

ate Papers of the Sec. - Gen: U Thant - Prior to Nov. 1961 - As Burmese Rep. to the UN  
reports - Revolution in Hungary

01/01/1000 - 01/01/1000

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER  
CLEAR

UNARCHIVES  
SERIES 0890  
BOX 8  
FILE 3  
ACC. 1/5.2.7.1

Mar 16  
mp

## REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY

Background: Until 1918 Hungary (area: 35,000 sq. m, about one-seventh the area of Burma; population 9,000,000, about half that of Burma) formed one half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the dissolution of the dual monarchy it became independent. After a shortlived communist dictatorship under Bela Kun in 1919, Admiral Horthy seized power and maintained the title of kingdom for the country and called himself Regent. His regime was a conservative though not totalitarian dictatorship, embodying the rule of the land-owning aristocracy traditional in Hungary. In 1941 it joined the German campaign against Yugoslavia and subsequently against Russia. In March 1944 Hitler ordered the occupation of the country by German troops. Horthy was stripped of power, while Szalassy,

the leader of the Hungarian Nazi Party known as the Arrow Cross Party, was made Prime Minister. After the Russians had later conquered one half of Hungary the Hungarian Chief of Staff, General Miklosz formed a provisional government and concluded



an Armistice with the Allies in January 1945. Thereafter communist influence grew stronger and stronger. The first election to a National Assembly, however, was not won by the communists but by the smallholders' party. A coalition government was formed under M. Ference Nagy as Prime Minister. The communists secured key positions in the army and police, formed groups of sympathisers in other parties, and set out to reduce the smallholders majority by undemocratic methods. In June 1947 Ference Nagy resigned from Switzerland, where he had gone on a 'vacation' (in fact, this was a flight). Communist grip on the country was tightened.

Changes after Stalin's death. In June 1953 the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party made important changes in the party organization in line with the similar changes carried out in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. A noteworthy feature of the re-organisation was the exclusion from the Politburo of some of the leading Hungarian communists. In July 1953 the cabinet headed by M. Matyas Rakosi resigned and M. Imre Nagy became Prime Minister. The appointment of Imre Nagy's Cabinet involved the disappearance from the Government of most of the leading members of the former communist hierarchy, notably of M. Rakosi himself, who for six years had been regarded as the 'Strong man' of Hungary and held the Premiership since 1952. Rakosi, however, remained First Secretary of the Party. In his first statement of policy to the new Assembly Imre Nagy announced what amounted to a complete reversal of the former government's policy. Nagy said that the former government's policy of pursuing the industrialization of Hungary at the expense of its agricultural development had been a mistaken one, since the country was based fundamentally on an agricultural economy and lacked the prerequisites for the building up of heavy industry. He announced the abandonment of the policy of enforced collectivization of agriculture, an amnesty for political offenders who represented no danger to the State, the abolition of internment camps, the cessation of deportations, greater toleration in religious matters and permission for the revival of retail trade.

Imre Nagy remained as Prime Minister till April 1955, when he was dismissed from Premiership and expelled from the Party for 'right-wing deviationism'; he was succeeded by M. Hegedus, the first Deputy Premier, who had been Acting Prime Minister since M. Nagy's reported illness in February 1955. The Central Committee's resolution accused Imre Nagy of representing political points of view which stand in sharp contradiction to the general policy of the Party and to the interest of the working class, the working peasantry, and the people's democracy; of impeding the development of heavy industry and co-operative farming, and of trying to push into the background and cloud over the leading role of the Party.

The Hungarian people were unhappy about the dismissal of Imre Nagy from Premiership. They were also grieved at the reintroduction of restrictive measures under the new government led by Hegedus. Inspired by the Poznan Riots in Poland (June '56) the Hungarians gave vent to their long suppressed feeling of frustration by outspoken criticisms of the Government and the Party. Public meetings attended by thousands of Hungarians - including many communists of longstanding - developed into outspoken attacks on the Hegedus Government and against M. Rakosi in particular. At all such meetings demonstrations occurred in favour of the restoration to power of Imre Nagy. As a result of these popular outbursts party-membership was restored to Imre Nagy. The Budapest Radio in making the announcement of the restoration of party-membership to Nagy added that Nagy's earlier expulsion from the Party had been played by the personal prejudices of Rakosi.\*

