of insurgents on the island was 400-500 broken down as 100 staff and remainder trainees. It was reported that an unspecified number died while attempting to escape from the island.

Returnees.

12. The refugees across the border have been returning in numbers not larger than 2000-2500 NCL per month. It is well known that there exists a fair influence on the refugees by leaders in various camps and intimidators. A constant effort has been made by these leaders with resort to subversive activities in the country thus creating an unfavorable security sit with rumours of harsh treatment by the RPA and local auth. There has been a large influx of OCL particularly from Masisi where reports of intimidation by the Zairian Mil and locals forced even third generation Zairians to flee. The details of returnees and their subsequent resettlement is at Appces A and B.

Prison and Commune Cachot Data.

13. The details are given at Appx C.

Achievements of Milobs.

13. The success of the Milob operation within the Sector cannot be measured by any quantitative means. The presence and regular patrolling by the Sector Milobs did have a calming effect on the situation.

14. The Sector milobs were instrumental in creating a climate of confidence among the UN and NGO agencies operating in the sector. The Milobs briefings every morning provided an ideal forum for

exchange of info and coord of tasks for each day. The Milobs were able to build a cordial working relationship with the local auth and the RPA thus facilitating the working of the NGOs. It is a credit to the Sector that throughout the mission no attempt was made to hijack any UN veh or indulge in armed robbery of UN property.

15. The Milobs were employed in the Mission in atypical fashion where they had no access to monitor the other party (FRGF and ex FAR) in the conflict. It can be also stated here that the effectiveness of the Milobs was curtailed by the Zairian Govt's decision to restrict movement across the border to the refugee camps. They were thus not able to gauge the pulse of the refugees and get details about the happenings in the camps.

Future Prospects.

16. At this time there is a significant amount of apprehension regarding the closure of UNAMIR. This also extends to the non UNAMIR agencies and the local population. The agencies see us as an element of protection and the local population see us as a restraining influence on the RPA. However with the RPA in fair control of the sit at present it appears no alarming incident is likely in the near future.

17. The FRGF will attempt to use all their means to create a sit unfavorable for the return of innocent refugees. In this regard the operation undertaken by the Zairian Govt and UNHCR will be seriously put to test. As of now the guided repat scheme of UNHCR has not been a success. With the change in Zairian Minister of Interior a hardliner stance can be expected. If the leaders at the camps manage to refrain large numbers of FRGF and the militia from leaving Zaire there is strong likelihood of an unpleasant civil war in the future. This assessment presumes that the FRGF will be able to rearm and train themselves adequately in the interim period.

Lessons Learnt.

18. Coord of Hum Tasks. The Milobs were very effective in the coord of hum tasks providing necessary assistance to the NGOs.

19. Joint Investigations. This was another aspect which provided quick and efficient reporting of an incident. The Milobs and the HRFOs were able to work together and follow an incident to its logical conclusion.

20. Withdrawal of UNAMIR. The hasty withdrawal during the genocide period due to the lack of a strong Mandate and the failure later on to build up armed tps in UNAMIR rapidly led to a tremendous loss of face and credibility. It took a lot of effort on the part of the UN community to regain the lost prestige and regain credibility.

21. Milobs for Hum Assistance. There is a need to create a pool of resources available with Milobs HQ for use by the milobs to undertake petty requests from the local auth.

Recommendations.

19. Though the security sit in the country has shown considerable improvement since Jul 94 the local populace and at times even the local auth have shown considerable apprehension regarding the closure of the Mission. The Rwanda Govt is reluctant to have any kind of armed tps presence in the country considering it an affront to their sovereignty. The Govt however does need support of the NGOS who alone are providing for medical care, resettlement and rehab of refugees. The NGOS are likely to severely restrict their activities with closure of UNAMIR. It is therefore strongly recommended that UNAMIR continues in some form. The presence of Milobs in the country, even though unarmed, will provide a semblance of security in the country and a suitable climate for the UN agencies and NGOS to operate. In addition the presence of UN community in the form of Milobs will be reassuring for the refugees across the border.

20. A comprehensive recce needs to be made to identify the immediate needs of the country noting vital sectors. This will help in determining the composition of the force required in terms of engrs, comn, med care and milobs for monitoring tasks.

21. Media can play an effective role in influencing public opinion. Radio UNAMIR came into existence only in Feb 95. Noting the strength of rumours and strong influence by intimidators in the camps radio broadcasts can play a crucial part in confidence building and reassuring the refugees to return.



V Belski
Lt Col
Sect Cdr
Sect 5



INFORMATION CIRCULAR N^o. 019/96


DATE: 7 March 1996

TO: All Military and Civilian Personnel
FROM: Susan Matthew, CAO
SUBJECT: UNAMIR Mission Closure Ceremony




The UNAMIR Mission Closure Ceremony will take place on Friday 8 March 1996 at 1630 hrs at the UNAMIR Headquarters car park.

All military and civilian personnel are encouraged to attend the ceremony and to offer their full assistance for its success.




FROM : SO TO COS
TO : Distribution List
DATE : 7 March 1996
SUBJECT : AMENDMENT TO PROGRAMME OF UNAMIR MISSION CLOSURE CEREMONY

MILUB - C.P.

08/03

Reference A: COS letter dated 6 March 1996.

1. Attached to this memo please amendments to the programme for UNAMIR closure Ceremony which will take place on 8 March 1996.

