

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

(6 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

(5 CONFIDENTIAL)

24/66 THUR 2200

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1002

BOX 107

FILE 2

ACC. PREPARED

TO : UNAMIR HQ/OPS
UNAMIR HQ/SUPPORT.

June 21, 1995

FROM : SENBATT

INFO : DFC X UNAMIR MARSHALL PROVOST (KIGALI);

N° 110 / SENBATT/CONT.CDR

SUBJECT : Seizure of a SENBATT vehicle by RPA Gendarmerie following a traffic accident;

- 1)- On Tuesday 20 June 1995, around 11.20 hrs, a UN truck 4456 belonging to SENBATT contingent was involved in a traffic accident in BUTARE town x lance-corporal KATUNDI INNOCENT, RPA soldier, on his motorcycle without number plate, has knocked against the left side of the truck due to lack of control while trying to bypass this vehicle and threw down the pavement with his motorcycle x
- 2)- UNAMIR MP settled in BUTARE and SENBATT MP detachment were urgently sent to this place to proceed monitoring of this traffic accident x they did not find on the field the motorcycle driver who, according to RPA Gendarmerie arrived too, went to hospital to get medical treatment, meanwhile he didn't suffer any visible injuries x
- 3)- The RPA officer denied MP officers access to this man and seized SENBATT truck, then conducted this vehicle to their post in spite of the opposition of Senegalese militaries and MP officers x
The RPA L.O also attending this event and requested to impede seizure of SENBATT vehicle didn't react;
- 4)- This truck was in a regular situation, and was carrying out material transportation for NGO "CONCERN" located in BUTARE area.
- 5)- UNTILL now, negotiations conducted for release of the vehicle remained vain x Accordingly, I request, please, your prompt reaction towards competent rwandan authorities to induce RPA Gendarmerie of BUTARE to hand over SENBATT vehicle x

RPA L.O.
Will take care
of this problem
23/9/95

Abdel Kader GUEYE
Colonel
Commandant Contingent
Commanding Officer



MA 700PC

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO : LIST A,B,C,D,E AND F

FROM : CAMP COMMANDANT

[Signature]
Capt

et sf
6

FILE : 1000/DIST/01

DATE : 20 JUN 95

SUBJECT : FORCE STANDARD DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. AN APPROVED NEW STANDARD DISTRIBUTION LIST IS ATT AS APPX TO THIS FOR YOUR INFORMATION PLEASE.
2. IN CASE OF AMENDMENTS OR ADDITIONS REQUIRED, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OFFICE.
3. BEST REGARDS.

c/b
21/06/95

APPX
(Refer to PARA 1 TO
FILE NO 1000/DIST/01)

FORCE - STANDARD DISTRIBUTION LISTS

Serial Addressee

List A - Command Group

1.	MA TO FC
2.	MA TO DFC
3.	COS
4.	DCOS OPS
5.	DCOS SP
6.	CMO
7.	CHAO
8.	CIV POL COMMISSIONER
9 - 12	SPARE

LIST B - HQ BRANCHES

13.	FMO
14.	G1/CMPO
15.	G2 MIL INFO
16.	G3 OPS
17.	G3 PLANS
18.	G3 ENGR
19.	G3 AIR
20.	FPM
21.	FORCE PAO
22.	G4 (LOGISTIC)
23.	G4 (MOV CON)
24.	G6 COMMS/FSO
25.	CAMP COMMANDANT
26.	RPA LO
27.	FORCE WELFARE OFFICER
28.	CLO
29 - 30	SPARE

LIST C - ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE EXTERNAL TO HQ UNAMIR - OPERATIONS -
NOT TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH LIST D

31.	MILOB GP HQ
32.	UN CIV POL
33.	SECTOR 1
34.	SECTOR 2

LIST C - CONTINUED

35.	SECTOR 3
36.	SECTOR 4A
37.	SECTOR 4B
38.	SECTOR 4C
39.	SECTOR 5
40.	SECTOR 6
41.	95 FLSG
42.	FORCE SIG COY
43.	FORCE ENGR COY
44.	AUSMED
45.	MP COY
46 - 50	SPARE

LIST D - ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE EXTERNAL TO HQ UNAMIR -
ADMINISTRATION - NOT TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH LIST C.

51.	ETHIOBATT
52.	SENBATT
53.	GHANBATT
54.	INDBATT
55.	MALAWICOY
56.	MALICOY
57.	NIBATT
58.	TUNBATT
59.	ZAMBATT
60.	MP COY
61.	95 FLSG
62.	FORCE SIG COY
63.	FORCE ENGR COY
64.	AUSMED
65 - 70	SPARE

LIST E - CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HQ UNAMIR

71.	OFFICE OF SRSG
72.	ED
73.	CAO
74.	CSO
75.	CFO
76.	FSA
77.	CLAIMS
78.	OIC GEN SERVICE
79.	CILM
80.	CMCO
81.	C BOI UNIT
82.	CCPO
83.	CCO
84.	CISS
85.	CITMM

LIST E - CONTINUED

86.	CBES
87.	EDP
88.	BROWN AND ROOT

LIST F - OTHER UN AGENCIES

89.	UNDP
90.	UNHCR
91.	UNREO/IOC
92.	UNICEF



UNAMIR - MINUAR

From: A/COS

To: Lists A and B

Date: 14 June 95

Subject: DFC's FAREWELL APPRECIATION

1. Please find attached a copy of a farewell letter from the DFC addressed to all UNAMIR HQ staff members.
2. Section Heads are requested to circulate this note of thanks among their respective staffs.

G/b
Jen
26/06



From : Brig-Gen HK Anyidoho psc(t), jdc

*Office of the DFC/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ*

*Kigali
Rwanda*

13th June, 1995

HKA/778/121/DO/95

*STAFF OF UNAMIR FORCE HQ
C/O COL ARP JAN
A/CHIEF OF STAFF
UNAMIR HQ
KIGALI*

Dear Colleagues,

I wish to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to the Force Commander, Maj Gen G Tousignant and the entire staff of the Force HQ for the farewell dinner organized in my honour. I wish also to thank you for the loyalty and the support you have always given me. I was particularly impressed with the kind words said about me by Force Commander, and I will always cherish the memories of the excellent working relationship we have had.

As I depart UNAMIR and Rwanda for home, I leave your efforts in the hands of God to guard and guide you in all your operations. I know you will continue to serve this mission dutifully and faithfully as ever.

Finally, may I please ask you to convey my sincerest regards to all the Staff at the Headquarters and may God bless you all.

*Sincerely yours
H. Anyidoho*



UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY



INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: CO UN MP COY

FM CAPT S CHEMINGUI
KIGALI DETACHMENT COMMANDER
SENIOR MEMBER TUNISIAN MPS

INFO: MA TO FC
MA TO DFC
DCOS SP
CO TUNBATT
FPM

DATE: 13 JUN 95

SUBJECT: TREATMENT OF TUNISIAN MPS BY FPM, MAJ SICHILIMA

Ref: A - memo to Maj Sichilima ref local girls in MP vehicles, dated 2 May 95(attached)
B - memo, Maj Plante/ CO TUNBATT, dated 10 Apr 95(attached)

1. At about 1640 hrs, 12 Jun 95, I was called by the FPM and requested to attend his office immediately. When I arrived, he told me that he had two points to discuss with. The first was about a conversation he had on the radio that morning concerning a driver that he was using from the shift to drive Kibungo. I informed him that when the CO MP Coy heard the conversation he informed me that an arrangement was made between them.

2. The second point was only a question "you Tunisians, what are you doing in the company?" I was very surprised by the comment and could not understand exactly what was meant by it. I believe that since the arrival of the Tunisians in this mission, we have worked hand in hand with everybody in this unit and we have performed to the best of our ability. I know that most of my MPs do not speak english but at least they speak french, which allows them to investigate any case with the Gendarmerie using french. As well, 9 of the 11 Tunisian MPs are drivers, compared to only 5 of 25 Zambians. None of my MPs have used MP vehicles to convey local girls but I believe that this is not the case with the Zambian MPs because twice they were caught doing this. You will remember the first incident at reference A and the second was on the 9th of June when the FPM came to the MP Coy at 0030 hrs in the morning asking for the SITREP and at the time he was drunk and in vehicle 1466 with two local girls in the vehicle. When confronted by the shift commander, a Tunisian Warrant Officer attempting to identify the girls, the FPM stated: "I am sorry sir, I will never do it again". As well, my MPs have never reported for work while under the influence of

② MA to DFC

1. For DFC's review
2. He should discuss this issue with DCOS Sp and myself once settled.

A/DFC
16.6

G.B.
Incidents

See
15/06/95

alcohol, a scene that has been repeated several times by the Zambian MPs at this Coy. You can check the most recent file from 9 Jun 95, UNAMIR/KIG 820-01-95 where a Zambian MP reported to work intoxicated. This does not include the other incidents, including the Zambian that threatened the CSM with a rifle while intoxicated.

3. The former CO of the MP Coy, Maj Plante, wrote a memo to the CO TUNBATT prior to his departure reference our performance in the MP Coy. You will see at reference B that he was more than .. pleased with our performance.

4. I am quite concerned by the FPM's attitude towards the Tunisians. In relating that the strength of the UN MP Coy will be reduced, he stated that he will see what he can do. I believe he is indicating his attempt to repatriate all the Tunisian MPs because of his notion that we are not doing anything. Maybe he fails to realize that two of the three shifts are commanded by Tunisians and that the supply and vehicles are under the responsibility of another Tunisian. Surely having been the CO of the MP Coy for a short period of time he realises that the Tunisian are contributing much more to the Coy than his Zambian soldiers. Perhaps that is what concerns him? He may be made aware of two distinct cases where the Tunisians were responsible for the apprehension of suspects. On 23 Apr 95, we apprehended 4 robbers, 3 RPA and 1 civilian at an armed robbery incident. On 7 May 95 we prevented the theft of two UNAMIR minibuses, UNAMIR 238 and UNAMIR 240 by stopping the two RPA soldiers attempting to steal them.



UNAMIR
MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM



TO: CO FORCE MP COY
Maj J. SICHILIMA

FM: Kigali Detachment Commander

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J. Sichilima'.

DATE: 2 May 95

SUBJECT: USE OF MP VEHICLES TO CARRY LOCAL GIRLS

1. I am being informed that on Saturday 29 Apr 95 at about 2400 hrs, the CSR^M accompanied with a local girl saw the shift commander patrolling around "Chez Lando", and asked him to give him a ride to his residence but the shift commander refused this request because the CSR^M was with a local girl. Later the CSR^M came to the MP coy compound and ordered Pte Bwalya to drive him to his residence at that time he was still accompanied by local girl.
2. This problem was discussed during our meeting of the 26 Apr 95 and I believe that everyone is aware about the restrictions concerning unauthorised passengers. We made it clear once for all that MP vehicles assigned to the Force MP Coy are to be used for operational duties and not for joy rides.
3. Submitted for any action as you deem necessary. I strongly suggest that the FPM be made aware of this inter-office memorandum



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: CO Tunisia Bn

INFO: COS and FPM

FROM: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy *Plante*

DATE: 10 Apr 95

SUBJECT: PERFORMANCE TUNISIA MP-
FORCE MP COMPANY

-
1. As I am leaving the Mission, I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that I have been very pleased to have Military Policemen from Tunisia employed in my MP Company.
 2. Being a new unit, they faced a tremendous task. They all accepted the challenge and because of their hard work, they directly contributed to the excellent reputation enjoyed by the MP Company.
 3. Moreover, I would like to express my personal appreciation, to my **right hand man**, Capt Chemingui. Although UNAMIR is his first UN mission, he adapted extremely well under the most difficult and demanding conditions. Twice, I changed his duties and responsibilities. He gladly accepted, and while employed as both the Company Ops Offr and/or the Kigali MP Det Comdr, he proved to be a very knowledgeable professional MP, dedicated to his men and profession. Furthermore, Capt Chemingui is a very hard worker, loyal and liked by everyone in the MP Company. He sets a very high standard for himself and through his leadership, his men follow him. Capt Chemingui should be promoted to Major at the earliest opportunity.
 4. I wish I would have more Capt Chemingui in my unit.

→ FC

DFC

OPERATIONS BRANCH
NIGERIAN AIR FORCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
LAGOS - NIGERIA.
May 1995.

S R S G
UNAMIR
KIGALI
RWANDA.

Sir,

THE PLIGHT OF AN OBSERVER - SON LDR E. AKPAMA (ID No. 2126)

1. I am one of those who answered the call from another UN Mission to Rwanda in 1994. After serving in Rwanda for about one hundred days, I was directed to return back to my mother Mission - MINURSO. My plight is that:

(a) I have nothing to show that I ever served in Rwanda because neither a certificate of service nor medal of service was issued to those of us who answered your call from other Missions.

(b) I lost part of my MSA through reductions for CTO in Nairobi and lodging that I never enjoyed.

(c) On my departure from UNAMIR, I was given an opened Travel Authorisation which made it impossible for MINURSO to settle my claims till this very moment I am writing.

2. As a Military Man, I am not in uniform to acquire academics degrees rather medals of service or certificates of honour and my due promotions. I am therefore using this medium to appeal on behalf of all those who served UNAMIR from other Missions to be so recognised with a medal or at least a certificate of participation in the peace process in Rwanda.

3. Your co-operation and kind understanding in advanced is highly appreciated.

[Signature]
EMMANUEL AKPAMA
SQUADRON LEADER
NIGERIAN (ID No 2126)

cc:
THE FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR
THE CMO, UNAMIR
THE CAO, UNAMIR.

SMPO

Where does this group fit in?
And why is the SRG?
He must be disciplined
individual. In any case
investigate to see if
he has a case.

G6-incidents
13/6/95

13/6
DFC

MESSAGE

FROM : TUNBATT

TO : UNAMIR FC

INFO : DFC-COS - DCOS PLAN - DCOS OPS - DCOS SUP.

NR 2353 TUNBATT HQ//G2 ON THE 25 MAY 1995

SUBJECT : VACATING THE BUSOGO AND GISENYI SITES

I have the honour to let you know that today, at about 11h30, two RPA Lieutenants have come at the Commandment Post of the Contingent declaring to be messengers of Colonel William BAGIRE, Commander of the 211th Brigade of RPA in RUHENGARI.

These two officers had firmly asked us to vacate the sites mentioned in the subject no later than Friday 26 May 1995

Though it has been declared to them that we will start vacating on Monday 29 May 1995, they have maintained their position fixing the vacating time-limit as ultimatum

Therefore, I have the honour to request for your intervention towards UNAMIR competent officials for them to activate the vacating, on the one hand and towards Rwandese authorities in order to give us the necessary time, on the other.

COS / DCOS SP
How far have we gone with this?
— J. J.
24/5
DFC/COS

Place on file
sh
ms

56
26/05/95

MESSAGE**FROM** : TUNBATT HQ**TO** : UNAMIR FC**INFO** : DFC - COS - DCOS PLAN - DCOS OPS - DCOS SUP .**NR 2353** //TUNBATT HQ // G2 ON THE 25th MAY 1995**OBJET : EVACUATION DES SITES DE BUSOGO ET DE GISENYI #**


J'AI L'HONNEUR DE VOUS RENDRE COMPTE QUE DEUX LIEUTENANTS DE L'APR SE SONT PRESENTES CE JOUR VERS 11H30 AU PC DU CONTINGENT DECLARANT ETRE LES MESSAGERS DU COLONEL WILLIAM BAGIRE COMMANDANT LE 211eme BRIGADE APR DE RUHENGERI #

CES DEUX OFFICIERS AVAIENT DEMANDE FERMEMENT D'EVACUER LES SITES SUS CITES EN OBJET AU PLUS TARD LE VENDREDI 26 MAI 1995 #

BIEN QU'IL LEUR A ETE DECLARE QUE LE DEMENAGEMENT VA ETRE ENTAMME LE LUNDI 29 MAI 1995 # ILS AVAIENT MAINTENU LEUR POSITION FIXANT LES DELAIS D'EVACUATION SOUS FORME D'ULTIMATUM #

A CET EFFET HONNEUR VOUS DEMANDER D'INTERVENIR :

- D'UN COTE , AUPRES DES RESPONSABLES COMPETANTS DE LA MINUAR EN VUE D'ACTIVER LE DEMENAGEMENT .
- DE L'AUTRE , AUPRES DES AUTORITES RWANDAISES DANS LE BUT DE NOUS OCTROYER LES DELAIS NECESSAIRES #

A handwritten signature in dark ink is written over a circular official stamp. The stamp contains some illegible text and a central emblem. The signature appears to be 'M. Bagire'.

FROM: MILOB SECT 5

TO: MILOB GP HQ (OPS) ←

DATE: 13 MAY 95

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF THE GISENYI BORDER POST STATUS

1. Refer your letter dated 12 May 95 on the above subject, the clarifications sought for are follows:

a) The restriction has been in force since November 94.

b) The reasons for which UNAMIR civilian and military persons are barred from going across to Zaire are as follows:

- * UNAMIR has no mandate in Zaire, and therefore the Zairian government sees no reason as to why UNAMIR persons, in their official capacity should come to Zaire. It is pertinent to point out here that, UNAMIR persons can still go across to Zaire as sightseers or tourists using their diplomatic passport.

- * The presence of the Kibumba, Katali and Kidaho camps in the vicinity of Goma with their confirmed interhamwe presence, makes it undesirable for the UNAMIR to come to Goma. They could become targets of the former government who see them as the eyes of the government in power in Rwanda(sic).


- * Somewhere during last Oct/Nov, leaflets with message for refugees in the camps were supposedly dropped from UNAMIR aircrafts into the Goma camps. This reportedly led to unrest in the camps and was strongly resented by the Zairian Government.

This impasse could be solved if dialogue is initiated at the higher levels with the Zairian Government.

c) It may be realised that the current situation in the country, sensitivity of the Zairian border and the frequent interhamwe activities from the camps makes the security at the border checkpoint extremely suspicious and stringent. On the 11th of May, three UNHCR security persons from Goma crossed the border on their way to UNHCR Gisenyi. One of them, Jacoba Hartman, a new arrival to Goma was in possession of a document which made a political statement issued by the camp leaders in Goma, expressing their desire to return to Rwanda and expressing their solidarity with a newly formed political

G6
26/5/95

party in Rwanda, which is sympathetic to their views. The lady in question says that this leaflet was distributed some days back and there was nothing secret about it. In fact she claims that she was not aware that it could have other implications in Rwanda. In light of what has been stated before it is obvious that the RPA did not share the same view as her and those of her other companions. Under instructions from higher hq they detained all three persons for the night in Gisenyi UNHCR house and had them go upto Ruhengeri/Kigali to explain themselves. Negotiations by UNHCR chief Goma, UNHCR Gisenyi and MILOBS earlier, had no effect. The matter has now been resolved today with the intervention of the special envoy UNHCR. The concerned persons have been released and allowed to go back to Goma.



ASHOK SARKAR
MAJ
FOR SET COMD

THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
GITARAMA PREFECTURE
B.P. 53 GITARAMA

24.04.95.

His Excellence

The President of the Republic of RWANDA
KIGALI.

Thru: The Minister of Internal Affairs
and Communal Development
KIGALI.

*DCMD
Pse disposes with
original docu
Jfhi
24/5
DFC*

Dear Sir,

RE : NTIGULIRWA J.M.V.

Following a letter the above mentioned wrote to you on 28/2/95 copied to me, on the issue of his arrested relatives from NTONGWE, I am pleased to send you a copy of the letter wrote to me by the Director of GITARAMA Prison Mr MUGEMANGANGO F.Xavier N° 020/05.15, explaining fully the circumstances surrounding the 7 persons from NTONGWE Commune, whom NTIGULIRWA talked of in his letter addressed to you Sir on 28/2/95. It Should be noted however that the letter has been interpreted in English to meet other readers needs especially those to whom copies of the 28th February 1995's letter were sent.

.../...

G6
19/5/95

THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
PRISON-GITARAMA
GITARAMA

12/04/95

The Prefet
GITARAMA Prefecture
GITARAMA.

Dear Sir,

Reason : Reply of your letter of 03/04/1995.

Following your letter N° 449/04.09.01/3 of 3/4/1995 wrote to me asking about prisoners indicated in a letter wrote by NTITEGEKERWA M.Francine and NTIGURIRWA J.M.V. who had afeared that their relatives may be dead, I am informing you of the following,

Prisoners originating from KINAZI-NTONGWE who are : RUTEBUKA Laurent GAHUTU Augustin, SAKAMANA Aimable, MUGENZI, GAFARANGA and NTAMWERA Mathias entered Gitarama Prison on 26/2/1995. But MURWANASHYAKA Deogratias was not brought among them but rather remained at the Commune as explained by the Bourgmestre NTONGWE in the Security meeting of 22/3/1995.

On 18/3/1995 , NTAMWERA Mathias died of Malaria. I am requesting the Bourgmestre of NTONGWE through the copy of this letter to inform the family of the deceased.

Wish you well

Director of GITARAMA Prison
(sé)

MUGEMANGANGO F.Xavier.

FOR INFORMATION :


- Mr Bourmestre of NTONGWE Commune
GITARAMA.

Hoping that the explanations in the letter here in will meet
your high considerations,

Yours faithfully,

NYANDWI J. Desire

Prefet GITARAMA.



FOR INFORMATION :

- Mr The Vice-President and Minister of Defense, KIGALI.
- Mr The Prime Minister, KIGALI.
- Mr The Minister of Justice, KIGALI.
- Mr The Special Representative of the Secretary General UN,
KIGALI.
- ✓ - Mr The Chief Military Observers, UNAMIR, KIGALI.
- ✓ - MILOBS GP HQ, KIGALI.
- United Nations Commission for Human Rights, KIGALI.
- Mr The Public Prosecutor, GITARAMA.
- Mr The Director of GITARAMA Prison.
- Mr the Burgemaster of NTONGWE, GITARAMA.
- Radio UNAMIR, KIGALI.
- Brigade CO 305th BN. GITARAMA.
- S.R.P. GITARAMA.
- CO 31st BN . GITARAMA.

FOR INFORMATION :

- Mr Burgemaster of NTONGWE Commune
GITARAMA.

NL BURUM LES 493139099=FOPF X 18-MAY-1995 13:24:05 345467

P 181500 B MAY 95

FROM : SENBATT , BUTARE

TO : UNAMIR HQ / DFC / DCOS OPS /G3 PLAN /G3 OPS

BT

UNCLAS OPS 133

SUBJ : SECTOR 4B RPA LO OFFICER

1. THE SITUATION BETWEEN THE BUTARE RPA LIAISON OFFICER AND SENBATT IS NOW WOR^STHENING .

2. DURING THE TAKING OVER OF TAC HQ FACILITIES THE RPA LIAISON OFFICER ASKED FOR AN OFFICE. HE WAS PROPOSED TO SHARE WITH THE OPS OFFICER THE OPS ROOM.

AS WITH THE FORMER TAC HQ HE WAS SHARING AN OFFICE WITH THE G4.

3. HE REFUSES THAT PROPOSITION AND IS NOW READY TO GIVE SENBATT TOUGH TIME IN BUTARE. FOR HIS POINT OF VIEW WE DON'T HAVE TO PATROL IN BUTARE TO SECURE UNAMIR AND NGO'S FACILITIES.

