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F.

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MRS. OGATA, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GENEVA

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 2 JANUARY 1995

NO.: MIR _____

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SUBJECT: SMSG RWANDA'S VISIT TO ZAIRE, DECEMBER 28-31

1. I visited Kinshasa from 28th - 31st December accompanied by a team that included Brig. Gen. Anyidoho, DFC, Mr. Arnauld Akodjenou, Head of Desk, Zaire OPS, UNHCR, who joined me from Geneva and four UNAMIR experts. During my stay in Kinshasa, I was received twice by the Prime Minister, Mr. Kengo Wa Dondo; the Minister of Defence, Admiral Mavua Mudima; the Minister for Justice, Mr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lunda Bululu and the Minister for Interior, Mr. Malumba Mbangula. After my meeting with the Defence Minister, technical level talks were held between our team led by Brig Anyidoho and the Zairean technical team. President Mobutu did not receive me but I have indicated that I would fly out to Gbadolite at the President's convenience to call on him. I also met the heads of Missions of USA, France and Belgium.

2. I informed my interlocutors that our shared objective was to persuade the Rwandese refugees to return home voluntarily. I stated that there were two main obstacles to refugee return, namely, intimidation by political elements controlling the camps and the refugees' fears of retribution and harassment on return. I stated that while it was essentially for the Zairean government to address the issue of intimidation, the Rwandese government needed to allay doubts in the minds of refugees returning home. The UN was prepared within financial limitations to help both governments mount campaigns, in a synchronised manner, to achieve the objective of a significant refugee return to Rwanda. I briefed Zairean leaders on Operation Retour and stated that the express reason for my visit was to work out details of logistic and financial support that the UN would consider providing within its limited means.

3. While the Zairean response, as a whole, was positive, there were two distinct strains apparent in their assessment of the situation. Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo referred to recent meetings between the two Prime Ministers and the Presidents in which essential elements had been agreed. He also underscored the commitments he had made during his recent visit to New York when he met the Secretary-General and addressed the Security council. He acknowledged that the options had been narrowed down to Zaire providing troops to control the camps and security corridors into Rwanda. Also, that Rwanda would play its part by organizing Security Zones and providing assurances to the Hutu refugees. The Prime Minister felt that it was high time for action to be taken on the agreed agenda. He welcomed my visit in the context of logistic and financial support from UN for the operation. The Prime Minister was, therefore, positive, constructive and eager to start the operation.

4. The second strain articulated by the Minister of Defence - who is close to President Mobutu - questioned Rwanda's motives. His view was that the "Tutsi dominated government" did not want the Hutu refugees back, that Bizimungu and Twagiramungu had no clout, that Kagame had made provocative statements like the right of hot pursuit into Zaire, that unless genuine reconciliation was set in motion refugees would not return home, that Kagame had made no serious effort to negotiate. I replied that while many of the concerns articulated by the Defence Minister and other Zairean leaders were legitimate, our experience in Rwanda was that the RPA had cooperated on a number of important issues related to the treatment of refugees. I gave the example of Operation Retour in which the RPA had accepted our advice of not closing down IDP camps by force but to allow a gradual, voluntary melt-down. Also, after the French

departure from HPZ, RPA had heeded our advice not to send in its forces for a period of 6-8 weeks. Operation Retour was an effective test of the Rwanda government's bona-fides and if it succeeded, the same formula of a dignified, secure, welcoming return of refugees would be applied to Goma, Bukavu and Ngara. As far as reconciliation was concerned, 2000 former RGF being re-integrated in Gako was not a small figure. I also informed Zairean leaders that the Rwandese government had agreed to cooperate with the International Tribunal. While I held no brief for the Rwandese government and even if Zairean government's worst fears were true, it was still worth making the effort to enable the refugees in Zaire to return voluntarily. At this point, Mr. Akodjenou, the UNHCR representative, made an important contribution by asserting that in UNHCR's assessment, if the intimidation in the camps around Goma could be controlled, a majority of refugees would return home despite fears of harassment. Eventually, the Minister of Defence acknowledged the importance of making a combined effort to enable the refugees to return home voluntarily. Thus, the bottom line of both strains - one eager, the other skeptical - was to seek UN's support for a major effort by Zaire to control the law and order situation in the camps and encourage the refugees to return to Rwanda.