Mass demonstrations. The upsurge of nationalism grew in tempo and on October 22-23, 1956 mass demonstrations attended by hundreds of thousands of workers, students and soldiers took place in Budapest, Debreczen, Miskolc, Szeged, Gyor and other cities, at which demands were made for greater democratization of the government, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the release of Cardinal Mindszenty and the return of M. Nagy to political power. In Budapest where some 200,000 demonstrators massed in the centre of the city, representatives of Hungarian Universities and High schools adopted a 22 point resolution calling inter alia for Imre Nagy to be placed at the head of the Government and the Party; for rapid progress towards democratization, removal of Stalinists, for the development of Soviet-Hungarian relations on a basis of absolute equality, for the ending of the teaching of Russian as a compulsory language in schools, and for less time to be devoted to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. The resolution expressed "solidarity with our Polish comrades" declaring that Poland had set "an example which our country should follow".

#### THE INSURRECTION

Following these mass demonstrations heavy fighting broke out in Budapest during the night of October 23-24. A state of emergency was declared throughout the country, martial law, a censorship, and a curfew imposed and all rail and air communications with the outside world cut off. At dawn on October 24 it was announced that M. Imre Nagy had taken over the Premiership from M. Hegedus, and that the Government had invoked the Warsaw Treaty and were appealing to the Soviet forces to help restore order. ( It subsequently became known that M. Gero, and not M. Nagy, had been responsible for calling in Soviet troops ).

In his broadcast appeal to the insurgents to lay down their arms, Nagy promised a broad democratization of Hungarian public life, the construction of socialism based on specific Hungarian characteristics, and a basic improvement of the people's living standards. After stressing that these reforms depended on the restoration of order, he added "Peaceful student demonstrators

have been joined by hostile elements who have misguided many workers and are inciting them to actions against the people's democracy. I call on all Hungarians to be firm against these 'provocateurs'. Our national existence and future are at stake".

Meanwhile the revolt spread throughout the country and it became clear that the bulk of the Hungarian armed forces were on the side of the insurgents and that the main strength of the revolt was being provided by the industrial workers. On October 28 M. Nagy announced (1) that he had talks with the Soviet C. in C. in Hungary, who had promised that all Russian forces would be withdrawn immediately from Budapest; (2) that negotiations would be made with the USSR to secure the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the whole of Hungary; (3) that the secret Police had been dissolved; (4) that a new police force would be created based on the Army and on armed units of the workers and the youth movement; (5) that the Communist coat-of-arms would be abolished and the former national coat-of-arms restored in the national flag; (6) that March 15 (the anniversary of the Hungarian revolution of 1848, which had been abolished as a public holiday by the communist regime) would again become the principal Hungarian national holiday. On October 30 Budapest Radio and the Hungarian Defence Ministry announced that the Soviet forces had begun to withdraw from Budapest according to the promise made to M. Nagy. Though the situation was obscure at the time of the announcement, it subsequently became clear, however, that far from withdrawing from Budapest, strong Soviet reinforcements of tanks and infantry had crossed the Hungarian frontiers.

On October 31 the Hungarian Government sent a message to the UN Secretary-General announcing Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty, appealing to the UN and the Great Powers to guarantee Hungary's permanent neutrality, and giving notice that the Hungarian delegation would raise this matter at the forthcoming regular session of the General Assembly. Budapest Radio announced during the day that (1) M. Nagy had seen the Soviet Ambassador, protested to him at the continuing movement of Soviet troops and armour into Hungary, and informing him that Hungary intended to leave the Warsaw Pact and pursue a policy of absolute neutrality; (2) that Mr. Nagy had sent a cable to the Soviet President, Marshal Voroshilov, asking the Soviet Government to fix a date and place for negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; and (3) that he had verbally informed all accredited diplomats in Budapest of his talks with the Soviet Ambassador. On the same day Cardinal Mindszenty was released from the monastery in which he had been detained under police surveillance.

Meanwhile Soviet forces were continuing to enter Hungary across the Soviet and Rumanian frontiers and were deploying in strength round the capital, which was being encircled by Soviet armour. Soviet tank formations were reported to be moving into western Hungary towards the Austrian frontier. Alarmed at these movements of Soviet forces the Hungarian Government on November 2 ordered its armed forces to take up positions covering the Parliament building in Budapest and the approaches to the Danube bridges. M. Nagy sent a further communication to the UN drawing the attention of the Organization to the continued entry of strong Soviet forces into Hungary, and pointing out that they had taken control of the principal railway lines and were moving into the western part of the country.