2. Regards.


HM MUZYAMBA
Capt
SO TO COS

Distribution :
Action:

ED
CAO
COSX
CSO
OSRG (Protocol)
Indbatt
Ghancoy
Malawicoy
Nicoy
Camp Comdt
All Heads of Depts/Branches

Information:

SRSG
FC

PROGRAMME FOR
MISSION CLOSURE CEREMONY
ON 8 MARCH 1996

SRLNO	DATE/TIME	PLACE	EVENT	RESPONSIBILITY	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	081630 HRS	" "	INVITED GUESTS SEATED	CAMP COMDT	Spectators as well
2	081645 HRS	" "	Pde Marches on	Pde Comd	
3	081655 hrs	" "	SRSg and FC Arrive	Pde Comd	Gen Salute
4	081700 Hrs	" "	R.Govt Rep arrives	Pde Comd	Gen Salute/UN Anthem,R.National Anthem
5	081710 Hrs	" "	Reviewing Officers Inspect Pde	Pde Comd	
6	-	" "	Speeches	SRSg and R Govt Rep	
7	-	" "	Beating the retreat	Pde Comd/Indian Mil Band	
8	-		Flag Lowering	Pde Comd	
9	-	" "	Pde Marches off	Pde Comd	
10	-	FHQ Briefing Room & Fore court	Refreshment	Force Welfare Officer	Invited Guests only

TO : MILOB GP HQ ,KIGALI


FROM: SECTOR 3 , BUTARE

DATE : 06 MAR 96

SUBJECT : FINAL REPORT OF SECTOR 3

REFERENCE : Your HQ Letter No MILOB/OPS/43 dated 22 Feb 96 .

- 1. Please find attached the final report (total 15 pages incl Appces) in respect of this Sector .**
- 2. Kindly ack .**



**Keita M' Bemba
Lt Col
Sector Cdr , Sector 3**

FINAL REPORT SECTOR 3

BUTARE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Milob Sector Butare was established on 04 Aug 1994, with the main tasks of monitoring humanitarian aid activities in the communes of Butare Prefecture. The Sector operated as a subsector of Sector 3 and was called Sector 3A until 24 Mar 95 when it became a full fledged sector and changed nomenclature with Kibuye becoming Sector 4B . At about the same time Gikongoro was established as Sector 4A to cover all the communes of Gikongoro prefecture.
2. The problem of resettlement of IDPs which was mainly of Sector 4A spilled over to Sector 4B making both the Sectors to work in close cooperation in that thousands of IDPs, then in camps in Gikongoro came from Butare as evidenced by the 70,000 IDPs resettled in home communes after the closure of all camps by the Rwandese Govt on 18 Apr 95, which operation is popularly known as the Kibeho crisis in which both the sectors actively participated. Butare infact became the transit center from where IDPs were despatched to various home communes.
3. Consequent to the new mandate in Jun 1995, Gikongoro and Butare were reorganized as Sectors 3A and 3B respectively. The two Sectors were amalgamated into one as Sector 3 on extension of the mission and revision of the mandate in Dec 1995 . Milob Sector 3 therefore, now comprises of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures.

IMPORTANCE OF PREFECTURES

4. Butare prefecture lies 136 Kms South of Kigali and is the second largest city of Rwanda. It is hilly and can be said to be heavily populated for its size. Butare is also the educational seat of Rwanda as the only national university is situated here. Prefecture shares borders with Burundi in the South and East .
5. Gikongoro prefecture derives its importance from the fact that it was the buffer zone between the withdrawing FRGF troops and the RPA , buffer being provided by the French troops. This resulted in a large number of people fleeing their homes either into the neighboring countries or the Nyungwe forest . Due to this a large number of

IDP camps came up in the sector. The closure of these camps resulted in a large number of people returning to their home communes. As a result there is a large displaced population in the communes of this prefecture. The other issue is the proximity of Nyungwe forests to the prefecture. The movement of infiltrators into the prefectures of Cyangugu and Kibuye and thereafter into the forest has made the prefecture susceptible to insurgent activities.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

6. Op Homeward. The Milob Sector took part in the initial planning stages of this operation. During the operation the task was to monitor the departure point in various IDP camps. Border monitoring was one of the activity which involved confirming the reports of refugee movement towards Burundi .The Milob teams were also involved in the assessment of situation in the IDP camps in order to provide an update on the humanitarian assistance required in the camps and also to investigate human rights violations.

7. Op Hope. The Milob Sector participated in Op Hope. The tasks assigned to the Milobs during this operation under the command of contingents included the following :

- a. Perform Milob tasks assigned by the respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all the activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform Milob Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of the operation.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities.
- g. Maintain post operation presence in Kibeho and Ndago camps and report situation.

8. Op Retour. The Milob Sector participated in this operation which was information campaign to create conditions in the IDP camps to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their home communes while simultaneously gearing up the communes to receive them. Important tasks performed during this operation were :

- a. Monitor the security situation in the targeted camps with in AOR.
- b. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed troops in the home communes and the camps.

- c. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed troops within the marshalling areas.
- d. Provide Milob escorts for convoys leading to camps , home communes and to those in transit.
- e. Provide continuous liaison with the government authorities , UN agencies, NGOs and RPA .

RETURNEES

9. Month wise details of returnees in respect of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures are attached as Appx A and B respectively.

10. The returnees are settling down well in their home communes but some with difficulties due to the fact that they left their homes a long time ago and have to start their lives all over again. Problems faced by returnees especially who left their homes decades ago are :

- a. Housing / accommodation.
- b. Food .
- c. Farming land .
- d. Farming tools .
- e. Seeds.

PRISON AND COMMUNE CACHOT DATA

11. Latest data on the main prisons and commune cachets in respect of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures is attached as Appx C and D respectively .

ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS

12. While it may be difficult to asses the success of Milob operation in our AOR in quantitative terms, it can be stated that the presence of Milobs in the area and their formal and informal interaction with the locals and the Rwandese authorities has gone a long way in bringing the situation to what it is today .

