

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS - CONTINGENCY PLANS

2 SEPT 1994 - 21 JAN 1995

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

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ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 137

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0283

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FROM : G 3 PLANS
TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST
INFO : COS
: DCOS (OPS)
DATE : 21 Jan 95

5000.46 (Plans)

SUBJECT : REMINDER - ONE
CONTINGENCY PLANNING : INFO ON VEHS

1. Reference letter 5000.46 Plans dated Jan 95 on the same subject.
2. This info is immediately required for various calculations in the contingency plans. The same is held up due to the considerable delay on your part.
3. You were required to provide the following info:
 - a. Holdings. Intimate your holding of vehs other than APCs in the following category:
 - (1) Large Vehs. Vehs with more than 4.5 ton capacity.
 - (2) Medium Vehs. Vehs with 2 - 4.5 ton capacity.
 - (3) Small Vehs. Vehs with less than 2 ton capacity.
 - b. Details. Also please provide Length, Width, Height and approximate Weight of the empty veh and that loaded to its capacity.
4. Please send the info on priority.

Distribution

INDBATT

P K Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3
For G 3 Plans

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GHANBATT

TUNBATT

ZAMBATT

ETHIOBATT

FRAFBATT

NICOY

MALICOY

MALAWICOY

FORCE ENGINEER COY

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FROM: DCOS(OPS)
TO: DCOS (Sp)
DATE: 12 Dec 1994

5000.46 (Plans)

COMMENTS ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLAN FOR THE

CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Reference Logistic estimate forwarded by your branch vide letter number 4000.1/ log-11, dated 5 Dec.

2. Major aspects of logistics having implication on the Op Plans NIKE, HECTOR and JASON are;

- a. Accn.
- b. Supplies and water.
- c. Transport.
- d. POL.
- e. Ammo.
- f. Medical.
- g. Repairs and maintenance.
- h. Stores (Defence and Ordnance).

3. Accn.

- a. Op NIKE. The accn required at the battalion safe areas need to be earmarked by the contingents. However an understanding, if possible, can be reached with the owners about the process of occupation in case of NIKE RED. If such arrangement is not possible, alternatively some contingents have accn at the HQ where one more coy can be accommodated. Other coys will have to use tents. The Logistics branch will have to make provision for the required tentage. The minimum requirement for a coy is;

- (i) Living tents - 16 (8 in one tent).
- (ii) Kitchen shelter - 1.

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- (iii) Store tent - 1
 - (iv) Dining shelters - 2 / 3 (depending on the size).
 - (v) Water storage - 3 tanks/drums of 1000 lit capacity each with the facility of one refilling in a day.
- b. Op HECTOR. Accn aspect in Op HECTOR will not pose much of a problem. The contingents should earmark accn in the subsector after readjusting the deployment of their sector. Alternatively the reinforcement will come with their tentage.
- c. Op JASON. It is a remote possibility that all the sectors will be withdrawn to Kigali simultaneously. In the most probable scenario three to four contingents will be in Kigali at one time thus totalling to about 3000 personnel. If the situation so demands temporary evac to other countries should be resorted to. Therefore accn has to be planned for 2000 to 3000 personnel in addition to those already stationed in Kigali. Alternatively they will have to live in tents. However in that case camping areas will have to be earmarked for them. Thus they will be in a position to be redeployed in their sectors if the situation improves or evac to a neighbouring country. In the case of final evac of Kigali the plan exists to use the land routes and the KIA. An understanding will have to be reached with the concerned Governments. Depending on the situation one/two land routes and the KIA will be kept functional.

2. Supplies and Water.

- a. Op NIKE. It lays down 7 days at the coy level and 7 days at the battalion level. In order to maintain mobility of coy it can be modified to 4 days at coy level and 10 days at the battalion level. It will be contingent's responsibility for the storage and transport. However 1 x 3/4 tons vehicle will be adequate for moving a coy reserve. Water storage will have to be catered for by having one 10,000 lit capacity bladder or 4 drums of 1000 lit capacity each for a coy with the facility of one refill in a day by two water tankers allotted to the battalion. Therefore the Logistics branch has to provide the following to a battalion;

- (i) One/two water tankers.

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(ii) Four 1000 lit drums or one 10,000 lit capacity bladder per coy.

(iii) 1 x 3/4 ton vehicle per coy and one for the battalion HQ and other elements to move the supplies, for the contingents not having adequate transport.

- b. Op HECTOR. The incoming reinforcement will come self contained for supplies and water for three days. Beyond this normal resupply procedure should be followed.
- c. Op JASON. The Logistics branch has to stock 14 days rations for additional personnel in Kigali. Contingents will withdraw with balance rations and thus it can cater for about 20 days instead of 14. It will amount to stocking up of about 112 tons of supplies and 1260 tons of water or catering for 11,20,000 lit of water supply for total 14 days calculating 20 lit per person.

4. Transport.

a. Op NIKE. The problem is certainly complicated by the fact that only INDBATT and ZAMBATT are self contained in transport. It will involve more vehicle movement in order to increase the presence in the sectors. The minimum requirement will have to be met. APCs as mentioned are not likely to pose much of a problem. APCs on an average have a cruising range of about 300 to 400 kms, once topped up. The wheeled APCs can traverse on the roads and tracks and also the M 113 types which will, at the most bruise the roads. Trailers will have to be catered for to transport the containers. the Logistics branch has to make provision for the cranes for lifting heavy loads and the containers.

b. Op HECTOR. Though the movement of the reinforcement is the obligation of parent contingent, however due to the inadequacy of transport with the contingents some may have to be provided to boost up the holdings. A coy level reinforcement will require about 13/14 Bedfords for men and stores. Your branch should be having the transport state of the contingents and the additional requirement can be calculated.

c. Op JASON. In the most probable scenario it will entail withdrawal of 2 to 3 contingents to Kigali. The situation in all the sectors may not warrant a fall back to Kigali. Therefore a staggered withdrawal may be the event.

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In such a case the transport may be recycled. Simultaneously some contingent may be directly evac to a neighbouring country, thus an understanding has to be reached with the countries. As per the plan, whatever be the situation, one/two land routes and the KIA will be kept functional for evac process. Attempt will be to evac a contingent as one body. Your branch has to work out the requirement based on the contingencies of one and two contingents falling back to Kigali.

5. Transport question being important has to be tackled on priority. You may have to set time frame for the provision of additional transport to support the Op plans.

6. POL. The 14 days reserve as mentioned in NIKE will have to be built up. The laid down scales of 7 days at coy level 7 at the battalion can be modified to 4 days at coy and 10 days at the battalion HQ. Coy level reserve can be stocked in drums which can be transported easily. At the battalion HQ also it can be held in drums but with a facility of shifting it into a tanker during NIKE YELLOW or it can even be shifted into a vehicle. However a tanker will be required at the battalion HQ to keep refilling the reserve.

7. Ammo. Stocking, maintaining the necessary reserve and moving it when required is the responsibility of the contingents.

8. Maintenance. 30 days res spares will have to be stocked.

9. Medical. All the contingents will have to stock 30 days reserve. AUSMED will also be required to have the same reserve.

10. Other stores. Contingents will have to maintain the required stocks.

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FROM : G 3 (PLANS)

5000.46(Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATE : 27 Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANNING SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS:

MILITARY PARALLEL STATES OF SECURITY TO THAT DEFINED

BY THE SRSG FOR THE UNAMIR

1. Further to our letters on the security plans.

2. The SRSG vide his letter dated 16 Dec has defined five security conditions for the UN personnel. This branch has already defined the security states pertaining to the military personnel vide instructions on plans Op NIKE, HECTOR and JASON. Following are the parallel states applicable to the military personnel;

	<u>Phases</u>	<u>Defined by the SRSG</u>	<u>Applicable to mil Personnel</u>
stg 1	a. Phase-1	Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities)	Op NIKE GREEN, YELLOW and HECTOR.
stg 2	b. Phase- 2	Restricted movements (All movements to be restricted)	NIKE RED
stg 3	c. Phase- 3	Relocation (Persons, to the extent property relocated to conc centres in anticipation of evac)	NIKE RED
stg 4	d. Phase- 4	Programme suspension (Regular ops cann't continue, all non essential persons evac)	JASON GREEN, YELLOW ALFA and BRAVO.
stg 5	e. Phase- 5	Evac (All ops must be halted and all persons evac)	JASON YELLOW CHARLIE and JASON RED.

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3. It is for info of all.

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G 3 Plans

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INDBATT	1
GHANBATT	2
TUNBATT	3
ZAMBATT	4
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MALAWICOY	8
MALICOY	9
CANCON	10
AUSMED	11
File	12
Spare	13 and 14

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(C)

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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : G 3 AIR

: AIR OPS (MOVEMENT CONTROL)

INFO : DCOS (OPS)

DATE : 14 DEC 1994

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. You are required to work out air resources required to support the Op Plan JASON (final evac of RWANDA). The requirement is to be calculated as per the following parameters;

a. Priority of evac;

(i) Personnel.

(ii) Stores.

(iii) Vehicles.

b. The resources required for the following contingencies;

(i) 2000 personnel, 300 tons stores and 95 vehicles including 20 APCs of 14 tons class.

(ii) 3000 personnel, 425 tons stores and 125 vehicles including 40 APCs of 14 ton class.

(iii) 4000 personnel, 550 tons stores and 150 vehicles including 60 APCs of 14 ton class.

2. Also please work out the timings required for the provision and for the air crafts to be ready for the evac process.

3. Please forward the requirement by 20 Dec for further compilation.

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G 3 Plans 3

Vehs

1. Cat — Dimensions — { length, width, wt. }

— > 4 Tons — Large

— 2 - 4 Tons — Med

— < 2 Tons — Small.

2. APCs — Dimensions — length, width, Ht., wt.



TO: G3 Plans

FROM: G3 Air ops

INFO: Air Ops
Movecon
DCOS Ops

DATE: 14 December 94

SUBJECT: AIR RESOURCES FOR OP JASON

1. The air resources required to lift personnel is fairly straightforward to estimate but will vary considerably on aircraft type. Do you wish us to calculate these rates for maximum airlift capability or a balance of tactical or civilian aircraft types?
2. Unless I know the types of vehicles, their dimensions and weights it is not possible to calculate how many aircraft would be required to extract them.
3. Please furnish me with an accurate breakdown of vehicle types and their specification, without this I cannot provide the information that you require.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "JD Janiurek".

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
SO2 G3 Air

20-11
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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : 28 Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Find the updated SOP on contingency plans laying down various measures to be adopted by the military staff members under different states of security.
2. Due to some essential additions, this copy supersedes the one sent vide letter 5000.46 dated 26 Dec 94. however Annexure 1 and 2 should be retained.

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G 3 Liaison
Air Ops
G 4(Mov Con)
G 6(Comm)
Camp Commandant
HQ Mil Obs
INDBATT
FILE
G - 4 (Logistics)

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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS : SOP FOR

UNAMIR MILITARY STAFF

General

1. Reference security instructions on Plans NIKE, HECTOR and JASON.

2. In the event of deteriorating situation in Sector 6 the security measures will be activated in Kigali. This SOP lays down the measures to be adopted under various conditions to ensure safety of the military staff working at the HQ UNAMIR and HQ Mil Obs.

3. The various existing plans denote the following;

a. Op NIKE. It lays down the measures to counter the increased threat in the sectors. It enables increased presence in the sectors.

(i) NIKE GREEN. It indicates a low level threat and normal activities will continue.

(ii) NIKE YELLOW ALFA, BRAVO and CHARLIE. It caters for a medium level threat and normal ops will continue till the situation permits without endangering safety of personnel.

(iii) NIKE RED. This status denotes a high level threat. It lays down strict restrictions on op activities and movements.

b. Op HECTOR. This plan encompasses the reinforcement measures for the threatened sectors.

c. Op JASON. This plan entails the threatened sectors falling back to Kigali or being evac to neighbouring countries in JASON GREEN and YELLOW ALFA stages. it also lays down instructions for the preliminary evac during JASON YELLOW BRAVO STAGE and the final evac of the Core

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Group and the left over security force in JASON RED stage.

Threat

4. The current situation in Rwanda seems to be stabilised however it is likely that the former RGF which is believed to be in the process of regrouping may in future embark insurgency ops. The threat in Sector 6 is likely to develop after the situation in the other sectors is deteriorated. The developing threat is likely to afford reaction time to activate the alert measures in Sector 6 and thus Kigali.

5. The threat to UNAMIR in Kigali is likely to be ;
 - a. Insurgency threat aimed at BBGNU and the RPA.
 - b. Attacks on UNAMIR personnel/ property.
6. The above mentioned threat is likely to develop as under;
 - a. Infiltration in Sector 6 to assess the capability of RPA.
 - b. Ambushing of UNAMIR vehs and property.
 - c. Theft of vehs and personal and official property.
 - d. Extortion.
 - e. Sabotage of UN property.

Op Plan NIKE

7. NIKE GREEN (Low Level Threat).
 - a. The presence of troops will be increased in Sector 6 by the Sector Cdr accordingly.
 - b. Normal ops will continue.
 - c. Mil obs and the will be kept updated of the situation by the ops branch and the Sector 6 Cdr.
 - d. Prepare to meet the next level of threat.
8. NIKE YELLOW (Medium Level Threat).
 - a. YELLOW ALFA.
 - (i) Sector 6 troops consolidate on the platoon, coy

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and the battalion positions progressively as per the existing plan.

- (ii) Security of KPs to be enhanced.
- (iii) Curfew imposed for all UN personnel from 10 pm to 6 am.
- (iv) All movements to be in groups of atleast two persons.
- (v) Comm on motorola when moving out.
- (vi) Ops branch will ensure 24 hour comm with HQ Sector 6. It should be duplicated with tele.
- (vii) In case of emergency the duty officer in the ops branch should be approached on radio who will immediately get in touch with the HQ Sector 6 to rush in the RRF to the desired spot.
- (viii) Cdr Sector 6 to enhance the security at Hotel Meridien and Belgian Village to one section each and one platoon at the Amahoro Complex.

b. Yellow BRAVO and CHARLIE.

- (i) Plan HECTOR is likely to be ordered at this stage to beef up the troops strength in Sector 6. It is likely that one/two coys will reinforce Sector 6 to counter the increased threat. Cdr Sector 6 will be the overall cdr.
- (ii) No distinct gap between BRAVO and CHARLIE.
- (iii) All movements restricted to that required to perform official duties only.
- (iv) All members of staff may fall back to the following Safe Areas;
 - A. Amahoro Hotel.
 - B. Amahoro Stadium for the over flow.
- (v) Security at Amahoro Complex enhanced to one platoon.
- (vi) Logistics branch to ensure the desired water and electricity supply in the Amahoro Complex.