On November 3 Budapest Radio announced that the all-party national Government would be headed by M. Imre Nagy as Prime Minister with General Maleter as Defence Minister. The other members of the new cabinet would be M. Janos Kadar, M. Zoltan Tildy, M. Bela Kovacs, and Mme. Kethly, a prominent Social-democratic leader, who had been imprisoned for many years under the communist regime.

At dawn on November 4, the Soviet Army having completely encircled Budapest launched a massive attack with tank and infantry forces to crush the national uprising. During the night of November 3-4 General Maleter, the Hungarian Minister of Defence, and General Istvan Kovacs, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army, had been negotiating at Soviet headquarters for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Budapest, and the Soviet attack was apparently launched while these talks were still in progress. It was subsequently reported that the Generals had been forcibly detained by the Russians. The first news of the Soviet attack was given in a broadcast by M. Nagy, who announced that Soviet troops unleashed an unprovoked attack on Budapest with the aim of overthrowing the Hungarian democratic government and that the Hungarian armed forces were resisting the aggression. For two hours thereafter Budapest Radio broadcast this announcement at frequent intervals in Hungarian, Russian, English, French, and German, and made repeated appeals to the United Nations to come to Hungary's assistance. At noon on the same day (Nov. 4) Moscow Radio interrupted its programme to announce that a 'Hungarian revolutionary workers' and peasants' government' had been formed by M. Janos Kadar; that this government had appealed to the Soviet Command to help in 'putting down the mutineers protected by the Nagy Government'; and that the Soviet troops had crushed the forces of 'reactionary conspiracy among the Hungarian people'. The broadcast added that the Nagy Government had disintegrated owing to the withdrawal of honest patriots from it.

Despite heroic resistance by the Hungarian armed forces and people, and particularly by the workers and students, the Soviet Army had succeeded by November 10 in crushing the popular revolt in almost all parts of Hungary. Casualties during the first ten days of November and the last week of October were estimated at 25,000 killed and 50,000 wounded. Reports reaching Vienna on November 13 indicated that the Russians were deporting large numbers of Hungarians of military age to the USSR in trains. M. Nagy had taken refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, while Cardinal Mindszenty was believed to have taken refuge in the US Legation. It subsequently became known that the Yugoslav Government protested to the Kadar's Government of Hungary (on November 23) that Imre Nagy and his associates who left the Yugoslav Embassy in Belgrade under guarantees of safety had not returned to their homes. It was reported later that Nagy and his associates were sent to Rumania. Mme Anna Kethly, who during the early stages of revolt had visited Vienna to make contact with Austrian Socialists and who had been prevented by the Russian troops at the frontier from returning to Budapest, subsequently flew to New York to contact UN headquarters.

Mass exodus of Hungarian refugees. The number of refugees crossing the frontier into Austria which had totalled about 30,000 by mid-November, increased greatly and by December 1 had amounted to over 100,000. Many refugees, however, were intercepted by Russian patrols before they could cross the frontier. The refugees were offered asylum by the USA, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand, France, Canada and Norway.

At the United Nations. On November 2 the UN Security Council met to discuss the situation in Hungary. The Soviet delegate at once <sup>p</sup>posed the discussion by the Security Council. The Council nevertheless decided to go ahead with the discussion of the situation in Hungary. On November 4 the Soviet Union vetoed an American resolution in the Security Council calling for an end of any intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. The United States of America immediately called for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly. The call was approved by 10 votes to 1 (Russia). The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on November 4 in favour of a US resolution which called on the Soviet Union to cease immediately all attacks on the Hungarian people and to withdraw all its forces from Hungary. The resolution also provided for UN observers to make an on-the-spot survey of the situation. Furthermore the resolution condemned the Soviet aggression. The Burmese delegation abstained in line with the majority of the Asian-African countries. (The Government of the Union of Burma wished that their delegation had voted in favour of the resolution. However, owing the extremely short notice of the proposal the Union Government could not send their instructions to their delegation in time for voting.)

At the Asian Socialist Conference, Bombay. Meanwhile, the Asian Socialist Conference, which was being held in Bombay during the first week of November and which was presided over by Burmese Prime Minister U Ba Swe, discussed the situation in Hungary. In one of its resolutions, the Conference demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and appealed to the UN to rally to the support of Hungary to uphold her freedom and neutrality. In his speech on the subject U Ba Swe said on November 4 " Comrades, we socialists have persistently urged that foreign troops and bases should not be allowed to be stationed in a country even with the consent of the Government concerned, as they would inevitably give rise to tension in the particular area. But for a big Power to station its troops against the consent of a small country, and what is still worse, to shoot people and to impose on the helpless government its own puppets and stooges, is the most despicable form of colonialism. Yet, it is exactly what has been happening in Hungary, which has now appealed to the United Nations for help."

