

UNAMIR

UNAMIR MANDATE

13 DEC 1994-18 JAN 1996

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
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Kigali, le 16.01.96  
N° 021/96.01/PST/c



PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
CABINET DU PRESIDENT



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AFC  
18-1-96

Réf. n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

Mr. Shaharyar M.Khan,  
Special Representative of the U.N.  
Secretary General,  
P.O.BOX 749,  
Kigali, Rwanda.

Note: Shined we send  
a copy to HQ?

Dear Mr. Khan,

I thank you very much for your greetings and best wishes for the New Year 1996 conveyed to me, my country and the people of Rwanda on behalf of UNAMIR. I also wish you a prosperous New Year 1996. I would particularly like to express my appreciation for your personal efforts and guidance of the various activities of UNAMIR, in carrying out its operations during your tenure as the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General in Rwanda since mid 1994. I want to assure you Rwanda Government's continued willingness to cooperate with you in achieving the objectives and mission of UNAMIR in the country within the limits of its mandate. As a member of the United Nations, my country is committed to its Charter and supports its activities.

It is my hope that the remaining period of stay of UNAMIR in Rwanda, will be fully utilized in fulfilling its mandate.

Wishing you all the success in your endeavours,

Sincerely,

*Pasteur Bizimungu*  
Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
President of the Republic of Rwanda



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**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR  
HELD ON 19 DECEMBER 1995**

On 19 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi  
Mr. Sam Nkusi

Mr. Musoni James  
Major Kamarade Kayitare

Office of the Vice-President  
Ministry of Transport and  
Communication  
Ministry of Youth and Cooperatives  
RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan

✓ Brig. Shiva Kumar  
Mr. Bill Clive  
Ms. Isel Rivero  
Mr. Ismael Diallo

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General  
Deputy Force Commander  
Acting Chief Administrative Officer  
Special Assistant to SRSG  
Spokesman

1. SRSG opened the meeting by stating that the meetings of the Joint Commission had been valuable in clarifying the Government of Rwanda's position on the mandate. He suggested that the meetings continue over the phase-down period and be held twice a month. He informed Mr. Dusaidi that the scaling down of UNAMIR had already begun with the CIVPOL, Military Police and MILOBS. A more precise schedule would emerge in a few days' time. Taking note of UNAMIR's scaling down, Mr. Dusaidi agreed that meetings of the Joint Commission should be held fortnightly starting from Tuesday, 9 January.

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2. SRSG then referred to the International Tribunal which was beginning its technical work in Kibuye during the present week. UNAMIR would be providing the security required. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that the Tribunal had been informed that as of 8 March 1996, they would have to provide their own security. The Acting Force Commander indicated that the International Tribunal would be sending out forensic experts to Kibuye from Wednesday, 20 December. He asked for cooperation from the Rwandese authorities to assist and facilitate their work. Mr. Dusaidi replied that he would be informing the appropriate authorities.

3. On the issue of equipment, SRSG stated that following Security Council guidelines UNAMIR and UN HQ were examining possibilities on how to move forward. As a separate issue, he urged Mr. Dusaidi to provide a response on the equipment list to be financed from the Trust Fund. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Rwandan Ambassador was pursuing the matter at the United Nations. Regarding the list provided by UNAMIR he indicated that a reply to the Trust Fund list would be forthcoming shortly.

4. On the question of the SOFA, Mr. Dusaidi informed the SRSG that his colleagues were studying UNAMIR's comments and would revert to the matter as soon as they had completed their review. It was noted that the housing/administration sub-Committee had met and would continue its work in the following week.

5. SRSG then explained that a legal interpretation of UNAMIR Sub-contractors terms was expected from New York. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that delays in the discussions with the Sub-contractors was an internal United Nations technical problem and not an unwillingness to negotiate with the Government of Rwanda.


6. Mr. Nkusi reverted to the problem of UNAMIR staff which were departing the mission area and not paying their telephone bills. The SRSG replied that the Administration was in the process of finalizing a list of staff who were departing.

7. Mr. Nkusi pointed out that the equipment list provided by UNAMIR included equipment which was out of service and which needed repair. Mr. Clive, as Acting CAO, reiterated UNAMIR's position to cooperate with the Government of Rwanda in examining the reservations expressed by Mr. Nkusi at the technical working group level. He added that faulty equipment would not be placed against the Trust Fund. It was agreed that technicians from both sides would attempt to evaluate the depreciation of each item.

8. The Acting Force Commander requested that a centralized system of requests for UNAMIR engineering assistance be put in place by the Government of Rwanda. Since requests were received from different Ministries and sources, UNAMIR could not anticipate the Government's priorities. Mr. Dusaidi agreed with the request and promised to follow-up through the Liaison Officer.


9. Mr. Nkusi informed the SRSG that the Government was adhering to the policy that all organizations operating in Rwanda needed to register their communication equipment and follow the frequency guidelines provided by the Government. In addition, NGOs leaving the country needed to declare their communication equipment prior to departure. SRSG requested Mr. Nkusi to provide him with written instructions which he would share with the Heads of UN Agencies and Programmes as well as with NGOs.

10. It was agreed that the next meeting would be held 9 January 1996.



Claude Dusaidi

Date: 5/1/95



Shaharyar M/ Khan

Date: 20-12-95



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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**UNAMIR NEW Mandate****SRSg's Interview on Radio UNAMIR - Saturday 16 December 1995**

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSg), Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan gave a wide-ranging interview on Radio UNAMIR relating to the new UNAMIR mandate. The following are the salient features of the interview:

**New Mandate's Focus****Question**

On Tuesday, 12 December 1995 UNAMIR's mandate was extended by another 3 months. The world body will remain in Rwanda as a symbol of encouragement to those refugees considering returning from exile. I asked Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan to explain the difference between the old mandate and the new one.

**Answer**

The difference is in the nature of responsibilities UNAMIR would now handle from 9 December 1995 up to 8 March 1996. Basically what the international community, if you like, the Security Council, has been stressing is that UNAMIR is still relevant in providing a beacon of confidence to the refugees who are across the lake in Zaire and in Tanzania. By that I want to specify that we are not actually engaged in any protection or security duties in our new mandate. But our very presence may help in the international effort which is being made by Rwanda, by the regional countries, by UN agencies and by the donor countries, to persuade the refugees to return home voluntarily. So, the next mandate underlines the good offices we can offer in persuading the refugees to return voluntarily. The mandate refers to the Cairo Summit as also to providing logistics to UNHCR and other agencies engaged in this exercise. So, our next mandate, I hope, will reflect what President Bizimungu said two days ago, namely, that UNAMIR II has been a successful operation. We feel that these remarks reflect the reality on the ground and we feel that this cooperation can continue.

**Negotiations on the New Mandate****Question**

The agreement to extend the mandate was taken after quite considerable negotiations. There seems to be three different inputs: the wishes of the Government of Rwanda, the wishes of the donor

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community and the wishes of the UN itself. How much did that affect the shape of this new mandate?

#### Answer

The differences were basically on two issues: one was the number of people required to defend the new mandate. As you know, we have 1800 formed troops and four hundred military observers and others, making a total of 2200. The Government of Rwanda was saying 'all right, if our friends in the international community feel that the presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda is going to help the refugees come back, we agree to their staying on, but we do not believe, that you need so many troops to be able to fulfil that mandate'. On the other hand, the international community was of the view that the number of troops we had until 8 December was a bare minimum anyway and that to reduce further would make it difficult to fulfil the mandate. Anyway, there was discussion on this issue and we have now arrived at a suitable figure of 1400 and I am sure that we will be able to cooperate on this basis.

The second point of difference was that the Government of Rwanda insisted that, as a sovereign Government, it should have the authority to provide security protection to everyone, including diplomats and UN agencies. The Government of Rwanda felt that the sub-paragraph of our last mandate, in which we were required "to contribute " to security protection was no longer required. Now, the Security Council is very conscious of the need for international personnel to have security and protection and this issue was resolved when the Representative of Rwanda openly stated, in the Security Council, that the Government of Rwanda would provide complete protection to the UN community, to the Human Rights monitors and others. That left only the question of the Tribunal.

#### The Tribunal

Now, the Tribunal is a separate issue. The Tribunal insists that it must have its own security and protection. Judge Goldstone made a very plausible case that even in the Hague, they are not protected by the Dutch police or security forces. The Tribunal has its own protection force as is the case wherever they are operating, as for example in Croatia. In Arusha also the Tribunal will have its own protection force. So far, the Tribunal had been relying on UNAMIR to provide this protection. However, once it was agreed that the present mandate would end on 8 March, it was also agreed that from 8 March, the International Tribunal would be protected by an alternative international force. Once these two issues -- the number of military personnel required and the question of who is to protect the International Tribunal were decided -- there was no problem and the resolution went through. We can now look to the last three months of our stay here in a spirit of cooperation and in the hope that we will be helpful in persuading the refugees to return home voluntarily.

#### The Cairo Summit Declaration

#### Question

Recently, you have been accused by a refugee organization of being biased towards this Government. How do you react to such allegations?

### Answer

Well, I react favourably in the sense that if you are criticized by both sides, you know that you are doing your job in a manner that is unbiased. In the radio interview concerned, I had referred to the Cairo Conference decisions in which it had been acknowledged that there were people who were required to be apprehended as alleged criminals in the genocide and handed over to the International Tribunal. This was one of the agreements in the Cairo Declaration. Also, that there were camps in which there were "intimidators" - this word was used in the Cairo Declaration - that the intimidators had to be separated from the others in order that ordinary people exercise a free choice. There was also a clear reference to the suppressing of hate radios. Now, when you accept that there is hate radio, that there is need to separate the intimidators from the normal people, and that there are certain people who may be required for the Tribunal, naturally there is a responsibility with that concerned State to meet those obligations. My remarks were made in that context. I do feel very strongly that the commitments made in Cairo, in Bujumbura, in Nairobi, must be implemented, whether they are by the countries around Rwanda, like Tanzania or Zaire, or whether by Rwanda itself which has made many commitments on issues related to refugees' return. It is not enough to sign declarations. One has to see them implemented. And this also goes for the agencies and for the donor countries which have to support the process they have all agreed to. So my remarks were made in that context and were quoted, perhaps, a little out of context.

I have been myself to Tanzania and to Zaire, on more than one occasion. Both countries are insistent that refugees should go back. Both countries are looking for international support in order that the refugees return in safety and dignity. Now, what they are also saying is that they need international support to be able to pursue this objective. This international support is expected in the form of financing and of personnel that are required to perform the difficult task of separating camps, closing down 'hate Radio' campaigns and separating the political elements from the common folk in the camps. So persuading them to return voluntarily is not going to be an easy task. Therefore, I do believe that the international community must support these programmes, support the implementation of Cairo and Bujumbura. There are people, I have to state, who see this process of voluntary refugee return as a political defeat for their objectives and they will criticize others because, if they see this tide of refugee return actually ebbing away from them and if large numbers begin to come back and are settled reasonably safely here, then they will lose a political prop on which they have based their whole philosophy. I am not surprised that when we see a major campaign regionally to persuade the refugees to return, and if success is written on the wall, that there will be a lot of criticism, not only of myself, but of all UN agencies and all the others who are part of this process of seeking voluntary refugees' return.

### Future Deployment of UNAMIR

### Question

To return to the psychological presence of UNAMIR, with your troops you are going to have to choose carefully how you deploy your men, where and for what reason will UNAMIR's blue helmets be deployed in Rwanda?

**Answer**

At the moment we have, of the 1800 formed troops, roughly half in Kigali. They include the logistics, the engineers, the communications. The remaining 50% are in four locations: in Gisenyi, Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibungo. All four are opposite the likely entry points of the refugees: two opposite Zaire, and two opposite Burundi and the inlet from Tanzania. In the new mandate, with a reduced force strength, what we are planning is that the contingents in Kigali would remain, more or less, in the same shape, but instead of four, we would place two logistics cells opposite in Cyangugu and in Gisenyi, and withdraw the units from Gikongoro and Kibungo. We want to keep these logistic cells in these two areas because the very reason for UNAMIR's three-month mandate is that we should be helpful for the returning refugees and we cannot be seen to be five hours away by road from Cyangugu and three hours away from Gisenyi. We have to be available on the spot and we have to show ourselves. So, in the new deployment, I foresee that we will have logistic units which comprise a few soldiers, communications, engineers and also vehicles in these two places, so that we can be helpful, as we were when the 14000 forcibly returned came through in August from Zaire. That was an excellent operation which was carried out very smoothly and we hope that we can be of some use on the spot as refugees come in. I would add that if we begin to have a large number of refugees coming in from Tanzania, we will certainly be able to divert a logistic cell out in Kibungo to be able to help there as well. So there is an element of flexibility in the dispersal of our forces in the next months.

**Civilian Police**

**Question**

One of the most striking changes in this mandate compared to the previous one is the complete withdrawal of the civilian police. Now in the previous mandate, one of the most important functions of the UN, was to train a local police force; and for that reason CIVPOL was seen as an integral part of the force. Why has there been this change?

**Answer**

I remember even last time, when we were discussing the previous mandate, there was a strong feeling from the Government of Rwanda that CIVPOL should now phase out. The duties of CIVPOL can be divided into two sectors: the majority of about 85 are engaged in monitoring in the prefectures, in helping the local police and gendarmerie, which did not exist until earlier this year, to perform police functions on the ground. With the development of a skeleton gendarmerie and, hopefully, a communal police force which is being trained, the monitoring element of the police work is no longer required. I can fully understand that the Rwandan police and gendarmerie want to stand on their own feet and perform their own sovereign activities.

The second area is the one that is perhaps going to lead to a temporary vacuum. The second area was the training that we were providing to the Rwandan gendarmerie and the commune police in two institutions, one in Ruhengeri for the gendarmes and the other, for the commune police training centre in Gishari which is near Nsinda, where 750 young recruits have been inducted and only two weeks ago, the Vice-President inaugurated the course and made an excellent speech, in which he praised the cooperation between UNAMIR and Rwanda in starting up this programme. In

this second area of cooperation, we had about 20 trainers from our CIVPOL in each of these institutes. It is entirely up to the Government of Rwanda to decide whether or not they need the trainers. We were told that Rwanda preferred, and we fully understand this, to have this training on a bilateral basis. So in fact this programme has closed down. Our trainers in our CIVPOL are now back at Headquarters. They will phase out within three to four weeks; already 30% will go within the coming week and the remainder will phase out. The CIVPOL programme has been a great success and it is now at an end. I personally feel rather sad that we cannot continue the training which was proceeding well but it is a decision by the Government of Rwanda and we respect it.

### **The Equipment Issue**

#### **Question**

Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, there is a clause which invites the Security Council to consider UNAMIR leaving behind its non-lethal equipment for continued use in Rwanda once it has packed its bags and gone. Can you explain the reasoning behind this.

#### **Answer**

Yes I think it is important to understand the background to the equipment issue, because the man in the street does not really understand why the UN cannot leave behind the equipment that it has brought in. After all, it is much used, it is second hand; it costs a certain amount of money to take out of the country and if the UN does really want to help Rwanda, says the man on the street, why not leave this equipment behind? The answer to the question is that there are basic regulations of the UN General Assembly on this issue that apply to all peace-keeping operations, whether it is in Cambodia or Kuwait, Mozambique or Somalia. There are clear regulations as to how the equipment that has been used in a theatre of peace-keeping is to be disposed of. These regulations place equipment disposal in four categories as follows: the first category relates to equipment and material that belongs to other countries. You see a large number of vehicles, for instance, with white paint and UN markers on them, but a lot of them do not belong to the UN. They are working for the UN, but they belong to countries which have provided these vehicles, this material, to the UN operation. They could belong to, let's say, India, or Zambia or Nigeria or Chad, and at the end of the day, these countries have to decide whether they want the equipment back or not. In other words, this equipment does not belong to us and it belongs to the country which has sent it. It is for that country to decide what it wants to do with it. So we have no control over this first category.

The second category is equipment which is here and which is good enough to be used in another theatre of peace-keeping. The UN General Assembly has decided that if you have equipment that is usable in, let's say, Haiti today, or in Liberia, or in Angola, then just as we have received equipment from Somalia and Kuwait and Mozambique, similarly we are obliged to send our equipment to those countries because otherwise, new equipment would have to be bought. So the second category consists of equipment that we are obliged to send to other peace-keeping operations.

The third priority is other UN agencies. The UN General Assembly rules state that if other agencies require this equipment they should have priority of use. For instance, I have requests from UNHCR for vehicles. I have requests from the Human Rights Organization here, I have requests from the Tribunal, from the Deputy Prosecutor's Office, I have requests from other agencies for equipment in order to perform their work which is essential for Rwanda. And the UN General Assembly would require UNAMIR to transfer the equipment to the agencies which need it.

It is only in the fourth category of what is left that is to be seen as available for the Government of Rwanda. Now, these are UN General Assembly regulations. Neither I, nor the Secretary-General, nor indeed the Security Council, can change these regulations. Only the General Assembly can override its own resolutions. Therefore, I think what you are seeing for the first time, is a very clear indication from the Security Council that the equipment that we have here and that we shall not obviously require after three months should be usable in Rwanda for the Rwandese Government, for the Rwandese people, for the rehabilitation, for use in Rwanda. So I hope people understand that much as though we would like to hand over all the equipment as we leave, we are constrained and limited to doing so because of these resolutions of the General Assembly, of which of course Rwanda is a party.

#### UN Future Presence in Rwanda

##### Question

What other than equipment will the UN leave behind? What would be the shape of a future UN presence in Rwanda following the March 8 draw-down.

##### Answer

This is, of course, a matter for Rwanda and the Security Council to decide. What is clear is that on 8 March, UNAMIR comes to an end. And six weeks from that point onwards, we shall no longer be here. I think this point needs to be emphasized because in my informal discussions, I get the impression from my friends in Rwanda that UNAMIR wanted to stay on and find all sorts of excuses for doing so. This is not the case. As the Secretary-General's report very clearly indicated, UNAMIR was ready to phase out even now. That is to say on 8 December 1995. What happened was that a laudable attempt by the regional States and by the international community to put together an attempted lift-off on the refugee issue was made at this point in time. It was felt that our presence here would be helpful. It would not be critical, but it would be helpful in trying to persuade the refugees to return. This is why Rwanda says: 'all right, if our friends say you [UNAMIR] should stay, we have no aversion to your staying'. But the future of UNAMIR is very clear. Come 8 March and we shall phase out. Now, your question is what happens afterwards. Is a civilian, development-oriented presence, which lends itself to meeting Rwanda's genuine current needs going to replace UNAMIR? By that I mean repair of roads, bridges, repair of various other institutions - you know a lot of buildings are still not operative - repair of electricity, water and communications, getting agriculture back on its feet again by the distribution of seeds, etc., getting jobs going on a short-term basis. These are the immediate issues that Rwanda needs to have tackled and it feels that it needs a kind of peace corps, doctors, engineers and agronomists working

here and reacting quickly to immediate situations. In other words, to address the sort of twilight zone between the end of civil strife, civil war, genocide as we have seen and the beginning of the normal development programmes through the World Bank and bilateral assistance through the Round Table. There is a twilight zone which needs to be addressed, between peacekeeping and normal development, perhaps peace-building.