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9. NIKE RED.

- a. Staff members fall back to Safe Areas, if not done already.
- b. Sector 6 Cdr to deploy one platoon RRF at the Amahoro Complex in addition to the one in defence of the Complex.
- c. Movements kept to the minimum even during the day time.
- d. All to use ballistic protective equipment.
- e. This stage may also entail evac of civil non essential persons leaving behind only a core group.
- f. All branches will prepare a list of non essential staff members to be evac in the next stage.

Op JASON

10. This plan entails evac from Rwanda. It may only be partially activated depending on the situation. The aim will be to remain in a position to redeploy when the situation improves. The plan will be activated when the situation in the sectors deteriorates to the extent that the security of even the military personnel is endangered. It may result in evac of the threatened sectors only.

11. JASON GREEN. This part deals with the preparation for the evac. UN Agencies and the NGO personnel may be evac in this stage. All branches will prepare the non essential staff members for evac. The affected sectors will prepare for the procedure of falling back to Kigali or evacuation to a neighbouring country as ordered by the FORCE HQ.

12. JASON YELLOW. This part defines the evac process.

a. Yellow ALFA.

(i) Threatened sectors withdraw to Kigali after destroying their non essential stores. All important and vital stores will be brought back to Kigali. Some contingents may be evac to the neighbouring country. Contingents will be intimated about the disposal of the above mentioned stores in that case.

(ii) All non essential military personnel including the staff will manifest with the Mov Con.

(iii) All non essential stores of only the

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contingents/ troops in Sector 6 will be destroyed after taking confirmation from this HQ.

b. Yellow BRAVO. It involves preliminary evac. It will be under taken when the final evac is most likely.

(i) All military non essential personnel and the left over civilians (core group) evac.

(ii) All troops not required for the defence of Kigali evac by land and/or air.

(iii) Units will be preferably evac by land route and others not forming part of formed contingents by air. The equipment of high value will be given priority in evac.

(iv) Those moving out by air will have a luggage weight limit of 15 kgs.

(v) All vehs and equipment not required by the minimum presence will be evac by land and/or air.

c. Yellow CHARLIE. It is the main evac stage.

(i) A Core Group will be formed which will continue functioning as the minimum presence, till the last evac. It will comprise of the following;

- A. Appropriate representative of HQ UNAMIR.
- B. Force Cdr/DFC/COS.
- C. Core Ops personnel.
- D. Engrs.
- E. Air op staff.
- F. Representative of the Logistics branch.

(ii) Important and essential stores evac.

(iii) Non essential stores of units which withdrew from Kigali destroyed under the arrangements of Engrs.

13. JASON RED. It involves the final evac of the Core Group from Rwanda. The security force will be evac by the land route and the Core Group by air. Remaining stores will be destroyed by the Engrs.

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Miscellaneous Aspects

14. Destination After the Evac. To be intimated in due course of time.

15. Earmarking of Accn in the Safe Areas. It will be coordinated by the G 3 Plans and all the branches will be intimated accordingly.

16. Family Members. The SRSG has instructed vide circular on security plans, dated 16 Dec that the responsibility for the security and evac of family members is that of the concerned officers. They should be evac before UNAMIR evac process starts.

17. Non Local Domestic Help. Same as above.

18. Forms to be Filled. The following forms need to be filled at the earliest and forwarded to CMPO and the Plans branch. Copies are attached as Annexure 1 and 2.

a. General Info. Copy attached as Annexure 1. Two copies per officer to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

b. Inventory for Personal Effects. One copy to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

19. Evac of Office Equipment. CMPO will coordinate the evac of essential office stores. Forward a list of office equipment in your branches to the CMPO by 09 Jan 95 to enable him to screen the same into essential category.

Check List

20. Forms as mentioned in paragraph 18 to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

21. List of office equipment as mentioned in paragraph 19 to be forwarded to CMPO by 09 Jan 95.

22. All branches to prepare the list of non essential staff members and forward to the Plans branch by 09 Jan 95 as mentioned in paragraph 9 above.

23. Plans branch will compile the list of Core Group by 09 Jan 95.

24. All staff members should be in possession of ballistic equipment.

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Military Parallel States of Security to That Defined by the SRSG for the UNAMIR

25. The SRSG vide his letter dated 16 Dec 94 has defined five security conditions for the UN personnel. This branch has already intimated the security states pertaining to the military persons vide instructions on plans Op NIKE, HECTOR and JASON. Following are the parallel states applicable to the military personnel;

<u>Phases</u>	<u>Defined by the SRSG</u>	<u>Applicable to mil persons</u>
a. Phase-1	Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities)	Op NIKE GREEN, YELLOW and may be Op HECTOR.
b. Phase-2	Restricted movements (All movements to be restricted)	NIKE RED
c. Phase-3	Relocation (Persons, to the extent property relocated to conc centres in anticipation of evac)	NIKE RED
d. Phase-4	Programme suspension (Regular ops can not continue, all non essential persons evac)	JASON GREEN, YELLOW ALFA and BRAVO
e. Phase-5	Evac (All ops halted and all persons evac)	JASON YELLOW CHARLIE and JASON RED.

26. It is for info and neccessary action please.

P K Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3
For G 3 Plans

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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)


TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATE : 23 DEC 94

REMINDER -TWO

SECURITY CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Reference reminder No one dated 08 Dec 94.
2. The required instructions have not been received from all the contingents. It has caused considerable delay in compilation of the same.
3. It is desired that the same be forwarded immediately.


P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3

Distribution List

Action

ETHIOBATT
MALI COY
MALAWI COY
INDBATT (Please forward your Op JASON instructions)

INFO

GHANBATT - Frame your instructions based on Sector 2.
ZAMBATT - Frame your instructions based on combined Sector 4A(N
and 4A(S).

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From: Col K P O'Kelly
DCOS (Sp)
HQ UNAMIR

①

Extn: 11109

To: DCOS (Ops)

File Reference: 4000-1/LOG-11


Date: 5 Dec 94

Subject: CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. I attach a copy of the work carried out by my staff in respect of the draft contingency plans you circulated for comment.
2. While I endorse the general thrust of the paper, it is perhaps slightly alarmist in places in that, given the stated requirement, we will build up the necessary reserves. But the fact is that they do not exist today and, were a crisis to arise, we would be lacking essential stocks.

② G3 Plans

1. This tells us the limitations of the plans, yet fails to consider several practical alternative solutions. Their plan should find ways to make it work vice preventing road blocks unless they are indeed "show stoppers". (Acen section is one)
 2. Cant we ~~explore~~ if the glass is half full?
- DCOS Ops
6.12


K P O'KELLY
Col
DCOS (Sp)



UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM: LT COL A CHABIR, ADCOS SP
TO: COL KP O'KELLY, DCOS SP
INFO: CLOGO
DATE: 02 DEC 94
SUBJECT: LOGISTIC ESTIMATE OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

AIM

1. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO DISCUSS THE LOGISTIC ASPECT OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANS.

GENERAL

2. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE LOGISTIC ESTIMATE UNDERTAKEN AT THIS PURPOSE ARE:

- UNDER THE CURRENT SITUATION, LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO OPERATION NIKE IS NOT POSSIBLE. THE FORCE IS SUFFERING MAINLY THE FOLLOWING SHORTFALLS: ACCOMMODATION, TRANSPORTATION ASSETS, STORAGE CAPACITY, POOR MAINTENANCE CAPACITY.
- OPERATION HECTOR COULD BE SUPPORTED, AND SO WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED IN THIS PAPER.
- OPERATION JASON IS NOT FEASIBLE AT ALL. NEITHER THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE NOR THE EVACUATION PHASE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES IN KIGALI

THEIR ACCOMMODATION AND THEIR EVACUATION FROM K.I.A ARE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT TO DON'T SAY IMPOSSIBLE.

- ONLY THE MEDICAL SUPPORT COULD BE ENSURED FOR THE 3 OP PLANS.

OP PLAN NIKE

3. OPERATION PLAN NIKE WHICH BEGINS WITH A WITHDRAWAL TO PLATOONS, THEN COMPANIES LOCATIONS AND ENDS BY WITHDRAWAL TO A BATTALION DEFENDED AREA, HAS THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS.

A. SUPPLY

THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WE CAN FACE WITH OP NIKE ARE:

(1) ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITS HAVE NOT WHAT IS REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE THE TROOPS. THE SHORTFALL WILL BE MORE STRESSED WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONNEL.

(2) SUPPLY

CLASS 1 (SUBSISTENCE)

AS STATED IN THE PLAN, CONTINGENT SHOULD HAVE 14 DAYS RESERVE, 7 AT 1ST LINE (SUBUNITS) AND 7 AT CONTINGENT LEVEL. CURRENTLY NO RESERVE COULD BE HELD SINCE THE REQUESTED 140.000 RATION DON'T ARRIVE YET ON THEATRE. THE SECOND POINT IS THE STORAGE FACILITIES PARTICULARLY FOR THE SUBUNITS. AS WE KNOW, IN THE

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AVERAGE, A COMPANY HAS 130 MEN. THE RESERVE WILL BE:

COMBAT RATION = $7 \times 130 = 910$

POTABLE WATER = $7 \times 3L \times 130 = \underline{2730} \text{ L}$

TOTAL WEIGHT = 5 TONS

AS A CONSEQUENCE, NORMALLY ONE 5 TONS TRUCK SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO CARRY THE COMPANY RESERVE. DO WE HAVE IT? NO. SO WHAT

2 OPTIONS

EITHER TO REDUCE THE RESERVE TO BE HELD BY THE COMPANY, INSTEAD OF 7 IT WILL BE ONLY 3 DAYS, AND THE CONTINGENT HOLD 11 DAYS, OR TO PROVIDE THE UNITS WITH TRUCKS. IN THE IMMEDIATE, THE 1ST OPTION IS RECOMMENDED. IN LONG TERMS THE SECOND IS NECESSARY SO WE IMPROVE AUTONOMY AND MOBILITY OF THE FORCE.

CLASS 2 (DEFENCE STORES)

UNDER OP PLAN NIKE, UNITS SHOULD HAVE DEFENSE STORES TO PROTECT THEIR LOCATION AND THE SAFE SITES WHERE THEY HAVE TO MOVE IF NECESSARY. THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW. A REQUEST FOR MORE STORES SHOULD BE RAISED WHEN THE CONTINGENTS DETERMINE THEIR NEEDS.

CLASS 3 (POL)

UNDER THIS OPERATION, THE USE OF VEHICLES WILL BE INCREASED (ESCORTS, PATROLS MORE LARGE, ETC). THE

SHARP POINT IS THE STORAGE CAPACITY. 3 OPTIONS ARE POSSIBLE.

- SET-UP BLADDERS
- HOLD POL IN DRUMS
- PROVIDE UNITS WITH EITHER TRAILERS OR TANKERS.

OPTION 1 IS LESS EXPENSIVE BUT IT DOESN'T OFFER THE REQUIRED MOBILITY WHEN THE CONTINGENT HAS TO WITHDRAW.

OPTION 2 IS ALSO CHEAP BUT THE MOBILITY IS STILL THE DISADVANTAGE.

OPTION 3 IS THE BEST, HOWEVER, ACTUALLY THE FORCE HAS NOT THE REQUIRED ASSETS TO PROVIDE CONTINGENTS WITH THE REQUIRED QUANTITY. IN ORDER TO KEEP THE MINIMUM REQUIRED STOCK AT EACH LEVEL, PLATOONS AND COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE A RESERVE IN DRUMS. EACH VEHICLE SHOULD HAVE IN JERRYCANES A DAILY CONSUMPTION. THE SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT SECTION IN THE LOGISTIC BRANCH ARE TO DEFINE THE EXACT QUANTITY OF THE 14 DAYS RESERVE AND PLAN FOR ITS BUILDING.

CLASS 4. PROBABLY NOT REQUIRED.

CLASS 5. (AMMUNITION) = CONTINGENT RESPONSIBILITY

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HOWEVER THE TRANSPORT ASPECT OF CLASS 5 WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH TRANSPORTATION.

CLASS 6. NOT REQUIRED.

CLASS 7. MAJOR END ITEMS: NO CHANGE. NIGHT VISION DEVISE, TENTS AND VEHICLE ARE THE MAIN SHORTFALLS THE FORCE SUFFERS.

CLASS 8. MEDICAL STORES, FMO RESPONSIBILITY.

status?

CLASS 9. THE USAGE OF VEHICLE WOULD BE INCREASED AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NEED FOR SPARE PARTS WOULD ALSO INCREASE. THEREFORE, A 30 DAYS STOCK SHOULD BE HELD AT EACH LEVEL (1ST LINE, 2ND LINE, 3RD LINE).

doesn't follow

- 3 TRANSPORTATION

NO UNIT, EXCEPT PERHAPS ZAMBATT AND IND~~IA~~BATT, IS SUFFICIENT. THE MAJOR SHORTFALL IS THE APCs

~~not enough~~!

TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY. IN THE OTHER HAND, MANY CONTINGENTS HAVE THEIR STORES IN ISO CONTAINERS (FOOD, AMMUNITION, MEDICINES, WATER, MAJOR END ITEMS, ETC) THESE ISO CONTAINERS ARE LOCATED AT BATTALION AND COMPANY LOCATIONS. TO MOVE THIS, WE NEED A LOT OF TRUCKS, SM TRAILERS AND MHE. THE CURRENT CAPABILITY ALLOWS TO MOVE ONLY 5 APC'S. BUT WE DON'T HAVE ANY CAPABILITY TO LOAD AND UNLOAD THE CONTAINERS.

drive APC's

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- 4 MAINTENANCE

SINCE SECTOR 4 AND 5 ARE THE EXPOSED SECTORS TO THE THREAT, A MRT SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO EACH SECTOR. BUTARE AND RUHENGARI SEEM TO BE THE SUITABLE SITE FOR THIS ASSETS.

- 5 CONCLUSION

OP NIKE IS NOT BE FEASIBLE WITHOUT LOGISTIC IMPROVEMENT. PARTICULARLY:

- TRANSPORT ASSETS
- STORAGE CAPACITY
- ACCOMMODATION

OPERATION JASON

6. OPERATION PLAN JASON IS ASSUMED TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE FOLLOWING PHASES:

- PHASE 1 = WITHDRAWAL TO A BATTALION DEFENDED SAFE AREA.
- PHASE 2 = WITHDRAWAL TO KIGALI.
- PHASE 3 = STATIONING IN KIGALI.
- PHASE 4 = EVACUATION BY AIR FROM KIA.