4. AT THE OTHER HAND HE EVER DON'T WANT TO LIAISE BETWEEN SENBATT AND RPA REPRESENTATIVES IN BUTARE PREFECTURE .

G6 - incident
19/5/95

COS
Let us monitor this
closely. SENBATT have
never really enjoyed good
relationship with RPA.
Butare is a big place
and we have to be
careful.
J. G.
24/5
DTC/aw

5. FOR TIME BEING SENBATT IS CONDUCTING THE MISSION WITHOUT A
LIAISON BETWEEN HIS HQ AND RPA LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

BT

#

IN.730

MESSAGE

FROM : TUNBATT COMMANDER
TO : UNAMIR H.Q. , F.C // COS //
INFO : DFC // COS //
No 2216 / TUNBATT H.Q // G 2 ON THE 17th MAY 1995.

SUBJECT : RPA COMPLAINS AGAINST TUNBATT.

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT TODAY 17th MAY 1995 # TWO RPA BATTALION COMMANDERS CAME TO TUNBATT HQ CLAIMING THAT TWO LOCALS CAME YESTERDAY THE 18th BY HELI TO OUR HQ # ACCORDING TO THEM THESE TWO LOCALS ARE : THE FIRST , THE SON OF THE FORMER MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND THE SECOND A SECOND LIEUTENANT FROM THE FORMER RGF # THE TWO OFFICERS ACCUSED CLEARLY UNAMIR TO BE COOPERATING WITH FORMER GENECYDE PARTICIPANTS #

AFTER INVESTIGATION DONE BY MY SELF# IT HAS BEEN CERTIFIED THAT THE DUTY OFFICER GOT A CALL AT AROUND 1045 hrs FROM UNAMIR TELLING THAT A HELI WAS COMING TO OUR HQ TRANSPORTING THE P.O. MIRS ZINA ZELLEG AND TWO RWANDEESE WORKING WITH UNAMIR # HE SAID TOO THAT THE TWO LOCALS ARE GOING TO RUHENGARI # EFFECTIVLY THE HELI ARRIVED AT AROUND 1100 hrs AND THE TWO LOCALS SUPPOSED TO BE WORKERS ARRIVED WITH IT # THEY ASKED FOR FOOD AND TRANSPORTATION TO RUHENGARI # THE DUTY OFFICER GAVE THEM SOME FOOD BUT REFUSED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH TRANSPORTATION # THEY LEFT THE CAMP BY THE MAIN GATE FEW MINUTES AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL #

SINCE THE HELI LEFT FROM KIGALI AIRPOR AND SINCE IT IS AN UNAMIR HELI # THE DUTY OFFICER DID NOT PAY ANY ATTENTION TO THE MATER BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE UNAMIR WORKERS #

UNFORTUNATLY WE DID NOT TAKE THE NAME OF WHOME TALKED TO US BY PHONE BUT I SUPPOSED THAT HE KNEW THEM AND DID NOT TELL US THE TROUTH # SO HE INTRODUCED ALL UNAMIR IN BAD POSITION #

SIR , THE STRONGEST PROOF OF OUR GOOD FAITH MAY BE THAT WE DID NOT NEITHER HELP THEM TO ESCAPE NOR HID THEM #

TUNBATT IS THE BIGGEST LOOSER # THIS ACT DESTRUCTED ALL THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP THAT WE BUILT DURING EIGHT MONTHS WITH LOCAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES # IN ADDITION , WITH THIS ACT WE MAY LOOSE OUR OWN CREDIBILITY WITH UNAMIR AND RPA AUTHORITIES #



COS
I hope this sit' is
now clarified.
24/5
DFC/amy

G6
23/05/95

MESSAGE

FROM : TUNBATT COMMANDER

TO : FC .

INFO : DFC // COS // G3 OPS // G3 PLAN //

No 2233 // TUNBATT HQ // G 4 ON THE 17 th MAY 1995 .REFERENCE : UNCLASS PLANS 056 DATED ON THE 13 th MAY 1995 .SUBJECT : REALLOCATION OF APCs FROM TUNBATT TO GHANBATT .

- 1 - AT THE LAST DFC'S VISIT TO TUNBATT H.Q HE WAS AGREE WITH THE COLONEL MAJOR TOUMIA FORMER TUNBATT COMMANDER TO EXCHANGE THE 20 APCs AGAINST 20 TRUCKS TROOP'S CARRIER .
- 2 - THE REFERENCED MESSAGE DID NOT MENTION THIS EXCHANGE AND IT IS VERY AFFECTING TO THE TROOP'S MORAL TO SEE THEMSELVES DEPRIVED OF THEIR APCs WITHOUT BEEING REPLACED .
- 3 - AT MY OPINION AND TAKING IN ATTENTION THE THREAT AND GEOGRAPHE SITE OF TUNBATT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LET THESE APCs IN THIS AREA .
- 4 - FROM ANOTHER SIDE , WHEN REQUESTED WE USED THEM AND PLEASE BE SURE THAT WE WILL USE THEM AGAIN WHEN IT WILL BE REQUIRED.
- 5 - IF , AFTER THESE ARGUMENTS THE UNAMIR HQ WANTS DEFINITLY TO REALLOCATE THE APCs TO THE GHANBATT WE REQUEST AT LEAST TO REPLACE THEM BY TRUCKS TROOP'S CARRIER.
- 6 - BEST REGARDS .

COS

This message seeks
to print a picture
as if it was as a result
of my visit that
the vehicles are
being taken from
TUNBATT to GHANBATT.

Have we not given them
the trucks before withdrawing
the APCs?



G6
23/05/95

24/5
DFC/ma

DFC

COS

To : - UN Agencies
- All NGOs working in Rwanda

THROUGH : General TOUSSIGNANT
UNAMIR Force Commander

DATE : 14 May 1995

AFTER DFC HAS
SEEN THIS PLEASE
PASS TO COS.
COS
Sen. - FC needs to see
this 14/5
DFC

Ladies and Gentlemen, Honourables,

The EC (European Community) has suspended its aid to RPF Government of Kigali because you, NGOs on the field, have said the truth on the massacres of Kibeho. We encourage you to always say only the truth. Do never hide it. Do never smother it. Do never transform it.

Have you ever been in Arboretum, the valley of ponds at Butare Etc... ? Have you noticed that in villages, apart from Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, there are no more men and young men? You will only see some women and little girls. Where are the males? If you inquire, you will, for sure, find the truth. Then say what you will have found : the truth.

RPF functions on lie. All of you know that lie is its sap; and until when the lie will reign? It depends upon you, NGOs. It is true that not the ambassadors and Governments will overcome the poisonous lie wherever it is, but you NGOs in collaboration with the media, indeed the press which doesn't praise RPF.

Meanwhile, we hope that you have stopped providing food to RPF soldiers, because this cannot be justified at all. Similarly, we hope you no longer feed the civil servants and those who returned from Burundi, Uganda etc.. who reap from where they didn't sow. However, continue providing medical assistance to all the people, provide food to prisoners and orphanages. Is it true that you give food to members of RPF Government too? Perhaps you did this only once! To struggle against lie is also not to feed the liar, otherwise it would be to encourage him. RPF extremists are trying to intimidate the entire world by telling lies and resorting to trickery while they are methodically killing by means of side arms, hammers, bayonets and starving people to death in prisons and in multiple dwelling-houses in villages transformed into places of detention and tortures.

15/5/95

DEF

Move freely and get informed. You will also be informed of many horrors. Don't be afraid of publishing what you will have seen and heard, you will see that RPF will be afraid and since it is cunning, it will use "unfortunate Hutus": Pasteur BIZIMUNGU, the Prime Minister, Minister for Home Affairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to condemn other Hutus. Oh poor Martyrs! However, no one should pity for them, they blundered themselves and they persist and sign!!!

RPF is an excellent ventriloquist!!! Never or seldom have we heard the Tutsi defending the undefendable; RPF has delegated the Hutu, WELL MANIPULATED!! since it knows perfectly well that it is not worth trusting. Remember RUKEBA, the chairman of UNAR 1960. He was a Hutu of Cyangugu as Twagiramungu. Is it by simple coincidence?!!! No, RPF has found good moderate Interahamwe, since for RPF and its media partisans, any Hutu is, from now on, Interahamwe. What a synonym!! And then? Then these moderate interahamwe must condemn interahamwe, for RPF this is more credible. What a cowardice!! if these manipulated Hutus were courageous, they would resign to let Tutsis alone be responsible for these crimes.

Unfortunately, one would say that they have been openly cut!!! If they dare to do so, they know their fate. They will be called genociders, killers, dirty extremist Hutus and then arrested!!!!!!!!!!!!

These people must be assisted because they are dead alive, the unfortunates! To help them would also be to assist persons in danger and this is not a joke!! Their reanimation, though late, would also support the positive action of Peace of NGOs and UN Organisations.

The cure for Rwanda is too simple that none is willing to administer it : Truth and only the truth. This has been lacking since 1 October 1990 and we are now living the consequences. We shouldn't despair, it is never not too late to do a good thing and better late than never.

We encourage and wish you good luck.

Rwandese living abroad

N.B. Mister RUKEBA was the apparent chairman of UNAR as Mister KANYARENGWE is presently the apparent chairman of RPF.

13/05 '95 18:19

11267

KABALI

INFO UNAMIR FHQ

FROM: MILOB SECT 5

TO: MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

DATE: 13 MAY 95

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF THE GISENYI BORDER POST STATUS

1. Refer your letter dated 12 May 95 on the above subject, the clarifications sought for are follows:

a) The restriction has been in force since November 94.

b) The reasons for which UNAMIR civilian and military persons are barred from going across to Zaire are as follows:

* UNAMIR has no mandate in Zaire, and therefore the Zairian government sees no reason as to why UNAMIR persons, in their official capacity should come to Zaire. It is pertinent to point out here that, UNAMIR persons can still go across to Zaire as sightseers or tourists using their diplomatic passport.

* The presence of the Kibumba, Katali and Kidaho camps in the vicinity of Goma with their confirmed interhamwe presence, makes it undesirable for the UNAMIR to come to Goma. They could become targets of the former government who see them as the eyes of the government in power in Rwanda(sic).

* Somewhere during last Oct/Nov, leaflets with message for refugees in the camps were supposedly dropped from UNAMIR aircrafts into the Goma camps. This reportedly led to unrest in the camps and was strongly resented by the Zairian Government.

This impasse could be solved if dialogue is initiated at the higher levels with the Zairian Government.

c) It may be realised that the current situation in the country, sensitivity of the Zairian border and the frequent interhamwe activities from the camps makes the security at the border checkpoint extremely suspicious and stringent. On the 11th of May, three UNHCR security persons from Goma crossed the border on their way to UNHCR Gisenyi. One of them, Jacoba Hartman, a new arrival to Goma was in possession of a document which made a political statement issued by the camp leaders in Goma, expressing their desire to return to Rwanda and expressing their solidarity with a newly formed political

② COS

Suggest 4th
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to alter re:

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AFC

1. ref att.

2. For perusal please

Recommend we maintain

Status quo with regards

Gisenyi Border Post

Sol. Hunt
ops
14/5

Ref Adv
UNAMIR

G6

party in Rwanda, which is sympathetic to their views. The lady in question says that this leaflet was distributed some days back and there was nothing secret about it. In fact she claims that she was not aware that it could have other implications in Rwanda. In light of what has been stated before it is obvious that the RPA did not share the same view as her and those of her other companions. Under instructions from higher HQ they detained all three persons for the night in Gisenyi UNHCR house and had them go upto Ruhengeri/Kigali to explain themselves. Negotiations by UNHCR chief Goma, UNHCR Gisenyi and MILOBS earlier, had no effect. The matter has now been resolved today with the intervention of the special envoy UNHCR. The concerned persons have been released and allowed to go back to Goma.

b) The reasons for which UNAMIR civilian and military persons are barred from going across to Zaire.

* UNAMIR has no mandate in Zaire. The Zairian government sees no reason as to why UNAMIR persons, in their official capacity, should be allowed to cross. It is pertinent to point out here that, UNAMIR persons can still go across to Zaire as sightseers or tourists using their diplomatic passport.

ASHOK BARKAR
MAJ
FOR SET COMD

* The presence of the Kibumba, Katoli and Kibanga camps in the vicinity of Goma with their confirmed inter-hamwe presence, makes it undesirable for the UNAMIR to come to Goma. They could become targets of the former government who see them as the eyes of the government in power in Rwanda (sic).

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COPY FOR DFC/CMO

FAX

FROM: MILOB SECT 5

TO: MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

DATE: 13 MAY 95

DATE: 11 MAY 95

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF THE GISENYI BORDER POST STATUS

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
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G6
18/5/95

party in Rwanda, which is sympathetic to their views. The lady in question says that this leaflet was distributed some days back and there was nothing secret about it. In fact she claims that she was not aware that it could have any other implications in Rwanda. In light of what has been stated before it is obvious that the RPA did not share the same view as her and those of her other companions. Under instructions from higher hq they detained all three persons for the night in Gisenyi UNHCR house and had them go upto Ruhengeri/Kigali to explain themselves. Negotiations by UNHCR chief Goma, UNHCR Gisenyi and MILOBS earlier, had no effect. The matter has now been resolved today with the intervention of the special envoy UNHCR. The concerned persons have been released and allowed to go back to Goma.



ASHOK SARKAR
MAJ
FOR SET COMD

13/05 '95 18:19

011267

KABALI

001

FAX

INFO UNAMIR FHR

DCMO

500 at one copy for ANA/DFC

FROM: MILOB SECT 5

TO: MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

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
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G6-1000
23/05/95

~~party in Rwanda, which is sympathetic to their views.~~
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ASHOK SARKAR
MAJ
FOR SET COMD

MEMORANDUM

DFC (THRU DCOS OPS)

INCIDENT LIST

1. THIS IS A QUICK SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS OCCURRED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BETWEEN 15 AND 30 APR. IT REPRESENTS THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INSTANCES AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED AS WE CAN EVALUATE ONLY THAT WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED.

2. DEATHS: THERE HAVE BEEN 17 REPORTED INCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATHS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. 9 INCIDENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RPA IN THE COMMUNES AND INVOLVING 35 PEOPLE;
- B. 4 SEPARATE INCIDENTS WERE ATTRIBUTED TO THE RPA IN THE IDP CAMPS INCLUDING THE FINAL KIBEHO SHOOTING. THE FIRST 3 INVOLVED 23 PEOPLE KILLED.
- C. 4 INCIDENTS OUTSIDE OF THE IDP CAMPS WERE ATTRIBUTED TO MOBS WITH BETWEEN 19 AND 24 PEOPLE KILLED.
- D. DURING THIS PERIOD THERE WERE 3 INCIDENTS (NONE REPORTED IN THE IDP CAMPS) AGAINST THE RPA WHICH RESULTED IN 3 SOLDIERS BEING KILLED AND 3 INJURED.

3. VIOLENCE RESULTING IN INJURY: THERE WERE 22 REPORTS IN TOTAL:

- A. 14 AGAINST IDPs. 8 BY THE RPA OUTSIDE THE IDP CAMPS AND INVOLVING 8 IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS AND SEVERAL HUNDRED WHO HAVE NOT BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED. IN THE 4 INCIDENTS PERPETRATE BY THE RPA IN THE IDP CAMPS, MORE THAN 700 PEOPLE WERE INJURED. LASTLY IN THE 4 MOB INCIDENTS, THERE WERE AT LEAST 20 PEOPLE INJURED.
- B. 5 INCIDENTS WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE RPA AGAINST PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNES AND RESULTED IN MORE THAN 33 PEOPLE BEING INJURED.
- C. THERE WERE 3 INCIDENTS AGAINST THE RPA RESULTING IN 3 INJURIES.

4. ARRESTS: THERE HAVE BEEN 27 REPORTED INSTANCES OF ARREST:

- A. 1 INCIDENT IN THE IDP CAMPS RESULTING IN THE ARREST OF 2 PEOPLE BEFORE THE KIBEHO INCIDENT. THERE ARE NO FIGURES FOR HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED DURING OR FOLLOWING KIBEHO.
- B. 13 INCIDENTS AGAINST IDPs IN THE COMMUNES INVOLVING MORE THAN A 1000 PEOPLE.
- C. 13 INCIDENTS AGAINST 920 UNSPECIFIED PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNES.

5. HARASSMENT:

- A. THERE WERE 2 CONFIRMED INCIDENTS OF RPA HARASSING/ ABUSING IDPs AND MANY MORE BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
- B. THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 INCIDENTS OF THE RPA HARASSING/ ABUSING PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNES.

*Mr. Make copy
Mr. Sam
- See me - Why -
msg in between.
JH
25/5-
DSC/am*

*Don't
Jai*

*G15 - INCIDENT
8/5/95*

G6 - incident

6. ACCESS: THERE HAVE BEEN 5 REPORTED INCIDENTS OF RPA OBSTRUCTING UN PERSONNEL PERFORMING THEIR DUTY.

7. THEFT: THERE HAVE BEEN 7 INCIDENTS OF THEFT AGAINST THE UN BY PEOPLE BELIEVED TO BE RPA AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF TIMES THAT THE RPA HAVE BEEN ACCUSED/SUSPECTED OF ROBBING FROM LOCALS/IDPs.



GK LEDUC
CAPT
G2 COLL

4 May 96

INCIDENTS INVOLVING RWANDESE AUTHORITIES

SECTOR 2

ARREST 04/18/95 MULINDI 7667

GHANBATT REPORTED ON 18 APR THAT A WOMAN, NYIRAHIRE ARNESTIN TOLD THENM THAT HER HUSBAND NTAMUSCO-BORA IGNANCE (HUTU) AND TWO OTHER HUTU MEN HAD BEEN ARRESTED ON 16 APR AT MULINDI GR 7667 BY THE GENDARMIE AND THE GITUKU CONSEILLIER. WOMAN ALLEGES THAT SHE LEFT MULINDI DUE TO HARASSMENT AND ARREST OF HUTUs BY THE LOCAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. HER HUSBAND WAS ARRESTED BY THE GITUKU CONSEILLIER WHEN HE CALIM TO VISIT HIS WIFE. HUSBAND WAS LATER RELEASED DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE BUT WHEREABOUTS OF THE OTHER TWO MEN IS NOT KNOWN.

ATTACK 04/19/95 KABARI II 6170

SECTOR 2 HQ REPORTED, ON 19 APRIL 95, A WOMAN REPORTED TO GHANBATT HQ LOCATION IN KIBUNGO WITH SEVERE AND DEEP CUTS ON HER HEAD. HER HUSBAND WAS ALSO INJURED IN THE ATTACK. THE ASSAULT WAS COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL MILITIA; TWO OF WHOM WERE IDENTIFIED BY NAME. THEY CARRIED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, A MATCHET, GRENADES AND AXES.

ATTACK 04/23/95 NGENDA 0644

MILOBS GP HQ REPORTED, ON 23 APR 95, RPA TROOPS IN NGENDA GR 0644, FIRED ABOUT 15 ROUNDS AT TWO IDPS WHO TRIED TO ESCAPE FROM A CONVOY OF IDP TRUCKS ON THEIR WAY TO GASHORA. THE ESCAPE OCCURED AT APPROX 1600 HRS NEAR THE GHANBATT POSITION, THE EXTENT OF INJURIES TO THE IDPS IS UNKNOWN AS GHANBATT PATROL WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY TRACE OF BLOOD OR BODIES/PEOPLE. A WOMEN ALSO TRIED TO ESCAPE, BUT WAS ARRESTED BY THE RPA AND IS BEING DETAINED IN THE COMMUNE HOLDING FACILITY IN NGENDA.

HARASSMENT 04/25/95 NGENDA 0644

MILOB HQ REPORTED ON 25 APR 95 THAT THE RPA IN NGENDA GR 0644 REFUSED TO ALLOW IDPS TO DISEMBARK FROM THEIR TRUCKS UNTIL THEY HAD RECEIVED AUTHORITY FROM THE BOURGERMEISTER. THE IDPS HAD BEEN ON THE TRUCKS FOR FIVE DAYS WITHOUT FOOD AND WATER.

ARREST 04/26/95 NGENDA 0644

MILOBS SECTOR 2 REPORTED, ON 26 APR 95, THAT 200 IDP AT NGENDA TRANSIT CAMP GR 0644 HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND ACCUSED WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE.

ARREST 04/27/95 GAHARA 5442

MILOB SECTOR 2, ON 27 APR 95, REPORTED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE SECTOR REMAINED GENERALLY CALM AND THAT AT GAHARA GR 5442 ARRESTS WERE BEING CONDUCTED OF ALL MALE RETURNEES OVER 15 YRS OLD FROM THE KIBEHO CAMP.

ARREST 04/28/95 MUGESERA 4764

MILOB SECTOR 2 REPORTED ON 28 APR THAT THEY HAD BEEN DENIED AT GUNPOINT, PASSAGE BEYOND THE CHECKPOINT AT MUGESERA GR 4764 AND AT THE COMMUNE OFFICES IN GAHARA GR 5442, THE RPA GUARD REFUSED TO TELL THEM HOW MANY PRISONERS WERE IN THE COMMUNE JAIL AND THE REASON FOR THEIR ARRESTS.

ARREST 04/28/95 NYARABUYE 8754

MILOB SECTOR 2 REPORTED ON 28 APR THAT FIVE POEPLER HAD BEEN ARRESTED AT NYARUBUYE GR 8754 AND THAT THE PEOPLE ARE BEING HELD AT THE RPA IN NYARUBUYE.

SECTOR 3

ATTACK 04/17/95 SECTOR 3

MILOBS SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 17 APR 95, ON 10 APRIL 95 ONE MAN WAS SEVERELY INJURED WHILE TRYING TO PROTECT HIS LIVESTOCK FROM THEFT. THE MAN WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD AND BOTH HIS ARMS WERE BROKEN. THIS INFORMATION WAS CONFIRMED AT THE KIBUYE HOSPITAL.

TWO OTHER PATIENTS WERE ADMITTED FOR GUNSHOT WOUNDS BUT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS ON THEIR CASES FOR FEAR OF RPA REPRISAL.

HARASSMENT 04/18/95 GITARAMA 7370

MILOBS SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 18 APR 95, MILOBS ACCOMPANIED A HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM TO GITARAMA PRISON WHERE THEY WERE INFORMED THAT MORE THAN 25 INMATES WERE INJURED BY BRICKS THROWN INTO THE COURTYARD IN THE NIGHTS OF 13, 14, AND 15 APR 95. MILOBS WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH RPA LO SINCE RPA TROOPS ARE THE ONLY PERSONS AUTHORISED TO GET CLOSER TO THE WALLS. PRISON CONDITIONS WERE REPORTED WORSE THAN BEFORE AND THERE HAD BEEN 30 DEATHS BETWEEN 13 AND 18 APR 95. MANY PRISONERS WERE OBSERVED BEING AT THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE.

ATTACK 04/18/95 MUSHUNGWE ISL 0853

MILOBS SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 18 APRIL 95, MILOBS PATROLLED FROM KIBUYE THE BUTEMBO SECTOR (GR 1254). THEY WERE INFORMED THAT THE RPA CLEARED MUSHUNGWE ISLAND (GR 0853) OF PEOPLE TWO WEEKS AGO. ALSO, ABOUT 216 RETURNEES WERE SEEN SLEEPING IN A COMMON CENTRE INSTEAD OF THEIR HOUSES FOR FEAR OF RPA.

