

MDR

MISCELLANEOUS

29 JAN 1994 - 23 JAN 1995

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[4 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]  
[13 CONFIDENTIAL]  
RH/WG JULY 2009

UNARCHIVES  
SERIES 51002  
BOX 107  
FILE 3  
ACC. 1998/0283

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ (OPS)  
CMO ✓  
DCMO  
FORCE ENGR OFFR

DATE: 23 JAN 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : 6464.0/OPS

SUBJECT : REPORT ON MINE INCIDENT IN KAMEMBE ON 21 JAN 95

Reference:

A. MILOB GP SITREP OF 21 JAN 95.

1. Attached is a copy of the detailed report on the mine incident which occurred in KAMEMBE (GR 790258).
2. A report on a second incident which occurred close to the same location on 22 Jan is yet to follow.
3. It is please requested that arrangements be made for Force Engrs to de-mine the area as recommended in the report.
4. Please accept for necessary action.

*Diagon...*  
A ANOCHKINE  
Lt Col  
SOO

*Seen  
27/1  
DSC*

*G6  
28/1/95  
SB*

This FAX has 3 pages

1/3

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA  
UNAMIR - MINUARSEC 4C MILOB HQ

TO : MILOB GP HQ , KIGALI

FROM : MILOB HQ SECTOR 4C , CYANGUGU

REPORT ON EXPLOSIONS WHICH OCCURRED ON 21 JAN 95  
AT KAMEMBE CENTRAL MARKET CYANGUGU GR 79025 AT  
APPROX 1130 H

1. Reference our sitrep dated 21 Jan 95. A detailed report about the explosions is submitted in succeeding paragraphs.
2. On 21 Jan 95 at approx 1130 h two explosions occurred in the market of Kamembe (Cyangugu) GR 790258. This resulted in injuries to approx 15 persons . Two of the injured later succumbed to their injuries in the local hospital.
3. Area of Explosion. The explosion area is the South Eastern portion of the market. For details see sketch att ( annx A ). There were a few stalls of vendors selling the local fruit Avocado by sitting on the ground. A track also leads to the market from the eastern slopes and passes through this area. One of the explosions occurred on the track itself. Both the explosion sites are about 100 m apart. Due to a building these are however not inter-visible.
4. Casualties. 15 persons were injured in the blasts. Two persons later died in the hospital (one woman and one child about 10 years old ). Six persons severely injured are still admitted in the local hospital (run by Norwegian peoples aid and opened only recently). Seven people were discharged after first aid. The injured have received injuries on the lower limbs except two who have received injuries on their chest as they were sitting on the ground at the time of the blast. The persons who died probably stepped on the explosive and thus received the maximum brunt of the explosion. They had already lost their limbs in the explosion and died due to shock, loss of blood and lack of blood transfusion facilities.


Page 2/3

5. Nature of explosives. The craters of the blasts are not very deep ie approx 3-4 ''only . This indicates that a small qty of explosive or an anti pers mine (suitably booby trapped )had been laid .Both sites are regularly used by the locals .The mine detector used by the Ethiobat did find some old Chinese mines in the near vicinity but chances of old mines bursting are remote .

6. Present Sit. The RPA has cordoned off the area and is carrying out its investigations.No arrests have been made so far .The injured are in a state of shock .On being questioned ,they are unable to comprehend much .All they could remember was that they heard a big bang suddenly and felt pain immediately due to injuries.

7. Assessment. This incident has occurred in a place which is crowded and the date and time of the incident was chosen appropriately (max people crowding the place ).It is apparent that this is an act of terror to create panic amongst the local population and bring discredit to the govt in power . It appears to be an act done by someone of the old regime .It may be the beginning of a series of similar acts in future .

8. Recommendations. The possibility of old mines exploding on their own (although remote) cannot be completely ruled out . An explosive expert from the force engineers will be able to investigate the technical aspects correctly . It is therefore recommended that such an expert be made available .



( S R Sharma)

Maj

for Sec Cdr 4C

22 Jan 95



MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ (OPS)  
CMO ✓  
DCMO

DATE: 23 JAN 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : 6464.0/OPS

SUBJECT : REPORT ON PERSONS SEEKING UNAMIR PROTECTION IN SECTOR 2

Reference:

A. MILOB GP SITREP OF 19 JAN 95.

1. Attached is a copy of the detailed report on 3 persons who were reported to have sought UNAMIR protection as reported in the above-quoted SITREP.

2. Please accept for necessary action and info.

*Int. Anochkine*  
A ANOCHKINE  
Lt Col  
SOO

*Seen  
+ gw  
24/1  
JH*

*G6  
25/1/95  
SB*

FILE: 2000/OPS

DATED: JAN 95

FROM: MILOB SECTOR HQ KIBUNGO

TO: MILOB GROUP HQ KIGALI

INCIDENT - PEOPLE SEEKING PROTECTION 19 JAN 95

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1630 HOURS 19 JAN 95, THE ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR GHANBATT KIBUNGO ADVISED THIS HQ THAT THREE PEOPLE IN RUSUMO HAD REQUESTED PROTECTION FROM UNAMIR. THE PEOPLE WERE BEING MOVED FROM RUSUMO TO THE GHANBATT HQ IN KIBUNGO.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 1830 HOURS, THE PEOPLE WERE INTERVIEWED BY HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS AND THE FOLLOWING DETAILS WERE ASCERTAINED:

A. ALL THREE MEN WANTED TO NOTIFY THE BOURGMEISTRE OF WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE THREATENING SITUATIONS, THE BOURGMEISTRE WAS NOT HOWEVER AVAILABLE SO THE MEN TURNED TO UNAMIR FOR ADVISE. NOTE: DIFFICULTIES WITH LANGUAGE CAUSED THIS ACT TO BE MISINTERPRETED AS A REQUEST FOR PROTECTION\*

B. TWO MEN, SAMUEL HABUMUREMYI AND FAUSTIN NKURUNZIZA, WANTED TO NOTIFY THE AUTHORITIES THAT THEY WERE RECEIVING VERBAL HARASSMENT FROM THEIR NEIGHBOURS; ACCUSING THAT THE TWO MEN WERE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER MILITIA. SUPPOSEDLY THE MEN HAD RETURNED FROM TANZANIA ON 11 DEC 94 WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF UNHCR (LIKELY IN TRANSPORT FROM THE RUSUMO BORDER CROSSING). THE MEN WERE AFRAID THAT THE NEIGHBOURS MIGHT INJURE THEM BUT NEITHER OF THE MEN ACTUALLY FEARED FOR HIS LIFE.

C. THE THIRD MAN, JOSEPH RWIGAMBA, CLAIMED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE RPA WHO WAS JAILED IN KIGALI AND LATER ESCAPED. HE CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS A FEUD BETWEEN HIS FAMILY AND ANOTHER FAMILY WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER AND AN UNCLE IN MUHAZI COMMUNE ON OR ABOUT 31 DEC 94. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT MEMBERS OF THE RIVAL FAMILY WERE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE RPA. ACCORDING TO RWIGAMBA THOSE IN THE RPA WERE JEALOUS THAT RWIGAMBA HAD BEEN PROMOTED WITHIN THE RPA AND TOOK ACTION WHICH RESULTED IN RWIGAMBA'S IMPRISONMENT BY THE RPA. HE FELT THREATENED BY THIS FAMILY BUT AGAIN HE WANTED TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF SOMEONE IN CHARGE.


3. THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM ARRANGED FOR THE KIBUNGO PROSECUTOR AND THE THREE MEN TO MEET WITH THE BOURGMEISTRE IN RUSUMO WHERE IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT NO CHARGES WERE PENDING AGAINST ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS. FURTHERMORE, THE BOURGMEISTRE GAVE HIS ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD STOP ANY ALLEGATIONS BEING RAISED.

4. AS NONE OF THE MEN BELIEVED THAT THEIR LIVES WERE IN DANGER, THEY WANTED TO RETURN HOME. THE FIRST TWO MEN TO THEIR HOME IN RUSUMO AND THE THIRD WAS TRANSPORTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TO HIS HOME COMMUNE OF MUHAZI.

5. IN MUHAZI, THE MAN MET WITH THE LOCAL BOURGMEISTRE AND WAS AGAIN ASSURED THAT NO THREAT EXISTED. THE MAN HOWEVER VISITED HIS BROTHER'S HOME WHERE HE MET HIS SISTER-IN-LAW WHO ADVISED THAT HIS BROTHER HAD DISAPPEARED A WEEK AGO. THE MAN NOW BELIEVES THAT HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER AND WANTS TO RETURN TO RUSUMO WHERE HE SILL STAY WITH A RELATIVE. AS IT WAS TOO LATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO DRIVE HIM TO RUSUMO, THE MAN REMAINED AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE ON THE NIGHT OF 20/21 JAN 95.

6. THE MAN FEELS THAT HE SHOULD PRESENT HIS CASE TO THE RPA HEADQUARTERS IN KIGALI AND HAS ASKED HUMAN RIGHTS TO ARRANGE A MEETING. IN THE INTERIM, HUMAN RIGHTS WILL LEAVE HIM IN RUSUMO WHERE IT IS FELT THAT HE IS RELATIVELY SAFE.

7. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL FOLLOWUP ON THE CASE OF THESE THREE MEN OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS.



LCOL R GORG

COMMANDER SECTOR 2 MILOBS

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR

07 Jan 95

G2/3000

See Distribution

PRELIMINARY REPORT - BUSANZE CAMP 071500B JAN 95

Casualty Figures

1. Initial reports from BUSANZE DP Camp (GR 4491) have provided the following casualty figures:

12 Dead

36 Wounded (casualty figures are believed to be incomplete as an unknown number of the camp population dispersed into the local area). 6 of the wounded were helivaced to CHK.

Detail of Incident

2. There are two conflicting stories about what actually happened.

a. The story from an eye witness in the camp is that the RPA soldiers from the border checkpoint (about 3kms SW of the camp) attacked from the S side of the camp at about 070200B JAN 95. The RPA ran down the hill to the S of the camp firing indiscriminately and shouting that the population should leave for BURUNDI or for other camps in the area. The RPA also threatened that they would return tonight (the evening of 07 Jan 95).

b. The local RPA Bn Comd claims that they have had problems previously in that area with people crossing from BURUNDI and using BUSANZE as an operating base for "bandit" attacks. He claims that at approx 070200B Jan 95 a group of his men intercepted some people attempting to cross from BURUNDI. His men were fired on and responded in kind.

Facts Relating to the Incident

3. The facts relating to the incident are as follows:

a. UNAMIR Sitrep of 31 Dec 94 mentions that the RPA and local civilian authorities had given the population of BUSANZE camp 7 days in which to leave the camp on 30 Dec 94. They claimed that they wanted to close it for security reasons. At the time 902 Burundian nationals were found in the camp.

G6  
23/1/95  
SB



- b. Most of those killed were located in the main area of the camp as opposed to the extremities.
- c. The dead and wounded were mostly women and children.
- d. The location of the cartridge cases indicated that a variety of weapons had been fired within the main area of the camp.
- e. Injuries appeared to have been caused by gunshots and fragmentation grenades.
- f. The population of the camp have fled into the surrounding area and are afraid that the RPA soldiers will return tonight. The GHANBATT platoon have undertaken to protect the survivors if the survivors move to the GHANBATT position in RUNYOMBI (approx 2kms from camp).

