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CROATIA - UNPROFOR OUTGOING CODE CABLES

Index

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 25 January 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-2-91
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN
REGARDING FRENCH CASUALTIES

Alambil
At Gen

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Please find enclosed, for your information, a copy of my letter of today's date, addressed to President Tudjman.

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NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

25 January 1993

CEN 113
CZG-088

Your Excellency,

As you are probably aware, a French soldier was seriously wounded at Paljuz, at 1300 hours on 23 January 1993, due to Croatian Army tank fire.

2. I have just been informed that at about 1540 hours today, two French soldiers have been killed and three wounded, at Karin Plaza area due to Croatian Army shelling.

3. I am bringing this to your attention in the context of the fact that we have been repeatedly asking your authorities for over 72 hours now to cease fire in the area. May I request you to instruct the local forces to comply with this requirement.

4. Needless to say, I am informing New York and Geneva of these casualties to UNPROFOR personnel.

With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Force Commander

His Excellency
Dr Franjo Tudjman
President of the Republic
of Croatia
Zagreb



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

CRYPTOFAX

CZY.008 HSO
25 Jan 93



TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 25 January 1993
(FOR THAROOR)

INFO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Page 1 of 3

FAX: FAX OUT NO:

FROM: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA FAX NOS:
Vance (41-22)-917-00-79
(41-22)-917-00-80

In accordance with your request, I am attaching a summary of our discussions with President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak regarding the Croatian offensive in and around Maslenica.

We first learned of the Croatian offensive around noon on Friday, January 22. We attempted to reach General Nambiar but were informed that he had left the office for a meeting with President Tudjman. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on Friday, I reached President Tudjman who said that the Croats had initiated a limited operation to secure the area around Maslenica Bridge. The President stated that the "police" were attempting to secure the area so that construction of a pontoon bridge could begin. I urged him to stop the fighting immediately. He said that he would do so. Later that afternoon, I spoke with General Nambiar who briefed me on the preliminary reports which he had received. General Nambiar stated that he had dispatched General Gaudreau to the area to assess the situation. I then contacted President Milosevic and urged him to help contain the fighting.

Following the plenary session on Saturday, January 23, David and I discussed the offensive with President Tudjman and Defense Minister Susak. The Croats stressed the importance of rebuilding the Maslenica Bridge and expressed their exasperation with what they described as the continued stalling by the Knin authorities. We urged them to contain the fighting immediately and to bring the situation under control. The President and the Defense Minister assured us that they would do so.

At approximately 5:00 p.m., we convened a meeting with Presidents Tudjman, Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic. We emphasized the crucial importance of bringing the situation under control. We urged all sides to do everything in their powers to contain the fighting. All sides agreed to do so. Thereafter, David and I met with President Milosevic and reiterated the need for restraint. The President said that he would do what he could to persuade the Serbs in the Krajina to contain the conflict. The Croatian delegation departed Geneva for Zagreb at approximately 7:30 p.m. on Saturday night.

On Sunday morning, we received reports from UNPROFOR that shelling had resumed early that morning. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, David and I met with President Cosic. During the course of the meeting, President Cosic received a call from General Panic who informed the President of reports that the Croatian Air Force and Croatian Navy were engaged in an attack on Maslenica. General Panic requested that he be given the authority to use JA military forces in the Maslenica area. President Cosic ordered General Panic not to deploy any military forces until the President had the opportunity to discuss the matter fully with the General upon his return to Belgrade. We expressed our appreciation to the President for the restraint that he had shown. The President responded that it was vital that the Security Council take action against Croatia. President Cosic then left for Belgrade.

Following the meeting with President Cosic, I contacted Defense Minister Susak who assured me that he had given explicit orders to stop the fighting. I asked Susak whether Croatian planes or ships had been involved in the offensive. The Defense Minister stated unequivocally that no planes or ships had been employed. I again urged Susak to do everything in his power to stop the fighting immediately.

Early on Sunday afternoon, we received a report from UNPROFOR that the Croatian commander in Zadar, Admiral Letica, had stated to representatives of UNPROFOR that the cease fire agreed to by President Tudjman was only a proposal and was therefore not binding on the Croatian military. I immediately contacted Defense Minister Susak who assured me in the strongest terms that he had issued a clear order to stop the fighting and that his order was binding on all military personnel.

Despite these assurances, we have received a report this morning from UNPROFOR that the Croatians are continuing military operations in and around Maslenica and Zemunik.

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| OUTGOING FAX NO.: | DATE: 25 JAN 93 |
| TO: GOULDING NEW YORK UNATIONS | FROM: NAMBIAR UNPROFOR ZAGREB |
| FAX NO.: | FAX : |
| ATTN: | FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : TITLE : |
| INFO : VANCE, ICFY GENEVA | |
| SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL FROM DEFENCE MINISTER SUSAK. | |

UNPROFOR-2-92

MESSAGE

- (1) MINISTER OF DEFENCE SUSAK CALLED ME ON TELEPHONE AT 2040 HRS TODAY TO ASK ME WHAT THE SITUATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WAS; I INFORMED HIM THAT OPERATIONS HAD NOT YET CEASED.
- (2) HE REFERRED TO THE LETTER I HAD SENT TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND ENQUIRED HOW THE CASUALTIES COULD HAVE OCCURRED WHEN THE CROATIAN ARMY WAS KEEPING THE FRENCH TROOPS INFORMED OF WHAT THEY (THE CROATIAN ARMY) WAS DOING. I TOLD HIM THAT EVEN IF THAT IS CORRECT, IT DOES NOT CONDONE WHAT HAD BEEN DONE. WHILE TAKING COVER BEHIND THE ASPECT OF EXCHANGE OF SHELLING, HE ACCEPTED THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS UNFORTUNATE.
- (3) I REMINDED HIM OF WHAT I HAVE BEEN INFORMING HIM ALL ALONG - THAT SUCH UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. I ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSURANCES PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND HE HAVE BEEN GIVING SECRETARY VANCE AND US, THE REALITY ON THE GROUND WAS THAT ADMIRAL LATICA AND HIS COLLEAGUES MAINTAINED THAT CEASEFIRE WAS ONLY A PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND NOT BINDING.

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- (4) I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. HE STATED THAT BOBETKO WAS RETURNING TOMORROW AND WE COULD SET UP A MEETING ON HIS RETURN TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION.
- (5) I INFORMED HIM THAT I AM PREPARED TO MEET, BUT THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECT WAS TO STOP THE FIGHTING.

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25 Jan 93

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE 25 JAN 1993 16Z

MOST IMMEDIATE

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TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → 12
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG
GOULDING, UNTAC, PHNOM-PENH
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB
DATE : 25 JANUARY 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-2-90
REF. : REUR MSC-123 AND 124

Handwritten signature
15 Jan

93 JAN 25 17:33
UNPROF-2.90.
Page 1 of 10

1. An annex describes the operational situation as it has been reported to us at 1300 hours today as requested in your MSC-124. The present message suggests a course of action which might be considered, in the light of the situation and its implications.
2. The Croats' strategic objective, as stated by their Zadar commanders to our people there, is the line Bobija - Karin - Nadin - Libane - Tinjske. Despite their early successes due to the surprise nature of the attack, they are far short of achieving this. We estimate that the Serbs are organising for defence and counter-attack, and have sufficient hardware to do so with some effect. One of the uncertain elements is the effectiveness of their command and control. A further element of uncertainty relates to whether the front is going to be widened to include other objectives in this or other sectors. We are doing all we can to minimise this possibility. The Croat proposal for a ceasefire at this time, just repeated in Zadar to Gaudreau and Peterson, would have the Serbs vacate territory still under their control. Although we will convey it again in Knin, this is not a serious position.
3. We remain deeply perplexed by the underlying objectives of the Croatian action. Even were they to attain the line described above, it would certainly not provide them the security they would need to effect a unilateral reconstruction of the bridge and reopening of the Dalmatian highway, as all of it would remain under Serb artillery threat.

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4. The consequences of their action are, however, far reaching. From our perspective, they are:-

- (a) the fact that the implementation of the Vance Plan is, probably, just about back to square one;
- (b) with this, the slow process of confidence-building, without which we cannot move forward on a consensual basis, has crashed, and will need major efforts in many quarters for it to be got back on the road;
- (c) the Geneva peace process itself is brought into question, because of the pressures the situation probably imposes on, especially, the Serb leaders:- perhaps above all on Milosevic and Cosic, rather than on Karadzic.

Although these were perfectly obvious to anyone with knowledge of the situation on the ground, we find it hard to believe that the calculations were actually made. Indeed, it seems to us increasingly that such bizarre conduct came as a result of a fit of pique on the part of some rather inexperienced leaders in Zagreb. We had tried, many times in the last months, when they expressed ungovernable impatience, especially on Maslenica, to spell out for them what we saw as the natural and logical consequences of unilateral resort to force; and had tried to make clear to them, in every context, that there are no short-cuts, and that they have to negotiate the resolution of vital problems rather than go back to war.

5. This being said, we are sure that not even Tudjman has been as exasperated with the Krajina Serbs as we, ourselves. As you know, we have been trying to negotiate with them, so as to secure their compliance, for the last ten months. Our draft reports to the Secretary-General for the Security Council have been bleak and factual and, in recent months, we have been raising the pressure level by going public on their non-cooperation and misdeeds. But this has been a part of negotiation, and we have at all times stayed in touch with them, seeking to find ways to move forward. It has, however, been quite frustrating to sit, as we have, through hundreds of hours of evasive nonsense. (I should add that the Croats have also been rather astute in throwing major spanners into the works at sensitive moments!)

6. Despite these setbacks, we feel that the Secretary-General and the Council will expect us to think beyond the bleakness of the present situation, and try to project answers to the basic questions which will still be with us when the present hostilities cease. We perfectly understand the unlikelihood that the Council will wish, in such circumstances as have been reported in recent months, to blame only one party. Indeed, blaming one side or the

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other is not much good, unless we can use the situation as a means of pressure on both to move forward again.

7. The crucial issue for us on the ground is the UN's reputation for impartiality. In the absence of an enforcement action, and related resources, without the reputation of impartiality we lose whatever moral authority we might still retain; and, perhaps, might as well go home. And driving an army through our mandate, in a unilateral resort to force, must, in our view, be vigorously condemned if we are to retain any credibility in the region. Thus, the ceasefire and return to former positions must, in our opinion here, be one of the foundations of any Secco resolution. One has to bear in mind - if we may say so - the fierce sense of honour which prevails in the region. The Serbs will not be able to absorb this blow emotionally or politically; any more than the Croats can withstand, indefinitely, the non-implementation of the key elements of Mr. Secretary Vance's peace plan of December 1991.

8. Despite the present continuing fighting, we feel that the Council might want, in any deliberation, to seize the fundamental underlying issue which has remained immobilised - so far as we are aware - for nearly a year (though Thornberry was with Carrington when the latter met with the Krajina Serbs in Belgrade in the summer, and Carrington proposed talks). This is, of course, the future relationship between Croatia and its Serb minority. I do not wish to venture into the Co-Chairmen's territory, but we all feel that until Croats and Serbs in Croatia accept that they are going to have to live with, and respect, one another, as majority and minority, there will never be peace here, and anything we do will be "Band-aid". So we should like any resolution to obligate the parties in that direction. There would be loud screeching on the Serb side; but the Croats, too, would have to swallow a great deal of their former rhetoric, and make political accommodations which many of the present Government would resent, and find extremely difficult. I will say no more on this matter because I feel it beyond my direct mandate.