HARASSMENT 04/21/95 SECTOR 3

SECTOR 3 HQ, ON 21 APR 95, REPORTED THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION CONTINUES OUT OF CONTROL. THE READINESS OF NEIGHBOURS TO HAVE OTHER NEIGHBOURS INCARCERATED INCREASES DAILY IN THE VACUUM CREATED BY THE LACK OF A JUSTICE SYSTEM. CIVIL AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE CONTROL OVER THE ARMED ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE YOUNG SOLDIERS WHO CARRY OUT MOST OF THE ARRESTS SEEM TO HAVE ALLOWED POWER TO GO TO THEIR HEADS. THEY ALSO REPORTED THAT TWO OF THEIR INTERPRETERS HAVE BEGUN TO BE HARRASSED BY RPA ELEMENTS.

HARASSMENT 04/24/95 BUTARE 7111

SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 24 APR 95, THE GUARD COMMANDER OF THE PLATOON GUARDING THE STADIUM IN BUTARE YESTERDAY NOTICED A PATTERN IN THE SCREENING BY THE RPA; THEY REMOVED ANYONE WHO LOOKED HEALTHY OR IN ANY WAY DIFFERENT FROM THE AVERAGE IDP. THERE WERE SPORADIC SHOTS FIRED INSIDE THE STADIUM THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

ATTACK 04/19/95 BIRAMBO 4673

MILOB SECTOR 3A REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT THE LOCALS IN BIRAMBO GR 4673 AND BWAKIRA GR 5052 BELIEVE THAT THE INCIDENTS OF BANDITRY ARE BEING COMMITTED BY RPA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THERE WAS NO EXPLANATION WHY THE LOCALS HAVE THIS BELIEF.

DEATH 04/19/95 BWIKIRA

CIVPOL SECTOR 3A REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT LOCALS IN BWAKIRA COMMUNE CLAIM THAT THE RPA KILLED A MR GATESABO ON 12 APR 95 IN THE TOWN CENTRE. REASON FOR THE ARREST/MURDER IS NOT KNOWN.

ARREST 04/19/95 KAVUMU 334542

CIVPOL SECTOR 3A REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT A SECTION OF RPA SOLDIERS ARRESTED FIVE PEOPLE IN KAVUMU SECTEUR GR 334542 ON 16 APR 95. THOSE

ARRESTED WERE MUNYANKIMDI, PASCAL BAYAVUGE, MATIMA, BIZIMAMA AND PHOCAS. THEY WERE TAKEN TO GAKUTA GR 295526 EXCEPT MUNYANKIMDI WHO IS HELD IN KAVUMU. ALL ARE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE BUT LOCALS SAY THE MEN ARE INNOCENT.

ARRESTS 04/19/95 MUYUNZWE 6260

MILOB SECTOR 3A REPORTED ON 19 APR THAT SINCE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES HAVE CEASED THEIR PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN (FOR THE WEEK OF NATIONAL MOURNING), ARRESTS HAVE STARTED AGAIN IN MUYUNZWE GR 6260. 20 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED IN SEVERAL DAYS.

DEATH 04/19/95 RUBAGANO 4266

MILOBS GP HQ REPORTED, ON 19 APR 95, RPA TROOPS IN RUBAGANO (GR 4266) IN SECTOR 3A WERE REPORTED TO HAVE SHOT DEAD A LOCAL WHEN HE ANSWERED A KNOCK ON HIS DOOR WITH A MACHETTE IN HIS HAND.

HARASSMENT 04/19/95 RUTONDE 5780

MILOBS SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 19 APR 95, PATROLS TO RUTONDE VILLAGE (GR 5780) IN THE KIVUMU COMMUNE WERE INFORMED THAT RPA TROOPS DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES WERE HARASSING LOCALS AFTER EVERY VISIT BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL. LOCALS ALLEGED THAT RPA TROOPS APPROACHED LOCALS WHO WERE INTERVIEWED BY MILOBS AND DEMANDED A LIST OF QUESTIONS ASKED. RPA TROOPS OFTEN TRIED TO TELL THE LOCALS THAT UNAMIR WAS NO GOOD FOR RWANDA.

MILOB FURTHER REPORTED THAT LOCALS CLAIM THAT ARRESTS ARE COMMON IN THE AREA AND THAT THE RPA NOW BIND THOSE ARRESTED AND DRAG THEM THROUGH THE STREETS AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THOSE IMPLICATED IN GENOCIDE.

DEATH 04/20/95 RUBABANO 4266

MILOBS SECTOR 3 REPORTED, ON 20 APR 95, A TEAM FROM KIBUYE WENT TO RUGABANO (GR 4266). THE TEAM REPORTED THAT EARLY IN THE MORNING ON 25 MARCH 95 THE RPA CAME TO THE HOUSE OF MR. GATERA ILDEPHONSE, 47, HUTU, WHO PANICKED AND RAN OUT TO THE BUSH. HE WAS WOUNDED BY A GUNSHOT AND CARRIED BACK TO THE HOUSE BY RPA WHERE THEY SLIT HIS THROAT.

IN A SUBSEQUENT REPORT, MILOBS STATED THAT APPARENTLY THE MAN WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING A COW AND SELLING THE MEAT. HE DENIED THE CHARGE BUT PAID FOR THE COW TO AVOID ARREST. ON 25 MAR 95, THE RPA CAME TO HIS HOUSE, THE MAN PANICKED AND RAN OUT THE BACK DOOR INTO AN RPA AMBUSH. HE WAS WOUNDED BY A GUNSHOT AND WAS TAKEN

BOTH GROUPS WERE REFUSED ACCESS TO HER ALTHOUGH THEY WERE PERMITTED TO VIEW THE WOMAN AT A DISTANCE. THIS IS UNUSUAL AS IN THE PAST, HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FREE ACCESS TO THE AREA WHERE WOMEN ARE HELD. ICRC WILL BE ASKED TO ASSIST.

ARREST 04/20/95 MURAMA 6749

MILOB SECTOR 3B REPORTED ON 20 APR THAT THEY INVESTIGATED WHY TWO PEOPLE FROM MURAMA GR 6749 AND MASSANGO GR 6254 SOUGHT REFUGE WITH UNAMIR. ONE WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING A COW AND THE OTHER GENOCIDE. BOTH WERE BEING PROSECUTED BY A CIVILIAN LIVING IN KIGALI WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN AN ARREST WARRANT BY THE BOURGERMEISTER AFTER HE CLAIMED TO HAVE IDENTIFIED A MURDERER. THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THE WARRANT WAS SWORN HOWEVER APPEARS TO HAVE ESCAPED AND THE CIVILIAN USED THE WARRANT TO ARREST THE TWO MEN. THE MATTER IS UNDER INVESTIGATION.

HARASSMENT 04/20/95 NTONGWE

MILOB SECTOR 3B REPORTED ON 20 APR THAT A COMBINE MILOB/HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM HAD BEEN REFUSED ACCESS TO THE NTONGWE JAIL DISPISTE LETTERS FROM THE PREFECT AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE. THE RPA GUARD INSISTED ON LETTERS FROM THE VISE PRESIDENT, BDE COMD AND BN COMD.

ARREST 04/20/95 RUKO 7653

MILOB SECTOR 3B REPORTED ON 20 APR 95 THAT THEY VISITED RUKO SECTEUR GR 7653 TO FOLLOW UP ON THE PEOPLE WHO HAD SOUGHT REFUGE AT MILOB HQ AND WHO HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES. THE PATROL WERE UNABLE TO FIND ANYONE AND QUESTIONS TO LOCALS RESULTED IN BLANK LOOKS AND ASSERTIONS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL(S) DID NOT BELONG TO THE SECTEUR. INVESTIGATION CONTINUES. MOST PERSONS FROM OTHER SECTEURS HAVE BEEN LOCATED. ON 20 APR 95 MILOBs VISITED THE COMMUNE JAIL AND FOUND ONE OF THE WOMEN WHO HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT SHE WOULD NOT BE BOTHERED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES (RPA AND PREFECT). THE JAIL WAS REPORTED TO HAVE 42 INMATES.

ATTACK 04/24/95 TUMBA 7110

MILOB SECTOR 3 REPORTED ON 24 APR THAT A MOB ATTACKED RETURNING IDPs. THE LOCAL MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT INSTRUCTED THE MILOB ESCORTING THE IDP HOW TO DO A PROPER ESCORT BUT WHEN HE WAS ASKED TO

IN TO THE HOUSE WHERE HIS THROAT WAS SLIT. THERE WERE FOUR WITNESSES TO THE MURDER, ONE OF WHOM IS READY TO IDENTIFY THE SOLDIER WHO USED THE KNIFE, WHEN THE SOUS-PREFECT WAS INFORMED OF THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS, HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED OF A FORMAL INVESTIGATION AS THE MAN WAS A THIEF ANYWAY.

ARREST 04/27/95 MWENDO 4558

MILOB SECTOR 3A REPORTED ON 27 APR THAT TEACHERS IN MWENDO GR 4558 ARE NERVOUS FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF ONE TEACHER IN THE COMMUNE LAST WEEK. THIS UNREST MAYBE AGRIVATED BY THE LACK OF SALARIES AND TEACHING MATERIAL.

SIMILIAR FEARS WHERE REPORTED FROM RUTSIRO COMMUNE GR 3183 WHERE TEACHERS IN THE COMMUNE ARE ALSO WERE UNEASY DUE TO THE RECENT ARREST OF FIVE TEACHERS FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

ARREST 04/18/95 SUZA 8661

MALICOY ON 18 APR 95 REPORTED VISITING SUZA GR 8661 AND FINDING THAT THE LOCAL WOMEN AND CHILDREN SLEEP IN THE FIELDS DUE TO THE INCREASE NUMBER OF ARRESTS OF YOUNG HUTUS. IDP REPORTEDLY DO NOT COME BACK TO THIS SECTEUR ANY LONGER AND THOSE THAT DID HAVE FLED FOR THE BORDER. LOCALS ADVISE THAT THE AREA HAS MANY INFORMERS HENCE THEY ARE UNWILLING TO SPEAK WITH UNAMIR.

ARRESTS 04/19/95 KAYENZI 8389

MILOB SECTOR 3BA REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT ARRESTS IN KAYENZI COMMUNE GR 8389 CONTINUE AND OFTEN WITHOUT A REASON BEING GIVEN. THE COMMUNE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE RPA SELDOM INFORM THE COMMUNE OFFICE OF WHOM THEY ARREST OR THE REASON WHY.

ATTACK 04/19/95 RUNDA 5892

MILOB SECTOR 3B REPORTED ON 19 APR THAT A PREGANT HUTU WOMAN, AGNES NYRABUSHISHI, WAS SEVERLY BEATEN BY THE RPA ON 4 APR 95 WHILE IN RPA CUSTODY. SHE WAS TAKEN TO A HEALTH CARE CENTRE BUT THE ICRC BUT WAS FORCABLY REMOVED FROM THE CENTRE BY THE RPA ON 16 APR 95. RPA WERE ADVISED THAT THE WOMAN NEEDED HOSPITAL CARE FOR HERSELF AND THE BABY BUT THEY IGNORED THE ADVISE. THE WOMAN WAS PLACED IN THE RUNDA JAIL AND HAS BEEN REFUSED MEDICAL CARE COMPLETELY. HUMAN RIGHTS IS ACTIONING. MILOB REPORTED ON 20 APR THAT THEY HAD ACCOMPANIED HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE PRISON TO SEE THE WOMAN AND

ASSIST IN CALMING THE CROWDS, THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT HE COULD DO NOTHING AS IT WAS A MILITARY MATTER.

SECTOR 4A

ATTACK 04/06/95 KIBEHO

ZAMBATT REPORTED, ON 6 APR 95, THAT AN RPA MOUNTED PATROL WAS STONED BY IDPS AT KIBEHO CAMP (GR 5007) AT 1900 HRS. THE RPA REPLIED BY OPENING FIRE AND ONE FEMALE IDP WAS SHOT IN THE ARM.

HARASSMENT 04/13/95 KIVUGIZA

ZAMBATT REPORTED, ON 13 APR 95, THAT TWENTY RPA SOLDIERS FORCED THE REMAINING AND NEW IDP'S OUT OF KIVUGIZA DP CAMP IN RWAMIKO COMMUNE (GR 4914) AT 0630 HRS ON 13 APR. THE RPA TOLD THE DP'S THEY HAD TO JOIN OTHERS AT KIBEHO WHERE SEVERAL OF THE GROUP HAVE ARRIVED AT THE TIME THE REPORT WAS FILED BY ZAMBATT. THE IDPS WERE TOLD TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY AND WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE THEIR POSSESSIONS. THE RPA WERE REPORTED TO HAVE FOLLOWED THE IDPS FOR SOME DISTANCE AND GIVING THREATS.

DEATH 04/18/95 MUKO 378405

ZAMBATT REPORTED ON 18 APR THAT SIX MEN DRESSED IN UNIFORM ABDUCTED MR MURANGIRA (35), HIS WIFE ROSE (30) AND THEIR CHILD (-1), MR GATORANO AND HIS WIFE BUGIRABABIRI AND A MR NDIBWAMI ON 172000 APR 95. LATER THREE WERE FOUND KNIVED AND DEAD 500 METRERS FROM GATORANO VILLAGE. A WOMAN AND THE CHILD WERE SEVERLY BEATEN AND REQUIRED HOSPITALISATION. NDIBWAMI ESCAPED. MOTIVE FOR THE ATTACK IS NOT KNOWN. THE INCIDENT WAS REPORTED BY JOSEPH MUTIMURA. A SCABBARD AND GRENADE WERE REPORTEDLY FOUND BY LOCALS AT THE PLACE OF KILLING BUT THESE ITEMS WERE RECOVERED BY THE RPA BEFORE ZAMBATT ARRIVED.

DEATH 04/18/95 KIBEHO

AT 0530 HRS ON TUES 18 APRIL 95, APPROX 3 BNS OF RPA SOLDIERS ENCIRCLED THE CAMP AND BEGAN TO CLOSE IN ON THE POPULATION. MANY SHOTS WERE FIRED. THE CAMP POPULATION FLED IN A MASS PANIC TO THE TWO ZAMBATT BASES, IN THE CHAOS 1 WOMAN WAS SHOT IN THE PELVIS BY RPA, AT LAST COUNT 10 PEOPLE DEAD, ALL HAD BEEN TRAMPLED OVER. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT SOME SHELTERS WERE SET AFIRE.

HARASSMENT 04/18/95

NDAGO

AT APPROXIMATELY 0700HRS RPA SURROUNDED THE NDAGO CAMP, TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED, WHICH SENT IDP'S INTO A WIDE SPREAD OF PANIC. HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE ATTEMPTED TO RUN THROUGH THE CONCERTINA WIRE AT ZAMBATT BASE. THE SITUATION THAT FOLLOWED IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF KIBEHO. NO DEATHS REPORTED, HOWEVER HUNDREDS WERE INJURED BY THE CONCERTINA WIRE. RPA ALSO BRIEFED THE PEOPLE ABOUT THE CLOSURE OF THE CAMP.

DEATH

04/19/95

KIBEHO

ZAMBATT REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT THE WATCHMAN FOR THE UNICEF WATER WORKS IN KIBEHO WAS FOUND DEAD IN A PIT LATRINE. IT IS BELIEVED BUT NOT PROVEN THAT THE RPA ARE RESPONSIBLE. MAN IDENTIFIED AS METHEOU ILIBANDUMUGABO.

CIVPOL REPORT OF 20 APR STATED THAT THE MAN WAS SEEN TO BE ARRESTED BY RPA SOLDIERS AND HAVING HAD HIS HANDS TIED BEHIND HIS BACK BEFORE HE DIED.

HARASSMENT 04/19/95

KIBEHO

THE RPA OPENED FIRE IN THE AIR TO SCARE AWAY IDPS WHO HAD STARTED THROWING STONES AT RPA TROOP AT KIBEHO IDP CAMP. ZAMBATT REPORTED, ON 19 APR 95, RPA WHO ARE INVOLVED IN THE CORDON OF DP CAMPS CONTINUE TO DESTROY IDP'S SHELTERS AND LOOT VALUABLES INCLUDING LIVESTOCK.

DEATH

04/20/95

KIBEHO

AT KIBEHO, THE TEAM REPORTED THAT AT 1250 HRS DPS THREW STONES AT RPA WHO OPENED FIRE TO SCARE THE PEOPLE. NO CASUALTIES OCCURRED.

MILOBS 4A REPORTED, ON 21 APR 95, A SHOOTING INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON 20 APR 95 AT 1730 HRS IN KIBEHO DP CAMP. THE DEATH TOLL NOW IS REPORTED TO BE 20 (16 FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS, 2 FROM MACHETE WOUNDS, AND 2 TRAMPLED). 60 DPS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED.

DEATH

04/21/95

KIBEHO

AUSMED, ON 21 APR 95, REPORTED THAT IN KIBEHO CAMP GR 5007 AT APPROX 1610 HRS IT APPEARS RPA ELM FIRED INTO THE CROWD FOR REASONS UNKNOWN. SEVEN PEOPLE WERE INJURED IN THE INCIDENT AND TREATED AT CCP. INJURIES INCLUDED FIVE BALLISTIC, ONE MACHETE AND ONE TRAMPLE INJURY.

DEATH 04/21/95 KAMANA

AT KAMANA GR 5197 TWO PERS WERE SHOT DEAD AND TWO PERS APPREHENDED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RUN AWAY FROM A ROAD BLOCK.

DEATH 04/22/95 KIBEHO

MORNING OF 22 APR 95, IDPS ATTEMPTED TO BREAK THROUGH THE RPA CORDON. THE RPA FIRED ABOVE AND INTO THE CROWD TO ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION. THE NUMBER OF CAS FROM THIS INCIDENT WAS UNCLEAR, AT 221050 AUSMED RECEIVED A CASEVAC FOR 14 IDPS.

AT 221400 HRS THE RPA RE-ESTABLISHED THE CORDON AFTER APPROX 100 IDP WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BROKEN THROUGH. SOME FIRE IMPACTED ON THE WALLS OF THE ZAMBATT LOCATION WHERE AS MSF WERE SHELTERING, ONCE THE FIRE CEASED, THE CROWD CALMED DOWN. AS AT 221500 THE CAS STATE WAS 23, WITH ONE DEAD CAS. AT 221600 CAS BEGAN TO BE MOVED TO RURAL HOSPITALS AND AUSMED.

AT 221730 HRS, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THERE WAS A MASS BREAKOUT. IT WAS ESTIMATED UP TO 5000 IDPS ATTEMPTED TO MOVE IN AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. THE RPA RESPONDED WITH SMALL ARMS, HVY MG AND MORTAR FIRE. THE ZAMBATT COY/AUSMED COMPOUND RECEIVED SNIPER FIRE FROM OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND, IT DID NOT APPEAR ANYONE WAS TARGETED.

THE LATEST REPORT IS THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF DEAD AND MANY MORE INJURED, SOME IDPS ARE ARMED WITH FIREARMS, GRENADES AND MACHETTES AND THE RPA HAVE SEALED OFF THE CAMP.

DEATH 04/23/95 KIBEHO

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 23 APR 95, THERE WAS SPORADIC FIRING HEARD EARLY IN THE MORNING OF 23 APR 95, AROUND THE KIBEHO CAMP. ABOUT 300 IDPS HAVE OCCUPIED THE BUILDING OF THE NGOS, MILOBS BELIEVE THE RPA WILL LAUNCH AN ATTACK TO DISLODGE THE DPS. THE RPA HAVE ARRESTED APPROX 150 MEN ON ALLEGATIONS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE. AT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS REPORT, THE CAMP WAS COMPLETELY CLEARED OF IDPS EXCEPT FOR THE GROUP OCCUPYING THE NGO COMPLEX. THE CASUALTY STATE OF IDPS IS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 5000 DEAD AND 650 WOUNDED.

A LATER REVISED FIGURE PUT DEATHS AT APPROXIMATELY 2000, AND THE NUMBER OF WOUNDED AT MORE THAN 600.

HARASSMENT 04/23/95 GIKONGORO

ZAMBATT REPORTED ON 23 APR 95 THAT SAMUEL HARERIMANA OF UNICEF GIKONGORO HAD HIS MOTOROLA STOLEN AT GUNPOINT DURING THE EVENING/NIGHT OF 22 APR.

THE FOLLOWING DAY, HE WAS STOPPED BY RPA WHILE ENROUTE TO KIBEHO AND TOLD THAT THEY WOULD SOON ARREST HIM AS THEY CLAIM HE WAS COMMUNICATING WITH THE FRGF IN EXILE.

ARREST 04/25/95 GIKONGORO 5827

POLITICAL ACTIVITY SITREP REPORTED, ON 25 APR 95, THAT TWO WORKERS OF A FOREIGN NGO (GOAL) WERE DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING, AFTER SECURITY FORCES FOUND A LETTER IN THEIR CAR WHICH HAD BEEN WRITTEN BY THE FORMER RWANDESE INTERIM PRESIDENT, MR THEODORE SINDIKUBWABO AND WAS ADDRESSED TO THE CHEF DE CAMP OF AN IDP CAMP IN GIKONGORO GR 5827. THE LETTER REPORTEDLY URGED DPS TO RESIST ORDERS TO RETURN HOME.

RADIO RWANDA REPORTED ON 26 APR 95 THAT TWO ZAIRIAN NATIONALS WORKING FOR A FOREIGN NGO AND TWO WHITE PEOPLE INCLUDING AN AUSTRALIAN WOMAN, WERE ARRESTED AND WERE BEING QUESTIONED ABOUT THE LETTER.

HARASSMENT 04/26/95 KIBEHO

ON RADIO RWANDA ON 26 APR 95 IT WAS REPORTED THAT A SECURITY MEETING WAS HELD ON TUESDAY IN BUTARE TO ASSESS THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE RECEPTION OF RETURNEES. SPEAKING AT THE MEETING, THE LOCAL ARMY COMMANDER DENIED THE REPORTS CARRIED BY FOREIGN MEDIA SAYING THAT MASSACRES WERE CARRIED OUT IN KIBEHO. HE EXPLAINED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF KIBEHO EVENTS, SAYING THAT THE CRIMINALS IN KIBEHO CAMP ATTACKED THE SOLDIERS, CAUSING UNAMIR TROOPS AND GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS TO OPEN FIRE IN SELF-DEFENCE AND 200 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN A FIRE EXCHANGE. HE SAID THAT THREE GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND NINE OTHERS WOUNDED AND THAT 30 GUNS AND MANY HANDGRENADES WERE SEIZED FROM THE CRIMINALS IN THE CAMP.

DECEPTION 04/27/95 KIBEHO

ON 27 APR 95 BETWEEN 1900 AND 2300 HRS, THE RPA WERE SEEN CARRYING DEAD BODIES ALONG THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD. WITNESSES COUNTED ABOUT 16 BODIES.

DECEPTION 04/29/95 KIBEHO

ZAMBATT REPORTED, ON 29 APRIL 95, RPA ARE EXHUMING BODIES IN KIBEHO UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND TRANSPORTING THEM OUT OF KIBEHO. NO UNAMIR PERSONEL IS ALLOWED NEAR THE EXHUMATIONS.