The problem is -- and this again is something that is not easily understood -- the problem is that people say it should be easy. 'You are spending X number of dollars per day on your military presence over here, you have all these soldiers, this equipment, these vehicles, surely all that needs to be done is to replace them with a civilian presence'. Unfortunately, the UN cannot make this transition automatically, because peace-keeping operations are funded by assessed contributions -- that is, by obligatory contributions from member States. The funds for a civilian presence, a peace corps type of presence, an emergency peace building presence of doctors and engineers come from voluntary contributors. You cannot use money earmarked for a peace-keeping operation in civilian operations. Therefore, the money that is funding UNAMIR cannot automatically be diverted to a civilian operation. During the next three months, seeing the problems of the United Nations, its limitations, its constraints, the attitudes of the member countries, we should discuss how we can evolve a presence that meets Rwanda's needs, which is properly funded by voluntary contributions. It is important that people should understand that this is not an automatic diversion or flow of money from one operation to the other.

#### UNAMIR and Refugee Return

##### Question

Finally, Sir, how optimistic are you that the presence of UNAMIR will make any difference to the return of refugees?

##### Answer

I am very clear that the presence of UNAMIR is important, but not critical. Those people who argue that UNAMIR has been here for a year and a half and the refugees have not come back and therefore it proves that UNAMIR's presence does not affect the issue are, I believe, missing the point. The argument that they make is irrelevant. Never has it been asserted that the presence of UNAMIR itself is the magnet which will draw the refugees back. We may be an influential factor, we may be, at best, an important factor, but there are other factors, much more critical, which will have to be addressed for the refugees to return voluntarily. These factors are outlined in Bujumbura, in Cairo in Nairobi and if you allow me to summarize them, they are: that the refugees in camps must have psychologically the confidence to return and to believe that they will be treated fairly and with justice; that they will not be persecuted or be brow-beaten and that they will get their due share. This is a vital, critical factor which the refugees need to be convinced of in Tanzania and in Zaire. And this convincing has to be done essentially by the Government of Rwanda. The areas in which these assurances have to be given are known. They are that there should be no arbitrary arrest, that people who come back should be given their dues, that anyone who is suspected of any misdemeanor or a worse crime should be given transparent justice and that these are not

statements and declarations made at conferences, but are declarations to be implemented on the ground.

I will add here, that the Rwandan Government's track record recently does indicate that the people who are coming back have been well treated. Look at the 14000 who were forced back from Zaire in August. Within three or four days, they were back in their communes, reasonably settled. Even when you look back to August last year when the French left and the Humanitarian Protection Zone became part of the whole, we saw roughly a million IDPs return to their homes over a period of three or four months. Some of them went out of the country, some of them went to Zaire, to Tanzania and to Burundi, others had difficulties settling back because they were accused of being part of a syndrome that was against the new Government. But, by and large, the majority of those people, of that million, went back safely. So the track record shows that there is an effort by the Government to settle these people, honourably and honestly. Of course, there will be occasions when people will take revenge, when people will go outside the transparent justice syndrome and where people may get treatment that is not correct. But, the psychological element of reassurance needs to be fortified by action on the ground.

The second critical element is that, in the camps as has been stated in Cairo, and in the tripartite discussions taking place currently, there is a need to stop hate campaigns, hate radio. There is need to stop intimidation, there is need to separate those who have been in the militia and the military from those ordinary people who went along with them, at the time of the trauma last year. And there is need to stop military training and infiltration across the borders. Now, once that stops, or is controlled, there are greater chances of the refugees coming back. In this whole syndrome, UNAMIR can play a positive role. Put another way, if we were to be seen going out at the very time when everyone is putting together these efforts to get the refugees back voluntarily, it would send wrong messages in camps. To answer your question, I feel that the next three months are important in trying to persuade the refugees to return. I feel our presence here is relevant, is important, but it is not critical. Whether, we are here or not, it is not going to critically affect the return of refugees. It is the other two elements that I have mentioned which are going to affect the return of refugees and I hope that we can all put our act together and that the two critical obstacles can be overcome so that we begin to see a return of refugees in large numbers taking place.

#### Question

We are still dealing in conditionals here; we are still working on "Plan A - Refugees must return". The refugees have voted with their feet out over the past 18 months not to return. Is it not time for the international community to think about **"Plan B"** -- moving the refugee camps away from the border so there is no infiltration, so that the refugees can be settled in some other places where they could become self-sufficient.

**Answer**

I honestly believe that a very serious attempt must be made to implement the decisions that all the parties have taken in trying to get the refugees back voluntarily. By that I mean implementation of Bujumbura and Cairo Declarations. I do not believe implementation is taking place. I believe that if implementation does take place, only then will you be able to assess whether or not the refugees have exercised their voluntary desire to return. If, at that point, they still decide not to come back, then I reckon your **"Plan B"** needs to be looked at seriously. But, I reckon, that the whole syndrome, politically as well as in terms of refugees on the ground, we must make an effort to get those refugees back as part not only of a humanitarian process, not only to relieve the countries like Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi of the burden of carrying these refugees, but also as part of a political settlement, because until the refugees come back, one cannot really say that we are moving towards the kind of ethnic harmony that we all regard as essential for a political solution in this country. So long as the refugees stay out, there is a basic part of the jigsaw puzzle that is missing and without putting that part back into the whole, I feel a political resolution of the problems will be missing. Until this part is put back into the jigsaw puzzle, there will continue to be tension, especially around borders and I feel it will always breach against regional security in the region.

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**For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84496, 84539, 84510 ext.: # 11075 or 11077.**



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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF  
UNAMIR UNTIL 8 MARCH 1996**

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**Resolution 1029 (1995) adopted unanimously  
on 12 December 1995****Text of the Resolution****The Security Council,**

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994 and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Noting the letters of the Foreign Minister of Rwanda to the Secretary-General of 13 August 1995 and 24 November 1995 (S/1995/1018, Annex I and S/1995/1018, Annex II),

Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwanda refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and welcoming in this context

.../

the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry pursuant to its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration of 29 November 1995 issued by them (S/1995/1001),

Emphasizing the importance of all States acting in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region held in Bujumbura in February 1995 and those contained in the Cairo Declaration,

Commending the Government of Rwanda's continuing efforts to maintain peace and security as well as to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a final period until 8 March 1996;
2. Decides also, in the light of current efforts to restore peace and stability through the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:
  - (a) Exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation,
  - (b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,
  - (c) Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,
  - (d) Contribute, with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda, to the protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda as an interim measure until alternative arrangements agreed with the Government of Rwanda can be put in place;

.../

3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to 1,200 troops to carry out the mandate set out in paragraph 2 above;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the number of military observers, headquarters and other military support staff to 200;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to withdraw the Civilian Police component of UNAMIR;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda;
8. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;
9. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary measures to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment that are scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner;
10. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;
11. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;
12. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);
13. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress towards repatriation of refugees;
15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**A TRIBUTE TO THE PEACEKEEPERS**

*A Man*

*By Nadine Najman*

*He closed his eyes without a cry, without a tear,  
While the sun crept up the hill he'd just seen.  
The night had been serene and crystalline.  
He had forgotten to feel cold, to have fear.*

*I do not want to know what was  
the colour of his faded gaze, nor  
the original accent of his now  
dead words: the man that  
I ~~imagine~~ resembled me, as  
a brother resembles a sister.*

*I do not know either if he had a wife  
If his mother prayed every day for his life  
If he slept sometimes with a sigh or two.*

*I know only that he believed he could cope.  
That this was a soldier, that his helmet was blue.  
And that the wheat in the field grew green like hope.*

---

The poem above, UN HOMME (A MAN) was written in honour of a peacekeeper who died. The poet is Nadine Najman, a french Air Force Officer who works in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, in New York. Her most recent book "Le calice jusqu'à la lie" won the prize "Théophile Gautier" at l'Académie Française.



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*Bureau du Porte-parole*

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**HOMME AUX CASQUES/BERETS BLEUS**

**UN  
HOMME**

*par Nadine Najman*

*Il a fermé les yeux sans un cri, sans un pleur,  
Alors que le soleil grimpait sur la colline.  
La nuit avait été sereine et cristalline,  
Il avait oublié d'avoir froid, d'avoir peur.  
Je ne veux pas savoir quelle était la couleur  
De ce regard éteint, ni l'accent d'origine  
Des mots qui se sont tus: l'homme que j'imagine  
Me ressemblait beaucoup - comme un frère à sa soeur.  
Je ne sais pas non plus s'il avait une femme,  
Si sa mère priait tout les jours pour son âme,  
S'il se couchait parfois en soupirant un peu.  
Je sais uniquement qu'il croyait en la chance,  
Que c'était un soldat, que son casque était bleu,  
Et que le blé poussait vert comme l'espérance.*

---

Ce poème a été écrit à la mémoire d'un casque bleu, tué. Ecrit par Nadine Najman, Officier de l'Armée de l'Air française, au Département des Opérations de maintien de la Paix, au Secrétariat de l'ONU, à New York. Son plus récent livre "Le Calice jusqu'à la lie" a remporté le prix "Théophile Gautier" de l'Académie française.

# U.N. and Rwanda Agree to Extend Peacekeeping for 3 Months

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 12 — After nearly two weeks of confrontation between the Rwandan Government and the Security Council, the Council today extended for three months a peacekeeping mission the Rwandans say they do not want or need. But the Council agreed to reduce the number of troops and to curtail the tasks they will perform.

Rwanda's representative, Manzi Bakuramutsa, said after agreement was reached that this would be the last extension of the force. He had been holding out for only 800 troops; the United Nations proposed 1,400.

After missing a renewal deadline last Friday because of prolonged haggling, the two sides compromised today on 1,200 troops and 200 military monitors. There are now 1,800 troops and 300 advisers in Rwanda.

The reduced peacekeeping force will assist in the return of refugees and look after its own security, but it will not be responsible for the protection of other foreigners in Rwanda. The Security Council lost the battle for that during final arguments this morning. Rwanda holds a rotating Security Council seat, and Mr. Bakuramutsa has made the most of it.

The Security Council decision provoked an unusually sharp protest from Canada. Speaking before the vote, Canada's envoy, Robert R. Fowler, warned that the United Nations mission, commanded until today by a Canadian, would be seriously compromised. He drew a parallel to the small contingents of troops in Mogadishu during the ill-fated Somalia mission.

"The Government of Rwanda has sought ever more stridently to impose restraints," he said. The United Nations force in Rwanda, he added, "will not be able to do the job it was designed to accomplish."

The acrimony evident in the Council's debate over Rwanda has complex roots. The Security Council, fearful that hard-liners might be gaining the upper hand in the Rwandan Government, which came to power last year, is concerned that revenge attacks against real or perceived supporters of the previous Government are possible, fueling new cycles of violence.

The Council does not want to be seen to be deserting Rwanda for a second time in two years. In April and May of 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, most from the Tutsi minority, were massacred as

the United Nations stood aside.

The present Tutsi-led Government in Kigali still holds the United Nations guilty for failing to stop the genocidal attacks. But the Government also argues that it now has an army capable of defending the Rwandan people — and foreign agencies — and that any military intrusion by the United Nations is a violation of Rwandan sovereignty.

Alison L. DesForges of Human Rights Watch/Africa calls the Rwandan political situation "clearly precarious." In an interview today, she said that there seems to be a struggle going on within the Government, and "it is not certain if the forces of moderation or the forces of extremism are going to predominate."

Human rights groups are concerned by Rwanda's decision to begin expelling private relief organizations. More expulsions, Ms. DesForges said, will raise "the suspicion that the Government is trying to eliminate foreign witnesses" before taking reprisals against those involved in the massacres in 1994.

In Arusha, Tanzania, today, the first indictments were made by an international tribunal for Rwanda created last year by the Security Council. Eight people were charged with genocide in the slaughter of 15,000 Rwandans around Kibuye in 1994, but they were not identified.

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14 DEC 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG  
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UNAMIR-MINUAR

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SHIVA KUMAR

14/12

TO: Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan  
SRSG

DATE: 13 December 1995

FROM: Ismaël A. Diallo  
Spokesman, UNAMIR

To your  
personal  
attention.

SUBJECT: Practical Strategies for New Mandate

A. Introduction

1. The opinions expressed in this note were conceived and drafted before December 8, 1995 when the Security Council formally met on Rwanda. UNAMIR's mandate has been since extended for a further period of three months in Resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, 1995.

2. The subsequent reading of that resolution has convinced me more of the imperative need for UNAMIR to take the direction outlined in the following proposals.

B. Background

3. If we accept that the mere presence of UNAMIR has contributed to the normalization of life in Rwanda, we cannot say as much with respect to the desired goal of mass repatriation of refugees in neighbouring countries.

4. We may add, as a corollary to the above, that such a presence for a further period of three months would not achieve much in terms of incentive for massive waves of returning refugees.

5. Undoubtedly, UNAMIR's confidence building role inside Rwanda has had a trickle effect in the camps without, however, registering the desired impact for solving the refugee problem and helping in a major way to achieve national reconciliation.

6. The new mandate, unlike the previous three under UNAMIR II, is totally focussed on the refugee repatriation exercise and calls, therefore, for creative initiatives and practical strategies in order to accomplish the new mission.

C. Proposals

1. Joint Teams

(a) It is imperative to establish joint teams consisting of Government officials from Ministries of Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and Social Affairs, UNAMIR

14/12

officials, both civilian and military, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR officers and local representatives of the population in the communes.

(b) These teams would physically visit the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania and talk to the refugees there in a bid to reassure them of safe repatriation. Host countries will, of course, be advised in advance.

(c) The teams would organize visits of refugee representatives to their respective communes so as to witness the security prevailing there and take back the message of positive information to the camps.

(d) The joint teams would also visit communes across the country, to get first-hand information on the situation there prior to convincing the refugees to return home and would subsequently continue to monitor the reintegration of the returnees.

(e) The members of these teams would be constantly on the move, spending over half their time in the communes and refugee camps during the three-month extension.

## 2. Radio UNAMIR

### (a) A colleague's views

- (i) A colleague in my office, who got close to the Radio Section during my two-month absence, has strong views about the parochial, sectionalist spirit of the Radio management, which is too wrapped into itself to value the great potential of inputs from other UNAMIR sections, especially within the OSRSG.
- (ii) In that self-inflicted isolation, the Radio management does not set any programmes of work, not even weekly schedules, on the basis of which the colleagues in OSRSG can formulate contributions, in a collegial approach that is imperative if the Radio has to function as Radio UNAMIR and not simply as a section of UNAMIR.
- (iii) At the same time, the Radio section remains fragmented within: heads of programmes hold daily meetings and proceed to give assignments to their journalists, who complain of being denied a chance to contribute ideas, as professionals, for the better running of programmes. In fact there are no programmes as such; there are only language units that are called programmes, which is a misnomer.
- (iv) Heads of programmes are in constant touch with external news agencies, giving out information that is sometimes more interpretational than factual, which may lead to the phenomenon of "uncoordinated troop movement" with respect to the work of the Spokesman's Office.
- (v) Other colleagues in OSRSG have aired strong criticism about the poor quality of Radio Rwanda News Summary, which is sent to the SRSG without any effort at editing and which reflects badly on the

professionalism within UNAMIR, among the many UN Offices that receive the daily summary.

**Note:** The above observations come from the Information Officer (UNV) in my office, who stands by every statement made above and requests a review of the whole matter.

**(b) New approach**

- (i) Whatever the veracity of the above criticism, there is need to formulate a clear strategy for Radio programmes under the new mandate.
- (ii) There is also need to associate more the colleagues in OSRSG in the policy-making exercise aimed at that reorientation.
- (iii) In that connection, weekly or fortnightly plans of work for Radio programmes should be discussed at OSRSG meetings so that colleagues may add their inputs and help boost the impact of Radio UNAMIR.
- (iv) Under the proposed reorientation, Radio UNAMIR should focus more on contacts with the population in the communes to bridge the information gap with the refugee camps.
- (v) That would entail exchange of messages among relatives inside and outside the country (in refugee camps) for a more concrete effort at confidence building and fighting disinformation in refugee camps.
- (vi) Such activities would be more effective than current trends devoted to news coverage of various seminars and visits of personalities, which coverage should be of secondary importance under the new mandate.
- (vii) It would also help if Radio UNAMIR management could establish better working relations with Radio Rwanda, without of course having to compromise its objectivity, and set up structural collaboration with other UN agencies, IOM, ICRC and other major NGOs involved in assisting the refugees and interested in their repatriation.

**3. Mandate Commission**

(a) In anticipation of further negotiations expected to take place prior to the end of the new mandate on 8 March 1996, the ground-work could start immediately, with the setting up of a Government-UNAMIR Commission as soon as possible.

(b) The Commission would oversee the implementation of the new mandate and iron out differences that tend to undermine cooperation with the Government.

(c) This would help avoid last moment recriminations that have sprung up in discussions just before the end of previous mandates.

(d) More significantly, the Commission would study the nature and functions of the proposed body that will replace UNAMIR after 8 March 1996, with a consensus on the post-UNAMIR cooperation between the Government and the UN.

(e) That Commission should finalize its recommendations in the third week of January 1996, so that they may serve as guidelines for the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 1 February 1996.

#### **4. Inter-Agency Publication**

(a) The concerted efforts of UN agencies in the repatriation exercise will require a special publication highlighting the operation, under UNAMIR coordination.

(b) To avoid fragmentation of those efforts, there should be a clear policy setting up a data centre for compilation and processing of information on repatriation and related activities.

(c) In case of financial limitations on the part of UNAMIR, whose budget for public information now stands at only US\$ 10,000, the UN partners could pool together resources for a joint publication.

(d) The project would involve three issues - one by January 10, 1996, one on 15 February and the last before 8 March - to be produced in English, French and Kinyarwanda.

**N.B.:** The suggestions above have been intentionally made brief to avoid taking too much of your time. Similar views may have been already formulated by your Office. Whatever decisions are taken on what UNAMIR will do to accomplish its mandate during the coming three months, it is worth noting that this is the last opportunity for the Mission to win over its critics and leave Rwanda after 8 March 1996 with confidence and a clear conscience. This would at least avert the prospect of confirming Mr. Dusaidi's assertions that Rwanda has agreed upon the mandate renewal "not because [Rwanda] believes that actually UNAMIR can assist, as it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se".

