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**ASSESSMENT OF THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS**  
**FROM DP CAMPS AT KIBEHO AND NDAGO**

For: MGEN G.C. Tousignant

By: LTCOL A.D. Brimelow

Date: 26 November 1994

Ref: Z 723, Sheet 40 Butare, Ed 1, 1:50 000

**AIM**

1. To clear criminal elements from Kibeho and Ndago Displaced Persons Camps with the following limitations:

- a. The operation must be completed as soon as possible;
- b. Surprise must be maintained;
- c. RPA participation is required;
- d. Tasks which require RPA contact with DPs must be minimised;
- e. The risk of casualties is to be minimised; and
- f. NGO cooperation is required.

**FACTORS**

**Relative Strengths**

2. Opposition. The estimated populations of Kibeho and Ndago are 40 000 and 20 000 respectively. The number of dwellings approximates 10 - 15 000. The strength of the criminal element is unknown:

- a. Criminals and extremists in both camps are suspected of being armed;
- b. Armed resistance is likely;
- c. Suspects are likely to attempt to escape;
- d. A number of the criminal element is known to the RPA;
- e. The general mood of the camp inhabitants is one of apprehension and insecurity.

3. Own Troops.

- a. UNAMIR presently consists of six battalions and three independent companies;

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- b. Two battalions are not yet fully deployed;
- c. One of the remaining four battalions is conducting rotation which will not be completed until 30 Nov;
- d. The sector in which the objective camps are located is occupied by GHANBATT (the rotating unit) and ZAMBATT (deployment not complete);
- e. ZAMBATT is the most self sufficient unit in terms of transport;
- e. The RPA have indicated the availability of a battalion sized force to cooperate in the conduct of the operation;
- f. The use of UNAMIR troops from other sectors will degrade security in the sectors from which they are drawn;
- i. The use of a significant portion of a single unit, other than GHANBATT or ZAMBATT, would degrade security to an unacceptable level;
- j. Three of the contingents are French speakers.

4. Deductions

- a. The nature of the task requires a cordon and search type of operation;
- b. RPA contact with the bulk of the population should be avoided, therefore participation in the cordon element would be prudent;
- c. RPA liaison will be required to identify suspects;
- d. A holding/screening facility will be required for detainees;
- e. The requirement to achieve surprise will require deployment, from a relatively remote assembly area, under cover of darkness and will probably prevent full scale rehearsals;
- f. The use of obscurants by day, illumination by night and APCs early in the operation would probably cause panic among the DPs, therefore, a dawn H Hr and subsequent introduction of APCs (if necessary) would probably be necessary;
- g. The likelihood of casualties might require the forward deployment of medical support.
- h. Establishment of a composite force will be necessary if the operation is to be mounted before the GHANBATT rotation/ZAMBATT deployment is complete;
- i. The establishment of a composite force may result in the requirement for disparate national clearances, which could delay the operation and compromise security.
- j. Contributions to a composite force should be limited to company level to reduce the complexity of command and control. Likely contributors are:
  - (1) FRAFBATT - one company ;
  - (2) TUNBATT - two companies;

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- (3) ZAMBATT -one company (until fully deployed);
  - (4) GHANBATT - two companies (after rotation completion -30 Nov); and
  - (5) ETHIOBATT - two companies.
- k. Maximum force available on a composite basis is seven companies;
  - l. The maximum force available on a single unit basis is one battalion (four companies);
  - m. Since GHANBATT and ZAMBATT both occupy positions in relatively close proximity to the objective, either of these units presents the practical alternative if the most cohesive force possible is to be utilised;
  - n. Both alternatives, given RPA participation, present the requirement for the superimposition of a separate command and control element

### Ground

5. General The Kibeho/Ndago DP Camp complex covers an area of approximately 15 x 4 Km. The complex is situated between the 00 and 11 Northings and the 82 and 88 Eastings on a dominating ridgeline which generally runs NW/SE with heavily populated radial ridges which slope steeply to the east and west. Each ridgeline represents a separate objective. The area between the 04 and 06 Northings is the least populated and generally defines the relatively indistinct boundary between the two camps. The feature is devoid of vegetation. Observation to the East and West is generally good along the whole feature. A well defined, unsealed road provides easy access for mounted and dismounted operations along the ridgeline throughout the complex. Lateral access to the ridgeline is difficult and steep for dismounted troops and is limited four routes for vehicular traffic from the East and two from the West.