The meeting of the Prime Ministers of Colombo countries, held in New Delhi on 12th. to 14th. November 1956, also considered the situation in Hungary, and in their joint statement, the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India announced inter alia that they had watched with deep distress the tragic events in Hungary, that they considered it the inalienable right of every country to shape for itself its own destiny, free from all external pressure, that the Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own future, without external intervention from any quarter.

Further action in the UN. On the 9th November the UN. General Assembly passed three resolutions on Hungary. The first resolution proposed by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Peru, and Pakistan demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and called for free elections in the country under UN auspices. Burma abstained on the resolution as a whole; in explaining Burma's vote the delegation made it clear that Burma considered that the Soviet armed intervention was a violation of the UN Charter and of the Hungarian independence and that the Soviet troops should be withdrawn speedily. Regarding the holding of free elections in Hungary

the stand taken by the Burmese delegation was that such elections were impracticable so long as the Soviet troops were still in Hungary, and that if such elections were to be held after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops it should be left to the Hungarians to decide whether or not to request any assistance from the UN. The second resolution proposed by the United States called upon the USSR not to interfere with the relief supplies sent to Hungary, accusing her at the same time of inhuman treatment of Hungarians. The third resolution proposed by Austria requested international co-operation in undertaking on a large scale immediate aid for Hungary by furnishing medical supplies, food-stuffs and clothing. The Burmese delegation voted for the third resolution.

On November 12 the Kadar Government rejected the UN Secretary-General's request for permission for UN observers to enter Hungary to make an on-the-spot report on the situation in the country. On November 21 the UNGA passed an Indian resolution calling on Hungary to admit UN observers. On November 30 the Secretary-General reported to the UNGA that he was still unable to get observers into Hungary and that this had made the task of investigating the situation in revolt-torn country extremely difficult. On January 7, 1957 it was known that the UN Secretary-General had acknowledged failure of implementing UN resolutions on Hungary in the face of the Soviet and the Hungarian non-cooperation, and proposed a special new committee be set up with broader powers of investigation. On January 10 UNGA set up a special 5-Power committee to investigate the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The five countries on the Committee are Australia, Denmark, Tunisia, Uruguay and Ceylon.

While resolution after resolution was passed in the UNGA in its desperate attempt to find remedy for the Hungarian issue, fresh outbreaks of violence took place in Hungary. In one case the Hungarian communist militia opened fire on demonstrating workers at a large wagon factory in south-east Budapest. Fierce clashes took place also at Csepel iron and steel plants. The Hungarian Government had been facing a serious economic crisis, and had been fully aware that it had not been enjoying the confidence of the people. The actual split between the so-called government of the workers and peasants and the actual workers and peasant themselves had been known for some time. The Hungarian people had waited impatiently for the long-rumoured declaration of a "new programme" from the Soviet-supported government. The people had not however, expected that any Kadar statement could solve their economic chaos, but their hope had been that it would lead to a broadening of the Government by bringing in the non-Communist parties. This hope and the general optimism that the Soviet Union might accept another 'Poland' in Hungary were crushed by a declaration drafted in a 4-day Budapest meeting of satellite leaders with Soviet Communist Party Secretary N. Krushchev and former Soviet Premier G. Malenkov. The declaration was nothing but a blunt and brutal warning to Hungary and the other satellites, such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and East Germany, to be content with their present status or face a return of stalinism.



## ANNEXURE (1)

### RUSSIAN VIEW OF THE REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY

Hungary's former leadership committed grave mistakes and distortions that aroused just dissatisfaction among part of the population. The actions of the popular masses who came out on October 23 against the grave errors and distortions were perfectly legitimate. Very soon, however, an attempt was made to use this healthy movement in the interest of the reactionary fascist elements who tried to undermine the people's democratic system and overthrow it. They provoked in Budapest mass disorders that later developed into an uprising of anti-popular forces. The USSR Government at the request of the Hungarian Government, agreed that the Soviet military units stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty should be used to assist in ensuring law and order in Budapest. A few days later, however, the Soviet units were withdrawn from Budapest. After this the reactionary forces discarded their mask and launched brutal activities against the democratic leaders of Hungary. The counter-revolution revealed in the white terror its true face before the entire people. The Imre Nagy Government proved incapable of counter-acting the onslaught of reaction and finally collapsed. Chaos reigned in Hungary. In this grave situation the people's democratic forces began to organize resistance to fascism.