13. The Milobs were instrumental in creating a climate of confidence among the NGOs and other UN agencies operating in the sector thereby allowing them to effectively carry out their tasks. Timely and effective coordination provided by the Milobs between these various groups operating in Rwanda saw tasks being completed in more satisfactory and efficient manner.

14. Participation of Milob sectors in the crisis management committees set up in the prefectures to provide assistance and coordination in the movement of returnees into the prefectures and to their home communes was very helpful. Milobs were instrumental in providing valuable information to the govt authorities and the NGOs about the situation as prevailing so that efforts could be coordinated. The assistance provided and verification of the situation was continuously done and assessments and probable outcomes in the future were evaluated and passed on to the HQs at Kigali.

15. The Milobs have constantly monitored the situation in the communes as regarding the repatriation and resettlement of returnees and advised the Govt authorities, NGOs and UN HQ at Kigali on the same. Assistance was also provided to RPA in movement of troops, officials and rations. Schools, hospitals, clinics, and orphanages in the prefectures were regularly visited and assistance required assessed and coordinated with NGOs and HAC.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

16. The prefectures of Butare and Gikongoro are expected to remain relatively calm. This can be assessed from the fact that the RPA and the local administration are firmly in control of the situation in these two prefectures.

17. However, it can be easily said that significant amount of apprehension exists in the minds of locals, NGOs and other UN agencies regarding the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda at this crucial juncture. The withdrawal of UNAMIR may cause some increase in incidents of arrests and harassment but is not likely to have alarming proportions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Although, the situation in the country is much improved from what was experienced last year, withdrawal of UNAMIR is likely to cause if not a drastic deterioration but definitely a feeling of insecurity in the minds of local populace and various international agencies thus hindering the normalization process . Also, the hesitation on part of the returnees to return to Rwanda is likely to increase tremendously.

19. In view of above , the following recommendations are offered :

- a. UNAMIR should continue to maintain its presence in some form.
- b. Deployment of Milob teams in the neighboring countries of Zaire , Tanzania and Burundi.

CONCLUSION

20. To conclude, it can be said with confidence and certainty that the Sector was able to perform its tasks and achieve desired objectives most creditably. Appreciation received from the local authorities , NGOs , other UN agencies and the RPA are a pointer in this direction.

RETURN OF REFUGEES IN SECTOR 3**1995 : BUTARE PREFECTURE**

FROM		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL FOR 95
	OCL	3000	79	339	448	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3866
BURUNDI	NCL	—	—	65	—	525 @	750 @	1907 @	3208 @	1735 @	524 @	105 @	4490 @	13309
	TOTAL	3000	79	404	448	1226	2382	2752	3746	1903	659	185	4636	21420#
	OCL													
TANZANIA	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
UGANDA	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
ZAIRE	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
NET TOTAL	NCL													
	TOTAL													

NOTE :**OCL - OLD CASE LOAD (1959 CASES) # Incl spontaneous returnees****NCL - NEW CASE LOAD****@ - SPONTANEOUS (GIVEN BELOW)****May - 701****Aug - 538****Nov - 80****Jun - 1632****Sep - 168****Dec - 146****Jul - 845****Oct - 135**

APPX A (Contd)

1996 : BUTARE PREFECTURE

FROM		JAN	FEB	MAR UPTO 08 MAR	TOTAL 1996	GRAND TOTAL 1995-96
	OCL					
BURUNDI	NCL					
	TOTAL	3106	8713	609	12,428	16,294
	OCL					
TANZANIA	NCL					
	TOTAL					
	OCL					
UGANDA	NCL					
	TOTAL					
	OCL					
ZAIRE	NCL					
	TOTAL	599	769	—	1368	1368
	OCL					
NET TOTAL	NCL					
	GRAND TOTAL					

NOTES :

OCL - OLD CASE LOAD (1959 CASES)
NCL - NEW CASE LOAD

RETURN OF REFUGEES IN SECTOR 3

1995-96: GIKONGORO PREFECTURE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

FROM		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL FOR 95
	OCL													
BURUNDI	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
TANZANIA	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
UGANDA	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
ZAIRE	NCL													
	TOTAL													
	OCL													
NET TOTAL	NCL													
	TOTAL													

NOTE :

OCL - OLD CASE LOAD (1959 CASES)

NCL - NEW CASE LOAD

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES IN COMMUNES

PREFECTURE : BUTARE

YEAR : 1995

COMMUNES	POP BEFO- RE WAR	POP AFTE R WAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	AP R	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL FOR 1995
GISHAMVU	37180	23403					25	17	263	207	105	66	14	45	
HUYE	288332	20260					-	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	
KIGEMBE	54000	21000					762	336	1120	1152	500	210	50	307	
KIBAYI	43270	9315					16	4	395	560	344	79	13	2456	
MARABA	47200	27704					-	3	-	3	4	-	-	-	
MBAZI	26960	25240					-	-	1	66	-	-	-	3	
MUGANZA	38439	10133					2	2	151	453	121	42	-	1094	
MUGUSA	38520	28000					15	5	36	58	16	23	8	5	
MUYAGA	36260	20083					55	-	203	136	223	23	1	134	
MUYIRA	41970	33052					2	-	28	153	85	76	9	53	
NDORA	33000	20000					-	5	14	19	22	14	2	114	
NGOMA	31935	38723					18	3	49	104	61	19	6	19	
NTYAZO	55690	42603					18	5	5	23	29	6	15	36	
NYABISINDU	38000	24050					-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	
NYAKIZU	62000	41000					89	-	81	88	53	22	-	8	
NYARUHENGRI	35050	10031					85	5	316	419	251	66	51	210	
RUHASHIYA	33650	26926					2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
RUNYINYA	44880	30600					13	-	-	12	3	-	-	9	
RUSATIRA	34580	28600					-	-	-	3	7	-	-	-	
SHYANDA	41800	39863					-	3	11	43	15	4	4	18	
NET TOTAL	802696	520586					1104	388	2675	3568	1840	650	173	4511	