7. PHASE 1 THIS PHASE IS ALMOST LIKE OP NIKE RED/OR YELLOW CHARLY. THE LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS ARE THE SAME(ACCOMMODATIONS - CLASS 1 AND 3 RESERVES).

8. PHASE 2 WITHDRAWAL TO KIGALI.

HERE AGAIN THE MOVEMENT COULD NOT BE EXECUTED AS IT APPEARS TO BE. THE LACK OF MHE, TRUCKS, SM TRAILERS TRUCKS IS TOO HIGH THAT NOT ONLY THE EQUIPMENTS COULD NOT TO BE MOVED BUT ALSO SOME TROOPS AS WELL. THE UNITS SHOULD TAKE WITH THEM NOT ONLY THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO THE IMPORTANT.

FOR A BATTALION WITH 800 MEN THE 14 DAYS OF RESERVE ALONE WILL REACH 64 TONS AS SHOWED BELOW:

WATER:

$800 \times 3L \times 14 \text{ DAYS} = 33\ 600 = 40 \text{ TONS.}$

COMBAT RATION

$800 \times 14 = 11200 \text{ CBT RATION} = 24 \text{ TONS.}$

TOTAL = 64 TON.

TO MOVE 64 TONS TT NEEDS 16 X 4T TRUCKS WITHOUT CONSIDERING SOME OTHER EQUIPMENTS (GENERATORS, FRIG CONTAINERS, COMMUNICATION, ETC)

9. PHASE 3 = STATIONING IN KIGALI

WITH THE CURRENT MEANS AVAILABLE, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE FORCE IN KIGALI. UNLESS EACH CONTINGENT RECEIVED ENOUGH TENTAGE, THERE IS NO WAY TO WITHDRAW AT THE SAME TIME THE FORCE IN KIGALI.

10. PHASE 4 = EVACUATION

THE EVACUATION BY AIR FROM KIA FOR TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE A CHALLENGE FOR THE UN. USING ONLY KIA, EVEN IF IT COULD BE MAINTAINED OPEN TO THE TRAFFIC WILL CAUSE THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS.

- STATIONING DURATION OF TROOPS IN KIGALI WOULD BE LONG AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, SUSTAINMENT OF THE FORCE WILL BE DIFFICULT.
- FORCE WILL BE LONGER EXPOSED TO THE "COLLATERAL DAMAGE".
- ONCE KIA CLOSED, WHAT COULD HAPPEN?
- NEED FOR A LARGE MHEs.

11. ALTERNATIVES

IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE THE LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS OF OP JASON, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT

- A. THE WITHDRAWAL TO KIGALI SHOULD BE THE LAST TACTICAL OPTION AND SO MAINTAIN THE CONTINGENTS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTORS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.
- B. IF TROOPS HAVE TO WITHDRAW, NEIGHBOUR COUNTRY SHOULD BE USED. HERE ARE PRE-AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MADE WITH UGANDA AND TANZANIA (SECTOR 5 AND SECTOR 2).

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C. USE OF OTHER AIRPORTS FOR EVACUATION

- KAMEMBE AIRPORTS IN CYANGUGU.

- RUHENGARI.

- AND BUTARE.

G3 AIR OPS SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO STUDY THIS
ALTERNATIVES.

12. RECOMMENDATION

A. G4 SHOULD ESTABLISH PRIORITIES OF SUPPLY TO EQUIP THE
CONTINGENT AND TROOPS WITH THE REQUIRED VEHICLES AND
MHE.

B. ESTABLISH A BUILD-UP PLAN OF THE REQUIRED RESERVE
(CLASS 1 - CLASS 2 - CLASS 3).

C. WITH PARTICIPATION OF G3 AIR OPS STAFF ESTABLISH A PLAN
OF EVACUATION EITHER FROM ONE OR FROM MANY AIRPORTS.

D. ESTABLISH A DESTRUCTION PLAN WITH THE CONCRETE
LISTING OF ITEMS.

E. UPDATE THE LOG PLANNING AS THE LOGISTIC SITUATIONS
CHANGES.

G. AN ADMINISTRATIVE\LOGISTIC ORDER SHOULD BE ISSUED FOR THE THREE PLANS.

H. G3 PLANS COULD PLAN FOR ROAD EVACUATION (UGANDA AND TANZANIA).

A CHABIR

LT COL

ADCOS SP



Enclosures:

1. G1 ESTIMATE
2. G4 ESTIMATE
3. FMO ESTIMATE



UNAMIR

Kigali, Rwanda

Nations Unies
Mission pour l'Assistance au Rwanda

United Nations
Assistance Mission to Rwanda

Le Représentant Spécial
du Secrétaire Général

The Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

***SRSG's CIRCULAR N°. 001 TO ALL PERSONNEL
UNAMIR DESIGNATED OFFICIAL INFORMATION***

RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL

7 December 1994

TO: All UNAMIR Personnel

FROM: Shaharyar Khan,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SUBJECT: Security Plan

1. The Secretary-General has instructed that security arrangements for United Nations personnel in Rwanda be coordinated by myself for all UNAMIR personnel and by the UNDP Resident Representative for UNDP and the other UN agencies with appropriate coordination between the entities.
2. The UNAMIR Security Plan is currently being revised and, as part of the routine requirements of the Plan, information regarding the location of personnel and property must be submitted as indicated below.
3. In the event of internal disorder or hostilities, and depending on the level of disturbance, one of the following five Security Conditions will be declared and UNAMIR personnel will be notified regarding what precautions to take and how to conduct themselves:

Phase I - Green Level - Normal Activities

This is the safest level of operation. Green Level indicates there is no threat to UNAMIR personnel or property and normal mission duties should be carried out. Security coordinators must have up-to-date information on the whereabouts of personnel and assets.

Phase II- Yellow Level - Medium Level Threat

Yellow Alpha

A 10 pm curfew will be in effect for all UN personnel.

All travel shall be undertaken in groups of at least two persons.

Movement and travel is to be limited to that which is required for completion of official duties.

Phase III- Yellow Bravo

Relocation of protected personnel to safe areas as designated by the Security Coordinator.

Phase IV- Yellow Charlie

Limitation of activities to those essential for basic support of UNAMIR mandate.

✓ Partial evacuation of all non-essential personnel.

Phase V- Red Level

Full scale evacuation

All operations must be halted; all personnel will be evacuated

All UN Agencies are required to comply with UNAMIR security guidelines. Phases III - V are only applicable to personnel whom UNAMIR is under obligation to repatriate, although some exceptions do exist.

4. Shortly, you will be notified of the appointment of a Zone Warden or Area Coordinator who will be primarily responsible for security in the geographic area in which you live. If you have any questions regarding the Security Plan, they may be directed to your Zone Warden or Area Coordinator.

Precautionary Measures

5. In the meantime, all personnel should take certain measures now, as routine precautions. Specifically, all international personnel should undertake the following preparations:

- (a) Prepare an inventory in quadruplicate of all furniture, valuables, household effects and automobiles (Proforma inventory blanks are attached to this circular) and, for military staff, send two copies to the Chief Military Personnel Officer; for civilian staff, send two copies of inventory to the Civilian Security and Safety Section. You should retain the remaining two copies. The Security and Safety Section will maintain a data bank for purposes of the Security Plan. Every three months, you should send an updated inventory to the Security and Safety Section;
- (b) For military staff, advise the Chief Personnel Officer and your superior officer of the location of your residence; make sure to notify the relevant officials of your new address whenever you move. For civilian staff, advise the Personnel Section and your Chief of Division/Section/Unit of the location of your residence; make sure to notify the relevant officials of your new address whenever you move. This data will be transmitted to the Security and Safety Unit Data Bank;
- (c) *For all staff, advise the Security and Safety Unit and other relevant officials of any medical conditions which you may have which might affect your mobility or ability to comply with any security directives.*
- (d) Check regularly to see that identity cards, passports, Laissez-Passers and health certificates are in order;
- (e) Check that at least one week's supplies of water and food are maintained in your residence;
- (f) Check that reserves of gas supplies are maintained;
- (g) Ensure that supplies of flashlights, candles, matches and contents of first-aid kits are maintained;
- (h) Check that UN and privately owned vehicles, if any, are constantly refuelled and that spare wheels and tool kits are in order;
- (i) Maintain reserve finances of at least US\$400 (e.g. in traveler's checks);
- (j) Give consideration to selection of clothes, depending on the season, to be packed should an evacuation be ordered, the limit in weight to be 15 kgs per person.

Family members, non-local domestic help, visitors

6. As UNAMIR is a non-family mission, there is no direct obligation and thus, there are no special provisions for the evacuation of family members. Further, because it is anticipated that

UNAMIR will continue functioning during periods of greater disruption than a family mission, it is anticipated that family members of UNAMIR staff who happen to be in Kigali will evacuate earlier than UNAMIR personnel. Thus it is recommended that family members in the Mission area leave the country as soon as Phase I is declared by commercial carrier - before UNAMIR evacuates. In any event, any UNAMIR staff member with family in Rwanda should ensure that spouse's and children's locations are known at all times and that appropriate arrangements are made for their security.

7. Similarly, non-local domestic help employed by staff members and visitors, including dependents, are not covered under the Security Plan. These categories of individuals should be advised to leave the country during Phase I. Financial responsibility for their travel is solely that of the staff member involved. In any event, these categories of individuals should be advised to maintain valid passports, visas, health certificates and other documents required for travel outside the country.

Payment of allowances/compensation for loss or damage

8. In the case of evacuation, allowances will be paid in the safe haven area or home country, to those eligible under the provisions of the Security Plan.
9. Compensation of internationally-recruited staff members for loss of, or damage to, personal effects, including household goods, attributable to service in connection with an emergency situation or a disaster will be payable in accordance with the relevant administrative instructions. In cases of hardship, appropriate advances may be made pending final settlement of a claim for compensation.

Parting words

10. Again, I remind you that *it is essential to your own security that you fill in and submit the attached forms to the appropriate offices* as indicated above to ensure that those responsible for the implementation of the Security Plan are able to locate you in case of an emergency.
11. Please retain this letter for reference and continue to update the appropriate offices within UNAMIR of any change of address or property inventory.

ANNEX 1

INFORMATION / SECURITY PLAN LISTING

UNAMIR ID N° _____

NAME: _____
(Family name) (Other names)

NATIONALITY: _____

CITY/COUNTRY OF HOME LEAVE: _____

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT UNAMIR: _____

OFFICE NUMBER AND LOCATION: _____

TELEPHONE: _____

FUNCTION/TITLE: _____

RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT DUTY STATION: (state quarters, floor, entrance,
type of building; attach location sketch to main road and, most importantly, state grid reference)

HOME TELEPHONE: _____

UN LAISSEZ-PASSER N°.: _____ EXPIRY DATE: _____

NATIONAL PASSPORT N°.: _____ EXPIRY DATE: _____

PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

LOCATION OF PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

EXPIRATION DATE OF CONTRACT WITH PARENT ORGANIZATION: _____

* DEPENDENTS PRESENT AT DUTY STATION : YES _____ NO _____

* SPOUSE: _____

* It should be noted that the presence of these groups in the UNAMIR mission area runs contrary to UNAMIR administrative circular #13/94. If these individuals are present in the UNAMIR mission area, they are the sole responsibility of the staff member. Under no circumstances will UNAMIR be held liable for their security and safety.

CIVILIAN STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE

CIVPOL STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF, CIVPOL PERSONNEL OFFICE

MILITARY STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICE

ALL PERSONNEL OFFICES PLEASE FORWARD A COPY TO THE SECURITY AND SAFETY UNIT

ANNEX 2

INVENTORY OF PERSONAL EFFECTS
FURNITURE, HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AUTOMOBILES & VALUABLES

Note: Please complete this form in the following order:

I. FURNITURE AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS IN:

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| A. Living Room | E. Bedroom No. 3 | I. Laundry |
| B. Dining Room | F. Bedroom No. 4 | J. Balcony |
| C. Bedroom No. 1 | G. Office | K. Other rooms |
| D. Bedroom No. 2 | H. Kitchen | L. Garage |

II. AUTOMOBILE(S)

III. VALUABLES

IV. CLOTHING

Name: _____

Functional Title: _____ Grade/Rank: _____

Address: _____ Date of Inventory: _____

DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	PLACE OF PURCHASE	DATE OF PURCHASE	PURCHASE COST**		ESTIMATED REPLACEMENT COST
			LOCAL	US \$	

* IT IS THE STAFF MEMBER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE THE DESIGNATED OFFICIAL OF ANY CHANGES IN THE INFORMATION GIVEN.

** STATE ONLY IN CURRENCY ACQUIRED.

ANNEX 2 (Cont'd)

Name _____ Page _____ of _____

[illegible]

* State only in currency acquired.

CIVILIAN STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO SECURITY AND SAFETY UNIT

CIVPOL STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CIVPOL PERSONNEL OFFICE

MILITARY STAFF MEMBERS: SUBMIT TO CHIEF MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICE

ALL PERSONNEL OFFICES PLEASE FORWARD A COPY TO THE SECURITY AND SAFETY UNIT

UN CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : G 3 (PLANS)

5000.46(Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATE : 27 Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANNING SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS:

MILITARY PARALLEL STATES OF SECURITY TO THAT DEFINED

BY THE SRSG FOR THE UNAMIR


1. Further to our letters on the security plans.

2. The SRSG vide his letter dated 16 Dec has defined five security conditions for the UN personnel. This branch has already defined the security states pertaining to the military personnel vide instructions on plans Op NIKE, HECTOR and JASON. Following are the parallel states applicable to the military personnel;

a.	<u>Phases</u>	<u>Defined by the SRSG</u>	<u>Applicable to mil Personnel</u>
a.	Phase-1	Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities)	Op NIKE GREEN, YELLOW and HECTOR.
b.	Phase- 2	Restricted movements (All movements to be restricted)	NIKE RED
c.	Phase- 3	Relocation (Persons, to the extent property relocated to conc centres in anticipation of evac)	NIKE RED
d.	Phase- 4	Programme suspension (Regular ops cann't continue, all non essential persons evac)	JASON GREEN, YELLOW ALFA and BRAVO.
e.	Phase- 5	Evac (All ops must be halted and all persons evac)	JASON YELLOW CHARLIE and JASON RED.

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3. It is for info of all.



P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans

Distribution List

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ETHIOBATT	5
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MALICOY	9
CANCON	10
AUSMED	11
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Spare	13 and 14

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BYUMBA

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19 Oct 94

NICOY CONTINGENCY PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. The Military and political situation in Rwanda is generally calm. However, the RPA has continuously displayed negative attitude towards UNAMIR personnel. This has greatly hampered UNAMIR activities. In Sector one where NICOY is based, the RPA has not only refused the contingent to carry out some of its assigned tasks, but has turned down requests for assistance and mutual cooperation. This attitude of RPA has not in anyway dampened the resolve of the contingent to fulfil its mandate under the auspices of UNAMIR general plan.