It was no easy question for the Soviet Government to take a decision on. The Soviet Government realized the difficulties that would inevitably rise in connection with the use of troops of one country in another country. But the Soviet Government could not remain indifferent to the destiny of friendly Hungary. History would never have forgiven the Hungarian working people and the Soviet who had made great sacrifices for Hungary's liberation from fascist oppression, if today, 12 years after the rout of the hitlerite hordes in the 2nd. World War, the Hungarian and Soviet peoples had retreated before the participants in the counter-revolutionary putsch and permitted the restoration of a hot-bed of fascism in the heart of Europe.

Events that took place in Hungary would have taken on an absolutely different character and would not have caused bloodshed if from the very outset the actions of the internal counter-revolution forces had not been backed by foreign instigators who had already long ago prepared to unleash a fascist putsch against the people's democratic system in Hungary. There are subversive activities against the countries of the Socialist camp conducted not by private groups or organizations but by state institutions subordinated to the highest government bodies maintained on State budget. What about the annual allocations by the United States of considerable sums for the organization of subversive activities against the East European countries?. A large number of subversive groups financed from abroad have been exposed in the Hungarian republic in the past years. The counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary has been prepared long ago, it was systematically and carefully planned not without the active participation of outside forces.

[ Source: Soviet News Bulletin ]



ANNEXURE (2)

Marshal Tito's view of the Hungarian issue.

X

X

X

X

There is no point now in investigating who fired the first shot. The army was called out by Gero. That was a fatal mistake to call the Soviet army at a time when the demonstrations were still in progress. To call upon the army of another country to teach a lesson to the people of one's own country, is a serious mistake. That action had the effect of still further enraging the people and that was why there came about a spontaneous uprising, in which the Communists found themselves, even against their will, alongside various reactionary elements. Reactionary elements got mixed up in this uprising and exploited it for their own ends. Are there not plenty of Horthyites there? Who has re-educated them? Could Rakosi be expected to have re-educated them? We all know that Horthy had large fascist forces in Hungary, those "swastika crosses", various other reactionary elements, the adherents of Ference Nagy, etc. In short there was a large number of people who are not for communism, who are not only against Rakosi but against socialism in general. And all this got mixed up in the uprising. These reactionary forces did not dare to raise their heads earlier, regardless of the aid which they got from abroad, nor did they have the strength or the courage to rise as long as they thought that the party was united and monolithic. But as soon as they saw that the party had split and that a huge section of the party membership had risen against Rakosi's clique and the remnants of the past, they immediately intervened.

These reactionary forces very quickly, within two or three days, revealed their true face. As in the general-people's revolt against all things that had been done in the past, the prevailing leadership showed no desire to remove the elements which had enraged the Hungarian people and to start out along a truly Hungarian path of the development of socialism, with all its internal specific aspects, matters quickly took a different turn and the reactionaries began dominating more and more. The justified revolt and uprising against a clique turned into an uprising of the whole nation against socialism and against the Soviet Union. And the communists who were in the ranks of the rebels, willy-nilly finally found themselves in a struggle not for socialism but for a return to the past as soon as the reactionaries took matters into their own hands. Against the ~~own~~ will they found themselves in such a situation.

Was it possible now to prevent this? It seems that it was already late. Had Nagy's government been more energetic, had it not wavered this way and that, had it stood firmly against anarchy and the killing of communists by the reactionary elements, had it offered decisive resistance to the reactionaries, etc. ... perhaps matters would have taken a correct turn and perhaps there would not have been any intervention by the Soviet army. And what did Nagy do? He called the people to arms against the Soviet army and appealed to the Western countries to intervene.

In the West this intervention was made full use of. It was exploited by the imperialists who could hardly wait to attack Egypt. They attacked it precisely in that phase of the

Hungarian tregedy and attacked it, hoping that the Soviet Union would be greatly preoccupied and would not be able to intervene against that aggression. Thus renewed fighting took place in Hungary. Soviet troops were reinforced. Nagy fled and a new government was set up. I can say to you, comrades, that I know these people in the new government and that they, in my opinion, represent that which is most honest in Hungary. They were persecuted under Rakosi, they were in prison and stand sincerely for a new development. And the very programme announced by Kadar, which you have read, proves this. But the Soviet intervention weakens that whole programme and the government itself is in a very serious situation.