UNITED  
NATIONS

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1995/1015\*\*  
12 December 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

~~Draft~~ Resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994 and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Noting the letters of the Foreign Minister of Rwanda to the Secretary-General of 13 August 1995 and 24 November 1995 (S/1995/1018, Annex I and S/1995/1018, Annex II),

Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and welcoming in this context the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry pursuant to its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

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Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration of 29 November 1995 issued by them (S/1995/1001),

Emphasizing the importance of all States acting in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region held in Bujumbura in February 1995 and those contained in the Cairo Declaration,

Commending the Government of Rwanda's continuing efforts to maintain peace and security as well as to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a final period until 8 March 1996;

2. Decides also, in the light of current efforts to restore peace and stability through the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation,

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,

(c) Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,

(d) Contribute, with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda, to the protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda as an interim measure until alternative arrangements agreed with the Government of Rwanda can be put in place,

3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to 1,200 troops to carry out the mandate set out in paragraph 2 above;

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S/1995/1015\*\*

English

Page 3

4. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the number of military observers, headquarters and other military support staff to 200;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to withdraw the Civilian Police component of UNAMIR;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda;

8. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

9. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary measures to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment that are scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner;

10. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

11. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;

12. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);

13. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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*Office of the Spokesman*

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SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF  
UNAMIR UNTIL 8 DECEMBER 1995

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Resolution 997 (1995) adopted unanimously  
9 June 1995

Text of the Resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 4 June 1995 (S/1995/457),

Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of certain offenses in Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation among all members of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura in February 1995,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force until such time as the Government of Rwanda has entered into bilateral arrangements for the establishment of other training programmes;

(e) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to Rwanda; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 or any subsequent agreement;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

NB

The UNAMIR had originally been established by resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Resolution 918 (1994) had expanded the mandate of the Mission to include responsibility for the security of civilians and of humanitarian operation, had increased its strength to up to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.

By its action today, the Council affirmed that the Chapter VII restrictions imposed by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if such arms or matériel are for use within Rwanda. It called upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwanda camps within their territories.

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In a statement to the Council, the representative of Zaire called for an independent investigation to refute the claims that his country had been involved with the sale or supply of arms for use in Rwanda. He said it was up to the Government in Rwanda to create a favourable climate for the return of the refugees.

The representative of Rwanda, speaking after the vote, called for an end to the arms embargo against his Government and for an international commission to study the problem of the refugee camps. He added that the change in the UNAMIR mandate reflected the changed situation in his country.

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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF  
UNAMIR UNTIL 8 MARCH 1996**

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**Resolution 1029 (1995) adopted unanimously  
on 12 December 1995**

**Text of the Resolution**

**The Security Council,**

**Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994 and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,**

**Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,**

**Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),**

**Noting the letters of the Foreign Minister of Rwanda to the Secretary-General of 13 August 1995 and 24 November 1995 (S/1995/1018, Annex I and S/1995/1018, Annex II),**

**Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwanda refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,**

**Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and welcoming in this context**

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the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry pursuant to its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration of 29 November 1995 issued by them (S/1995/1001),

Emphasizing the importance of all States acting in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region held in Bujumbura in February 1995 and those contained in the Cairo Declaration,

Commending the Government of Rwanda's continuing efforts to maintain peace and security as well as to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a final period until 8 March 1996;
2. Decides also, in the light of current efforts to restore peace and stability through the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:
  - (a) Exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation,
  - (b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,
  - (c) Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,
  - (d) Contribute, with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda, to the protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda as an interim measure until alternative arrangements agreed with the Government of Rwanda can be put in place;

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3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to 1,200 troops to carry out the mandate set out in paragraph 2 above;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the number of military observers, headquarters and other military support staff to 200;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to withdraw the Civilian Police component of UNAMIR;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda;
8. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;
9. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary measures to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment that are scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner;
10. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;
11. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;
12. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);
13. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress towards repatriation of refugees;
15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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*Bureau du Porte-parole*

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**LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE RENOUVELLE LE MANDAT  
DE LA MINUAR JUSQU'AU 12 DECEMBRE 1995**

**Résolution 1028 (1995) adoptée à l'unanimité, le 8 décembre 1995**

**Texte de la résolution**

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant toutes ses résolutions précédentes sur la situation au Rwanda, en particulier sa résolution 997 (1995) du 9 juin 1995,

Ayant examiné le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission d'assistance des Nations Unies au Rwanda (MINUAR) en date du 1er décembre 1995 (S/1995/1002),

1. Décide de proroger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 12 décembre 1995;
2. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.



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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS THE MANDATE OF  
UNAMIR UNTIL 12 DECEMBER 1995**

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**Resolution 1028 (1995) adopted unanimously**  
**8 December 1995**

**Text of the Resolution**

**The Security Council,**

**Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995,**

**Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),**

1. **Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period expiring on 12 December 1995;**
  2. **Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.**
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*Bureau du Porte-parole*

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**LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE MODIFIE ET RENOUVELLE LE MANDAT  
DE LA MINUAR JUSQU'AU 8 DECEMBRE 1995**

**Résolution 997 (1995) adoptée à l'unanimité, le 9 juin 1995**

**Texte de la résolution**

**Le Conseil de sécurité,**

**Rappelant toutes ses résolutions précédentes sur la situation au Rwanda, en particulier sa résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993, par laquelle il a créé la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), et ses résolutions 912 (1994) du 24 avril 1994, 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994, 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994 et 965 (1994) du 30 novembre 1994, qui énoncent le mandat de la MINUAR,**

**Ayant examiné le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la MINUAR en date du 4 juin 1995 (S/1995/457),**

**Rappelant aussi sa résolution 955 (1994) du 8 novembre 1994, portant création du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, et sa résolution 978 (1995) du 27 février 1995, concernant la nécessité d'arrêter les personnes soupçonnées de certains crimes au Rwanda,**

**Souhaitant qu'il importe de parvenir à une réconciliation authentique de tous les membres de la société rwandaise dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha,**

**Prenant note avec une vive préoccupation d'informations selon lesquelles des éléments de l'ancien régime mèneraient des préparatifs militaires et feraient des incursions de plus en plus fréquentes au Rwanda et soulignant la nécessité de prendre des mesures efficaces pour que les Rwandais se trouvant actuellement dans des pays voisins, y compris ceux qui sont dans des camps, n'entreprennent pas d'activités militaires destinées à déstabiliser le Rwanda et ne reçoivent pas d'armements, étant donné qu'il est fort probable que ces armements seraient destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda,**

Soulignant que des efforts accrus sont indispensables pour aider le Gouvernement rwandais à instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance propre à faciliter le retour des réfugiés rwandais se trouvant dans des pays voisins,

Soulignant aussi qu'il est nécessaire d'accélérer le versement de l'aide internationale pour le relèvement et la reconstruction du Rwanda,

Demandant de nouveau à tous les États d'appliquer les recommandations adoptées par la Conférence régionale sur l'assistance aux réfugiés, rapatriés et personnes déplacées dans la région des Grands Lacs, tenue à Bujumbura en février 1995,

Mesurant l'utilité du concours que les spécialistes des droits de l'homme déployés au Rwanda par le Haut Commissaire aux droits de l'homme ont apporté en vue de l'amélioration de la situation générale,

Considérant qu'il incombe au Gouvernement rwandais d'assurer la protection et la sécurité de l'ensemble du personnel de la MINUAR et des autres membres du personnel international servant au Rwanda,

Réaffirmant qu'il est nécessaire de régler à long terme les problèmes de réfugiés et problèmes connexes dans les États des Grands Lacs et notant avec satisfaction, par conséquent, que le Secrétaire général a l'intention de nommer un Envoyé spécial chargé de procéder à des consultations concernant la préparation et la convocation, dans les plus brefs délais, de la Conférence régionale sur la sécurité, la stabilité et le développement,

1. Décide de proroger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 8 décembre 1995 et autorise une réduction des effectifs, qui seront ramenés à 2 330 soldats trois mois après l'adoption de la présente résolution et à 1 800 soldats un mois plus tard;

2. Décide de maintenir à son niveau actuel l'effectif des observateurs militaires et du personnel de la police civile;

3. Décide, compte tenu de la situation actuelle au Rwanda, de modifier le mandat de la MINUAR en lui assignant les fonctions suivantes:

a) User de ses bons offices pour faciliter la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;

b) Aider le Gouvernement rwandais à faciliter le retour librement consenti des réfugiés, en toute sécurité, ainsi que leur réinsertion dans leur milieu d'origine, et, à cette fin, appuyer les efforts faits par le Gouvernement rwandais pour instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance, grâce à des activités de surveillance menées dans l'ensemble du pays par des observateurs militaires et des observateurs de police;

c) Faciliter l'aide humanitaire, ainsi que la fourniture d'une assistance et de services spécialisés en matière de génie civil, de logistique, de santé publique et de déminage;

d) Aider à l'instruction d'une force de police nationale;

e) Contribuer à assurer la sécurité, au Rwanda, du personnel et des locaux des organismes des Nations Unies, du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, notamment en assurant en permanence la protection du Bureau du Procureur, ainsi que des spécialistes des droits de l'homme, et contribuer également, si besoin est, à assurer la sécurité des organismes humanitaires;

4. Souligne que les restrictions imposées par la résolution 918 (1994) en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies s'appliquent à la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels qui y sont spécifiés à des personnes se trouvant dans des États voisins, si ces armements ou ces matériels sont destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda;

5. Demande aux États voisins du Rwanda, de façon à éliminer des facteurs contribuant à la déstabilisation de ce pays, de prendre des mesures pour veiller à ce que ces armements et ces matériels ne soient pas fournis aux camps de réfugiés rwandais se trouvant sur leur territoire;

6. Prie le Secrétaire général de tenir des consultations avec les gouvernements de pays voisins concernant la possibilité de déployer des observateurs militaires des Nations Unies, et de consulter en priorité le Gouvernement zaïrois concernant le déploiement d'observateurs, y compris dans les aérodrômes situés dans l'est du Zaïre, afin de contrôler la vente ou la livraison d'armements et de matériels susmentionnés; prie aussi le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport sur cette question un mois au plus tard après l'adoption de la présente résolution;

7. Prend note de la coopération existant entre le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR aux fins de l'accomplissement de son mandat, et prie instamment le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR de continuer à mettre en oeuvre les accords conclus entre eux, en particulier l'Accord sur le statut de la Mission, en date du 5 novembre 1993, ou tout accord qu'ils pourraient conclure ultérieurement pour remplacer cet Accord en vue de faciliter la mise en oeuvre du nouveau mandat;

8. Rend hommage aux États, aux organismes des Nations Unies et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui ont fourni une aide humanitaire aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées qui étaient dans le besoin, les encourage à persévérer et demande au Gouvernement rwandais de continuer à faciliter l'acheminement et la distribution des secours;

9. Demande aux États et aux organismes donateurs d'honorer l'engagement qu'ils ont pris d'apporter une aide au relèvement du Rwanda, d'accroître l'aide qu'ils apportent déjà à cette fin et, en particulier, de favoriser la mise en place à bref délai et le fonctionnement efficace du Tribunal international ainsi que le rétablissement de l'appareil judiciaire rwandais;

10. Encourage le Secrétaire général et son Représentant spécial à continuer de coordonner les activités des Nations Unies au Rwanda, dont celles des organisations et organismes qui s'occupent de questions humanitaires et de développement, ainsi que celles des spécialistes des droits de l'homme;

11. Prie le Secrétaire général de lui présenter d'ici au 9 août 1995, puis le 9 octobre 1995 au plus tard, un rapport sur la manière dont la MINUAR s'acquitte de son mandat, sur

la situation humanitaire au Rwanda et sur les progrès réalisés en ce qui concerne le rapatriement des réfugiés;

12. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.

**NB**

La MINUAR a été, à l'origine, établie par la résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993. La résolution 918 (1994) a étendu le mandat de la Mission pour inclure la responsabilité de la sécurité des civils et de l'opération humanitaire; elle a augmenté sa force à hauteur de 5,500 soldats et a imposé un embargo sur les armes au Rwanda.

Dans son acte de ce jour, le Conseil a affirmé que les restrictions du chapitre VII imposées par sa résolution 918 (1994) s'appliquent à la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels à des personnes dans les États voisins du Rwanda, si ces armements et matériels sont destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda. Le Conseil a lancé un appel aux États voisins du Rwanda pour qu'ils prennent des mesures afin de veiller à ce que ces armements et ces matériels ne soient pas transférés dans des camps Rwandais situés sur leur territoire.

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Dans une déclaration au Conseil, le Représentant du Zaïre, a demandé une enquête indépendante pour réfuter les allégations selon lesquelles son pays était impliqué dans la vente et la livraison des armements destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda. Il a déclaré qu'il revenait au Gouvernement du Rwanda de créer un climat favorable au retour des réfugiés.

Le Représentant du Rwanda, prenant la parole après le vote, en a appelé à la fin de l'embargo sur les armes contre son Gouvernement et a demandé l'établissement d'une commission internationale chargée d'examiner le problème des camps de réfugiés. Il a ajouté que les modifications dans le mandat de la MINUAR reflétaient l'évolution de la situation dans son pays.

### Mandate Options

- a) As a follow-up to substantive para.2 [d], the troop figure at para.3 may be given as 1200. An additional paragraph may be introduced on the following lines:

"Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the International Tribunal and the Government of Rwanda, to induct an international security contingent to ensure the security of the International Tribunal's offices, its personnel and its field operations. Until the induction of this force, and as an interim measure, requests UNAMIR to continue providing an appropriate contingent for this purpose, pending the arrival of the international security contingent."

- b) Para. 3 to read:

"Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force-level of UNAMIR to a total not to exceed 1200 formed troops to carry out the mandate etc. [minus reference to Military Observers]."

The additional para. to read:

"Requests the Secretary-General to deploy an appropriate number of military observers and headquarters support staff to carry out the mandate."

- c) "Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the UNAMIR military contingent to an appropriate level in order to carry out the mandate set out in para 2 above and further requests him to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate."

- d) Additional para. 4:

"Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of Rwanda, the International Tribunal and the UN Agencies concerned to induct an international security contingent that would provide protection of the International Tribunal and UN international personnel and would replace the UNAMIR contingent currently engaged in these protection duties."



## Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1995/1015\*

8 December 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Germany, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland and United States of America: draft resolutionThe Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994 and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Noting the letters of the Foreign Minister of Rwanda to the Secretary-General of 13 August 1995 and 24 November 1995 (S/1995/1018, Annex I and S/1995/1018, Annex II),

Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and welcoming in this context the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry pursuant to its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

S/1995/1015

English

Page 2

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration of 29 November 1995 issued by them (S/1995/1001),

Emphasizing the importance of all States acting in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region held in Bujumbura in February 1995 and those contained in the Cairo Declaration,

Commending the Government of Rwanda's continuing efforts to maintain peace and security as well as to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR [for a final period] until 8 March 1996;

2. Decides also, in the light of current efforts to restore peace and stability through the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation,

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,

(c) Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,

(d) Contribute, in consultation with the Government of Rwanda, to the security of the International Tribunal for Rwanda as an interim measure until alternative arrangements can be put in place, and assist in ensuring the safety of international personnel, in case of need;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to a total not to exceed 1,400 personnel to carry out the mandate set out in

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paragraph 2 above, that force level to include engineering, logistics and guards units and military observers; and further requests him to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw for use in Rwanda;

5. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

6. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary measures to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment that are scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner;

7. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

8. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;

9. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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## BRIEF ON POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE

*[Signature]*  
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G3 Plans

1. The draft resolution recommended by the Govt of Rwanda to the Security Council will require UNAMIR to reduce its strength of 2200( including MILOBS and UN CIVPOL) to 800. The draft confines the employment as well as deployment of the strength to engineering , logistics, Guard companies and Military Observers. CIVPOL and Tribunal protection duties have not been included in proposal .
2. The salient aspects of the proposal as it pertains to UNAMIR are as under:-
  - a. Exercise its good offices to help achieve the repatriation of refugees within the frame of reference of the Bujumbura conference and the Cairo summit of the Heads of State of the great Lake Region,
  - b. Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, ~~to~~ support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,
  - c. Assist the UNHCR in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,
  - d. Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of UNAMIR.

### Proposed Force Structure

3. The proposed force structure based on the Rwanda Government draft is as under:
  - a. Force HQ. 20.
  - b. Engr Coy. 125.
  - c. Sig Coy (telecomm engg). 50.
  - d. Logistics. 50.
  - e. Inf Elements. 375 ( One coy comprising of 115 personnel and 15

*[Signature]*  
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personnel for the command admin in the bn HQ if any).Details are given at Annexure 1.

- f. Mil Police. 20.
- g. Mov Con. 15.
- h. Mil Obs. 145.

#### **Options for the Contributing Contingents**

4. **Option 1** To organise homogenous protection elements in terms of Infantry while continuing to maintain a international structure for other elements.The advantages of this proposal are as under:-

- a. Security is centrally coordinated.
- b. Command and control is facilitated.
- c. Reactions in case of adverse contingencies are faster and more responsive.
- d. Accountability is guarranted.
- d. Administration of the force is simpler.

5. **Option 2** To maintain a heterogenous composition in all elements. The implications of such a structure are as under:-

- a. Universally acceptable as also likely to be favoured by the Rwanda Government.
- b. Impartiality in functioning can be projected.

#### **6. Recomend Force structure**

- a. Infantry

INDIA                      Bn Hq with 2 coys(245 pers)

- a. Infantry  
INDIA Bn Hq with 2 coys(245 pers)  
GHANA 115
- b. Engineers INDIA
- c. Logistics CANADA
- d. Mil Police GHANA and NIGERIA
- e. MOVCON INDIA

### Military Observers

7. The tasks assigned to the MILOBS in the draft resolution forwarded by the Rwanda Government is mentioned at para 2(b) above . From the analyses of the task following sub tasks emerge:-

- a. Assist UNHCR in regulating the smooth flow of refugees by manning the border crossings
- b. Monitor the refugee situation in the Transit Camps.
- c. Monitor the resettlement of the refugees in various communes.
- d. Monitor the security situation in various communes.
- e. Assist and coordinate humanitarian activities with NGOs.
- f. Monitor and report prison conditions.

8. To determine the strength of MILOBS required for performance of above tasks, the following factual data is essential:

- a. Total communes in Rwanda

143

B.S

*How many do we or  
are we allowed to visit  
now?*

- b. Border crossings 15
- c. Refugee Transit Camps 15

9. **Strength proposed for MILOBS**

- a. Teams for visiting communes 80 (team of 4 vis a commune once in 7 days)
- b. Border Crossing 15x4= 60
- c. Sector HQ 6X4= 24
- d. MILOB HQ 8
- e. HAC 5

Total 177

10. **Recommendation** The shortfall of 32 as recommended in para 3 of the proposed structure can either be made by up reducing the strength of other elements or alternatively MILOB HQs be asked to suggest deployment based on the proposed figure of 145.

**PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE-REVISED MANDATE**

**ESSENTIAL GUARD DUTIES**

- Force HQ-	35
- Transit Camp	35
- TRAFIPRO	45
- UN Wksp	10
- Helipad	20
- IVECO	10
- Bahadur	10
- Fuel Station	10
- BBC	20
- Comn Compound	10
- Magerwa	10
- FC's Res	10
- RRF	35
- RAP	15
- Camp Sec	20
- Adm Pers	30
- Reserve	35
- HQ'	15

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375  
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LOGISTICS                      50

FORCE ENGR                      125

FORCE SIG                      50

STAFF                      20

MOVCON                      15

<u>MILOBS</u>	145
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<u>MIL POLICE</u>	20
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TOTAL-	<b>800</b>
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UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

**From:** Col W J Fletcher   
DCOS (Sp) Extn 11109

**To:** FC, DFC

**File Reference:** 4000.1/LOG-4

**Date:** 6 Dec 95

**Subject:** FORCE OPTIONS

**Reference:** Draft Resolution (Rwanda).

1. Enclosed is a comparison of Options which the Force Commander may wish to you as options in response to any query on the Rwanda Draft Resolution. Option A is that which has been suggested by the Rwanda Government.

2. Options B and C would see the emphasis on engineering, logistics and communications support with the commensurate formed troops capability for security and escort duties. I certainly do not see the situation changing with respect to the numbers of requests for transport and engineer plant. In fact, if the mandate were to include assistance to UNHCR in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees, we would be placed in a position where we would have to maximize our transport capability and, as well, in a position of having to provide escorts for vehicles, both our own and UNHCR/IOM, moving after curfew to position for the next days activities for example. The need to maintain a high level of comms will be equally critical in the event of mass repatriation. Engineer support will be in heavy demand and regardless of the amount of plant and expertise in the Mission, it will not be sufficient.

3. You will note that I have segregated the MOVCON from INDBATT (-) for purposes of clarity. GHANCOY 2 has been included in Option C as I have made the assumption that the coy would continue to provide security for the Tribunal. The coy is not included in Option B as that should be one of our task arguments that cannot be accomplished with less than a force of 1200 military.

4. I have made a first attempt at defining troops to task in the enclosed summary. In all of the above, I have assumed that the reduction to a reduced force manning level would take place over the period 9 Dec to approximately 1 Feb 96 depending upon availability of strategic movement resources being made available to facilitate the repatriation of the deployed troops in Sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5.

 file.

## **TROOPS TO TASK**

<b><u>TASK</u></b>	<b><u>TROOPS REQUIRED</u></b>
Combat Engineer support incl administration at existing work load.	Engr Coy (-)
Security of UNAMIR installations and troops in Kigali Area	Nine Platoons infantry
RRF Kigali	Two Sections infantry
Security for Tribunal installations and on site investigations(should be seen as impartial)	Three Platoons infantry
Convoy Escort UNAMIR and UNHCR refugee repatriation	Two Sections infantry or MP
Traffic Duties, Investigations	Two Sections MP
Military Logistics Support to UNAMIR (incl self sufficiency)	Logistic Support Unit
Communications Support to Kigali and deployed Observers, Refugee control	Signal Company (-)
Information collection and Analysis (in support of UNAMIR and repatriation of refugees)	One Team
Movement Control - UNOE/COE	MC Detachment
UNAMIR Headquarters	Staff Officers/clerks - 20 persons
Military Observers	As required by Mandate and availability

**FORCE OPTIONS FOR FIFTH MI NDATE**

OPTION	ENGR	LOG	SIG	INDBATT (-)	GHAN 2	MOVCON	MP	STAFF	MILOB	TOTAL
A (0800)	135	70	50	400	-	15	10	20	100	800
B (1000)	150	85	75	475	-	15	20	20	160	1000
C (1200)	150	85	100	470	135	15	20	25	200	1200
	1400	202	85	90	540	135	15	30		

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

Sec. Council

RECEIVED

- 6 DEC 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG  
UNAMIR

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 5 December 1995

copy: FC  
ED  
SA/SRSG  
6-12-95TO: KHAN  
UNAMIR  
KigaliFROM: KITTANI  
DPKC  
New York

FAX NO: 3-3090

FAX NO: (212) 963-4879  
ROOM S-3727

SUBJECT: Draft resolution on UNAMIR

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 4

1. Re your fax MIR-4103. Please find attached the counter-proposal prepared by Germany, UK and USA. This proposal was handed to the Permanent Representative of Rwanda who is consulting his Government on it. He has promised to obtain their views by tomorrow morning at which time he is expected to meet with the 3 co-sponsors to continue the consultation process. Grateful for any suggestion you may have.

2. As you will see, the draft is silent on the issue of whether we should continue our police programme as mandated under SecCo resolution 997. We expect the Three to clarify this point tomorrow.

Best regards.

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda.

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration issued by them of 29 November 1995 (S/1995/1001).

5 December 1995

1:00 pm

Draft Resolution (Rwanda)The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and coming in this context the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry pursuant to its resolution 1013 (1995), of 7 September 1995,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda, and military observers;

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration issued by them of 29 November 1995 (S/1995/1001),

withdraw, for use in Rwanda by United Nations agencies in assisting

Welcoming the summit of Heads of State of the Great Lakes region held in Cairo on 28-29 November and the Declaration issued by them of 29 November 1995 (S/1995/1001),

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes Region held in Bujumbura in February 1995 and those contained in the Cairo Declaration,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 March 1996;
2. Decides also, in the light of current efforts to restore peace and stability through the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation,

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks,

(c) Assist UNHCR and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees,

(d) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of United Nations and international personnel and premises, including those of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to that required to carry out the mandate set out in paragraph 2 above, that force level to include engineering, logistics and guards units and military observers;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda by United Nations agencies in assisting

the Government of Rwanda in refugee repatriation and in reconstruction;

5. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

6. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

7. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;

8. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);

9. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of Rwanda and with the relevant United Nations agencies on the nature of a continued United Nations presence in Rwanda after 8 March 1996, and on the role such a United Nations presence might play in furthering the search for peace and stability through justice, reconciliation and refugee return and assisting the Government of Rwanda in its pressing task of rehabilitation and reconstruction;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, progress towards repatriation of refugees, and the results of the consultations referred to in paragraph 10 above;


12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

DFC

**Senior Staff Meeting  
1 December 1995**

1. The Force Commander, as acting Head of Mission, informed the meeting that an urgent request had been received from the Secretary General's Chef du Cabinet requesting UNAMIR's comments on President Carter's letter. The Force Commander read out paragraph 2 of the letter which stated that an agreement had been reached with the Rwandese Government on an extension of 3 months for UNAMIR but also implied a change in the mandate. To "help ensure" the safe return of refugees was different from "assist" in the safe return of refugees.
2. Following an extensive exchange of views, it was decided that the Force Commander should seek an immediate meeting with the Vice President to seek his views on the subject.

**ACTION: FC**

  
Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG

cc. ED  
DFC  
CAO  
SA/SRSG  
Spokesman

file copy SRSG



### Mandate : Suggestions for Mandate

1. UNAMIR should discontinue and be replaced by a UN presence under a different politico-civilian mandate and acronym.
2. The phase-out period for UNAMIR's military contingent (71-97 days) should be included in the new mandate.
3. This civilian presence should be backed by a meaningful mandate so as not to give the impression of UN walking away from Rwanda.
4. The Civilian Option should be linked to the following immediate tasks:
  - a) Secure and efficient refugee return encompassing the humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in preparation for a possible massive return of refugees.
  - b) Urgent post conflict, socio-economic reconstruction tasks and repair of civil war damage.
  - c) Revival of national justice system which would include police/gendarmerie training, triage commission support, improving prison conditions, preparation for genocide trials etc.
  - d) National Reconciliation at all levels.
  - e) Support for regional efforts to ease regional tensions bearing in mind activities of International Commission on Arms transfer and regional conference initiatives.
  - f) Assist Tribunal, Human Rights and UN Agencies in fulfilling their objectives.

All the above points should be included in the new mandate.

Mandaté  
A

5. The post conflict, peace-building image of the next "civilian" mandate as opposed to the current military mandate may be projected by the following measures:

- a) A clear reference in the resolutions to UN's post-conflict peace-building role to preserve and sustain peace and stability that has been achieved in Rwanda.
- b) A "White Helmet" assistance component which would consist of a technical assistance unit (doctors, engineers, agronomists, logistics, communications). This unit would be drawn from UNV's or technicians provided by member States. The unit would use the equipment available from UNAMIR's pool.
- c) In addition, the Unit may be assisted by the specialised units currently part of UNAMIR's military contingent [200 Indian Engineering Unit, 50 Indian Communication Unit, 100 Canadian Logistic Unit plus 50 Headquarters co-ordinating staff, total 400 approx.]. This unit could remain as a military contingent or, if agreed, could become part of the "White Helmet" unit, essentially performing their present tasks.

6. The funding of the contingents at para 5 (b) & (c) above would be from assessed contributions.

7. In addition to the White Helmet proposal at para 5 and in order to provide continued protection to the Tribunal, the Human Rights Monitors and UN Agencies in Rwanda, a military contingent of 300-400 formed troops may be retained in Kigali.

8. In order to fulfil the objectives of the mandate and to assist Human Rights Monitors, a contingent of 240 Military Observers may be deployed in Rwanda. [Current-strength 320].

9. In order to assist in the training of Gendarmerie and Communal Police a component of 55 CIVPOL may be deployed. [Current strength 120].

10. UNAMIR's equipment/material may be taken over according to the following priorities:
  - a) Equipment required by civilian replacement to UNAMIR, particularly for use by White Helmets.
  - b) Equipment required by UNDP and UN agencies for Refugees Accelerated Plan of Action for Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. This equipment would be eventually handed over to GOR.
  - c) Equipment required for other peace-keeping operations.
  - d) Equipment required by GOR/NGO's.

This was the consensus at a meeting with interested Amb plus UNDP.  
As you have seen, we could discuss further.

Shahmery/line

FC  
DFC  
23/11

Confidential

G10  
Consensus view - Donors Meeting - Kigali 22nd November, 1995

1. UNAMIR Chapter must be closed on 8th December. There should be no amendment or alteration to UNAMIR's mandate. Any continuation of UN's presence in Rwanda should be in a different form and mandate to UNAMIR.
2. A take-it-or-leave it policy in the current negotiations for the new mandate should be avoided. Now that G-10 position and Rwanda's response is known, the door should be kept open for further discussion on the mandate.
3. Generally, the Civilian Option (Option 4) was favoured. It responded more closely to the situation on the ground. It required, however, an innovative approach if it was to succeed. The Half-way [Option 2] and Monitoring [3] Options had some merit and should not be discounted.
4. The Civilian Option should be aimed at addressing the immediate problems of secure return of refugees, their rehabilitation and resettlement, restoring the judicial process (including police training, prisons, triage commissions, trials etc.), demobilisation and repair of infrastructure damaged in the civil war. Essentially, UN should move to a peace-building role from a peace-keeping role.
5. This peace-building or humanitarian support role may be undertaken by "White Helmets" that would replace Blue Helmets. Thus a core of technicians, logisticians, communicating experts would be mandated to assist in safe refugee return, to prepare for their resettlement rehabilitation in communes, repair of infrastructure etc. The White Helmets could be raised by converting the existing UNAMIR specialised units (engineers, logistics, communication -ie about 420 military personnel) into White Helmets. Alternatively, or in addition, a unit consisting of civilian doctors, engineers, agronomists etc. may be raised through UNVs or through other sources to act as a "White Helmet" brigade carrying out a civilian mandate.

Mandate  
A

6. The funding for the Civilian Option must come through fixed contributions and not through voluntary sources. Preferably, DPKO budget should continue to fund the White Helmet peace-building Civilian Option. The Trust Fund should serve for financing the civilian White Helmet contingent.

7. The issue of equipment was important. It needed sensitive handling. It was obviously ~~as~~ a bargaining lever but required flexibility to overcome the rigidity of UN General Assembly Resolutions. One way in which this flexibility could be achieved would be for most of the equipment to be handed over to UNHCR/UNDP who have priority rights on the equipment. This transfer would be in the context of refugee return and based on the suggestions of the current Thematic Conference.

8. The issue of security for the Tribunal, Human Rights Monitors and other agencies needed to be addressed in the event of UNAMIR phase-out after December 8.

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REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE  
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



VICE-PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET  
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
CABINET DU VICE-PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT  
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
B.P 23 KIGALI

P4/2  
CRN406

20th November, 1995,

H.E. Ambassador Shariyar Khan,  
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General,  
UNAMIR,  
KIGALI.

Your Excellency,

Further to the Rwandese Foreign Minister's letter of 13th August 1995 to the United Nations Secretary General, requesting the transfer of UNAMIR's equipment to the Government of Rwanda, please find attached to this letter a list of equipment the Government of Rwanda wishes to request from the United Nations.

Please accept, your Excellency, my compliments and highest regards.

Yours Sincerely,

**Claude DUSAIDI**

**POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT  
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

**Enc.**

Mandate /  
Stores & Eqpt

P5/6  
CRN 406

**A. UN HOSPITAL**

WITH ALL ITS EQUIPMENT

**B. TELECOMMUNICATION**

- MOBILE & PORTABLE RADIOS
- REPEATER SYSTEMS
- HF SSB RADIOS
- SATELLITE SYSTEMS (VSATS, INMARSATS)
- MULTIPLEX EQUIPMENT
- TELEPHONE PABXS
- TELEPHONE RURAL LINKS
- METERING, TEST EQUIPMENT & TOOLS
- SPECTRUM ANALYSERS

**C. BROADCAST EQUIPMENT**

- RADIO UNAMIR + ACCESORIES

**D. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT**

- BONOCULARS
- NIGHT VISION GOGGLES
- DIRECTION FINDERS
- MOBILE RADAR/RADAR GUN
- MINE DETECTORS
- METAL DETECTORS (PORTABLE & WALK THROUGH)

**E.. GENERATORS**

- VARIOUS SIZES (LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL)

**F. OFFICE EQUIPMENT**

- COMPUTER
- PRINTERS
- OFFICE FURNITURE
- SHREDDERS
- FAX MACHINES
- COPY WRITERS

P6/E  
CRW 406

#### G. VEHICLES

- **HEAVY DUTY VEHICLES**
- FORKLIFTS
- GRADERS
- CRANES
- DOZERS
- GARBAGE COMPACTORS
- SEWAGE TRUCK
- VIBRATOR ROLLER
- BUMP TRUCKS
- LOW LOADERS
- UTILITY VEHICLES (HEAVY) \* see attached
- **TRANSPORT VEHICLES**

#### H. UTILITY UNITS

- WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEMS
- TENTS
- PREFAB UNITS
- PUMPS, TANKS, BLADDERS
- TRAFIPRO COMPLEX
- MAINTENANCE WORKSHOP

#### I. ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCs)

7/0-6207  
MIR-3925



R-REGISTRY	Action to:
	1
	2
	3
4	DFC
1995 NOV 17 10:09	
UNAMIR	
Initial	

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
UNAMIR  
P.O.Box 749, Kigali, Rwanda  
Tel: 250-84265/6/8/9 Fax: 250-86877 (Rwanda)  
Fax: 212-963-3090 (USA)  
TELEFAX COVER SHEET

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1995
TO: MAJ GEN VAN KAPPEN DPKO UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: MAJ GEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA
ATTN: LT COL YOUSSEF ROOM 3650	REPLY FAX: 212-963-3090
FAX: 1(212)-963-4879	INTERNAL DISTR: FC, DFC, DCOS SP
SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION ON STRENGTH OF MILITARY OBSERVERS AFTER 09 DEC 95	

REFERENCE:

A. UNAMIR MONTHLY UNMO LIST G FORM II BY NATIONALITY.

1. THE PRESENT MILOBS STRENGTH IS 285 AFTER 18 MILOBS WHOSE DDM WERE EXTENDED TILL THE END OF MANDATE.
2. 56 MILOBS ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE THE MISSION BY THE END OF DECEMBER 1995 WHILE THE REMAINING 229 HAVE THEIR DDM RANGING FROM JANUARY TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1996.
3. YOU ARE PLEASE REQUESTED TO DIRECT ON THE POSITION OF THE MILOBS AS ENUMERATED ABOVE IN CASE THE MANDATE IS RENEWED OR TERMINATED.
3. BEST REGARDS.

DRAFTED BY:	CLEARED BY: LT COL I ABUBAKAR CMPO
NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES	INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 1

FC (DFC) DCOS SP CMPO  
20/11

United Nations  Nations Unies

F/W-2993

UNAMIR  
1995 NOV 17 P 7 171


## OUTGOING FACSIMILE

17 NOVEMBER 1995

TO: TOUSIGNANT UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: VAN KAPPEN FOR KITTANI UNATIONS, NEW YORK
Fax No:	Fax No: 212-963-4879
SUBJECT: FUTURE STRENGTH OF MILITARY OBSERVERS-UNAMIR	
ATTN: DCOS, CMPO	DRAFTED BY: LT COL YOUSSEF ROOM NO: 3650 EXT: 3721
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. PLEASE, REFER TO YOUR FAX MESSAGE No MIR 3725 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1995, REGARDING THE FUTURE STRENGTH OF OBSERVERS IN UNAMIR, OUR ACTIONS WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE MANDATE IS EXTENDED OR NOT.
2. IF THE MANDATE IS NOT EXTENDED, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE RETAINED/REPATRIATED ACCORDING TO THE CLOSE DOWN SCHEDULE WHICH WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES.
3. IN THE EVENT THE MANDATE IS EXTENDED, AND DEPENDING ON THE NEW STRENGTH OF THE MISSION, WE WILL REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENTS FOR THOSE MILOBS WHOSE TOUR OF DUTY WILL HAVE EXPIRED. IN ORDER MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH AT THE PRESENT LEVEL, WE WILL ASK THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO REMAIN IN THE MISSION UNTIL THEIR REPLACEMENTS ARRIVE IN THE MISSION.

BEST REGARDS

  
18/11

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR  
HELD ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 14 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi  
Mr. Higiro Thaddée  
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi  
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare

Office of the Vice-President  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ministry of Planning  
RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan  
  
Col. Shiva Kumar  
Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer  
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza  
Ms. Susan Mathew  
Ms. Isel Rivero  
Mr. Mtshana Ncube  
Mr. Ismael Diallo  
Mr. Mamady Condé

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General  
Chief of Staff ✓  
Principal Officer, DPKO  
Executive Director  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Special Assistant to SRSG  
Senior Legal Officer  
Spokesman  
Senior Political Affairs Officer

1. The SRSG introduced Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer, DPKO, on mission to Rwanda. The SRSG then referred to the previous meeting and indicated that, at the request of Mr. Dusaidi, he had prepared a non-paper which summarized the points raised by the G-10 and UN Specialized Agencies regarding UNAMIR's Mandate and which had been subject of discussions at the last meeting.
2. Regarding the list of UNAMIR disposable equipment, the SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that UN Headquarters had responded that it would be ready by 27 November.
3. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he would refer the non-paper to higher authorities and that he would provide the SRSG with his Government's views on the Mandate at the forthcoming meeting.