DECEPTION 04/30/95 KIBEHO

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 30 APR 95, BETWEEN 292000 AND 300500 HRS, RPA TROOPS WERE OBSERVED IN THE VALLEYS NEAR

KIBEHO CAMP, MILOBS ALSO BELIEVE THEY HEARD DIGGING FROM THE VALLEY, WHICH WAS POSSIBLY BODIES BEING EXHUMED, HOWEVER IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH HOW MANY BODIES WERE EXHUMED DUE TO THE DARKNESS.

RPA TROOPS DENIED A MILOB TEAM ACCESS TO THE LOCATION OF FRESHLY DISTURBED TOP SOIL, WHERE IT IS BELIEVED CORPSES HAVE BEEN EXHUMED.

ZAMBATT REPORTED SIMILIAR ACTIVITY.

SECTOR 4B

ARREST 04/23/95 BUTARE 7111

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 23 APR 95, RPA TROOPS CONTINUED WITH THE FORCED CLOSURE OF IDP CAMPS AT KIBEHO AND MUNINI. THEY ALSO SCREENED IDPS AT THE HUYE STADIUM IN BUTARE, WHERE THEY HAVE ARRESTED IDPS AND TAKEN THEM TO THEIR BARRACKS FOR INTERROGATION. SEVERAL IDPS HAVE HAD PERSONAL EFFECTS CONFISCATED, SUCH AS RADIOS AND MATTRESSES.

ARREST 04/24/95 HUYE 683146

MILOBS SECTOR 4A REPORTED, ON 24 APR 95, IDPS AT HUYE STADIUM AND THE RECEPTION CENTRE CONTINUE ATTRACTING HUNDREDS OF ON LOOKERS SOME OF WHO ARE BEING ALLOWED BY RPA TO CHECK ON KNOWN SUSPECTS ALLEGED TO HAVE KILLED THEIR RELATIVES.

ARREST 04/24/95 RUNYINYA 6012

MILOBS SECTOR 4B REPORTED, ON 24 APR 95, AT RUNYINYA TEAM REPORT 250 IDPS HELD BY RPA INCLUDING TWO WOMEN SUSPECTS OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE. THEY ARE DELIBERATELY BEING DENIED FOOD WHILST ONE WAS FOUND DEAD IN THE CELL PRESUMABLY AFTER SEVERE BEATING.

ATTACK 04/25/95 BUTARE 7111

SECTOR 3 HQ, ON 24 APR 95, REPORTED THAT AT APPROX 1600HRS ON 23 APR A GROUP OF IDPS ON FOOT WAS OBSERVED BEING HARASSED BY CIVILIANS ALONG THE ROAD JUST SOUTH OF BUTARE GR 7111. SEVERAL WERE BLEEDING FROM HEAD WOUNDS CAUSED BY PROJECTILES HURLED AT THEM FROM THE ROADSIDE. MILOBS AT THE SCENE TURNED AND STATIONED THIER CAR TO TRY TO PROTECT THE IDPS. APPROX HALF WAY THROUGH A VILLAGE, THREE CIVILIANS WITH STICKS BEAT THE MOB AWAY FROM THE VEHICLE AND THE CONVOY HALTED UNDER THEIR PROTECTION. THREE MILOB VEHICLES, ONE NGO

VEHICLE AND TWO SENBATT VEHICLES ARRIVED. THE MOB BEGAN TO CLOSE IN AS THE IDPS WERE LOADING INTO THE VEHICLES. STONE THROWING BEGAN IN EARNEST DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CIVILIANS WITH STICKS. THE CROWD ATTACKED THE MILOB VEHICLES AND THE NGO VEHICLE. THOUGH THERE WAS NO SERIOUS DAMAGE, THE COMPLETE LACK OF DETERRENT VALUE OF UN INSIGNIA WAS APPARENT. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT BETWEEN 10 AND 15 IDPS LOST THEIR LIVES IN THIS INCIDENT. SEVERAL SMALL GROUPS OF RPA PASSED BY DURING THE TROUBLE AND DID NOTHING TO ASSIST.

ARREST 04/26/95 NYAKIZU 5796

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 26 APR 95, THAT 468 PEOPLE ARE BEING HELD AT NYAKIZU GR 5796, THE DETAINEES ARE ACCUSED OF TAKING PART IN THE GENOCIDE.

ATTACK 04/26/95 RUNYINYA 6012

MILOB SECTOR 4B REPORTED, ON 26 APR 95, THAT A MAN WAS FOUND ON THE GITARAMA-BUTARE RD, THE MAN CLAIMED HE HAD ESCAPED WITH 70-80 DPS FROM KIBEHO AND HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND BEATEN BY THE RPA AT RUNYINYA GR 6012. THE MAN STATED HE ESCAPED FROM THE RPA AND IS NOW UNDER PROTECTION OF UNAMIR.

ARREST 04/27/95 MARABA 8631

MILOB SECTOR 4B REPORTED ON 27 APR THAT THERE WERE 238 PEOPLE INCLUDING 8 WOMEN AND 8 CHILDREN IN THE MARABA JAIL. HOW MANY OF THESE ARE RETURNING IDPS IS NOT KNOWN.

ARREST 04/27/95 MBAZI 7117

MILOB SECTOR 4B REPORTED ON 27 APR THAT THE BOURGERMEISTER FOR MBAZI GR 7117 SAYS THAT 9 RETURNING IDPS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED WHILE THE RPA CLAIM THAT THERE WERE ONLY 5. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 100 PEOPLE BEING DETAINED IN THE COMMUNE JAIL.

ATTACK 04/27/95 RUSATIRA 6097

MILOB SECTOR 4B, ON 27 APR 95, REPORTED THAT AT RUSATIRA GR 6097 FOUR IDPS WERE MURDERED BY A MOB OF LOCALS. 10 OTHER RETURNEES WERE INJURED IN THE ATTACK. 10 RETURNEES HAD ALSO BEEN ARRESTED IN THE TOWN.

ARREST 04/28/95 RUHASHYA 6926

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT RUHASHYA COMMUNE GR 6926, 1 IDP WAS KILLED BY HOSTILE LOCALS AND 50 WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA, THIS BROUGHT THE TOTAL OF DETAINEES IN THE COMMUNE PRISON TO 165. IT IS REPORTED THAT 1347 IDPS HAVE RETURNED TO THE PRISON.

ARREST 04/28/95 RUSATIRA 7138

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT NYABISINDU GR 7128, 4 IDPS WERE KILLED AND 10 HOSPITALIZED FROM INJURIES CAUSED BY HOSTILE LOCALS. 10 OTHER IDPS HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN THE COMMUNE PRISON. IT IS REPORTED A TOTAL OF 2500 IDPS RETURNED TO THE COMMUNE.

ARREST 04/28/95 SHYANDA 7418

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT SHYANDA COMMUNE GR 7418, 150 IDPS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RPA.

SECTOR 4C

DEATH 04/15/95 BUGARAMA 9002

MILOBS SECTOR 4C REPORTED, ON 15 APRIL 95, THE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY CALM DURING THE PERIOD. AT ABOUT 1900HRS, 3 MEN AND 1 WOMAN SOUGHT PROTECTION OF THE MILOBS IN BUGARAMA. THEY WERE AFRAID OF BEING KILLED, DURING THE NIGHT, BY GENDARMERIES. THEY INFORMED MILOBS THAT, ON 14 APRIL 95, 11 LOCALS WERE KILLED BY THE GENDARME AROUND 1500 HRS. MILOBS INVESTIGATED THIS REPORT.

MILOBS SECTOR 4C REPORTED, ON 18 APRIL 95, MILOBS ALONG WITH HR INVESTIGATED THE BUGARAMA INCIDENT REPORTED ON 14 APR 95. THE GENDARMERIE, RPA, BOURGMESTRE AND ONE OF THE INTERAHAMWE ARRESTED WERE INTERVIEWED. DETAILS ARE THAT THE GENDARMERIE WAS INFORMED AT APPROX 1000HRS OF SOME SUSPICIOUS PERSONS IN A HOUSE. RPA AND GENDARMERIE WENT TO THE HOUSE AND ORDERED THE OCCUPANTS TO COME OUT. ACCORDING TO THE CAPTURED INTERAHAMWE, THEY STARTED FIRING FROM INSIDE THE HOUSE KILLING ONE GENDARME AND INJURING ANOTHER. RPA/GENDARMES ALSO RETURNED FIRE KILLING 3 OF THE INFILTRATORS AND INJURING 2 OTHERS. FOUR OF THEM ESCAPED TO THE NEARBY FOREST. THERE WERE IN ALL 9 PERSONS IN THE HOUSE; 4 X RWANDESE, 3 X ZAIREANS AND 2 X BURUNDESE. RPA RETRIEVED 2 X AUTOMATIC

ARREST 04/28/95 GISHAMVU 6505

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT GISHAMVU COMMUNE GR 6505, NYAKUZU GR 5696 AND RUNYINYA GR 6012, THE LOCALS EXPRESSED FEAR DUE TO A LACK OF SECURITY, AS THE RPA WAS ARRESTING IDPS AT RANDOM.

ARREST 04/28/95 MARABA 8631

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT MARABA COMMUNE GR 8631, 244 IDPS WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA, THIS INCLUDES 8 WOMEN AND 8 CHILDREN.

ARREST 04/28/95 MBAZI 7117

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT MBAZI COMMUNE GR 7117, 20 IDPS HAVE BEEN ARREST BY THE RPA, HOWEVER LOCAL INFORMED MILOBS THAT MORE IDPS WERE BEING HELD IN THE COMMUNE PRISON.

ARREST 04/28/95 MUGUSA 8425

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT MUGUSA GR 8425, 30 IDPS ARE DETAINED IN THE COMMUNE PRISON.

ARREST 04/28/95 MUSANGE 690095

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THE RPA CONTINUE THE ARREST OF PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING IN THE GENOCIDE. AN RPA SECTION DEPLOYED TO MUSANGE GR 690095, WAS REPORTED TO BE HOSTILE TOWARDS UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND WAS NOT ALLOWING IDPS TO SETTLE IN THEIR HOMES WITHIN THE AREA.

ARREST 04/28/95 MUYAGA 9026

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT MUYAGA GR 9026, THE RPA HAVE ARRESTED 10 IDPS.

ARREST 04/28/95 MUYIRA 8639

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT MUYIRA GR 8639, THE RPA ARRESTED 154 IDPS.

ARREST 04/28/95 NTYAZO 8631

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 28 APR 95, THAT AT NTYAZO GR 8631, THE RPA HAVE ARRESTED 89 IDPS, THESE INCLUDE 7 WOMEN AND A 13 YEAR OLD BOY.

RIFLES, AMMO, 6 X GRENADES, 1 X MACHETTE AND SOME UNIFORMS FROM THE HOUSE.

DEATH 04/16/95 NYABISHUNGU 9112

MILOB GP HQ REPORTED, ON 16 APR 95, MILOB SECTOR 4C WERE INFORMED ON 14 APR 95 AT ABOUT 1100-1230 HRS, 8 BANDITS ATTACKED 2 RPA SOLDIERS IN THE NYABISHUNGU AREA (GR 910 120), ONE RPA SOLDIER WAS KILLED AND ONE WAS INJURED. THE SAME DAY BETWEEN 1300 AND 1500 HRS APPROX 20 RPA SOLDIERS CAME TO THE AREA TAKING 17 LOCAL MALE CIVILIANS FROM THE ROAD TO THE BANKS OF THE RUBYIRO RIVER (AT GR 9112) AND SHOT THEM ALL. ONLY ONE PERSON SURVIVED. A MILOBS TEAM WENT TO THE SPOT WHERE THE KILLINGS TOOK PLACE, APPROX 2 KM EAST OF NYABISHUNGO VILLAGE, AND FOUND 16 RECENTLY DEAD BODIES. SOME AK-47 AMMUNITION WAS SEEN AT THE LOCATION. RETURNING FROM THE SITE, THEY MET 5 RPA SOLDIERS WITH 1 OFFR (CAPT) AND THE BURGOMESTRE OF BUGARAMA COMMUNE PROCEEDING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE KILLING GROUND.

ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 APR 95, A LOCAL MAN CAME TO A MILOB LOCATION AND INFORMED THEM THAT THE RPA HAD PUT 5 MEN INTO PRISON, AMONG THEM WERE THE LOCALS THAT HAD ORIGINALLY INFORMED MILOBS OF THE INCIDENT ON 14 AND 15 APR.

COMMENT: THE REPORTS FROM BUGARAMA AND NYABISHUNGU MAYBE THE SAME INCIDENT.

HARASSMENT 04/20/95 BUGARAMA 4329

MILOBS SECTOR 4C REPORTED, ON 20 APR 95, BUGARAMA TEAM WAS INFORMED BY THE LOCAL PO[PULATION THAT RPA THROW GRENADES INTO THE HOUSES. THE LOCAL POPULATION IS AFRAID OF RPA ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

ARREST 04/22/95 KIRAMBO 0444

CPMT KIBUYE REPORTED, ON 22 APR 95, THAT 10 LOCALS WERE ARRESTED AT KIRAMBO ON 18 APR 95. AFTER BEING ARRESTED THE LOCALS WERE TAKEN TO THE MARKET PLACE AT GITAKA, PUBLICLY BEATEN, THEN TAKEN TO KIYEMZI RPA CAMP.

SECTOR 5

DEATH 04/18/95 BUNYOVE 3124

MILOBS GP HQ REPORTED, ON 18 APRIL 95, RPA IN THE NIGHT 15/16 APR 95, CONDUCTED A CORDON AND SEARCH

EXERCISE AT BUNYOVE CELLULE (GR 3124). THIS WAS BASED ON INFORMATION THAT SOME INFILTRATORS WERE HIDING THERE. DURING THE SEARCH, A SUSPECTED INTERAHAMWE THREW A GRENADE KILLING ONE RPA SOLDIER AND WOUNDING ANOTHER SERIOUSLY. HE WAS LATER SHOT DEAD WHEN HE TRIED TO ESCAPE. THE OWNER OF THE HOUSE IN WHICH THE SUSPECT WAS HIDING WAS ALSO SHOT DEAD DURING THE EXCHANGES.

DEATH 04/20/95 KIBAVU

MILOB SECTOR 5 REPORTED ON 20 APR THAT A LOCAL NAMED BUDONI HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE AREA OF KIBAVU GR 3023 BY RPA DURING A DRUNKEN BRAWL.

ARREST 04/25/95 MURUNDA 3088

MILOB SECTOR 5 RPEORTED ON 25 APR THAT A LOCALS IN MURUNDA COMMUNE GR 3088 SAY THAT ARRESTS ARE FREQUENT AND TORTURES ARE BEING CONDUCTED.

SECTOR 6

THEFT 04/15/95 KIGALI 0783

CIVPOL REPORTED, ON 15 APRIL 95, AT ABOUT 0930 HRS, 6 ARMED PERSONS IN MILITARY UNIFORM AND 4 IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES USING A TOYOTA SALOON VEH. ATTACKED THE RESIDENCE OF ONE HOLLAND SAMUEL, CHIEF OF THE MISSION OF THE SALVATION ARMY (AN NGO OPERATING IN THE COUNTRY).

ATTACK 04/17/95 KIGALI 0783

AUSMED REPORTED, ON 17 APR 95, THAT AT 170037B APR 95 AN UNKNOWN LOCAL MAN WAS OBSERVED ARGUING WITH RPA GUARDS OUTSIDE THE RPA BARRACKS OPPOSITE CHK. VERY SHORTLY AFTER A SINGLE SHOT, POSSIBLY A PISTOL SHOT, WAS HEARD FROM WITHIN THE RPA COMPOUND. FURTHER, AT 0100 HRS ANOTHER SHOT WAS HEARD, AT 0146 HRS FOUR SHOTS IN QUICK SUCCESSION WERE HEARD. AT 0302 HRS ANOTHER TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED. IT WAS REPORTED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE REACTION FROM THE RPA GUARDS THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD.

THEFT 04/17/95 KIGALI

MP COY REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT TWO MEN DRESSED IN UNIFORM STOLE AT GUNPOINT, UNAMIR VEICLE 1107, FROM THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE MEN MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF THE RPA GUARD AT THE HOTEL.

ARREST 04/19/95 KIGALI

CIVPOL REPORTED ON 19 APR 95 THAT AN UNDP LOCAL EMPLOYEE WAS ARRESTED ON 18 APR AND IS BEING HELD AT THE NYAMIRAMBO GENDARMIE BRIGADE. REASON FOR ARREST IS NOT KNOWN.

ATTACK 04/20/95 KIGALI

AUSMED REPORTED ON 20 APR THAT THEY OBSERVED THE RPA ARREST AN LOCAL CIVILIAN IN FRONT OF THE AUSMED BARRACKS. THE MAN WAS TRAVELLING IN HIS VEHICLE WHEN HE WAS STOPPED BY AN RPA SOLDIER. THE DRIVER EXITED HIS VEHICLE AND SPOKE TO THE SOLDIER IN KINYARWANDAN. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE SOLDIER SHOT THE MAN IN THE LEG. THE MAN WAS TAKEN BY THE RPA TO THE RPA BARRACKS.

THEFT 04/22/95 KIGALI 0783

MP COY REPORTED, ON 22 APR 95, THAT THE RPA FORCED THEIR WAY INTO THE CHEZ LANDO HOTEL, THE RPA LEFT AFTER BEING CONFRONTED BY MPS.

THEFT 04/23/95 KIGALI

MP COY REPORTED ON 23 APR THAT THREE RPA SOLDIERS WERE CAUGHT ATTEMPTING TO ROB A UNAMIR RESIDENCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE MERIDIAN HOTEL. THE SOLDIERS WERE TAKEN TO THE MP COY LOCATION WHERE THEY WERE TO BE QUESTIONED. A RPA VEHICLE WITH PERHAPS 10 SOLDIERS ENTERED THE MP COMPOUND AND DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED RPA SOLDIERS. AN IMPASS WAS REACHED AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO COMMIT THE RRF TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. THE SOLDIERS AND THEIR WEAPONS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE RPA SECTION AND THE GOODS CAPTURED WERE GIVEN TO THE GENDARMARIE WHO ARE INVESTIGATING THE CASE.

THEFT 04/24/95 KIGALI 0783

CIVPOL REPORTED, ON 24 APR 95, ON 23 APR AT ABOUT 2000 HRS, 4 MEN, 2 IN FINE CIVILIAN SUITS AND 2 OTHERS IN RPA UNIFORM, ROBBED ONE DR. DRECHSLER FRIZ HELMUT, A GERMAN NATIONAL AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL COOPERATION (GTZ), KIGALI.

THEFT 04/26/95 KIGALI

MP COY REPORTED ON 25 APR THAT SIX ARMED MEN (FOUR IN RPA UNIFORMS AND TWO IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING) ROBBED THE HUMAN RIGHTS RESIDENCE NEAR ST FAMILIE CHURCH. THE NIGHT GUARD CLAIMS THAT THE GROUP

ARRIVED IN A UNAMIR PICKUP TRUCK AND SAID THEY HAD A MESSAGE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM. WHEN THE GATE WAS UNLOCKED, THEY FORCED THEIR WAY IN AND THREATENED THE PEOPLE WITH THEIR RIFLES. THEY TOOK TWO UN VEHICLES (HR 1917 AND HR 1957), TWO HANDHELD MOTOROLAS, TWO COMPUTERS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS AND MONEY.

THEFT

04/27/95

KIGALI

MP COY REPORTED ON 27 APR THAT FOUR PERSONS DRIVING WHAT APPEARED TO BE A UNAMIR LANDCRUISER CAME TO THE RESIDENCE OF LCOL OPONG AND TOM BRUCE ON THREE OCCASSIONS. ON THE LAST OCCASSION, THE INTRUDERS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE THEIR WAY IN. ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS HAD A WEAPON AND AFTER WARNING THE INTRUDERS THAT HE WOULD SHOOT, FIRED THREE SHOTS. THE INTRUDERS RAN OFF.

(1)

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
INFO : DCMO, MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT : REPORTED ARREST OF BISHOP OF KABGAYI

DATE : 10 MAY 95

1. THIS REFERS TO THE FHQ DIRECTIVE TO INVESTIGATE THE REPORT OF THE ARREST OF FATHER SIBOMANA ANDRE, BISHOP OF KABGAYI AND OUR SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION THAT THE BISHOP WAS IN FACT A FREE MAN AS AT 1700 HRS ON 02 MAY 95.

2. CONSIDERING THE APPREHENSIONS OF THE BISHOP AND THE IMPORTANT POSITION HE OCCUPIES IN GITARAMA AND WITHIN THE CLERGY OF RWANDA I FELT IT NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER IN GREATER DETAIL.

3. FATHER SIBOMANA ANDRE IS IN FACT ONLY THE ACTING BISHOP OF KABGAYI. HIS ACTUAL APPOINTMENT IS ADMINISTRATEUR APOSTOLIQUE DU DIOCESE DE KABGAYI AND HE TOOK OVER THE SAME ON 12 APR 94 WITHIN A WEEK OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR. HIS PRESENT POSITION WAS OCCUPIED AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS PREDECESSOR, BISHOP THADEE NSEGIYAMUA, WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY THE RPA IN JUN 94 FOR, IN THEIR PERCEPTION, HAVING SUPPORTED THE GENOCIDE.

4. FATHER SIBOMANA IS A HUTU, WHO BESIDES HIS POSITION IN THE KABGAYI DIOCESE IS A REGULAR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE RWANDESE PRINT MEDIA. HE IS ALSO AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION RWANDAISE POUR LE DEFENSE DU DROITS DE LE PERSONNE ET DES LIBERTES PUBLIQUES (ABL), A SUPPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION OF RWANDA. HE CLAIMS THAT HE IS BEING TARGETED BY THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSPOKEN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND INHUMAN PRISON CONDITIONS IN RWANDA-- AN ASPECT HE HAS BEEN WRITING AND SPEAKING ABOUT. HE WAS NOT PRESENT AT KABGAYI DURING THE KILLING OF THE LATE BISHOP, ALLEGEDLY BY THE RPA, AND THEREFORE CLAIMS THAT HE WAS NOT A WITNESS TO THIS, HAVING BEEN AWAY AT MASANGO AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, HIS SECRETARY JANE YANKULIJE HAD WITNESSED THE SAME AND WAS THUS CONSIDERED A THREAT BY THE AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH THE SOUS-PROSECUTOR OF GITARAMA HAD ISSUED A WARRANT OF ARREST FOR JANE YANKULIJI THE ARREST HAS NOT BEEN EXECUTED. IN FACT, FATHER SIBOMANA'S APPREHENSIONS OF HIS OWN ARREST CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE THREATS OF ONE RPA SERGEANT, CLAVER BUNGWVE WHO HAD BEEN DETAILED TO EXECUTE THE ARREST OF THE SECRETARY, JANE YANKULIJE ON 01 MAY 95. THE SERGEANT WAS INFURIATED BECAUSE IN HIS TWO VISITS TO KABGAYI TO EXECUTE THE ARREST THE SECRETARY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE THREATS HAD LED FATHER SIBOMANA TO APPROACH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VATICAN IN RWANDA AND RESEON DES CITOYENS (RON) WHICH IN TURN LED TO THE MESSAGE REACHING THE SRSG.