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES IN COMMUNES**PREFECTURE : BUTARE****YEAR : 1996**

COMMUNES	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL FOR1996	GRAND TOTAL	POP ON 08 MAR 96
GISHAMVU	66	264				
HUYE	-	02				
KIGEMBE	612	1237				
KIBAYI	623	781				
MARABA	04	04				
MBAZI	-	-				
MUGANZA	439	554				
MUGUSA	55	139				
MUYAGA	370	1431				
MUYIRA	195	383				
NDORA	76	136				
NGOMA	-	92				
NTYAZO	128	463				
NYABISINDU	-	-				
NYAKIZU	77	182				
NYARUHENGRI	339	356				
RUHASHYA	03	01				
RUNYINYA	07	30				
RUSATIRA	02	05				
SHYANDA	09	23				
NET TOTAL	3005	6083				

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES IN COMMUNES**PREFECTURE : GIKONGORO****YEAR : 1995**

COMMUNES	POP BEFO RE WAR	POP AFTE R WAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL FOR 1995
KARAMA								--	01	646	50	04	01	--	702
KARAMBO								--	--	40	--	13	05	06	64
KINYAMAKRA								02	--	449	05	02	07	--	465
KIVU								--	08	26	107	7	3	2	153
MUBUGA								08	--	117	26	07	02	01	161
MUDASOMWA								--	1	148	--	--	01	01	151
MUKO								18	--	83	04	03	06	--	114
MUSANGE								--	01	33	--	--	04	01	39
MUSABEYA								13	--	07	--	--	03	02	25
NSHILI								08	12	45	15	06	24	14	124
NYAMAGABE								--	--	479	36	09	07	01	532
RUKONDO								--	01	417	21	06	03	01	449
RWAMIKO								06	06	167	70	03	02	01	255
NET TOTAL								55	30	2657	334	60	68	30	3234

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES IN COMMUNES**PREFECTURE : GIKONGORO****YEAR : 1996**

COMMUNES	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL FOR1996	GRAND TOTAL	POP ON 08 MAR 96
KARAMA	01	03	—	04	712	
KARAMBO	03	06	—	09	51	
KINYAMAKAR A	07	—	—	07	472	
KIVU	37	316		353	507	
MUBUGA	01	11	—	12	187	
MUDASOMWA	05	06		11	226	
MUKO	03	—	—	03	95	
MUSANGE	01	—	—	01	37	
MUSABEYA	02	—	—	02	17	
NSHILI	17	93	—	110	182	
NYAMAGABE	10	10	—	20	547	
RUKONDO	—	—	—	—	447	
RWAMIKO	19	73		92	436	
NET TOTAL	106	518	—	624	4031	

PRISONER STATE : BUTARE PREFECTURE**(COMMUNE CACHETS & MAIN PRISONS)**

SL NO	COMMUNE	MALE	FEMALE	BABIES	MINORS	TOTAL
1.	MARABA	316	08	----	04	328
2.	MUYAGA	236	05	01	02	244
3.	MBAZI	77	05	01	02	85
4.	HUYE	273	13	03	01	290
5.	KIBAYI	60	06	--	--	66
6.	RUSATIRA	267	21	06	02	296
7.	NYARUHENGER	130	08	03	01	142
8.	NDORA	80	-	03	--	83
9.	NYAKIZU	152	04	--	--	156
10.	MUYIRA	72	01	---	---	73
11.	RUHASHYA	156	06	02	---	164
12.	MUGANZA	85	04	---	01	90
13.	GISHAMVU	194	02	--	02	198
14.	MUGUSA	252	15	03	03	273
15.	SHYANDA	164	02	—	01	167
16.	KIGEMBE	91	08	02	01	102
17.	RUNYINYA	545	21	05	05	576
18.	NTYAZO	145	15	--	13	173
19.	NYANZA	20	--	--	—	20
20.	BRIGADE BUTARE	38	03	--	--	41

MAIN PRISONS : BUTARE

BUTARE PRISON

NYANZA PRISON

MEN : 6179
WOMEN : 215
BABIES : 54
MINORS : 109

2898
165
30
62

TOTAL

6557

3155

PRISONER STATE : GIKONGORO PREFECTURE**(COMMUNE CACHETS & MAIN PRISON)**

SL NO	COMMUNES	MALES	FEMALE	BABIES	MINORS	TOTAL
1.	MUBUGA	32	02	---	--	34
2.	MUDASOMWA	27	---	--	--	27
3.	RWAMIKO	44	--	--	-	44
4.	KARAMA	13	--	--	--	13
5.	KINYAMAKRA	24	--	--	--	24
6.	KIVU	49	--	--	--	49
7.	MUKO	33	--	--	--	33
8.	MUSANGE	56	02	--	--	58
9.	MUSABEYA	21	01	--	--	22
10.	NSHILI	74	--	--	--	74
11.	RUKONDO	77	04	--	01	82
12.	MUNINI	54	03	01	02	60
13.	NYAMAGABE	--	--	--	02	02

GIKONGORO MAIN PRISON

MALES -1481
 FEMALES -22
 MINORS -19

TOTAL -----
 1522

Final Draft
CAIRO DECLARATION ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION

November 29, 1995

ED
Diallo
Benaoud
30-11-95

Deeply concerned about the persistent tensions, hostilities, insecurities, and recent genocide in the Great Lakes region, and their adverse effects on democratic and economic development, the Presidents of Zaire, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda and a special Presidential envoy from Tanzania met in Cairo, Egypt, on November 28-29, 1995. The meeting was co-convened by Presidents Mobutu and Museveni and former President Murewa, with the support of Presidents Nibungu and Shrimungu. Former President Carter of the United States and Archbishop Tutu of South Africa served as facilitators. The Heads of State and Delegations at this summit meeting, which was an African initiative, pledged to take joint concrete actions to advance peace, justice, reconciliation, stability, and development in the region.