9. The third element which we would like inserted in a Secco resolution would be a reiteration of 743 and relevant succeeding resolutions, and a condemnation - which should not be one-sided - of the lack of seriousness (and the tension this has caused) of the parties so far in carrying them out. In this regard, it might require the parties to meet, under UNPROFOR, at a senior leadership level, to resolve outstanding questions, priority being given to major issues of economic cooperation. The issues might even be listed (chosen with care, to appeal to both sides) in the resolution or an accompanying Secretary-General's report; with the Secretary-General reporting back to the Council by a specified date:- Maslenica, Perucá, other areas of interlocking economic concern. It would be good if the Council were to take a direct interest in the implementation of these basically operational

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matters, because they are very inflammatory. Consideration might also be given, should the Serbs prove of good behaviour (a long shot) to a future requirement for the Croats to lift their economic embargo (which is helping to cripple the sectors without really pushing the Krajina into a better frame of mind, and negotiations).

10. You will appreciate that I am quite tentative about the content of a possible resolution because, inter alia, I am not really informed about a number of matters on which I have touched above. But I fully agree that a balanced resolution, with carrot-and-stick for both sides, and within an overall settlement framework, is what is now required, together with an urgent ceasefire and return to the previous ceasefire line. Without these elements, the future here, for everybody including UNPROFOR, is, probably, far from rosy.

Endall

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN THE UNPA
SITUATION AS AT 1300 HOURS ON 25 JANUARY 1993

BUILD-UP

1. Concurrent with attempts by the Croatian Government to put pressure on UNPROFOR to provide protection for the commencement of construction of the bridge at Maslenica, which lies on the Western boundary of UNPA Sector South, the Croatian Army continued the build-up of its forces along the boundaries of the UNPA Sector South and the adjoining "Pink Zones", throughout the month of January 1993. Croatian Government pressure took the form of ultimatums to UNPROFOR in meetings arranged by Defence Minister Susak with the Force Commander and his senior colleagues at Zagreb on 7 January 1993 and at another meeting at Geneva on 10 January 1993 which was attended by, among others, the Co-Chairmen of the ICFF, President Tudjman, Defence Minister Susak and Lieutenant General Nambar. On both occasions the Croatian Government stand was that in case UNPROFOR could not assure protection for the bridge construction, the Croatian Government would undertake unilateral action on their own. In response, both at the Zagreb and Geneva meetings, it was conveyed to the Croatian authorities that any unilateral action on their part could lead to renewed hostilities in the region and hence, it was essential that the Croatian authorities meet with the Serb authorities at Knin and negotiate some agreement with them before undertaking any action for bridge construction. Thereafter, attempts were made by UNPROFOR representatives to arrange a high-level meeting between representatives of the Croatian Government and the Knin authorities to discuss the issue of Maslenica Bridge as well as other matters of concern to either party. A meeting was agreed to by the Croatian Government at Maslenica on 21 January 1993 but the Knin authorities wanted the meeting to be postponed to 22 January 1993, which, on the other hand, was not acceptable to the Croatian Government. On 21 January 1993, Vice Prime Minister Milas of Croatia conveyed that they were willing to have the meeting on 23 January 1993.

2. While efforts continued to arrange a meeting between the two sides, it was reported by UNPROFOR military observers and troops on the ground that the Croatian Army (CA) was building up its forces along the confrontation line. These included reports on restructuring and relocating its units and formations, training exercises, reinforcement of defensive positions, concentration of newly inducted troops in certain areas, build-up of artillery and tanks, construction of an airfield at Luoići, and intensified patrolling. Some build-up was also reported in areas adjoining the boundaries in Sector East and Sector West, but these were ten to 15 kilometres in depth from these boundaries and not on the boundaries itself. A protest was sent by the Force Commander to General Bobetko, the Croatian Army Chief on 18 January 1993, highlighting the reports he had received and asking that action be taken to honour the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements, but no reply was received (A non-committal reply was later received

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on 23 January 1993, after hostilities broke out).

3. On the Serb side, the Knin authorities brought to the notice of UNPROFOR reports of the CA build-up. These were conveyed to Vice-Premier Milas on 19 January. However, no orders for mobilization were issued on their side. On 20 January 1993, it was reported that the Knin authorities had asked their male population to stay within their homes as a preparation for possible mobilization and had commenced maintenance of equipment in some storage areas. UNPROFOR continued to monitor the situation and report to New York and Geneva on the situation.

EVENTS ON 22 JANUARY 1993 AND THEREAFTER

Sector South

4. The CA commenced its attack at about 0730 hours on 22 January 1993, when it was reported that Croatian artillery positions at Starigrad had commenced shelling of the Serb position at Rovanjaska. Thereafter, over the next few hours, reports were received of CA attacks on Serb positions at Islam Latinski and Zemunik Airport. Reports were also received of Croatian build-up of forces in the Velebit Mountains. The Force Commander called on President Tudjman at 1330 hours on 22 January 1993 and conveyed his serious concern at the unilateral action by the CA, which he said, would result in destabilizing the situation in the area. He asked that the CA halt its offensive immediately and that the forces be withdrawn to previous positions. In response, President Tudjman stated that the actions of the CA were caused by Serb intransigence on the issue of the Maslenica Bridge and that the aim of his forces was to provide security for the commencement of bridge construction at Maslenica. He asserted that his forces would not attack in other areas if the Serbs did not retaliate and stressed that they would not withdraw from the areas captured around Maslenica. At a meeting of UNPROFOR representatives at Zadar with Admiral Letica, Commander of the Croatian Forces, on 23 January 1993, the Croatian Commander conveyed that the objective of his forces was the line southwards from Zrmanja River - west of Obrovac - Krusevo - UNPA boundary - Smilicic - Skabrnje - Nadin, with the aim of securing the Maslenica Bridge and the highway running through it.

5. The Serbs were taken by surprise by the Croatian offensive on 22 January 1993 and responded to the attack by declaring a "state of war" and ordering the mobilization of all its male population, reportedly between the ages of 18 and 60. UNPROFOR-controlled weapon storage areas were broken into and heavy weaponry, including tanks, artillery, APCs, anti-aircraft guns, and so on, were removed and moved towards the area of the fighting. On the afternoon of 22 January 1993, while moving through the UNPA on the road Sveti Rok - Mali Alan, a convoy of Serb TDF was ambushed by CA, who had infiltrated into this area, resulting in 21 Serb dead and some wounded.

6. Since then, the Croatian offensive has continued notwithstanding assurances given by President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak that instructions had been issued to cease offensive action. In fact, Admiral Leticia has conveyed that the Defence Minister's instructions to cease fire cannot be interpreted as executive orders but, in actual fact, was a proposal for the Serbs to accept the aims and objectives of the Croatian offensive. At the time of writing this report, Croatian attacks are continuing in the area of Jasenice, Drace, Smilcic, Biljane and Zemunik. It is our assessment that the CA has committed five to six brigades so far in their main effort in the Maslenica area. The present situation in various parts of Sector South are as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

7. Maslenica Area. Maslenica and Rovanjaska are now under Croatian control. CA has deployed one infantry company and some 81mm mortars each in both these areas. The Serbs are still in control at Jasenice, where reportedly, they now have two infantry companies, supported by an artillery battery. CA troops have reportedly infiltrated in Mali Alan and possibly are holding the saddle area.

8. North of Maslenica Area Serbs have occupied/reinforced positions along the cease-fire line. Serb TDF have reportedly deployed a tank platoon in Podum, artillery battery at Kangrce, a tank company at Rakici, two artillery batteries at Licki Osik, four to five tanks between Licki Ribnik and Sitnik, artillery battery at Uzelci, some heavy mortars at Papuca and an infantry company along with some heavy guns and mortars at Ruka. The situation in the Velebit Mountain area is not clear and Serb artillery continues to shell suspected areas. The CA has reinforced on their side of the cease-fire line, but does not appear to be planning any offensive action in these areas.

9. South of the Maslenica Area. The situation is as follows:-

(a) The CA has captured Islam Latinski on 22 January and Novi Grad on 23 January. The CA has continued to attack Smilcic on 23 and 24 January, but the Serbs appear to be holding on. Some fighting has reportedly recommenced in the area of Smilcic - Biljane at 0800 hours on 25 January, and continues up to this time.

(b) CA has continued its attempts to capture Drace, where a tank battle has continued throughout 24 January and still continues on 25 January. The Serbs are holding on and have reportedly reinforced their positions with a tank platoon, some infantry and some anti-tank guns.

(c) CA has captured Murvica, Smokovic, Musapstan, Crno, Babindub and the southern portion of Zemunik Airport. Serbs continue to hold Goleš and the runway area of Zemunik Airport. Both these areas are under

heavy shelling and attack by the CA.

(d) The Zadar area was shelled by the Serbs for some time on 24 January, but stopped under orders of "Defence Minister" Spanovic. Earlier, the CA had threatened to retaliate by shelling Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac, in case the shelling of Zadar did not cease.

(e) The Kakma area remains quiet, with the Serbs having reinforced their positions along the cease-fire line.

10. Drnis Area. The CA has continued to fire at Zitnic and Kasic from the direction of Pakovo Selo and Mucici, using artillery and tanks. The Serbs have retaliated with artillery fire at 1630 hours on 24 January. The Serb TDF continues to occupy/reinforce positions in this area and two infantry battalion groups are reportedly deployed in the Drnis area and one battalion group at Knin. The Serbs report that four CA brigades are building up for attacks in this area. However, UNPROFOR has no reports so far which substantiate this information.

11. Peruca Area. The Peruca area remains quiet though there is tension and fear on the Serb side. Some CA activity had been reported in Sinj and adjacent areas. The Serb TDF has reinforced this area, reportedly with an infantry battalion and some tanks. In a meeting on 25 January, the Knin authorities stated that they intended to take over the Peruca Dam from UNPROFOR control, as they had reports that the CA was building up two brigades for an attack.

12. Movement of Refugees. Since the commencement of fighting on 22 January, eastward movement of Serb refugees has been reported from the area of hostilities into towns/villages in depth, including Knin. UNPROFOR assisted with the evacuation of approximately 200 civilians from Smokovic on 23 January.

13. Meeting with Knin Authorities on 25 January 1993. The Sector Commander and his senior colleagues attended a meeting with "Defence Minister" Spanovic, "Interior Minister" Martic, TDF Commander Novakovic and Chief of Police, Cusic, at 1000 hours on 25 January 1993. Spanovic expressed disappointment with the fact that UNPROFOR had not provided any assistance to their side and said that the Serbs had "been pushed to the wall". He stated that they intended to take over the Peruca Dam as they had reliable information that two CA brigades were concentrating in the area with the aim of capturing the Dam. He also reported the build-up of four CA brigades for attacks towards Drnis. Spanovic and Martic expressed strong resentment at some actions of the French troops who, in their view, assisted the CA. They said that the French troops were not welcome any more. The Sector Commander has asked them not to do anything that would aggravate

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the situation and assured them that the allegations against the French were untrue.

Sector North

14. Mobilization of the TDF in Sector North commenced on 22 January 1993. On the night 22/23 January, almost all weapon storage areas were broken into and most heavy weapons were removed. The TDF has occupied positions along the cease-fire line on 23 and 24 January with infantry, tanks and artillery. Some of these forces have reportedly been moved to Sector South as reinforcements. The Serb TDF/militia have closed the Turanj crossing point and have reportedly placed some restrictions on movement of UNPROFOR personnel in the Vojnic area. These restrictions have been protested by the Sector Commander. No activity has been observed on the Croatian side of the cease-fire line, though the Serb TDF allege that the CA have moved two brigades into the Karlovac area. The UNMOs are patrolling areas on the Croatian side of the cease-fire line and the Sector is monitoring the situation closely.