③ JFC  
Thanks  
JFC  
18 Nov 95

②  
Fc  
1. For info please.  
2. You also joined the Mtg.  
shall info C/SRSG.  
A  
17/11

4. Mr. Dusaidi regretted that the United Nations was not able to finalize the equipment list earlier. He informed the SRSG that the Rwandese Foreign Minister had written a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the transfer of UNAMIR equipment and material to the Rwandese Government. Mr. Dusaidi then added that Rwanda would not be expected to give its response on the UNAMIR's Mandate while the United Nations was delaying its response on the equipment list. He said the two issues went hand-in-hand.

5. Mr. Dusaidi then reiterated his views concerning UNAMIR protection of UN bodies and agencies in Rwanda which could be provided by private services and/or Rwandese Security Forces. He repeated that it was insulting to Rwanda to suggest that it could not handle the security of foreign representatives. He could not accept the 1,800 as a critical mass as if it were a magic number. The truth was that during the genocide the United Nations had reduced its force to 210. Mr. Dusaidi expressed the views that Rwanda needed the rehabilitation of its infrastructure and that it was necessary to have a clear picture of how it was being done. However, in the short-term, he wished to know how the facilities occupied by UNAMIR would be repaired. He suggested that joint visits be undertaken to these sites in order to arrive at a clearer idea on the magnitude of the work to be done prior to UNAMIR's departure.

6. Regarding the rehabilitation of Rwanda's infrastructure and repair of facilities occupied by UNAMIR, SRSG stated that UNAMIR would repair the damage it had caused, due to its own possession of buildings but could not assume for damage caused by the conflict. UNAMIR had undertaken repairs of damaged bridges, roads and even undertaken some demining activities.

7. The CAO enumerated the numerous initiatives taken by UNAMIR in the repair of general infrastructure of Rwanda such as at the Kanombe International Airport where maintenance costs added up to \$23,000 a month. Repairs to the Amahoro stadium, Gikongoro communal offices, Kigali Hospital, Police and Gendarmerie Training Schools, Military Academy, Butare School for Demobilized Children, Tea factory, Amahoro hotel, in addition to the loans of 12 generators, amounted to approximately over a million dollars. There were many other items which were not quantifiable such as disposal of ammunition and explosives, demining, repairs of bridges, roads and helicopters landing pads, construction of septic tanks and their servicing, and finally providing food for two orphanages. 1.3 8 72

8. The SRSG then turned to the issue of UNAMIR contractors such as Economat and Brown and Root. He clarified that items imported for the use of UNAMIR by the contractors were privileged and tax-exempt. Privileges and immunities were not otherwise extended to these companies. SRSG suggested that meetings be held with the management of those companies at which UNAMIR could attend as observer in order to ascertain their taxation liability. The CAO added that a final legal opinion had been

requested from the United Nations Legal Counsel on the responsibility of contractors under the SOMA. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Ministry of Finance had been instructed to examine Rwandese Tax Law and its application to international contractors.

9. Mr. Dusaidi then explained how he visualized UNAMIR's role in Rwanda. He said that the term "assistance mission" was particularly important for Rwanda. Tracing the significance of the term he said that the word was accepted after a careful and deliberate consideration. It referred to the need for United Nations to assist in the implementation of the Arusha process which meant financial support for the rehabilitation of refugees, a united army, demining, etc.. The genocide had led to an even greater need for United Nations to assist Rwanda in repairing the shattered infrastructure and helping Rwanda to recover from last year's crisis. In this regard, the Assistance Mission would have to change its Mandate from a peace-keeping role to a civilian role. Rwanda needed material assistance. UNAMIR could not walk out and leave behind a shattered nation. The United Nations had a moral responsibility to provide the country with the equipment it needs to stand on its feet. A level of flexibility in the application of UN rules had to be exercised. Rwanda required special measures. In fact, the world had a responsibility to rebuild Rwanda having stood still during the genocide. Mr. Dusaidi went on to say that Rwanda was examining the feasibility of legal responsibility.

10. The SRSG thanked Mr. Dusaidi for providing the historical context and his own rationalization for the concept of Assistance Mission. He suggested that these views should be raised in the Security Council.

11. Maj. Kamarade interjected that Rwanda needed technology, experts, heavy machinery to improve production. Rwanda needed to achieve food security in order to be able to receive the refugees. Spoon-feeding did not help as people became used to hand-outs. The need for self-sufficiency needed to be included in the Mandate.

12. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the future mandate needed to reflect these objectives.

13. SRSG indicated that while he understood Rwanda's reasoning, the United Nations had to be understood as a compartmentalized bureaucracy. Peace-keeping did not encompass economic development which was a role played by UNDP and the specialized agencies.

14. Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer then added that she would transmit the comments made by Mr. Dusaidi to her superiors in New York. She explained that at the United Nations everyone shared the same eagerness to assist Rwanda, but that it needed to recall that UNAMIR had never ceased to be a Chapter VI Operation and that it did not have a peace-enforcement Mandate under Chapter VII. Regarding the future, she suggested that the

Rwandese Ambassador should clarify Rwanda's position in the Security Council as there was not much time left till the 8 December. At the moment the United Nations did not have the proper instruments to respond to post conflict needs. The requirements indicated by Mr. Dusaidi belonged to unchartered territory which fell outside traditional peace-keeping and peace-making.


15. In the opinion of Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi, the international community should treat Rwanda as a special case and therefore UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian mission. The Force Commander remarked that it was clear by the remarks made that a concept for a new mission was emerging which fell outside traditional peace-keeping. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that what was needed was a mission with a radically different concept.

16. Mr. Nsengumuzemyi then enquired about United Nations Financial Regulations and Procedures as related to the United Nations Budget. More particularly, he wished to know the mechanisms used by Trust Funds in purchasing equipment.

17. Ms. Lindenmayer provided an extensive reply which included explaining the differences between United Nations Regular Budget and voluntary contributions, the creation of Trust Funds for particular projects and peace-keeping, assessed contributions.


18. Mr. Dusaidi closed the meeting by stating that Rwanda was responsible for rebuilding itself. The Government wanted to be assisted in the priorities it had identified. Sometimes, donor countries and NGOs acted on their own priorities even without consulting the Government.

19. It was decided that the next meeting would be held on **Monday, 20 November** instead of Tuesday, 21 November.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Date: 17/11/95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan

Date:

## FUTURE MANDATE - SOME QUESTIONS

Reference: SRSG's Note to FC dated 18 Sep 95.

1. Options open regarding the fate of future Mandate:
  - (a) Continue as at present for next six months - status quo.
  - (b) Conversion to Milob Msn.
  - (c) Termination of Msn - Total pull-out.

2. Questions Raised by SRSG:

- (a) Efficacy of reduced UNAMIR with say 1200, including Logistics, Engrs and a Contingent for Emergency. Close coys in Sectors, Milobs/Civ Pol remain. Would Mandate need to be adjusted? Is this Militarily feasible?

\*Recommendation

Militarily even the current strength of 1800 is considered inadequate. Further reduction is not operationally acceptable. We will have no deterrent value. If we stay, the responsibility of Tribunal & HR will be forced on us. The Mandate as such is lukewarm. Further dilution is not recommended. UNAMIR II have performed commendably and peaked. With current/reduced force level and the likelihood of mass repatriation and resultant socio-economic and ethnic problems, it stands a fair chance of sharing the defamation only. It will be a down slide phase.

- (b) Is a Milobs Msn desirable? What role would Milobs perform that HR Monitors are doing anyway? Does their presence inspire confidence for refugee repatriation? Can they compensate for Formed Tps? Is it not better to have no presence rather than a toothless, ineffective presence?

\*Recommendation

Totally in agreement. Milobs cannot replace Formed tps, nor can they instill the same level or degree of confidence the presence of Formed tps could inspire. HR Monitors though can perform similar tasks, do not give the 'blue beret' influence. However, they could possibly perform 'Monitoring' job better than others because of their military background, trg and perception of situation. Therefore, a decision on their retention will

have to be independent of Formed tps and for 'Monitoring and Reporting' purposes only.

- (c) Would not UNAMIR's effectiveness be seriously undermined by phase-out of Logistic, Engineering back up? If so, should not every effort be made to retain it for next 6 months after 09 Dec 95? How can this be achieved?

\*Recommendation

Presence of Logistic and Engr resources in the Msn is intimate to the retention of Formed Tps. These are support elements which cannot be retained without formed tps. Basically, they are more for inhouse support. If Formed tps are to be phased out, then the Logistic and Engr support will have to be under the aegis of UNHCR (additional transport) and UNDP (on contract to some NGO for Engr tasks). There is no way that these elements could stay as Part of UNAMIR without Formed tps, except on bilateral agreement with Government of Rwanda. We do not recommend their retention with reduced force strength.

- (d) Is Rwandese keenness to take over equipment after phase-out affecting their attitude towards UNAMIR's close down? Would this attitude change if they were informed as early as possible what eqpt they would be given and what would be removed?

\*Recommendation

It was evident during the last Mandate Mtg that the Government of Rwanda wanted UNAMIR to be terminated in Dec 95 and the current extension was only a 'phase-out' phase. Therefore, the contention that it is affecting their attitude towards UNAMIR close down may not be fully valid. It may at best be an influencing factor. Bulk of the Eqpt presently with UNAMIR, on which the Govt/RPA have set their eyes are 'Contingent owned Equipment (COE)' like engr plant and troop carrying vehs. These in any case cannot be left behind without the consent of the respective Govts. These details will have to be worked out between the UN and the concerned Govts and will be a long-drawn time consuming process. Secondly, giving details of what to expect from UN at this stage may be counter productive as if it does not satisfy the Rwandan needs, they may well resort to their well rehearsed 'hijack tactics' and make our movement and stay difficult. We do not recommend giving them a list of possible equipment that would be given to them on termination of the mission at this stage.

OFFICE OF THE SRSG  
UNAMIR  
URGENT

DRAFT

ED), FC, Sawing way  
pl. see. pl. feel free to  
comment & all freely.

Sawing way

### UNAMIR's Mandate

ED)  
FC  
Sawing way

1. Please refer to my code cables MIR.3236 and 3426 dated 14 and 28 September, you will see from the second telegram that discussions on UNAMIR future mandate have begun.
2. Recently, Force Commander General Tousignant, my senior colleagues and I have discussed this issue in depth and the following unanimous view has emerged:
  - a) While UNAMIR's mandate would be decided by the Security Council nearer December 9, UN may adopt the approach that UNAMIR would wind up immediately after December 9. This <sup>would be in accordance with</sup> was the understanding when our current mandate was agreed. This UNAMIR phase-out would imply the winding up of formed troops, MILOBs, CIVPOL and our Civilian component.
  - b) The onus for <sup>any</sup> change in this process would lie with Rwanda and the Security Council.
  - c) While Rwanda is likely to press for the winding up of formed troops, it may seek the retention of MILOBs, CIVPOL (for training) and a civilian component ~~headed by SRSG~~. Thus, they may prefer UNAMIR being converted into an Observer Mission. <sup>Option A 3236</sup>
  - d) They may even seek a reduction of formed troops, preferring to <sup>retain</sup> keep the engineering and logistic units <sup>superior</sup> assisting a smaller formed troop contingent.
  - e) Option (d) is not feasible from an organizational point of view. Militarily, a further reduction in formed troops cannot be sustained.
  - f) Even an Observer Mission does not stand up to scrutiny as Human Rights Monitors are expected to perform the basic task of overseeing human rights. Moreover, in our present mandate, there is no military role for Military Observers to perform.
3. The Rwandese Government would probably prefer to have an "assistance mission" in which UN would rebuild infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, telecom, water, power etc.) and socio-economic facilities. This task is outside the ambit of Peace Keeping operations and would need to be performed by a civilian mission based on a different mandate and with adequate powers and financing.

A

4. Agencies particularly Tribunal and Human Rights (UNHCR), donors and neighbouring countries (Zaire, Tanzania) are likely to oppose a scaling down of UNAMIR due to its negative effect on security and the return of refugees. A reduction in formed troops however is not feasible.

5. Rwanda has given its suggestions on a revised SOMA. They are being studied but on first impression they are disconcerting. UNAMIR cannot, in any case, continue unless SOMA remains substantively in its present status.

6. While you evaluate all the options, I would recommend that we should begin the process by stating what was agreed before the finalization of the current mandate i.e that UN would proceed on the basis of winding up its mandate after December 9. The onus of bringing about any change would therefore rest with Rwanda and members of the Security Council.

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA  
UNAMIR - MINUAR

26 September 1995

TO: Mr. Wilfrid De Souza, Executive Director

FROM: A. B. Sidique Dao, HAO/ SA-SRSG

SUBJECT: Joint GoR/UNAMIR Meeting of 26 September 1995

I have the honour to forward herewith Note for File in respect of the above subject matter which was prepared by Mr. Mtshana Ncube, Admin/Legal Officer.

CC: COS  
SPA  
SPO

FC

1. There are the minutes of yesterday's mtg.

2. For perusal please.

ED

27/9.

NOTE TO FILE

UNAMIR MANDATE AND UNAMIR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

26 September 1995

Meeting between members of the Government Commission and the Special Representative of the Secretary General and his delegation held at UNAMIR Headquarters at 10 o'clock on 26 September 1995

The meeting was attended by a Government delegation constituted into a Commission and appointed by the Vice-President, Major General Kagame. The Commission members were:

- |    |                        |                         |
|----|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | Mr. Claude Dusaidi     | Vice-President's Office |
| 2. | Maj. Kamarade Kayitare | Defence                 |
| 3. | Maj. Joshua Rasana     | Defence                 |
| 4. | Maj. Kamanzi Mushyo    | Defence                 |
| 5. | Dr. Ndahiro Emmanuel   | Defence                 |
| 6. | Mr. Sam Nkusi          | MINITRANSCO             |
| 7. | Mr. Higiyo Theddie     | MINAFFET                |
| 8. | Mr. Antoine Sendama    | MINIREISO               |

UNAMIR was represented by:

- |    |                           |             |
|----|---------------------------|-------------|
| 1. | Ambassador Shaharyar Khan | SRSG        |
| 2. | Mr. Wilfrid De Souza      | ED          |
| 3. | Col. Shiva Kumar          | COS ✓       |
| 4. | Mr. Sammy Buo             | SPA         |
| 5. | Mr. Mamady Conde          | SPO         |
| 6. | Mr. Mtshana Ncube         | A/LO        |
| 7. | Mr. Gilles Briere         | CMCO        |
| 8. | Mr. Abu Bakarr S. Dao     | HAO/SA-SRSG |

1. The meeting was proposed by the Government following the creation of the above Commission.
2. Mr. Dusaidi, the head of the Government Commission, stated in his opening remarks that the commission was appointed by the Vice President "to look at all aspects of UNAMIR" i.e. to appraise its work.
3. Some of the issues that the Commission wants to focus on are:
  - (a) If there is to be a transition, it should be a smooth one;
  - (b) What staff will be left in the transition period;
  - (c) What, if any, of UNAMIR equipment can be left behind;
  - (d) The successes or failures of the UNAMIR Mission.

4. In response the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, welcomed the delegation and thanked Mr. Dusaidi for the overview on issues of interest to the Commission (i.e. the Government). He then outlined what he and UNAMIR saw as the issues to be taken up in this and other discussions to follow. He saw the issues as the following:

- (a) What happens after 9 December 1995;
- (b) What, if anything, remains after 9 December 1995, i.e. What physical things can be left behind and what personnel may be needed to remain;
- (c) The legal basis of UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda. [Ambassador Khan underlined the importance of absolute clarity for both parties on how UNAMIR comes to be here. He said there should be no grey areas].
- (d) Any other issues.

5. In summing up, Ambassador Khan indicated that he saw the issues for discussion as:

- (a) The Mandate;
- (b) What UNAMIR leaves behind by way of equipment;
- (c) Legal aspects of the Mission;
- (d) Any other business.

6. The Mandate

Ambassador Khan reiterated the fact that UNAMIR is in Rwanda under chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, and is here with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda. Whether UNAMIR leaves or stays is for the Government of Rwanda to decide "we cannot impose ourselves on Rwanda. This is the bottom line. If you feel we should phase out in the next few weeks you tell us. The decision is your sovereign right. We are here as a result of the Security Council resolutions, and it is of course the Security Council that ultimately decides." Ambassador Khan then promised to explain in some detail how decisions on such matters are taken by the Security Council and to present to the Commission the options.

7. What do we leave behind by way of equipment?

- (a) Ambassador Khan preceded his categorization of equipment used by UNAMIR by explaining some of the principles governing use and transfer of equipment in Peace Keeping

Missions. The fundamental principle is that where equipment has depreciated below a certain value the UN will consider, in the light of costs in moving such equipment to another mission or to Brandis in Italy, disposing of such equipment locally. The key issues here are the age of the equipment, considering the likely cost of transporting it to another mission.

(b) Ambassador Khan then went on to explain the different categories of equipment now used by UNAMIR. These are:

(i) Contingent owned equipment. This equipment belongs to the Contingent in question and is taken back by the Contingent to its country upon completion of the mission. The UN pays for the use of such equipment.

(ii) Equipment loaned to Contingents by member states. This is equipment given to those Contingents which come to the mission without their own equipment. The equipment belongs to the Government. Depending on the attitude of the loaning government, such equipment may follow the personnel to whom it is loaned should these be transferred to another mission. This equipment is bound to be returned to the state making the loan.

(iii) Equipment purchased by the UN. This equipment is moved from mission to mission until its value falls below a certain designated level where upon it may be disposed of as scrap or sold. Ambassador Khan outlined three ways in which property may be dealt with:

- Write-offs under UN rules. These can be left behind.
- Equipment (including vehicles) still in good condition but can be considered for sale at a depreciated value. An agreement has already been signed to purchase some of this equipment using funds from the Trust Fund.
- Equipment which does not fall into subparagraphs (i) and (ii). This equipment is in good condition and is normally transferred to other missions or stored for use in future missions.

- [Ambassador Khan stated that there will

be a complete list of property by 15 October 1995].

- (c) As a general rule lethal equipment is excluded from any of the above considerations. Were such equipment to be left to the Government of Rwanda, there has to be authorization from the Government that owns the equipment and from the Security Council.
- (d) The other category of equipment which is within the ambit of UNAMIR to consider in the discussions with the Rwandese Government is communications equipment, generators, office equipment, utility equipment (bladders, tents and pumps).


#### 8. Legal aspects of the mission

Discussion on issues falling under this category was deferred because the Special Representative of the Secretary General had only just received, some 20 minutes before the meeting, the Government's comments on the SOMA. Ambassador Khan needed time to study the comments.