The question may now be asked whether the Soviet intervention was necessary? The first intervention was not necessary. The first intervention, coming at the invitation of Gero, was absolutely wrong. The second mistake consisted in the fact that ~~the~~ responsible men, instead of waiting for the second intervention, did not at once do what they did do later on, when the second Soviet intervention took place - that is, - they should have set up a new government and issued such a declaration, the worker and communist elements would probably have separated from the reactionary elements and it would have been easier to find a way out of the critical situation.

Before I refer to the second intervention of the Soviet troops, I must say that the situation in Hungary assumed such proportions - and you have read a great deal about it - that it was clear that there would be a terrible massacre, a terrible civil war, in which socialism could be completely buried and in which a third world war could break out. Because the very interference from the West and the renewed coming to power of Horthyites and the old reactionaries, could not be tolerated by the Soviet government.

What did the reactionary elements do? I have already stated already very early they showed their true face. It became clear that even among the top positions they were assuming more and more power as soon as they ordered that the word "comrade" could no longer be used, that the red stars should be taken down. This became clear the moment a communist could not say that he was a communist or else he would be done away with and also by the fact that the communists were being hanged. Had there been only one such incident and had they hanged some member of the police who was known for his ill-deeds, it might be said that this occurred as a result of a spontaneous revolt of a group of people. But there was a general massacre. In Shoprony they hanged 20 communists. They caught people in the streets and killed them if they wore tan shoes because the police wore tan shoes. They broke into homes and killed communists. All this was done by the wild fascist and reactionery mobs.

Nagy's government did nothing to prevent this. It continually wailed over the radio for help instead of fighting against this and showing in some way the will to put a halt to the massacre of communists and progressive men. Instead of that it issued a manifesto that is a declaration whereby it renounced the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed its independence, etc., as if that was the most important thing at the moment, as though its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, meant something.

Many people are now asking the question why the second Soviet intervention occurred. It is clear, and we have said so and will continue to say it, that we are against the interference and use of foreign armed forces. What was now the lesser evil? there could be neither chaos, civil war, counter-revolution and a new world war, or the intervention of Soviet troops which were there? The former would be a catastrophe and the latter a mistake. And of course, if that meant to

save socialism in Hungary, then, comrades, we shall be able to say, although we are against the interference, that the Soviet intervention was necessary. But had they done every thing they should have done earlier, there would not have been any need for military intervention. This error came unfortunately as a result of their idea that military power resolves everything. Just look how a bare-handed and poorly armed people offers fierce resistance when it has one goal - to free itself and to be independent. It is no longer interested in the kind of independence it will gain in whether there will be restored a bourgeoisie and reactionary system, but only that it should be nationally independent. It was this idea that prevailed among the people. Naturally, I can now say only that the first thing was the worst that could have happened and the second, the intervention of the Soviet troops, was also bad, but if it leads to the preservation of socialism in Hungary, that is to the further building up of socialism in that country, and to peace in the world, then one day this would become a positive thing, on condition that the Soviet troops withdraw the moment the situation in that country is settled and quiet.

We have said this to the soviet comrades. We concealed nothing. The Soviet comrades stated that their troops would leave then. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union too is in a difficult situation now. Their eyes have been opened now and they realize that not only are Horthyites fighting but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is fighting. Soviet soldiers are not going there with a glad heart. Therein lies the tragedy. You can rest assured that we have never advised them to go ahead with the army. We never gave such advice and could not do so even now that they are in a crisis. In this grave situation we can tell them nothing except that they should take care to rectify the old mistakes. That is the gist of the matter. Therefore, we should combat those rumours in our country which see in the Soviet intervention a purely interventionist action. That is not correct. I, comrades, am deeply convinced of this.

I am deeply convinced that the blood which has flowed in Hungary and those dreadful sacrifices made by the Hungarian people will have a positive effect and that the comrades in the Soviet Union, and even those Stalinist elements, will realize and comprehend that things cannot be managed thus any longer. It is our tragedy- the tragedy of all of us- that socialism has been dealt such a terrible blow. It has become compromised. And do you not recall, comrades, that we often said that such methods would only compromise socialism? We did say that. I should not want us now to beat our breasts and say gleefully: "We told you so".

X

X

X

X

[Excerpt from Marshal Tito's speech delivered on November 11 before the Acting Body of the League of Communists at the Yugoslav People's Army Club in Pula.]