6. Approaches There are four principal approach routes as shown on the attached trace:

a. Approach A

(1) Advantages

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Clears the largest camp first.

## (2) Disadvantages

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;

b. Approach B

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously;
- (b) Well defined, multiple axes to the Northern end of the objective.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Large frontage (15 Km) cannot be covered in a single phase;
- (b) Linear configuration of objective would necessitate flank security;
- (c) Difficult to control;
- (d) High ground not dominated early in the operation;
- (e) Difficult approach; and
- (f) No concealment and cover is sparse.

c. Approach C

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Blocks most likely escape route to the south early.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;
- (c) Long approach march; and
- (d) Fails to clear the most heavily populated camp early in the operation.

d. Approach D

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously; and
- (b) Two well defined axes to the northern end of the objective.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Longest approach;
- (b) Two single routes only to the northern end of the objective; poor access for vehicles elsewhere;
- (c) Insecure flanks;
- (d) Approach is dominated by high ground; and
- (e) Difficult to control.

8. Deductions All approaches offer a range of useable assembly areas and FUPs and would require the use of multiple phases. Approaches A and C provide for the most manageable frontages and ease of control however leapfrog of sub units would be necessary to access assigned objectives. Approaches B and D present the capacity to access multiple objectives simultaneously, however the going is generally poor, coordination would be difficult for an unrehearsed force and the size of the objective would require the force to reorient for subsequent phases.

- a. Approaches A and B are the most direct;
- b. Approaches A and C facilitate the most positive control;
- c. Approach B facilitates the opportunity to present the most impact early in the operation.
- d. Approach D is discounted due to poor access, going, control requirements and the need to maintain security.

Time and Space

9. The operation is to be mounted as soon as possible to deter the RPA from taking unilateral action, however, the desired effect (to provide incentive to DPs to return to their homes) should complement Op TAHA. Considerations are as follows:

- a. Outline planning - 5 days (D-11);
- b. Consultation with RPA - 1 day (D-6);
- c. Battle procedure - 5 days (D-5);
- d. Conduct (approach A):
  - (1) Preliminary move - 1 day (D-1);
  - (2) Move to FUP/cutoff positions - H-6;

- (3) Time in FUP - 2 hrs;
- (4) Advance from LD to objective - H+20;
- (5) Clearance of objective (restricted to daylight hours) - 5 days.

e. Approach C would require more time to conduct a move to the FUP with the attendant risk to the element of surprise. Clearance of the objective would be marginally faster in the first phase; subsequent phases would take the same amount of time. Approaches A and B are the most direct.

10. Deductions The earliest practical D Day is 8 Dec 94. The earliest completion date is 13 Dec 94. Any significant delay to this timeframe might prompt the RPA to take unilateral action to forcibly clear the camps.

#### Assessment of Tasks

11. The Camp complex presents approximately 15 search objectives and up to 10 escape routes. The task / troop requirement is assessed as follows:

- a. Secure FUP (approaches A and C) - one company;
- b. Secure FUP (approach B) - four platoons;
- c. Clear each objective - one company;
- d. Reserve - one platoon;
- e. Flank security (approaches A and C) - two sections;
- f. Flank security (approach B) - four sections;
- g. Cordon/cutoff - minimum of 10 platoons;
- h. Holding/screening facility security - one platoon;
- i. Command and control element;
  - (1) A Tac HQ;
  - (2) Helicopter support;
  - (3) Signals detachment.
- j. Transport - battalion lift plus second line element;
- l. Medical support element;
- j. Liaison - MILOB detachment;
- k. CIVPOL detachment;
- l. Interpreter element;
- m. BBGNU law enforcement representation;
- n. UN representatives;

- (1) UNREO;
- (2) Human rights;
- (3) ICRC.

o. NGO representatives.

12. Deductions The assembly of a seven company force (plus a RPA battalion) would create the need for a command and control capability which is beyond the resources of UNAMIR. The maximum practical UNAMIR force is four rifle companies plus organic and second line support. Regardless, multiple phases will be required to successfully complete the task.