#### Conclusions

- 4. At this early stage the facts tend to support the eye-witness claim rather than that of the RPA.
  - a. Had the RPA intercepted a group of people who had crossed the border from BURUNDI then the casualties would have been more likely to have been caused at the edge of the camp.
  - b. An RPA patrol in the centre of a DP camp at night is considered an unlikely event and even if true they could never have known where the group of intercepted people had come from.
  - c. 2 RPA injuries were reported in the area. Both of the injuries involved fractured limbs inconsistent with gunshot wounds. If the party challenged had fired first then it is likely that members of the RPA party would have sustained gunshot wounds.
  - d. The ultimatum given by the RPA on 30 Dec 94 expired on 06 Jan 95. This implies that the incident was orchestrated by the RPA in order to close the camp on the deadline.
  - e. The RPA claim that the camp was used as operating base by insurgent elements from BURUNDI is considered highly likely and the presence of Burundian nationals in the camp does tend to support this aspect of the RPA story.



Further Report

5. The MILOBs are investigating the incident and will submit a more detailed report as soon as all the relevant facts are known. It is stressed that this is merely a preliminary report and as such may contain inaccuracies.



S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
For FC

Distribution:

Internal:

Information:

FC (through MA)  
DFC  
COS  
DCOS Ops  
FMO

NL BURUM LES 493139099=FOPF X 12-JAN-1995 17:16:59 014913

QAAUZYUW UCCVVD0001 0121900-UUUU--UCCVDA.  
ZNR UUUUU  
O 121845Z JAN 95  
FM U  
BT

UN.013

Page 1

UTC Time: 95-01-12 17:19:13

NL BURUM LES 493139099=FOPF X 12-JAN-1995 17:16:59 014913

QAAUZYUW UCCVVD0001 0121900-UUUU--UCCVDA.  
ZNR UUUUU  
O 121845Z JAN 95  
FM UNAMIE TAC HQ BUREAU  
TO UNAMIE FORCE HQ SIGNAL OPS DEPT  
BT  
UNCLAS EFS 137  
SUBJECT: WITHDRAWAL OF TWO SIG OPS

1. CAN SIG OPS DUE FOR WITHDRAWAL BY FRI 13 JAN 95. NO REPLACEMENT YET.
2. AGREEMENT OF SIG OPS WILL HALT COMMUNICATION FROM THIS END.
3. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SIG OF REPLACEMENT AS EFFORTS TO REPLACE THEM LOCALLY NOT FRUITFUL
4. PLEASE EXPEDITE ACTION.

BT  
#0000

*So what alternative  
arrangements have they made?  
JH:  
13/1  
DJC/care*

*G6  
16/1/95  
SB*

RUE

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ (OPS)  
DFC/CMO

DATE: 6 JAN 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : 6464.3/OPS

SUBJECT: ALLEGED REPRISAL/HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION  
OF FRGF SOLDIER BY RPA

1. Attached is a copy of the preliminary report on the above subject received from MILOB Sector 2.
2. Please accept for information and necessary action.

COS  
I believe Ghanbalt  
escorted this man  
to Kigali yesterday.  
Can I have any further details.

*[Signature]*  
S ILIYA  
Col  
SOO

*[Signature]*  
11/1  
DFC/CMO

GC  
12/1/95  
SB

UM LES 492400055=SRVS X 10-JAN-1995 13:25:39 990256

OM: CU0

TO: CO

SUBJ: ALLEGED REPRISAL/HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 0900 HOURS, 10 JAN 95, GHANBATT HQ KIBUNGO ADVISED THAT A SOLDIER HAD ARRIVED AT THEIR COMPOUND AND REQUESTED PROTECTION; CLAIMING THE RPA WANTED TO KILL HIM. OPS OFFR WENT TO GHANBATT LOCATION TO DETERMINE FACTS OF MATTER AND DISCOVERED SOLDIER CLAIMS TO BE FORMER MEMBER OF RGF AND THAT HE WAS BEING TAKEN AWAY FOR EXECUTION WHEN HE ESCAPED. MILITARY POLICE SGT FOR GHANBATT ACKNOWLEDGES HEARING SHOTS NIGHT 9/10 JAN 95 FROM DIRECTION OF RPA BARRACKS.

2. SOLDIER WAS INTERVIEWED IN THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS KIBUNGO, MILOB OPS OFFR AND OPS OFFR GHANBATT USING GHANBATT INTERPRETER. SOLDIER'S STORY IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. SOLDIER'S NAME IS KALISA COME DATE OF BIRTH 1970. ORIGINALLY RESIDENT KIBUNGO PREFECTURE, KIGARAMA COMMUNE, KANSANA (5460 ESTIMATED).
- B. FORMERLY BELONGED TO RGF 31 BN STATIONED IN BYUMBA. CLAIMS FOUGHT IN WAR LIKE ANY OTHER SOLDIER AND DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN MASSACRES.
- C. FLED TO ZAIRE FOLLOWING WAR BUT RETURNED TO RWANDA TO FIND PARENTS. LOCATED PARENTS IN HOME VILLAGE AND LEARNED THAT RPA WERE LOOKING FOR FORMER RGF MEMBERS.
- D. FLED TOWARDS BURUNDI BUT WAS IDENTIFIED BY CIVILIAN AT SAKE COMMUNE WHO INFORMED LOCAL RPA.
- E. SOLDIER CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY RPA IN SAKE ON 8 DEC 94, TAKEN DIRECTLY TO RPA CAMP IN KIBUNGO AND IMPRISONED/INTERROGATED UNTIL SUN 8 JAN 95. AT THIS TIME HE AND 5 OTHER PEOPLE WERE PLACED IN SPECIAL PLACE, A DARK PLACE WITHOUT FOOD, WHICH HE CLAIMS IS A PREPARATORY TO BEING TAKEN AWAY FOR EXECUTION.
- F. SOLDIER CLAIMS ON MON 9 JAN, HE OVER HEARD GUARDS SAYING THAT THE MEN IN THE ROOM WOULD BE KILLED. AT 2000 HOURS, HE CLAIMS THE GUARDS CAME AND TOOK TWO OF THE SIX PEOPLE IN THE ROOM AWAY. 30 MINUTES LATER THE GUARDS CAME AGAIN AND INFORMED THE REMAINING FOUR MEN TO COME OUT OF THEIR CELL CLAIMING THAT THE MEN WERE TO BE INTERROGATED AGAIN. BASED UPON WHAT THE SOLDIER HEARD AND THAT NORMALLY INTERROGATIONS WERE NOT DONE AT NIGHT, THE SOLDIER DECIDED THAT HE WAS BEING TAKEN AWAY FOR EXECUTION.
- G. THE SOLDIER RAN AND CLAIMS THAT THE RPA GUARDS FIRED AT HIM SEVEN TIMES; ONE SINGLE SHOT AND THEN SEVERAL BURSTS. (THIS APPEARS TO AGREE WITH SHOOTING HEARD BY GHANBATT SGT)
- H. SOLDIER HID IN BUSH UNTIL FIRST LIGHT THEN RAN TO GHANBATT ASKING FOR PROTECTION.

### 3. PRESENTLY:

- A. THE SOLDIER IS UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY WITHIN THE GHANBATT HQ AREA,
- B. HUMAN RIGHTS KIBUNGO ARE AWARE OF THE MATTER AS IS THEIR DEPUTY DIRECTOR WHO IS VISITING KIBUNGO,
- C. CIVPOL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM KIGALI TO INTERROGATE/ INVESTIGATE THIS CASE,
- D. THE SOLDIER IS PREPARING A LIST OF NAMES AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE OTHER FIVE MEN WHO WERE IMPRISONED WITH HIM.
- E. DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INTENDS TO ADVISE THE PREFECT AND

WHICH MEAN

LOCAL PROSECUTE OF INDIVIDUAL FILE INTENTION IS TO SOLICIT ANY CHARGES



13:26 From PTT Telecom NL C-Fax

To 0025083911

P2

ANY CHARGES WHICH MIGHT EXIST AGAINST THE SOLDIER. NO QUERIES  
BEEN RECEIVED OF HIS WHEREABOUTS.

. THIS IS A BRIEF REVIEW OF INFORMATION COLLECTED AND SHOULD BE  
CONFIRMED BY PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATION BEFORE IT IS ACCEPTED AS  
TRUTH.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS FAX ON VHF CHANNEL 15 TO CU0.

Last Page : Total Page(s) 2



## UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



## NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: FC

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

Info: **DFC** COS, CAO  
DCOS Ops, DCOS Sp, G2 Mil Info, G3 Ops, CO GHANBATT

Date: 10 Jan 95

File: FPM/5

Subject: THE BUSANZE CAMP ATROCITY

Can file pce  
48  
111  
DSC

1. You may wish to be aware that I am now in possession of the empty cases - listed below - recovered in Busanze Camp in the wake of the shootings on Sat 7 Jan. Although detailed forensic examination would be needed to analyse the firing pin impressions of these cases for legal purposes, it appears that we have:

a. 25 x 9mm from 2 different batches:

(1) 8 x FN 75 9PARA - all of which appear to have been fired from the same weapon.

(2) 17 x SF 87 9mm - possibly fired by 2 different weapons.

b. 1 x 5.56mm marked "85 13".

c. 12 x 7.62 short AK from 7 different batches:

(1) 3 with similar Arabic markings but from 2 different batches. The firing pin impressions reveal that they were fired from 2 different weapons

(2) 1 with a Cyrillic marking and the date 1983 - fired from a weapon other than the 2 AKs from which the arabic rounds were fired.

(3) 2 marked "93 85" fired from a 4th weapon.

(4) 2 marked "05 85" possibly fired by a 5th weapon.

(5) 2 marked "3 87" possibly fired by 2 different weapons.

(6) 2 marked "93 16" apparently fired by yet another weapon.

2. We cannot be sure that all empty cases have been recovered but we know that at least 38 rounds were fired and that they came from 2 or 3 x 9mm weapons, 1 x 5.56mm weapon and at least 6 x 7.62mm Kalashnikovs.


G6  
12/1/95  
SP

*M. Cuthbert-Brown*  
M CUTHBERT-BROWN  
Maj  
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

② COS


1. Cdn Hels have been instructed to stop unscheduled, unauthorized overflights of the city and military and govt buildings. In future all flights will be briefed regarding photography restrictions while in the helis as part of the pre-flight briefing.
2. Due to insurance and legal implications Cdn Hels will also refrain from carrying pax on flights that are not prior authorized by this HQ.
3. Suggest we task G3 Air to estb a "self-policed" restricted area trace for heli flts. We should also raise the issue at the p 5an mtg with the RPA COS/LOs. We will continue to notify the RPA LO of our flt schedule the previous evening in order for him to present objections by exception regarding our intentions.
4. Req your dir regarding suggestions in para 3 above.

GL  
11/1/95  
SB

  
DCOS ops  
9.1


③ DFC

1. I agree with the recommendations of DCOS ops. G3 Air should work out unilaterally a trace giving restricted / no fly zones for own helicopters operating in Rwanda for approval.
2. We will also include this point in the Agenda for discussion with RPA on 12 Jan 95. However, we will not unduly stress on the requirement. In any case, I keep won't provide this.

  
COS  
10/1

④

FC

Sir, I agree entirely with the views above but we shall control the heli flights ourselves as you suggested this morning. 