2. However the present situation has necessitated the need to work out a contingency plan in anticipation of any adverse situation that may arise. This plan is based on the current situation in Rwanda, the UN mandate and the Contingent National plan. The NICOY deployment was also taken in consideration in marshalling out this plan.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to enumerate actions to be taken as a contingency to any adverse situation that may arise in the mission area.

WARNING ORDER

Stage 1

4. On receipt of any adverse report, warning order for move would be sent to units within three days, on the Codeword DAMISA. At this stage, troops must identify non-essential equipments that may hinder their movement for destruction. Only essential items should be retained for move. The troops should be very portable.

1 of 5

SECRET

SECRET

Stage 2

5. If the situation does not improve on the second day, the stage 2 of the state of rediness for move on the codeword BAREWA shall commence. At this stage the troops should eliminate all non - essential eqpt and be ready to move. All security items that cannot be carried must be destroyed. Any equipments or items that may offer an advantage to the adverse party must be destroyed.

Stage 3

6. Codeword ZAKI Signals the commencement of stage 3. Once this is given, troops are expected to withdraw through carefully disignated routes. The sub unit commanders must ensure that the withdrawal routes are secured and safe for troops passage.

REINFORCEMENT PLAN

7. If any particular unit is adversely affected, effort would be made to reinforce the unit with own troops or the closest UNAMIR unit. But if the adverse situation engulfs the whole UNAMIR troops and reinforcement could not be feasible due to the contingent deployment which presently is not mutually supporting, the engaged pl should immediately withdraw to the closest UN location by all means.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN

8. Any unit that is engaged with any opposition or if faced with serious armed conflict shall withdraw from such location on the Codeword ZAKI. Troops should follow the enumerated route thus:

- a. Byumba. All troops in Byumba shall withdraw through the road RUKOMO - GATUNA - UGANDA. If the route is blocked, the troops shall withdraw through the road KABALI - KIVUYE - UGANDA or road CYUNBA - UGANDA.
- b. Nyagatare. Troops in Nyagatare should move through the high avenue of approach road GABIBO - NAGITUMBA - UGANDA or alternatively through a cross country route road BWENBASHA - UGANDA.
- c. MURAMBI. The troops in Murambi should move to KIGALI through road MURAMBI - GAHINI - KIGALI.
- d. GATUNA. Troops in Gatuna should cross through the Rwanda - Uganda border into Uganda.

SECRET

9. This contingency plan is subject to change if immediate air request or assistance for evacuation is provided either by UN or own Government. In that case, all troops must concentrate in present location in Byumba for evacuation.

COMMENTS

10. This withdrawal plan is subject to the nature of the opposing forces and further directives given by Nigeria government. For instance, a threat from RPA may reverse the whole withdrawal plan. In such situation, the whole troops may withdraw to Kigali for possible air evacuation in conjunction with other UNAMIR troops. This plan is based on the assumption that countries SW of Rwanda are hostile to RPA.

11. If there is immediate threat from RGF and Interahamwe, then all troops under command shall withdraw as per the plan in paragraph 7. i.e troops in Nyagatare and Gatuna must adhere to the withdrawal plan while troops in Murambi would withdraw through road GABIRO - NGITUMBA - UGANDA or road GABIRO - NYAGATARE - BWEHASHA - UGANDA.

12. All movement must be controlled and maximum security maintained for quick reaction. All subunit commanders should recon these routes and get acquainted with them for unforeseen circumstances.

LIAISON

13. On successful withdrawal of troops into Uganda or Kigali as the case may be, the subunit commanders should liaise immediately with the most senior Nigerian Military officer on the ground or the representative of the Nigerian Ambassador or officials of Nigerian High Commission. Immediate sitrep through the fastest communication must be established with the nearest Nigerian Embassy or High Commission for onward transmission to DA Ops Lagos and Nigerian Defence Attachee in New York.


CONCLUSION

14. This contingent plan is designed in anticipation of any adverse situation against UNAMIR. The subunit commander should be conversant with sequence of action already memorised.

SECRET

The reinforcement plan is dependent on the involvement of other UNAMIR troops, therefore various subunit commanders should have close liason with neighbouring UNAMIR troops.

15. The withdrawal plan has been simplified for easy execution, and made flexible to counter any threat from the contending forces. Various telephone number of all Nigerian Embassies and High Commission closest to the withdrawal routes must be known. It is imperative that this contingency plan be kept secret and strictly adhered to whenever the situation arises.


LA ADEOYE
Lt Col
Contingent Commander

Distribution:

External:

Information:	Copy	No
HQ MILOB Gp		1
Sector 2		2
Sector 3		3
Sector 4A		4
Sector 4B		5
Sector 4C		6
Sector 5		7
AUSMED		8
BRITCON		9
CANCON		10
ETHIOBATT		11
FRAFBATT		12
GHANBATT		13
MALAWI COY		14
TUNBATT		15

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1 of 5

SECRET

G3h-ANS 3
Rwanda ps
DB
6/11

② G3 Plans
Pls indicate where this
plan deviates from ours.
Correct with OpsB Nicosy or
draft reply for me/EC. *[Signature]*
Dec 5.11

SECRET

Stage 2

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SECRET

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COMMENTS

10. This withdrawal plan is subject to the nature of the opposing forces and further directives given by Nigeria government. For instance, a threat from RPA may reverse the whole withdrawal plan. In such situation, the whole troops may withdraw to Kigali for possible air evacuation in conjunction with other UNAMIR troops. This plan is based on the assumption that countries SW of Rwanda are hostile to RPA.

11. If there is immediate threat from RGF and Interahamwe, then all troops under command shall withdraw as per the plan in paragraph 7. i.e troops in Nyagatare and Gatuna must adhere to the withdrawal plan while troops in Murambi would withdraw through road GABIRO - NGITUMBA - UGANDA or road GABIRO - NYAGATARE - BWEPASHA - UGANDA.

12. All movement must be controlled and maximum security maintained for quick reaction. All subunit commanders should recce these routes and get acquainted with them for unforeseen circumstances.

LIAISON

13. On successful withdrawal of troops into Uganda or Kigali as the case may be, the subunit commanders should liaise immediately with the most senior Nigerian Military officer on the ground or the representative of the Nigerian Ambassador or officials of Nigerian High Commission. Immediate sitrep through the fastest communication must be established with the nearest Nigerian Embassy or High Commission for onward transmission to DA Ops Lagos and Nigerian Defence Attachee in New York.


CONCLUSION

14. This contingent plan is designed in anticipation of any adverse situation against UNAMIR. The subunit commander should be conversant with sequence of action already memorised.

SECRET

The reinforcement plan is dependent on the involvement of other UNAMIR troops, therefore various subunit commanders should have close liason with neighbouring UNAMIR troops.

15. The withdrawal plan has been simplified for easy execution, and made flexible to counter any threat from the contending forces. Various telephone number of all Nigerian Embassies and High Commission closest to the withdrawal routes must be known. It is imperative that this contingency plan be kept secret and strictly adhered to whenever the situation arises.



LA ADEOYE
Lt Col
Contingent Commander

Distribution:

External:

Information:	Copy	No
HQ MILOB Gp		1
Sector 2		2
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Sector 4A		4
Sector 4B		5
Sector 4C		6
Sector 5		7
AUSMED		8
BRITCON		9
CANCON		10
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GHANBATT		13
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G3 LANS3
Re-examine in Plan NIKE
content

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HQ BRITCON
BFPO 615

See Distr

9 Sep 94

OP GABRIEL - BRITCON CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. General. It is considered unlikely that BRITCON would need to respond unilaterally to any major incident within Rwanda. Reaction to incidents will invariably be planned, controlled and co-ordinated by HQ UNAMIR and it is anticipated that contingency plans will be produced by that HQ in due course. However, BRITCON may be required to act independently and rapidly for reasons of national interest. The BRITCON contingency plans described below are deliberately lacking in detail. Only the worst case scenario, an emergency withdrawal, has been planned in detail.

2. Threat. The threat to BRITCON throughout Rwanda is assessed as low. However, the political and domestic situation within the country is not stable and the unforeseen may occur. Though considered unlikely, threats to BRITCON may emanate from the former government forces (RGF), the Hutu militia, the Rwandan Peoples Army (RPA), or the local population.

a. RGF. The RGF have little residual capability. It is assessed that they have neither the means nor the inclination to attack BRITCON. However, to cause embarrassment, or to obtain supplies or equipment, they might carry out the following:

- (1) Raids on convoys/outstations.
- (2) Ambushes on convoys.
- (3) Harassing fire with small arms onto outstations.
- (4) Close quarter attacks onto deployed personnel eg medical sections, engineer work parties etc.

b. RPA. UNAMIR and BRITCON have developed a good working relationship with the new government of Rwanda and the RPA, therefore little friction is expected during the deployment. It is anticipated that any disagreements will be resolved using tact and common sense, and through discussion and negotiation at the appropriate level. However, the government of Rwanda/RPA might become hostile towards UN contingents in general or BRITCON in particular, as a result of some accident or incident. It is thought unlikely that the RPA would ever mount a direct assault onto HQ BRITCON or any other outstation. Any hostility might manifest itself in the following ways:

- (1) Harassment and intimidation of BRITCON personnel by RPA patrols.
- (2) Arrest of BRITCON personnel and/or seizure of weapons/equipment.
- (3) Restriction of movement.
- (4) Sniping attacks at bases/ personnel.
- (5) A demand for the immediate withdrawal of BRITCON from Rwanda.

c. Local Population. A lack of food or water, the outbreak of disease, or some incident such as a traffic accident, may provoke crowd unrest within refugee camps, threatening any medical sections or other work parties operating there.

3. Contingency Plans The reaction to any incident will be based on the Political Policy Indicator (currently De-escalate), the Rules of Engagement (reproduced at Annex A), and the mission (ie humanitarian assistance, not peacekeeping). Any response will depend on the faction involved and the circumstances of the incident.

a. RGF The following options are available in response to acts of banditry by the RGF:

- (1) Increase the level of security at affected outstations.
- (2) Increase the level of close protection given to medical sections/ engineer work parties if appropriate. Manpower may be provided by BRITCON, another UN contingent, or the RPA.
- (3) Restrict unescorted movement within the affected area.
- (4) Movement in convoys only.
- (5) Increase the level of patrolling activity in areas frequented by medical sections/engineer work parties. Patrols to be provided by RPA or local UN force.
- (6) Cease humanitarian work in the affected area. If necessary, withdraw to Kigali.

b. RPA

(1) Most difficulties between BRITCON and the RPA will be resolved diplomatically through HQ UNAMIR. If any difficulties are not satisfactorily resolved in this way the following options are available:

(a) Harassment/Intimidation

- i. Confine 23 PFA to its base and raise the level of security there.
- ii. Withdraw 10 AB Wksp and the Engineer detachment at Byumba to Amahoro Stadium.
- iii. Stop all movement.
- iv. Increase the level of security at HQ BRITCON.
- v. Cease humanitarian work until the situation is resolved.

(b) Shooting Attacks

- i. Withdraw 23 PFA to Amahoro Stadium.
- ii. As Paragraph 3 b (1) (a) ii to v.

(2) In circumstances where a complete withdrawal of BRITCON is necessary, either at the insistence of the Rwandan government, or because the UK government or COMBRITCON consider it necessary, the recovery of the force will (provisionally) be effected as follows:

(a) Deliberate Withdrawal A deliberate withdrawal will be conducted as an end of deployment move. The emphasis will be on moving out of Rwanda as quickly as possible, taking all appropriate stores and equipment. The majority of the contingent (approximately 400 personnel) will return to the UK by air, departing from Kigali. The remainder of the contingent (approximately 200

RESTRICTED

personnel employed as drivers and escorts) and all B vehicles will move through Uganda, to BATLSK Kenya, to await recovery by sea from Mombassa. The vehicle crews, less a small sea party, will fly from either Kampala or Nairobi to the UK. Any C vehicles that cannot be transported will either be left with another UN contingent or abandoned.

(b) Emergency Withdrawal.

i. If BRITCON is required by the Rwandan government to leave the country at very short notice, all personnel will move by road to Uganda. A number of gifted 4 ton Bedfords will be used. Subsequently, the majority of personnel will return to the UK by air from Entebbe airfield in Uganda. B vehicles will be recovered by sea from Mombassa. The gifted Bedfords will be disposed of in accordance with instructions received from JHQ. Critical and sensitive equipment will be taken out of theatre. Non essential stores will be abandoned. Vehicles and equipment left in Rwanda will be destroyed or disabled as appropriate.

ii. If BRITCON is prevented from leaving Rwanda, it will concentrate in the Amahoro Stadium and will remain there until HQ UNAMIR or the British Government has successfully negotiated its release. A fighting withdrawal will not be attempted.

c. Civil Unrest.

(1) BRITCON personnel should try to avoid any areas where civil unrest is anticipated.

(2) If any elements of the contingent are required, in the course of their duties, to go into areas where civil unrest is likely, they are to:

(a) Be reinforced by a minimum of 10 close protection personnel.

(b) Maintain a continuous radio link with the nearest BRITCON base, checking communications every 30 minutes.

(c) Carry three days rations and water.

(d) Be provided with an RPA LO if possible.

(3) At the first sign of hostility from the local population, the detachment should withdraw from the area, using the minimum force necessary to extract itself.

d. Levels of Readiness/Alert.

(1) Dress States. The following dress states will apply within BRITCON.

State	Meaning
ONE	Helmets, body armour, webbing not required
TWO	Helmets, body armour to be carried when outside of secure base areas or when on sentry duty. Webbing to be worn by sentries/escorts and carried by all others
THREE	Helmet, body armour and webbing to be worn by all

(2) Levels of Readiness/Alert.

(a) The following levels of readiness/ alert apply throughout UNAMIR:

State	Meaning
GREEN	Threat low. Attacks not anticipated
AMBER	Threat medium. Attacks possible
RED	Threat high. Attacks imminent

(b) The current level of readiness is GREEN. The authority for raising or lowering the level of readiness rests solely with HQ UNAMIR (Rules 4B and 5B also need MOD approval). In an emergency, commanders may raise the threat state locally without authority, however, HQ BRITCON is to be told the reasons for the changed state as soon as is practically possible.