#### Summary of Deductions

13. Principal deductions are as follows:

- a. A cordon and search operation is required;
- b. Cooperation by the RPA to provide the cordon, liaison with protection parties, advice and linguists will minimise the likelihood of casualties to and apprehension among DPs;
- c. An operation mounted at dawn is most likely to achieve the desired element of surprise;
- d. The establishment of a composite force would minimise security degradation in each sector;
- e. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT will provide a measure of unity of command, minimise the logistic burden and facilitate the maintenance of security;
- f. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT is not feasible before 5 Dec or on deployment of the remainder of ZAMBATT, whichever is the earlier;
- g. The composition of the force and the potential complexity of the command and control arrangements imply the establishment of a Tac HQ;
- h. Approach A is the most practical in terms of control, coordination and supportability;
- i. The requirement for a multi phased operation and the associated battle procedure presents 8 Dec as an indicative D Day.

#### COURSES OF ACTION

##### Opposition

14. Course A Armed resistance.

- a. Likely reaction by some individuals but coordinated resistance is unlikely.
- b. The effect of this would be to create panic amongst the DPs and increase the possibility of collateral damage.



15. Course B      Escape.
- a.      Most likely reaction.
  - b.      This course of action would have little effect on the aim of the operation.
16. Deductions:
- a.      The most probable course is Course B, however, suspects might choose to fight once escape routes are blocked.
  - b.      UNAMIR troops should prevent escape if the likelihood of violence is low, otherwise escapees should be left to the cordon.
  - c.      UNAMIR should respond to engagement strictly in the terms of the ROE.

**Own Courses**

17. Course I      Assign a formed unit to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.
- a.      Advantages:
    - (1)      Unity of command is inherent;
    - (2)      The logistic overhead is minimised;
    - (3)      The maintenance of physical and operational security is enhanced; and
    - (4)      Control and coordination is simplified.
  - b.      Disadvantages:
    - (1)      The earliest time that a unit will be available to conduct the operation is 5 Dec. Time for preparation is, therefore reduced.
    - (2)      Advance on a single axis will reduce momentum; and
    - (3)      An element of surprise will be lost on depth objectives.
18. Course II      Assign a composite force to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.
- a.      Advantages:
    - (1)      Participation by a variety of countries is consistent with the spirit of the UN ethos;
    - (2)      Participation by a French speaking nation would enhance community relations;
    - (3)      Maximum presence would be maintained in all sectors.

## b. Disadvantages:

- (1) Unity of command is not easily achieved;
- (2) Administrative overhead is increased;
- (3) Disparate communication equipment could frustrate command and control.

19. Course III Assign the RPA to conduct the search with UNAMIR providing the cordon.

## a. Advantages:

- (1) Casualties to UNAMIR will be minimised;
- (2) Does not compromise UN impartiality;
- (3) Adheres to the current peacekeeping (vice peacemaking) concept of operations.

## b. Disadvantages:

- (1) The presence of the RPA in force may cause panic amongst the DPs unless an intense information campaign precedes the operation;
- (2) Influence over RPA activities will be marginalised;
- (3) Potential adverse effect on Op TAHA.

**COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE**

## 20. Guidance on the following issues is requested:

## a. Confirmation of your requirement to mount the operation in view of the potential adverse effect on Op TAHA, the UNAMIR mandate/concept of operations and the risk to UNAMIR troops;

## b. Troops to task:

- (1) Size; and
- (2) Composition.

## c. Command and control arrangements;

## d. Timing;

## e. Delineate specific tasks and roles:

- (1) RPA;
- (2) CIVPOL; and
- (3) NGO.

## f. ROE limitations

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UNAMIR HQ

**FROM:** A/DCOS SP  
**TO:** SO1 G3 (Plans)  
**THROUGH:** DCOS SP  
**DATE:** 2 December 1994  
**SUBJECT:** LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR OP "DP CAMPS"

1. Please find attached logistic planning for Operation "DP Camps" approved by DCOS SP.
2. Regards.

A. CHABIR  
LTCOL  
A/DCOS SP  
HQ UNAMIR

*Almch*

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: COL KP O'KELLY, DCOS SP 4000.1/LOG-11

FROM: LT COL AHMED CHABIR, ADCOS SP

DATE: 1 December 1994

SUBJECT: LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR  
OP "DP CAMPS"

AIM

1. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO CONSIDER THE LOGISTIC PLANNING TO SUPPORT OPERATION "DP CAMPS".