To: DFC, through COS and DCOS Ops

Info:

Date: 09 Jan 95

Subject: ALLEGED BREACH OF RWANDAN GOVERNMENT RESTRICTED AIRSPACE BY UN HELICOPTER ON 09 JANUARY 1995

1. On 9 January 1995, a UN Bell 212 helicopter (CFRWL, callsign UN 079), under command of a senior captain of Canadian Helicopters Limited, was carrying out a maintenance airtest flight in the vicinity of Kigali International Airport. The captain had taken the opportunity to offer the sortie as a short sight-seeing trip around Kigali city to 6 Canadian soldiers, who were shortly to leave Rwanda at the end of their tour of duty.
2. During the flight, the aircraft made a number of passes over well-known landmarks within the city. These included the old Rwandan presidential residence near the International Airport and the main civic buildings in the city centre.
3. On returning to the Airport at the end of the sortie, the Captain was ordered to land on the civil aircraft ramp, where the aircraft, crew and passengers were detained by soldiers of the RPA. On being informed of the situation, I immediately proceeded to the scene with Mr Smith of Movecon and a UN Legal Advisor. In discussion with the RPA officers present, I was informed that the aircraft had been impounded for carrying out an 'illegal' reconnaissance mission over Rwandese civic and military installations. The senior RPA officer vigorously demanded that all the camera film belonging to the passengers be surrendered. I consulted HQ UNAMIR by radio for instructions, and recommended compliance as the best means of diffusing a potentially charged situation. On receiving approval from the Chief of Staff HQ UNAMIR and Commanding Officer of the Canadian Military Contingent, the film was duly handed over. Discussion then followed about the legality of the sortie.
4. There is presently no officially notified restricted airspace in Rwanda. The last upgrade to Rwandese aeronautical maps and charts took place before the 1994 civil war. Since then, despite various attempts by HQ UNAMIR to extract details of sensitive/restricted airspace from the RPA to avoid unnecessary tensions, no such details have yet been made available. This fact was explained carefully to the RPA at the airport, but permission to release the aircraft, crew and passengers was still refused until an on-the-spot written admission of wrongdoing was given. On the advice of the UN legal representative, I declined to do so. However, I did offer to present a full factual account of the incident,

together with a copy of a new flying instruction prohibiting unauthorised overflight and photography of Rwandese civic and military installations. This offer was also refused, whereupon I placed the matter in the hands of the senior civilian and military staffs at HQ UNAMIR. Following intervention by the UN Force Commander, the aircraft, crew and passengers were released.



C W DIXON  
Sqn Ldr  
SO2 G3 AIR  
HQ UNAMIR





UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: Lists A, B and D

From: Force PM

Info: DFC, COS, DCOS Ops, DCOS Sp, MA/FC, CO Force MP Coy

Date: 4 Jan 95

Subject: THE REPORTING OF INCIDENTS OF DEATHS, SERIOUS INJURIES  
AND OTHER SERIOUS INCIDENTS

1. A number of incidents have occurred recently in which deaths and serious injuries have been caused (most notably, but not exclusively, in traffic accidents) involving UNAMIR personnel and vehicles but which have not been notified immediately to UNAMIR MPs and to HQ UNAMIR, as required by UNAMIR Administrative Instruction 005/94. It should be obvious that this failure has the potential to prejudice and/or impede investigations and to prevent the gathering of information that might be used to learn valuable lessons.

2. The need for the Force PM to initiate inquiries into such incidents - including all those in which death, serious injury or serious loss has resulted to members of UNAMIR and/or local people and other third parties - means that it is not sufficient to report them only to contingent MPs or to make reports only through daily SITREPs. The attention of sector and local commanders is drawn to Administrative Instruction 005/94 and, specifically, to the need for them to:

a. Ensure that UNAMIR MPs and HQ UNAMIR are informed of such incidents immediately. (It is incumbent on both of these to ensure that the Provost Marshal is also informed.)

b. Ensure the preservation of the scene of any serious accident or incident until all necessary details have been recorded and evidence has been collected.

M CUTHBERT-BROWN  
Maj  
Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

(2)  
PM  
Good. Any deliberate  
attempt to conceal  
accidents should be treated  
with the desired disciplinary  
action. You have my  
full support.  
G6  
7/1/95  
SB  
05/1  
DFC



CDs We have  
be talking & doing  
extra NVDs for  
Sometime now  
574 should be able  
to indicate present  
status of  
03/1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS		FILE NUMBER
PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE INFO PRIORITY	ANALYTIC GROUP 041545Z JAN/95
PAGE 1 OF 3	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATOR'S NUMBER ETHIOBATT 175
FROM: CO Ethio Batt. cyangugu		
TO: COS - Kigali		
Info - DCOS (ops)		
Subject - Assessment of the Situation		
Reference your message dated 03 Jan 95.		
1. I have obtained the copy of Milob's Information Report as of 30 Dec 94. As was explained in the report, ex-RGF soldiers (militias) have launched two separate raids around Gafunzo GR and Nyamashelle GR areas and that they clashed with RPA. This was also confirmed by our own activities. Those ex-soldiers who were at Nyangezi Desert, 60 miles from Bukuru, have returned to camps around Bukuru. From this new location, they started acts of theft in our AOR. On the other hand, one can notice intermittent acts of killings and robbery of RPA. These two acts should <sup>not</sup> be mixed (confused) and should not		
DRAFT		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
NAME	OFFICE	YES COS & DCOS Eyes only
RELEASING OFFICER		
NAME	OFFICE	
COI - TADELE	Lodene	
SIGNATURE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
		UNCLAS

G6  
7/1/95  
SB

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		FILE NUMBER
PRECEDENCE ACTION	PRECEDENCE INFO	DATE/TIME GROUP
PROPERTY	PROPERTY	04/1341
FREE	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATORS NUMBER
2 OF 3		ETHIOBATT / 75
FROM:		
TO:		
<p>come to unnecessary conclusion.</p> <p>2. Though we have started activities, after assessing the situation, unless our two basic problems are solved it will be difficult to effectively control any water movement.</p> <p>The first problem is the insufficiency of Night Vision devices. With the existing 3x NVD we can not cover the entire border.</p> <p>The second problem is the motor-boats which is still not solved. Unless these two major problems are solved, we can not effectively control water movements by foot patrols and guarantee our superiority.</p> <p>3. As joint operation with RPA is forbidden, we discussed the matter with them, came to an agreement to perform coordinated activities.</p> <p>✓ We have already started to materialize these.</p>		
DRAFTER		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
NAME	OFFICE	TEL
RELEASING OFFICER		
NAME	OFFICE	TEL
SIGNATURE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		FILE NUMBER
PRECEDENCE	PRECEDENCE INFO	DATE-TIME GROUP
Priority	Priority	041545Z JAN/95
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER	
3 OF 3	Ethiopia 171	
FROM:		
TO:		
<p>Agreements. So we request the HQ. to give necessary assistance to effectively control our AOR.</p> <p>Regards.</p>		
DRAFTED		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
NAME	OFFICE TEL	
RELEASED OFFICER		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
NAME	OFFICE TEL	
REMARKS		



ASC UNAMIR II



MINUTE

445-10-3

HQ UNAMIR

Attr: DCOSOPS

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. Find enclosed a Threat Assessment produced by WO2 Tapping, amended as requested.

*[Signature]* **MAJ**  
for **P.F. McINTOSH** **AOD**  
LTCOL  
CO

/ DEC 94

G-6  
28/12/94  
SB

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada		ACTION REQUEST		FICHE DE SERVICE	
To - A			Date		
DFC/COS			2.12		
			Time - Heure		
From - De					
DCOS Ops					
Language spoken - Langue utilisée			Telephone No. - N° de téléphone		Extension Poste
<input type="checkbox"/> English / Anglais <input type="checkbox"/> French / Français					
<input type="checkbox"/> Please call / Prière d'appeler		<input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call / Vous a rappelé		<input type="checkbox"/> Will call again / Vous rappellera	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Wants to see you / Désire vous voir	
<input type="checkbox"/> Action / Donner suite		<input type="checkbox"/> Approval / Approbation		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and return / Noter et retourner	
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments / Commentaires		<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply / Projet de réponse		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and forward / Noter et faire suivre	
<input type="checkbox"/> As requested / Comme demandé		<input type="checkbox"/> Signature		<input type="checkbox"/> Note and file / Noter et classer	
File No. - N° de dossier			Message taken by - Message reçu par		
WO Tapping from G2 cell has updated / expanded this assessment based on your observations. <i>[Signature]</i>					
GC 218 (89/08)			7540-21-907-5351		

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

### KIBEHO/NDAGO AND SURROUNDING AREAS

#### INTRODUCTION

1. This assessment is based on 60 plus incidents reported since early Sept '94. It is provided in order to assist planning of operations in the areas of Kibeho GR 5007 and Ndago GR 5201.
2. The area of sector 4A which includes Kibeho and Ndago and the communes of Butare Prefecture to the East have been of particular intelligence interest for some time now. There have been numerous reports of possible Threat Forces (Former RGF, Interahamwe and bandit elements) from the DP camps committing murders and attacks both within the camp confines and in the surrounding areas. There have also been a significant number of incidents involving RPA troops in this region.
3. This report covers :-
  - a. political aspects
  - a. incidents involving the RPA,
  - b. incidents involving Threat Forces,
  - c. incidents involving refugees.
  - d. deductions and
  - e. assessment.

#### POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. Since late September the Prefect of Gikongoro and RPA commanders have conducted a number of discussions and public rallies with camp leaders and inhabitants of both Kibeho and Ndago camps in attempts to persuade the people to return home. On 24 Nov the DP's complained to the Prefect that when they return home they find their houses occupied or destroyed and that some returnees are arrested by the RPA.
5. In mid Nov the NGO's in both Kibeho and Ndago ceased operations in the camps for a 48 hr period due to the increase in tension. Britcon and Ausmed ceased their contribution to the humanitarian effort in the two camps at around the same time.



#### INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE RPA

6. On 1 Nov locals in Ndago informed Malawi troops of an incident which occurred in Ruko GR 5200 in which the RPA had killed 6 people and absconded with a mother and two children. All those killed/injured/kidnapped were said to be related to a known militia leader during the war. This incident led to the movement of DP's from Ndago to Kibeho and the comment from DP's that they would not return home as long as the RPA were in power.
7. A number of reports have been received of RPA harassment in the Runyinya commune GR 6012 and the Cyafurwe area GR 5317. The bulk of the reports suggest that robbery by the RPA was the motive and the RPA camps at Ramba GR 5414 and Mbasa GR 5410 are reportedly where the soldiers responsible come from. Local Tutsi's in Ramba are said to act as guides for the RPA in their collection of cattle and other possessions.
8. The RPA have denied access to UNAMIR troops on a number of occasions in the Runyinya area. They insisted that a newly deployed Malawi Pl move to a different location in the commune on 12 Nov. Large numbers of refugees have reportedly returned to refugee camps from the Runyinya commune.
9. Previous attempts by the RPA to conduct searches / registration within refugee camps have resulted in riotous behaviour by the DP's and a number of fatalities inflicted by the RPA.

#### INCIDENTS INVOLVING THREAT FORCES

10. On the night of 20 Oct 94 11 people were murdered in their homes in Gasasa GR 556125 in the Runyinya commune. Locals claimed that the attackers were Interahamwe who had come from refugee camps in the area of Rwamiko GR 4913. Locals also claimed that there had been a number of attacks in that area in the past week with a number of locals being killed.
11. A murder took place on Ni 4/5 Nov in Karama in the Runyinya commune. Three women were killed, one seriously injured and a male slightly injured. The burgemeister suspected that the assailants came from the refugee camps in the Rwamiko area, and that they were killing witnesses to atrocities which took place during the war.
12. On 14 Nov Ghanbat reported finding 2 grenades in the house of a suspected bandit at Runyinya. The bandit escaped.
13. Malawi Coy reported that two elderly women of around 70 years were macheted to death and two young boys severely beaten on 14 Nov in Mpanda GR 5607. The assailants were reportedly from the Kibeho camp.
14. The RPA reported to Malawi Coy on 15 Nov that they had arrested 7 people in Runyinya who were from Kibeho and had been recognised by locals as killers during the war. One of them was shot dead by the RPA as he tried to escape.