Sector East

15. Mobilization commenced in Sector East on 22 January. All weapon storage areas were broken into and heavy weapons removed. The Serb TDF has occupied positions on the cease-fire line with infantry, tanks and artillery. Some positions in depth have also been occupied. Mine laying by the Serb TDF has been reported in some areas. The bridges at Batina, Erdut and Ilok are closed. Some cease-fire violations have occurred over the past three nights, but these have not been more than usual. At approximately 1140 hours on 24 January, 60 members of the "Arkan Tiger Brigade" forced their way through the UN checkpoint at Batina Bridge. They returned through the bridge after a complaint was made to the TDF commander.

16. Mobilization orders have resulted in a fresh wave of tension and fear among the minorities within the UNPA, some of whom have requested to leave the sector and cross over to the Croatian side. Negotiations have been conducted by UNPROFOR with the authorities on both sides and approximately 75 people are reportedly being allowed to cross over to the Croatian side on 25 January 1993, while some others have been placed under UNPROFOR protection.

17. No build-up of CA has been observed so far along the cease-fire line, though some reinforcements of tanks, APCs and some other weapons were reported approximately 10 to 15 kilometres from the cease-fire line since approximately two weeks ago.

Sector West

18. Concurrent with the other sectors, mobilization of the Serb TDF has taken place in Sector West on 22 and 23 January.

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However, though the weapon storages have been opened in a few cases, no weapons have been removed so far due to the local Serb authorities having accepted the assurances of the Sector Commander that presently there is no build-up by the CA and that UNPROFOR takes responsibility to prevent CA attack on to the Serb areas. Notwithstanding the current acceptance of the Sector Commander's assurances by the local Serb authorities, this situation is not likely to continue for long as, reportedly, the local Serb authorities are under increasing pressure from Knin to remove the weapons and occupy positions along the old cease-fire line and any delay on their part is likely to be viewed by the Knin authorities as "disobedience" of their orders.

Meeting at Zadar

19. The Deputy Force Commander, Peterson and others have had a meeting with the Croatian Army authorities in Zadar at 1100 hours. Report on the meeting is awaited.

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Paid
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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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'93 JAN 25 13:57
TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 25 January 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR - 89
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT - CENTRAL B-H.

Copy of cable from Kiseljak on the subject is forwarded for information.

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| OUTGOING FAX NO. | DATE: 24 JANUARY 1993 |
| TO: HQ, UNPROFOR ZAGREB | FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK |
| FAX NO.: | FAX: |
| ATTN: FC, DFC, COS, CIV AFFAIRS, CHIEF MILINFO, & H O'S | FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : LTC CASPERS TITLE : DACOS G 2/5 RELEASING OFF. : CORDY-SIMPSON SIGNATURE : R. Cordy-Simpson |
| INFO : INTERNAL: COMD, DCOMD, COS, CIV AFFAIRS, G 2/5, G 3 | |
| SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT | |

SUBJECT: CROAT INTENTIONS FOR PROVINCES 3, 8, and 10

BACKGROUND

1. Since the GENEVA talks in early January, tensions have steadily increased between elements of both the Croat HVO and the principally Muslim Army of BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BH) in Central and Southern BH. Discord between these elements seems to exist every time the pressure from Bosnian Serb forces lulls, and is significantly related to ethnic perceptions over the Peace Plan.

2. The tensions seem to be most severe in areas where there is no clear majority of either ethnic group in a particular oblast. This does not prevent areas like PROZOR (majority Croat) or JABLANICA (majority Muslim) from experiencing the effects of ethnic turmoil. Over the past week, the political and military leaders of the Croatian Community of HERCEG-BOSNA have begun to implement their "understanding" of the proposed settlement for the conflict in BH. This premature and imperfect grab for control of provinces 2, 8, and 10 has resulted in extremely high tensions in these and adjoining areas, and heavy fighting between Muslim and Croat units in and around GORNJI VAKUF.

3. Ethnic perceptions of the meaning of the new provinces as proposed in GENEVA are not just localized. This can be illustrated by 2 orders attached: one from Mr Rajic, Defence Minister for the Republic of BH; the other from Brig Petkovic, Commander of the HVO.

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UN CONFIDENTIAL

4. Local tensions express themselves in a variety of ways; from denying Muslim citizens access to government facilities until they sign loyalty pledges to HERCEG-BOSNA (seen in late October 1992 in NOVI TRAVNIK); to the current declaration of control of all military forces remaining in the area, which resulted in the recent fighting between these "allies".

5. At present, ECMM and UNPROFOR are in the process of trying to bring an end to the violent fighting between HVO forces and BH Army units in the vicinity of GORNJI VAKUF. A ceasefire arranged for 23 January 1993 had only limited effect.

GORNJI VAKUF

6. In summary, BRITBAT believes that the HVO commander from TOMISLAVGRAD, Col Siljeg, is largely responsible for the continued attacks on GORNJI VAKUF. It is understood that Mr Boban has in the course of today ordered Col Siljeg to stop fighting. Further reports indicate that:

a. The southern part of GORNJI VAKUF is quiet where the Muslims have given way.

b. GORNJI VAKUF has been struck by BM21 rocket launchers at least 4 times. Artillery and tanks have been continuously employed, with T-55 tanks firing single rounds into houses.

c. The town of KRISTINA has been ethnically cleansed by the HVO, with all Muslim houses burning.

7. The HVO has also laid down a number of conditions to local Muslims, including the surrender of arms into a joint HVO/Muslim authority (not yet created), and the demand for a number of Muslims to be held accountable for war crimes. The HVO has further stated that Muslims may stay in GORNJI VAKUF if unarmed.

EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT

8. The current conflict in GORNJI VAKUF and surrounding communities has been exacerbated by the presence of units of both sides from other areas. During the build-up of forces in late 1992 around TURBE, both BH Army and HVO units were rushed into this area to prepare the defense against Serb forces. Many of these units remained in Central BH as that front settled and the Geneva Conference provided a prospect for peace. Most incidents of direct conflict between Muslims and Croats have been initiated by members of these external units.

9. Coincidental with the recent preparations for a return to GENEVA, HVO units from the clearly Croat-dominated southern obstinas have been moved into Central BH. Incidents of civil disobedience in Muslim-owned and -operated businesses and, almost

UN CONFIDENTIAL

certainly, the terrorist bombing of the car belonging to the Muslim Mayor of TRAVNIK, trace back to members of these HVO elements from the South.

10. As tensions increased and HVO demands for control of these areas expanded, Muslim heavy elements from ZENICA and vicinity were moved in to reinforce in-place forces with predictable results. More disturbingly, UN-source reports of soldiers wearing patches identifying them as members of Croatian Army (CA) units in this area have been received. The role of these soldiers is not clear, but the sightings tend to correlate to areas where HVO units from southern oblasts are positioned.

IMPACT ON UNPROFOR/UNHCR OPERATIONS.

11. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GORNJI VAKUF still remains the primary resupply route into BRITBAT's area, with HQ B Coy stationed in this town.

12. The recent slaying of a British UN soldier occurred as a result of this internecine fighting, and considerable time, assets and efforts have now been diverted from BH Command's humanitarian mission in order to try to help implement the ceasefire between Muslims and Croats.

13. Primary and tertiary delivery routes for UNHCR relief run through this area. This relief has understandably had to be diverted along the MOSTAR route or suspended for the time being.

14. On 20 January 1993, the MOSTAR UNHCR field officer met with Mr. Tadic, the minister appointed by Mate Boban to coordinate assistance in HERCEG BOSNA, and municipality leaders from the southern and central areas. Mr. Tadic stated that all future deliveries of aid for this region must be made directly to the local government (HERCEG BOSNA) and not to the more ethnically neutral coordinating committees as heretofore. The officer was also informed that if UNHCR declined to comply with this instruction, the HVO would close the border at METKOVIC to UNHCR traffic.

15. Security of UNHCR field offices and convoys in this area is increasingly uncertain. HVO elements have threatened UNHCR representatives and facilities for "feeding the Muslims".

16. Muslims are expressing their resentment for current HVO actions, the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the lack of Western military intervention on their behalf by threats and low-level violence, such as last week's hijacking of a UNHCR vehicle and personnel in JABLANICA. This insecurity is significantly impacting the volume and breadth of coverage of aid deliveries in and throughout this area.

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CRISIS IN CROATIAN UNPAs.

17. A direct connection between the Croat assertion of authority in Central and Southern BH and the outbreak of fighting in UNPA South, with resultant tensions in the other Croatian UNPAs, is difficult to establish. The timing in relation to the resumption of the GENEVA Talks and the presence of CA soldiers within Central BH raises significant concerns.

ASSESSMENT.

18. It is difficult to assess why the Croats should be taking such a hard line. A quieter approach would seem to offer only a slightly longer transition to probable political dominance with international approval. Whether to try to stabilize this tense area, or more likely to remind the Muslim leaders that once peace breaks out they must then deal with the Croats, there are some things which are certain:

a. There is absolutely no doubt that the Croat leaders in BH read the current provincial plan as guaranteeing them control of a three province "ethnic canton". Their protestations that they are only trying to prepare for the implementation of the GENEVA Plan clearly show the hegemonist interpretation they put on the plan.

b. It is equally obvious that the allies against "Serbian Aggression" will, at best, be uneasy rivals during the implementation phases of the GENEVA Plan.

c. Any settlement of the current trouble will lie in the negotiator's ability to convince the Croats to accept the limitations placed on their control of these provinces by the constitutional requirement for free and democratic elections included in the GENEVA Plan.

19. The significant Muslim minorities in the new provinces will inevitably carry considerable weight in the infrastructure of these provinces if the democratic processes are allowed to prevail. Currently, with the exception of Province 3, HVO and Muslim/BH Army forces are not separated in the basic alignment for withdrawal of forces to the provinces. All forces will have to be separated on clear delineation lines to effect any Plan.

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C24-1
UNPROF-07
C26. 86
6/7

THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
HQ HVO
No. 01 - 70/93
Mostar, 15 January 1993.