ANNEXURE (3)

A. DIAGNOSIS OF THE TROUBLE IN HUNGARY

BY YUGOSLAVIA

(Extracts from the speech delivered by Yugoslav Vice-President Edward Kardelj.)

X

X

X

X

X

X

The actual social leading role of the communist party cannot be decreed by law. Actually the party can be the leading or most progressive social factor only if it acts in accordance with the objective laws of social development. And as these laws act through men, through social classes, the communist party, or any other leading organized socialist force - during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism - must see to it that the most progressive socialist tendencies are expressed through it, as well as through the whole social machinery. At the same time the party should change concurrently with the development of socialist forces. If the party does not understand this, then all its claim to be a communist and its boasting about Marxism and Leninism and the invoking of its historical leading role will be in vain, resulting as a brake impeding socialist development. It has been clearly shown in Hungary. In that country an anti-democratic system of bureaucratic despotism had been pursued for years against the wishes of the working people, the definite arbitrary policy of a clique. This finally led to an armed uprising in which the working class constituted the main force, i.e. precisely the class which alone can be the protagonist of the socialist transformation of Hungarian society. In this connection it is not so important to know who made use of the revolt of the working-class and by whose slogans the working-class was duped when it rose with elemental force against something which had become socially unbearable and reactionary. It is much more important to realize that the political system acting in the name of socialism had become such an obstacle to further socialist development that it unavoidably provoked the armed resistance of the working-class, i.e. of the main force of socialist progress because that class had no other means for expressing its will. The Hungarian events are a tragedy of the contemporary socialist movement, but they constitute at the same time and to an ever-increasing extent, a lesson and an incentive to international socialism.

X

X

X

X

X

X

There is a discussion going on in the communist press now in order to ascertain whether or not the revolutionary developments in Hungary were caused by some mistakes committed by the earlier government or by the political system. It is clear, however, that a certain number of mistakes would not have led to such a decisive reaction on the part of the masses, if the latter had had the possibility of expressing their wishes aimed at changing the discredited policies of the leadership and, thereby, also at correcting mistakes. And when the socialist working-masses have not the possibility to express such tendencies and to correct mistakes, then it is clear that we are faced with a definite political system which separates the masses from power.

X

X

X

Two appraisals of the armed uprising in Hungary are most often heard in the socialist movement today. Both appraisals, however, are erroneous and harmful for the future development of socialism in the world. One side maintains that these events amount to a counter-revolution organized beforehand, and that a number of mistakes committed by the former political leadership had made one part of the masses side with the counter-revolution. The other side asserts that these events amount to a revolution for freedom and national independence, both of these concepts remaining abstract and nebulous and identifying, in the final analysis, freedom with multi-party system of the classical bourgeois democracy and independence with a return to the old positions of Hungarian nationalism.

X

X

X

An objective Marxist analyst must ask, on the basis of the first appraisal, several purely practical questions. First of all; if the Hungarian developments were precipitated by only by certain 'mistakes' committed by the Rakosi-Gero clique and not by the bureaucratic system which had begun to play a reactionary role with regard to socialist development, why did the Hungarian working masses oppose the policy which had led to these 'mistakes' only by resorting to arms? Why could not the sentiments of the working-class be voiced through normal channels, through corresponding representative organs, or, at least, through the Hungarian Workers' Party, for which it was claimed to be the most progressive detachment of the working class, whereas it is now obvious that it had lost all contact with the working-class? Finally how can socialist conscience be consoled by the assertion that - 11 years after its own victory - the working-class had become the dupe of the counter-revolution? Even if we suppose that it is so, the following question must arise: should one, in such a case, blame the working class and not the system which had brought the working-class into the absurd situation of fighting against its own historical interest?

However, such fallacious logic cannot but lead to an absurd conclusion which has nothing in common with socialism, and even less with Marxism, namely that a party or state can build socialism without the working class or even against the latter's will.

X

X

X

Our standpoint is now under fire from two sides. One side reproaches us, in the name of proletarian internationalism, that we are not unreservedly supporting the Soviet intervention. The other side reproaches us, in the name of the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and democracy, that we are not just as unreservedly opposed to intervention in Hungary.

I personally believe that the question of socialism was not the most important factor impelling the Soviet Union to intervene in Hungary but the ratio of forces under the prevailing international conditions. Any somewhat realistic observer must have come to the conclusion that a Soviet intervention in the present international situation would become inevitable at the moment when internal developments in Hungary began to create conditions for the intervention of the other side, or for the creation of Western political bases in Hungary. Such a situation would greatly disturb the present ratio of forces in Europe, provoking very grave disturbances and even endangering peace in Europe. Various 'Free Europes' and similar institutions, and even various nationalistic

hotheads in Hungary itself have confirmed such fears. There is no doubt that even we had to take this element into account to a certain extent when determining our stand, not to speak of the stand of the Soviet government.