15. OC Malawi Coy and Sector 3 Comd visited the Burgermeister of Runyinya on 19 Nov. The Burgermeister stated that the Interahamwe were stopping refugees in Kibeho camp from returning to their homes. He claimed that after people had returned to their communes the Interahamwe followed them up and killed them. He further stated that there were 96 Interahamwe operating in the area led by one GATIBITA Thomas and they had access to military uniforms and grenades. He reportedly has followers in Ndago GR 5101, Munini GR 4800, Kibeho and Rwamiko GR 4813 camps.

16. Ghanbat conducted a cordon and search in the Kibeho camp on 20 Nov and found three hand grenades.

17. Sector 3 HQ reported that eight people had been killed and four injured in Ramba GR 5414 on 21 Nov. No further detail.

18. In the last two months there have been 10 reported incidents in Sector 4A, not involving the RPA, which have included grenades. There have been six in sector 3 in the same period. Whilst it cannot be categorically stated that Threat Forces from the camps were responsible for these incidents it is assessed that there is the possibility of their involvement.

#### INCIDENTS INVOLVING REFUGEES

19. A number of reports have been received of people returning to both Kibeho and Ndago camps after being resettled in their home communes. The most common reason given has been harassment/killings by the RPA. A large proportion of returnees have reportedly come from the Butare Prefecture, including the Runyinya commune.

20. A report from Ghanbat in late Sept '94 indicated that 24 out of 30 refugees who had returned to Muryira GR 8639 had been killed by the RPA. Investigation revealed that 6 of them had been arrested for a period and then released while the other 24 were still living quite happily in the commune. The report which the refugees heard was of the 24 being killed. It is probable that this report and others are the result of propaganda by Threat Force elements within the camps.

21. Malawi Coy reported on 22 Nov that two persons, NGOMA MBIRUTI and ROWABA LINDA often visited the village of Ramba GR 5414 and threatened the locals that they would be killed if they did not return to the refugee camps.

22. During Op Homeward there has been a number of incidents of intimidation by elements within the camps as refugees were being loaded for repatriation. Groups of up to 300 have been noted at loading points in Kibeho and Ndago attempting to persuade refugees not to leave the camps. Threats were made that DP's would be killed by the RPA on their return and that families of DP's left behind in the camp would also be killed. This activity often led to the large numbers of people registered by UNHCR for a move, reducing drastically during the 24 hrs between registration and uplift.

23. One particular agitator reported by Britcon was seen in both Ndago and Kibeho on consecutive days during loading. He was described as about 25 years old and wearing a distinctive green felt cowboy style hat.

## DEDUCTIONS

24. Prefects and RPA commanders have attempted to persuade DP's to return to their home communes. This effort appears to have had a negligible effect.
25. RPA activity has done little to create the necessary environment required to entice refugees home. Whether the reports of such activities are true or the result of a successful propaganda campaign by Threat Force elements is irrelevant; if the reports reach the refugees they have the same effect.
26. Threat Force activity both inside and outside the camps is resulting in the instability desired by those forces. It is possible that some of the activity attributed to the RPA has in fact been conducted by armed Threat elements wearing military style uniforms.
27. The Threat Forces currently enjoy sanctuary within the camps and are well placed to maintain, through propaganda, both a high level of support for the former government and continued campaigns against the current one.
28. The numbers of Threat Forces and their supporters within the camps is likely to be significant. This is particularly so, given that a large proportion of DP's are guilty of some form of crime committed during the war and there has, to date, been no policy statement from the government to explain how it intends to bring to justice those it considers guilty.
29. The numbers of reports of armed attacks outside the camps, possibly by Threat Force elements, suggest that they have access to weapons. Quantities are unknown but they are likely to be restricted to small arms and hand grenades.
30. There may be some level of coordination between Threat Force elements in Kibeho, Ndago and other camps in the area.
31. Searches have been conducted in the past by UNAMIR troops without incident and hand grenades have been found in Kibeho camp. There was no RPA involvement during this search.

## ASSESSMENT

32. A search of any refugee camp is unlikely to be productive if the Threat Forces are forewarned.
33. Following any searches of camps the Threat Force propaganda machine will swing into action and the threat to UNAMIR forces will increase significantly. This is likely to occur whether Threat Force elements are removed at the time or not.
34. If attempts are made to arrest Threat Force elements during a search of the camps, particularly in the presence of RPA troops, those elements are likely to resist with whatever force and weaponry they have available. This is likely to include firing on UNAMIR troops.

35. The Threat to UNAMIR troops following a joint operation with the RPA could be reduced if a well planned and implemented Psyops campaign was conducted prior to the operation.



G.A. TAPPING  
WO2 INT ANALYST  
AUS MED SPT FORCE

/ Dec '94



6 December 1994

DFC

I came to see you this morning but gathered that you were busy with meetings and visitors. For the sake of expediency, these are the points I wished to discuss with you.

1. The RPA has referred to us a complaint from the comune at Nyamata. On the 31 October a UN helicopter apparently visited the site of a mass grave or massacre and "collected bones". The RPA wishes to receive clarification.

It could be that we transported some HR monitors and forensic experts and that they had to collect samples to determine timing of sites.

Could you let Dr. Kabia know what was the 31 October mission about?

2. We were rather surprised to see that the conference room on the main floor is not anymore. The SRSG's office was neither informed of the changes nor consulted. How were these plans finalized?

  
Isel Rivero

Handled.  
J. G.  
07/12  
DFC

66  
8/12/94  
SB



(34)

(4)  
J. Essaiet

66

Avec les compliments  
du Centre pour les Droits de l'Homme

With the compliments  
of the Centre for Human Rights

Con los atentos saludos  
del Centro de Derechos Humanos

Does PS  
See SRSG's mto  
at ①. Take  
note for our  
next meeting  
2d 12  
Dfcl/cm

Pse return  
to me.



①  
Human Rights observers  
have been found on by RPA.  
This matter must be brought  
to the attention of RPA during your  
weekly meeting. Perhaps the Party-  
soliers could be identified for  
appropriate disciplinary action?  
Atty. FC.

Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

17-12

12

# Special Investigations Unit

## MEMORANDUM

**To:** DOC Human Rights Field Office Rwanda  
**CC:** Commissaire Divisionnaire CIVPOL  
**From:** Andreas Schiess, OIC SIU après avoir écouté l'équipe sur terrain

**RE:** Mission à Cyangugu / Karama  
Incident à Kanazi

**Date:** Vendredi, le 16 décembre 1994

1) **Introduction**

Dans l'enquête concernant le cas du 20 novembre 1994 à Karama, une équipe composée de José Maria Abenza Rojo (médecin légiste), Maj. Sekou Marena (CIVPOL), Cristobal Espinosa Martinez (police), Patricia van Nispen tot Sevenaer (HRFO), Chris Fry (HRFO), Jane Rasmussen (TL HRFO), Walter Ehmeir (HRFO), Charles (interprète), est arrivé à Cyangugu vers 07h05. Après avoir pris contact avec le préfet pour obtenir l'autorisation des parents des victimes pour l'exhumation, s'est rendue à Karama. Où étant l'équipe s'est entretenue avec les intéressés pour obtenir encore leur avis concernant l'exhumation.

2) **Travail sur place à Karama et retour à Cyangugu**

Après plus de 35 minutes d'entretien les parents des victimes ont opposé un refus catégorique mais polis pour cette opération de cette exhumation qui serait contraire au respect dû à la mémoire des morts. La vérité selon eux peut être obtenue sans avoir à profané les morts. Néant obtenu aucun résultat, l'équipe est retournée à Cyangugu où elle a pris contact avec le bataillon éthiopien en vu d'obtenir éventuellement les pièces à conviction pour la manifestation de la vérité (photographies des lieux, fragments de grenades, douilles etc.). C'est au cours de cet entretien qu'il a été porté à la connaissance de l'équipe que le 14 décembre 1994 dans le secteur de Kazani (préfecture Cyangugu) 5 personnes ont été tuées et un gravement blessé. Cette découverte a été faite le 15 décembre 1994 par une patrouille éthiopienne. Les morts ont été enterrés et le blessé transporté au siège de MSF. L'entretien s'est déroulé aux environs de 11h.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: All Contingents

File Reference: 1000.7(DFC)/G/6

From: Brig Gen HK Anyidoho  
DFC/COS/CMO

Date: 08<sup>th</sup> December 1994

Subject: PAYMENT OF COMPLIMENT

1. All ranks of UNAMIR Forces are reminded that payment of compliment to superiors and the return of such compliments on the part of the superiors to their juniors, is a fundamental requirement of the military. As such, all ranks are to take note and accord their colleagues this basic respect irrespective of their nationality.
2. Accept for the information and compliance of all under command.

G6  
13/12/94  
SB



NYK BE UNAMIR

X/OST /IMMEDIATE - WE ARE NOT ABLE ACCESS TO THE FAX  
MACHINE RL SLUSH RELAY

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FAX NO 94 DEC -7 18 00

DATE

07 December 94

TO: PERMANENT MISSION FOR TCHAD NEW YORK	FROM: BGEN HK ANYIDHOHO DFC/COS/CMO UNAMIR - RWANDA
FAX NO: (212) 818-9583	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
SUBJECT: MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE	
INFO:	ORIGINATOR ROOM NO: 2029
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. We received the news of the sudden death of Master Corporal Kaourben Edouard (UNID M4960) of the Tchadian Contingent serving with UNAMIR, on 06 Dec 94, with deep shock and sorrow whilst performing his duties at Kilinda, Rwanda.

2. The untimely death of Master Corporal Edouard, which resulted from a freak accident when the vehicle he was travelling in skidded in the bad weather, is particularly tragic and unfortunate.

3. The death of this soldier is certainly a great loss to his country, UNAMIR, and more painfully to his family and friends in Tchad. His contribution to the ongoing efforts to restore peace to the people of Rwanda, will forever be recognised in the annals of the history of UNAMIR.

4. May I on behalf of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Rwanda, all ranks of UNAMIR and civilian staff convey to you and the Government of Tchad and especially the bereaved family our sincere condolences.

6. May his soul rest in Perfect Peace.

DF/COS/CMO

UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

ORIGINATING FAX NO:

DATE: 07 DEC 94

TO: ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: COL J ARP DCOS OPS FOR FORCE COMMANDER <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, NEW YORK	
FAX: 001-212-963 9053	FAX: 1-212-963-3090
REFERENCE:	
SUBJECT: SPECIAL INCIDENT REPORT - NOTICAS	
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: ONE	

1. ON 06 DEC 94 AT 1430 HRS LOCAL TIME, A PATROL FROM FRAFBATT (TCHAD CONTINGENT COY) COMPRISING OF TWO OFFICERS AND FOUR MEN WAS SENT OUT TO KILINDA GR 5358 TO VERIFY INFORMATION ON SOME ARRESTS MADE BY RPA ELMS.
2. ON THEIR WAY BACK AT APPROX 1930 HRS LOCAL TIME IT HAD STARTED RAINING WITHIN THE VICINITY OF KILINDA, THE VEHICLE SKIDDED INTO A RAVINE. A SPARE WHEEL FELL ON MASTER CORPORAL KAOUBEN EDOUARD'S NECK AND BROKE IT. HE DIED IMMEDIATELY WHILST OTHERS WERE UNHURT. THE SOLDIER WAS SEATED BEHIND THE VEHICLE, SOMAVAG TRUCK. THE BODY OF THE SOLDIER IS BEING BROUGHT TO KIGALI THIS MORNING.
3. EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO INFORM THE TCHADIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO INFORM THE NEXT OF-KIN.
4. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WILL BE COMMUNICATED LATER.