THE DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Based on the decision of HVO HZ II-B. No 01-1-32/93 from 15 January 1993 and the order of the Head of the Defence department No 02- I/1-9 from 15 January 1993, in connection with the agreement about the establishment of BH from Geneva and also the competences of the command of Armed forces in the provinces,

1 ORDER:

1. All formations of the HVO Armed forces and the BH Army in the area of the provinces 3, 8, 10 (croat provinces) are under command of the HQ HVO, which means under command of the OZ (Operative zone) Middle Bosnia, SZ (North-west) and JI (South-east) Herzegovina.
2. All HVO formations in the areas of the provinces 1, 5 and 9 (muslem provinces) are under command of the HQ BH Army (part of the brigades of OZ Middle Bosnia).
3. The HVO forces in the communes of Kiseljak and Kresevo so far are under command of the HQ HVO, which means OZ Middle Bosnia.
4. The members and formations of the HVO Armed forces and BH Army who will not be subordinated to the command mentioned in the paragraphs 1. and 2. of this order have to leave the areas of the provinces they do not belong to, otherwise they will be treated as paramilitary and disarmed.
5. Officers of the BH Army have to be represented also in the command of the HVO Armed forces at the level of OZ (Operative zone) and brigades according to the number of soldiers in the battlefield.
This is also the realisation of the common command agreement.
6. Those officers of the BH Army who by their former work made influence on the breaking relations between croatian and muslem populations can not be in the common command.
7. OZ commanders are obligated to start negotiations with the BH Army commands and to find the best solutions for forming of the common command.
8. The term for the execution of this order is 20 January 1993.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Sarajevo, 18 January 1993
Ref.: 01/93

CEN-111
UNPROFOR-89
C26: BG
7/7

According to the agreement suggested and partly signed at the International Conference for the former Yugoslavia, and according to the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Geneva agreements), and with the aim of establishing peace on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of protecting the citizens and their properties, I declare:

ORDER

1. All units of the Croatian Defence Council, which are in this moment settled in provinces 1, 8, and 9 declared as Moslem provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements, are to be placed under the higher command of the BH Army Headquarters.
2. All units of the BH Army which are in this moment settled in provinces 3, 8, 10 which are declared as Croatian provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements, are to be placed under the higher command of the HVO Headquarters.
3. All units of the Republic Srpska in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are to be removed with all personnel and material into the provinces 2, 4, 5, which are declared as Serb provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements.
4. All units of the Croatian Council of Defence, BH Army and Serb Army which are in this moment settled in the province 7, having a special treatment according to the Geneva agreements, have to stop all conflicts.
5. This order will be valid in all hereabove mentioned points until the final agreement, signature and new order about implementation of the Geneva Peace Agreement.
6. The responsible persons for the fulfillment of this Order are:
 - Brigadier Milivoje Perkovic, Commander of the HVO Headquarters.
 - Colonel Sefer Halilovic, Chief of the BH Army Headquarters.
 - General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Serb Army in Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

MSC00787

CRYPTOFAX

'93 JAN 26 -8 :13

CGZ 011

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
FROM: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA
DATE: 25 JANUARY 1993
SUBJECT: ICFY BH CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS

J. B. Briz
UNPROFOR 10

1. Not much progress today. A map for Sarajevo was discussed with Serbs and Muslims but was not acceptable to either. A government structure (see yesterday's report) in provinces was also discussed but was not appealing to the Serbs.
2. The provincial map was also considered in various meetings. It is not acceptable to the Serbs and Muslims for a variety of reasons. The Serbs consider it does not give them a fair share of industrial capacity in addition to their usual arguments about Serb ownership of the land. In fact, at this stage, they appear to want to retain all of their ill-gotten gains. In particular they argue they should get Dobož and the Serb salient running south-east from there. The Muslims, it is feared, are encouraged by news from Washington and President Clinton's emerging foreign policy. Not much appears to be acceptable to them.
3. Further bilateral discussions are planned for tomorrow and possibly a plenary Wednesday or Thursday. It depends on whether one of the parties is prepared to make some concessions to start moving things along.
4. Mr Vance called Zagreb, prompted by the unfortunate news of the French casualties in Sector South. I understand he debriefed you by 'phone. Your message to COS BH COMD has passed the full circle and arrived back here.
5. Incidentally, the CAO's office has indicated that Lt. Col Mbogo should return to Zagreb. This is a busy seven-day a week liaison office and I formally request that he remain.

MSC-124

24 Jan 93

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CNZ - 057 / CYZ 041 P1/1

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
VANCE, GENEVA

FROM: GOULDING, NEW YORK *hashipman*

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: MSC - 124

SUBJECT: Continued Fighting: Security Council Action

13 JAN 24 10 54 46

1. For Nambiar: Many thanks for your UNPROFOR-2-085 and 086. In order to permit the Secretary-General to present the situation appropriately to the Security Council on Monday, most grateful you send us a summary of events, updated to (say) 1300 hours your time on 25 January, together with an indication of the kind of action that you believe will best strengthen your hands at this time. We will do our best to obtain the support you need, but must caution you that the mood described in our MSC-123 will militate against a straightforward repetition of the "resolution 762" scenario.

2. For Vance: Greatly appreciate the discussion in telecon Vance-Tharoor today. For our approach to the Security Council, would also welcome receiving, as of 1300 hours your time Monday, a brief account of your efforts with the Croatian authorities and the assurances given (and violated) by Zagreb in regard to cessation of hostilities.

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93 JAN 25 - 5:18

Office of the Secretary-General
Palace of Nations

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24 Jan 93

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

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24 93 JA 18

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Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE : 24 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 86

SUBJECT: SITUATION AROUND MASLENICA: UPDATE

93 JUN 24 18:34

Palat

JUN 24 18:34

1. Details of the situation as at 1500 hours today are contained in Sector South sitreps forwarded under our UNPROFOR-Z-85 a couple of hours ago. Shelling towards Zadar, which had ceased yesterday evening, recommenced around 1230 hours today, but Zadar itself has not been shelled today. The Croats had already warned that if it were to begin again, they would retaliate on Knin, Obrovac and Benkovac. For their part, the Serbs have said that if Knin is shelled, so also will Zagreb; we estimate this is within their capability. CivPol has evacuated approximately 200 women and children from Smokovic to Benkovac, and the Serbs are evacuating Medak. A French detachment at Zemunik is sheltering in foxholes and cellars because of the proximity of belligerent positions and the intensity of hostilities. Some of its positions have been hit several times by the heavy weapons of both sides. Sector South commander is looking into the evacuation possibility of this group. Sector South has described the problems of providing updated and overall pictures because of communications' and evident operational difficulties.

2. Early this morning, Goran Hadzic and Spanovic came to Sector South Headquarters and conveyed the following message to us: - that they would be ready to discuss the situation on the basis of whatever we proposed, and would accept our mediation, but would do so only when there was a ceasefire. Meanwhile, they said, they had sought military assistance from Cosic and General Panic in Belgrade. We later heard from Wilson in Geneva that Cosic had not agreed to a proposal from Panic that JA aircraft be deployed in support. Panic has been trying to reach us in Zagreb this afternoon.

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3. Gaudreau is back in Knin and led talks this afternoon with Hadzic and Spanovic, together with Rob and Peterson. Spanovic emphasized his orders not to shell Zadar, but only military objectives in the vicinity. He said they urgently wanted a ceasefire but that they would not talk to the Croats until there was one. Knin understood the Croats' need to have this area and had the meeting taken place at Maslenica, as planned, something could have been worked out. We also have the representatives in Zadar whom we deployed there on Friday. They are in close touch with CA leaders. They reported at approximately 1300 hours through Knin as follows: - The CA believes that it has now attained phase 1 of its objectives, namely a security line; however, a number of Serb strongholds continue to hold out along the line. Phase 2, that of consolidation, is now beginning. They are reported to be in confident mood. As regards negotiations, they are not ready to consider even a temporary ceasefire unless the Serb side concedes three points: - the security line; the complete withdrawal of Serb troops from the area of their concern; and no new movements of Serb forces towards the CFL. However, they are seeking confirmation from Zagreb for this position at this time.

4. I was briefed this morning by two UNMOs who had spent the last 48 hours observing the situation. They said that the CA attack had been carefully prepared and was fully coordinated. They believed its objective was as stated, namely, the securing of the bridge area and the highway in the vicinity. The Serb side had been caught totally by surprise and were quite unprepared. The CA had made initial rapid inroads, and had by yesterday afternoon almost attained their objective. However, they had failed to overcome the prepared Serb defensive positions. The Serbs were now moving up much reinforcement and heavy weaponry, of which they had the preponderance, but still appeared disorganised and confused. There was general mobilisation. They expected a Serb counterattack immediately they were ready. They believed the Croats would want to talk peace as soon as possible; the Serbs, perhaps some days from now.

5. I have asked Gaudreau to ask Rob to look at our Peruca deployment to see if it would be feasible and desirable to reinforce there.

6. Gaudreau and Peterson have been tasked to visit Zadar as soon as possible to meet up with the CA local command and explore the question of an end to the hostilities. They have no mandate to conduct substantive negotiations. I have asked them to report tomorrow morning. At this time I shall consider whether the time is ripe to begin exploratory talks on the ground. ENDALL.

MSC-123
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CNZ 056 CYZ 040 P1/1

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TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓
FROM: GOULDING, NEW YORK *hashi*
DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993
NUMBER: MSC-123
SUBJECT: Continued Fighting: Security Council Action

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We have taken note of the contents of your UNPROFOR-Z-080 and the most instructive analysis in your 081, for which many thanks. While we understand the concerns of the Knin authorities about the nature of the Security Council's action on the Croatian offensive and take your point (your 081, para 4) about the passage of resolution 762 in response to a lesser incursion, it should be apparent from our MSC-116 that the mood in the Security Council is not wholly sympathetic to the Serb case. We will, as necessary, draw the Council's attention on Monday to ongoing developments, but any statement or resolution emerging from it is likely to be equally critical of Serb violations and non-co-operation with the Vance Plan. Though members of the Council are opposed to any attempts to find a military solution to the standoff in the UNPAs and Pink Zones, many have become almost as exasperated as the Croats by the behaviour of the Serbs in these areas. In this respect the situation differs significantly from that of resolution 762 in June 1992, when the last Croatian offensive was seen as undermining a viable peace process. But we note your concerns and are sure the Council will wish to help uphold your credibility and effectiveness.

CNZ 054 CYZ 039 Pl/1

144/93
23 Jan 93

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~~CODED CABLE~~

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓

FROM: *for* GOULDING, NEW YORK *Thamphawee*

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: MSC-121

SUBJECT: Peruca Dam

1993 JAN 23 P 12:12

We have taken note of disturbing contents of your UNPROFOR-Z-082. At this stage it does not seem to us that there is any useful action that could be taken at Headquarters, particularly since you have not seen evidence for these allegations. Should you receive additional information confirming the seriousness of this threat, we could make a public appeal to both sides in the name of the Secretary-General, if you judge that this might help. Please advise, when appropriate, on the wording and timing of such an appeal.

93 JAN 23 21:30

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Public Information Office

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23 Jan 93

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COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION

23 93 JA 19 312

Page 1 of 2

CZN-104
CZG-079

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

Radric Thomsen

DATE : 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-082

SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM "RSK"

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1. We have just received (2000 hours local) the attached letter from so-called Minister of Defence Spanovic. It has reached us through Sector South.

2. Similar reports have come in during the day. We have not seen evidence for such allegations, though a concentration of Croatian Army is reported near Sinj, some kilometers to the south of Peruca. The dam is still prepared for demolition and is, obviously, highly vulnerable and extremely dangerous. Martic has also threatened to blow it.

Endall

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Palais des Nations
93 JAN 23 19:56

Z - 082

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Translated from Serbian

RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

No.: 01-52-1/93

Knin, 22.01.1993

- Gen. Batish Namliar
- Sector South HQ

According to the information that we have Croatia is planning an attack against UN forces on the HEPS Peruca and the taking over of the same.

For these intentions it has planned and executed preparations of the 126 brigade and special saboteur units from Split. At the same time Croatia is planning to blow the dam up because of which it is already evacuating the population from Trilje and Omis. For this act they wish to put the blame on the Serbs.

Please inform the UN Security Council of these intentions, and please undertake URGENT MEASURES IN ORDER TO PREVENT A DISASTER.

Minister
Colonel

Stojan Spanovic

23.01.1993

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CZM-103
CZG-048

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

93 JAN 23 18:59

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23 JAN 1993 18:59

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Page 1 of 5

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 081

SUBJECT: CONCERNS OVER THE CONTINUED FIGHTING AROUND MASLENICA

1. Together with my senior colleagues, I am trying to assess the various implications of the still developing and widening situation caused by the extraordinary Croatian action. DRC Gaudreau came from Knin to report to me this afternoon and is returning tomorrow morning.

2. On the ground, fighting is continuing, and the Serbs are continuing to move up heavy armament. A general mobilisation is taking place in the sectors and heavy weapons are being broken out of the double lock storage depots. Crossing points are being closed or restricted, and there are reports of UNPROFOR personnel not being permitted to leave Sector East. Zadar is being shelled. My tentative impression is that the Croatian Army has found it heavy going, though they made initial quick advances due to a virtual unpreparedness on the Serb side. The danger of a more general conflagration is not utterly remote.