(c) Actions On. Detailed actions on changes to the level of readiness are contained in Annex B. Most actions will apply to BRITCON as a whole; others may apply to specific locations or areas. Generally, all the measures for a particular alert state will be imposed simultaneously, however, specific measures from a higher alert state may be imposed or other measures omitted. The measures which are currently in force in BRITCOM are GREEN 1 to 7.



G W CROSS
Maj
for COMBRITCON

Annexes:

- A. Rules of Engagement. (to fol)
B. Alert Measures.

Distr:

External:

Info:

JHQ (less Annexes)

Internal:

Action:

List A

ANNEX B TO
HQ BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 9 SEP 94

ALERT MEASURESSTATE GREEN

Measure	Meaning
ONE	<u>Dress and Eqpt.</u> a. Dress State 2 applies. b. All sentries and those moving away from secure areas are to carry wpns. c. Sixty rds 5.56mm ball to be issued to all pers with rifles/LSWs.
TWO	<u>ROE.</u> Rules 1B, 2A, 3B, 4A, 5A, 6A apply
THREE	<u>Veh Mov.</u> a. Admin veh mov on MSRs only. b. Mov by convoy. Single veh mov only with the auth of HQ BRITCON. c. Min of dvr and escort per veh. d. No ni mov unless specific permission given by HQ BRITCON.
FOUR	<u>Mov In/Out of Theatre.</u> a. Manning level not to fall below 2/3 of original str otherwise no restrictions on mov of pers out of theatre. b. No restrictions on mov of pers or visitors into theatre.
FIVE	<u>Ops.</u> a. Def plans to be produced for all permanent bases b. Sy fencing to be erected around all key areas. c. All permanent bases to be guarded continuously. d. No restrictions on deployment of med sects/ work parties.
SIX	<u>C2.</u> a. Ops rooms to be permanently manned. b. Comd nets to be permanently manned. c. HF radios/CEIs to be carried by all convoys/vehs moving more than 20 kms from a permanent base, unless otherwise agreed by HQ BRITCON.
SEVEN	<u>Log.</u> a. Each permanent base to maintain 7 days reserve of rats and water. b. Pers moving away from permanent bases to carry 3 days supply of rats and water. c. Ammo res as dir by HQ BRITCON to be held at permanent bases.

STATE AMBER

Measure	Measure
ONE	<u>Dress and Eqpt.</u> a. Dress State 2 applies. b. Wpns to be carried by all pers at all times.
TWO	<u>ROE.</u> Rules 1B, 2B, 3C, 4A, 5A, 6A apply
THREE	<u>Veh Mov</u> a. No veh mov of any kind off MSRs unless auth by HQ BRITCOM. b. No single veh mov. c. All convoys to have properly constituted escort. d. No ni mov.
FOUR	<u>Mov In/Out of Theatre.</u> a. No mov of pers out of theatre except on compassionate grounds. b. VIP/press visits postponed.
FIVE	<u>Ops.</u> a. Base defs to be completed. b. Base gds to be doubled, incl at 10 AB Wksp loc. c. Sentries deployed to veh park and BFI in AMAHORO stadium. d. Stand to/local alert measures practised. e. Veh anti ambush drills practised. f. Engr det at BYUMBA to wdr to AMAHORO stadium. g. 23 PFA to wdr to AMAHORO stadium. h. Airhd det and UK mil ac to be given close protection. i. Thirty man QRF at 15 mins NTM at each base, remainder at 3 hrs NTM. j. Increase the level of close protection given to med sects and engr work parties. k. Review deployment on humanitarian tasks.
SIX	<u>C2.</u> a. Gd nets activated.
SEVEN	<u>Log.</u> a. Ammo res to be distr as dir by HQ BRITCON. b. Non essential stores/eqpt packed.

STATE RED

Measure	Meaning
ONE	<u>Dress and Eqpt.</u> a. Dress State 3 applies. b. Addl 60 rds 5.56mm to be issued to all pers with rifles.
TWO	<u>ROE.</u> a. Rules 1B, 2B, 3D, 4B, 5B, 6B apply.
THREE	<u>Veh Mov.</u> a. Only op vital mov permitted. b. Mov only in prep vehs.
FOUR	<u>Mov In/Out Theatre.</u> a. No mov out of theatre. b. All visits cancelled. c. Routine resup flts suspended.
FIVE	<u>Ops.</u> a. Base defs manned. b. Base def routine adopted. c. 10 AB Wksp wdr to AMAHORO stadium. d. Humanitarian tasks suspended. e. Contingent at one hr NTM. f. Emergency wdr plan activated.
SIX	<u>C2.</u> a. Special SITREPs to HQ UNAMIR.
SEVEN	<u>Log.</u> a. All contingent issued 3 x 24 hr rat packs. b. Importation of fresh rats suspended. c. Collection of water stopped. Water usage minimized.

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Rem HECTOR implications

B

C3HANS

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Total pages 23

HQ BRITCON
KIGALI

8 Oct 94

1390/6

OPO 3/94

Ref:

A. Maps RWANDA, Sheets 4, 10, 17, Edition 1, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

Task Org: See Annex A.

1. SITUATION

- a. En Forces. To fol.
- b. Friendly Forces. To fol.

2. MISSION

BRITCON is to wdr from RWANDA within 24 hrs in order to (maintain the sy of BRITCON pers)(comply with the instrs of the Rwandan govt).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Ops. BRITCON will wdr, by veh, from the AMAHORO stadium (AS) to UGANDA, via the GATUMA br (012428). As soon as is practically poss, a rear recce party will mov to estb an intmed staging area in the Ugandan mil bks in MAKENKE near MBARARA, and Tac HQ/ Mov Con HQ will be deploy to the area of GATUNA. The remainder of the contingent will pack essential and classified stores and eqpts, and will then mov, in convoy, to the staging area. All BRITCON pers are to be clear of the Rwandan border within 24 hrs. The contingent will set up a tented camp and will then remain in the staging area until further instrs are received from JHQ. Subsequently, it is likely that the majority of pers will fly from ENTEBBE airfd; the vehs, less the gifted Bedford 4 ton trucks, will probably mov by sea from MOMBASSA. ME will be the mov of pers out of RWANDA.

b. All Sub Units Msns. On orders, wdr to the MAKENKE army bks near MBARARA, UGANDA.

c. Tac HQ/HQ Mov Con Msn.

- (1) On orders, wdr to GATUNA br.
- (2) Recce and report on the wdr route to border.
- (3) Con rd mov of main body from KIGALI to MBARARA, UGANDA.
- (4) Provide tfc con, rec and mcd sp during wdr.

To facilitate wdr of main body.

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d. Coord Instrs.

(1) Timings.

- | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| (a) | H hr. | To fol |
| (b) | All dvrs report to veh park. | H hr |
| (c) | Rear Recce Party departs AS no later than. | H + 1hr |
| (d) | HQ Mov Con departs AS no later than. | H + 1hr 11 mins |
| (e) | C vehs depart AS no later than | H + 1 hr 23 mins |
| (f) | First packet departs AS no later than | H + 18 hrs 23 mins |
| (g) | Last packet departs AS no later than | H + 20 hrs 26 mins |
| (h) | Last veh across RWANDA/UGANDA border no later than | H + 23 hrs |

(2) Rear Recce Party.

(a) Composn.

D COMBRITCON
 9 Para Sqn RE rep and dvr/guide
 Det 216 Para Sig Sqn
 QM 5 AB Bde Log Bn rep and guide
 63 AB (CS) Sqn RLC rep and dvr/guide
 82 AB (GS) Sqn RLC rep and dvr/guide
 23 PFA rep and dvr/guide
 10 AB Wksp REME rep and guide

(b) Tpt. Two x LR 110 FFR with tlrs, one each provided by 9 Para Sqn RE and 216 Para Sig Sqn. Two x LR 110 GS with tlrs provided by 5 AB Bde log Bn. One LR 110 GS with tlr from 23 PFA.

(c) RV. At H hr. See Annex C.

(d) Tasks.

- (i) Recce staging area in mil bks in MAKENKE, near MBARARA.
- (ii) Prep to receive remainder of contingent. Provide guides at Rel Pt.
- (iii) Liaise with local Ugandan mil and MA KAMPALA.
- (iv) Set up fwd HQ.

(3) Packing/Loading of Eqpt.

- (a) Sub units are responsible for packing and loading all their own stores and eqpt.
- (b) 82 AB (GS) Sqn RLC is to load res stocks of C Sups.
- (c) Bids for addl manpower are to be dir to the Ops Offr. Sub units are to rel any spare pers they may have to the Ops Offr as soon as poss.

(4) Main Body Packet Org/ Loading Table. See Annex B.

RESTRICTED

(5) Veh Loading Area/ Convoy Assy Area. See Annex C. At H hr all dvrs are to report to OIC convoy assy area, 2IC 63 AB (CS) Sqn, to mov vehs into packets. Subsequently, vehs may only be moved for loading with the auth of OIC assy area.

(6) Route Card. See Annex D.

(7) Mov Table. See Annex E.

(8) Destruction Policy.

(a) Stores/Eqpt. Non essential stores are to be left in place and, where possible, handed over to HQ UNAMIR

(b) Rats/Water. Rats/ water not required during the wdr are to be abandoned.

(c) POL. POL not taken out of RWANDA are to be left in situ.

(d) Classified Eqpt/Material. All classified eqpt is to be taken out of RWANDA. All classified material/ docs are to be taken out of RWANDA or burnt.

(9) Action On Rd Blocks. Info HQ BRITCON and HQ Mov Con. Allow vehs to be searched if required. Negotiate rel. Send reg SITREPs. No stores or eqpt to be handed over without HQ BRITCON auth.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Personal Dress and Eqpt. All pers to mov with fighting order and all personal kit.

b. Wpns. Personal wpns to be carried. GPMGs to remain with inf until last packet.

c. Ammo. Addl 60 rds 5.56mm to be carried per man. Sub unit reps to collect from C Sups at or before H Hr. All res ammo to be taken out of RWANDA.

d. Rats. All pers to carry 3 x 24 hr rat packs (approx 1800 packs). Sub unit reps to collect from C Sups at or before H hr. Feeding in UGANDA will be conducted centrally using 10 man rat packs. All res 10 man rat packs to be taken out of RWANDA, other rats are to be left behind.

e. Water. All pers to carry full water bottles. Each veh to carry 2 full water jerrycans. All water carriage packs to be installed in tlrs and filled.

f. Tpt

(1) BRITCON Veh Alloc. The current veh alloc is shown at Annex F. Sub units will retain and provide dvrs for the vehs they currently own and/or have been alloc in theatre, with the fol exceptions:

(a) One LR 110 FFR from 5 AB Bde Log Bn to Pro det.

(b) One LR 90 FFR from 5 AB Bde Log Bn to 216 Para Sig Sqn.

(c) Two 16/24 KVA tlrs from 30 Sig Regt det to 5 AB Bde Log Bn.

(2) Gifted Bedford 4 Ton Alloc. Twenty two gifted Bedford 4 ton vehs will be required to mov the contingent out of RWANDA. 63 AB (CS) Sqn RLC are to provide the dvrs for these vehs. The alloc is as fols:

(a) 10 AB Wksp 8 vehs.

(b) Log Bn 11 vehs.

(c) A Coy 2 PWRR 2 vehs.

(d) 30 Sig Regt det 1 veh.

RESTRICTED

- g. Fuel. All vehs to be refuelled in veh park by UBRE at or before H hr in packet order. All vehs to carry 4 full jerry cans of fuel. One mixed commodity UBRE to deploy with Tac HQ/ Mov Con. Remaining UBREs to mov with main body.
- h. Maint/Rec. All vehs to carry tow chains/ bars. Broken down vehs to be towed to ECP at GATUMA br, if possible. If not, breakdown to be reported to Tac HQ to arrange rec. All rec assets to mov with last packet. Any vehs that cannot be repaired at the ECP are to be abandoned there. Subsequently, it may be poss to deploy an FRT back to the ECP to carry out more in depth repair.
- i. Med. One med sect colloc with Tac HQ, one med sect to remain in AS until penultimate packet. Pers in Force hosp to be collected by 23 PFA and transported out of RWANDA. 23 PFA to provide med facilities in MAKENKE camp if required. Emergency cases casevac from ENTEBBE airport.
- j. Accn/ Tentage. No accn is aval in MAKENKE camp. All pers will live in tents. All sub unit tentage is to be taken during wdr.
- k. Sub Unit Stores/Eqpt. Only op essential stores and classified eqpts are to be taken out of RWANDA. Sub unit stores are to be loaded in sub unit integral vehs. Space on pool 4 ton trucks, in pallet loads, is as fols:

(1)	HQ BRITCON (incl elms P Info, 29 Mov Regt RLC, 29 PC Regt RLC, 160 Pro Coy, 89 AB Int Sect	4
(2)	QM 5 AB Bde Log Bn	
(a)	Tentage	32
(b)	Gen stores	4
(3)	82 AB (GS) Sqn RLC	
(a)	10 man rat packs	24
(b)	Gas bottles	2
(c)	Ammo	4

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Locs.
- (1) HQ BRITCON closes AS at H + 20 hrs and opens MAKENKE camp at H + 29 hrs.
 - (2) Tac HQ/HQ Mov Con opens GATUMA (012425) at H + 5 hrs .
 - (3) HQ Rear Recce MAKENKE camp opens at H + 9 hrs 30 mins .
- b. Altn Comd /Loc OC 9 Para Sqn/Tac HQ.
- c. Liaison.
- (1) LO (nominated by 2 PWRR) to HQ UNAMIR at H hr.
 - (2) D COMBRITCON to estb liaison with Ugandan army and DA KAMPALA on arrival in MAKENKE camp.
 - (3) DA KAMPALA to deploy to MAKENKE camp at H hr.
 - (4) LO nominated by HQ BRITCON to deploy to the High Commission KAMPALA, with INMARSAT, once contingent complete in MAKENKE.

RESTRICTED

(5) Sub Unit LOs. An LO from each sub unit is to remain in the Ops Room at all times. LOs will wdr with the last packet.

d. Comms Instr. See Annex G.


e. Codewords.

Ser	Codeword	Meaning	Issued By
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	INVICTA	Rear Recce Party estb in MAKENKE	D COMBRITCON
2	MINDEN	Tac HQ Estb at GATUMA br	Tac HQ
3	ALBUHERA	First packet departing AS	HQ BRITCON
4	BUFFS	Last packet departing AS	HQ BRITCON

Acknowledge.

M J WHARMBY
Lt Col
COMBRITCON

Authentication:


G W CROSS
Maj
OC A Coy 2 PWRR

Annexes:

- A. Task Org.
- B. Packet Org/Loading Plan.
- C. Loading Area/Convoy Assy Area.
- D. Route Card.
- E. Mov Table.
- F. Veh Alloc Table.
- G. Comms Instr.