G6

9/12/94

SB



Internal Memorandum

TO: Senior Political Advisor through DFC

FROM: G3 Air Operations

DATE: 6 December 94

SUBJECT: COMPLIANT RECEIVED FROM NYAMATA COMMUNE

1. I received a letter from Isel Rivero through the DFC's office referring to a complaint received from Nyamata commune. Apparently on the 31 October a UN helicopter landed there and the passengers visited a mass grave site and "collected bones". The RPA wishes to clarify the situation.
2. My records indicate that a Human Rights forensic investigation team visited that site between 0900 and 1600 on the 31 October. The helicopter request was through a MR Gary Haugen.
3. The events would appear to be a completely legitimate forensic investigation in keeping with the ongoing Human Rights investigation of this massacre site. I am surprised that local liaison was not made at the time by the team, however these things are easily missed at the time.
4. I hope that this information is useful and I suggest that you contact Major Racine, the Human Rights team LO on 72939 or HRL on Motorola channel 8.

*J D Janiurek*

J D JANIUREK  
Sqn Ldr RAF  
SO2 G3 Air  
Ext 11161

Isel  
This is the result of your  
Enquiry. I hope this satisfies  
the purpose.

*J Di*  
06/12  
DFC/LOS

G6  
6/12/94  
SB

UNAMIR

OUTGOING FAX NO.....

TO: BARIL FOR ANNAN UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: BRIG HK ANYIDHOHO DFC/COS UNAMIR <i>[Signature]</i>
PREFIX NO:	DATE: 02 DEC 94
FAX NO: 212-963-4879	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
INFO:	ORIGINATOR: ROOM 2029
SUBJECT: RETURN OF RWANDESE REFUGEES BY ZAIRE GOVERNMENT AT GISENYI BORDER POST ON 27 NOV 94	
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS: 3	

1. PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED AN INCIDENT REPORT ON ABOVE-MENTIONED SUBJECT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. BEST REGARDS.

C6  
SB  
3/12/94





1013 HQ

TO: HQ UNAMIR KIGALI // FC //

INFO: MILOB HQ KIGALI

DATE: 28 NOV 94

SUBJ: INCIDENT REPORT: RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES BY ZAIRE  
GOVERNMENT AT GISENYI BORDER POST 27 NOV 94

1. At approximately 1100 hrs on 27 Nov 94 the Director of UNHCR Goma informed this HQ that a representative of the Governor of NORTH KIVU DISTRICT had announced to him that a number of Rwandese refugees being held as "criminals" in local prisons would be immediately returned to Rwanda. This action was to take place at the border post located at GISENYI. Exact number of people to be returned was not made clear, nor was the exact status of these persons given i.e. whether or not they had been arrested in connection with recent problems in KATALE CAMP or were being held for other "crimes."
2. At approximately 1500 hrs UNHCR informed this HQ that "40-50" persons were being moved to the border under escort by Zaire military. Maj McComber and Maj Wannemacher, with RPA LO, moved to that location.
3. On arriving at the border the situation was as follows:
  - a. Zaire military (green beret) of platoon strength under command of a Captain and equipped with MG-mounted pickup trucks was present as escort to the "prisoners."
  - b. Governor of NORTH KIVU province was present.
  - c. 37 Rwandese men were being returned to Rwanda. These men were all without shirts or shoes. Some showed evidence of recent beating i.e. lacerations and dried blood. Their attitudes ranged from quiet resignation to a degree of "cocky-ness." None appeared to be particularly afraid of being handed over to RPA.
  - d. Representatives of the international press were present, including Reuters, BBC and a Japanese television crew.
  - e. UNHCR representatives from GOMA and GISENYI were present
4. UNHCR Officers from Goma first spoke with Zaire officials and discussed the "legality" of the situation vis-a-vis forced return of refugees. Zaire officials appeared disinterested. Zaire officials wanted UNHCR to take over responsibility for the transfer of the 37 persons. UNHCR resisted this, noting that they were present as observers. At one point a UNHCR Security Officer was told by a Zaire military officer that "she would be

expelled from Zaire because of her attitude." Concurrent with this discussion, Zaire military officers were discussing the transfer with RPA officers present. At this time the most senior RPA officer was a Lieutenant. The Zaire stand was that "these men are your brothers. You must take them back." The RPA was reluctant to allow the process to proceed. The discussion became somewhat heated. At this point Maj McComber separated the Zaire and RPA officers to await the arrival of more senior RPA.

5. At approximately 1600 hrs an RPA battalion commander arrived on site. It was decided that the transfer would proceed. He explained that to diffuse the situation he would take possession of the 37 men, that they would be held in Gisenyi until he received further orders from his government and that UNAMIR and ICRC would have access to the group. The deputy-Prefect of Gisenyi also arrived on site at this time. He explained that the Rwandan government had not yet been properly informed of the situation, but that he agreed with the decision of the RPA commander.

6. The transfer took place between 1630 and 1700 hrs. The 37 men were moved by RPA transport to the Gisenyi jail where they remain at this time.

7. The Zaire officials had prepared a list of the 37 men which noted that all of them had been tried in Zairean courts and convicted of crimes that ranged from murder to "wearing of military uniform." UNHCR representatives signed this document, noting that they had only "assisted" in the transfer. Rwandan officials refused to sign the document. This was noted on the document by the Zaire officials.

8. Maj McComber and Maj Wannemacher moved with the group to the Gisenyi jail and made arrangements for follow-up and passage of information.

9. The following was additionally noted:

- a. Goma UNHCR has received information that senior Zaire government officials had refused to allow this action to take place. It is possible that the local Governor is acting independently in this matter.
- b. Zaire military was very "heavy handed" in dealing with the 37 prisoners, despite being "on camera." RPA soldiers present treated the returned men coolly (and as prisoners) but in a correct manner.

JS McComber  
Maj

TO: DFC

FROM: IM

Room No. - No de bureau Extension - Poste Date 30-11-94

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	✓	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

MA  
 For your pleasure ready  
 25/11  
 05/10  
 Dream and your too.  
 1/2 11994

COM.6 (2-78)

MONDAY NOVEMBER 14 1994

# Britain alerted for invading armada of yellow plastic ducks

BY NICK NUTTALL  
 ENVIRONMENT  
 CORRESPONDENT

AN ARMADA of toy ducks is heading for Britain after sailing half way round the world braving winds, the ocean currents and frozen Arctic seas. Among the yellow plastic ducks are blue turtles, red beavers and green frogs, some expected to bob down past 12,000-mile voyage on beaches along the British and Irish coasts.

The toys, lost from a container ship in the North Pacific

are following in the wake of such legendary explorers as Fridtjof Nansen. Between 1893 and 1896 the Norwegian rammed his ship Fram into the Arctic pack-ice and proved that there is a mighty conveyor belt of ice across the roof of the world. The ducks will be carried on this transpolar drift from Siberia into the North Atlantic and on to the British Isles.

Depending on the Gulf Stream and other ocean currents, scientists believe, the toys could even reach France. Some of the brightly coloured toys, with the legend "The First Years" emblazoned on

its way from Hong Kong to Tacoma, Washington. Eleven months later, on November 16, 400 of the toys were found beached at Sitka, Alaska. Other ducks, which have helped prove the scientists' forecasts, have bobbed up at Kodiak, Alaska.

Dr Ebbesmeyer and James Ingraham, of the US Government's National Marine Fisheries Service, have been using a system called the Ocean Surface Current Simulations, which uses information going back to the Second World War. The documented paths of other ocean debris, including plastic bottles and wreck-

age from ships, have also been used to predict the likely route of the toy armada. The scientists believe the toys have now penetrated the Bering Strait between Alaska and Siberia and were frozen in the Arctic sea this autumn. The transpolar drift, which conveys ice for 2,000 miles over the North Pole at about five miles a day, should bring them into the North Atlantic in five years' time.

The scientists, whose research is published in Eos, journal of the American Geophysical Union, say the toys should be taken south, where they will hit the Gulf Stream, which brings warm water to Ireland and the west coast of Britain.

"Once the toys get caught up in the Gulf Stream they hit you guys," Dr Ingraham said. "The scientists who are urging anyone making plastic duck sightings to contact them, believe the fate of the toys will help to fine tune their ocean models. These, they hope, will boost forecasts for fisheries and pollution."

"It is this kind of work which shows just how small the world is and how pollution from the Pacific can affect the North Atlantic and European waters," Dr Ebbesmeyer said.



179 E. 47th  
 20,000 ducks to  
 lost from ship  
 Oct 1, 1994



MA TO DFC

File p8e  
HBM  
MA  
5/12

MILOB HQ

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

TO: HQ UNAMIR KIGALI // FC //

INFO: MILOB HQ KIGALI

DATE: 28 NOV 94

SUBJ: INCIDENT REPORT: RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES BY ZAIRE  
GOVERNMENT AT GISENYI BORDER POST 27 NOV 94

1. At approximately 1100 hrs on 27 Nov 94 the Director of UNHCR Goma informed this HQ that a representative of the Governor of NORTH KIVU DISTRICT had announced to him that a number of Rwandese refugees being held as "criminals" in local prisons would be immediately returned to Rwanda. This action was to take place at the border post located at GISENYI. Exact number of people to be returned was not made clear, nor was the exact status of these persons given i.e. whether or not they had been arrested in connection with recent problems in KATALE CAMP or were being held for other "crimes."
2. At approximately 1500 hrs UNHCR informed this HQ that "40-50" persons were being moved to the border under escort by Zaire military. Maj McComber and Maj Wannemacher, with RPA LO, moved to that location.
3. On arriving at the border the situation was as follows:
  - a. Zaire military (green beret) of platoon strength under command of a Captain and equipped with MG-mounted pickup trucks was present as escort to the "prisoners."
  - b. Governor of NORTH KIVU province was present.
  - c. 37 Rwandese men were being returned to Rwanda. These men were all without shirts or shoes. Some showed evidence of recent beating i.e. lacerations and dried blood. Their attitudes ranged from quiet resignation to a degree of "cocky-ness." None appeared to be particularly afraid of being handed over to RPA.
  - d. Representatives of the international press were present, including Reuters, BBC and a Japanese television crew.
  - e. UNHCR representatives from GOMA and GISENYI were present
4. UNHCR Officers from Goma first spoke with Zaire officials and discussed the "legality" of the situation vis-a-vis forced return of refugees. Zaire officials appeared disinterested. Zaire officials wanted UNHCR to take over responsibility for the transfer of the 37 persons. UNHCR resisted this, noting that they were present as observers. At one point a UNHCR Security Officer was told by a Zaire military officer that "she would be

G6



expelled from Zaire because of her attitude." Concurrent with this discussion, Zaire military officers were discussing the transfer with RPA officers present. At this time the most senior RPA officer was a Lieutenant. The Zaire stand was that "these men are your brothers. You must take them back." The RPA was reluctant to allow the process to proceed. The discussion became somewhat heated. At this point Maj McComber separated the Zaire and RPA officers to await the arrival of more senior RPA.