5. I now proceed to the details of our negotiations.

6. The Zairean Force

(i) The Prime Minister and Zairean Ministers stated that the Zaire government would select a well-trained, elite force to carry out the operation in the camps.

Comment: it could be the Presidential Guard but not necessarily so.

(ii) The Prime Minister stated that a force of 1500 had been contemplated. We indicated that a force of 1500 may be appropriate for North Bukavu (Goma) but may be inadequate for a simultaneous operation in Bukavu. ^{we} We indicated a preference for a simultaneous rather than a sequential operation. In discussions at the technical level, the Zairean side agreed to a force of 2500 which would be divided between North and South Kivu. However, for internal reasons, they are maintaining the indicated figure of 1500.

(iii) The Zairean made it clear that they would not want to have a UN battalion providing corridor-security on Zairean soil. This security would be undertaken by Zairean troops who would hand-over returning refugees at the border to UNAMIR.

Comment: your proposal at para 2 (c) of code cable 4217 would therefore not be necessary.

7. UN troop contribution

(i) The Zairean accepted that UN officers (ratio 20:1) would form part of the Zairean force, as planners/advisers/technical experts to the operation. These officers should be drawn from military or para-military units and not from Civpol units as indicated in para 2 (a) of your code cable 4217. It was agreed that 125 such advisers would be required for the 2500 force operation.

Comment: Most if not all of these 125 "advisers" could be supplied from Milobs with UNAMIR. It would be necessary to obtain permission for their redeployment from Rwanda to Zaire.

(ii) It was agreed that there were no grounds to appoint UN Milobs for the operation. Instead, a contingent of about 50 UN officers may be appointed to form a mini-GHQ in Goma - with an antenna in Bukavu - that would oversee and coordinate the operation in Zaire as also coordinate with the Rwandese government through UNAMIR.

(iii) A platoon for security of GHQ as also a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to counter violence in the camps would be attached to the Goma GHQ.

Comment: Most of the staff required for (ii) and (iii) above could also be drawn from UNAMIR with permission from countries concerned for redeployment.

8. Status and nomenclature of operation

(i) The Prime Minister and Zairean leaders were emphatic that UNAMIR should not be seen to spill over into Zaire. The UN operation in Zaire should, therefore, have a separate name and persona. However, Zaire had no objection to this operation being carried out under overall command structure SRSG and Force Commander in Rwanda. The name and acronym

suggested is United Nations Relief Mission in Zaire UNREMIZ.

Comment: This refers to para 2 (d) of code cable 4217).

(ii) As regards command and control, we pressed for the operation (UNREMIZ) to be placed under UN command and control, (as leaving Zaire to pursue its own agenda could prove hazardous). We felt that a UN Force Commander (a Brigadier, preferably a Francophone African country) should be assisted by a Zairean Deputy Force Commander (a Colonel) and that the Zairean troops along with a) UN/advisers, b) GHQ and c) Security support should form UNREMIZ.

(iii) The role of UNREMIZ would be to bring order and security into the camps as indicated in para 2 (a) of your code cable. By its presence, UNREMIZ would inspire confidence in the camps and would reduce intimidation. They would also escort refugee convoys to the border from where UNAMIR/UNHCR would arrange escorts to security zones, welcome centres, relief centres, etc. UNREMIZ would act under a UN Security Council Mandate (Chapter VI).

(iv) The Zairean forces would wear their own uniforms with special berets (colour to be determined). UN forces would wear blue-berets.

Comment: Uniforms would need to be provided.

9. Timing and Alternative Camps

(i) It was agreed at the technical level talks that UNREMIZ should be a four month operation.

Comment: (i) My personal feeling is that a six-month period would be more realistic. Prime Minister Kengo agreed with my view in our wrap-up meeting. He said the mandate could be extended.

(ii) I believe Zaire is pressing for the shorter period in order to keep costs down.