3. The Croatian military in Zadar have conveyed, through Sector South personnel who were sent there to liaise immediately the fighting began, their willingness to begin ceasefire talks with Knin, as well as a threat to shell it and Benkovac. The terms which they have suggested i.e. a withdrawal of Serb forces behind a line which they have previously described as their objective, with UNPROFOR controlling the vacated area, seem unlikely of acceptance. Rob and Peterson conveyed these this afternoon to Hadzic, Spanovic and Martic in Knin (expressing no view on the matter, but emphasizing that they were acting only as postmen). The Knin authorities said they were willing to talk, on certain conditions, including a full withdrawal of the Croatian forces to their previous positions, and would give their answer at 1000 hours tomorrow, Sunday.

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Z - 081

4. As you will appreciate, we have consulted extensively within headquarters on the situation, and are deeply concerned to retrieve whatever can be retrieved. A first step has been the issuance of a press statement to correct much disinformation which has been circulated locally. We did not issue yesterday, although I did a TV and some radio interviews, and I and the DCM spoke to some of the international press. The current text has already been sent to DPI in New York. There are now several major dangers. First, it is hard to see how we shall, for the foreseeable future, be able to move forward on the implementation of the Vance Plan. Everything the Serbs had alleged of Croatian intentions has, unfortunately, been vindicated, even if their own intransigence (which they of course attributed to their mistrust of the Croats) may have been, at least in part, to blame. How can we talk of disarmament of their police, return of heavy arms to storage, non-victimisation of Croats, restoration of law and order, institution of UNPROFOR border controls, etc. etc.? The second, of course, is that we are in grave danger of losing most of our credibility: - not only in terms of our effectiveness, but also in terms of our impartiality. You will have seen Zecevic's letter today to the Secretary-General complaining about what he regarded as an inadequate Security Council response. We can understand the reluctance of the Council to take other steps on the eve of the renewed Geneva Conference; though Croatia did not, apparently, hesitate. However, you will recall that in the case of a much lesser sin, over the Miljeveci plateau, there was a specific directive to the Croats in a SecCo resolution to pull the military out. We are inclined to feel that it could jeopardise the United Nations' reputation locally if the Council does not take more formal action in the present matter which, if the fires are not rapidly extinguished, could lead to a descent into general warfare. We are appalled by the irresponsibility of the Croats in this matter, although we were all too aware of the war mentality of some of their wilder spirits; despite the at times crass, uncooperative and brazen behaviour of most of the Knin group.

5. In short, the prospects are bleak at this time if we do not see an end to the hostilities and a return to the status quo ante. We shall do our best at this end, but feel it necessary to bring our medium- and longer-term concerns to your attention, for the most effective action which can be taken. As of tonight, we have a situation of considerable gravity on our hands.

ENDALL

2-081 3/5

PRESS STATEMENT

Issued by Shannon Boyd, Acting Chief, Press and Information,
UNPROFOR, on behalf of the Mission

1. At 1500 hours today, Saturday 23 January, the situation in the area of Croatian incursions into the UNPA and Pink Zones is, that fighting continues, with the Croatian Army still seeking to advance, despite assurances given by President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak that they had ordered a ceasefire as of Friday afternoon. UNPROFOR confirms that Zadar is now being shelled and that mobilisation in the area is widespread. There are no reports at this time of UNPROFOR casualties.

2. The UNPA and Pink Zones were established, with the agreement of all concerned, by Security Council Resolutions 743 of 21 February 1992 and 762 of 30 June 1992.

3. Croatia's unilateral military action has been condemned by the Security Council, by the Secretary-General, and by UNPROFOR. The Force Commander, Lt. General Satish Nambiar, at an urgent meeting requested by him with President Tudjman at 13.30 on 22 January, called on the Croatian Government to halt its offensive and to withdraw to the positions which it had previously occupied. UNPROFOR, in accordance with the directions of the Security Council, is seeking, by all means available to it, to contain and defuse the situation.

4. UNPROFOR deeply deplores this unilateral resort to force and resulting hostilities in an area in which peace had been established for more than a year. It profoundly regrets the bloodshed which they have caused.

5. In view especially of a number of misleading statements attributable to various sources, UNPROFOR wishes to place on public record the sequence of events preceding Croatia's unilateral military action and the consequent tragic events.

6. It should first be said, that allegations and allusions in certain media to the effect that UNPROFOR had prior notice of the Croatian action and, even, that it had somehow given it prior approval, are wholly devoid of truth. The background and sequence of events are as follows: -

7. The Croatian armed incursion into the UNPA and Pink Zones has been stated to have the objective of securing the area of Maslenica bridge, which formerly carried vital traffic from northern to southern Dalmatia. The question of reconstruction of the bridge has been under discussion in joint machinery presided over by UNPROFOR, and established by Resolution 762, in common with numerous other issues of joint concern to Croatia and the Serb local authorities. These include Peruca Dam, Obrovac power station

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- 2 -

and reservoir, water supplies on both sides of the confrontation line, the reopening of roads and railways, the restoration of power supplies and the repair of power lines, as well as many other issues of economic and social concern in and around the Pink Zones. A pre-requisite for these discussions has been the restoration on each side of minimal confidence in the good faith of the other party to the discussions. The most recent of such discussions, involving UNPROFOR and experts on both sides, took place at Zitnic on 19 January. Due to the painstaking and patient work which was taking place, major progress had become a strong possibility, provided that both sides, at a political level, took certain decisions to cooperate.

8. To this end, during the past five weeks, UNPROFOR had held many rounds of bilateral talks at senior levels of the Croatian Government with, in particular, Ministers Milas, Susak and Mudrinic; and, on the Serb side, in Belgrade and Knin, with Col. Spanovic, Mr. Martic and Mr. Bjegovic, with a view to establishing such political agreement for a possible breakthrough in regard to these various steps towards a normalization of the situation.

9. The last such bilateral meetings took place at Knin on Monday 18 January and in Zagreb on 19 January. At these meetings, UNPROFOR sought to finalise arrangements for a high-level meeting between both sides, under the chairmanship of the Force Commander, at which a number of these issues would be discussed and, hopefully, resolved. The process of intensive bilateral preparations had finally led to an agreement to meet, at Maslenica, on Thursday, 21 January, between high level delegations. The first item on the agenda was the reconstruction of the Maslenica Bridge. It was followed by Peruca dam and Obrovac power station. Substantive bilateral preparations on these various issues had also been conducted by UNPROFOR, and each party was fully informed regarding the situation. Various "packages" had been discussed of action to be taken, under UNPROFOR supervision and control, to restore a variety of important facilities, on an agreed basis, so that the lives of the people in the various affected areas could begin to return to normal after the earlier tragic hostilities. As a result of these consultations, UNPROFOR felt that the proposed high level talks had a reasonable chance of success.

10. At the last moment i.e. late in the evening on 20 January, the Serb side asked for a postponement of the meeting from 21 until 22 January so that they could study the final agenda and make necessary preparations. Upon this being conveyed to the Croatian Government, Vice Prime Minister Milas said that a meeting on 22 January would be impossible. He offered, however, to meet on 23 January. Before this offer could be conveyed, the news came of Croatia's unilateral resort to force. UNPROFOR had expressed its concern, in clear language, to the Serb side over the last-minute postponement.

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11. Meanwhile, during the past two weeks, UNPROFOR had observed substantial military movements on the Croatian side of the ceasefire line, and a heightening of tension in certain areas, accompanied by an increase in ceasefire violations, and attempts to infiltrate arms into the Croatian side of Sector West. On 18 January the Force Commander wrote to General Bobetko, Chief of Staff, Croatian Army, on these matters, and on other recent aspects of Croatian Army activities, calling on him to exercise maximum restraint. Also on that date, the Knin authorities met with Deputy Chief of Mission Thornberry, and conveyed to him their detailed concerns on the subject. The DCM raised them at a meeting with Croatian Vice Prime Minister Milas the following day at which time he also handed over copy of the Force Commander's letter.

12. In view, especially, of this background, UNPROFOR is deeply troubled by the return to hostilities, with all the tragic suffering brought about by war. The cause has been stated to be the question of Maslenica Bridge which, though of great importance to Croatia, was literally on the eve of potentially fruitful negotiations. It is also baffled by a decision to choose unilateral resort to force, rather than peaceful negotiations in accordance with an agreed peace plan and ongoing discussions within its framework. Months of patient confidence-building and consultations had preceded Friday's incursion.

13. Despite the setback, UNPROFOR will continue to devote its resources to the process of peaceful settlement of the outstanding issues. Meanwhile, the Force Commander has prioritised that the Mission should use every effort to contain the damage which has now been done. UNPROFOR is convinced that the way forward must be found by negotiations, and not through a return to the grim and tragic path to a renewal of general hostilities in the area. A ceasefire and return to former positions must be achieved as soon as possible.

ENDALL

CZG-077

CZN-102

UNPROF-280
23 Jan 93
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Page 1 of 5

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

MOST IMMEDIATE

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 080

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM KNIN AUTHORITIES

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Copy of a letter I have received today from Mr. Zdravko Zecevic is faxed herewith for your information. The letter is also addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council.

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MOST IMMEDIATE

93 JAN 23 15:27

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Translated from Serbian

REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAYINA
-GOVERNMENT-

No.: 04-5-34/93
Knin, 23.01.1993

UN SECRETARY GENERAL
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali

GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR Zagreb

PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Yoshio Hatano

Mr. CEDRIC THORNBERRY DHM Zagreb

After receiving the information given by the agency "TANJUG" from 22 January 1993 about the consultative session of the UN Security Council which was related to the aggression of the regular Croatian Army on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krayina, the Government of the Republic of Serb Krayina was given the authority to inform you of the following:

1. The Security Council, in other words its members were evidently surprised by the arrogant blow given to them by a member of the UN, the Republic of Croatia with its unparalleled aggression, not only on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krayina, but also to the integrity of UNPROFOR which is protecting that territory in accordance with the Vance Plan.

2. The Government's assessment is based on the fact that the statement, by which a demand is made for the withdrawal of the Croatian Army to the initial positions, was given orally instead of being issued as a regular act such as a presidential statement or SC resolution. This way the SC has shown its utter helplessness to punish the real culprit for the armed conflicts which are happening in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

3. The Government considers and asserts that a warning given in such a shape stimulates not only the Republic of Croatia but also any other potential aggressor to do what ever they wish and stay unpunished.

4. The Government assesses Mr. Hatano's statement as only a warning to the Republic of Croatia, without any legal consequences, in which way the Security Council has shown its partiality. In other words, while Iraq is being punished with bombarding for the slightest disrespect of any SC resolution, the Republic of Croatia, since it became a member of the UN, has violated the following SC resolutions:

-Resolution 762,

2 - 080 3/5 T 1093 6/8

-No Flight Resolution over the territories of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serb Krayina,

-Resolution on the arms import embargo

and a whole list of other SC documents.

5. For all these violations neither responsibility nor any measures have been taken against the Republic of Croatia.

6. The astonishing thing in Mr. Matano's statement is the conclusion in which he expresses regret because all sides in the conflict are allegedly violating agreements concerning hostilities, and they have been sent an appeal to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and to abide by all the relevant SC resolutions. It is the Government's opinion that this is only a common phrase without any legal efficiency.

7. The Government of the Republic of Serb Krayina is informing you that it will not allow another "Miljevci Plateau" to happen. In the event regular units of the Croatian Army were not to withdraw, the regional militia of the Republic of Serb Krayina will be forced to undertake measures to re-establish the former state.