GENERAL

2. THE "DP CAMPS" IS COMBINED OPERATION (MULTINATIONAL). THE BUILD-UP OF THE FORCE, THE SUSTAINMENT OF THE OPERATION AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE SAME FORCE ARE RAISED ON THIS PAPER.

BUILD UP OF THE FORCE

3. THE BUILD-UP OF THE FORCE REQUIRES:
  - AT CONTINGENT LEVEL: SELECTION OF THE COMPANIES WHICH HAVE THE BEST COMBAT READINESS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE SUBSEQUENT LOGISTIC BURDEN.
  - AT THE FORCE LEVEL: COORDINATE AND PREPARE ALL THE ASSETS TO MOVE, TO SUSTAIN AND TO REDEPLOY THE COMMITTED FORCE.
  - THE SUPPORTING UNITS: BE PREPARED TO DEDICATE THE REQUIRED ASSETS IN A SHORT NOTICE TIME.

Thank you. Please  
pass to SO1 G3 (Plans)  
for his information.  
I continue to liaise  
with him as the  
details develop.

A - MOBILIZATION OF COMBAT UNITS

THE SELECTED UNITS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED EARLY TO PREPARE THEIR COMPANIES. THE CONCERNED CONTINGENTS SHOULD SUBMIT THEIR LOGISTICS REQUESTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE COORD LOG CELL. THE PURPOSE IS THAT EACH COMMITTED ELEMENT HAS 3 DAYS COMBAT SUPPLY (BASIC LOAD). IN THE FIRST 3 DAYS OF THE OPERATION NO RESUPPLY IS EXPECTED TO BE FORWARDED. FOR MOVEMENT, CONTINGENT HAVE TO USE THEIR OWN ASSETS. HOWEVER AS UNITS DON'T HAVE ENOUGH 1ST LINE APC OR TCV, THE ZAMBAT DAF FLEET AND THE B/R SM - TRAILERS COULD BE USED.

B - MOBILIZATION OF LOGISTIC ASSETS

LOGISTIC CELL SHOULD MOBILIZE THE SUPPORTING ELEMENTS. THE FOLLOWING ARE NEEDED:

- TRANSPORT ELEMENT WITH TRUCKS, SM-TRAILERS, MHE, BUS, RECOVERY VEHICLE, WATER TANKER AND FUEL TANKER. THIS MEANS COULD BE PROVIDED BY B/R, ZAMBATT AND 3CSG.
- MAINTENANCE: A MOBILE REPAIR TEAM (MRT) SHOULD BE POSITIONED INITIALLY IN BUTARE WITH 2ND LINE SPARE PARTS.
- SUPPLY: ALTHOUGH THE MISSION WOULD NOT BE LONG AND THE SUPPORTED FORCE IS NOT LARGE (1250 MEN) THERE IS A

NECESSITY TO HAVE A CERTAIN STOCK ON HAND AT THE  
AREA OF OPERATION. THEREFORE, THE GHANAIAAN SUPPLY  
PLATOON COULD BE USED AT THIS PURPOSE.

- THE SUPPORTING UNITS THAT COULD BE EMPLOYED TO  
SUPPORT THE FORCE ARE:

3 CSG

BROWN AND ROOT

GHANAIAAN SUPPLY PLATOON

4. SUPPORT OF THE FORCE

A. SUPPLY: TO PREVENT ANY LOGISTIC BURDEN TO THE  
OPERATION, THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES ARE TO BE OBSERVED

\* CLASS I (SUBSISTENCE): THE COMMITTED UNITS SHOULD BE  
PROVIDED FROM THEIR CONTINGENT WITH 3 DAYS OF COMBAT  
RATION AND POTABLE WATER. KNOWING THE DAILY RATE PER DAY  
AND PER MAN IS ONE COMBAT RATION AND 3 LITRES POTABLE  
WATER. THE SUPPLY PLATOON WILL SUSTAIN THE FORCE WITH THE  
SAME DAILY RATION. THE LOGISTIC CELL WILL ISSUE TO THIS  
PLATOON 7 DAYS COMBAT RATION, 7 DAYS POTABLE WATER AND 1  
X 20.000 L WATER TANKER FOR WASHING WATER.