(ii) As indicated by the Prime Minister, the senior political leadership would be moved to the West Coast. We also advocated a surprise swoop against the main leaders in the camps to mark the beginning of the operation.

(iii) Although the issue was not raised in the negotiations, it is likely that Zaire would expect UNHCR/UN's help to move the refugees who decide to stay in Zaire to camps located about 150 kms away from the border.

10. Logistic Support

Attached at Annex "A" is an estimate of the logistic support required. It is recommended that the items required may be airlifted directly from UNISOM to Goma. Alternatively a single country may undertake the operation. Speed is of the essence and highest priority must be accorded to delivering logistics on time. Where possible the remaining items would be made available from UNAMIR.

11. Financial Support

As directed in para 4 of your code cable, it was made clear that there were limitation on financial support from UN and that, in any case, UN international rates could not apply to a national effort. The Zairean side understood that international rates could not be applied to national troops. However, they indicated that some financial incentive needed to be provided to the Zairean troops. As suggested in para 2 (e) of your code cable, we have examined the pay scale of UNDP local staff. It is our considered opinion that a fair salary would equate to the average pay scale for local staff which ranges between US\$400-500 per month. My military advisers feel that an additional US\$50-100 pay should be added to this figure providing a salary of US\$500-600 per person to the Zairean troops. The total expenditure for 4 months would amount to approximately US\$ 4 million.

Comment: It is important to "incentivise" the Zairean army by offering them a "completion bonus" of US\$ 50-100 per month after a successful operation. This sum to be given direct to the soldiers instead of through the government.

12. The Rwanda Operation

A parallel operation to welcome back the refugees in safety and with proprietary rights needs to be mounted in Rwanda. This operation would require the following actions:

(a) The opening of security zones/welcome centres within Rwanda (at some distance from the frontier). These security zones would have UNAMIR, UNHCR, ICRC and Human Rights monitors deployed within the camps to provide security and protection. However, Rwandese government officials would be able to exercise authority and even RPA would have the right to enter the camps.

(b) Three security zones should be opened opposite Goma, Bukavu and Ngara in consultation with UNHCR/Agencies.

(c) UNHCR, Agencies and NGOs would provide facilities in the camps.

13. Conclusions and Recommendations

(a) I gained the impression that Zaire had decided to act against militarisation and intimidation in the camps. UN's offer of logistic, human and financial support was, therefore, timely and welcome for the government.

(b) Our emphasis in the negotiations has been that the UN operation should be:

- (i) Inexpensive
- (ii) Practical and easily mounted
- (iii) Effective.

(c) Zaire would like to mount the action immediately. UN back-up (logistics, force, financial arrangements) must be in place within a month for the operation to start in 1st week of February.

(d) While UNAMIR could provide the bulk of the human element and have it in place in time, immediate action would be necessary to (a) appoint commanders/deputy commander, (b) obtain permission for UNAMIR contingents and Milobs to serve with UNREMIZ and (c) for the logistics to be in place within 4 weeks.

(e) The financial terms should be settled in New York.

(f) The basic reason for attaching 125 UN advisers to the 2500 force, for a UN commander and for a GHQ is to ensure that Zaire remains faithful to the mandate and its force is not decided from achieving the given targets.

(g) The weakest link in the outline operation is logistics. Unless the basic logistics are made available on the ground before the operation starts, its chances of success will be heavily reduced. It would seem that either a single country (USA, France, Germany, NATO, Europe, Britain) can mount this logistic back up operation or an airbridge should be set up between Mogadishu and Goma.

(h) President Mobutu must be persuaded to go through with the operation. The Rwandese leadership, for its part must be persuaded to provide security and a welcoming attitude to returning refugees. The Secretary-General may wish to intercede himself with leadership. The leaders of USA, France, Belgium and OAU for Zaire and USA, Uganda and OAU for Rwanda may be requested to support the effort once it is launched.

14. I enclose the agreed minutes of the two technical teams Annex "A" a document on logistic requirements Annex "B".

15. I am proceeding to Tanzania on 4th January and will report to Headquarters on 5th January.

16. Best regards.