8. While the Republic of Serb Krayina fighters are defending their houses and while the regular army of the Republic of Croatia is murdering civilian population without reprimand, the President of the Republic of Croatia and his assistants have the audacity to announce in public that they have undertaken the whole operation with the cooperation of the UN, namely, with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, for which a dementi was issued by authorized UNPROFOR officials on the ground. Since these same officials have unambiguously ascertained who started this aggression, and that is the Republic of Croatia, the only option left for the citizens of the Republic of Serb Krayina is to defend themselves and to implement the self defence principle based on the UN Charter.

9. The Government of the Republic of Serb Krayina demands an urgent session of the UN SC and the conduct of the Republic of Croatia in this bloody conflict, as the indisputable violator of all UN SC resolutions, be included on its agenda. Only sanctions by the Security Council will prevent the Republic of Croatia from using force to solve present and future political issues. Otherwise, the whole International Community will be responsible for the spreading of the war in the whole territory of the Balkan region. Then, it will be clear who is responsible for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Prime Minister
Zdravko Zecovic

23.01.1993/



РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

ВЛАДА

Број: 04-5-34/93.

Нини, 23. 01. 1993. год.

- 2-080
- 710
- ГЕНЕРАЛНОМ СЕКРЕТАРУ УН
господин Вутроо Вутроо Гали
 - ГЕНЕРАЛ САТИШ НАМБИЈАР - Загреб ✓
 - ПРЕДСЈЕДНИК САВЈЕТА БЕЗБЈЕДНОСТИ
господин ХАТАНУ - Њујорк
 - господин СЕДРИК ТОРНБЕРИ -
шеф цивилних послова Загреб

Поводом информације агенције "ТАНУГ" 22. Јануара 1993. године околностима уједињених Савјета безбједности Уједињених Нација која се односила на агресију регуларне Хрватске војске на територији Републике Српске Крајине Влада Републике Српске Крајине је овлашћена да Вас обавјести о следећем:

1. Савјет безбједности, односно његови чланци су или очито затечени изненадним шапором који им је упутио чланци УН Републике Хрватске безпримјерном агресијом не само на територији Републике Српске Крајине, већ и на интегритет снага УНПРОФОР-а који штите тај територију у складу са Венсовим планом.

2. Влада ову оцјену заснива на чињеници да је изјава којом се тражи повлачење Хрватске војске на почетна положаја саопштена уопштем путем, умјесто уобичајеног акта како је предсједничко саопштење или Резолуција Савјета безбједности.

Тиме је Савјет безбједности показао ову намоћ да казни правог кривца за оружане сукобе који се дешавају на територију бивше Југославије.

3. Влада сматра и тврди да овакве облици упозорења Републици Хрватској управо представља потицај не само Републици Хрватској већ и другим потенцијалним агресорима да могу радити што им је воља и то некажњено.

4. Влада оцјенује изјаву господина Хатана само као упозорења Републици Хрватској, али без икаквих правних последица, чиме је Савјет безбједности показао своју пристраничност. Наиме, док се један Иран ка-
жњави бомбардовањем за најмање непоштирање било које Резолуције Савјета безбједности Републике Хрватске од нада је постала чланци Уједињених Нација је прекршила следеће резолуције Савјета безбједности:

- Резолуцију 782,
- Резолуцију о забрани летова изнад територија бивше Босне и Херцеговине и територија Републике Српске Крајине,
- Резолуцију о ембаргу на увоз оружја

те читав низ других докумената Савјета безбједности.

5. За све ове поврде Републике Хрватске никада није била позва-
на на одговорност, нити су према њој предузете било какве мјере.

6. Најомјашније у изјави господина Хатана је констатација којом се изражава жеља што обе стране у сукобима наводно крше споразуме око непријатељства, па им се упућује апел да сарађују са коопрадеја-
дницима Женевске конференције, те да се придржавају ових релевантних резолуција Савјета безбједности. По мишљењу Владе ово је пука фраза без икаквих правних učinaka.

7. Влада Републике Српске Крајине Вас обавјештава да неће дозво-
лити да се догоди нови "МИЉЕВАЧКИ ПЛАТО" јер у случају да се регуларне јединице Хрватске војске на позиву регионалне милиције Републике Српске Крајине мораће предузети мјера да успостави раније стање.

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8. У тренутку дан борби Републике Српске Крајине бране своје домове, док регуларна војска Републике Хрватске намахњено убија цивилно становништво, предоједини Републике Хрватске и његови сарадници имају снагу да јавно изјаве да су цијелу операцију подузели у сарадњи са Уједињеним Нацијама, одрешно предсједницима Женевске конференције, што су чак и овлашћени дисциплину на терену демантовати.

Пошто су ти исти органи наводно установили то је започео агресију, а то је Републике Хрватске, грађанима Републике Српске Крајине није преостало ништа друго него да се бране и да примјене принцип самоодбрана што је записано на Повели Уједињених Нација.

9. Влада Републике Српске Крајине тражи да се хитно сазове ванредна сједница Савјета безбједности и да се коначно на дневни ред стави понашање Републике Хрватске у овом крвавом рату, те да се према кој као неспорном изјави БиХ Резолуција Савјета безбједности предузму санкције које ће спријечити да од сада па у будућности политичка питања покушава ријешити војном силом.

У противном цијела Међународна заједница бити ће одговорна за могуће ширење ратног пожара на подручју цијелог Балканског региона. Тада ће влада свима постати јасно то је заправо главни узрочник кризе у бившој Југославији.



ПРЕДСЈЕДНИК ВЛАДЕ: *[Signature]*
гг Здравко Зечевић

CZN - 101
CZG - 076

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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Page 1 of 2
23 93 JAN 14 00 12 Z

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 079

SUBJECT: PROTEST LETTER TO GENERAL BOBETKO

Copy of my second protest letter of today's date to General Bobetko is faxed herewith for your information. The contents are self explanatory.

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UNPROFOR Z-079
Packets for 079
93 JAN 23 14:28

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

Z - 079

2/2

23 January 1993

My dear General,

1. Further to the letter I addressed to you earlier today.
2. I have just been informed by Sector South that the company of the Kenyan battalion located at Biljane is under heavy shelling by your forces. Thirteen bombs/shells have fallen on the company Headquarters location since 1300 hours today.
3. You are requested to have these actions stopped without delay as they are endangering the lives of UN personnel. I am informing the Secretary General and Secretary Vance of these developments. Any casualties that are caused to UN personnel will be the responsibility of the Croatian authorities.

With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,

Satish

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar
Force Commander
UNPROFOR

General Janko Bobetko
Chief of Staff
Croatian Army
Croatian Army Headquarters
Zagreb

CZN 100

CZG 074

UNPROF-2.78
137/93
23 Jan 93

23 93 ^{p.s.} ~~ROUTING CODE CABLE~~

Page 1 of 2

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 ^{JANUARY} ~~DECEMBER~~ 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-78

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Attached, please find the above subject letter for your information.

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Translated from Serbian

RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
No. 01-52-1/93
Knin, 22.01.1993

Gen. Ratish Nambiar
Sector South HQ

According to the information that we have Croatia is planning an attack against UN forces on the HEPS Peruca and the taking over of the same.

For these intentions it has planned and executed preparations of the 1st Brigade and special saboteur units from Split. At the same time Croatia is planning to blow the dam up because of which it is already evacuating the population from Trilje and Omis. For this act they wish to put the blame on the Serbs.

Please inform the UN Security Council of these intentions, and please undertake URGENT MEASURES IN ORDER TO PREVENT A DISASTER.

Minister
Colonel

Stojan Spanovic

23.01.1993

CMU

CZV 099

CZC 075

136/93
UNPROF-Z-77
23 Jan 93

MOST IMMEDIATE

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Page 1 of 1

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 7x 1200 LT MOST IMMEDIATE

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 ^{JANUARY} DECEMBER 1992

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-77

SUBJECT: CROATIAN OFFENSIVE

Clawhill
H Gen

Reference your MISC-116 of 22 January 1993.

We would like to point out that operations by the Croatian Army units are not restricted to the pink zones but also within the UNPAs, in the opstine of Gracac, Obrovac and possibly Benkovac.

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CZN-098.

CZ9-073.

UNPROF-276
135/93
23 Jan 93OUTGOING CODE CABLEMOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 4.

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -OK.
 INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA
 FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
 DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993
 NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2- 76

Alambid
HR Gen

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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SECTOR SOUTH

1. At 1830 hrs yesterday evening, after I had sent the attached letter to President Tudjman, I received a call from Defence Minister Susak to inform me that instructions had been issued to Croatian Army units to cease operations.
2. There was a lull during the night, but as of 0800 hours this morning, Croatian Army units have resumed operations in area East and North East of Zadar. I have written to General Bobetko (in the absence of President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak at Geneva) to ask his units to cease operations (copy of the letter attached).
3. In the meanwhile, the Serbs in the UNPAs have apparently declared a "state of war", have ordered general mobilisation, and in many cases, broken into storage areas and taken out some heavy weaponry. We are doing what we can to limit the scope of these activities and restore stability. A copy of a cable I received from Sector South on a meeting held at Knin is attached. My Deputy Force Commander is at Knin and meeting the authorities there at 1000 hours.

CZN-098 CZG-073.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

2/4

22 January 1993

Your Excellency,

Secretary Vance informs me you have given him an assurance that you would issue orders to the Croatian Army to cease hostilities with immediate effect. However, the reports I have received from Sector South indicate that the Croatian Army continues with its operations.

May I request you to please issue appropriate instructions immediately in order to enable us to stabilise the situation.

*With warm regards
Yours sincerely,*

~~Lt Gen Satish Nambiar~~
~~Force Commander~~
UNPROFOR

His Excellency
President Franjo Tudjman
Republic of Croatia
Zagreb

Maslenica

CZN-098

CZG-073

P.2

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

3/4

23 January 1993

My dear General,

In response to the letter I had addressed to President Tudjman yesterday evening, Defence Minister Susak had conveyed to me at about 1830 hours that instructions had been issued to the Croatian Army units to cease operations.

Regrettably, whereas there appears to have been a lull during the night, I have just been informed that the Croatian Army units have resumed offensive operations in the area this morning. I ask you to please take immediate action to cease all operations to enable us to prevent the spread of the conflict.

I have informed Secretary Vance in Geneva and am now informing the Secretary General in New York of these latest developments.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,**Satish*

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar
Force Commander
UNPROFOR

General Janko Bobetko
Chief of Staff
Croatian Army
Croatian Army Headquarters
Zagreb

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CZV-098.


CZV-073.

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UNPROFOR Page 1 of 1 Pages
SECTOR SOUTH

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| OUTGOING FAX NO. : | DATE/TIME: 230625A JAN 93 |
| TO: HQ UNPROFOR | FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH |
| FAX NO. : | FAX: |
| ATTN: FC | FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : CAPT GAROLI TITLE : DO 2 RELEASING OFF. : Mr. Dobbe SIGNATURE :  |
| INFO : FAX NO. : | |
| SUBJECT: RESULT OF THE MEETING WITH 'RSK' AUTHORITIES | |

MESSAGE

- PRESENT IN THE MEETING WERE SECTOR COMD, CAC, MR. BORIS MARTINOVIC (LEGAL ADVISOR OF 'RSK') AND MR SPANOVIC.
- IN THE MEETING THE 'RSK' AUTHORITIES INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE DECLARED A STATE OF WAR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
 - MOVEMENT OF TROOPS IN EUROPE WHICH 'RSK' CLAIMED THEY HAD ALREADY KNOWN CONCENTRETING IN AREAS OF ITALY, GREECE, HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA.
 - THE EARLY MORNING ATTACK BY CROATIAN ARMY IN AREAS OF ISLAM LATINSKI (2692), SUHOVAR (3329), ISLAM GRCKI (3790), PODGRADINA (3842), KASIC (3823) AND AN AMBUSH AND SHELLING AT MALI ALAN (5003), ROVANJSKA (4401) AND ZEMUNIK AIRPORT (2881).
 - ACCORDING TO MR. 'KARADZIC WHO GAVE SOME INFORMATION THROUGH THE NATIONAL RADIO THAT JNA (YUGOSLAVIAN NATIONAL ARMY) WILL ASSIST THE SERIES OF SERBIAN KRAJINA IN THIS ISSUE. THEY REQUESTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO HAVE MEETING IF THE WORLD IS NOT SEEING THEIR PROBLEM, IT SHOULD BE KNOWN THAT GENERAL MOBILIZATION IS BEING CONDUCTED AND ALL 'RSK' AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE OBLIGED TO THIS ORDER. NOTE THAT THEY STATED THAT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH UNPROFOR.