The Heads of State and Delegations were convinced that the problems of Rwanda and Burundi were basically a consequence of a confluence of negative interests of ~~colonization and local opportunists~~ who have fostered the ideology of exclusion that generates fear, frustration, hatred and tendencies to extermination and genocide.

The Heads of States and Delegations call upon the international community to condemn vigorously the ethnic and political genocide ideology used in competition for conquest and monopoly of power.

Determined to prevent future genocide, ensure reconciliation with justice relating to the tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and encourage the return of refugees to their home countries, the Heads of State and Delegations affirmed their mutual confidence and decided on the following specific actions:

- a) They condemned the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, other incidents of mass killings in the past, and the ideology of genocide despicably used by some forces to pursue their own selfish ends. They also condemn the other similar acts and events which have occurred in the past and are recurring in Burundi.
- b) The Heads of State and Delegations of the Great Lakes region solemnly pledge that their territories will never be used to serve as bases by armed groups to launch incursions or attacks against any other country represented at this conference. They agree to cooperate by providing all information in advance on suspected persons or on anticipated incursions or armed attacks against another country.
- c) The Heads of State and Delegations in whose countries refugees were currently located pledged to take action to curtail activities of those in the camps who seek to intimidate the refugees wishing to return to their homes. President Mobutu

pledged soon to remove from the refugee camps the identified intimidators. The Tanzanian envoy affirmed his government's desire to isolate all criminals from the refugee camps and will seek cooperation from the international community in acquiring the resources necessary to achieve this objective.

d) The Heads of State and Delegations agreed to prevent military training and delivery of weapons to militia groups or any other groups among the refugees.

e) The Heads of State and Delegations viewed with deep concern the use of radio broadcasts to spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take all possible action to terminate the illegal and inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country into another. They called upon the international community to assist by providing technology to identify the location of mobile transmitters.

f) The Heads of State and Delegations urged an acceleration of the work of the International Tribunal. They solemnly and unequivocally pledged to place at the disposal of the International Tribunal for trial all those indicted by the Tribunal, and urge leaders of all other nations to do the same.

They also expressed full support for the Commission of Inquiry's investigation of the assassination of President Ndadaye and the massacres that followed.

g) The Rwandan Head of State declared unequivocally that his government wanted the refugees to return to Rwanda at an early date, reclaim their property, live in safety and peace, help rebuild their country's economy, and participate in its political life under a broad-based government of national unity. His government will guarantee the safety of the returning refugees. It will work in collaboration with the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and the international community. In cooperation with Zaire, it will work out arrangements by which refugees can return home to assess the situation for themselves and then go back to the camps to apprise the other refugees of the true conditions prevailing in Rwanda.

In addition, other visits to and from the camps by refugees, NGOs, and others will be encouraged.

h) The Heads of State and Delegations perceive no major restrictions to the return of refugees to Rwanda. They believe that when the refugees are convinced of the fact that conditions are safe to return, a large number will go home. A majority will move back to their country with minimum assistance. Working closely with UNHCR and other international agencies, the involved governments believe that the number of returning refugees who avail themselves of UNHCR assistance should rise progressively to 10,000 a day within a short time. There are no impediments within Rwanda or Burundi to an even higher rate of return.

1) The Heads of State and Delegations commend the UNHCR for its continuing efforts to assist the refugees and anchorate their plight in the refugee camps. Its work and commitment are greatly appreciated. The participants would urge in the future the local representatives of UNHCR devote more of their attention and resources toward helping the refugees return and settle safely, even if this requires some modification of the organization's guidelines. The governments stand ready to work with UNHCR in this effort.

j) The horrendous genocide in 1994 massively strained the Rwandan judicial system. It is trying to cope with the unprecedented requirements, including training of many judges and magistrates. It will seek assistance from the international community as appropriate and consistent with its principles. Fully conscious of the conditions in its overcrowded prisons, it will separate prisoners according to the severity of charges against them, move as innovatively and expeditiously as possible to try or release those not guilty of serious crimes, and temporarily augment facilities for housing prisoners.

k) As requested and approved by the leaders of Burundi, the Heads of States and Delegations will provide assistance, and call upon the international community also to assist, in the implementation of the Convention of Government, including support for the National Debate. Security of persons is a fundamental problem in Burundi. As requested and approved by the leaders of Burundi, assistance will be sought to improve the system of justice. The Heads of State and the Delegations will support the efforts of the Burundian government to work out modalities for all the population to regain full confidence in the security forces.


l) The Heads of State and Delegations considered it imperative that the search for peace in the Great Lakes region should be accompanied by coordinated and concrete actions by the international community in mobilize financial resources so as to bring economic and social development to the region.


m) The Heads of State and Delegations agreed to seek solutions to related property and asset issues among governments in the region.


n) The Heads of State and Delegations requested that former presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Toure of Mali, Carter of the United States, and Archbishop Tutu of South Africa analyze in depth the results of this meeting and the continuing problems of the region and prepare recommendations for consideration by the five governments at a second meeting, early in 1996. With prior approval from the five governments, other participants and observers will be invited.


The Heads of State and Delegations were pleased by the frank and constructive discussions that characterized their Cairo Summit. They commended The Carter Center for arranging the meeting.