5. At approximately 1600 hrs an RPA battalion commander arrived on site. It was decided that the transfer would proceed. He explained that to diffuse the situation he would take possession of the 37 men, that they would be held in Gisenyi until he received further orders from his government and that UNAMIR and ICRC would have access to the group. The deputy-Prefect of Gisenyi also arrived on site at this time. He explained that the Rwandan government had not yet been properly informed of the situation, but that he agreed with the decision of the RPA commander.

6. The transfer took place between 1630 and 1700 hrs. The 37 men were moved by RPA transport to the Gisenyi jail where they remain at this time.

7. The Zaire officials had prepared a list of the 37 men which noted that all of them had been tried in Zairean courts and convicted of crimes that ranged from murder to "wearing of military uniform." UNHCR representatives signed this document, noting that they had only "assisted" in the transfer. Rwandan officials refused to sign the document. This was noted on the document by the Zaire officials.

8. Maj McComber and Maj Wannemacher moved with the group to the Gisenyi jail and made arrangements for follow-up and passage of information.

9. The following was additionally noted:

- a. Goma UNHCR has received information that senior Zaire government officials had refused to allow this action to take place. It is possible that the local Governor is acting independently in this matter.
- b. Zaire military was very "heavy handed" in dealing with the 37 prisoners, despite being "on camera." RPA soldiers present treated the returned men coolly (and as prisoners) but in a correct manner.

JS McComber  
Maj

Who carried out the assessment? Is it from your G2 cell? I would like a further observation on these points which I consider valid.

①

② DFC

For your perusal/us in further discussion.

28.11

## THREAT ASSESSMENT KIBEHO/NDAGO AND SURROUNDING AREAS

### INTRODUCTION

1. This assessment is based on 60 plus incidents reported since early Sept '94. It is provided in order to assist planning of operations in the areas of Kibeho GR 5007 and Ndago GR 5201.
2. The area of sector 4A which includes Kibeho and Ndago and the communes of Butare Prefecture to the East have been of particular intelligence interest for some time now. There have been numerous reports of Threat Forces (Former RGF, Interahamwe and bandit elements) from the DP camps committing murders and attacks both within the camp confines and in the surrounding areas. There have also been a significant number of incidents involving RPA troops in this region.
3. This report covers :-
  - a. political aspects
  - a. incidents involving the RPA,
  - b. incidents involving Threat Forces,
  - c. incidents involving refugees.
  - d. deductions and
  - e. assessment.

### POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. Since late September the Prefect of Gikongoro and RPA commanders have conducted a number of discussions and public rallies with camp leaders and inhabitants of both Kibeho and Ndago camps in attempts to persuade the people to return home. On 24 Nov the DP's complained to the Prefect that when they return home they find their houses occupied or destroyed and that some returnees are arrested by the RPA.
5. In mid Nov the NGO's in both Kibeho and Ndago ceased operations in the camps for a 48 hr period due to the increase in tension. Britcon and Ausmed ceased their contribution to the humanitarian effort in the two camps at around the same time.

### INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE RPA

6. On 1 Nov locals in Ndago informed Malawi troops of an incident which occurred in Ndago GR 5200 in which the RPA had killed 6 people and absconded with a mother and two children. All

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1/12/94  
SB

those killed/injured/kidnapped were said to be related to a known militia leader during the war. This incident led to the movement of DP's from Ndago to Kibeho and the comment from DP's that they would not return home as long as the RPA were in power.

7. A number of reports have been received of RPA harassment in the Runyinya commune GR 6012 and the Cyafurwe area GR 5317. The bulk of the reports suggest that robbery by the RPA was the motive and the RPA camps at Ramba GR 5414 and Mbasu GR 5410 are reportedly where the soldiers responsible come from. Local Tutsi's in Ramba are said to act as guides for the RPA in their collection of cattle and other possessions.

8. The RPA have denied access to UNAMIR troops on a number of occasions in the Runyinya area. They insisted that a newly deployed Malawi PI move to a different location in the commune on 12 Nov. Large numbers of refugees have reportedly returned to refugee camps from the Runyinya commune.

#### INCIDENTS INVOLVING THREAT FORCES

9. On the night of 20 Oct 94 11 people were murdered in their homes in Gasasa GR 556125 in the Runyinya commune. Locals claimed that the attackers were Interahamwe who had come from refugee camps in the area of Rwamiko GR 4913. Locals also claimed that there had been a number of attacks in that area in the past week with a number of locals being killed.

10. A murder took place on Ni 4/5 Nov in Karama in the Runyinya commune. Three women were killed, one seriously injured and a male slightly injured. The burgemeister suspected that the assailants came from the refugee camps in the Rwamiko area, and that they were killing witnesses to atrocities which took place during the war.

11. On 14 Nov Ghanbat reported finding 2 grenades in the house of a suspected bandit at Runyinya. The bandit escaped.

12. Malawi Coy reported that two elderly women of around 70 years were macheted to death and two young boys severely beaten on 14 Nov in Mpanda GR 5607. The assailants were reportedly from the Kibeho camp.

13. The RPA reported to Malawi Coy on 15 Nov that they had arrested 7 people in Runyinya who were from Kibeho and had been recognised by locals as killers during the war. One of them was shot dead by the RPA as he tried to escape.

14. OC Malawi Coy and Sector 3 Comd visited the Burgermeister of Runyinya on 19 Nov. The Burgemeister stated that the Interahamwe were stopping refugees in Kibeho camp from returning to their homes. He claimed that after people had returned to their communes the Interahamwe followed them up and killed them. He further stated that there were 96 Interahamwe operating in the area led by one GATIBITA Thomas and they had access to military uniforms and grenades. He reportedly has followers in Ndago GR 5101, Munini GR 4800, Kibeho and Rwamiko GR 4813 camps.



15. Ghanbat conducted a cordon and search in the Kibeho camp on 20 Nov and found three hand grenades.

16. Sector 3 HQ reported that eight people had been killed and four injured in Ramba GR 5414 on 21 Nov. No further detail.

#### INCIDENTS INVOLVING REFUGEES

16. A number of reports have been received of people returning to both Kibeho and Ndago camps after being resettled in their home communes. The most common reason given has been harassment/killings by the RPA. A large proportion of returnees have reportedly come from the Butare Prefecture, including the Runyinya commune.

17. Malawi Coy reported on 22 Nov that two persons, NGOMA MBIRUTI and ROWABA LINDA often visited the village of Ramba GR 5414 and threatened the locals that they would be killed if they did not return to the refugee camps.

18. During Op Homeward there has been a number of incidents of intimidation by elements within the camps as refugees were being loaded for repatriation. Threats were made that DP's would be killed by the RPA on their return and that families of DP's left behind in the camp would also be killed. This activity often led to the large numbers of people registered by UNHCR for a move, reducing drastically during the 24 hrs between registration and uplift.

19. One particular agitator reported by Britcon was seen in both Ndago and Kibeho on consecutive days during loading. He was described as about 25 years old and wearing a distinctive green felt cowboy style hat.

#### DEDUCTIONS

20. The Prefects and RPA commanders have attempted to persuade DP's to return to their home communes. This effort appears to have had a negligible effect.

21. RPA activity has done little to create the necessary environment required to entice refugees home. Whether the reports of such activities are true or the result of a successful propaganda campaign by Threat Force elements is irrelevant; if the reports reach the refugees they have the same effect.

22. Threat Force activity both inside and outside the camps is resulting in the instability desired by those forces. It is possible that some of the activity attributed to the RPA has in fact been conducted by armed Threat elements wearing military style uniforms.

23. The Threat Forces currently enjoy sanctuary within the camps and are well placed to maintain, through propaganda, both a high level of support for the former government and continued campaigns against the current one.

24. The numbers of Threat Forces and their supporters within the camps is likely to be significant. This is particularly so given that a large proportion of DP's are guilty of some form of



crime committed during the war and there has to date been no policy statement from the government to explain how it intends to bring to justice those it considers guilty.

25. The numbers of reports of armed attacks outside the camps, possibly by Threat Force elements, suggest that they have access to weapons. Quantities are unknown but they are likely to be restricted to small arms and hand grenades.

26. There may be some level of coordination between Threat Force elements in Kibeho, Ndagò and other camps in the area.

✓ 26. Searches have been conducted in the past by UNAMIR troops without incident.

#### ASSESSMENT

27. A search of any refugee camp is unlikely to be productive if the Threat Forces are forewarned.

28. Following any searches of camps the Threat Force propaganda machine will swing into action and the threat to UNAMIR forces will increase significantly. This is likely to occur whether Threat Force elements are removed at the time or not.

29. If attempts are made to arrest Threat Force elements during a search of the camps, particularly in the presence of RPA troops, those elements are likely to resist with whatever force and weaponry they have available. This is likely to include firing on UNAMIR troops.

30. The Threat to UNAMIR troops following a joint operation with the RPA could be reduced if a well planned and implemented Psyops campaign was conducted prior to the operation.

TO : CO TUNBATT  
FROM : Maj C.E. KAMANGE  
G2 UNAMIR HQ KIGALI  
INFO : MA TO DFC/COS  
SUBJECT : COMPLAINT BY ETIRU, RUHENGARI  
DATE : 23 NOV 94

*Kamange*

1. Rwanda Industrial Company called ETIRU has complained about some items being stolen from the residence of their Director General located in RUHENGARI, and illegal occupation of their premises.
2. According to their complaint (letter attached) it is indicated that TUNBATT soldiers are responsible.
3. You are therefore requested to investigate and a report to be submitted to the DFC/COS without delay.

*MA*  
*Keep track*  
*and give me update*  
*25/11/94*  
*DFC/COS*

*G6*  
*28/11/94*  
*SB*

ETIRU  
RWANDA INDUSTRIAL COMPANY  
T.R.N° H16/87/ RUHENGARI  
POBOX. 25 RUHENGARI-RWANDA  
POBOX 1408 KIGALI

TEL: Ruhengeri: 46456  
TEL: Kigali: 73234

To the attention  
of the UNAMIR Force Commander

Ruhengeri, Saturday 19 November 1994

Dear Sir,

As of Monday, 14 November 1994, at 9:00 hours, we noted that an African painting representing masks (orange and turquoise colors) had been stolen from the residence of the Director General, located on the estate belonging to ETIRU.

After inquiry, it was found out that the theft is to be attributed to a UNAMIR Tunisian armed guard.

We regret that hapless incident but unfortunately, it is adding to various indelicate acts including the illegal occupation of our former offices. We hope for a rapid reparation for the damages incurred.

Yours faithfully,

François Gahylle  
Technical Director

cc:

- Mr. Zeletzki
- UNAMIR delegation present at ETIRU.

G2  
I want this  
investigated and  
a report submitted  
without delay.  
J. J.  
23/11/94



**etiru**

ETABLISSEMENT INDUSTRIEL DU RWANDA

R.C.N° H16/87 RUHENGARI

B.P. 25 RUHENGARI-RWANDA

B.P. 1408 KIGALI

Tél: Ruhengeri: 46456

Tél: Kigali: 73234

A l'attention du Commandant en chef de la MINUAR

Ruhengeri, le samedi 19 novembre 1994

Mon Commandant,

En date du lundi 14 novembre 1994, à neuf heures du matin, nous avons constaté le vol d'un tableau africain représentant des masques (tons orange et turquoise) dans la maison du Directeur général, dans la propriété d'ETIRU s.a.