 FC
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 CMO
 CMD

FOR THIS MSG PCS AMEND THIS
C. L. A, C-6 6~ TKS
C2N: 93
C2B: 69

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

22 93 JA 13 567

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-71

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CROATIAN MILITARY ADVANCE INTO PINK ZONES

REF. : MY UNPROFOR-Z-069 OF TODAY

..... We have been monitoring Croatian radio and TV and by noon our time the attached had been the only information released locally.. The Serbs in Knin have called in our people and told them that if there is no ceasefire and withdrawal by 1300 hours they will begin shelling Zadar and Zagreb. Tudjman has indicated he will see us at 1330 hours and I shall report thereafter. UNMOs have told us that RSK forces have begun withdrawing their weaponry from storage.

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Endall

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22 93 JA 13 267

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COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB

22 93 JA 12 317

BOZ
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C8N393 P2/2

Croatian TV News Program at Noon 12:00, Friday, 22 January 1993

=====

Item 1

In his talks with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorwald Stoltenberg, President Tudman was said to have discussed (among other things) the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia, and the beginning of works on the establishment of a pontoon bridge at Maslenica and preparations for the construction of a permanent bridge -- with the knowledge of Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the UNPROFOR officials.

Item 2

The news anchorman stressed that the item had been a repeat of a morning announcement:

"This morning the Croatian police has started implementing security measures in the area of Maslenicko Zdrilo, in order to protect the construction workers and equipment at the site of the future pontoon bridge from possible Chetnik provocation."

=====

Note: The above news items have been interpreted to the best of this analyst's ability. The actual text may have differed to a small -- and almost certainly unimportant -- extent from the above interpretation, as the news program was not recorded, but noted and interpreted live off the air. (Bruno Ogorelec)

132/93 MISC. 116
019 P01
22 Jan 93

93-01-22 19:49

5603

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

UNPROFOR

CNZ-051

P1/4

Palma

CYZ-037

AM12

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 JAN 22 19:53

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *for* GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *Robertson*

DATE: 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: MISC-116

SUBJECT: Croatian Offensive

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| US | ✓ | |

1. At informal consultations of SecCo today, SecGen spoke along lines of attached statement. Representatives of France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom urged that a statement be issued deploring this offensive, while the Ambassador of Venezuela argued that it would be unfair to condemn this violation when the Serbs were guilty of far worse in the region. The US agreed with both views and expressed support for a general statement to the press by the President.

2. In consultation with the Secretariat, the President made the following informal remarks to the assembled media at the end of the meeting: "The members of the Security Council deplore the Croatian Army offensive that took place today in the Pink Zones. They urge the Croatian authorities to withdraw their forces to positions occupied before this offensive, and strongly support the efforts of the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to defuse the situation. They equally deplore violations by all sides of the United Nations peace-keeping Plan, and appeal to all parties to cooperate fully with the peace process in the region led by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. They demand that all parties adhere faithfully to all relevant Security Council resolutions. The

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1993-01-22 19:50

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

019 P02

CNZ-051

CYZ-037

P2/4

members of the Council call on all parties to undertake no action that could jeopardize the peace process, and to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen in their current efforts."

3. Please let us have copies of any press statements issued at your end (Zagreb and Geneva).

**Statement by the Secretary-General to informal
consultations of the Security Council on the events in Croatia of
22 January 1993**

Since early this morning UNPROFOR has been receiving reports of Croatian Army attacks in the "pink zone", in the area of Maslenica bridge, north-east of Zadar and in the Drnis area. These reports have been confirmed by UNPROFOR's troops on the ground and by UN military observers. One UNPROFOR checkpoint is in an area overrun by Croatian Army forces, though there are no reports of any UNPROFOR casualties. In reaction, the local Serb forces have been reinforcing their positions and appear to have broken into several storage depots which had held heavy weaponry under joint UNPROFOR-Serb control.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lt.-Gen. Satish Nambiar, sought an urgent meeting with the President of Croatia, Mr Franjo Tudjman. The meeting took place at 1330 hours (local time). Gen Nambiar conveyed my concern at these developments and called on the President to stop the Croatian military offensive and to withdraw his forces. President Tudjman responded that the military action had been undertaken for the limited purpose of providing security for the construction of a bridge at Maslenica. His forces would not withdraw from the Maslenica bridge area but had no intention of extending operations to other areas.

The co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Mr Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, have also

CNZ-051 P4/4

appealed to President Tudjman to withdraw his forces.

CYZ-037

I deplore this unilateral military action by the Croatian authorities, which is a setback to the efforts being undertaken by UNPROFOR under the terms of Security Council resolution 762 to achieve a peaceful transfer of control in the "pink zones". UNPROFOR is taking all steps in its power to prevent the situation from escalating. In addition to reiterating his demand that the Croatian Army withdraw to positions held before the recent offensive, the Force Commander has called upon the local Serb authorities to exercise restraint and not to embark upon a cycle of action and retaliation which could have calamitous consequences. He has sent the Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Major-General Gaudreau, to the area to review the situation and issue the necessary directives to UNPROFOR personnel there.

ST/et 22.1.93

CZN 095

CZG 070

UNPROT-17-73

22 Jan 93

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

22 93 JA 13

557

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 1

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 7x 1839 LT p.c.

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-73 *Handwritten: Nambiar*

SUBJECT: RE MY UNPROFOR-Z-72 *Handwritten: w/gu* (MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN)

The last word in the second line of paragraph 6 of the above cable should, of course, be "disagreement", not "agreement".

Endall

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93 JAN 22 17:47
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 United Nations Unit

** CYCY **

893-01-22 15:33 5615

YUGOSLAVIA

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH 22 93 JAN 15

522

Page 1 of 7

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -TX 1630LT P.S.
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB
DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-72
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN
REF. : MY UNPROFOR-Z-69 AND 71 OF TODAY

Handwritten signature
H Gen

93 JAN 22 17:40

UNOG TELECOMM UNIT
PAGES 1-6 UNATIONS

1. I met with Tudjman for 20 minutes to discuss the morning's events and their possible implications. I had Thornberry, Gaudreau and Campose; he, Radic, Susak, and two senior military personnel.

2. I asked that their military action be halted and that they withdraw to their previous positions. UNPROFOR would have to stabilise the situation as best it could.

3. Tudjman said that he had personally authorised action by their military and police personnel to provide necessary protection for the reconstruction of Maslenica bridge. This was the sole object of the operation which of course included securing the adjacent area around Zemunik. Once completed, their forces would remain in this area. Any withdrawal was out of the question. He said that he had emphasised the Croatian need for the bridge to be available in a letter to the Secretary-General of 9 December and that he had personally discussed it with the Secretary-General who had, he said, indicated that their request was fully justified. He had also discussed it with Co-Chairmen Vance and Owen on 2 and 4 January, and with them again on 12 January. They had told him they had discussed it in Belgrade and that Cosic and Milosevic had also agreed with their objective. He stated that, on 20 January, he had discussed it once again with Mr. Vance and Lord Owen. He had informed them about the delays in the talks which Milas and Thornberry were trying to hold with the Serbs, and that these delays could no longer be tolerated. He stated:- "They said we should not tolerate those delays any longer."

CZU 0.4 CZG 061

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- 3 -

..... 9. After the meeting, I sent DFC Gaudreau to Knin to oversee the situation on my behalf. One matter of concern is that some of the Knin authorities have been trying to say that we were party to this unilateral action, and there are reports of angry crowds outside UNPROFOR locations. We are looking into these. Meanwhile, I am drawing attention to my letter to Bobetko of 18 January (attached), which Thornberry also brought to Milas' attention on 19 January. We are dealing with these allegations, which are troublesome for the future of UNPROFOR and, indeed, stability in the region, and I shall emphasise this in my responses to the press. I am also attaching copy of my letter sent to Spanovic and Martic yesterday.

..... 10. I attach copy of protest just received from RSK.

Endall

C2N 094

C2G 069

3/7

- 2 -

3. I said we fully understand their frustration. But it was my view that unilateral action would be totally counterproductive. I said we must do all we could, now, to limit the damage that was being done, and that I would inform the Secretary-General of his position.

4. Tudjman said that he appreciated UNPROFOR's position on this. His actions, he said, were also aimed at showing the Krajina Serbs that agreements must be made. They were parallel to what was occurring in BH, and would help to show the Serb extremists that their occupation of Croatia could not be allowed to continue any longer. He had directed that the peace-keeping operation in the area should be fully safeguarded, and that local agreements should be made with UNPROFOR to avoid casualties.

5. I emphasised that this action could have widespread repercussions. Heavy weapons were already being moved out by the Serbs. Tudjman said that we must warn them not to do that. If they reacted, Croatia would expand their actions. They had no present intention of moving in the Drnis and Lika areas. Their movements there were precautionary only. He wanted to reiterate, that Mr. Vance and Lord Owen had told him that there had now been enough delays.

6. We pointed out that we had been working extremely hard to bring both sides to the table. Finally, there had been agreement only on the date. Croatia had demanded 21 January, the Serbs had said 22; last night Milas had said 23 January. We feared the far-reaching implications of this action in regard to the many other areas where cooperation would be required. What would the chance now be of any such cooperation in the near future? We shared the exasperation with the Serb delay on Wednesday night (which we had communicated to Milas during the Tudjman/Co-Chairmen meeting). But it had been a question of a day.

SEK
UNPROFOR:
2-72

7. Tudjman said they had been patient long enough, in BH, with the Serbs in the Krajina, in Croatian-Serbian relations. The time had come, now that various leaders had agreed on the need for normalisation and to move forward, to make the Serb extremists in the Krajina fully aware of the realities. In this, he expected UNPROFOR to perform its tasks. Otherwise, Croatia would implement unilaterally, as with Maslenica. Meanwhile, it remained fully available to discuss all other matters.

8. Susak said this was a matter of principle for them. Maslenica was too important to discuss along with the other matters which were on the Serb-Croat agenda. (On departure, he told Thornberry that they were fully willing to meet in Maslenica tomorrow to discuss the remainder of the agenda ...)

CCN 074

C26 067

UNITED NATIONS



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UNPROFOR

18 January 1993

My Dear General,

1. I am writing this letter to seek your intervention with regard to certain reports I am receiving from our sectors which indicate an increased level of activity by your forces along the UNPA and "pink zone" boundaries. Some examples of these are:-

(a) Increased patrolling and cease-fire violations by Croatian forces in the general areas of Zadar, Sibenik, Tinj, Skradin, Zemunik, Drnis and Gospic. Reinforcement of your forces in these areas and preparation of combat positions along the cease-fire line are also being reported. There are also reports of construction of an airstrip at Lucici.