The Heads of State and Government expressed their profound appreciation to the Government of Egypt and the Egyptian people for their support and hospitality for this historic meeting.



Mobutu Sese Seko


Yoweri Kagame Museveni


Faustin Armand Bazombanza


Sylvestre Ntibunganya


Abdulrahman Kirane


Jimmy Carter
(witness)

29 November 1995, Cairo, Egypt

HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME

Kabgayi Gitarama

Kabgayi 8/9/1995

*Projet de réponse
MBF A.*

Objet: Demande de régularisation situation
judiciaire détenus venant de Kibeho commune
Kigoma.

Mr le Procureur de la République

Permettez- moi de vous écrire pour solliciter l'objet repris en marge. En date du 30/8/95 en visitant le cachot communal de Kigoma nous avons constaté la présence des détenus en provenance de Kibeho dont les noms suivent:

1. SEMAZURU Ephrone

2. KAYITARE

3. MUGANYNTWARI

4. HITIBANJE

5. RUKANDARUHETO

6. KAMANZI

7. MUDACUMURA Eugène

8. MBAHAYO Narcisse

9. SEKIMONYO P. Célestin

10. SEBUKANE Elias

11. GNONRIRA Etienne

12. TUBANANKENGA Martin

13. GATERA Jean


14. MINANY Jean Claude

Nous avons eu accès aux statements de ces détenus. Le quorum des personnes à charge afin de procéder à la détention préventive n'est pas atteint pour certains dossiers alors qu'ils sont détenus pour la plupart d'entre eux depuis le mois d'avril.

Nous vous saurions gré de bien vouloir régulariser la situation administrative de ces détenus auquel cas procéder à leur mise en liberté provisoire sans préjudice de la procédure en vigueur au Rwanda.

Assuré de votre collaboration je vous prie de croire à mes sentiments les meilleurs

Etienne BIGNOUMBA MOUNDEMBA
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER



HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME

Kabgayi Gitarama

Kabgayi , 4/5/1995

*Projet de réponse
* A. A. A. A. A.
* B. B. B. B. B.
* Urgent*

**Objet: Demande de mise en liberté
provisoire de mme NYIRAMPIRE Godelive
cachot communal Tambwe par manque de chef
d'accusations**

Monsieur le Procureur de la République

J'ai l'honneur de vous écrire pour solliciter l'objet repris en marge. En date du 4 /9/1995 lors de nos patrouilles quotidiennes nous avons constaté l'incarcération de mme NYIRAMPIRE Godelive originaire de la Préfecture de Kibuye. Cette dame a été arrêtée le 1/6/1995 par le nommé GAKUBA de Nyarusange civil donc non habilité de procéder à l'arrestation d'une tierce personne. Selon votre I.P.J aucun chef d'accusation ne figure dans le dossier du prévenu car mr GAKUBA est introuvable .

Nous avons interrogé la prévenue devant votre I.P.J qui reconnaît les faits .Mais il ne peut procéder à la mise en liberté de la prévenue dans l'attente des personnes à charge et que s'il la libérait ,il serait en danger a t-il dit.


Nous comprenons toutes ces raisons .Cependant nous nesommes guidés dans notre action que par la procédure en vigueur dans votre pays. Par conséquent ,nous ne trouvons pas normal que l'on puisse garder une personne en détention sans chef d'accusation et surtout si celle ci a été arrêtée de façon illégale comme elle l'a été.

Sans préjudice à la procédure normale au Rwanda nous demandons sa mise en liberté provisoire .

Assuré de votre collaboration je vous prie de croire à mes sentiments les meilleurs

Etienne BIGNOUMBA MOUNDEMBA

HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER



HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME

Kabgayi Gitarama

Kabgayi 23/9/1995

**Objet: Demande de mise en liberté
provisoire détenus arrêtés illégalement
et arbitrairement cachot communal
de Bulinga**

Monsieur le Procureur de la République

**Permettez -nous de vous écrire pour solliciter la mise en liberté provisoire des personnes
suivantes arrêtées illégalement et arbitrairement au cachot communal de Bulinga:**

- 1.MAMIRARORO Vétuste**
- 2.NYIRABATSINDA Alphonsine**
- 3.KAKUZE Dative**
- 4.HABUMUREMYI Donat**

**En date du 20 septembre ,parallèlement à l'entretien que nous avons eu avec votre I.P.J nous
avons interrogé les détenus sus mentionnés en présence de votre agent.Des entretiens que nous
avons eus avec les détenus il ressort ceci:**

**1.Mme MAMIRORO a été arrêtée en date du 17/9/1995 pour participation au génocide sans
mandat à la place de son père qui le lendemain s'est présenté et mis au cachot dans les mêmes
conditions que sa fille.**

**2.Mme NYIRABATSINDA Alphonsine en état de grossesse a été arrêtée le 17/9/1995 pour
participation au génocide à la place de son époux qui n'était pas présent au moment de
l'arrestation.**

**3.Mme KAKUZE Dative ancienne militante du M.R.N.D arrêtée le 5/9/1995 sans autre motif
que sa participation à l'ancien Parti au pouvoir**

**4.HABUMUREMYI arrêté pour participation au génocide le 31/8/1994 , libéré le 7/9/1995
et réarrêté le 27/4/1995**

**Nous avons discuté longuement avec votre I.P.J qui reconnait le caractère irrégulier de ces
arrestations .Mais il ne peut agir librement sous pression des militaires .Il arrive comme dans
le cas de mr HABUMUREMYI que vos services libèrent des détenues dont les arrestations
sont douteuses mais les militaires s'arrangent à monter des scénarios pour réarrêter la personne**

c'est faux, les libérations se font en collige

arrangements

libération

Face à ces agissements illégaux .Nous vous saurions gré de bien vouloir revoir les cas des personnes précitées

Assuré de votre collaboration, je-vous prie de croire à mes sentiments les meilleurs

Etienne BIGNOUMBA MOUNDEMBA

HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER

HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME
Kabgayi Gitarama

Kabgayi le 25/09/1995

**Objet: Observations sur détention
 de mr NKUNRUNZIZA Cyrille et demande de
 mise en liberté provisoire pour vice de procédure**

Monsieur le Procureur de la République Gitarama

Suite à la détention de mr NKUNRUNZIZA Cyrille arrêté le 14/09/1995 par un mandat délivré par vous. Nous avons mené nos propres investigations sur cette arrestation. Permettez-nous de faire quelques observations.