Après enquête, il s'est révélé que la disparition est à attribuer à un gardien tunisien armé de la MINUAR.

Nous regrettons ce malheureux incident mais malheureusement, il fait suite à diverses indécatesses dont l'occupation injustifiée de nos ex-bureaux. Nous espérons une rapide réparation des dégats encourus.

Veuillez agréer, Mon Commandant, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus vigilants.

*François Gahyille*  
*Directeur technique*

Copie adressée à Monsieur Zeletzki et à la délégation MINUAR présente à ETIRU

Banque Commerciale du Rwanda N° 95257 Ruhengeri/N° 12954/53 KIGALI

BACAR-N°2-225020-3070-78



ETIRU  
RWANDA INDUSTRIAL COMPANY  
T.R.N° H16/87/ RUHENGRI  
POBOX. 25 RUHENGRI-RWANDA  
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cc:

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G2  
I want this  
investigated and  
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23/11/94



Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
Kigali  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/7

FORCE COMMANDER

REPORT ON INCIDENTS AT ZAMBATT LOCATION

GENERAL

1. While at the MILOB Sector Commander's bi-monthly conference at Gikongoro on Sat 12 Nov 94, I received an instruction from you directing me to visit ZAMBATT location to confirm and also obtain some details regarding the recent RPA activities in their company locality.
2. In fact, it was my plan to visit the ZAMBATT location on the same issue after the conference so your instructions tied in perfectly well with my projected itinerary and hence, it was a welcome one.

AIM

3. The aim of this report is to provide you with detailed information regarding the RPA activities in MUSANGE/MUSABEYA areas of ZAMBATT AOR (of Sector 4A) during the last week.

RPA ACTIVITIES

4. My contact with the Battalion G3 revealed 3 separate incidents within the area for last week (07 - 12 Nov 94) alone. Each will be discussed separately.
5. CYANIKA CAMP. On 7 Nov 94, 1 RPA soldier together with 2 Displaced Persons (DPs) reportedly went to CYANIKA Camp on a motor bike to look for another DP. On reaching the camp, they were allegedly surrounded by the inmates of the camp. The RPA soldier out of fear of being lynched fired several shots into the air to disperse them. There was no casualty in this incident.

COMMENTS

6. Whatever good intentions the RPA soldier had for going to the camp, it was wrong for him to fire in the camp for obvious political and security implications. The leadership of the RPA need to educate their troops about this matter. On the other hand, this could also be a made up story trying to justify why the soldier had to fire, since the RPA are known to fire in order to disperse the DPs from some camps.

G-6  
SB  
15/11/94

*Abraham  
I have given for a good  
report. However, the  
events have already been  
conveyed in the media news  
& New York. 5/11/94  
Keep on file please  
not to be used  
14/11/94  
15/11/94  
DFC/COS/CMO*

7. MUSANGE. A group of RPA soldiers (about a platoon strength) from MURAMA (Sector 3B) surrounded the ZAMBATT platoon location at MUSANGE on 10 Nov 94, while another group of RPA soldiers also fired in the village to disperse the DPs. In the process, 7 people were killed and several others (figure not known) also were injured.

8. It is quite clear that the intention of the RPA was to restrict the ZAMBATT Platoon from interfering with their operations and hence the platoon was surrounded.

#### COMMENTS

9. The RPA action could be viewed at two strata of violations; first as an act of arms aggression and intimidation against UN personnel and military installations and secondly, an act of deliberate violation of International Human Rights.

10. It must be noted that it was a planned operation by the RPA to forcibly disperse people from areas of concentration fearing that such concentration might harbour some elements of the militia.

11. Their action will lead to a loss of confidence in UNAMIR especially in Sector 4. A formal protest should be launched to condemn their action, particularly the arms aggression and intimidation against the ZAMBATT Platoon.

12. MUSABEYA. On 11 Nov 94, an RPA patrol reportedly drove into a market at MUSABEYA where several people had assembled for petty trading. The RPA patrol was allegedly surrounded by the locals and two hand grenades were also thrown at them.

13. The RPA soldiers consequently opened fire and threw some hand grenades into the crowd. In the process, 7 people were killed leaving 13 others seriously wounded. The RPA continued to fire several shots into the air after that. On realizing that they were running short of ammunition and could be captured or lynched by the aggrieved locals, they headed for the ZAMBATT Platoon location for safety.

14. While running towards the UN Platoon location, they kept on firing in their direction of movement. As a result, some of the structures at the Platoon location were hit by some rounds. However, the ZAMBATT Platoon did not return fire. They rounded up 10 RPA soldiers and disarmed them. A Colonel from the RPA, I was told, came later to apologize for the actions of his soldiers and ZAMBATT accordingly released the soldiers with their weapons and actually drove them back to their location. The Colonel assured the Company Commander that such an incident would never be repeated. This notwithstanding, some RPA soldiers came back on the night of the same day to burn down some structures in the village.

#### COMMENTS

15. This last incident will further destabilize the already insecure situation in Sector 4. The ZAMBATT Platoon acted very wisely and this prevented any arms confrontation with the RPA. It also saved us from taking any casualties.

16. A formal protest should again be made on this incident also to the Rwandese Government.



17. I have advised ZAMBATT to be more cautious and also to look out for militia activities in the area vis-a-vis RPA activities.

#### CONCLUSION

18. The 3 separate incidents as narrated in the report are all in bad taste pointing to RPA calculated attempts to forcibly disperse the DPs from the camps.

19. By so doing, they not only ignore UNAMIR presence but conduct arms aggression and intimidation against UNAMIR military installations and personnel as well. This could erode the confidence the locals have built in UNAMIR since the departure of the French.

20. This issue needs to be addressed very firmly with the Government to stop the RPA from acting without regard to UNAMIR presence. Otherwise, the current developments would lend credence to the propaganda mounted by the former RGF that UNAMIR cannot provide the population with security after the French withdrawal from the former Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). It is in line with this that our proposed co-ordinated operation to get rid of the militias from DP camps is in the right direction.

#### RECOMMENDATION

21. I recommend that the appalling arms aggression and Human Rights violation by the RPA be taken up very firmly with the Government.

22. A formal protest letter should also be submitted to both the Government and the RPA about the two incidents at MUSANGE (on 10 Nov 94) and MUSABEYA (on 11 Nov 94).

23. We should go ahead with the proposed co-ordinated operation with the RPA, ICRC and NGOs to get rid of the militia elements from DP camps.

HK Anyidoho  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS/CMO (CONTICO)



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MEMORANDUM

1000-1 (Force Signal Officer)

12 Nov 94


DCOS Ops

SECURITY AT UNAMIR FRONT GATE

1. Enclosed are two separate incidents which have occurred at the UNAMIR HQ front gate and involved the UN civilian security pers. There have been other incidents which I have intervened with over the past four months. All incidents have involved the UN security pers and Canadian soldiers. The most recent incident which occurred on 8 Nov 94 was witnessed by Maj Plante.

2. It appears as if the UN security pers are intentionally being belligerent and awkward to the soldiers at the front gate. I have nothing but praise for the job that the Airborne and Signal Regiment pers have accomplished since taking over from the Ghanaians.

3. I believe that this matter needs to be resolved by the appropriate UN civilian authority as there has been no success at our level.

  
P. Rutherford  
Maj  
Force Signal Officer

Enclosures: 3

DCOS ops  
Unfortunately I do not  
have the incidents attached.  
Could you please come for discussion  
if you have the incidents documented.  
+ Ji  
14/11  
DFC/COS/CMD

② DFC/COS

1. In addition to these minor, yet annoying and unnecessary incidents, I received a complaint regarding the behaviour of the SRSG's bodyguard during Happy Hour at the BBC Mess from the Catering Supervisor. I can elaborate some details if required.

2. I suggest that these incidents are discussed with the Chief of Security (through the CAO?). Request your advice or assistance as to how best approach this issue.

  
DCOS ops  
13.11

G6  
SB  
15/11/94

TRADUCTION

AU: COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE

DE: COMMISSAIRE DE CIVPOL

OBJET: RAPPORT SUR LE VOL PRESUME DE 44.00 FRANCS  
RWANDAIS.

DATE: Le 8 novembre 1994

1. Le 7 novembre 1994 vers 14h45, un BERTIN RUTABINGA (m) est venu au QG de CIVPOL et a déclaré qu'il échangeait les monnaies locales et étrangères devant la PTT comme d'habitude, quand un Land Cruiser de la MINUAR, immatriculation N° 800, s'est présenté pour changer de l'argent.

2. Le plaignant a ajouté qu'il y avait deux officiers blancs en uniformes camouflés dans le véhicule et qu'ils ont demandé le taux d'échange auxquels le plaignant a répondu que c'était 220,00 FRW le dollar pour les billets de 100 et 50 et 210 FRW pour les petites coupures.

3. Selon le plaignant, l'officier a ouvert un petit sac et a sorti deux billets que le premier croyait des billets de cent. Puisqu'il pleuvait, le plaignant s'est pressé pour rendre les 44.000,00 FRW rapidement. Dès qu'il s'est rendu compte qu'il s'agissait des billets de 10, il a essayé vainement avec l'aide de ses confrères près de lui d'indiquer au chauffeur du véhicule MINUAR 800 de s'arrêter. Dans le but de rattraper le chauffeur, il a loué les services d'un motard pour le poursuivre mais le véhicule avait disparu.

4. Il a néanmoins continué sur la moto au QG de la MINUAR pensant que c'était la destination du chauffeur.

5. Puisqu'il n'a pas pu le retrouver, il a raconté ce drame à un officier qui lui a conseillé de le rapporter à la police de la MINUAR dont voici le résultat.

6. Je vous présente, monsieur, ce rapport pour votre information et commentaire.

G6  
28/11/94  
SB



Ih Jhe,

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
Kigali  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/6

26<sup>th</sup> October 1994

COMBRITCON

**INCIDENT AT KANZENZE BRIDGE**

1. Please accept my deepest sympathy for the tragedy which occurred at Kanzenze Bridge site at 1245 hrs on Tuesday 25 October, 1994 in which a mine exploded at GR 096723 causing injuries to a number of your men, in particular to Sapper Copsey who lost a right foot and lower shin and Cpl Hill who received lacerations to the left shoulder and wrist. Thankfully the other three soldiers involved received only minor injuries. The enthusiasm which they showed on a rainy day during my visit last Saturday proved to me how professional your engineers are.
2. This is a particularly poignant tragedy in view of the imminent departure of BRITCON after a very successful mission in Rwanda.
3. I ask that they accept the situation as one of those professional hazards that a soldier has to go through. I wish them all a speedy recovery from their injuries.

HK Anyidoho  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS/CMO (CONTICO)



## UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

## INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Capt Bieteru, Ops O, UNAMIR MP Coy  
FROM: Maj Plante, Force Provost Marshal *Plante*  
DATE: 23 Oct 94  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION-  
MAJ KAISER RIZVI, UNID 505, MILOB GP HQ

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1. On 22 Oct 94, I was tasked by the FC, through DCOS SP, to conduct a formal investigation into an incident which happened during the night of 15 Oct 94 outside the Kigali Night.
2. At that time, it is alleged that a UNAMIR vehicle (1016) would have been stolen at gun point. I understand that the vehicle has been recovered on 19 Oct 94.
3. You are hereby tasked to conduct a full police investigation regarding this incident. Your investigation will include interviewing Maj Kaiser and any other witnesses which could help you in determining the exact details surrounding the incident.
4. I will expect a preliminary report on or before 29 Oct 94.