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Distr:

External:

Copy No

Action:

DA KAMPALA

1

Info:

HQ UNAMIR

2 - 3

JHQ

4 - 5

DA NAIROBI

6

Internal:

Action:

Engr

7 - 8

Comms

9

Inf

10

pt

11

Log

12

Pro

13

Med

14 - 15

ES

16

MILO

17

D COMBRITCON

18

Ops Offr

19

QM 5 AB Bde Log Bn

20

Info:

COMBRITCON

21






































File

22

Spare

23 -26

TASK ORG

 BRITCON					
 OPCOMD	 OPCOMD	 OPCOMD	 OPCOMD	FORCE TPS OPCOMD	SPECIAL TASKS TAC/ MOV HQ
 9 36  ? 33  523 62	 A 2 Pull  2 Pull	 63 5  82 5  9 912  881 931 9  10 5	 23  23  23  23  23	 E 258/30  A 216  ? 89  ? 89  ? 89	<p>OC 9 PARA SSN RE</p>  ? E/ 258  ? 258  ? 5/ 29  ? 5/ 160  ? 23  63
(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
		 63  63	 ? 23  23	 ? 258/30  23	

- Notes:
1. To Tac/Mov HQ
 2. Two pl only
 3. EGD
 4. MWF

PACKET ORG/ LOADING PLAN1. Packet 1 - Rear Recce Party.a. Comd. D COMBRITCONb. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
LR 110 GS	Yes	Log Bn	D COMBRITCON/ 63 AB (CS) Sqn rep/ dvr
LR 110 FFR	Yes	Sigs Det	Sigs x 3
LR 110 FFR	Yes	9 Para Sqn RE	Engr rep/dvr
LR 110 GS	Yes	Log Bn	82 AB (GS) Sqn rep/ dvr QM Log Bn rep/ guide
LR 110 GS	Yes	23 PFA	23 PFA rep/ dvr 10 AB Wksp rep/ guide

c. Total Vehs. 52. Packet 2 - Tac/Mov Con HQa. Comd. OC 9 Para Sqn RE.b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
LR 90 FFR		9 Para Sqn RE	OC, Adjt
LR 110 FFR	Yes	30 Sig Regt det	Sigs det
LR 90 FFR		Log Bn	Sigs det
LR 90 FFR	Yes	23 PFA	Med sect
LR 110 GS	Yes	23 PFA	Med sect
DAF UBRE		Log Bn	
LR 110 FFR	Yes	Pro	Pro
LR 110 FFR		Pro	Pro
LR 110 FFR		Log Bn	Pro
LR 110 FFR	Yes	29 Regt RLC det	Mov det x 4

c. Total Vehs. 10

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3. Packet 3

a. Comd. From 9 Para Sqn RE

b. Composition.

Veh	Tlr	Unit From	Pax/Load
LRs x 2	Sub unit comd's discretion	9 Para Sqn RE	Escorts
LWT x 3		9 Para Sqn RE)
MWT x 1		9 Para Sqn RE)
Dumper Truck		9 Para Sqn RE) Veh crews
JCB		10 AB Wksp)
JCB x 2		Log Bn)

c. Total Vehs. 10

4. Packet 4.

a. Comd. From 23 PFA

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 11 (to incl 2 x LR FFR)	Unit discretion	23 PFA	23 PFA pers/ eqpt

c. Total Vehs. 11

5. Packet 5.

a. Comd. From 23 PFA.

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 12 (to incl 2 x LR FFR)	Unit discretion	23 PFA	23 PFA pers/ eqpt

c. Total Vehs. 12

6. Packet 6.

a. Comd. From 23 PFA.

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 12 (to incl 2 x LR FFR)	Unit discretion	23 PFA	23 PFA pers/ eqpt

c. Total Vehs. 12

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7. Packet 7.

a. Comd. From 10 AB Wksp

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 10	Unit discretion	10 AB Wksp	10 AB Wksp pers/ eqpt
LR FFR	Unit discretion	9 Para Sqn RE	9 Para Sqn RE pers

c. Total Vehs. 11

8. Packet 8.

a. Comd. From 10 AB Wksp

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 2	Unit discretion	10 AB Wksp REME	10 AB Wksp pers/ eqpt
Bedford 4 Tons x 8		Log Bn	10 AB Wksp pers/ eqpt
LR FFR	Unit discretion	9 Para Sqn RE	9 Para Sqn RE pers

c. Total Vehs. 11

9. Packet 9.

a. Comd. 5 AB Bde Log Bn

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Bedford 4 ton x 1		Log Bn	QM stores
LR 110 FFR	Yes	30 Sig Regt	VSC 501
LR 110 GS	Yes	30 Sig Regt	Sigs det
DAF 4 ton x 6	Unit discretion	Log Bn	Rats
LR FFR	Unit discretion	Log Bn	Log Bn pers

c. Total Vehs. 10

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10. Packet 10.

a. Comd. 5 AB Bde Log Bn

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Bedford 4 ton x 8		Log Bn	Tentage
Bedford 4 ton x 1		Log Bn	Sigs det pax
Bedford 4 ton x 1		Log Bn	9 Regt RLC pax/ 29 Regt RLC pax
Bedford 4 ton x 1		Log Bn	BRITCON HQ/ RAO stores
LR FFR	Unit discretion	Log Bn	Log Bn pers

c. Total Vehs. 12

11. Packet 11.

a. Comd. From 5 AB Bde Log Bn

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 9	Unit discretion	Log Bn	Log Bn eqpt/pax
LR 110 FFR	Yes	216 Para Sig Sqn	Sigs det

c. Total Vehs. 10

12. Packet 12.

a. Comd. From 9 Para Sqn RE

b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 10	Unit discretion	9 Para Sqn RE	9 Para Sqn RE eqpt/ pax

c. Total Vehs. 10

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13. Packet 13.

- a. Comd. From 9 Para Sqn RE
- b. Composn.

Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
Unit vehs x 7	Unit discretion	9 Para Sqn RE	9 Para Sqn RE eqpt/pax
DAF 4 ton		Log Bn	Ammo
LR 90 FFR	Yes	23 PFA	Med sect
LR 110 GS	Yes	23 PFA	Med sect

- c. Total Vehs. 10

14. Packet 14.

- a. Comd. OC A Coy 2 PWRR
- b. Composn.


Veh	Tlr	Veh From	Pax/Load
LR 110 GS		2 PWRR	OC
LR 90 GS		23 PFA	Inf
Bedford 4 ton x 2		Log Bn	Inf
LR 110 FFR		216 Para Sig Sqn	Sigs Det
LR Safari		Log Bn	COMBRITCON
FODEN x 2		10 AB Wksp	
Bedford Lt Rec x 2		10 AB Wksp	

- c. Total Veh. 10

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ANNEX C TO
HO BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 9 OCT 94

LOADING AREA/CONVOY ASSY AREA



C-1

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ANNEX D TO
HQ BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 9 OCT 94

ROUTE CARD

Ser	Leg Distance (kms)	Total Distance (kms)	Description
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	0	0	SP. Entrance to AMAHORO stadium. GR 125841. Turn left onto Route PEGASUS. Stay on Route PEGASUS until CP 1
2.	13	13	CP 1. X rds. GR 048856. Turn right onto BYUMBA rd. Drive straight through GATUMA to KABALE
3.	104	117	CP 2. T junc in centre of KABALE. Turn right onto MBARARA rd. Drive through MBARARA heading towards KAMPALA and for approx 5 kms beyond.
4.	149.5	266.5	Rel Pt. Entrance to MAKENKE bks at far end of village on right hand side.

D - 1

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ANNEX E TO
HQ BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 8 OCT 94

MOV TABLE

Ref:

A. Maps RWANDA, Sheets 4, 10, 17, Edition 1, 1:50,000.

1. Route. AMAHORO Stadium (126841) - RUKOMO x rds (114201)
 - GATUMA br (012428) - KABALE x rds - MBARARA - MAKENKE bks.

2. Critical Pts.

a. SP. Entrance to AMAHORO stadium (125841)

b. CP 1. X rds (048856)

c. CP 2. X rds (114201)

d. CP 3. GATUMA br (012428)

e. CP 4. KABALE T junct.

f. Rel Pt. Entrance to MAKENKE bks.

3. Gap Between Vehs.

a. All Packets Less Packet 3. 100m.

b. Packet 3. 50m.

4. Veh Speed.

a. All Packets Less Packet 3. 40 km in hr.

b. Packet 3. 20 km in hr.

5. Halts.

a. All Packets Less Packet 3. Ten min halt at CP 3, and then a ten min halt every 2 hrs.

b. Packet 3. A 10 min halt every 2 hrs.

6. Pro. Tfc Pts at CP 1, CP 2 and CP 4.

7. Rec. All vehs to carry tow ropes/bars. Vehs which break down in RWANDA to be towed to ECP at CP 3 by other packet vehs. Vehs that cannot be towed to be emptied and left with dvr and escort. Loc of veh to be reported over net or to nearest tfc post. Rec vehs in last packet to recover vehs if poss.

8. Med. Med sect at AMAHORO stadium until Packet 13. Med sect at CP 3.

9. Driving In UGANDA. In UGANDA drive on the left. Ex extreme caution if driving at ni. Many local vehs and bicycles do not have lts.

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Ser	Packet No	No of Vehs	Pass Time (mins)	From	To	Distance (kms) (e) to (f)	Running Time (mins)	Latest packet arrives (f) H + hr:min	Latest packet clear of (f) H + hr:min	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)
1	One Callsign 11A	5	1	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4 Rel Pt	- 13.0 51.5 29.5 23.0 149.5	- 19 78 45 35 225	1:00 ^a 1:19 2:37 3:22 4:07 8:12	1:01 1:20 2:38 3:33 4:08 8:13	10 min halt at CP 3 Incl 2 x 10 min halts
2	Two Callsign 0D	10	2	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4 Rel Pt	- 13.0 51.5 29.5 23.0 149.5	- 19 78 45 35 225	1:11 1:30 2:48 3:33 After Ser 14 After Ser 14	1:13 1:32 2:50 3:45 After Ser14 After Ser14	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
3	Three Callsign 46C	10	2	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4 Rel Pt	- 13.0 51.5 29.5 23.0 149.5	- 39 155 89 69 449	1:23 2:02 4:47 6:26 7:45 15:54	1:25 2:04 4:49 6:28 7:47 15:56	Incl 1 x 10 min halt Incl 1 x 10 min halt Incl 1 x 10 min halt Incl 4 x 10 min halts
4	Four Callsign 36A	11	2	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4	SP CP 1 CP 2 CP 3 CP 4 Rel Pt	- 13.0 51.5 29.5 23.0 149.5	- 19 78 45 35 225	18:23 18:42 20:00 20:45 21:30 25:35	18:25 18:44 20:02 20:57 21:32 25:37	10 min halt at CP 3 Incl 2 x 10 min halts

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5	Five	12	3	SP	SP	-	-	18:35	18:38	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	18:54	18:57	
	36B			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	20:12	20:15	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	20:57	21:10	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	21:42	21:45	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	25:47	25:50	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
6	Six	12	3	SP	SP	-	-	18:48	18:51	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	19:07	19:09	
	36C			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	20:25	20:27	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	21:10	21:23	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	21:45	21:48	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	26:00	26:03	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
7	Seven	11	2	SP	SP	-	-	19:01	19:03	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	19:20	19:22	
	22C			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	20:38	20:40	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	21:23	21:35	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	22:08	22:10	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	26:13	26:15	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
8	Eight	11	2	SP	SP	-	-	19:13	19:15	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	19:32	19:34	
	22D			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	20:50	20:52	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	21:35	21:47	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	22:20	22:22	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	26:25	26:27	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
9	Nine	10	2	SP	SP	-	-	19:25	19:27	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	19:44	19:46	
	15A			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	21:02	21:04	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	21:47	21:59	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	22:32	22:34	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	26:37	26:39	Incl 2 x 10 min halts

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10	Ten	12	3	SP	SP	-	-	19:37	19:40	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	19:56	19:59	
	15B			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	21:14	21:17	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	21:59	22:12	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	22:44	22:47	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	26:49	26:52	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
11	Eleven	10	2	SP	SP	-	-	19:50	19:52	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	20:09	20:11	
	15C			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	21:27	21:29	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	22:12	22:24	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	22:57	22:59	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	27:02	27:04	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
12	Twelve	10	2	SP	SP	-	-	20:02	20:04	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	20:21	20:23	
	43C			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	21:39	21:41	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	22:24	22:36	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	23:09	23:11	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	27:14	27:16	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
13	Thirteen	10	2	SP	SP	-	-	20:14	20:16	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	20:33	20:35	
	44C			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	21:51	21:53	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	22:36	22:48	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	23:21	23:23	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	27:26	27:28	Incl 2 x 10 min halts
14	Fourteen	10	2	SP	SP	-	-	20:26	20:28	
	Callsign			CP 1	CP 1	13.0	19	20:45	20:47	
	25A			CP 2	CP 2	51.5	78	22:03	22:05	
				CP 3	CP 3	29.5	45	22:48	23:00	10 min halt at CP 3
				CP 4	CP 4	23.0	35	23:33	23:35	
				CP 4	Rel Pt	149.5	225	27:38	27:40	Incl 2 x 10 min halts

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ANNEX F TO
HQ BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 9 OCT 94

VEH ALLOC TABLE

Unit	Veh Type	Veh Reg No	User/Remarks	Trl Type	Trl Reg No
Log Bn	DAF 4 TON	28 KJ 85		3/4 TON	68 GT 74
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 71		3/4 TON	71 GT 70
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 77		3/4 TON	72 GT 26
	DAF 4 TON	53 KK 16		3/4 TON	87 GT 12
	DAF 4 TON	53 KK 17			
	DAF 4 TON	53 KK 21			
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 72			
	DAF UBRE	54 KK 00			
	DAF UBRE	09 KL 06			
	DAF UBRE	09 KL 15			
	LR 110	32 KJ 80	P INFO	3/4 TON	24 ES 20
	LR 110	32 KJ 96	SVC BAY	3/4 TON	54 KC 24
	LR 110	36 KL 84	OC NSU	3/4 TON	55 KC 64
	LR 110	36 KL 90	PWRR	3/4 TON	89 KC 85
	LR 110	45 KL 92	CO	3/4 TON	90 KC 24
	LR 110	64 KJ 27	C SUPS	3/4 TON	06 GR 97
	LR 110	64 KJ 72	RAO		
	LR 110	64 KJ 82	C SUPS		
	LR 110	88 KE 59	PMR	4.5 KVA	32 TM 31
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 18		COOKSET	15 TM 94
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 32			
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 38			
	LR 90 FFR	51 KG 53			
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 87	FUEL SECT		
	JCB	25 KE 99			
	JCB	27 KE 39			