Nous relevons des vices de procédure considérables sur la façon dont les investigations ont été menées.

1. D'abord les investigations n'ont pas été menées par vos services qui sont les seuls habilités par la loi en vigueur dans votre pays mais par les militaires. Sans méconnaître l'importance du pouvoir militaire au Rwanda, nous observons quand même que cela constitue un vice flagrant de procédure vis à vis de la loi et nous met dans le doute sur la sincérité et la justesse de leurs investigations.

2. Nos doutes se renforcent par le fait qu'ils ont interrogé des témoins et mené des investigations à l'insu du Directeur du dispensaire de Kabgayi violant ainsi les franchises hospitalières.

3. En effet en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre l'Autorité Publique ne peut franchir les domaines des lieux tels que les Hôpitaux, les Universités ou les lieux de culte pour y mener des investigations sans une dérogation expresse du responsable des établissements précités. *en vertu de quelle loi ?*

4. Nous rappelons que les Hôpitaux en temps de guerre et de paix sont protégés de toute action militaire de toute investigation sauf dérogation du responsable du dit établissement cette disposition est clairement précisée dans le Droit International Humanitaire cf (protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 art 12 et 13 ratifié par le Rwanda en août 1964)

5. Cela n'a pas été le cas le Directeur de l'hôpital de Kabgayi le Docteur LEGRAND n'a pas été informé alors que les militaires ont mené des investigations dans son établissement et arrêté la victime au sein même de l'hôpital violant ainsi le droit international humanitaire et les franchises hospitalières.

6. Nous avons interrogé les témoins et la plaignante les témoignages que nous avons recueillis n'amènent pas immédiatement une action pénale sur le plan judiciaire contre l'inculpé.

*Ont pas le droit d'incriminer
 investigation au lieu (hospitalière)*

7. L'un des principaux témoins à charge mr Jamuel déclare qu'il a agi devant le fait accompli sans avoir aucune idée de la portée de ces déclarations sur son collègue. Les militaires se sont présentés à lui en disant qu'ils savent tout.

8. La plaignante mlle Clarisse déclare qu'au cours d'une blague Jocelyne aurait dit à son collègue en présence du malade (Clarisse) qu'il était un Interahamwe. Ces déclarations ont entamé le moral de Clarisse qui ne cessait de parler de Cyrille

9. Ces faits recueillis auprès des témoins à charge révèlent l'importance du docteur LEGRAND qui devrait être avisé d'abord sur la conduite de son agent face à une malade déjà traumatisée

10. Il lui revenait en premier lieu après avoir entendu les témoins et la patiente de prendre les sanctions professionnelles qui s'imposent

11. En application des articles 11 et 12 du code de procédure pénale Rwandais, le docteur LEGRAND devrait être au préalable entendu avant de prendre une décision judiciaire qui relève du domaine médical.

12. Compte tenu de ces vices de forme et sans préjudice de la procédure en vigueur au Rwanda nous demandons la mise en liberté provisoire de l'inculpé.

Assuré de votre collaboration, nous vous prions de croire à nos sentiments les meilleurs

Etienne BIGNOUMBA MOUNDEMBA

HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER

Copies

1. Docteur LEGRAND Hôpital de Kabgayi

2. Colonel de Brigade A.P.R

3. Commandant de Secteur MINUAR

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

High Commissioner for Human Rights
Field Operation in Rwanda

HRFOR

Haut Commissaire aux Droits de L'Homme
Operation sur le Terrain au Rwanda

Gitarama, le 03 octobre 1995

*N° 9/1195/011/A/Procé
4-20-95*

**Objet : Demande de remise en liberté des frères
Augustin Ngirabega et Valence Mudahunga
et demande de réarrestation du vrai coupable
Noël Kagunya, tous domiciliés à Masango,
secteur de Gitinda, cellule de Gasiza.**

Monsieur le Procureur de la République
à Gitarama.

Monsieur le Procureur,

Permettez-moi par la présente de soumettre à votre approbation cette demande dont l'objet est mentionné en marge, suite aux enquêtes menées depuis trois semaines sur ce cas. Nous exposons ci-dessous, les résultats auxquels nous avons aboutis et qui motivent notre requête.

A Masango, secteur de Gitinda, cellule de Gasiza, nous avons été le 27 septembre mener nos enquêtes sur le comportement pendant la guerre des trois frères Augustin Ngirabega, Joseph Migabo et Valence Mudahunga détenus depuis bientôt un mois au cachot communal. Nous avons interrogé trois personnes parmi celles que les prévenus avaient citées comme témoins à décharge. Toutes ont innocenté Augustin et Valence pour leur aide et bonne conduite pendant la guerre consistant à avertir des familles qui devaient être massacrées par les miliciens ou à cacher chez eux certaines personnes menacées, dont Patrice Mazimpaka, âgé de 15 ans, fils de Juvine Nzabamwita et Innoncent Ndagijimana, tué hélas par la suite pendant les massacres. La mère de ce dernier, défunt a aussi témoigné en faveur de Valence et d'Augustin tout en accusant Noël Kagunya, du meurtre de son enfant. Elle nous a aussi informé de la libération de Noël qu'elle avait vu de ses propres yeux brûler sa maison et enlever son fils avec son groupe d'interhamwe. A notre question de savoir ce qu'ils savaient de Joseph, les témoins nous ont répondu pas grand chose puisqu'il n'était pas là pendant la guerre.