5. FATHER SIBOMANA PERCEIVES THAT WITH ALL THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT HIS SAFETY IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE ARRESTED BUT HE DOES NOT RULE OUT HIS PHYSICAL ELIMINATION THROUGH

(2) COS

Suggest we show A/FC and ask him to consider bringing this matter to the SRSG's attention for OSRSG action as per para 8. *Stacos ops 11.5*

AFC

1. For perusal and briefing SRSG please

J
11/05


ASSASSINATION MADE TO LOOK LIKE AN ACCIDENT.

6. FATHER SIBOMANA HAS BEEN MORE THAN HELPFUL TO UNAMIR AND HAS ASSISTED US IN EVERY WAY IN GITARAMA. IT IS LEARNT THAT IT WAS HIS FINANCIAL BACKING WHICH LED TO THE ONGOING EXPANSION OF THE HOLDING FACILITY OF THE GITARAMA PRISON TO CREATE MORE HUMAN CONDITIONS FOR PRISONERS.

7. ON MY SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD LIE LOW FOR SOME TIME TO ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT'S ANGER TO BLOW OVER, HE EXPRESSED HIS INABILITY TO ACCEPT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WITHOUT RAISING HIS VOICE. HE IS GRATEFUL TO UNAMIR FOR HAVING DISPLAYED CONCERN FOR HIS WELL BEING AND FEELS THAT IT IS DUE TO THE CONTINUOUS VISIT BY GITARAMA MILOBS TO HIS OFFICE THAT AN ADEQUATE MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT HOME TO THE AUTHORITIES. IN FACT, HE PERCEIVES THAT IT IS DUE TO THIS THAT THE WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST HIS SECRETARY IS NOT BEING EXECUTED.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT UNAMIR SHOULD APPROACH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VATICAN IN KIGALI ASKING HIM TO STRONGLY PROJECT THE VATICAN'S CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF FATHER SIBOMANA AND PERHAPS OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF OTHER FOREIGN MISSIONS TO DO THE SAME. IN THE MEANTIME THIS SECTOR HQ WILL CONTINUE TO DISPLAY OUR CONCERN WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE FATHER.

9. THIS MAY KINDLY BE BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF ACTING FC AND THE SRSG TO WHOSE OFFICE THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN HAD BEEN ADDRESSED.


SA HASNAIN
COLONEL
SECTOR CDR

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

**LSG
KIGALI RWANDA**

TO: CITMM

INFO: UNAMIR HQ, DFC
CO, LSG

FROM: 95 FLSG, Ops O

9 MAY 95

SUBJECT: LETTER OF APOLOGY

CITMM
This is a positive letter from a professional officer who clearly understands where we go wrong. I hope this apology is accepted by you and me if my officers; I add my personal

1. On 9 May at about 1130 hrs I acted in an inappropriate manner towards the CITMM and I wish to apologise for this.

2. I had been informed by one of my staff that Mr "Minas" had been given the keys to an APC. I assumed this was correct, given that Mr Minas and the owner of TRAFIPRO were concerned with the use of armoured vehs in the camp. Giving him the key was a severe breach of security given the various wpns and ammo stored in the veh (ready for emergencies). Thus I was quite angry because of my staff's mistake.

3. I and the CSM immediately went down to the carriers and found the CITMM and some BRSC employees in the veh. I immediately assumed Mr Minas had given the keys to the CITMM and was angry at this perceived additional security breach.

4. Without explanation I demanded where he got the keys, using obscene language in the process. He immediately became livid with rage, and began swearing at me. Getting nowhere, I said nothing further until he was done whatever he was doing. After the veh was relocked I demanded the keys - and he would not hand them over. As he drove away he was ranting and raving, swearing and shaking his fist.

6. I admit I was combative from the start, but his reactive anger far outdistanced mine, and though my regret at starting the argument was immediate the damage was done.

apology and hope that you can all continue to work in good spirit and co-operation
J. G. H.
11/5
D. F. C. M.

Pse copy to CO PSC

G-6
11/05/95

7. Up until this episode I've had a good relationship with the CITMM and I know should not have acted in this fashion - I should have respected his requirement to see the vehicle, or at least clarified the reason prior to getting upset.

8. Mr Jorsling, hopefully you understand what prompted my actions, and can forgive me.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G.T. Vassbotn', with a stylized, cursive script.

G.T. Vassbotn, Capt

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MA/DFC

To: Lists A, B and D

Info: COS
OIC Admin
C CIVPOL
DCOS Sp
CO Force MP Coy

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

W. A. L. May

Date: 8 May 95

Subject: THE IMPROPER POSSESSION AND USE OF DRUGS

1. During the last 2 weeks, general allegations have been made in the media and in reports to officers of a military unit that UNAMIR personnel have been involved in the transportation and abuse of drugs within Rwanda. More recently, a member of the mission has been arrested by the Rwandan authorities and accused of the improper possession of cannabis. Although none of these stories have been substantiated, it is apparent that extreme embarrassment would be caused were one to become so and checks on UNAMIR personnel by the RPA might become much more rigorous than at present. Please make every member of your unit and/or staff aware that:

a. The improper importation, possession or misuse of drugs will not be tolerated by the Rwandan authorities or by the Force Commander.

b. Allegations will be fully investigated with a view to disciplinary action being taken by the appropriate national authority.

2. Commanders at all levels are responsible for ensuring that this policy is respected; they are under a duty to report any suspicion of the misuse of drugs or any such allegation to the Provost Marshal or to the UNAMIR MP Coy.

*Seen
J. G.
09/5
DFC/umw*

*G-6 (incident)
9/5/95*



From: Col K M Tutt
Commander BRITCON
HQ UNAMIR

To: OIC Administration

Info: Office of SRSG, DFC through COS

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-21

Date: 8 May 95

Subject: RECEPTION DIFFICULTIES - LT COL ASHRAF KHAN
(UK REPRESENTATIVE - INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION INTO KUBEHO CAMP)

1. I had been advised by the UK Charge d'Affairs for RWANDA, Dr Lillian Wong, that a British Army Officer Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been assigned to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the UK representative on the International Commission into Kubeho Camp. He was due to arrive in Nairobi Airport at 0640 hours Sunday 7 May 1995. This memo records the events as seen from my perspective.
2. I agreed that I would check the UNAMIR travel arrangement from Nairobi and would extend the normal courtesy of ensuring that an incoming British officer was met by an in-theatre officer, in this case myself. On Saturday 6 May 1995 Air Ops HQ UNAMIR, Mr Smith, confirmed that all the necessary information would be passed to Mov Con Nairobi on Lt Col Ashraf Khan and other members of the International Commission and it was expected that Lt Col Ashraf Khan would be able to travel to Kigali on the UN flight Sunday 7 May 1995.
3. On Sunday 7 May 1995 at 1040 hours I met the UN flight. Lt Col Ashraf Khan did not pass through customs with the other UN passengers. Movement Control, the US civilian employed by Brown and Root, confirmed from the manifest that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been booked on the flight and was shown to have travelled on it.
4. At 1130 hours the Movement Control representative went into immigration and informed me that Lt Col Ashraf Khan was not at immigration, he further advised me that with some VIPs they are processed through different channels and this could have happened.
5. I returned to HQ UNAMIR and first checked by telephone if Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been transported by other means to the UK Charge d'Affairs residence, this had not happened. I then checked with the Political Affairs Officer, Mrs K Scott, she had no additional information, but advised me to discuss the matter with Air Ops.

Extn 11109

COS Admin / DCOS

*We have 15 dismantle
the problems at the
airport. I have some
suggestions to offer*

*09/5
DFC*

*66
7/5/95*

6. At about 1145 hours I then checked with the Air Ops officer Mr Smith. He investigated the movement of VIPs and confirmed that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had not moved from the airport through other channels.

7. Mr Smith then informed me, some ten minutes later, that the flight manifest had incorrectly shown Lt Col Ashraf Khan to have boarded the aircraft, but he had in fact not reported at Nairobi. There was a warm discussion over the radio between Mr Smith and the Mov Con representative at Kigali airport on the failure of Movcon Nairobi who, it now appeared, had in error shown him as being a passenger.

8. At 1200 hours I informed the UK Charge d' Affairs of the events, that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had not boarded the aircraft at Nairobi and she agreed to check with the High Commission in Nairobi.

9. Later that afternoon the UK Charge d' Affairs was informed by Lt Col Ashraf Khan from Nairobi that he had been on the UN flight, but because he had no appropriate visa had been refused entry, refused any right of contact with UNAMIR representatives and refused any right of use of the telephone. He was subsequently returned to Nairobi.

10. The incorrect statements at paragraphs 4 and 7, exacerbated by the intransigence of the Rwandese authorities, meant that three valuable hours within which the visa complication might have been resolved were lost. There appeared, within movement control, to be no positive information as to who was on the flight, no support for VIP passengers faced with immigration difficulties and no record of how they had disembarked. This sad series of errors had occurred despite the requirement to treat this passenger as a VIP.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: G2 Branch, HQ UNAMIR
(for the Independent International Commission)

Info: SRSG
FC
DFC
COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
UN HRFOR

From: Maj Mark Cuthbert-Brown
Force PM

Date: 30 Apr 95

Subject: PROVOST MARSHAL'S REPORT ON THE KILLING IN KIBEHO

INTRODUCTION

1. This report has been compiled with a view to covering my observations in Kibeho Camp during the period 1400 hrs Sat 22 Apr to 1700 hrs Sun 23 Apr and at various times thereafter. It is largely based on contemporaneous notes which, although not copious, provide accurate timings and cue my recollection of specific details.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to assist in the compilation of an accurate historical record, to offer some conclusions and to make some recommendations. Except where specifically mentioned, it is not intended to report on or collate the experiences of others.

BACKGROUND

3. As the Provost Marshal of UNAMIR since Nov 94, amongst other things it has been my responsibility, to investigate, largely at a political level, a wide range of incidents in order to provide information of use to the Headquarters' decision makers. Following the cordoning of the camp by the RPA on Tue 18 Apr (heralding the RPA's plan to close it), a brief visit that I made to the camp that day, and reports of a large number of deaths in Kibeho about midday Sat 22 Apr, UNAMIR's G3 Operations Branch asked me to go there and do what I could; unusually, I was not accompanied by other officers but started my journey in the company of a quantity of medical supplies (predominantly stretchers and bandages - of which supplies were running short in the Australian medical support unit in Kibeho).

4. It was not apparent to me at the time but Lt Page (HQ UNAMIR Military Spokesman - who has compiled his own report on the incident) has told me since that, more-or-less concurrently, the

G-6 (incidents)

following scene-setting events took place in the immediate vicinity of the ZAMBATT platoon location at around mid-day Sat 22 Apr:

- a. Heavy rain started.
- b. Shooting was heard close by.
- c. A large number of IDPs broke through the perimeter; 90 minutes later, ZAMBATT troops cleared the area, revealing bodies lying in the compound, mostly victims of crush injuries; they were later removed by ZAMBATT troops and placed just outside their perimeter fence.

I have also heard of at least one incident in which RPA troops being stoned by IDPs replied with rifle fire. What follows is a largely chronological account; some apparently extraneous detail is included in the hope that it might help others trying to build the complex jigsaw of incidents. A sketch plan is attached.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS ON SAT 22 APR 95

5. 1330 hrs. Take off by helicopter from Kigali for Rwamiko (it was not clear to me why it was not possible to land in Kibeho but I presumed that it was because the RPA had withheld approval; it might have been because an assessment of the risk of flying into a camp in which fire was being exchanged). Either way, others might be asked to address this point.
6. 1400 to 1405 hrs. Overfly Kibeho Camp about 2000 feet above ground level. It was observed that much of the camp had been deserted, that there were queues of IDPs on the Butare Road; thousands were apparently passing through 2 checkpoints (1 for registration and 1 for searching?) marked by a few vehicles to the South of the camp's centre. IDP columns were moving out of the camp on the road towards Butare.
7. 1415 hrs. Land at Rwamiko, met by a ZAMBATT infantry section and set off for Kibeho.
8. 1450 hrs. Refused access by an RPA checkpoint outside Kibeho Camp despite protests that we were carrying essential medical supplies. The checkpoint was manned by 2 x soldiers armed with AK47s and one clutching a hand grenade; attempts to persuade them to contact a superior were fruitless and they stuck to their apparent instructions that no-one was to pass. Could not establish radio communications with handheld Motorola set and return to Rwamiko.
9. 1525 hrs. Established radio contact with ZAMBATT's Bn HQ from its platoon base in Rwamiko. Requested that HQ UNAMIR and the ZAMBATT Company in Kibeho be notified of my predicament in the hope that one or the other could arrange our entry to the camp.
10. 1550 hrs. A helicopter arrived in Rwamiko carrying AUSMED personnel; the pilot informed me that he could fly into Kibeho and we boarded (along with 2 x AP News journalists who happened on the scene almost simultaneously), joining Donatella Lorch of the NY Times who was already in the aircraft.

11. 1600 hrs. Land in Kibeho. Assist loading of 2 x helicopters with stretcher-borne and walking wounded, most of whom seemed to be suffering injuries inflicted with machetes (a fact that should be confirmed or otherwise by AUSMED personnel). I was told that it was unsafe to walk into the camp unescorted and it was obvious that all potential escorts were fully occupied with protecting or treating wounded IDPs and the landing site. The sound of gunfire was intermittent but did not appear threatening. Journalists (Julian Bedford of the BBC, Donatella Lorch of the NY Times, the 2 x AP News TV journalists collected at Rwamiko plus Simona Opitz and Patricia Tome of the HQ UNAMIR radio staff) covered the evacuation of the wounded and readied themselves for travel by air to Kigali.

12. 1650 hrs. Having arrived in Kibeho much later than intended, I determined that there was no point in returning to Kigali and, therefore, decided to remain when then last helicopter departed. I travelled, therefore, to the ZAMBATT Company HQ in an AUSMED vehicle.

13. 1655 hrs. Met the AUSMED infantry defence platoon commander (Lt Steve Tilbrook), discussed the situation and toured the ZAMBATT defensive position; sporadic rifle fire (mostly individual shots but including the occasional 2 to 4 round burst of automatic fire, presumably from AKs) continued. Apart from a few close rounds that appeared to be strays rather than aimed at us, it did not seem threatening.

14. 1705 hrs. Heard a sudden raise in the tempo of firing, apparently from the area of the hillside opposite our position (ie., to the south) and crossed to the sandbagged position nearest this area.

15. 1705 to 1725 hrs.

a. Saw (intermittently using 10x binoculars and a 180mm camera lens) a large number of IDPs fleeing down the hillside from my right to left. Watched many IDPs falling, some appearing to trip on the uneven ground but some evidently shot as they fled; a few tried to pick themselves up and to continue their flight but others (say 30 to 40) remained where they fell. A few RPA soldiers moved slowly down the opposite hillside shooting individual IDPs as they ran across their front; others remained higher up and continued their handling of IDPs. Some shots came very close to our position.

b. Heard 10 to 20 grenade explosions, heard 6 or 8 RPG launches (but saw none), the launching of a few mortar rounds and the firing of a few rounds from a heavy machine gun (.50"?). Saw one explosion (felling one IDP although I am not sure that he remained down) on the far hillside that was too big for a hand grenade and too far from the nearest RPA soldier; it must have been the explosion of a mortar bomb. Some IDPs remained under effective RPA control in the queue for processing on the Butare road.

c. Observe Lt Gandhi, a Jordanian CIVPOL Officer, walking up from the area of the helicopter landing site.

From this period, spent much time touring the ZAMBATT Coy HQ

position, talking to and encouraging Zambian soldiers. Direct radio contact with Kigali was not possible; ZAMBATT's Coy HQ communicated only with its Bn HQ through HF radio.

16. 1730 hrs. Rain started, picking up in intensity; camera and notebook put away. Firing continued but started to reduce in volume. IDPs continued to flee but it was not possible from my position to see the source of their flight; buildings around the ZAMBATT position and the MSF hospital obscured my view to the right.

17. Time not recorded. Watched a woman stop on the far slope, apparently in response to a shout from an RPA soldier walking down it not far from the large water tank. She turned to face him with her hands held high over her head. He walked down to within 10 or 15 feet and shot her.

18. About 1735 hrs. Back at the position overlooking the far slope. Watched an RPA soldier pushing a woman up a path about 50m to my left. He was carrying an AK47 in his right hand "at the trail" (ie., held horizontally with his hand at the rifle's mid-point). As she walked forwards reluctantly, he pushed her in the small of her back three times with his left hand before looking over his right shoulder at the UN position from which a number of soldiers watched him, including Lt Tilbrook (I think) and myself with my binoculars. He pushed her 2 more times in the same way before shoving her into a dip behind a makeshift IDP shelter. He then raised his rifle to the hip and shot her once before turning and walking back down the path towards us. (I found and photographed her body about 0855 hrs Sun 23 Apr.)

19. Time not recorded. ZAMBATT truck pulls up on Butare Road; after a time, soldiers dismount and abandon the vehicle to walk to their platoon base.

20. 1800 hrs.

a. AUSMED and NGO personnel and vehicles mustered for departure (many vehicles were already parked in the Coy HQ compound). Rain started to let up although it did not stop entirely.

b. Fire continued at a slower rate. Met the ZAMBATT Company Commander (Maj Winter Mayaba); he recounted his belief in there being some Interahamwe in the compound to the West, including a former Major and Lieutenant in the RGF. Probably rightly, Winter and one of his senior NCOs were reluctant to let me try to visit his other base.

21. 1830 hrs. Several single shots from very close by and possibly from the roof of the neighbouring compound. Continued touring the ZAMBATT positions.

22. 1900 hrs. No change but now convinced of fire from the roof nearby; consciously avoiding exposure in that direction through the archway and in the courtyard.

23. 1945 hrs.

a. Attempts by some IDPs to enter ZAMBATT position. One (a woman carrying a baby on her back) succeeds in hiding in

the shadows and is not noticed by RPA who are patrolling our perimeter in the darkness beyond the poor security lighting (comprising improvised fluorescent tubes with 360 degree coverage - exposing those in the base but not throwing light far beyond the perimeter). Those obviously trying to enter the base are beaten back by ZAMBATT soldiers rather than risk a flood of more IDPs or repercussions from the RPA. Some IDPs seeking refuge (over trampled barbed wire coils around the camp's perimeter) in the latrines on the northern edge of our position. RPA trying to find them and to inhibit the entry of more.

b. One of a group of 3 x RPA soldiers tries to get a light for a cigarette but is refused by ZAMBATT soldiers; he then pursues 4 x IDPs who had tried to enter the position; the old man moves on a little faster than a woman with 2 small children. As the latter passed over a low bank towards the compound, the soldier (facing away from me, about 20 feet away) pulled the pin from a grenade and tossed over their heads, dropping it just in front of them. Almost simultaneously, a man sitting (why, I do not understand) in the open just beyond is hit by a shot fired from the darkness to my right.

24. 1955 hrs. Several bursts of heavy and automatic fire from 3 or 4 different weapons very close to the ZAMBATT base.

25. 2010 hrs. As above. Several IDPs try to enter the base but are turned around. The voices of groups - presumed to be RPA soldiers - moving around in the shadows outside the camp can be heard. Become aware of a background wailing from the area of the compound to the west (but this may have built up gradually over a period of time).

26. 2100 hrs. Wailing continues but there is a let up in firing and grenade explosions.

27. 2120 hrs. A few grenade explosions heard near the ZAMBATT Coy HQ.

28. 2130 hrs. Sporadic single shots in the same area.

29. 2133 hrs. Six rounds fired by the camp wall.

30. 2155 hrs. Hysterical screaming rises above the background wailing; Zambian officers speculate that it is related to a machete fight in the compound. Shortly gives way to normal level of wailing; it remains throughout the night. Zambian officer who had entered the camp around 1730 hrs reports that he had stopped his truck to avoid driving over corpses and that he and his men had had to pick their way along the track covered in perhaps 400 bodies. He reckoned that there were thousands of dead.

31. Until 0500 hrs. Occasional single shots, short bursts and, less and less through the night, grenade explosions continue.

32. 0510 hrs. Short burst of automatic fire close by the ZAMBATT Coy HQ.

33. About 0530 hrs (soon after first light). Look over wall

to rear of the Coy HQ and see bodies strewn around the area. Informed that there are still DPs hiding in latrines.

34. Time not recorded.

a. Join ZAMBATT troops walking to platoon base. It is evident already that RPA soldiers are moving bodies on the slopes around us and that attempts to bury them are taking place; there are a couple of large blood stains on the roadway from which bodies must have been removed.

b. Find the perimeter of the platoon position piled high with bodies, mostly around the sandbagged and barbed wire perimeter fence but had to pick our way between a few tens on the roadway; casual estimate is 400 having seen about 20 en route. Meet HRFOR monitors Annick van Lookeren Campagne (callsign HR4A8) and Alex Castanias (HR4A9). The surrounding area has become a dumping ground for bales of food, discarded clothing and the trappings of camp life; machetes, cooking vessels, water containers etc. Bodies are spread amongst them; separating them from food bundles and clothing is extremely difficult.

Afternote: I later reassessed the number of bodies on this position as about 600 based on discussion with an NGO representative who had attempted to calculate the number of dead; I remember his approximation of 40 to 45 bodies per square metre over an area of about 15 square metres. With a significant number of children in the pile, I believe that this is entirely credible.

35. 0630 hrs. Check in with HQ UNAMIR (callsign Zero) using the platoon camp's Motorola base station (and wonder why Coy HQ lacked such a facility). Not having seen much of the camp at this stage, I reported the possibility of about a thousand dead and perhaps many more. From this camp, RPA soldiers can be seen and heard scraping shallow graves around the hills. Zambian soldiers start to clear the dead from the roadway in order to allow vehicle access to their camp.

36. 0640 hrs.

a. Leave position with Alex. After recovering a few uninjured infants from within the pile of corpses and taking them to a muster point for abandoned children on the edge of the ZAMBATT platoon site, walk up to the MSF hospital, taking the shorter footpath route and passing through the large brick compound. Reception not unfriendly as we forced our way through the crowd from the western end to the south east corner and from there to the north east corner. Injured people show us their wounds (mostly of grenade and gunshots) and others indicate the fallen - both dead and seriously ill/wounded on the ground and in some rooms. Meet Nkurunziza (an interpreter and medical assistant with CARITAS) whom I last met on 14 Dec 94, during Op HOPE - and use him to talk to the crowd and to individuals.

b. Estimate that I have covered a little less than half the compound and seen 15-20 dead; perhaps a minimum, therefore, of 30-40 there, depending on the possibility of

having missed a large concentration.

c. Go back through the compound and exit through the south east corner and scan the opposite hillside from a position near the MSF radio room (from which Alex made contact with another callsign) and estimate a few tens of bodies across it - again using binoculars to attempt to distinguish between bodies, bundles and discarded clothing. Walk through the MSF hospital seeking supplies for Annick (with no joy) who had been talking of giving first aid to the injured. Walk alongside the southern edge of the compound towards the platoon position.

d. Callsign HR4A2 repeatedly bothers Alex about whether or not he is being escorted and finally demands that he switch to channel 12 (from 13). We know channel 12 to be unworkable with hand held radios in Kibeho; Alex, stepping between corpses, advises him of this. HR4A2, however, seemed unconvinced.