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23 PFA	DAF 4 TON	28 KJ 23	1 3/4 TON	40 KB 52
	DAF 4 TON	29 KJ 65	1 3/4 TON	69 GT 52
	DAF 4 TON	32 KJ 21	1 3/4 TON	77 KG 81
	DAF 4 TON	32 KJ 58	1 3/4 TON	90 GT 47
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 29		
	DAF UBRE	54 KK 20	2 3/4 GEN	07 TM 28
	LR 110	37 KL 84	3/4 TON	02 HF 77
	LR 110	40 KF 32	3/4 TON	06 ER 97
	LR 110	41 KF 75	3/4 TON	11 KE 06
	LR 110	41 KF 77	3/4 TON	15 ES 30
	LR 110	64 GJ 63	3/4 TON	18 GT 46
	LR 110	64 KJ 57	3/4 TON	18 GT 83
	LR 110	64 KJ 83	3/4 TON	18 GT 84
	LR 110	82 KE 48	3/4 TON	18 GT 85
	LR 110	98 KE 67	3/4 TON	18 GT 91
	LR 110	37 KL 84	3/4 TON	20 FL 33
	LR 110	38 KL 01	3/4 TON	21 FL 73
	LR 110	90 KJ 63	3/4 TON	22 KA 16
	LR 110	64 KJ 27		
	LR 110 FFR	47 KJ 03	3/4 TON	22 FH 12
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 56	3/4 TON	24 FH 13
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 60	3/4 TON	25 ET 42
	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 54	3/4 TON	33 ET 72
			3/4 TON	34 ET 54
	LR 127 AMB	09 KK 92		
	LR 127 AMB	10 KJ 43		
	LR 127 AMB	10 KJ 47		
	LR 127 AMB	10 KK 38		
	LR 127 AMB	63 KG 64		
	LR 127 AMB	63 KG 65		
	LR 127 AMB	63 KG 67		
	LR 90	35 KL 70	3/4 TON	47 KE 59
	LR 90	35 KL 88	3/4 TON	47 KE 61
	LR 90 FFR	35 KL 06	3/4 TON	57 KC 61
	LR 90 FFR	35 KL 07	3/4 TON	88 KC 72
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 79	3/4 TON	88 KC 92
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 80	3/4 TON	20 FK 69
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 81	3/4 TON	60 KC 19
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 84		
	LR 90 FFR	61 KJ 56	COOKSET	15 KE 48
	LR 90 FFR	61 KJ 57		
	LR 90 FFR	61 KJ 71		

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10 AB Wksp	DAF 4 TON	01 KL 96		1 3/4 TON	88 GT 80
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 27		1 3/4 TON	35 KC 26
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 33		1 3/4 TON	33 KC 00
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 46			
	DAF 4 TON	53 KK 60		16/24 KVA	03 TM 69
	DAF 4 TON	53 KK 72			
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 57		40 KVA	12 GT 74
	BED LT REC	91 KB 16			
	BED LT REC	91 KB 40			
	FODEN	33 KE 93			
	FODEN	33 KE 99			
	LR 1 TON	68 FL 75			
	LR 110	90 KJ 65		COOKSET	16 TM 02
	LR 110 FFR	66 KJ 23		3/4 TON	90 KC 75
	MC	92 KD 43			
	MC	93 KD 87			
	JCB	33 KG 48			
30 Sigs/216 Sigs	LR 110 FFR	38 KL 97		3/4 TON	13 KE 80
	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 68		3/4 TON	23 KE 60
	LR 110 FFR	91 KE 48		3/4 TON	59 KC 08
	LR 110 FFR	94 KE 37		3/4 TON	20 KE 51
				3/4 TON	45 EM 57
	LR 110 501	47 KF 39		3/4 TON	21 KE 58
	LR 110 GS	83 KE 02		16/24 KVA	15 HF 46
				16/24 KVA	05 TM 84
160 Coy RMP	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 70		3/4 TON	02 HF 47
	LR 110 FFR	66 KJ 48			
	MC	60 KJ 98			
	MC	92 KD 34			
29 Regt RLC	LR 110 FFR	71 KJ 30		3/4 TON	22 KA 03

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9 Para Sqn RE	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 10		1 3/4 TON	20 KA 92
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 83		16/24 KVA	15 HF 03
	DAF 4 TON	30 KJ 86		16/24 KVA	16 HF 12
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 27		WPU	19 TM 55
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 33		WPU	19 TM 62
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 34		WPU	14 TM 31
	DAF 4 TON	72 KK 37		WPU	22 TM 34
	LR 110 FFR	16 KF 06		3/4 TON	02 HF 72
	LR 110 FFR	19 KK 93		3/4 TON	17 KE 92
	LR 110 FFR	38 KL 77		3/4 TON	19 GT 96
	LR 110 FFR	39 KL 01		3/4 TON	21 FK 52
	LR 110 FFR	39 KL 21		3/4 TON	21 KE 33
	LR 110 FFR	47 KF 97		3/4 TON	21 KE 59
	LR 110 FFR	49 KF 52		3/4 TON	22 FH 80
	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 41		3/4 TON	86 KC 40
	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 50		TOWER LT	12 CP 78
	LR 110 FFR	65 KJ 88		TOWER LT	12 CP 79
	LR 90 FFR	58 KK 18		TOWER LT	12 CP 80
	LR 90 FFR	76 KF 75		TOWER LT	12 CP 81
	LR 90 FFR	77 KF 09			
	MC	55 KE 02		1000 GAL	07 CP 74
	MC	58 KG 83		W DIST	
	MC	60 KG 09		1000 GAL	10 CP 42
				DIST	
	LWT	25 KH 64			
	LWT	25 KH 68			
	LWT	25 KH 70			
	MWT				
	DUMPER	74 KG 63			

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ANNEX G TO
HQ BRITCON 1390/6
DATED 8 OCT 94

COMMS INSTR

Refs:

- A. HQ BRITCON 1390/9 dated 21 Aug 94.
- B. HQ BRITCON 1390/9 dated 4 Sep 94.
- C. BRITFORSIGTP 001 dated 15 Aug 94.

1. Refs A and B remain extant with the fol additions/amdts:

a. Callsigns.

(1)	Rear Recce Party.	11A
(2)	Tac/ Mov Con HQ	0D
(3)	Packet 3	46C
(4)	Packet 4	36A
(5)	Packet 5	36B
(6)	Packet 6	36C
(7)	Packet 7	22C
(8)	Packet 8	22D
(9)	Packet 9	15A
(10)	Packet 10	15B
(11)	Packet 11	15C
(12)	Packet 12	43C
(13)	Packet 13	44C
(14)	Packet 14	25A

b. Eqpt Realloc. The P Info INMARSAT is to be given to the Tac/ Mov HQ sigs det.

c. Rear Link. The VSC 501 will remain in op in the AMAHORO stadium until H + 12 hrs. The system will then be dismantled and moved to UGANDA. INMARSAT will provide secure a single channel voice and fax facility for HQ BRITCON until H + 20 hrs.

d. Net Details.

(1) Comd Net. One net will be used by all BRITCON elms.

(2) Freqs. The BRITCON comd net will continue to use F7 as the primary daily freq. If a freq compromise is suspected, altn freqs given in Ref C will be used (Note: F8 is 5.612 MHz, not 5.922 MHz).

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UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT MEASURES
REINFORCEMENT MEASURES
WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION PLAN

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.46 (G3 PLANS)

To: MA/FC (through DFC/COS)

From: DCOS Ops

Info: G3 Plans

Date: 17 Oct 94

Subject: PLANS

1. Please find enclosed for the FC's perusal and signature, the first drafts of the following:

- a. Security Alert Measures - Op NIKE.
- b. Reinforcement Measures - Op HECTOR.
- c. Withdrawal and Evacuation Plan - Op JASON.

2. You will note that addressees are now asked to consider the plans in their current form, and to begin the detailed staffwork which will evolve into fully-formed Force Plans. A formal timetable for the process has not been set beyond the first draft.


J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

Covering
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5000.46(Plans)

Copy No of 11 Copies

**UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT MEASURES, REINFORCEMENT MEASURES
AND WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION PLANS**

References:

- A. UNAMIR Op Directive No 02 - ROE dated 6 Oct 94.
 - B. Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive No 2 dated 17 Oct 94.
1. Composition. This document consists of three parts:
 - a. **Part I**. UNAMIR Security Alert Measures (SAMs) - Op NIKE.
 - b. **Part II**. UNAMIR Reinforcement Measures (RMs) - Op HECTOR.
 - c. **Part III**. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Plan (WEP) - Op JASON.
 2. ROE. It should be read in conjunction with Reference A and B which constitute the current UNAMIR ROE.
 3. Levels. All three plans are staged in an ascending order of threat response. For conformity, these stages follow the colour coding already adopted under current ROE, adapted to allow a more gradual escalation. A summary of the levels and their meaning is given at Annex A. **It should be noted that they are independent plans which are not automatically linked.** An example of their activation, illustrating how they could be combined, is given at Annex B.
 4. Authority to Escalate. The escalation of States of ROE, Reinforcement and Withdrawal and Evacuation **can only be ordered by the Force Commander**. In exceptional circumstances, described in Part I, Op NIKE Security Alert Measures can be raised (but not lowered) by Sector Commanders.
 5. Evolution. This is the first iteration of these plans. It is intended to fulfil the following requirements:
 - a. To provide immediate direction.
 - b. To act as a baseline for further planning.
 - c. To provide a structure for the detailed staffwork needed to assess options in more detail.
 6. Distribution. This document is for limited distribution as shown. It is to be controlled on "Need to Know" basis, and should not yet be discussed outside this HQ.

7. Further Action. Addressees are now requested to carry out the following action:

- a. Review the attached plans.
- b. Note the requirements at the end of each Part - Further Action. **Please note that the dates shown in each Part are for illustrative purposes only, and are not to be actioned.**
- c. Submit comments to G3 Plans 3, **by Mon 24 Oct 94**, covering the following:
 - (1). Suggested additions and amendments.
 - (2). Consideration of further Annexes to support the main documents, both now and as the plans evolve.



G C TOUSIGNANT
Maj Gen
FC

20 Oct 94

Distribution:

Internal:

Action:	Copy No
FC	1
List A Serials 1-7	2-8
FMO	9
G3 Ops	10
G4 Log	11

Annexes:

- A. Colour Coding - Escalation.
- B. Possible Scenario - Escalation of States.

COLOUR CODING - ESCALATION

Colour/Plan	ROE	NIKE	HECTOR	JASON
GREEN	Normal Rule 1 - B Rule 2 - A Rule 3 - B Rule 4 - A Rule 5 - A Rule 6 - A	Normal. Recce of locs for higher SAMs. Brief Protected personnel on Op NIKE procedures.	Normal. Planning to receive reinforcements. Planning to reinforce other Sector(s).	Preparation. Evolution of WEP. Contingency planning. Logistic planning.
YELLOW ALFA	Precautionary Stage Rule 1 - B Rule 2 - B Rule 3 - C Rule 4 - A Rule 5 - A Rule 6 - A	Section outposts to be withdrawn to platoon positions.	Recce move now. Advance Party at 6 hrs NTM Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.	Outlying Sectors withdraw to Kigali. Occupation of defensive positions in Kigali
YELLOW BRAVO		Platoons to withdraw to company localities.	Advance Party move now. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.	Preliminary evacuation of Protected and Non-Essential personnel.
YELLOW CHARLIE		Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas.	Main Body at 6 hrs NTM. NTM reduced as required.	Main Evacuation of bulk of UN military and civil personnel.
RED	General Alert Rule 1 - B Rule 2 - B Rule 3 - D Rule 4 - B Rule 5 - B Rule 6 - B	High level threat. Withdrawal to Safe Areas if not already ordered.	Main Body move now.	Evacuation of UN presence in Kigali. Withdrawal of Security Force.

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ANNEX B TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

POSSIBLE SCENARIO - ESCALATION OF STATES

EVENT	ROE	NIKE	HECTOR	JASON
Threat increases in Sector 5 Withdrawal to company localities in Sector 5 Protected Personnel withdrawn to Safe Areas in Sector 5	GREEN	GREEN (YELLOW BRAVO in Sector 5)	GREEN	GREEN
Decision to reinforce Sector 5	GREEN	GREEN (YELLOW BRAVO in Sector 5)	RED to reinforce Sector 5 from Sector 2	GREEN
Threat increases countrywide Highest alert state ordered	YELLOW	RED		GREEN
Situation deteriorates throughout country All units withdrawn to Kigali	YELLOW	RED		YELLOW ALFA
Preliminary Evacuation ordered	RED	RED		YELLOW BRAVO
Main Evacuation Ordered	RED	RED		YELLOW CHARLIE
Final UN Presence evacuated by air	RED	RED		RED
Security Party leaves Rwanda	YELLOW	RED		RED

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5000.46 (Plans)

PART I

UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

OP NIKE

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op NIKE are:

- a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Option - Op HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op HECTOR.
- b. UNAMIR Evacuation Plan - Op JASON. Part III. OP NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op JASON is activated.

2. Op NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR SAMs in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

THREAT

3. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

- a. Initially in Sector 4/5.
- b. Concurrently in more than one border area.
- c. In Kigali.
- d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

4. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

- a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.
- b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.

PROTECTION

5. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under current ROE, although there are national variations, UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

6. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

7. Command. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

8. SAMs. UNAMIR SAMs under Op NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Withdrawal to platoon positions.
 - (2). BRAVO. Withdrawal to company localities.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See **Annex C**.

8. Activation. The activation of a SAM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

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- a. The codeword - Op NIKE.
- b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.
- c. The SAM to be adopted.
- d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.
- e. Brief description of the reason for Op NIKE activation.
- f. Confirmation details.

9. Example. An example Op NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.
A. OP NIKE.
B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.
C. YELLOW ALFA.
D. BY 241200B OCT 94.
E. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.
F. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

10. Reaction. On receipt of the Op NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

- a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

11. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

- a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.
- c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

12. Reporting. Under Op NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

- a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.
- b. Specific reference to Op NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at

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0600 and 1800 hrs.

c. A weekly summary of Op NIKE activities.

13. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

14. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

- a. Crowd control.
- b. Personal search.
- c. Law and order enforcement.
- d. Guarding of Key Points.
- e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match OP NIKE escalation as follows:

- a. Op NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.
- b. Op NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.
- c. Op NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op NIKE plans to HQ UNAMIR by 7 Nov 94.

17. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 7 Nov 94.

18. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 7 Nov 94.

19. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been submitted to HQ UNAMIR.

20. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op NIKE by 7 Nov 94.

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PART I ANNEXES

- A. Op NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
- B. Op NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
- C. Op NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

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OP NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op NIKE YELLOW and RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under Op NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.
4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op NIKE contingencies.
5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

OP NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op NIKE RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - (1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.
 - (2). Maintain a register of these details.
 - (3). Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - (4). Develop plans to marshall those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.
 - (5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:
 - a. Op NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.
 - b. Op NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.
 - c. Op NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National

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contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.

6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During Op NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:

- a. At the request of the personnel concerned.
- b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.
- c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.

7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under Op NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:

- a. Op NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.
- b. OP NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.

9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under Op NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:

- a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.
- b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.
- c. They have guaranteed communications.

10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

- a. Minimum convoy is 4 vehicles.
- b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.

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- c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.
- d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
- e. Movement at night is minimized.

11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
- b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.
- c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op HECTOR and Op JASON.
- d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.
- e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on OP NIKE YELLOW or RED.

OP NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

- i. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op HECTOR AND JASON.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under Op NIKE YELLOW.
 - b. Maintain a register of these details.
 - c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.
 - e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under Op NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During Op NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.
7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

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8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, **on a voluntary basis**, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.

9. Fixed Installations. Under Op NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.

10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under Op NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.

11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

- a. Minimum convoy is 8 vehicles.
- b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.
- c. No movement off MSRs.
- d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
- e. No movement at night.

12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
- b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.
- c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op HECTOR and Op JASON.
- d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.
- e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.
- f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on OP NIKE RED.

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART II

UNAMIR REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

OP HECTOR

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op HECTOR are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Measures - Op NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op HECTOR RMs.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Plan - Op JASON. Part III.

2. Op HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

4 Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:

a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.

b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

5. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.

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6. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:

- a. At the request of the GSC.
- b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.
- c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.
- d. In response to a changing political situation.

7. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by **formed platoons and companies**, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op JASON.

8. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.
 - (2). BRAVO. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See **Annex C**.

9. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op HECTOR
- b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).
- c. The Gaining Sector(s).
- d. The level of reinforcement.
- e. The RM to be adopted.
- f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.

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- g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.
- h. Brief description of the reason for Op HECTOR activation.
- i. Confirmation details.

10. Example. An example Op HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below.

- 1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.
- A. OP HECTOR.
- B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.
- C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.
- D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.
- E. YELLOW ALFA.
- F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.
- G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.
- H. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGERI AND NDIZA AREAS.
- I. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

11. Reaction. On receipt of an Op HECTOR message, addressees are to:

- a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.
- b. Liaise with neighboring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.

12. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under Op NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:

- a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op NIKE, one platoon position.
- b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op NIKE, one company position.

13. Summary of NTM Timings. Op HECTOR.

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs

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YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

14. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

15. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR **by 7 Nov 94**.

16. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been submitted to HQ UNAMIR.

17. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op HECTOR by 7 Nov 94. Consideration should be given to:

- a. CNR compatibility.
- b. Frequency harmonisation.
- c. CEOI planning.

18. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op HECTOR by 7 Nov 94.

OP HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Identify:
 - a. Possible locations for use under Op HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:
 - a. 120 personnel.
 - (1). Recce Party - 5.
 - (2). Advance Party - 10.
 - (3). Main Body - 105.
 - b. 10 vehicles.
4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another Sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:
 - a. Notice to Move(NTM).
 - (1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.
 - (2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.
 - b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.
 - c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

OP HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under Op HECTOR RED, including routes.
3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:
 - a. Op HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.
 - (1). Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (3). Main Body - 24 hrs.
 - b. Op HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.
 - (1). Advance Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Main Body - 12 hrs.
 - c. Op HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:
 - a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.
 - b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.
 - c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.
 - d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.
 - e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.
 - f. Coordinate administrative support.

ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP HECTOR RED - HIGH THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.
3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:
 - a. Issue confirmatory orders.
 - b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.
 - c. Arrange administrative support as required.

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART III

UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION PLAN

OP JASON

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Plan (WEP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op JASON are:

- a. UNAMIR Security Alert Measures - Op NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op JASON.
- b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Measures - Op HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under current ROE, although there are national variations, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to

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continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:

- a. Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op NIKE.
 - b. Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op HECTOR.
 - c. Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.
 - d. Evacuating Kigali at the end of the evacuation process.
6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.
7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.
8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.
9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.
10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op HECTOR Reinforcement plan invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op HECTOR Reinforcement plan invoked if troops available.
5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.

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6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	Op JASON invoked. Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leave by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op JASON may be only partially invoked. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. Op JASON GREEN. During Op JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security environment will include:

- a. Op NIKE SAMs may be raised.
- b. Op HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).
- c. For full details, see **Annex A**.

15. Op JASON YELLOW. Under Op JASON YELLOW, the WEP will be stage, as described in **Annex B**, as follows:

- a. Op JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.
- b. Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.
- c. Op JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. Op JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leave by road.

See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WEP. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WEP.

18. Military Aspects of WEP. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WEP devolves to:

- a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.
- b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.
- c. G3 Plans for the coordination of deployment of units.
- c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:
 - (1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.
 - (2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.
- d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans in conformation with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

19. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WEP and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

- a. UN agencies.
- b. UN Aid agencies.
- c. NGOs.
- d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. **Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

- a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information

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which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda, at minimum loss of efficiency.

b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.

c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Sector 6 during Op JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.

22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under Op JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.

23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREO is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, **by 7 Nov 94**:

- a. Lists of all personnel in country.
- b. Lists of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.
- c. Location of assets.
- d. Priority for evacuation.
- e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.

24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 7 Nov 94, to include:

- a. Non-Essential Personnel.
- b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.
- c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op JASON by 7 Nov 94.

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26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.

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OP JASON GREEN

GENERAL

1. When Op JASON **GREEN** is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.

2. Op NIKE. Op NIKE may operate independently of Op JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op JASON would be invoked unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under OP JASON would follow naturally from this situation.

3. Op HECTOR. Op HECTOR may also operate independently of Op JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op HECTOR reinforcement to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op JASON. These include:

- a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op JASON activation.
- b. Briefing of all personnel.
- c. Contingency planning.
- d. Subsidiary Plans:
 - (1). Communications Plan.
 - (2). Logistic Plan.
 - (3). Movement Plan.
 - (4). Destruction Plan.

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5. Military Information. Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

- a. Insurgent activity.
- b. Developing threat.
- c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. Protected Personnel. UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan** to:

a. Ensure that OP NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

- (1). Listed and registered.
- (2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.
- (3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.
- (4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

- (1). Names & Parent Organisation.
- (2). Locations.
- (3). Medical Condition.
- (4). Available transport.
- (5). Stores and Equipment.
- (6). Capability for self-sufficiency.
- (7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation or another country, if ordered to do so.

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KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

- a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.
- b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op HECTOR.
- c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op JASON.
- d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op NIKE.
- e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WEP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

- a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.
- b. Marshalling apron work areas.
- c. Perimeter.
- d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.
- c. Third Line Supply Compound.
- d. Wksp.
- e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).
- e. UNDP Building.

10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within

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Sector 6 under Op JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

- a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, recced to platoon level.
- b. Requirement for defence stores.
- c. Evolution of RRF plans.
- d. Accommodation requirements.
- e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under Op JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

- a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during Op JASON YELLOW and RED.
- b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.
- c. The impact on Op JASON caused by a closure of KIA.
- d. Practical yardsticks for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.
- e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.
- f. Accommodation options.

ANNEX B TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. Op JASON YELLOW is the trigger for the UNAMIR WEP to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between Op JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and Op JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.
2. Op JASON YELLOW is staged as follows:
 - a. Op JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.
 - b. Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.
 - c. Op JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

OP JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of an Op JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:
 - a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.
 - b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.
 - c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes recd under Op JASON GREEN.
 - d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.
 - e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.
 - f. Carry out route clearance and security.
 - g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.
 - i. Move to Kigali.
4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of Op JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing

to Kigali as follows:

- a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.
- b. Provide guides down to platoon level.
- c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.
- d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.
- e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.

5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:

- a. Identification of deployment areas.
- b. Coordination between units.
- c. Arrival procedures.
- d. Issue of defence stores.
- e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.
- f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.
- g. Control of movement.
- h. Security procedures and ROE.
- i. RRF allocation.
- j. Administrative arrangements.

6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:

- a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).
- b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.
- c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

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- d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.
- f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

OP JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. General. Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

- a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.
- b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.
- c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.
- d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. Personnel. Personnel to be evacuated under Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

- a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.
- b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.
- c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.
- d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. Equipment. It is not intended to evacuate equipment under OP JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

- a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.
- b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. Personal Baggage. Personnel evacuated during Op JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

- a. Personal Weapon.

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- b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.
- c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

OP JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. Op JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

- a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.
- b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.
- c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact Force structure.
- d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.
- e. Final evacuation under Op JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under Op JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, Force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

- a. All remaining Protected Personnel.
- b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.
- c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

- a. Important stores.
- b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.
- c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

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16. Means of Evacuation. The means of evacuation employed will depend on available airlift, priority equipment requirements and land route security. In principle, evacuation will be achieved by:

- a. Air. Protected Personnel, UNAMIR civilian personnel and administrative and support personnel.
- b. Land. Formed units and sub-units, driving fleet vehicles in convoy, less those to be evacuated by air.

17. Security Force. The composition of the Security Force required to protect the UNAMIR presence will be determined by the threat. Its primary task will be to provide security for remaining UN installations and KIA, up to the point at which the air evacuation under Op JASON RED is completed. It is likely to consist of:

- a. HQ UNAMIR core operations personnel.
- b. A battalion (-) of wheeled/tracked APC-mounted infantry.
- c. Integral engineer support.
- d. Remaining Air Operations Staff.
- e. Second Line transport resources.

18. Destruction. When Op JASON YELLOW CHARLIE is ordered, the following equipment will be destroyed:

- a. All Non-Essential equipment, including that left by units evacuated under Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- b. Important equipment which cannot be evacuated within remaining air/vehicle lift availability. The bulk of Important equipment should have been evacuated under Op JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

OP JASON RED

GENERAL

1. Op JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:
 - a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.
 - b. The evacuation of the Security Force.
2. Op JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:
 - a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.
 - b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.
 - c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. Op JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:
 - a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.
 - b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.
4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:
 - a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.
 - b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.
 - c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.
 - d. Route recce for land evacuation route.
 - e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.
 - f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.
5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.

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- a. Centralisation of Security Force.
 - b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.
 - c. Clearing of route if required.
 - d. Route security.
 - e. Road move to neighbouring country.
6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.
7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of Op JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.
8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during Op JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.
9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.
10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under Op JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.

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UNAMIR
Force HQ
Kigali-Rwanda

2 September 1994


5000.46(PLANS)

TO: SRSG
DFC
MA TO FC
AUS CONT
BRIT CONT
HQ CAN CONT
FMO

FROM: G3 PLANS

SUBJECT: ORDERS FOR DISARMAMENT OF GENDARME

1. Attached please find copy of subject document.
2. Please accept for information.


A BRIMELOW
Lt Col
G3 PLANS

UN RESTRICTED

46 (Plans)

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

NO OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCL THIS: THREE

TO: GHANBATT ETHIOBATT FRAFATT UNAMIR HQ (TAC)	FROM: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI
INFO: MALAWI COY	
FAX: 00 -873-151-5562 ✓ FAX: 00 -871-383-02005p 1046 FAX: 00-873-383-020020r FAX: 00-873-383-020056+	FAX: 1-212-963-3090
	DATED: 01 SEPTEMBER 1994

4A
AC
4B
4A

SUBJECT: ORDERS FOR DISARMAMENT OF GENDARME

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED SUBJECT ORDERS.
2. REGARDS

G3 Plans

4A+4C Rx'd hardcopy

4B not possible, fax broken. Rx'd voice

4A Rx'ing now

[Signature]
J.F. JO

021137 SEP 94

+ SWITCHED OFF

passed by voice
01 Sept. 94
[Signature]

/ September 1994

ORDERS TO SECTOR 4 COMMANDERS
PLAN FOXTROT

SITUATION

1. Gendarmerie installed by French in Sector 4 are not recognized by the Rwandan Government.

MISSION

2. To disarm and demobilize the French installed Gendarmes in Sector 4.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline: Two phases
 - a. Phase 1: Rwandan Public Declaration that all Gendarmes in Sector 4 should voluntarily hand in their weapons, uniforms, equipment, ammunition and credentials during the next 7 days. Gendarmes will be offered reintegration in Rwandan Gendarmerie; and
 - b. Phase 2: UNAMIR troops will actively seek Gendarme weapon surrender, but not by force.

GROUPING AND TASKS


4. Grouping
 - a. Attached to each battalion;
 - (1) ICRC Representative;
 - (2) Interpreter;
 - (3) Milob; and
 - (4) Government Representative.
5. Tasks
 - a. Establish weapon collection centre within sectors (Cyangugu, Kibye and Gikongoro);
 - b. Provide security;
 - c. Collect weapons, ammunition, equipment and credentials from Gendarmes who surrender their weapons;
 - d. Provide administrative support at the collection centre;
 - e. Document all surrendered weapons;
 - f. Provide escorts using MILOB; and
 - g. Distribute leaflets to Gendarmes on D Day.

Coordinating Instructions

6. a. Timings;
 - (1) D - 1 Distribute leaflets to UNAMIR troops only;
 - (2) D Day Government declaration, distribute leaflets to population (phase 1 commences on order "Execute plan Foxtrot");
 - (3) D + 7 Phase 1 ends; and
 - (4) D + 8 Phase 2 commences.
- b. Rules of engagement;
 - (1) Weapon surrender during Phase 1 is strictly voluntary;
 - (2) Weapon surrender is to be requested by UNAMIR troops during Phase 2; and
 - (3) Weapons are NOT to be removed from Gendarmes by force.
7. Administration and Logistics
 - a. Clothing to replace surrendered uniforms will be provided by HAC;
 - b. Weapons are to be transported to Kigali Log Base in accordance with current instructions; and
 - c. All surrendered equipment is to be documented.
8. Command and Signals
 - a. No change to frequencies; and
 - b. D Day commences on order "Execute Plan Foxtrot".

Notes

1. Particular care must be taken to avoid conflict with Gendarmes.
2. Gendarmes are to be offered reintegration into new BBGNU of Rwanda.
3. Do NOT distribute leaflets before D Day.
4. This order cancels your requirement in OP Order 18 to conduct Security Operations with Gendarmes and Communal Police.



G.C. Tousignant
 Gen
 Force Commander