


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### Note to Mr. Nambiar

#### DPKO positions on key issues raised by US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs regarding Afghanistan

1. In response to the request from your office, the following note lays out DPKO's positions on the three issues raised by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher during his 8 August meeting with Mr. Annabi on Afghanistan.
2. While a formal note was not requested by your office, we felt that this format was most appropriate due to the amount of accompanying documentation.


#### Strengthening the JCMB Secretariat

3. Mr. Boucher's point on the need to strengthen the JCMB Secretariat has merit. In response to our query to UNAMA in this regard several weeks ago (CNF-128, para. 5(b), attached), UNAMA noted that it was making every effort to fill the vacancies in the UNAMA JCMB unit but did not consider that additional posts were needed. Nonetheless, a strengthening of the Secretariat could come either through increasing UNAMA posts dedicated to it, borrowing posts within UNAMA for the Secretariat, re-organizing the information flow to better serve the Secretariat, or requesting other stakeholders (especially IFIs) to provide posts or personnel to the Secretariat. Such a strengthening could address the existing weaknesses of the JEMB as follows:

- a) Uneven participation: The participation by the Afghan side, led by Professor Eshak Naderi, Senior Economic Advisor to President Karzai and the other co-Chair of the JCMB, needs to be re-energized. In addition, some key embassies in the JCMB process do not participate as extensively or at as high a level as they might. A solid JCMB monitoring and coordination team could help in re-focusing the attention of key stakeholders.
- b) Information management: There is currently a lack of information on the practical impact of measures taken to implement the Afghanistan Compact, and a lack of capacity to carry out a consolidated needs assessment of resources required to implement the Compact. An increase in technical staff would increase the capacity of JCMB monitoring and coordination team to gather, consolidate and disseminate this type of information.
- c) Civil-Military relations: A number of development and technical assistance activities covered by the compact are carried out by international military forces and escape the JCMB's coordination. A stronger JCMB monitoring and coordination team would be able to assess the effects of bi-lateral development engagement on the implementation of the Compact.

#### Special envoy

4. On 2 July 2007, DPKO presented, in a note from Mr. Guéhenno to the Secretary-General, a brief analysis of the pros and cons of the Special Envoy proposal (attached).




Our position was that “that the appointment of a high-level envoy would undermine the SRSG precisely at a moment when his office needed strengthening.”

5. Developing a position on the usefulness of such an envoy was always hampered, however, by the vagueness of the envoy’s anticipated function. Mr. Boucher, as described in our cable, finally provided a clearer idea of how the US saw the envoy’s role. The US concept, however, contradicts our understanding of the Afghan view of the envoy, in that the Afghans would like the envoy to be based mostly in Kabul while the US envisages someone who would be traveling to capitals and visiting Kabul only from time-to-time. Mr. Boucher’s concept also seems to contradict the Italian view, in that the Italians favour someone to specifically address regional tensions (see the meeting note of the SG with Italian Foreign Minister d’Alema in Rome, para. 3, attached), while Mr. Boucher explicitly rejected a UN political role in the region. Finally, while Mr. Boucher listed the United Kingdom as a country supporting his proposal, our contacts at the working level state that, if pressed by the US, the UK would support their proposal, however, at the moment, their preference is to work within the “existing command structure”, and strengthen UNAMA’s leadership either through revised TORs or new leadership.

6. In sum, DPKO feels that the disadvantages of an envoy continue to outweigh the advantages as expressed in the 2 July note. In addition, the lack of clarity and contradictions among Member States who purportedly support the concept provide further reasons for skepticism.

#### High-level meeting on Afghanistan

7. DPKO agrees that a high-level meeting could help renew interest and attention in Afghanistan under the following circumstances: (i) that both the Secretary-General and President Karzai would be able to attend; (ii) that a significant number (at least half) of countries attend at Ministerial level; and (iii) a positive joint press statement could be issued from the meeting. DPKO does not believe the meeting will be helpful, however, if the main purpose of its preparation is to result in the appointment of an envoy whose role remains unclear. It should also be noted that there are separate proposals for a high-level event as cited in my earlier note today.

  
Jean-Marie Guéhenno  
16 August 2007

cc. Mr. Pascoe  
Mr. Haysom