Rough estimate of the population of the compound is 10,000 plus.

37. Time not recorded. Move to the platoon position and, having passed through it (while Zambian troops were clearing bodies from the the roadway) and spoken to Annick (who continued attending to wounded) walk down Butare Road with Alex. Observe a few weak IDPs sitting and one woman crawling on the road together with a few infant orphans. Attempt to move onto the slope to its left (ie., the slope opposite the ZAMBATT Coy HQ and down which IDPs fled during the previous evening). Intercepted and denied access by RPA; rejoin roadway and continue eastwards.

38. 0730 hrs. Meet Capt Shema (RPA Butare Security Coordinator) on the Butare Road with whom I dealt during Op HOPE. He went towards the centre of the camp while we continued away from it.

39. Time not recorded. Continued attempts to inspect the inner slope but again refused access; AKs held across our path. Advised to seek permission from "Lt Col Fred". Groups of IDPs seen moving in both directions on the road; RPA instructions on their movements seem confused. Observe a portly officer addressing a group and, in listening to him briefly, attract the attention of sentries who close in on us; move back towards the centre of the camp with the intention of finding Captain Shema for permission to inspect the slope. Notice a .50" or similar large calibre machine gun on a pickup truck on the high ground to our left. Collect a handful of orphans and take them to the ZAMBATT position.

40. 0800 hrs. Back at the platoon position; again speak to Annick about her patients. Agree to seek AUSMED assistance for her and start to walk back towards the ZAMBATT Coy HQ.

41. 0845 hrs. Enter ZAMBATT Coy HQ and see AUSMED troops setting up an aid post; request assistance for Annick. About this time, separate from Alex who has to go and collect an HRFOR/Ministerial team from the landing site. Joined by Cpl Tidey and an Australian infantry escort and walk eastwards, skirting the southern side of the principal building to seek the woman shot about 1745 hrs Sat; find her corpse propped against a derelict and roofless IDP shelter. Clothes around upper chest and back stained with blood.

42. Time not recorded.

a. Walk back to roadway and down the spur towards the platoon position. Situation much as before but RPA moving around more. See 2 young orphans crying by a woman (their grandmother?) lying prone and apparently near death in a derelict shelter; cannot persuade them to come with me.

b. Find a man propped against a bale of food, eyes closed and rocking gently, a spear through the base of the rear of his neck and emerging from the area of the centre of his collar bone; consider that nothing can be done for him and move on, releasing a tethered calf from amongst the debris. (Why had I not seen the speared man earlier, when I covered the same ground? Was he a fresh injury? If so, he can only have been attacked by a soldier of the RPA, however unlikely this might have been in this location and in broad daylight.)

c. Collect an unhurt 3-year old, walking over bodies to get to him, and carry him through the platoon position to the open-air orphanage becoming well-established on the far edge of the platoon position. By this time RPA soldiers are removing bodies from around the gate of the northern end of the platoon position and taking them down the slope to the west. Take a couple of photographs; challenged by Captain Shema who demanded that I hand over my film. Protracted argument ensued with a ring of hostile RPA soldiers positioned around me.

43. 1100 hrs. Eventually concede my film to Shema, he naively pleading ignorance of the technology, demanding to inspect my camera in detail, and giving me an assurance that the film would be returned if approval could be gained from Rwanda's MOD. For good measure, he confiscated my last remaining unexposed film. Minutes later, I learn that he had also removed Lt Gandhi's film (he, also, had been wandering around the camp). During this period, movement of IDPs starts through the platoon position; a pair of men recognize a woman with a bullet wound through her shin (and being treated by Annick) as their mother - and become hysterical.

44. 1130 hrs. Movement of IDPs building up into a stream.

45. 1135 hrs. Walk - still with Cpl Tidey and his infantry escort - along the road towards Coy HQ. Some RPA soldiers - who appeared to be following us - become concerned about my taking notes but we ignore them.

46. 1140 hrs. Stopped at the first checkpoint - at which a convoy of MSF and other medical NGO vehicles had been halted on their way in. Turn back and, meeting Michael Ricca (HR4A2) who is becoming frantic about the halted convoy, find Capt Shema. Shema says that the soldiers should allow my passage because UNAMIR personnel were permitted to pass.

47. 1150 hrs. Set off again, cutting to the right before the checkpoint at which we were stopped earlier and head for the MSF compound. Most bodies now gone from the area around the platoon position. Stream of IDPs moving in the opposite direction.

48. 1158 hrs. Meet Col Ossae-Addae and MILOBs at the western end of the compound. He has apparently negotiated the release of IDPs with Shema and is watching them stream from the compound towards the platoon position and the Butare Road. Move around the southern edge of the dispensary, passing IDPs, some heavily bandaged and others lying in a debilitated condition. Advise them to move with the rest.
49. 1210 hrs. Having passed the Coy HQ, head towards the landing site. MILOBs in the area. Turned around by aggressive and uncommunicative RPA soldier.
50. 1220 hrs. FC arrives. Accompany his group to the platoon position and contribute to the briefing he is given. After hearing my estimate of the dead (about 800 seen and 1200 to 1500 overall), a Zambian captain takes me to one side and tells me that he counted 3,000.
51. 1325 hrs. FC departs area around ZAMBATT.
52. 1335 hrs. Meet US Defense Attache and Lt Col Karaki Karenzi, whom I understand to be Chief of RPA Intelligence. Make a representation about my film and am assured that it will be returned through the RPA UNAMIR LO. Lose track of Cpl Tidey and escort.
53. 1435 hrs. Journalists and camera crews, including Julian Bedford (BBC) and Donatella Lorch (NY Times), arrive with Lt Page. Media jamboree settles around the graves being dug for bodies in and around the dispensary compound, one of which is being filled with corpses mostly showing shrapnel and bullet wounds.
54. 1515 hrs. Enter the compound under cover of an escort provided to journalists and to Zambian troops removing corpses. Find the courtyard packed mostly with women and children; estimate 2,500 in all. Find Dr Balthazar, an English-speaking and locally employed CARITAS doctor working with a clinic packed with injuries from the night before; advise him of the 1745 hrs cut-off for the IDPs' departure and the threat of an armed assault by RPA at 1800 hrs about which I had been told earlier (by Col Ossae-Addae?). Try to persuade him to leave; wanting to continue working on his patients, he asks of the possibility of staying in the ZAMBATT base. I tell him that I cannot give an assurance but that I will ask. Leaving the compound, check with the senior NCO supervising the burial outside and confirm that he is counting corpses. Afternote: he later told me that the tally was 41.
55. 1540 hrs. Check in with Winter Mayaba and discuss the estimate of bodies in the compound; he reckons 7,500 including children. With hindsight, I am not sure that he was fully aware of the numbers that had left during the afternoon. He says that his CO's policy would be to exclude Balthazar from his compound.
56. Time not recorded.
- a. Back into compound and continue attempts to get people to leave. The media have moved off and RPA soldiers have closed up on the gate and appear more threatening - apparently not now allowing IDPs to leave because of the

President's visit. Talk to large crowd through Nkurunziza; the situation is confused and IDPs remain reluctant to leave.

b. Joined by Capt Merkus, a MILOB. Given hand signals by an aged woman to warn of the rapid advance towards us of aggressive hard liners; get a (Zambian to keep an eye on them and continue pleading with the crowd but to no avail. Hard liners edging towards us with hands behind their backs; decide that best course is to withdraw and to try to stop precipitate RPA action.

c. Use MILOB vehicle to go to the area of the ZAMBATT platoon position, near where we find the President in heated debate with Capt Francis Sikaonga at the site of a burial by RPA soldiers.

57. 1630 hrs. Catch Capt Shema and use Winter Mayaba's 7,500 figure to try to stop the RPA attack that we believe is to be expected around 1800 hrs. Capt Merkus - not carrying a weapon, unlike me - is able to break through the cordon around the President and succeeds in passing a similar message as mine. Join Donatella Lorch and other journalists in heading to the landing site and depart Kibeho around 1700 hrs.

TUE 25 APR 95

58. Accompany Col Kayumba (Deputy Head of the Gendarmerie), Col Gasinzi (Deputy Chief of Staff of the RPA but spelling?) and Major Frank Kamanze on a visit to Kibeho. Met there by Lt Col Patrick Nyamvumba (Commanding Officer of the RPA's Alpha Mobile 2 based in Gikongoro and, apparently, one of the 2 battalions participating in the Kibeho operation) and Capt Shema. Also present are Winter Mayaba of ZAMBATT, Capt Ian McMahon and WO Scott (leading the AUSMED Support Force) and Dr Lillian Wong (the British Charge d'Affairs in Kigali). Find that we are expected by press and TV crews; able to evict them from the meeting that I chair in which explanations are provided for our estimates of the dead - but not later when we toured the site. Figures given are:

a. My own. Believing that I saw around 800 dead not having having been able to see the whole camp, I estimated 1,200 to 1,500 in all.

b. AUSMED. Capt McMahon explained the means by which his teams walked a route using counting devices to record 650 wounded and 4,050 dead.

c. RPA. Patrick was unable to give a figure and relied on Shema to say that there were no more than about 200 in a mass and perhaps 100 elsewhere.

Explain that the UNAMIR figure is a comprise between my estimate of 1,200 to 1,500 and the ZAMBATT and AUSMED figures.

59. Unable to avoid the press from here on, we walked to the known mass graves around the 2 x ZAMBATT bases and, in so doing, passed along the route of Capt McMahon's teams; it was the same road down which I had passed several times on Sunday morning - at various times from 0600 hrs to 1630 hrs. Capt Shema said that

he did not know for sure how many had been buried in the 2 graves he identified to us because they had not been counted; he stuck, nevertheless, to his estimate of about 200.

THU 27 APR 95

60. Attend Kibeho and witness the President's announcement of the Independent International Commission. With Shema, lead him on a tour of the graves and refuse demands for Zambian troops to exhume those that they had buried. Inspect graves and hear figures from Winter Mayaba for the 3 graves around his Coy HQ (41 + 13 + 23 = 77). Accept Shema's word that Capt Francis Sikaonga had told him of 13 in a grave near the Zambian platoon base. Shema now says that although he is not sure of the number of dead his troops buried, it is because he had 3 soldiers counting and that each gave him a different figure; I understand him to say that 203 was the middle (or was it the average?) figure and this is accepted by the President.

61. I pointed out that we have not seen all remains and that many were buried in shallow graves over the hillsides. The President demands an assessment of a particular hillside about which I spoke - on which I had estimate a few tens to have been buried. Shema and I find 15 or so corpses in the open (some of which he claims to have died of old age and/or malnutrition) and the shallow graves of perhaps 30 others - although, in recognition that the numbers were trivial in comparison with those under debate and to head off any attempt at immediate exhumation, I accepted that with one or 2 exceptions we work on 1 corpse per grave. Also on this slope, I was able to see several tens of, and perhaps 100, discarded shell cases and links from a 7.62mm medium machine gun.

62. The final figure given to the President for this hillside is 30. Having seen the partial exhumation of the 2 x RPA-dug graves near the Zambian platoon location, we are later rushed to the Press Conference where the President, mentioning the approval of the 30 figure by "le Major Brittanique", announces a total of 338 dead. The event (conducted in the glare of the media and at great pace) did not allow the checking of other hillsides or many latrines - perhaps deliberately - and was most unsatisfactory.

SAT 29 APR 95

63. Having learnt of the location of 3 x pit latrines in which Capt Francis Sikaonga saw bodies being dumped, I cleared a visit to Kibeho with Lt Col Patrick Nyamvumba and was given an assurance of complete freedom to rove within the camp, together with Annick and Alex. In the event, Annick and I went to Kibeho and were denied access to all areas except that immediately around the ZAMBATT Coy HQ; we were not even allowed to walk to the unit's platoon base. It was explained to us by an unnamed officer that Patrick now has no authority in the camp and that it is commanded directly from the MOD in Kigali. We heard, from Zambian and Australian troops, reports of the movement of bodies at night:

a. Bodies of which locations have been charted are gone by sunrise.

b. Flashlights are used widely across the slopes at night.

c. RPA soldiers are seen scrubbing themselves - and their clothes - clean soon after first light.

d. An RPA truck that had slid off the Butare Road in bad weather was evidently of great concern to RPA soldiers; Australians trying to walk past it were made to move away at gunpoint. Since then, I have heard reports of trucks moving at night on the Butare Road.

Despite these apparent attempts to clean up the site, it remained possible (with good binoculars) to pick out 5 or 6 bodies on hillsides opposite the Coy HQ during the afternoon of Sat 29 Apr.

CONCLUSIONS

64. The body count for which I can vouch included a significant number of crush injuries, many of whom were infants and small children (the majority appearing to have died in the incident at mid-day Sat 22 Apr). This cause of death almost certainly predominated and leads to the conclusion that the scale of death was not preordained; rather, it suggests mismanagement on a grand scale. Fear and panic - compounded by restrictions placed on the essential life-giving resources of food and water, prolonged exposure to the elements and the denial of sanitation - led to a powderkeg needing the smallest spark for its almost inevitable ignition.

65. What provided the spark is not evident to me but when it came, a very large number of IDPs took flight. Save for hearing what I believe to have been a single rifle firing over the ZAMBATT Coy HQ during the evening of Sat 22 Apr, I am aware of no evidence that RPA troops were attacked other than by stoning at mid-day and have to conclude that, with possibly very rare exceptions, they opened fire on defenceless people almost as a sport. Whether or not officers took part or led any of the killing is not clear but, as a minimum, they failed to bring it under control and allowed a wide range of weapons to be brought to bear, including:

a. Very many AK47s.

b. Chain link-fed medium machine guns (from which many tens of discarded links were evident during my inspection of the slope south of the ZAMBATT Coy HQ).

c. RPG7s - from which I heard 6 or 8 rounds fired.

d. 60mm or similar light mortars - of which I heard a few fired and saw one land on the slope mentioned above.

e. Hand grenades - of which I heard many explode.

Notwithstanding the use of these weapons, the mortality rate would have been high just as a result of the crush around the ZAMBATT platoon's position.

66. There has been a deliberate, concerted and prolonged effort to suppress evidence of the scale of the killing:

a. Burial of remains started early and continued at great pace through the morning of Sun 23 Apr - possibly with the express intention of inhibiting press coverage - without any proper regard to the recording of details or the collection of evidence.

b. It seems clear (from his determination to prevent publication of any photographs by removing not only exposed film but also unused rolls) that Captain Shema felt that there was something to hide.

c. Corpses appear to be moved by night.

d. Despite - more likely because of - awareness of my role in the investigation of the incident and assurances from a senior RPA officer that I would be given free access to the camp on Sat 29 Apr, this was denied me.

67. It is impossible for me to determine the motivation for the suppression of evidence but it could be because:

a. Having been embarrassed by the extensive and negative press coverage of the event, the Government is trying to limit damage. Such bravado would make it most unlikely that the Independent International Commission can be anything other than a sham. Confirmation of its complicity in perverting the work of the Commission would be disastrous for the Rwandan Government.

or

b. Individual officers are trying to suppress knowledge of the extent to which they can be blamed (either for negligence in planning and a failure to exercise control over their troops or, less likely, for their active complicity in the carnage) and brought to account by their superiors. Having provided a very low estimate of the death toll and received support from Ministers, it is possible that RPA officers have forced themselves into a box and are trying to make the evidence prove their case.

68. If it is indeed that case that rogue officers are misleading the Government, 2 possibilities exist:

a. The Government fails to recognize the deception. If the Government cannot recognize the deception of its own soldiers (or, having recognized it, fails to react), the chances of the Independent International Commission succeeding in its tasks are very low. Confirmation of this possibility would suggest that the Government had lost control of the RPA more generally and represent a most serious development for Rwanda.

b. The Government identifies the deception. If the Government recognizes the deception, it should take swift and severe disciplinary action in the hope that it might then salvage some international sympathy and recover its credibility.

69. Whatever the truth, the best hope for the Government seems to be for it to open its eyes and claim to have identified a conspiracy by officers trying to hide their failure to exert control and the extent of the killing. Such a front would mask the poor planning that went into the operation to close Kibeho, enable the Independent International Commission to complete its investigation satisfactorily and allow the least damaging verdict on the Government's conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

70. It is recommended that:

a. Note is taken of this report's conclusions and, in particular, of the need to encourage the Government to open its eyes to the possibility of deception by junior commanders.

b. Extensive efforts are made to observe and record night-time movement in Kibeho and the surrounding area with a view to confirming or denying the suspicion that bodies are being moved.

c. Having exhausted low-level contacts (1) for the return of film seized in Kibeho on Sun 23 Apr, high level contacts should be exploited in an attempt to ensure that the Government takes control of the situation and allows good evidence for the Independent International Commission. (Were it to ignore this request, it would suggest that it is either complacent about its ability to command its junior officers or wilfully in league with them.)

Note:


1. Lt Col Karaki Karenzi, Lt Col Patrick Nyamvumba and Capt Shema; all concede that the film should be returned but offer plausible excuses for not being able to return it personally.

THE CENTRE OF KIREHO CAMP

NOTES: ROADS GENERALLY FOLLOW RIDGE LINES.
NOT TO SCALE. (23b) REPRESENTS A REFERENCE
TO A PARAGRAPH NUMBER.



↑
TO RUMIKO



MEMORANDUM

TO: FORCE HQ/PROPERTY OFFICER/ADP OFFICER (thru DFC)

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: CLAIM FOR DAMAGES TO PERSONAL LAPTOP

DATE: 29 APR 95

1. This refers to my claim submitted 10 Mar 95 and to the official answer dated 16 Mar 95. (copies attached)
2. Though I acknowledge that there was no formal request for me to contribute my personal laptop to UNAMIR, I would like to point out that I came to the mission in the middle of the war and that, at that time, there were few computer resources available and no ADP personnel to make the kind of formal request you refer to. I held the post of Military Assistant to the Force Commander through most of the war and for several months afterwards. In that capacity, I needed resources that UNAMIR could not provide. While I was not formally invited to use my computer, I was not formally asked not to; I used my computer constantly to draft official correspondence for the Force Commander.
3. I would also like to point out that the UN system is something of a mystery to new comers and that, even had I known the system well, there simply was no ADP equipment to be had during the war. Our pre-war holdings had been looted and the budget had not been approved to re-stock. But the work still had to be done somehow. There was no point in formal requests because there was no equipment to be had and no way to get it in if there had been. I have found myself in similar situations ever since being posted out of the Force Commander's office; I have been consistently required to use my own computer for work because there was nothing else available. It is for this reason that I feel compelled to point out the difference between what you termed generosity and what I label professional obligation. As a professional officer with a job to do I could not refuse to use my own equipment to get the job done. There just is no other way sometimes.
4. I ask that you reconsider the attached claim and that you take seriously my contention that I am owed compensation for having used my private assets to help the mission; whether officially requested to or not.

P.C. Lancaster

P.C. Lancaster
Maj
Acting Sector Comd

Enic
As we discussed
J.R.

05/5
DJC/ann

G6 (incidents)
5/5/95



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



082/27/A

27 Apr 95

To : COS

From : CO INDBATT

Subject : RRF ACTION AT MP COY COMPOUND ON 23 APR 95


A detailed report on the RRF action at MP Coy Compound on 23 Apr 95 is forwarded herewith for info of the FC please.


(N K Singh)
Colonel
CO INDBATT

for info please.

DFC ✓

FC ✓


Kareem or Rk
pse
ph
mes
ob/ob

G6



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



ACTION OF INDBATT RRF IN DEFUSING EXPLOSIVE
SITUATION BETWEEN RPA TROOPS AND UN MIL POLICE

1. On 23 Apr 95 at 1200h, four armed personnel, two of whom were RPA soldiers entered the compound of the residence of Mrs Lucienne Appel, a Human Rights worker, in Toyota Corolla No T2AG-1. The intruders were in possession of one AK 47 rifle with loaded magazine and a loaded pistol. They robbed the lady of a Sanyo TV, a cassette recorder, a VCR and personal items and clothing worth \$ 4000. The lady was able to inform UN Mil Police on her radio set.
2. Reacting to the situation, a Mil Police patrol in the vicinity apprehended the four RPA personnel and brought them to Mil Police Coy HQ for further proceedings.
3. Since two of the four persons involved in the robbery were RPA soldiers in uniform, after 10 minutes four RPA offrs with a section of armed RPA soldiers reached the Mil Police Coy HQ to get their pers released. With the RPA offrs vehemently and authoritatively insisting on the release of the four pers and Mil Police Coy offr denying the same, the situation became very tense and volatile.
4. At this stage the situation seemed to be getting out of control and Mil Police Coy offr informed the duty offr at UNAMIR HQ who inturn informed Bn HQ 1/3 Gorkha Rifles and a Rapid Reaction Force Section was immediately activated.
5. The RRF section under Capt JS Tanwar of 1/3 GR reached the location within four minutes. In the meantime CO 1/3 GR, Col NK Singh had already briefed Capt JS Tanwar on the move regarding the prevailing situation at the site of incident and had instructed him to calm down the RPA and UN Mil Police offrs, and defuse the situation by taking control of the entire happenings.
6. On reaching the site of action, the RRF found that four arrested RPA pers were sitting in a vehicle and other RPA offrs and soldiers were standing around 10-15 yards from the vehicle.
7. The Mil Police Coy offr (a Tunisian) seemed to be very tense and agitated. He was vehemently arguing with the RPA offrs. Analysing the tense situation, the RRF Cdr, Capt JS Tanwar told the Mil Police offr to calm down and requested him to introduce the RPA offrs to him. Meantime the RRF had already deployed themselves as per well-rehearsed drills in an all round manner.
8. The professional outlook and prompt action of the RRF had a pacifying effect on the RPA offrs and soldiers. It had a salutary effect on everybody alike.

9. RPA offrs asked Capt JS Tanwar to close in all the RRF pers but he convinced them that these soldiers did not intend any harm to them as long as the problem gets resolved.

10. In the course of all these activities, the RRF cdr by now had succeeded in deliberately playing for some time by discussing the issue which consequently had defused the situation to a large extent.

11. All these efforts of patience, tact, and presence of mind shown by RRF commander were nullified on arrival of the UNAMIR Civil Chief Security Offr who arrived in a high temper and started shouting at the RPA offrs for the RPA soldiers robbing a UN civilian and now trying to take away the soldiers. Getting agitated by this provocation, RPA offrs vehemently argued that UNAMIR must not interfere in the matters of their country and Mil Police of UNAMIR have no auth to curb the crime in their country.

12. It is really unfortunate that this act of total immaturity and unprofessionalism on the Chief Security Offr's part aggravated the otherwise defusing situation.

13. In the meantime Col NK Singh who was monitoring the entire situation on radio set asked for a RPA LO to reach the location. He also gave further instructions to Capt JS Tanwar and asked him to stop the Chief Security Offr who was continuously arguing and losing his temper making the situation more tense and difficult to handle.

14. Capt JS Tanwar again asked everyone to listen to him and suggested them to hand over the weapons, ammunition and keys of the vehicle to RPA offrs since the items belonged to a recognised national army, and take a receipt for the same from them. The RPA Offrs agreed to this solution. The RRF Cdr also asked them to take the four accused to the local police station (Gendarmerie) and carry on with the correct procedural formalities involving the whole affair. Initially, the Mil Police Coy Offr and Mrs Lucienne Appel refused to go to the local police station but later on agreed to do so when RRF escorted them to the police station at Remera (Kigali).