#### 9. Any other business

- (a) Under any other business Mr. Dusaidi suggested that in order to better understand some of the issues that the Government wanted examined by the Commission it was important to look at the genesis of the UNAMIR mission. He noted that it is called UNAMIR specifically because it is an assistance mission to Rwanda. He therefore called upon the meeting to "look at all aspects of the mission" data-base development by UNAMIR, documents, maps, etc.
- (b) Another member of the Commission raised the issue of the two Trust Funds - the UNDP Trust Fund and the Secretary General's Trust Fund. He wanted to know which one we were referring to when talking about using funds from the Trust Fund to purchase equipment. Ambassador Khan agreed that there are two Trust Funds: the UNDP Trust Fund and the Secretary General's Trust Fund. However if it were according to his wishes he would prefer to use the Secretary General's Trust Fund because it suffers from less red tape.

- (c) One member of the Commission asked about Mambas (PC tanks) from South Africa. It was the view of Ambassador Khan that the transfer of these fall under the Security Council since there are the property of the UN (see relevant Security Council resolution on transfer of property).

Mtshana M. Ncube   
Chief, Boards of Inquiry Unit  
Administrative/Legal Officer



UNAMIR-AMIRIAN

file - Mandate

*Office of the Spokesman*

**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF  
UNAMIR UNTIL 8 DECEMBER 1995**

**Resolution 997 (1995) adopted unanimously**  
**9 June 1995**

**Text of the Resolution**

**The Security Council**

**Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,**

**Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 4 June 1995 (S/1995/457),**

**Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of certain offences in Rwanda,**

**Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation among all members of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,**

**Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda,**

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura in February 1995,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force;

the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement concluded to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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**NB**

The UNAMIR had originally been established by resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Resolution 918 (1994) had expanded the mandate of the Mission to include responsibility for the security of civilians and of humanitarian operation, had increased its strength up to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.

By its action today, the Council affirmed that the Chapter VII restrictions imposed by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if such arms or matériel are for use within Rwanda. It called upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwanda camps within their territories.

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In a statement to the Council, the representative of Zaire called for an independent investigation to refute the claims that his country had been involved with the sale or supply of arms for use in Rwanda. He said it was up to the Government in Rwanda to create a favourable climate for the return of the refugees.

The representative of Rwanda, speaking after the vote, called for an end to the arms embargo against his Government and for an international commission to study the problem of the refugee camps. He added that the change in the UNAMIR mandate reflected the changed situation in his country.

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*mandate*

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*Office of the Spokesman*

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**NEW MANDATE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

1. 12 June 1995 Distribution of the new mandate resolution in 15,000 copies (English, French and Kinyarwanda).
2. 12-13 June 1995 FC and ED brief UNAMIR Senior Staff on the new mandate.
3. 14 June 1995  
11:00 - 12:15 FC & ED hold press briefing.
4. 15 June 1995 Distribution of "UNAMIR - Questions and Answers".
5. 15 June 1995 through 30 June Information sessions for all UNAMIR staff, including all contingents, MILOBs, CIVPOLs, international and local civilian staff, in Kigali as well as in all sectors, on the new mandate, to be conducted on different occasions by the following:
  - SRSG, FC, ED, Special Assistant to SRSG, Political Adviser, Spokesman.
6. Starting  
15 June 1995 Panel discussions on Radio UNAMIR and Radio Rwanda.
  - Radio UNAMIR guests: Col. Mugambage, Maj. Kabuye Rose, Maj. Rutayisire, Ms. C. Umutoni, Mr. C. Dusaidi (list not exhaustive).
  - Radio Rwanda guests: SRSG and FC.
7. 17 June 1995 Working Lunch with the media.
8. From 21 June Public Lectures for Civic groups: Women's Associations, Human Rights Associations, University, Higher Institutions, the public at large, etc., to be conducted by senior officials in point 5 above.

File copy

Draft: 27/03/95

### UNAMIR's Mandate - beyond 9th June

1. The issue of UNAMIR's mandate after June 9th has been raised by the President and the Vice-President in the context of a "phase-out" by UNAMIR from Rwanda. The following paper examines the issue as seen from Kigali. The paper has been drawn up after thorough discussion with Force Commander Gen. Toussaint and senior officers of the mission. Heads of Agencies have also been consulted.

2. The primary consideration regarding the number and configuration of a UNAMIR force in Rwanda depends on its mandate. Therefore, the first priority must be for the Security Council to approve a mandate that reflects the changed realities on the ground in Rwanda. The mandate must be relevant and defensible, especially in rough weather. Only then can the strength and configuration of the UNAMIR force contingent be accurately assessed.

#### History of the Mandate

3. UNAMIR's mandate has passed through three phases; each phase representing a qualitative change from the other. Now, beyond June 9th, a fourth phase needs to be considered. In each of the previous three phases, the troop strength and logistic back-up has not matched the demands of the mandate, so that the UN has come under severe strain at times of crisis leading to widespread criticism of failure to achieve objectives. A brief review of the three phases illustrates.

#### First phase

4. In the first phase [1993 - April 6 1994], UNAMIR's role was to ensure the faithful implementation of the Arusha Accords. There were seven, detailed agreements to monitor, including various dates when important events had to be completed, leading to a general election twenty-two months after the signature. Essentially, UNAMIR's role was that of a referee blowing the whistle between two contending parties. It was soon evident that neither side was

ready to play the game according to the rules and the strength available to UNAMIR was inadequate to keep the peace.

### Second phase

5. When, on April 6, war and genocide broke out, UNAMIR's strength, depleted further by withdrawals, was hopelessly inadequate to stem the tide of horror that swept across the country. In fact, between April 6th and July 19th, two parallel developments were taking place, a civil war and genocide, over which UNAMIR had scant influence. The UN force was unable to provide nationwide protection to innocent civilians caught in the war and genocide in which up to a million lives were lost. The UN and the Security Council faced widespread opprobrium for not having anticipated the disaster and when it broke, having neither the mandate nor the capability (400 soldiers) to stop the holocaust.

### Third phase

6. The third phase began in mid-July 1994, with the military defeat of the interim government and the assumption of office by the BBGNU which shortly thereafter assumed sovereignty over the entire territory of Rwanda. In this third phase, UNAMIR's role was to provide security, assist a return to stability, give protection to humanitarian agencies and to gradually help Rwanda and its people towards normalisation. UNAMIR's presence helped provide security and confidence that has led to a gradual return to normalcy. The UN, therefore, deserves to consider this phase as one of its most successful Peace Keeping Operations.

7. Over the past two months and as we near the end of the present mandate (June 9), signs of tension and insecurity have emerged. The cause of this negative trend can be found in the frustration at the absence of justice, the lack of up-front cash flow, the low grade insurrection being supported from the camps in Zaire with the consequent hardening of security measures by the RPA and the aggressive, extremist influence of "59ers". Rwanda, therefore, stands at the

cross roads. It can either continue its gradual climb back to normalcy, reconciliation and harmony. Or, extremism could lead to violence, retribution and a continued ethnic confrontation.

#### Phase IV

8. With regard to UNAMIR's future mandate, the argument from Ministry of Defence and RPA elements runs on the following lines. The Rwandese government is grateful for the support that UNAMIR has given in Phase III (Phase II being a dark chapter). UN's help in the economic and social restructuring - especially in rehabilitation, reconstruction, humanitarian aid would continue to be appreciated. However UNAMIR's military presence needs to be scaled down and to eventually phase out, as a large military force derogates from the sovereign authority of the government which must now assume sole responsibility for security and governance in the country. MILOBs, CIVPOL may remain and a small force to guard essential personnel and facilities but a phase-out needs to be negotiated from 9th June when the mandate ends.

9. Behind this façade of "derogation of sovereignty", the real reason for seeking UNAMIR's phase-out is that, in peacetime, UNAMIR is seen as a supervisory, monitoring agency, bringing no material benefit to the country. Unlike the Agencies, it does not channel funds, it does not help in the economic or social uplift of the country, it does not even provide material help like building barracks for the military or vehicles and telecommunications to the security forces. It does not repair bridges, roads and buildings it has used. It does not even help in demining. Instead, its huge, opulent presence is an eyesore to the public.

10. It is important, therefore, that UNAMIR should, in the changed context of Phase IV, be mandated to perform a "post-conflict peace building role" rather than its current peace-keeping mandate. In doing so, UNAMIR must play a central role in the national effort at rehabilitation and reconstruction. Apart from providing security, UNAMIR forces must help in the economic and social uplift of the country by helping set up communications, health-care, de-mining, tube

wells, undertake civil engineering works. etc. It must also be given appropriate funds to perform this task. In my opinion, UNAMIR's mandate should start with a package of peace-building operations aimed at addressing the central issues facing the country e.g. the repair of infrastructure, rehabilitation of refugees and reconstruction in the social and economic sectors, the restoration of the justice process and support for reconciliation measures at all levels. This uplift is an essential part of reconciliation as refugees will not return to a country which does not function effectively. To achieve these targets, the Security Council must set aside a sum of US \$50-70 m drawn either from the existing US \$611 m pledged at the Geneva Round Table, or as a separate contribution to SRSR's Trust Fund for Rwanda.

11. As against the RPA sponsored indication for a phase-out, the Prime Minister and Hutu moderates in the Cabinet have expressed disagreement with the proposal and have indicated that UNAMIR's presence was necessary until the bulk of refugees return. Moreover, the International Community has set forth objectives contained in Security Council resolutions that UNAMIR is expected to fulfil. The Rwandese government's position will be subjected to divergent pressures and its final position, may be expected to emerge as a compromise, probably in favour of the RPA's stand.

12. After careful consideration, it is suggested that UNAMIR's mandate for Phase IV (i.e. post June 9) may be based on the following outlines:

(a) It should project a peace-building rather than a peace-keeping image as stated in paras 9 and 10 above. ✓

(b) UNAMIR may also include border patrol activity between Rwanda and its neighbours (Zaire and Tanzania), provided of course it is so requested by the countries concerned. ?

(c) The current mandate may be made more precise in certain areas and updated to include protection of foreign magistrates, prosecutors, etc. likely to be involved for the national judicial process. Specifically these alterations are suggested as follows:

- (i) Para 2 (a) of the current mandate reads as follows:

"Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;"

The reference to "Contributing to the protection of civilian at risk" is vague and imprecise.

13. It is in fulfilling the vague and imprecise mandate of "protecting civilians at risk" that the task for UNAMIR becomes controversial. First, what precisely does "civilians at risk" mean. Are we to contribute to the protection of every citizen who feels a sense of fear? If so, this would mean that this category encompasses every moderate Hutu from the Prime Minister down to the ordinary villager. Are "civilians at risk" all those refugees and IDP's that have returned home but find their homes or properties taken over by the old case-load? If "civilians at risk" covers this extended category, I am afraid that in a mandate to protect them, UNAMIR has neither sufficient strength nor capability. I, therefore, believe that this vague, ambiguous phrase must be re-defined in our next mandate so that UNAMIR is given a precise and manageable mandate to defend, as follows: (Exact phraseology would be finalised later)

(i) To provide security to all returning refugees and IDP's in accordance with arrangements and agreements arrived at with concerned government(s) for protection along security corridors, transit camps and overnight relief centres.

(ii) To provide security to :

- (i) International Tribunal ✓
- (ii) Human Rights Monitors ✓
- (iii) UN Agencies } as regr
- (iv) NGO's }
- (v) International Community who?
- (vi) Magistrates, prosecutors, etc. Rwandan?

Forgn

- (iii) To provide border patrols in order to assist in the process of reconciliation at all levels.

14. The remaining items in the current mandate would be retained.

#### Conclusions

15. A) UNAMIR is now operating with a sovereign, one dimensional Government which feels that its "protection" and "monitoring" is an intrusion on their sovereignty. Due weight would have to be given to a considered request for a phase-out. Staying on against the express wishes of the government would be fraught with danger. The government's willing cooperation with UNAMIR is essential in order for it to attain objectives presented in its mandate.
- B) Conversely, there are some elements in the government that consider that the presence of our formed troops provide the necessary security for the population. These elements would prefer a phase out only after the bulk of refugees have returned.
- C) The Security Council representing the views of the international community also expects UNAMIR to provide security to the population and to underpin the process of normalisation, reconciliation and humanitarian relief.
- D) UNAMIR's hand in the negotiations is seriously weakened by the fact that it does not dispense financial funds or technical aid to Rwanda. This fact encourages the Rwandese government to believe that UNAMIR brings no benefit to Rwanda. It prefers, therefore, to dispense with its irksome, supervising presence. This attitude is likely to change if UNAMIR were to play in its next phase, a central peace-building role. In order to do so UNAMIR would need financial support and contingents that can help provide economic and social uplift in Rwanda.

? teeth/mandate, ?  
rears resources??

- E) Border patrolling by UNAMIR to prevent cross border military insurgency may also be considered.
- F) The mandate given to UNAMIR is, in some areas, imprecise and undefendable especially in adverse circumstances. It needs to be expanded and made more specific in the following areas:
- (i) The next phase should see UNAMIR engaged in a constructive, peace-building role. ✓
  - (ii) UNAMIR should also engage itself in border patrolling to deter de-stabilising activities taking place from across Rwanda's borders. ] see E.
  - (iii) The general phrase of "civilians at risk" should be replaced by a more precise task. ✓
  - (iv) Protection of foreign technicians (magistrates, prosecutors) may have to be undertaken by UNAMIR. ✓
- G) A worst case scenario of serious internal strife could develop as a result of the following developments":
- (i) An implosion in Burundi.
  - (ii) <sup>FRGF</sup> ~~RPA~~ sponsored aggression from Zaire.
  - (iii) An internal take-over by extremists.
  - (iv) Complete breakdown of order within country.

In such a scenario, UNAMIR would need to play a humanitarian, life-saving, evacuating role.

- H) Negotiations with the Rwandese government should aim to find a "via media" between the conflicting demands of A) above as against B) and C). This could possibly be achieved by a token withdrawal of troops and making the remaining phase-out conditional on the implementation of key issues e.g.: reconciliation, positive attitude to returning refugees, commitment to judicial process, overall cooperation with UN and International Agencies etc. Essentially, the successful return of the bulk of refugees should mark the effective phase out of UNAMIR formed troops (except those required for specific tasks).
- I) UNAMIR's main political task in Rwanda would remain unspecified and unwritten in the mandate. It is the security that our formed troops provide to the population as a whole. MILOBs and CIVPOL, though useful in their domains, are not a substitute for formed troops.
- J) UNAMIR would continue its efforts at reconciliation at all levels, from grassroots, to a waited army to the highest political echelons. It would continue to train police and help the revival of the judicial process.
- K) In a crisis, UNAMIR formed troops should be large enough to provide security and to evacuate UN and international personnel from Rwanda.
- L) Finally, it is possible that, financially, the Operation in Rwanda may not be sustainable. Phase-out may therefore present itself as making a virtue out of a necessity.

Course of Action

16. The following course of action is recommended:

(a) Headquarters may consider proposals for the new mandate suggested in paras. 12 and 13 for Phase IV.

(b) At the same time we may be authorised to engage in negotiations with the Rwandese government, for the present, with only a listening brief. (Given the contrasting view it may be difficult for the Rwandese government to iron out an agreed brief. However, in the end, the RPA point of view is likely to dominate).

(c) If a demand for a phase-out after June 9 is made, I may be authorised to respond by:

(i) Making the general point that the UN has a responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate by providing security, reconciliation and protection for various categories. The Rwandese request would need to be viewed against the objectives set forth by the Security Council in its mandate.

(ii) informing the Rwandese government that their views would be referred to New York.

(d) Once Rwanda's request has been received, the mandate as also the proposed troop strength to fulfil the mandate, would have to be examined and approved by New York. Maximal and minimal negotiating positions would then need to be conveyed to us in order to engage in negotiations.

(e) The results of these negotiations would then have to be confirmed by a formal session of the Security Council.

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## **UNAMIR's Mandate - beyond 9th June**

1. The issue of UNAMIR's mandate after June 9th has been raised by the President and the Vice-President in the context of a "phase-out" by UNAMIR from Rwanda. The following paper examines the issue as seen from Kigali. The paper has been drawn up after thorough discussion with Force Commander Gen. Tousignant and senior officers of the mission. Heads of Agencies have also been consulted.

2. The primary consideration regarding the number and configuration of a UNAMIR force in Rwanda depends on its mandate. Therefore, the first priority must be for the Security Council to approve a mandate that reflects the realities on the ground in Rwanda. The mandate must be relevant and defensible, especially in rough weather. Only then can the strength and configuration of the UNAMIR force contingent be accurately assessed.

### **History of the Mandate**

3. UNAMIR's mandate has passed through three phases; each phase representing a qualitative change from the other. Now, beyond June 9th, a fourth phase needs to be considered. In each of the previous three phases, the troop strength and logistic back-up has not matched the demands of the mandate, so that the UN has come under severe strain at times of crisis leading to widespread criticism of failure to achieve objectives. A brief review of the three phases illustrates.

#### **First phase**

4. In the first phase [1993 - April 6 1994], UNAMIR's role was to ensure the faithful implementation of the Arusha Accords. There were seven, detailed agreements to monitor, including also various dates when important events had to be completed, leading to a general election twenty-two months after the signature. Essentially, UNAMIR's role was that of a referee blowing the whistle between two contending parties. It was soon evident that neither side was ready to play the game according to the rules and the strength available to UNAMIR was inadequate to keep the peace.

### Second phase

5. When, on April 6, war and genocide broke out, UNAMIR's strength, depleted further by withdrawals, was hopelessly inadequate to stem the tide of horror that swept across the country. In fact, between April 6th and July 19th, two parallel developments were taking place, a civil war and genocide, over which UNAMIR had scant influence. The UN force was unable to provide nationwide protection to innocent civilians caught in the war and genocide in which up to a million lives were lost. The UN and the Security Council faced widespread opprobrium for not having anticipated the disaster, and when it broke having neither the mandate nor the capability (400 soldiers) to stop the holocaust.

### Third phase

6. The third phase began in mid-July 1994, with the military defeat of the interim government and the assumption of office by the BBGNU which shortly thereafter assumed sovereignty over the entire territory of Rwanda. In this third phase, UNAMIR's role was to provide security, assist a return to stability, protection to humanitarian agencies and to gradually help Rwanda and its people towards normalcy. In this third phase, the UN has been successful. UNAMIR's presence has helped provide an aura of confidence that has led to a gradual return to normalcy. The UN therefore deserves to consider this phase as one of its most successful Peace Keeping Operations.

7. Over the past two months signs of tension and insecurity have emerged. The cause of this negative trend can be found in the frustration at the absence of justice, the low grade insurrection being supported from the camps in Zaire with the consequent hardening of security measures by the RPA and the aggressive, extremist influence of 59ers. Rwanda, therefore, stands at the cross roads. It can either continue its gradual climb back to normalcy, reconciliation and harmony. Or, extremism could lead to violence, retribution and a continued ethnic confrontation.