Nous estimons que compte tenu de ce qui précède la détention prolongée de personnes sans aucune preuve ni témoignage sur leur culpabilité est illégale. Par conséquent nous vous demanderons de bien vouloir user des pouvoirs qui vous sont conférés par la loi afin de faire procéder à la libération des détenus concernés qui sont injustement arrêtés et de lancer un mandat d'arrêt pour la réarrestation du présumé vrai coupable, en l'occurrence Noël kagunya dont la libération compromet gravement la sécurité des témoins.

En vous réaffirmant notre disponibilité à collaborer franchement, veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Procureur, l'expression des nos salutations distinguées.

Thierno GUEYE
Chef de l'équipe du H.C.D.H à Gitarama / Kabgayi

Copies pour information

Colonel Baltazar, Commandant de la Brigade de Gitarama-Kibuye de l'A.P.R.

Lt Colonel Blanchette, Commandant de Secteur de la MINUAR

Monsieur Jean Désiré Nyandwi, Préfet de la Préfecture de Gitarama

Monsieur Martins, Chef de la Mission du H.C.D.H au Rwanda

Monsieur Essaied, Chef adjoint de la Mission du H.C.D.H

Juge Kalan, Coordinateur du Rapporteur Spécial de la Mission

MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE

PARQUET DE LA REPUBLIQUE

G I T A R A M A . -

Monsieur l'Inspecteur de Police Judiciaire
M A S A N G O .

Monsieur, l'I.P.J.

Des informations me parviennent selon lesquelles
des Personnes innocentes dont les noms sont repris ci-après seraient arrêtées
arbitrairement.

Il s'agit de trois frères à savoir :

- 1) NGIRABEGA Augustin
- 2) Joseph MUGABO
- 3) Valence MUDAHUNGA


De la même source (Haut commissariat aux Droits
de l'Homme), le nommé KAGUNYA NOSTI aurait été libéré alors qu'il y aurait des
éléments à sa charge.

Je vous demande, dès réception de la Présente
de me donner des éclaircissements sur le bien fondé de ces deux cas.

POUR LE PROCUREUR DE LA REPUBLIQUE
SUBSTITUT DU PROCUREUR
MBERA Ferdinand.

COPIE POUR INFORMATION A :

- MONSIEUR Thierno GUEYE (H C D H)
K A B G A Y I .



Gitarama, le 13/10/1995

N° 13/289/211/A/Proc'

Monsieur Thierno Gueye

Chef de l'équipe du HCDH à Gitarama.

Monsieur,

Suite à la lettre du 5 Octobre dernier adressée à l'IPJ de Masango et dont je vous ai réservé copie, j'ai été informé des faits suivants:

1. Au courant du mois de Septembre 95, vous vous êtes rendu à la commune de Masango où vous avez mené des enquêtes concernant les personnes suivantes: Ngirabega Augustin, Migabo Joseph, Mudahunga Valence, détenus à l'Amigo Communal et Kagunya Noël.
2. Vous vous êtes ensuite présentés au Bourgmestre, vous lui avez montré le résultat de vos enquêtes et vous lui avez demandé de remettre en liberté les personnes susmentionnées, et d'arrêter le vrai coupable, Kagunya Noël.-
3. Le Bourgmestre vous a proposé d'entendre ensemble les Responsables locaux et les plaignants dans les locaux de la maison communale, ce que vous avez refusé en disant que ce n'est pas ainsi que l'on mène les enquêtes et que vous avez vos méthodes pour les faire.
4. Le Bourgmestre connaissant ses compétences et celles de l'IPJ; vous a fort heureusement, adressé à ce dernier.
5. Vous avez demandé avec insistance à l'IPJ de remettre en liberté les trois frères susmentionnés et d'arrêter le vrai coupable.
6. L'IPJ vous a répondu qu'il ne peut pas prendre une décision pareille sans avoir mené des enquêtes approfondies, car il y aurait des éléments à charge des prévenus.

graphie de votre lettre du 30 Octobre dernier, il y a dans le dossier des témoignages

• témoignages sur la culpabilité de ces personnes.

Le fait qu'il y ait des éléments à la décharge et, peut-être dans cette affaire, pour certains des inculpés ceux-ci priment, n'exclut pas la présence d'éléments à charge.

La présence de ces derniers empêche une décision de mise en liberté sans concertation préalable.

J'essayerai toutefois, dans un souci de justice, d'accorder une attention prioritaire ^{au} traitement de ce dossier dont je ne manquerai pas de vous tenir au courant.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments intégrés .

Pour le Procureur de la République
le Substitut du Procureur

Alberic Ferdinand



Copie pour information:

Madame le Ministre de la Justice

K I G A L I .

Monsieur le Préfet de Préfecture

G I T A R A M A .

Monsieur le Commandant de la Brigade 305

G I T A R A M A - K I N Y A .

Monsieur le Lieutenant Colonel BLANCHETTE

Commandant de Secteur de la MINUAR

K A R O Y I - G I T A R A M A .

Monsieur Ian Martin, Chef de la Mission du HCDH

K I G A L I .

Monsieur Evariste, Chef adjoint de la Mission du HCDH

K I G A L I .

Juge KAEIAN, Coordinateur du rapporteur spécial de la Mission

K I G A L I .