RESUPPLY OF THE UNITS MAY NOT START BEFORE D+1.

\* CLASS 2 PROBABLY NOT REQUIRED.

\* CLASS 3 (POL): THE ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF VEHICLES IS 150.

THE DAILY CONSUMPTION RATE IS EVALUATED TO BE 50 L/DAY/VEHICLE. ALSO 7500 L ARE REQUIRED DAILY. 2 TANKERS TO BE DEDICATED TO THIS OPERATION (ROTATION). BESIDES THIS, EACH VEHICLE SHOULD HAVE 2X20 L JERRYCANES OF FUEL.

\* CLASS 4 (DEFENCE STORES) UPON RECONNAISSANCE. UNITS HAVE TO RAISE THEIR REQUEST TO SUPPLY PLATOON THROUGH TAC HQ. THE LOG CELL HAVE TO PROVIDE THE SUPPLY PLATOON WITH THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

SAND BAGS..... 2000  
BARBED-WIRE ..... 500 ROLLS  
CONCERTINA ..... 200 ROLLS  
POST PICKET ..... 1000  
TIE WIRE ..... 10 KG

- \* CLASS 5 (AMMUNITION) CONTINGENT RESPONSIBILITY.
- \* CLASS 6 (PERSONNEL ITEMS) CONTINGENT RESPONSIBILITY.
- \* CLASS 7 (MAJOR END ITEMS) PROBABLY NOT REQUIRED.
- \* CLASS 8 (MEDICAL STORES) FMO HAVE TO ORGANIZE MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE OPERATION.
- \* CLASS 9 (REPAIR PARTS) EACH UNIT SHOULD HOLD 7 DAYS 1ST LINE REPAIR PARTS. SPARE PARTS FOR 2ND LINE SHOULD BE ISSUED TO B/R. SO THE MRT COULD PROVIDE 2ND LINE MAINTENANCE WITHOUT DELAY.

B. TRANSPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT ARE THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMITTED CONTINGENTS. IN CASE OF SHORTFALL, ZAMBATT COULD BE TASKED TO REINFORCE THE "TASK FORCE" IN THIS SUBJECT. FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE ARRESTED PERSONS CLOGO HAS TO DEDICATE 1X50 MAN BUS.

C. MAINTENANCE: THE UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR 1ST LINE. 2ND LINE MAINTENANCE IS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE MRT.

PERSONNEL

5. BESIDES THE COMBAT UNITS, MP ELEMENT (GROUP/SECTION) IS REQUIRED FOR THE OPERATION. THE MISSION OF MP WOULD BE SEARCH AND INVESTIGATION OF ARRESTED PERSONNELS, MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE AND ESCORTING SOME PARTICULAR PERSONS.

DEMOBILIZATION

6. ONCE THE OPERATION IS CONSIDERED AS ACCOMPLISHED, THE COMMITTED UNITS WOULD RETURN TO THEIR CONTINGENTS. THE DEMOBILIZATION WOULD BE ACHIEVED AS FOLLOWS:

A. COMMITTED UNITS.

THE MOVEMENT BACK TO THE CONTINGENT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARTICIPATING CONTINGENTS. THE LAST ELEMENT TO BE DEMOBILIZED IS THE LOGISTICS ELEMENTS.

SUPPLY PLATOON, MRT, MEDICAL POST, WILL BE DEMOBILIZED AS ORDERED FROM G4/TAC. HQ. SUPPLY PLT HAS TO COLLECT DEFENCE STORES USED AND WHICH COULD BE REMOVED TO BE USED AGAIN.



CONCLUSION

7. THE OPERATION IS NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT. HOWEVER THE NEED FOR SURPRISE COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH SPEED WHICH REQUIRES ALSO RAPID AND SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE DIFFERENT TASKS. AS A THEORETICAL APPROACH THE ATTACHED PLANNING SHOWS THE REQUIRED TIME TO THE LOGISTIC PREPARATION.

A CHABIR  
LT COL  
ADCOS SP

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