#### Phase IV

8. With regard to UNAMIR's future mandate, the argument from Ministry of Defence and RPA elements runs as follows. The Rwandese government is grateful for the support that UNAMIR has given in Phase III (Phase II being a dark chapter). UN's help in the economic and social restructuring - especially in rehabilitation, reconstruction, humanitarian aid would continue to be appreciated. However UNAMIR's military presence needs to be scaled down and to eventually phase out, as a large military force derogates from the sovereign authority of the government which must now assume sole responsibility for security and governance in the country. MILOBs, CIVPOL may remain and a small force to guard essential personnel and facilities but a phase-out needs to be negotiated from 9th June when the mandate ends.

9. Conversely, the Prime Minister and Hutu moderates in the Cabinet have expressed disagreement regarding a UNAMIR phase out until the bulk of refugees return.

10. Against the RPA's demand must be considered the Security Council objectives that UNAMIR is expected to achieve through its mandate. The question is whether in the changed ground conditions UNAMIR has the strength and the capability to deliver in rough weather. In my opinion, except in one area - "providing security to civilians at risk", we are capable of fulfilling our mandate with our existing strength and even with reduced strength during Phase IV. Thus the current mandate's requirement of providing security to Human Rights Monitors, to the tribunal, to humanitarian relief agencies, etc. can be achieved without difficulty.

11. It is in fulfilling the vague and imprecise mandate of "protecting civilians at risk" that the task for UNAMIR becomes controversial. First, what precisely does "citizens at risk" mean. Are we to protect every citizen who feels a sense of fear? If so, this would mean that this category encompasses every moderate Hutu from the Prime Minister down to the ordinary villager. Are "citizens at risk" all those refugees and IDP's that have returned home but find their homes or properties taken over by the old case-load? Are "citizens at risk" all those who find themselves in prisons awaiting trial? Are they the Hutu's in IDP camps who refuse to move

out but are regarded as criminals by the government? If "civilians at risk" covers this extended category, I am afraid that in a mandate to protect them, UNAMIR has neither the sufficient strength nor capability. I, therefore, believe that this vague, ambiguous phrase must be re-defined in our next mandate so that UNAMIR is given a precise and manageable mandate to defend.

12. In short, I recommend that UNAMIR's mandate for Phase IV i.e. post June 9 - should be redefined as follows:

(a) To provide security to returning refugees and IDP's in accordance with arrangements and agreements arrived at with concerned government(s) for protection along security corridors, transit camps and overnight relief centres.

(b) In agreement with the government, to provide protection to displaced persons in camps.

(c) To provide security to :

- (i) International Tribunal
- (ii) Human Rights Monitors
- (iii) UN Agencies
- (iv) NGO's
- (v) International Community
- (vi) Magistrates

(d) To assist in the process of reconciliation at all levels.

(e) To assist Rwanda in its economic, social and institutional rehabilitation and also in the repair and restructuring of its infrastructural base and especially in:

- (i) restoring its national judicial process which encompasses the judicial courts, the gendarmerie, the communal police and the provision of magistrates;
  - (ii) rehabilitation, housing and land-tenure for returning refugees.
- (f) To provide security to foreign magistrates, prosecutors, experts engaged in the national judicial process.

#### **Objectives of Phase IV**

13. If the above mandate for UNAMIR is accepted by the Council, I believe that in the 6 months period of Phase IV, we should aim to achieve the following:

- (a) Except for a token reduction, the retention of the existing strength of formed troops to provide an aura of confidence and security to the population during a period of acute frustration.
- (b) To calibrate the phase-out of UNAMIR troops with the implementation by the Rwandese government of policies of reconciliation, justice, human rights and moderation. The greater the implementation of these policies the quicker the phase-out.
- (c) A negotiated understanding with the government of Rwanda that, given our revised mandate for Phase IV, and a satisfactory return of refugees we would begin a gradual phase-down of our formed troops.
- (d) For the present, we would envisage only a small reduction of our formed troops, aiming to phase-out substantially after the next 6 month period. In doing so, we would maintain our capability, to fulfil the mandate while at the same time providing reassurance to respect Rwanda's sovereignty.

(c) Eventually, a basic-core of formed troops along with MILOBs and CIVPOL would remain to support para. 12 c-e of our mandate. It is to be assumed that IDP's and the bulk of refugees would by then have returned home.

### **Conclusions**

14. A) UNAMIR is now operating with a sovereign, one dimensional Government which feels that its "protection" and "monitoring" is an intrusion on their sovereignty. Due weight would have to be given to a considered request for a phase-out. Staying on against the express wishes of the government would be fraught with danger.
- B) Conversely, there are some elements in the government that consider that the presence of our formed troops provide the necessary security for the population. These elements would prefer a phase out only after the bulk of refugees have returned.
- C) The Security Council representing the views of the international community also expects UNAMIR to provide security to the population and to underpin the process of normalisation, reconciliation and humanitarian relief.
- D) The mandate given to UNAMIR is, in some areas, imprecise and undefendable especially in adverse circumstances. It needs to be made more specific in the following areas:
- i) The general phrase of "civilians at risk" should be replaced by reference to returning refugees, IDP [(as suggested in para 15 (a)].
  - ii) Should UNAMIR also engage itself in border patrolling to deter de-stabilising activities taking place from across Rwanda's borders?

- iii) Protection of foreign technicians (magistrates, prosecutors) may have to be undertaken by UNAMIR.
- E) Negotiations with the Rwandese government should aim to find a "**via media**" between the conflicting demands of A) above as against B) and C). This could possibly be achieved by a token withdrawal of troops and conditioning the remaining phase-out with the implementation of key issues e.g.: reconciliation, positive attitude to returning refugees, commitment to judicial process, overall cooperation with UN and International Agencies etc. Essentially, the successful return of the bulk of refugees should mark the effective phase out of UNAMIR formed troops (except those required for specific tasks).
- F) UNAMIR main political task in Rwanda would remain unspecified in the mandate. It is the security that our formed troops provide to the population as a whole. It is the formed troops that provide this security and stability in the country. MILOBs and CIVPOL, though useful in their domains, are not a substitute for formed troops.
- H) In a crisis, UNAMIR Force should be large enough to provide security and to evacuate UN and international personnel from Rwanda.

### **Recommendations**

15. The following course of action is recommended:

- (a) Headquarters may consider the new mandate proposed in para. 12 for Phase IV, especially the replacement of "civilians at risk" para by the subparas proposed.
- (b) At the same time we may be authorised to engage in negotiations with the Rwandese government, for the present with only a listening brief. (Given the contrasting view

it may be difficult for the Rwandese government to iron out an agreed brief. However, in the end, the RPA point of view is likely to dominate).

(c) If a demand for a phase-out after June 9 is made, I may be authorised to respond by:

(i) informing the Rwandese government that their views should be referred to New York and subsequently to the Security Council for a response.

(ii) I would make the general point that the UN has a responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate by providing security, reconciliation and protection for various categories. The Rwandese request would need to be viewed against the objectives set forth by the Security Council in its mandate.

(d) Once Rwanda's request has been received, the mandate as also the proposed troop strength to fulfil the mandate, would have to be examined and approved by New York. Maximal and minimal negotiating positions would then need to be conveyed to us in order to engage in negotiations.

(e) The results of these negotiations would then have to be confirmed in a formal session of the Security Council.

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## BRIEF FOR FORCE COMMANDER

### ON

### THE UNAMIR 2 MANDATE

#### Background

- UNAMIR is now operating with a sovereign, one dimensional Government which feels that our 'protection' and 'monitoring' is an intrusion on their sovereignty. Furthermore, the Government has been internationally recognised by the UN and other countries. Therefore, by inference 'warring factions' no longer exist.
- An examination of the mandate and the tasks that UNAMIR is currently performing has identified certain inconsistencies which are highlighted below.
- The advice given in this brief is projected on a security situation that is continuing to improve and would have to be reassessed if any of the following scenarios were to eventuate:
  - Burundi implodes
  - internal strife - reorganisation of the government and disruption of coalition
  - attack by FRGF elements
  - violence to personnel of the Judicial system
- This is how we interpret the current mandate.

#### Discussion of the Current Mandate (As given in SCR 965 - 30 Nov 94)

- *(2a) Contribute to the security of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.*
  - "Contribute" indicates that UNAMIR is not overall responsible for security, therefore, are we assisting the Rwandan Government (ipso facto the RPA)?
  - The tasks that flow from this statement are to assist IDP protection and the transit of refugees.
  - Assist in the security of civilians at risk from what? (RPA, FRGF, Militia and criminals). We are assisting the Government/RPA in the security of civilians at risk by providing sanctuary to some individuals who claim their life is in danger, monitoring their well being through CIVPOL and HR etc. It is the Government's responsibility and one which causes avoidable friction. Our presence creates an aura of security and deterrence against revenge violence and excesses of the RPA and others. However, this is a secondary task/by product. CIVPOL is more appropriate if suitably augmented.
  - **Comment.** The only task to fall out is to 'contribute to the security of refugees and IDPs'. We are not currently establishing and maintaining secure humanitarian areas.

- *(2b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.*

- The tasks that flow from this statement are:

- escort of relief convoys
- escort of IDP convoys (This may also fit under 2a)
- security of warehousing and distribution points (camps & communes)
- provision of transport and manpower

- **Comment.** The current security situation poses a low threat to NGOs. These are "be prepared to" tasks and therefore secondary in nature.

- *(2c) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.*

- This area has not been progressed substantially at this stage. If we were to integrate the military of the FRGF and RPA then we may have a role in this process. Otherwise, this area is the domain of the SRSG and FC.

- **Comment.** Since this is not a specific military task it will not directly influence troops to task/Force Structure.

- *(3a) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali.*

- The tasks that flow from this statement are:

- Full time protection of the Prosecutors Office (inside/outside Kigali)
- Assist in the security of International Tribunal and human rights officers (inside/outside Kigali)

- What is their concept of operations outside Kigali? HQ in Arusha? Indicates witness protection.

- **Comment.** These are major manpower intensive tasks and require clear cut tasking and locations.

- *(3b) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.*

- This is a CIVPOL task.

#### Tasks being Performed that are not in the Mandate

- The tasks to monitor (borders, refugees and IDP) has evolved over the life of the mission. It is not included in the mandate as a specific task, however, if it is a requirement of the SRSG and FC and is vital to the success of the mission it should be included in the mandate.
- Even though monitoring of the borders provides some sense of security for the population along the Lake Shore it is not essential to the success of the mission; therefore, should we be planning the use of boats on Lake Kivu or FLIR operations over it?

### Proposed Tasks for UNAMIR

- The following tasks are proposed for UNAMIR:
  - Deploy into Sectors as required.
  - Protect displaced persons and refugees.
  - Provide armed escorts to human rights personnel and representatives from the International tribunal.
  - Provide full time protection to the Prosecutors Office.
  - Assist operations of relief agencies and NGOs, as required.
  - Monitor/Observe the flow of refugees and IDP and conditions in communes.

### Proposed Changes to the Mandate

- It is proposed that the following changes be made to the mandate:
  - Para 2a. Provide security for displaced persons and refugees.
  - Para 2b No change.
  - Para 2c No change.
  - Para 3a. Provide security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali.
  - Para 3b No change.

### Conclusion

- If the proposed tasks and changes to the mandate are accepted we will be able to provide you with a realistic assessment of the Force Structure required by UNAMIR in Rwanda, in the current political and security climate.

Brief Prepared by: LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3 PLANS  
 Cleared by: COL J. Arp, DCOS OPS  
 21Mar 95



UNAMIR-MINUAR

UNAMIR  
Hauts-Kat

TO: Mr. Shaharyar Khan  
SRSG

DATE: 3 March 1995  
REF: OSRSG/LA/001

FROM: I. Minta  
Legal Adviser

SUBJECT: Powers of Arrest and Detention in Respect of UNAMIR Personnel

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I have been approached by several UNAMIR staff for clarification of the powers of arrest and detention that may be exercised by or in respect of UNAMIR personnel. Concerns have been raised in this regard apparently because of two incidents in which staff have filed complaints of brutality or abuse of power against UNAMIR Military Police Personnel. I have not received copies of these complaints and I am thus not in a position to comment on them, particularly as they are still under investigation by CIVPOL (as confirmed to me by the CIVPOL Commissioner).

But I would like to re-state the provisions of the Status of Mission Agreement on powers of arrest and detention, and to request that these be conveyed to all UNAMIR personnel, in any appropriate manner, to meet their need for information on these matters.

I have reproduced below relevant portions of the check-list of the rights and obligations of UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda, which I prepared on my arrival here. The check list was circulated to all Section Heads as Administrative Circular No. 007/94 of 11 October 1994, to inform them of the provisions of the SOMA, and to ascertain areas where there were problems of implementation so that follow-up action could be taken.

ISSUE/SOMA REFERENCE	UNAMIR	GOVERNMENT
Policing/Powers of Arrest (Art VI: 40-42)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Personnel designated by SRSG shall police UNAMIR premises and deployment areas with powers of arrest;</li><li>• Military police have powers of arrest over military personnel</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Government officials may take into custody any member of UNAMIR:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(a) at request of SRSG; or</li><li>(b) in the commission/attempt of a crime [42]</li></ul></li></ul>

ISSUE/SOMA REFERENCE	UNAMIR	GOVERNMENT
Custody/Investigations (Art VI: 41-45; 47)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military personnel arrested shall be transferred to their contingent Commander [41]; other arrested on UNAMIR premises: transfer to Government [41];</li> <li>• Preliminary investigation shall not delay transfer of custody;</li> <li>• UNAMIR and Government to cooperate regarding all necessary investigations [44]</li> <li>• Prosecution of UNAMIR civilians subject to SRSG/Government agreement [47.a]; falling which: see <u>Settlement of Disputes</u></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNAMIR personnel arrested for crimes: transfer immediately to UNAMIR [42]</li> <li>• Government to promptly inform UNAMIR regarding any UNAMIR member suspected of crime, with evidence [47]</li> <li>• Government to prosecute persons accused of acts against UNAMIR or its members [45]</li> </ul>

For completeness, I have reproduced below, in full, the specific provisions of the SOMA referred to above. Points of particular importance are underlined:

" 40. *The Special Representative shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of discipline and good order among members of UNAMIR, as well as locally recruited personnel. To this end personnel designated by the Special Representative shall police the premises of UNAMIR and such areas where its members are deployed. Elsewhere such personnel shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the Government and in liaison with it in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of UNAMIR.*

41. *The military police of UNAMIR shall have the power of arrest over the military members of UNAMIR. Military personnel placed under arrest outside their own contingent areas shall be transferred to their contingent Commander for appropriate disciplinary action. The personnel mentioned in paragraph 40 above may take into custody any other person on the premises of UNAMIR. Such other person shall be delivered immediately to the nearest appropriate official of the Government for the purpose of dealing with any offence or disturbance on such premises.*

42. *Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 24 and 26, officials of the Government may take into custody any member of UNAMIR:*

(a) *When so requested by the Special Representative; or*

(b) *When such a member of UNAMIR is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence. Such person shall be delivered immediately, together with any weapons or other items seized, to the nearest appropriate representative of UNAMIR, whereafter the provisions of paragraph 47 shall apply mutatis mutandis.*

43. *When a person is taken into custody under paragraph 41 or paragraph 42 (b), UNAMIR or the Government, as the case may be, may make a preliminary interrogation but may not delay the transfer of custody. Following such transfer, the person concerned shall be made available upon request to the arresting authority for further interrogation.*

44. UNAMIR and the Government shall assist each other in carrying out all necessary investigations into offenses in respect of which either or both have an interest, in the production of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure of and, if appropriate, the handing over of items connected with an offence. The handing over of any such items may be made subject to their return within the terms specified by the authority delivering them. Each shall notify the other of the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the provisions of paragraphs 41-43.

46. All members of UNAMIR including locally recruited personnel shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such immunity shall continue even after they cease to be members of or employed by UNAMIR and after the expiration of the other provisions of the present Agreement.

47. Should the Government consider that any member of UNAMIR has committed a criminal offence, it shall promptly inform the Special Representative and present to him any evidence available to it. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 24:

(a) *If the accused person is a member of the civilian component or a civilian member of the military component, the Special Representative shall conduct any necessary supplementary inquiry and then agree with the Government whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted. Failing such agreement, the question shall be resolved as provided in paragraph 52 of the present Agreement.*

(b) Military members of the military component of UNAMIR shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offenses which may be committed by them in Rwanda."

It may be noted that the personnel mentioned in paragraph 40, who have the powers of arrest indicated in paragraph 41, are to be designated by the SRSg. These personnel may be different from military police who, as provided in paragraph 41, have powers of arrest over the military members of UNAMIR.

The SOMA does not contain any detailed rules governing the manner in which powers of arrest may be exercised. Consequently, we may have to apply general principles of law, mainly human rights law, as guidelines or safeguards against any possible excesses.

cc: **FC**  
**Executive Director**  
**DFC**  
**OIC/Administration**  
**All Section Heads**

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Security Council  
Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/965 (1994)  
30 November 1994

RESOLUTION 965 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3473rd meeting, on 30  
November 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation  
in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5  
October 1993 by which it established the United Nations  
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions  
912 (1994) of 4 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 925  
(1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the progress report of the Secretary-  
General on UNAMIR dated 25 November 1994 (S/1994/1344),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on security in  
the Rwandese refugee camps of 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1308),

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November  
establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine  
reconciliation between all elements of Rwandan society within  
the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting the deployment of human rights officers to Rwanda  
by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to monitor  
the ongoing human rights situation, to help redress existing  
problems and prevent possible human rights violations from  
occurring, to help foster a climate of confidence and the  
establishment of a more secure environment and thus facilitate  
the return of refugees and displaced persons, and to implement  
programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human  
rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice,

Noting also that the widespread dispersal of landmines is  
causing hardship to the civilian population and is hampering  
the return of refugees and displaced persons and other  
humanitarian relief efforts,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a  
Trust Fund pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until  
9 June 1995;

2. Reaffirms that UNAMIR will:

(a) Contribute to the security and protection of

SRSG

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(E)

displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;

(b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

(c) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

(a) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;

(b) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;

4. Strongly urges the Government of Rwanda to continue its cooperation with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas of Rwanda by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and human rights officers;

5. Welcomes UNAMIR's efforts to increase its radio broadcasting capabilities so as to reach the refugee camps in neighbouring countries and expresses the hope that it will soon be possible for the Government of Rwanda to conclude appropriate arrangements with UNAMIR in this regard, including the allocation of a radio frequency;

6. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, and encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, particularly in Rwanda;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible steps that could be taken by the United Nations to promote the establishment of an effective mine clearance programme in Rwanda;

8. Calls upon the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda directly or through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994;

9. Requests the Secretary-General, following the usual consultations, to inform the Council should he consider that the additional tasks in paragraph 3 require consideration of an adjustment in the logistic and personnel requirements of UNAMIR;

10. Decides to keep under review the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 February 1995 and 9 April 1995, on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

11. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and his Special Humanitarian Envoy to coordinate the United Nations response to the various aspects of the crisis in Rwanda;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

END OF TRANSMISSION

## OUTGOING FACSIMILE

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9.1 DEC 01

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DATE: 30 November 1994

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, N.Y. <i>f</i> <i>L. H. H. H.</i>
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: 1 (212) 963-9483
SUBJECT: Security Council Resolution and Presidential Statement on Rwanda	
ATTN:	ROOM:
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE:10	

Today the Security Council adopted Resolution 965 and Presidential Statement S/PRST/1994/75, copies attached. Also attached is the Statement by the United States in the Security Council in which the Permanent Representative pays high compliments to UNAMIR, the Force Commander and the SRSG for their work in the evolving situation in Rwanda.