15. Rest of the proceedings were carried out peacefully without any further hurdles and Indbatt RRF returned to its own location.

16. The initial hostile attitude of the RPA pers and UN Mil Police as well as the immaturity shown by the Civilian Chief Security Offr could have escalated this volatile and tense situation and consequently it could have grown out of control.

17. The professionalism, tact and firmness shown by Capt JS Tanwar and the RRF defused the situation and finally resolved the entire matter.

MA/DFC

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: As per Lists A, B & D

From: Colonel K.S. Sivakumar
Chief of Staff

Date: 22 February 1995

Subject: A PLEA - THE DANGER OF UNAMIR'S SKIRTS & BISCUITS

1. Find enclosed herewith an article titled "The Danger of UNAMIR's Skirts and Biscuits" published in IMVAHO dated 12 February 1995.
2. For information and suitable necessary action please.

*This is a "crap". Why did
the journalist not use the
time in educating his
young folks to discard
such habits.*

*22/2
DFC/cmb*

IMVAHO (pro-gouvernemental) - 12 Feb 9.

THE DANGER OF UNAMIR'S SKIRTS AND BISCUITS

Friends, Brothers, youth, ladies and gentlemen of Rwanda . We, all of us, know the worst moment which our country comes from, moment which has dived a whole nation into an ocean of killings mixed with sorrow and anguish . Yes , Rwanda was bereft of an uncountable number of his people that God himself knows the true number .

However, those responsible for these crimes are all known , unless one pretends to ignore them so that the truth may be hidden-which would be a useless way of seeing things !

We must go on seeking the truth ! Now is the time to say goodbye to all these ignominious facts, so that what we have gained nowadays may be saved for ever .

To make Rwanda be away from its sadness, every Rwandese must do his best . This shall be interesting when foreigners come to us for help and add their forces to what we have already done for ourselves . Thanks are, in advance, presented to them .

We must however define the help should not reduce him to the fact of begging or asking . It must not change our girls and women into prostitute nor make our young boys change into grabbers .

The help we need is that of making a Rwandese know to use his own energy . Thus living according to his own means, in evaluating and in esteeming things at their true values , as our culture has always educated him a long time ago . It goes without saying that the true help will be something new which will make him morally and physically grow well .

What makes us be nervous here in Kigali is to see that most of our young girls wear short skirts that common people call "Mpenye barimbuke". Sometimes these skirts may be long but able to let an opening showing their rear . It may also be tight, which makes them look like a ball full of air . These are "UNAMIR's skirts" and are unfortunately taken for granted. We noticed it every evening and night around our street lights where unconscious passers by shout at them "A la MINUAR ".

We should be ashamed of this seemingly accepted behaviour. Parents cry over days and nights but there is no change . Instead, they are mocked and misunderstood by those girls and by all those who tolerate such way of living even if it is destroying our society .

If in Kigali, we speak of UNAMIR's skirts, in Kibuye Prefecture or even in all other places where French soldiers through "Opération turquoise " have been, phrases like "Blanc biscuit ? Blanc biscuit ..." Are heard . It means "white man, give us biscuit ".

All along the road you pass by , that is the song that can even destroy your ears. Young men and girls coming from distant hills fall down and stand up in chows to ask biscuits .

The UNAMIR's car is driven at speed of 10 Km per hour because of the children running in front of it, arms in air as a priest reading his mass in a church.

The givers of biscuits throw them out of their car and assist joyfully to the struggle for life as if it is the only means they can use to distribute this insulting way of help.

Why, if UNAMIR wants to give biscuits, can it not gather all these young in one place or follow them at their homes instead of making them run after their car as if they are playing with animals at the Zoo ?

Dear reader, this kind of help that makes children run after a car, this kind of help that makes our girls take rides in the cars on which it is written UN, UNAMIR, UNHCR and many other writings difficult for us to understand , is unheard of .

Do not forget that this girl you are with into your car could have been studying if wrongdoers had not destroyed her class. Keep in mind that the ten dollars you give her today makes her come tomorrow. Once more we do not need this kind of help !

Fortunately all our girls do not follow this way of doing . However, she who follows it must be stopped. She is also a Rwandese. She should be prevented with all her friends who , together, destroy our new society.

We think it is what we have fought for when we said goodbye to the wrongdoers of the former government. We think it would be good to ask the new destroyers of our society to go away. We emphasize those who show wrong ways to our youth by practices which are far from our normal way of living .

If all the ladies and gentlemen of Rwanda think of it, our Rwandese values are to be restored .

23 February 1995

OSRSG/LA/001

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Incident at Kigali Airport Involving Senegalese Troops
on 22 February 1995

At about 10:30 hours on 22 February 1995 (on returning to the Office after accompanying the SRSG to a meeting with the Minister of Justice), I was called to attend to a problem at the airport involving 121 newly-arrived troops from Senegal. Ambassador Conde, our Chief of Protocol (in the absence of Ambassador Dessande), had already spoken to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requested their intervention.

At the airport, Immigration were refusing to let the troops in because they had no travel documents. I drew their attention to relevant provisions of UNAMIR's Status of Mission Agreement with Rwanda, which state in brief, that there should be no passport or visa requirements for UNAMIR personnel, and, instead, that an individual or collective movement order (issued by UNAMIR or a participating State) and a UNAMIR or National ID Card should suffice (ref: para 34 of SOMA). The UN Laissez-Passer should also suffice. The Immigration officers were prepared to accept this if confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior.

While seeking such confirmation, Ambassador Conde informed me by radio that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had talked to Cpt Murari of the RPA (airport security) by phone and agreed with him that the troops should be photographed individually and processed through, after which UNAMIR would address any concerns raised by the Government. It took a while to locate the Captain to confirm this, and when he finally showed up, with Maj. Kamanzi, they raised security questions. For example, Maj. Kamanzi asked if we could vouch that the troops were not French Legionnaires. They also mentioned that the order should come only from the Minister of Defence.

There was thus a standoff, and some heated arguments. Fortunately, the President of Rwanda and the Minister of Interior were arriving at the airport from Akagera Park, by UNAMIR Helicopter. I joined Ambassador Conde and the Rwandese Chief of Protocol to meet them, and we raised the problem with the Minister of Interior. The Minister personally instructed the immigration officers to comply with the arrangement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. UNAMIR's Chief of Security, Mr. Ischlika, then arranged for the photographs to be taken. I left the airport when the processing began, at about 1430 hours.

G6
25/2/95
SB

①

FE

Sir, I am rather surprised at the comments. An information on troops arrival is discussed openly at morning briefings which some of the civilians feel far too low for them to attend. In any case we had get the troops out of the airport but not them. What is the work about? They must do their work. You may wish to discuss with the SRSG Sir.

24/2
JH


At about 17:00 hours, we were informed that the Minister of Defence had stopped that process, presumably on the same security grounds raised earlier. There was talk of the repatriation of the troops back to Senegal. It took more than an hour of subsequent negotiation between Ambassador Conde, State Protocol, and the various Ministries to get that resolved. The troops were finally processed through at about 20:30 hours on the intervention of the FC who contacted the Minister of Defence. Steps were also taken to stop a second batch of troops that was due in this morning.

Comments

UNAMIR is required to inform the Government, in advance, of incoming troops. That was not done ahead of time in this case. The SRSG's Office only learned of their arrival when there was a crisis. When our protocol office was informed of the presence of the troops at the Airport, they informed immediately the Foreign Ministry. There were two other incidents this month, on 2 February and 20 February, of crises relating to troops whose arrival had apparently not been previously notified.

As we continue to press the Government to honour its obligations under the Status of Mission Agreement, we must certainly honour our own obligations.


Ike Minta
Legal Adviser


M. Conde
Acting Chief of Protocol

cc: SRSG
FC
ED
CIC/Administration
MOVCON

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ
CMO
COS(FHQ)

DATE: 23 FEB 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : REPORT ON THE LOOTING OF WFP TRUCKS AT GISENYI ON 18-19 FEB 1995.

1. Attached is a report on the looting of WFP trucks at Gisenyi on the 18-19 FEB 1995.
2. Please accept for your information and necessary action.

DCMO/800

*See on [] comments
[] att report*

*22/2
DFC/CMO*

[Signature]
A ANOCHKINE
Lt Col
For DCMO

*G6
25/1/95
SB*

To: MILOB GP HQ

Info: Force Comd
UNAMIR HQ


Date: 21 Feb 95

Subject: LOOTING OF WFP TRUCKS AT GISENYI ON 18-19 FEB 95.

1. Forwarded herewith, please find . . . copy of the report on the looting of WFP Trucks at Gisenyi on the 18-19 Feb 95 for your information and necessary action.

2. As the Sector Comd who was directly involved and was throughout at the scene directing the operations, I wish to request that the UN Civilian staff in GISENYI be specially commended for their roles. While performing their duties, they defied dangers/risks to their lives and worked as a team, thereby saving whatever was left of the trucks cargo. But for their cooperation and personal sacrifice, much more or even lives would have been lost. They won my admiration.


3. Best Regards.



E Essien
Lt Col
Sector Comd

SCMO/SOO

I would have wished to know specific names. Just UN civilian staff is not detailed enough. I wish to commend Lt Col Essien himself and his team of MICOBs also. A copy must go to SRSH's JTR.


22/2
OFC/AMU

8 Feb

1. At around 1300 hrs. on 18 Feb., Maj. Myandouki (MILOB) saw a group of some 50 people outside his house who were attacking the WFP trucks lined up outside. They were throwing stones at the drivers, opening the truck and looting the contents.
2. At around, 1315 hrs., he heard three shots fired and came out to find RPA soldiers trying to disperse the crowd. He found one dead body lying on the road, shot through the temple and was told that there was another dead body in the nearby premises, shot through the chest. According the truck drivers, the RPA had initially tried to disperse the crowd by beating them. When this failed they then opened fire, resulting in the deaths.
3. Maj. Myandouki reported the matter to the Duty Officer, Sect. 5 MILOB HQ and by 1345 hrs., teams of MILOB, Human Rights and UNHCR had reached the scene of looting. Support from formed troops from TUNBATT was requested for at about 1400h.
4. The WFP trucks were lined up on the dirt road originating from the GRANDE BARRIERE (BP1) and running parallel to the tarmac road skirting the lake (sketch attached), for a stretch of about 1 km. The looting was being carried out at the tail end of the line of trucks. At least 3 trucks were being looted simultaneously when the teams arrived. The RPA and Gendarmerie present were only a handful and they were making token efforts to beat the miscreants with sticks. This, in fact, had no effect at all.
5. Efforts were made by the UN personnel (UNAMIR, Human Rights) to stop the crowd from looting, at the risk of their lives. The formed troops were yet to arrive.
6. The RPA had arrested the WFP logistics coordinator from GOMA, Dan Coyle, because he had allegedly used a foul language "Fuck Off" on an RPA officer on the spot, and requisitioned his radio handset. This officer was the only one seen at the spot and he appeared to show scant interest in the looting going all around. As a result of UNHCR intervention vis-a-vis the RPA deputy, Dan Coyle was released after apologizing to the officer in question.
7. The initial decision by UNHCR/WFP to move the trucks through the border to Zaire did not go well with the RPA, who turned it down. It was decided, the best option was to move the trucks to MARERU (3118) TUNBAT Loc, where the trucks would be provided UNAMIR protection pending instructions from KIGALI. While the UNHCR Chief-Gisenyi went around to locate the RPA authorities to negotiate, the Sector Comd remained at the scene to control and direct the operations. The ops officer manned the ops room (radio room) maintaining coordination and radio links with those in the field and the authorities in Kigali. Both the RPA brigade commander and the local battalion commander were in KIGALI, and the only person who could be contacted was the RPA deputy (Maj. Goodman). This officer could and did authorize the move of the trucks out of the border area, but he claimed, he did not have the authority to allow their move out of GISENYI. Contact was established with KIGALI for the same, but no favourable response was received.
8. Meanwhile on ground, difficulties were being faced. The soldiers (RPA) on the spot would not allow the trucks to use the tarmac road skirting the lake as they mounted one road block after the other. They wanted the trucks to turn left, hit the dirt track where the looters were present and then head out of town. No amount of persuasion or pleading that the dirt track was too narrow for the trucks to turn and that the looters were still present there, could make them change their decision.

9. Meanwhile, three APCs of TUNBATT had arrived. One was immediately moved to the scene of looting. The troops unfortunately were under orders ~~not to~~ dismount from their APCs. After some coaxing however, they got down and moved to push back the crowd, thus stopping further looting. At that point of time, the crowd present had increased to approximately 1000 - 2000 consisting of both refugees from the reception centre (59/60 caseload) and local people who had joined in. The looting was led by youths, boys especially, who had meanwhile blocked the road with stones, and cut the pneumatic cables of the vehicles to demobilise them. They resorted to throwing stones at the teams (UNAMIR and other staff) who were trying to stop the looting. The teams later removed the barricades, as the APC led the convoy, to enable the vehicles leave the area.

10. One APC was used to block/deter the crowd on the dirt track (see sketch) and the remaining two were used to lead the convoy of trucks out of the border area onto the main road GISENYI - RUHENGARI. There was a minor attempt to stop the trucks near the Prefecture with a road block of stones. This was, however, soon cleared and the trucks moved to the last checkpoint at the entrance of GISENYI. Out of a total of 16 - 17 trucks, about 8 trucks got through the checkpoint, before the rest were stopped by the RPA pending permission from KIGALI. Out of the trucks which went ahead of the checkpoint, about 4 trucks proceeded further and 3 reached TUNBATT that night. A balance of 4 trucks could not go ahead. Another 8 trucks were stopped short of the checkpoint. Since it was already dark and the RPA refused further passage to the trucks, it was decided that the convoy should stay the night at the check point. RPA agreed to provide security in situ. The APCs were moved back to the TUNCOY (GISENYI) for the night.

11. A stock of the situation was taken later during the night at the MILOBS ops. room and all concerned were cautioned to remain alert. At the debriefing, it was learnt that Oskar Lehner, the head of the Human Rights team Gisenyi, while photographing the happenings was grabbed by the RPA, who took away the film from his camera. Encouraged by this, some miscreants from the mob attacked him and snatched away his watch, compass and pen. All the while, the RPA soldiers stood by passively. The indifference and nonchalant attitude adopted by the RPA at the scene of looting and elsewhere, during the later part of the day was confirmed by various persons on the spot. There were no officers of the RPA present on the spot to control the situation.

19 Feb

12. In the morning at around 0815 hrs, when the Sector Comd arrived at the check point, a small group of about 150-200 people were gathered, in the proximity of the convoy. The atmosphere was tense. At about the same time (0830 hrs.), MILOBS Sector HQ asked call sign CY-0A to direct the APCs from the TUNCOY to move up to the convoy. Permission to move the convoy was unduly delayed. It finally came through at 0930 hrs. Meanwhile, two trucks of ICRC had been permitted to move out at 0900 hrs and reached KIGALI safely later in the day. It was decided to move the remaining 10 trucks immediately towards RUHENGURI, even though the TUNBATT escort had not fetched up. This was justified as there were strong apprehensions of the looting starting again. It was anticipated that the APCs would soon catch up with the slow moving convoy en route. The TUNBAT escort finally fetched up at 1035 h. The milob teams were directed to take the convoy to TUNBAT location immediately the last truck crossed the check point.

13. The situation was being monitored at the checkpoint by the MILOB and Human Rights teams. Out of the 10 trucks, 6 moved out, headed by Chief of UNHCR Gisenyi, while the remaining 4 (slow moving ones with mechanical defects) were to move with HR51. At around 1000 hrs., YH1 reported that the 6 trucks moving ahead had been stopped 5 kms out of GISENYI and were being looted. The MILOBS team and Human Rights team which had been moving up after having monitored the crossing at the checkpoint, immediately rushed to the spot, to find that the convoy was halted in a haphazard manner. Some of the trucks had their transmission cables cut and the drivers except a few had disappeared. There was traffic jam and a rowdy, unruly mob of about 500-600 people were looting the trucks. The teams immediately went into action, clearing the traffic jam, pushing the looters off the trucks and getting the drivers to move their trucks.

14. In about 30 minutes, the trucks had cleared the spot, with the looters still clinging on to the trucks like ants. A number of them were injured when they tried to get off the running trucks with their loot. Often, the trucks would be stopped by the looters who intimidated the drivers and the MILOBs had to shuttle up and down the convoy pushing the trucks on.

15. The APCs finally joined the convoy, near KANAMA checkpoint. On seeing the APCs, the looters jumped out of the trucks, dragging their loot with them. Once again the unsuitability of APC-mounted troops was proved, when the troops expressed their inability to dismount from the APCs (there were orders to this effect) and prevent the looters from doing further damage.

16. The convoy was escorted through the KANAMA checkpoint and onto the TUNBATT HQ and subsequently to RUHENGURI.

17. Meanwhile in the rear, the remaining 4 trucks had broken through the area of looting under directions of HR51 and MILOBS teams proceeded ahead. One of the trucks

which had poor pulling power had to unhook its container trailer. When the RPA battalion commander, who was passing by the spot, was asked to assist with the security of the trailer, he declined. The trailer was later recovered under supervision of WFP.

18. Under the directions of the Sector Commander, all the trucks were pushed out through RUHENGARI to KIGALI. The same was escorted up to RUHENGARI by a joint MILOB and Human Rights team and supplemented by a MILOB team from RUHENGARI.

19. It was not possible to get an exact figure of the trucks which had passed through and the details of the trucks looted. This was primarily because the urgency of the situation demanded that the convoy be kept moving, on a piecemeal basis and was strung out well over 30 - 40 kms on the road. The RPA checkpoint and WFP RUHENGARI was contacted on the subject, but they did not have exact information. The same could only be consolidated, once the trucks had reached KIGALI. The teams returned from RUHENGARI after having ensured that all the WFP trucks had been pushed out of RUHENGARI town. The WFP, Kigali was unwilling to supply this information to the milobs in GISENYI through their field officer in RUHENGARI. They maintain they can supply the information to UNAMIR HQ. However, from WFP-GOMA, a total of 10 WFP trucks, 4 IFRC and one UNHCR trucks were completely looted.

Analysis

20. Elements contributing to the occurrence of the riot

(a) It is a known fact that the local staff ^{of} Rwandese Government have expressed displeasure towards the Goma-bound humanitarian assistance ("feeding the enemy") and found the aid provided to Rwanda meagre and conditional. Thus it is of little surprise that they were not greatly concerned with the security of the Goma-bound WFP trucks and did not take appropriate action to prevent the looting.

(b) It is because of the same reason, one suspects, that the letting through of Goma-bound WFP trucks was deliberately slowed down, resulting into accumulation of a large number of these trucks at the border. This obviously made an attractive target to the dissatisfied lot at the GISENYI reception centres.

(c) There is general dissatisfaction among the 59/60 caseload who are housed at the two reception centres (11,000). They have been awaiting settlement on Government-identified land for a very long time now. This coupled with barely enough rations, has turned them into a volatile lot.

(d) The situation would not have gone out of hand but for the unwillingness/inability of the local authorities to control the population. The absence of officers of the RPA/Gendarmerie on the spot

was felt. One had to deal with soldiers who did not understand the urgency of the situation and only caused hinderance to evacuation of UN property, through their rigid attitude.

(e) The Director of WFP Goma was at the scene of the incident. However, there seems to be a lack of concern, by the Goma people (WFP) to the accumulation of the trucks at the border. The incident could have been avoided by increasing the labour required to unload/load the trucks (necessary due to checking by the RPA), as also having someone to regulate the flow of these trucks from KIGALI.

Recommendation

21. (a) Whereas the 59/60 caseload in the reception centres get food regularly, the same is not true for their counterparts who have moved to the communes. Except for one commune in the GISENYI Prefecture, they have not been served as yet, within the framework of general WFP food distribution to needy people. This has all the trappings of future trouble and needs to be rectified in terms of policy directives, stock replenishment, logistics and implementing partners.

(b) The need for rapid allocation of land to the 59/60 caseload housed in the reception centres cannot be over-emphasized. A case to be taken up with the Government, underlining the urgency of the situation.

(c) It is necessary to have a permanent liaison officer ex-WFP Goma, to monitor the checking of the trucks by RPA at GISENYI and to regulate the flow of trucks from KIGALI if the WFP is to continue using the KIGALI-GISENYI-GOMA route.

(d) It is necessary to talk to cross-sections/identified leaders of the refugees and impress upon them, the seriousness and implications of the act committed. It is highly possible that if an event of this sort recurs, the food supply to these people may stop altogether -- WFP may be unwilling to send their trucks down to GISENYI for security reasons!

(e) It be recommended to the RPA and Gendarmerie that they evolve a system of duty officer at the Bn HQ, who can be contacted in such emergencies. Also, a stand-by force be maintained, under arrangements of the battalion HQ, to cater for such eventualities.

(f) The reaction time of the formed troops, to the situation, could be improved by having direct communications with the TUNCOY (GISENYI). At present no such facility exists. TUNBAT reaction time, especially on Sunday, 19 feb 95 was slow. If they had reacted faster, the situation on Day 2 would probably have been different.

(g) The formation of a rapid reaction team mounted on vehicles at COY/battalion level would be ideally suited to deal with such situations. It would improve the reaction time tremendously.

(h) Troops mounted on APCs are not suited for operations of this nature. They have orders not to leave their APCs. Whereas, time and again, the necessity was felt to have the troops go on ground to push the crowd away and guard the sacks of blankets and food lying on the ground, as also prevent the ongoing looting.


(i) The possibility of such an event recurring cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is necessary to guard the soft spots in the town. This includes the warehouses of WFP, COOPI and UNHCR. The local Gendarmerie have meanwhile accepted to provide guards at UNHCR warehouses. The security of the remaining warehouses is being taken up with the local authorities.

(j) Security guarantees will be required from the RPA/Gendarmerie for further distribution of food and non-food items in GISENYI. The same would also be required for UN personnel working in this area.

(k) Policy guidelines require to be streamlined at UNHCR/WFP HQ level for Goma-bound humanitarian assistance. The possibility of supplying Goma through air, till the situation improves, cannot be ruled out.

(l) The arrest of a member of the WFP by the RPA on grounds that the person had abused an RPA officer is a blatant violation of rules on the subject. The same should be taken up with RPA High Command in KIGALI.

SKETCH SHOWING AREA OF LOOTING ON 18th FEB



DFC

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Col K M Tutt
DCOS (Sp)
HQ UNAMIR

Extn 11109

To: List D

Info: List A

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-56

Date: 22 Feb 95

Subject: IMPROPER SALE OF PRIVILEGE ITEMS

Reference:

A. SRSG's Letter of 21 Feb 95.

1. The FC shares the SRSGs serious concern at the leakage of UN privilege items, including beverages, TV's electrical items and toiletries which are not been properly controlled and are appearing for sale within the local economy.
2. The UN has certain custom exemptions and these and our relationship with the national government are being put into danger by the actions of a greedy and immoral minority.
3. The Force Provost Marshal has been instructed to focus greater efforts at identifying those individuals involved in this type of activity in order that appropriate disciplinary action can be taken.
4. The sale and transfer of these privilege items between entitled UN personnel is permissible.