(b) An attempt by six trucks of the Croatian Army, loaded with arms, ammunition and other warlike materials, to enter Sector West through our checkpoint at Sovarnica Brook on 10 January 1993. Two of these trucks were stopped by our personnel while the remaining four drove away. One of the drivers mentioned that the arms and ammunition were being carried to Pakrac. There are also reports of build-up of your forces in the Kutina area, West of the sector boundary.

(c) A number of tanks and other heavy weapons observed in areas bordering Sector East, at Krndija, Gorjani and Dakovo, in contravention of the withdrawal agreements.

2. You would appreciate that such activities have resulted in increased tension in the area.

3. May I seek your cooperation in ensuring that your forces respect the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements and that they do not undertake any actions which could heighten tension and lead to further deterioration of the situation.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Force Commander

General Janko Bobetko
Chief of Staff
Croatian Army
Croatian Army Headquarters
Zagreb

** CYCY **

1993-01-22 15:36

5615

YUGOSLAVIA

037 P0

C2N 094

C2G 069

5/7

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

21 January 1993

My dear Colonel Spanovic,

Recent developments in the Sectors and statements made by some of your colleagues and subordinates, give us cause for concern. We have repeatedly informed you that all of us are fully committed to the implementation of the Vance Plan and other Security Council resolutions pertaining to the UNPAs.

2. Regrettably, we have not received the complete degree of co-operation required to enable us to execute our mission effectively; but we continue to try our best. Our understanding is that you and your people accept the need for continued deployment of UNPROFOR, so that peace is maintained, and a political resolution of the problem reached. If that be so, it is essential that you support our activities, and enable us to progress in the implementation of the Plan, so that our credibility is not affected, and the International Community represented by the Security Council, endorses continued deployment of UNPROFOR. We must have something to show to your people and others, that our deployment is in fact necessary and useful. It is therefore very much in your interests that we move forward on the issues that Mr. Thornberry has been discussing with you. To illustrate the point I am making, I must inform you that the cancellation of today's meeting has severely affected UNPROFOR's credibility, and has caused me and my colleagues to doubt your seriousness and genuineness.

3. I am also aware of various moves being initiated in the UNPAs on the grounds of a developing military threat. You should know that we are monitoring all such activity on your side, as well as the Croatian Army side, in order to ensure that the situation does not get out of hand. In this again, we require your full co-operation. I find it quite unacceptable that your militia and others continue to impose restrictions on our freedom of movement and activity at times.

4. There are also apparently various rumours circulating, and veiled threats being made, of possible actions against UNPROFOR personnel and units in case a No-Fly Zone enforcement resolution is passed by the Security Council. You and your people must understand that UNPROFOR is not associated with any such moves. We will continue to fulfill our mission, but that will very much depend on you. It is for you and your colleagues to ensure that none of our units or personnel, are subjected to any harm or abuse. I regret to state that some of the observations now being made will only do more damage to your cause than be of any help.

Colonel Stojan Spanovic
Knin

CZV094

CZG 069

- 2 -

5. Finally, I wish to once again emphasize that my colleagues and I in UNPROFOR are fully committed to our task, and will do everything we can to make the Plan work. But we need your complete and genuine co-operation and assistance, which sadly we have found somewhat lacking to date.

6. I look forward to a more rewarding and satisfying interaction between us.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Satish

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Force Commander

C2N 094

C2G 069

Translated from Serbian

RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MINISTRY OF INTERN. AFFAIRS
Str. Pov. No. 01-1
Knin, 22.01.1993.

UNPROFOR HQ
Gen. Satish Nambiar

Aggression on the RSK, protest.-

The Croatian armed forces have started on 22.01.1993 at 7,05 h, with the support of strong artillery fire and tanks an aggression on the RSK in the directions of Starigrad - Obrovac and Zadar - Benkovac.

The Croatian armed forces, after strong artillery preparation, in 08,00 h started a general attack in those directions.

In all the towns of South Dalmatia air attack alarms have been given. In the directions from Sibenik and Split to Drnis and Knin mobilization has been undertaken and grouping of the 113, 141 and 142 ZNG brigades. In the Sinj - Vrlika direction the 126 ZNG brigade has been mobilized.

The Croatian artillery has taken positions in Pakovo Selo and is in full alert to begin the shelling of Drnis and Knin.

We demand measures to be undertaken for preventing and condemning the aggression of the RC on the RSK.

The Serb nation will be forced, if these measures are not undertaken, to execute a mobilization and defend the RSK.

Minister of Defence
Col. Stojan Spanovic

Minister of Internal Affairs
Milan Martić

22.01.1993



C2N: 93
C2B: 69

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

22 93 JA 13

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-71

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CROATIAN MILITARY ADVANCE INTO PINK ZONES

REF. : MY UNPROFOR-Z-069 OF TODAY

..... We have been monitoring Croatian radio and TV and by noon our time the attached had been the only information released locally.. The Serbs in Knin have called in our people and told them that if there is no ceasefire and withdrawal by 1300 hours they will begin shelling Zadar and Zagreb. Tudjman has indicated he will see us at 1330 hours and I shall report thereafter. UNMOs have told us that RSK forces have begun withdrawing their weaponry from storage.

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COMMUNICATIONS
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22 93 JA 12 31 Z

FC/DCM/DFC/COS/COO/CMO/CAO/CBN OPS

C8N593 P2/2

Croatian TV News Program at Noon 12:00, Friday, 22 January 1993

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Item 1

In his talks with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorwald Stoltenberg, President Tudman was said to have discussed (among other things) the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia, and the beginning of works on the establishment of a pontoon bridge at Maslenica and preparations for the construction of a permanent bridge -- with the knowledge of Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the UNPROFOR officials.

Item 2

The news anchorman stressed that the item had been a repeat of a morning announcement:

"This morning the Croatian police has started implementing security measures in the area of Maslenicko Zdrilo, in order to protect the construction workers and equipment at the site of the future pontoon bridge from possible Chetnik provocation."

=====

Note: The above news items have been interpreted to the best of this analyst's ability. The actual text may have differed to a small -- and almost certainly unimportant -- extent from the above interpretation, as the news program was not recorded, but noted and interpreted live off the air. (Bruno Ogorelec)



РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

The Republic of Serbian Krajina
Ministarstvo za inostrane poslove
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

22 Jan 93

Cable Address
FAX No:
TEL No:

Number: 57/93

Terazije 3/1
11000 BEOGRAD
S.R. YUGOSLAVIA
Beograd

VERY URGENT

Mrs.. Peterson,

We would appreciate it if you could pass the urgent message to Mr. Boutros Ghali and to the President of the Security Council that the Croatian Army attacked the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the area of Obrovac and Benkovac.

There was artillery attack at 6 am and also infantry attack at 8 am..

The fights are still going on.



Sincerely yours,

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN
KRAJINA

SLOBODAN JARČEVIĆ

Belgrad, 22. 01. 1993.

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РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

The Republic of Serbian Krajina
Ministarstvo za inostrane poslove
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cable Address
FAX No:
TEL No:

Number: 56/93

Terazije 3/1
11000 BEOGRAD
S.R. YUGOSLAVIA
Beograd

Mrs. Peterson,

we wish to let you know that the Croatian Army attacked UNPROFOR in the area of Maslениčki most (Bridge of Maslenica), in the direction to Ravanjica. The attack was this morning.

Please, will you be so kind to pass the information most urgently, to the President of Security Council, to Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and to Mr. Satish Nambiar. Our units went forward to help UNPROFOR.

Belgrad, 22. 01.



Yours sincerely,

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN
KRAJINA

SLOBODAN JARŠEVIĆ

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

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Palais des Nations

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22 Jan 93

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CZG-066

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MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 2

TO : THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
UNATIONS, NEW YORK *OK*

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- *69*SUBJECT: CROATIAN MILITARY ADVANCE INTO PINK ZONES

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1. Sector South has been informing us since early this morning of shelling by the Croatian Army at Maslenica and in the area of Zemunik airport, together with ground advances supported by artillery. It also appears that preparations are being made in the Drnis area and at Vitlebit mountain in the Lika area for further military action by the Croats. According to Spanovic, so-called "Defence Minister" in Knin, a number of villages have been taken, and at least one UN checkpoint overrun. He has told us that many refugees are already in flight. He anticipates possible attacks in Knin, including by air. He insisted that his side has not yet used tanks or artillery, all of which are (nominally at least) in UN controlled storage. Spanovic has conveyed to us that we should inform UNPROFOR in the other sectors, because he may have to withdraw units from them to strengthen their position in Krajina. He has asked that the Security Council be urgently informed of these events. I should add, that the authorities in Knin have requested a meeting with our civil affairs personnel, and that the COS Sector South and a civil affairs officer are attempting to reach Zadar to see the Croatian authorities there.

2. Meanwhile, I have asked for an immediate appointment with President Tudjman, and will request the cessation of military action on the Croatian side.

3. The final trigger for this action will probably be stated by the Croats to be the failure of the Serb side to agree to a meeting yesterday regarding Maslenica. In fact, the Serbs had agreed to hold the meeting today. Two cables yesterday to Goulding provide

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CODE RESTRICTED

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CZG-066

background to the matter. The Croats have been exasperated by Serb delays, and have been threatening for some time to take unilateral action, which we have been trying to head off by pushing the Serbs in Knin to negotiate. Indeed, we had developed some qualified hope that we were making progress.

4. We have no reports of casualties to UNPROFOR personnel at this time. Should the Serbs seek to remove arms from storage, we shall attempt to do our duty but, given our limited resources, and the likely fury of the Serbs over what they will probably argue is a treacherous attack, we do not foresee that we shall be universally successful in the matter.

5. I shall keep you fully informed through Goulding's office in respect of this unilateral resort to force by Croatia.

Endall

CZN 070

CZG 052

1/2.5

COMMUNICATIONS
07201OUTGOING CODE CABLE

18 93 JAN 17 41Z

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK TX 1900LT P.S.

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 18 January 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-048

SUBJECT: LETTER TO GENERAL JANKO BOBETKO

Handwritten signature
H Gen

A copy of my letter to General Janko Bobetko of today's date is forwarded for information.

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Palais des Nations

93 JAN 18 18:14

EZN 070

CZG 052

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

18 January 1993

My Dear General,

1. I am writing this letter to seek your intervention with regard to certain reports I am receiving from our sectors which indicate an increased level of activity by your forces along the UNPA and "pink zone" boundaries. Some examples of these are:-

(a) Increased patrolling and cease-fire violations by Croatian forces in the general areas of Zadar, Sibenik, Tinj, Skradin, Zemunik, Drnis and Gospic. Reinforcement of your forces in these areas and preparation of combat positions along the cease-fire line are also being reported. There are also reports of construction of an airstrip at Lucici.

(b) An attempt by six trucks of the Croatian Army, loaded with arms, ammunition and other warlike materials, to enter Sector West through our checkpoint at Sovarnica Brook on 10 January 1993. Two of these trucks were stopped by our personnel while the remaining four drove away. One of the drivers mentioned that the arms and ammunition were being carried to Pakrac. There are also reports of build-up of your forces in the Kutina area, West of the sector boundary.

(c) A number of tanks and other heavy weapons observed in areas bordering Sector East, at Krndija, Gorjani and Dakovo, in contravention of the withdrawal agreements.

2. You would appreciate that such activities have resulted in increased tension in the area.

3. May I seek your cooperation in ensuring that your forces respect the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements and that they do not undertake any actions which could heighten tension and lead to further deterioration of the situation.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Force Commander

General Janko Bobetko
Chief of Staff
Croatian Army
Croatian Army Headquarters
Zagreb