A Note on the Security Council Meeting will be sent to you tomorrow, 1 December 1994.

Best regards.

*SPRB*  
✓

UNITED  
NATIONS

S 2/16



## Security Council

S/1994/1360

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/1360  
30 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolutionThe Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 4 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 25 November 1994 (S/1994/1344),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on security in the Rwandese refugee camps of 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1308),

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting the deployment of human rights officers to Rwanda by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to monitor the ongoing human rights situation, to help redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring, to help foster a climate of confidence and the establishment of a more secure environment and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons, and to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice,

Noting also that the widespread dispersal of landmines is causing hardship to the civilian population and is hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons and other humanitarian relief efforts,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust Fund pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994,

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1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 June 1995;
2. Reaffirms that UNAMIR will:
  - (a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
  - (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
  - (c) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:
  - (a) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;
  - (b) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;
4. Strongly urges the Government of Rwanda to continue its cooperation with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas of Rwanda by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and human rights officers;
5. Welcomes UNAMIR's efforts to increase its radio broadcasting capabilities so as to reach the refugee camps in neighbouring countries and presses the hope that it will soon be possible for the Government of Rwanda to conclude appropriate arrangements with UNAMIR in this regard, including the allocation of a radio frequency;
6. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, and encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, particularly in Rwanda;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible steps that could be taken by the United Nations to promote the establishment of an effective mine clearance programme in Rwanda;
8. Calls upon the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda directly or through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994;
9. Requests the Secretary-General, following the usual consultations, to inform the Council should he consider that the additional tasks in paragraph 1

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require consideration of an adjustment in the logistic and personnel requirements of UNAMIR;

10. Decides to keep under review the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 February 1995 and 9 April 1995, on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

11. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and his Special Humanitarian Envoy to coordinate the United Nations response to the various aspects of the crisis in Rwanda;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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/ PRST/1994/75

30 November 1994  
11.30 a.m.

The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General dated 18 November 1994 on the security in the Rwandese refugee camps (S/1994/1308), particularly those located in Zaire. It is gravely concerned at the situation described in the Secretary-General's report.

The Security Council condemns the actions being taken by the former Rwandan leaders, and by former government forces and militias to prevent, in some cases by force, the repatriation of the refugees in the camps. It also condemns the ongoing interference by these groups and individuals in the provision of humanitarian relief, and is deeply concerned that this interference has already led to the withdrawal of some non-governmental agencies responsible for the distribution of relief supplies within the camps.

The Security Council is alarmed at the indications that these same groups and individuals may be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda. It deplores the fact that food distributed by relief agencies for those in the camps is apparently being misappropriated for this purpose. The Council condemns all such actions. It warns these persons, many of whom may have been implicated in the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law which were unleashed on Rwanda in April 1994, that their actions will only reinforce the determination of the international community to ensure that such persons are brought to justice. The Council also stresses once again the responsibilities of neighbouring countries for ensuring that their territories are not used to destabilize the situation inside Rwanda.

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The Security Council notes the statement in the Secretary-General's report of 18 November that the first step towards promoting the repatriation of refugees must be a determined effort by the international community to reduce intimidation of prospective returnees and to improve security in the Rwandese refugee camps, especially those in Zaire. The Security Council attaches equal importance to the Secretary-General's observation that any operation to achieve this would be futile without parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda. The Council stresses the imperative of reinvigorating the political process to provide a framework for any action taken to address security in the camps and the repatriation of Rwandese refugees to Rwanda. The framework should include a mechanism for sustaining a dialogue between the Government of Rwanda, refugee representatives and the United Nations.

The Security Council considers that the options described in the Secretary-General's report raise complex issues which require further elucidation. The Council requests the Secretary-General to consult potential troop contributors to assess their willingness to participate in a possible peace-keeping operation modeled along the lines described in paragraphs 18 to 25 of the Secretary-General's report, namely to create secure areas within large camp sites, providing safe conditions for the refugees in those areas. The Council requests the Secretary-General to provide a detailed description of the objectives, rules of engagement and costs of such an operation as soon as possible. The Council further requests the Secretary-General to continue to explore as appropriate all possible means of addressing the problems in the camps. The Council will be giving further urgent consideration to this question in the light of the additional information it receives from the Secretary-General.

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The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General to assess the taking, on an interim basis, of initial measures aimed at providing immediate assistance to the Zairian security forces in protecting humanitarian operations in the camps, including the possibility of deploying security experts, from member Governments or through contract arrangements, to train and monitor the local security forces. The Council also requests the Secretary-General to consider what steps need to be taken to address the question of security in the refugee camps in Tanzania and Burundi. However, the Council is concerned that the use of local security forces without international involvement may not prove to be an effective approach to the security problems in the camps.

The Security Council recognizes that, in the wake of the events that have overtaken Rwanda, the Government needs immediate and major financial assistance, particularly in the establishment of security conditions inside the country, the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, economic and social rehabilitation and national reconciliation for all Rwandese.

The Security Council notes the deployment of 60 human rights officers in the country and the steps taken by UNAMIR to promote the re-establishment of civil administration throughout the country and looks forward to full deployment. The Council also welcomes the fact that procedures are being instituted, with the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda, to make operational the International Tribunal for Rwanda established in resolution 955 (1994).

The Security Council reminds States that in accordance with resolution 925 (1994), the Secretary-General has established a trust fund which could serve as a useful conduit for contributions to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda. It calls upon the international community to provide the

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resources needed for the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, the forthcoming UNDP-sponsored round-table meeting and the consolidated inter-agency appeal.

The Security Council welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to work with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to address the wider problems of the subregion.

The Security Council notes that preparations are under way for the convening in Bujumbura in the near future of a regional conference on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region, sponsored by the OAU and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 49/7. It also notes the Secretary-General's view that the United Nations and OAU should jointly convene at a later stage a broader conference to address a range of political and other issues, including national reconciliation, in order to identify long-term solutions to ensure peace, security and development in the subregion. Given the urgent need to take forward the political process as part of an overall strategy, including action on security in the camps and conditions inside Rwanda, the Council requests the Secretary-General to consider how preparations for this conference can be accelerated.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

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## UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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New York, N.Y. 10017Tel. 212-415-4050  
FAX 212-415-4053

## PRESS RELEASE

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY  
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NOVEMBER 30, 1994

Statement by Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, in Explanation of Vote, on the Situation in Rwanda, November 30, 1994

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The United States Government is pleased to have been able to support the resolution just adopted extending the mandate of UNAMIR. UNAMIR has done an exceptional job in difficult and rapidly changing circumstances. We particularly wish to thank all the troop contributing countries which have responded favorably to the Secretary-General's requests to participate in UNAMIR.

UNAMIR, the Force Commander and the Secretary-General's Special Representative have responded admirably to the evolving situation in Rwanda. But because the situation in Rwanda has changed since the Council last extended UNAMIR's mandate, it was necessary in the current resolution to clarify that mandate. We are well aware that UNAMIR has done an exemplary job of providing protection for all manner of international civilian personnel, whether involved in humanitarian assistance, investigation of allegations of genocide, monitoring of human rights, or other necessary pursuits. However, the mandate was originally designed before the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and before Human Rights Monitors were deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The renewed mandate therefore makes it clear that Human Rights Monitors and Tribunal personnel are entitled to protection. We do not believe that additional UNAMIR personnel will be required to carry out these protection functions, which UNAMIR has already begun to perform.

The U.S. Government is making preparations to dispatch investigators, prosecutors and support personnel to work with the International Tribunal. It is important that UNAMIR provide security for all the Tribunal's personnel, as well as for their premises, to ensure that they can carry out their work effectively and free from fear for their personal safety. We are sure that UNAMIR will design security arrangements in close consultation with the chief prosecutor, the head of the human rights officers and the Government of Rwanda.

The civilian police component of UNAMIR has been functioning for some time. The Council encouraged UNAMIR, in the Presidential statement of 14 October, to continue the activities of its civilian police observers. We reiterate that support in the current resolution.

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We believe that UNAMIR can carry out these responsibilities within existing resources for the moment. If the Secretary-General determines that additional resources might be necessary at some time in the future, he should inform the Council. We can consider at that time whether to authorize additional resources.

In closing, let me thank the Secretary-General, the Secretariat staff here in New York, and the personnel out in the field for their close monitoring and analysis of the various aspects of the Rwanda crisis, as reflected in the two long and complicated reports which they produced in the space of less than one week. We appreciate their efforts.

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SECTION 3 - UNAMIR MANDATECreation of UNAMIR

1. In its resolution 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to examine, in consultation with the OAU, the contribution that the United Nations, could make to strengthen the peace process in Rwanda. The possibility of an international force under the aegis of OAU and the United Nations was also examined.
2. The Security Council, in its resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993, established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).
3. In the same resolution, the Security Council urged both the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement and also requested the Secretary-General to monitor the progress of peace talks which were being held at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement and to begin contingency planning to meet the anticipated need.
4. In his report dated 24 August 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Council that a peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had been signed in Arusha on 4 August 1993. The two parties agreed that the war between them had come to an end and declared that they would spare no effort to promote national unity and reconciliation. They also agreed that all the six protocols of agreement which they had concluded and signed during the Arusha talks would be attached to the peace agreement.
5. The Secretary-General submitted a reconnaissance report to the Council on 24 September 1993. The reconnaissance report outlined the functions that a neutral international force might carry out to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The report also assessed the human and financial resources that would be needed.
6. The reconnaissance mission carried out a detailed survey of the armed forces belonging to each of the parties, including their respective structures and equipment, troop dispositions and relative strategic importance of the positions occupied. The reconnaissance team also received detailed briefings from the Commander of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) on its present status and role in Rwanda. NMOG II had replaced a previous NMOG I force in August 1993 and was currently made up of personnel from OAU member countries. Both NMOG I and NMOG II had a mandate to monitor and supervise the implementation of a cease-fire between the two parties in a de-militarized zone.
7. The reconnaissance mission assessed the essential requirements of a monitoring mission in Rwanda. This included an assessment of the following areas: cease-fire compliance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), establishment of cantonment and assembly areas for weapons and personnel, mine clearance, security of humanitarian aid efforts, return of refugees and displaced persons, disarming and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring of the Rwandese Defence Forces and the Gendarmerie. The mission also considered arrangements that could enhance various humanitarian activities.
8. In the light of the signing of the Arusha peace agreement and, on the basis of the findings of the reconnaissance mission, the Secretary-General recommended, in his third report, that the Security Council

authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with a mandate to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the installation and functioning of a transitional government.

9. The Security Council, having considered the report of the Secretary-General, adopted resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which the Council decided to establish under its authority the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months. The Council decided to establish UNAMIR subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial period only if a review by the Council indicated substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.

10. In the same resolution, the Security Council approved the proposal that the United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), which had been established by resolution 846 (1993), should be integrated into (UNAMIR). In addition, the Council welcomed the efforts of the OAU in helping to implement the Arusha peace agreement, in particular the integration of NMOG II within UNAMIR.

11. The Security Council further approved the proposal that the deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR should be carried out in stages and noted in this connection that UNAMIR's mandate, if extended, was expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda; events scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995.

12. The initial tasks of Resolution 872, gave to UNAMIR the mandate:

- a. To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali within a weapons secure area established by the parties in and around the city of Kigali;
- b. To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which called for the establishment of cantonment and assembly points and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and assembly zones;
- c. To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to the elections;
- d. To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programs;
- e. To investigate instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Arusha Peace Agreement;
- f. To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons;
- g. To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities; and,
- h. To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the Gendarmerie and police.

#### RESOLUTION 918 (1994)

13. Subsequent to the assassination of President Habyarmana and the terrible events that unfolded in the days immediately following his death, the Security Council agreed to the evacuation of most of UNAMIR. In the

chaos that swept Rwanda in the months of April and May, there seemed no other course open. However, it soon became apparent that UNAMIR would have a role to play in the event that hostilities came to an end. The Security Council, at the urging of the Force Commander, MGen Dallaire, adopted the following resolution:

- a. REAFFIRMING all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),
- b. Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,
- c. Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation,
- d. Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, and humanitarian support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,
- e. Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,
- f. Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations of the rights to life and property,
- g. Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law,
- h. Strongly urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred,
- j. Recalling also its request to the Secretary-General to collect information on the responsibility for the tragic incident that resulted in the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,
- k. Recalling further that it had requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for the investigation or reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict,
- l. Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with

countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

m. Desiring in this context to expand the mandate of UNAMIR of humanitarian purposes, and stressing the importance it attaches to the support and cooperation of the parties for the successful implementation of all aspects of that mandate,

n. Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

o. Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country.

p. Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

14. Due to an unsubstantive progress:

a. Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda,

b. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 22 May 1994 (S/1994/565),

c. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

1) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas,

2) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations,

d. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against person or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;

e. Authorizes in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,000 troops;

f. Requests the Secretary-General, as recommended in his report, and as a first phase, immediately to redeploy to Rwanda the UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strength the elements of the mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda.

g. Further requests the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties, progress towards a cease-fire, availability of resources and

## UNAMIR INDEX OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN RWANDA WITH GRIDS

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UNAMIR FORCE SOPS  
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

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SECTION I - BACKGROUND OF PEACEKEEPING

1. Each United Nations peacekeeping operation has its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS), which contain a set of instructions for all aspects of its operations and administration. The SOPS are prepared by the Commander and his staff and are revised as necessary to keep them relevant.

2. Each mission's SOPS vary according to the specific requirements of the particular mandate, the concept of operations, and the political and military context within which the mission operates. Given the diversity of peace-keeping missions undertaken by the United Nations, it would be impossible to design one set of SOPS adequate to the needs of them all.

3. However, there are many procedures which have been found to be common to most peacekeeping operations conducted over the past four decades. For the sake of efficiency, and to maintain some sort of consistency among missions, it is important to try to keep to a common core of procedures. To this end, these SOPS draw on the lessons learned in other missions as much as possible.

4. These SOPS will be reviewed once a year and revised as necessary by the DFC and Chiefs of Branches.

SECTION 2 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND1. Geographical inscription

The landlocked Republic of Rwanda, in East Central Africa, is bounded on the North by Uganda, on the East by Tanzania, on the South by Burundi and on the West by Zaire. Rwanda lies on the great East African plateau. It is a small country with area of 26, 338 square kms. Prior to the crisis in the spring of 1994 it had an estimated population of 8 millions.

2. History and Government

Rwanda developed into a highly centralized Kingdom ruled by the pastoral Tutsi minority, which arrived in the 14th to 16th centuries. The agricultural Hutu majority, which reached the area in the 7th to 10th centuries, served the Tutsi in exchange for protection and the use of cattle. The area was a German protectorate from 1899 to 1916 and subsequently was part of Belgian-administered Rwanda-Urundi.

3. Many Tutsi were driven from Rwanda by the Belgians in the 1940s for advocating independence; even more fled to escape ethnic strife in 1959. In 1961, Rwanda abolished the monarchy and declared itself a Republic; its independence was not internationally recognized until July 1, 1962. Since independence, Rwanda's history has been marked by ethnic conflicts. Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimaja took power in a bloodless coup in 1973 and continued to serve as president until killed in April of 1994. Prior to his death a new constitution had been worked out in an attempt to resolve the tensions between Hutu and Tutsi elements. It provided for a multiparty system headed by a premier but with executive power in the hands of a president, who was limited to two consecutive 5 year terms. On the 16th of March 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front agreed to hold talks to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. The talks were supported by the Organization of African Unity and facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania. A United Nations good will mission was launched to lend the support of the international community to the peace process.

UNAMIR Mandate

UNAMIR

194 DEC 14 21 58

FAX IN 5307

UNITED NATIONS FACSIMILE SWITCHING SYSTEM

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS

NEW YORK

FAX: (212) 963-3550

To: UNAMIR  
KIGALI (RWANDA)

From: COMCENIER  
U.N. HEADQUARTERS  
NEW YORK

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
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## OUT-GOING FACSIMILE

UNAMIR  
194 DEC 14 21:41:00

<b>TO:</b> AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB KAHN, UNAMIR, KIGALI GORDON-SOMERS, UNOMIL, MONROVIA AJELLO, ONUMOZ, MAPUTO BEYE, UNAVEM II, LUANDA GBEHO, UNOSOM II, MOGADISHU JENSEN, MINURSO, LAAYOUNE HVIDEGAARD, UNOMIG, SUKHUMI THAPA, UNIKOM, UMM QASR TER HORST, ONUSAL, SAN SALVADOR FURUHOVDE, UNIPIL, NAQOURA PEISSEL, UNFICYP, NICOSTA BRAHIMI, UNMIH, PORT-AU-PRINCE GALARZA, UNMOGIP, RAWALPINDI KEMPALA, UNDOF, FAGUAR	<b>FROM:</b> ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK 
<b>FAXNO:</b>	<b>FAXNO:</b> (212) 963-4879
<b>DATE:</b> 13 December 1994	
<b>SUBJECT:</b> Verification study	

No.: \_\_\_\_\_

1. The General Assembly has set up a Group of Governmental Experts, which is to conduct a study of the process of verification of agreements that control or limit armaments and military forces. The aim of the exercise is to identify practical ways in which the United Nations can strengthen its capacity to carry out verification activities if and when required to do so.

2. The Group has requested information on the experience of peace-keeping operations in the field of verification and I should therefore be grateful if you would provide us by 3 January 1995 with a factual brief on your mission's experience along the following lines.

1. Does the mandate include the verification of controls of or limits on armaments and military forces? (For example: cease-fire arrangements, buffer zones, presence or withdrawal of forces, arms limitations and troop levels, no-fly zones, disarmament, demobilization etc.).
2. How specific are the verification provisions of the mandate?
3. What methods are used in your mission?
4. How effective are those methods?
5. Comments.

Best regards.