Consequently, regardless of our concern regarding Soviet intervention in Hungary and its consequences for socialism, we nevertheless believe that the fate of socialism in Eastern Europe today is not being solved by taking stands for or against Soviet intervention, for the simple reason that this intervention was largely conditioned by the existing international situation. The main and decisive question lies in another direction, namely how was it all possible that after 11 years of a government that had pledged itself to socialism, in a relatively developed country with a powerful economic basis and a strong working-class, an armed uprising of the same class could take place, and how could this revolt provoke the intervention of another socialist state?. No matter whether this process is called a revolution or a counter-revolution, the fact remains that the working-class had risen against a government which was proclaiming itself socialist, and that the majority of the working-class had taken part in the uprising, because if that had not been the case, the uprising would have come to nothing. It is also a fact that this working class is rejecting even today everything that, in its view, this intervention is bringing in its wake, i.e. the restoration of the former system and of old methods.

Consequently, the cardinal problem of the present-day Hungary resides in a fact which is today being most emphatically denied in certain communist parties, a development which should be discussed, viz. what is actually needed in Hungary are radical changes in the political system, rather than changes of personalities and corrections of individual mistakes. Only if this is achieved can the negative consequences of Soviet intervention for socialism be greatly reduced.

Proceeding from these presumptions we considered it essential to give political support to the Kadar Government, expecting - or hoping - that this government would be able, and willing, to take the course of establishing closer relations with the working class, i.e. with the workers' councils, as well as other genuine democratic and socialist trends in Hungary, including such elements from the former government of Imre Nagy.

[ Source: Yugoslav Embassy's News Bulletin. ]



#### ANNEXURE (4)

##### A Western view of the Hungarian revolution.

When Stalin died it became necessary for the new regime to divert that popular explosion which is always possible on the death of tyrants. It was desirable, too, to avoid possible trouble with the satellite States and to put the Communist Parties of the free world into better credit. The easiest course appeared to be to blame all the crimes of the past two decades on to the dead Stalin. For the satellite States it was desirable to hint at national independence, a hint epitomized by composing the long-standing quarrel with Marshal Tito. Finally it was desirable to suggest that the Russian brand of Communism was a pattern and not a straight-jacket and that the nations might find their own roads to Socialism.

The first sign that the new line, if it was to be no more than talk, would not satisfy Russia's victims came with the East German revolt of 17th. June 1953. But these were early days - the revolt was crushed and it did not spark off revolt elsewhere. Crushed, too, was the revolt at Poznan, but the ferment went on. Finally there came the Polish and the Hungarian upheavals.

These two upheavals differed radically. The Polish revolt was not the revolt of an anti-communist people against Communism. It was a revolt of Polish Communists and allied elements who wanted freedom for Poland to handle its own economic affairs, to keep the Russian occupation in Poland to the minimum dictated by the possibility of a future resurgent Germany and to have a measure of freedom to handle trouble with Poland's relations with countries outside the Curtain. Poland's revolution was a controlled revolution. The real Polish revolution is yet to come. What exists meantime is not a settlement but an inter-regnum.

The Hungarian revolution was a very different thing. Here was a passionate, determined, incredibly heroic rising of a whole people, a revolt against everything Russian, everything Communist. The Russians sought eagerly for a Polish solution to the problem. But the Polish solution demanded two things - a man, who would, up to a point, work with the Russians, but could at the same time command sufficient popular support to keep things from getting out of bounds behind him. Poland had its Gomulka: Hungary had none. Imre Nagy, the first choice, had popular backing, but would have nothing to do with Moscow's stooges. Kadar, the second choice, would work with Russia and its stooges, but no Hungarian of any standing would work with him. The revolution grew and grew, until the Russians decided to drown it in blood with Russian troops.

It is plain that Russia abates no jot or tittle of its will and purpose to destroy the free world. The satellites must remain firmly tied to Russia, militarily, politically, and economically, in a monolithic bloc controlled from Moscow. Anything which tends to weaken or break that block will not be tolerated at any price, including massacre where necessary. Russian occupation forces are increased. The curtain drawn for an inch or two for a short time, again shuts out any light.

[ Source: Article by DIOGENES in TIME and TIDE ]