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DFC/emo

G6
23/2/95
SB

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Log 56

DATE: 21 February 1995

To: FC
ED
CAO
LA

From: Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Subject: Privileged items

Shaharyar Khan

I am concerned at the leakage of some UN privilege items that appear to be on the market. These include beverages, TVs, electrical items, toiletries. Justifiably the Rwandese government is concerned and has remonstrated.

I would like the strictest possible control on these items. In any case I must be informed of the quantities of these privileged items that are being brought in and their rationale. If leakage continues I shall have no hesitation to withdraw these privileges as I am not prepared to accept the tarnishing of UN's image in Rwanda.

*Welfare items only
to UNAMIR Rwanda*



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

To: Chief General Services

Info: CISS, DFC, COS, DCOS Ops, DCOS SP, MA/FC, G2

From: FC *[Signature]*

Date: 21 Feb 95

Subject: MEMORANDUM OF APPRECIATION - GIKONDO MASS GRAVE

I wish to signify formally the laudable contribution Mr Bah has made to the operation of UNAMIR. Although his brief submission on a Mass Grave Site at PALOTTI Church in GIKONDO probably took very little time to create and submit, it is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the very few formal pieces of information that anyone from the non-military side of the mission has volunteered.

I offer this formal recognition to encourage all other staff to be aware of other such manifestations of the troubles that swept RWANDA recently. I would much rather have one hundred such locations reported repeatedly by observant members of this mission than have one missed or not reported because nobody saw it or worse still, never took the small amount of time required to report it.

Together we can make a difference.

*See
22/2
DFC/amo*

*G6
23/2/95
SB*

DFC

COs

I agree totally

with this. See at
minor error in
para 2 fig

1. Ref att.
2. This is the response to
Kaj Icamanzi's allegations
I have given a copy to
FC for his perusal.
3. For info and comments
please

A
122/1



KIGALI, February 1995

Dear Minister

Subject: ALLEGED GROSS MISCONDUCT BY UNAMIR TROOPS

You have recently received a letter dated 15 February 1995 from the Chief RPA Liaison Officer, Major Kamanzi, identifies seven incidents in which he accuses UNAMIR troops of ill discipline and ill behaviour. The UNAMIR version of the incidents are recounted below so that you will have all the facts at your disposal to allow you to assess Major Kamanzi's allegations.

The first incident concerns the Australian soldier who removed the weapon from the RPA soldier and hid it in his lines. This matter did occur and has been investigated and disciplinary action has been taken against the soldier. AUSMED cooperated completely with the RPA and initiated ^{their} own investigation, with the RPA soldier being invited to a 'line up' in an attempt to identify the culprit. The outcome of the investigation and disciplinary action was advised to UNAMIR HQ in writing to be passed to the RPA. The soldier was awarded 28 days detention and a fine of US \$ 1900.

The second incident concerns the burning of the 100 Franc note. This incident occurred after a soldier attempted to buy cigarettes using the note. He was advised that he could not use the note because it was damaged and that no bank or vendor in Rwanda would accept damaged notes. Furthermore, there was no way of exchanging them. He therefore, in a fit of rage decided to burn the note to destroy it. The incident was investigated by CO AUSMED and disciplinary action was taken against the soldier. He was awarded 28 days detention.

The third incident occurred on 9 February 1995 at Butare and followed a vehicle accident involving a Zambian vehicle which had struck and killed an RPA soldier and injured another. The Australians stopped at the scene of the accident and provided first aid and helped remove the injured RPA soldier to hospital. An attempt was made to take the Zambian into custody, which is contrary to the Status of Mission Agreement. The Australian soldiers intervened and took the Zambian under their protection and indicated that any questioning could be done at UNAMIR TAC HQ. This was not acceptable to the RPA and Gendarmes and heated discussions ensued. The Australian soldiers were ordered to cock their weapons only after the RPA soldiers had cocked their weapons. The Zambian driver was then removed to TAC HQ.

66
23/2/95
SB

The fourth incident occurred on 11 February 1995 in RUSUMO between two GHANBATT soldiers and two Rwandan civilians. This case is still being investigated by the UNAMIR Military Police and , therefore, I will not be able to provide any information on this incident until the report has been completed.

The fifth incident occurred on 14 February 1995 outside the military wing of CHK. An RPA vehicle had broken down and was parked in an area reserved for the ambulance. The ambulance driver requested the RPA driver to move the vehicle but was told that it could not be moved because it had broken down and had a flat tyre. The Australian driver then asked if he could push the vehicle forward and the RPA driver agreed, getting in behind the wheel to steer while the ambulance driver pushed. Unfortunately, they still could not move the vehicle. The Australian driver then suggested that they push the vehicle forward with the ambulance, the RPA driver agreed. While this was occurring an RPA soldier came from across the road and accused the Australian driver of deliberately ramming the RPA vehicle. MAJ Kamanzi then appeared at the scene and also accused the driver of deliberately ramming their vehicle and also of holding a weapon to the head of the RPA driver. This was later denied by the RPA driver when questioned by the Gendarmes. He also accused the Australian soldiers of cocking their weapons and pointing them at the RPA guard. This did not occur, as was witnessed by a large number of people. There was no damage to the RPA vehicle and the act of pushing forward the vehicle was agreed to and assisted by the RPA driver. CO AUSMED placed his driver in detention on the strength of MAJ Kamanzi's accusations but was later released when the true story was revealed. The driver was released to go to the Gendarmes HQ for questioning but no charges were laid.

The sixth incident occurred on 15 February 1995 outside the AUSMED HQ. An RPA driver was reversing up the road and ran into an AUSMED Landrover that was turning left. The RPA driver was not looking and despite the fact that the incident occurred in front of the AUSMED guard there was no time to warn him. The AUSMED vehicle was reversed back inside the gate about 10 metres and the driver and the vehicle remained there for the duration of the incident. When the CO AUSMED arrived at the scene MAJ Kamanzi was seen striking an AUSMED JNCO and screaming obscenities at him. The CO directed him to stop. He then began to verbally abuse the CO, even after the CO identified himself by rank and appointment. MAJ Kamanzi then blocked both entry/exits to the barracks using RPA vehicles. Several people appeared at the scene to attempt to resolve the situation but none were successful. CO AUSMED refused to accept that his vehicle and driver had caused the accident and every effort to conduct a proper police investigation at the scene was thwarted by MAJ Kamanzi. The situation became tense when the RPA removed one vehicle from the entry and officers and soldiers stood in the entry to prevent them from replacing it. The RPA then reversed a vehicle into the crowd. The driver was ordered to stop and two RPA soldiers cocked their weapons. Immediately, the Australian soldiers retaliated by cocking their weapons. MAJ Kamanzi seemed to rejoice in this and continually stated that the RPA were ready to fight. He was repeatedly advised by the CO AUSMED that they were not here to fight anybody but would take whatever steps were necessary to protect themselves. Furthermore, the APC was not manned or moved at any stage during the incident. The vehicle and driver were released to go to Gendarme HQ several hours later. The vehicle was impounded on the demand of MAJ Kamanzi. The claim that MAJ Kamanzi tried to resolve the issue could not be further from the truth, he escalated what was a minor incident into a major confrontation. As an act of good faith, while not admitting liability, HO UNAMIR has arranged repair of the RPA vehicle.

I cannot comment on the last allegation by Major Kamanzi as there is no record of a UNAMIR vehicle being involved in an accident with two RPA soldier on a motorcycle on 15 February 1995. However, I have directed the Provost Marshall to investigate this matter.

Finally, I can assure you Minister that UNAMIR personnel hold the Rwandian population, both civilian and military, in highest regard and they would do nothing to jeopardise the progress that has been achieved towards a lasting peace.

G.C. Tousignant
Major General
Force Commander

His Excellency, Major General P.Kagame
Vice President and Minister for Defence
Office of the Vice President
Kigali

cc: Chief of Staff of the RPA



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Major Cuthbert-Brown
Force Provost Marshall

FROM: Paul Ischlika
CSO/ASC

Paul Ischlika

*PM
What has happened is that
so far? Are the MR outstopping
their bonds?
22/2
DTC*

DATE: 17 February 1995
Ref.: UNAMIR/SO/022

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ASSAULT AGAINST CPL. PARENT ID CARD #7563

I wish to submit a very serious report against the above mentioned Military Police for publicly assaulting me in the car park of the UNAMIR Headquarters.

At 1515 hrs LT. on 17 February 1995 I arrived at the UNAMIR HQ from the airport with my vehicle UNAMIR 1105, just as you were driving towards the main gate in a military police vehicle. As you are aware my allocated car park is the 3rd space in the last row at the top end near the container used as the Stationery Ware House. Ever since I was allocated this space I have always used the left bend to enter my parking space.

Throughout my six months with UNAMIR as Chief Security Officer, it has never at any time been made known either by an Administrative circular or by a sign post that the left bend is a "NO ENTRY".

Proceeding to my parking space I realized that a military vehicle UNAMIR 4617 belonging to the Nigerian Company was parked in my place. Infact there were two of those vehicles with about 20-25 Nigerian military personnel around who were the escort party to the Nigerian Delegation. In the process of looking for another space I saw a military vehicle coming towards me, which I allowed to pass, but at that point in time I had seen an open space belonging to the Humanitarian Officer where I was trying to park, as I did not want to ask the Nigerians out of my place.

Apparently Cpl Parent whom I had never met or known before, and who was in the said vehicle, abruptly stopped his vehicle came out and shouted at me to back out as that was a NO ENTRY.

*G6
23/2/95
SB*

I pleaded with him to allow me to park this time as I was only couple of meters away from the space and that next time I will take note, but he refused and kept on shouting at me in a very rude and authoritative manner to a point that I felt humiliated. In any case I had no where to back out as he had parked his vehicle behind me. In view of this I decided to park my vehicle in open the space of the HAO who is a friend and colleague of mine.

For parking in that space, Cpl Parent still kept harassing me that I should not park there as it belonged to another person, failing to realize that my own space was occupied by somebody else. Alighting from my vehicle and in an attempt to lock the door on the off-side, Cpl Parent blocked me by aggressively standing in my way and ordered me not to move an inch. Each time I tried to evade him he will cross my way. On several occasions Cpl Parent grabbed me on my left arm and pushed me back preventing me from moving. Twice Mr. Tony Adams the Transport Despatch Officer who was present told him that I was the CSO but Cpl Parent said he didn't give a damn. All this took place before all the local staff drivers and the Nigerian Military escort Team. Infact it was a public scenario.

As a matter of interest Cpl Parent even summoned another junior military police officer (a Ghanian) and ordered him to detain me on the spot.

When Cpl Parent demanded for my ID card which was hanging on my neck, three times I showed him only to allow me to pass but he kept holding me back that he was not finished with me.


You will be surprised to note that a Senior Nigerian military officer who was seated in their vehicle tried to pacify Cpl Parent but no, he wouldn't listen, as he was bent on imposing his military discipline on me.

As far as I am concerned, there is a legitimate Camp Commandant in the person of Capt. Dewgun appointed by the Force Commander who is responsible for the security of the UNAMIR HQ including any indiscipline behavior on the part of any staff member. Perhaps Cpl Parent's appointment as military police supersedes every authority in this mission and has the mandate to physically assault staff members for defying his orders.

As a military police officer who is supposed to impose discipline on the military, and who is also supposed to be disciplined himself, I am sure there are many ways Cpl Parent could book me to task than publicly humiliating and assaulting me for defying his orders particularly in my capacity as the Chief Security Officer for UNAMIR.

cc: F.C.
D.F.C
E.D.
C.A.O.
Camp Commdant

FC *WJ*

DPC (TSOR) 

1. Ref alt.

2. for info please

A
201



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - NYKUAR

PAGE 1 OF 1

SECU.CLASS

D T G

DOC.NQ

PRECE.

UNCLAS200925B FEB/95OPS 241IMMEDIATE

FROM : ETHIOBATT/YANGUGU/

TO : UNAMIR HQ/KIGALI

INFO : TAC HQ/BUTABE/

SUBJ: INCIDENT REPORT

1. THIS MORNING AT ABOUT 0430 HRS A BOAT WHICH WAS PROCEEDING TO GR(0145) FROM ZIWI ISLAND KNOWING THAT TROOPS ARE AROUND CHANGED THE DIRECTION TOWARDS GR(9246). THE TIME THIS BOAT ARRIVED AT THIS LOCATION ANOTHER 3 BOATS FROM THE DIRECTION OF ZIWI ISLAND CAME AND A FIRE WAS OPENED AGAINST OUR TROOPS. THEY RUN AWAY AFTER OPENING THE FIRE AND 1 BOAT WITH A MAN DRESSED CIVILIAN CLOTH WAS CAPTURED. CO LEFT THIS MORNING TO ASSES THE SITUATION AT THIS LOCATION.

2. BEST REGARDS.

- BT -

COS

Sir Ethio Batt asked to keep the HQ informed. A detailed report is to be submitted.

[Signature]
20/2
03 005

DFC



UNITED NATIONS
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UNAMIR - KIGALI

PAGE 1 OF 1

SECU. CLASS

D T G

DOC. NO

PRECE.

UNCLAS

200925B FEB/95

OPS 241

IMMEDIATE

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- BT -

②

cc

Pse fwd copy to
DFC and COS

③

Treated
AS

④

20/2

GR OPS

G6
22/2/95
SB

File

Department of Defence

①

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO	DATE - TIME GROUP 101240 Z FEB 95	SIC/ORIG NO E3L140OPS 1713
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: ASC UNAMIR II (RWANDA) To: HQ UNAMIR II		

② COS
For info
14/2

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF INCIDENT GENDARMERIE AND AS PERSONAL AT BUTARE 09 FEB 95

1. AT 1700B 09 FEB 95 TWO AS VEHICLES WERE RETURNING FROM REFUELLING FROM THE GHANAIAAN SUPPLY PLATOON. THE VEHICLES WERE PROCEEDING NORTH ALONG THE BUTARE MSR. THEY WERE 200M NORTH OF UNREO OFFICES WHEN THEY CAME ACROSS A ZAMBIAAN TRUCK FACING WEST, AT RIGHT ANGLES TO THE ROAD, ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD. A CASUALTY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES WAS UNDER THE REAR AXLES (THE AS ELM HAVE NO DETAILS ABOUT A DEATH AS THE CASUALTY WAS ALIVE WHEN EVACUATED FROM THE SCENE). THE VEHICLES STOPPED TO GIVE FIRST AID. AN INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL NGO WORKER SHIFTED THE CASUALTY INTO HIS VAN AT THE SCENE AND TWO AUSMED MEDICS ARRIVED. AS INF ELM CLEARED THE CROWD TO ALLOW ACCESS TO THE CASUALTY. AT THIS STAGE THERE WERE TWO GENDARMERIE AT THE SCENE TRYING TO QUESTION THE CASUALTY. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT THE MEDICS WANTED TO GIVE FIRST AID. THEY DID AND THE CASUALTY WAS SEEN TO HAVE SEVERE CRUSH INJURIES TO THE HEAD AND CHEST, AND HAVING BREATHING DIFFICULTIES.
2. THE MEDICS AND SGT RICE WENT WITH THE CASUALTY IN THE IMC VAN AND LAND ROVER TO BUTARE HOSPITAL. TIME ON SCENE WAS 10 MINUTES. CPL REILLY STAYED AT THE SCENE WITH THE REMAINING INF SECTION PLUS, TO TAKE THE ZAMBIAAN SGT DRIVER OF THE TRUCK TO TAC HQ AND RENDEZVOUS THERE WITH THE LAND ROVER AFTER IT HAD RETURNED FROM THE HOSPITAL.
3. AT BUTARE HOSPITAL THE MEDICS TOOK THE CASUALTY TO THE OPERATING THEATRE, AND HANDED HIM OVER TO HOSPITAL STAFF. ON LEAVING THE HOSPITAL AT 1724B THE PARTY DROVE PAST THE ACCIDENT SITE AGAIN ON ROUTE TO TAC HQ.
4. MEANWHILE CPL REILLY AT THE ACCIDENT SITE SAW TWO, THEN MORE, RPA AND GENDARMERIE ARRIVE AT THE SCENE, ARMED WITH PISTOLS, GRENADES, AK TYPE WEAPONS. THEY IMMEDIATELY HEADED TOWARDS THE ZAMBIAAN. CPL REILLY STEPPED BETWEEN THEM AND IDENTIFIED HIMSELF, AND SAID THE ZAMBIAAN WAS UNDER HIS

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G6
14/2/95
JB

PROTECTION. THE RWANDANS RESPONDED "NO, WE ARE TAKING HIM FOR QUESTIONING". CPL REILLY SAID IT WAS UN ORDERS TO WAIT FOR MILOBS TO ARRIVE BEFORE ANY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN, AND REQUESTED MILOB ASSISTANCE BY RADIO TO TAC HQ. AN RPA SOLDIER THEN ACCUSED THE AUSTRALIANS OF MOVING THE TRUCK TO DESTROY EVIDENCE, WHICH THEY HAD NOT, AND ALSO SAID "YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO COME TO OUR COUNTRY AND KILL OUR PEOPLE AND EXPECT TO GET AWAY WITH IT". CPL REILLY SAID THE CASUALTY WAS ALIVE AND HAD BEEN TAKEN TO HOSPITAL BY AS MEDICS. FURTHER ACCUSATIONS FOLLOWED ABOUT THE MOVING OF THE VEHICLE AND DEMANDS TO QUESTION THE ZAMBIAN AND TAKE HIM AWAY. A CROWD OF UNIFORMED AND NON-UNIFORMED RWANDANS HAD GATHERED DURING THIS TIME.

5. ON ARRIVAL BACK AT THE SCENE SGT RICE SAW THERE WERE 15 TO 20 RPA AND GENDARMERIES. CPL REILLY EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. SGT RICE MOVED FORWARD AND TOLD THE TWO GENDARMERIES ARGUING WITH CPL REILLY THAT HE WAS TAKING THE ZAMBIAN TO TAC HQ. THEY YELLED BACK HE COULD NOT DO THIS. SGT RICE SAID UN TROOPS COULD NOT BE HANDED OVER AND GENDARMERIES COULD QUESTION THE MBR AT TAC HQ. THE GENDARMERIES YELLED THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO GO ANYWHERE.

6. ABOUT THIS TIME A GERMAN UN POLICE OFFICER (BELIEVED CIVPOL) AND ANOTHER UN PERSON (AFRICAN WITH UN ID, STATUS UNKNOWN) ARRIVED BUT DID NOT INTERVENE. *who were these?*

7. AN RPA SOLDIER IN THE CENTRE OF THE SCENE SHOUTED A COMMAND IN RWANDAN AND THE CROWD DISPERSED. AS THIS HAPPENED TWO AS SOLDIERS SAW TWO GENDARMERIES GO TO ACTION, SGT RICE AND CPL REILLY THEN GAVE THE ORDER TO GO TO ACTION. ONE OF THE TWO GENDARMERIES IN THE SCENE WALKED FORWARD SAYING "IF YOU WANT TO FIGHT WE WILL FIGHT". SGT RICE PUSHED HIM AWAY AND GAVE THE ORDER FOR THE ZAMBIAN TO BE PUT ON THE 6X6. THE UN PERSON BESIDE THE GERMAN POLICEMAN CAME FORWARD SAYING YOU CAN NOT TAKE HIM, HE MUST REMAIN HERE. THERE WAS NOTHING TO BE ACHIEVED BY ALLOWING THE ZAMBIAN SGT TO REMAIN AT THE SCENE AND PROLONGED CONFRONTATION WOULD ONLY HAVE AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION AS THE AS TROOPS HAD NO INTENTION OF HANDING THE ZAMBIAN OVER TO THE GENDARMERIE.

8. AS INF AND MEDICS SPREAD OUT AROUND THE SCENE AS THE ZAMBIAN WAS LEAD ONTO THE 6X6, AND THEN MOUNTED VEHICLES AND DROVE TO TAC HQ. DURING THE PERIOD AFTER THE GENDARMERIES AND AS SOLDIERS HAD GONE TO ACTION AT LEAST SIX PEOPLE AT THE SCENE WENT INTO NEARBY SHOPS AND RETURNED WITH AK TYPE WEAPONS. GRENADES WERE ALSO SEEN TO BE PASSED OUT TO BOTH UNIFORMED AND NON-UNIFORMED PERSONS CARRYING WEAPONS.

9. DURING THE TRAVEL TO TAC HQ THE GENDARMERIES AND RPA PURSUED, AND THEN DEPLOYED AROUND TAC HQ. THE AS WERE ORDERED TO RETURN TO THE LOAD CONDITION WHICH THEY DID. THE ZAMBIAN, SGT RICE, AND A GENDARMERIE LT WENT


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INTO TAC HQ TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. AFTER THIS THE AS GROUP LEFT FOR MURAMBE AT 1800B.

10. AT TODAY'S ACTIVITIES AS PART OF OP RETOUR THE RPA IN THE CAMPS WERE FRIENDLY TOWARDS AS TROOPS. CAPT FREWEN HAD A CORDIAL CHAT WITH THE ACTING RPA BDE CDR AT TAC HQ THIS EVENING HOWEVER, AT A MEETING AFTER THIS, THE RPA LO FROM BDE HQ, AND THE RPA LO FROM TAC HQ ACCUSED THE AS TROOPS OF GOING TO ACTION FIRST AND DELIBERATELY ESCALATING THE SITUATION WITH THEIR AGGRESSION. THESE RPA DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT HAPPENED, AS THEY CLAIM THERE WAS ONLY ONE RPA WITH A PISTOL AND TWO UNARMED GENDARMERIES AT THE SCENE WHEN AS TROOPS WENT TO ACTION.

11. THE RPA BDE LO ADVISED US TO BE CAREFUL AND THAT IF ANOTHER SUCH INCIDENT OCCURRED THERE WOULD BE BLOOD SHED.

12. END OF INCIDENT SUMMARY.

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092355 B FEB 95

Ops 394

Tac HQ
UNAMIR HQ // OPS
INFO DFC

SUBJECT: INCIDENT REPORT

Ref:

A. Our INCREP dated 09 Feb 95

1. At about 091830 B Feb 95 a ZAMBATT truck UNAMIR 3424 driven by Sgt Chisowa F knocked down two (02) RPA Sldrs in mufti at BUTARE. At the time of the accident, the dvr was going to refuel after returning from KIGALI on Op RETOUR. One of the victims later died while the other one was evacuated to KIGALI in a RWANDI Coy ambulance.
2. An AUSMED team that arrived at the scene of the accident rescued the dvr otherwise he would have been seriously manhandled.
3. Later about one Coy of RPA Sldrs surrounded TAC HQ demanding the release of the dvr to them. The Siege continued until RPA acting Brigade Commander was invited who apparently persuaded the Sldrs to withdraw. However, he demanded

cc/ Pse fwd copies
to COS and DCOS
ops
11/2.

MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

that the Jvr be made available the fol
day to make a statement to the local police.
The Jvr has since given a statement and has
been asked to report whenever they need him.
4. There has been much fuss by the local
RPA Sldrs about the AUSMED team which
rescued the Jvr. RPA Sldrs were apparently
aggrieved about the method adopted to
rescue the Jvr which hinges on the threat
of use of force.

5. RPA Sldrs failed to release the veh
involved in the accident despite all entreaties
made to that effect.

6. Please Ack receipt

A
11/02

RX by Capt D. J. R. L. W.
Duty Officer.