TO: Maj. General Anyidoho, DFC ✓  
FROM: Philip Mitnick, CBMSO  
THRU: Peter Hornsby, CSS  
INFO: Ally Golo, OIC Administration  
Patsy Mullings, Site Supervisor  
DATE: 1 November 1994  
RE: Location of Corpses at 500 Man Camp Site

During the course of work at the site of the 500 Man Camp behind the Amahoro Stadium, several bodies were located in a drainage swale. Mr. Medili asked that we inform you of this situation and request that you make arrangements to have the bodies collected and prepared for proper burial.

As usual we are very grateful for your assistance in these difficult matters.

\\wpwin\docs\trca0111.mem

Chief Medical Officer  
I need your advice on this case  
J. G.  
02/11  
DFC/US.

G6  
80  
4/11/94



Office of the DFC/COS/CMO  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
Kigali  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/6

<sup>th</sup>  
26 October 1994

COMBRITCON

**INCIDENT AT KANZENZE BRIDGE**

1. Please accept my deepest sympathy for the tragedy which occurred at Kanzenze Bridge site at 1245 hrs on Tuesday 25 October, 1994 in which a mine exploded at GR 096723 causing injuries to a number of your men, in particular to Sapper Copsey who lost a right foot and lower shin and Cpl Hill who received lacerations to the left shoulder and wrist. Thankfully the other three soldiers involved received only minor injuries. The enthusiasm which they showed on a rainy day during my visit last Saturday proved to me how professional your engineers are.
2. This is a particularly poignant tragedy in view of the imminent departure of BRITCON after a very successful mission in Rwanda.
3. I ask that they accept the situation as one of those professional hazards that a soldier has to go through. I wish them all a speedy recovery from their injuries.

HK Anyidoho  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS/CMO (CONTICO)

UNAMIR  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

File No: 1000.04 (A\MA)

To: Senegalese Contingent Commander  
From: DFC\COS  
Info: FC  
Date: 31 March 1994  
Subject: DISPOSITION OF PISTOL INCIDENT  
Reference: Report by Lt Col Seck On Borrowing of Pistols  
dated 29 March 1994

- 
1. The reference has been reviewed. Your recommendation is not accepted until a formal investigation is conducted.
  2. A Board of Inquiry has been ordered and will be carried out in regards to this incident.
  3. When the board is completed, the report will be submitted to the FC with recommendations for his consideration in consultation with UN Headquarters in New York.
  4. Be assured that the FC will hold consultations with you before any action is taken.



H Anyidoho  
Brigadier-General  
Deputy Force Commander\Chief of Staff

## ROUTING SLIP RWANDA FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: DR KABIA

FROM: DAF

DE:

Room No. - No de bureau Extension - Poste Date

Très Urgent

Kigali, le 22 MARS 1994

N° 0125/02.3.2

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?	POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

Roméo DALLAIRE,  
de Brigade Commandant des  
de la MINUAR  
L I.

Commandant de la MINUAR,

1. (1) attach for your personal  
the report on the Kinyihira incident  
submitted by the DMZ Sector.

l'assassinat ignoble perpétré  
a coûté la vie de cinq person-  
service à l'Usine à Thé de

2. We are now working on the setting up  
of the Board of Inquiry.

demande de prendre toutes les  
lance en vue de veiller à la  
spécialement dans la zone  
Article 21 de l'Accord entre le  
l'Armée rwandaise et le Front Patriotique

et la réinstallation dans leurs biens des  
personnes déplacées de guerre et sur l'administration de la zone  
démilitarisée signé à Kinyihira le 30 Mai 1993 et de mener immé-  
diatement l'enquête pour découvrir les auteurs de cet assassinat.

Je vous prie également de tout faire  
pour hâter les enquêtes sur les massacres antérieurs dans cette  
région et notamment ceux de KINYIHIRA, RWIBIGI et ailleurs.

/...



FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

ROUTING SLIP

TO: A: <b>DR KABIA</b>	
FROM: <b>DE: 76</b>	
Room No. - No de bureau: <b>76</b>	
Extension - Poste: <b>76</b>	
Date: <b>2/13/02</b>	
FOR ACTION	<b>110</b>
FOR APPROVAL	
FOR SIGNATURE	
FOR COMMENTS	
MAY WE DISCUSS?	
YOUR ATTENTION	
AS DISCUSSED	
AS REQUESTED	
NOTE AND RETURN	
FOR INFORMATION	
POUR SUITE DIVERSE	
POUR APPROBATION	
POUR SIGNATURE	
POUR OBSERVATIONS	
POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?	
VOTRE ATTENTION	
COMME CONVENU	
SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE	
NOTER ET RETOURNER	
POUR INFORMATION	

1. It is for your personal  
 use report on the Minister's incident  
 submitted by the DMS sector.

2. The one more incident on the 1st of  
 of the Board of Inquiry.

*[Signature]*

2/13/02

COM 6 (2-78)

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE

**Très Urgent**

Kigali, le ...2-2-MARS-1994.....

N° 0125/02.3.2

CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE  
B.P. 1334 KIGALI

Réf. N° :

Annexe :

Objet :

*DR KABITA*  
*I suggest we expose the results of our preliminary investigation and the accusations against the PM so that the is aware we have already started some action*  
*Hfi 22/3/94 Dfe/cos*

Monsieur Roméo DALLAIRE,  
Général de Brigade Commandant des  
Forces de la MINUAR  
KIGALI.

Général Commandant de la MINUAR,

Suite à l'assassinat ignoble perpétré  
le 15 Mars 1994 à KINIHIRA et qui a coûté la vie de cinq person-  
nes innocentes qui rentraient du service à l'Usine à Thé de  
CYOHOKA - RWISIGI,

Je vous demande de prendre toutes les  
dispositions pour redoubler de vigilance en vue de veiller à la  
sécurité des personnes et des biens spécialement dans la zone  
démilitarisée conformément à l'Article 21 de l'Accord entre le  
Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise et le Front Patriotique  
Rwandais sur le retour et la réinstallation dans leurs biens des  
personnes déplacées de guerre et sur l'administration de la zone  
démilitarisée signé à Kinihira le 30 Mai 1993 et de mener immé-  
diatement l'enquête pour découvrir les auteurs de cet assassinat.

Je vous prie également de tout faire  
pour hâter les enquêtes sur les massacres antérieurs dans cette  
région et notamment ceux de KINIHIRA, RWISIGI et ailleurs.

/...

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l'assurance  
de ma considération distinguée.

Le Premier Ministre  
Mme UWILINGIYISENA Agathe



Copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le  
Président de la République  
K I G A L I.
- Monsieur le Représentant du Secrétaire  
Général des Nations Unies  
K I G A L I.
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense  
K I G A L I.
- Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur  
et du Développement Communal  
K I G A L I.
- Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères et de la Coopération  
K I G A L I.
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice  
K I G A L I.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Inter-office Memorandum

To: DMZ Sector HQ  
RPF Sector Comd.  
CPlans

File no: 1000.7(DFC)/G/4

From: Force HQ

Info: CMO

Date: 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1994

Subject: SHOOTING INCIDENT IN BUSHOGA ON 17 MARCH 1994

---

Reference:

A. 7189/DMZ/OPS, dated 03 March 1994

1. Your recommendation on the formation of a Joint Military Team to redefine the doubtful areas of the northern fringes of the DMZ is approved.

2. You are to liaise with the local commanders of the RGF and RPF to seek very high representation on the team. The RPF Sector Commander will represent the CMO. The Chief Plans Officer, Force HQ, will appoint a representative to serve on the team. The DMZ Sector Commander is appointed Chairman of the team.

3. The team is to commence work as soon as possible. Any problems should be communicated to this HQ for assistance.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'HK Anyidoho', written in a cursive style.

HK Anyidoho  
Brigadier General  
Acting Force Commander





UNAMIR - MINUAR

Inter-office Memorandum

To: DMZ SECTOR HQ

File no: 1000.7(DFC)/G/4

From: Force HQ

Info: COO

Date: 22 March 1994

Subject: SHOOTING INCIDENT IN BUSHOGA ON 17 MARCH 1994

---

References:

A. 7189/DMZ, dated 19 March 1994

B. 7186/DMZ/OPS, dated 17 March 1994

1. This is to acknowledge receipt of reference A. The contents of paragraph 4 of reference B are also well noted.

2. I would, however, like you to note that action to pull the two sides back from their present locations, as recommended vide para 4a of ref B, can only be initiated on the installation of the BBTG. This will be in line with the demarcation of the new DMZ.

3. Adequate provision has also been put in place now to meet the logistics requirements of the MILOBS operating in the DMZ.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. Anyidoho".

HK Anyidoho  
Brigadier General  
Acting Force Commander



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Inter-office Memorandum

To: SRSG

From: A/FC

Date: 18<sup>th</sup> March 1994

Subject: A BRIEF ON MY VISIT TO THE KINIHIRA INCIDENT SPOT

1. Following the Intelligence Report (INTREP) received on Wednesday, 16 March on the killing of five Rwandese Nationals, I went to the scene of the incident yesterday to carry out an on-the-spot check.

2. The car had just been removed from the scene when I got to the area, but I was able to see the area around the scene of the ambush and the final resting place of the car. I later-on saw the ambushed car, also in the yard of the tea plantation. The following are my observations:

a. The ambush was planned and executed by military professional men. It is a type described or know as an "area-ambush". In this type of ambush all approaches are covered to ensure the target is trapped.


b. The ambush was also placed in a curve to force a vehicle to slow down. There was a booby trap in the curve. Again, a professional way of laying an ambush.

c. The car is completely bullet-ridden with small arms ammunition and was also subject to a grenade exposition.

3. From a verbal account of the company commander of the Kinihira DMZ Company, the late Managing Director had gone with an amount of twenty million Rwandese Francs (20,000,000 FRW) to pay the workers on the plantation but apparently the payment did not take place. He left the money with the accountant on the plantation prior to falling into the ambush. According to the Company Commander, the late Managing Director had a prolonged disagreement with a local who used to work in the factory before resigning to establish his own plantation. This fellow is quite wealthy now and wields a lot of influence in the area. He was also known to have checked on the presence of the MD earlier on in the day of the 15th March. Another point of interest is that locals noticed the movement of strange people in the area that day prior to the springing of the ambush.

4. This short report is to give an account of my visit to the scene. I am awaiting a more detailed report from the MILOBs. I can only hope that the UNCIVPOL will continue with their investigation to arrive at some more detailed information.

5. Submitted for your attention, please.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. Anyidoho', with a horizontal line drawn through the middle of the signature.

HK Anyidoho  
Brigadier General  
Acting Force Commander

UNAMIR

4000.0(SMO)  
28 March 1994

See distribution

Sub: MEDICINE DEMAND FOR UNAMIR MEDICAL ELEMENT.

Ref: A. Ltr No.- 4000.4(SMO),dated-25 Feb 1994  
B. Ltr No.- 4000.4(SMO),dated-15 Mar 1994  
C. Fax- dated 11 Mar 1994

1. It is intimated that the UNAMIR Fd Hosp and other UNAMIR Med Elements are facing problems due to acute shortage of medicine. It has become very difficult to provide medicare to the patients as the medicine stock is almost exhausted . As per above ref letters medicines were demanded but not yet materialized .
2. You are earnestly requested to make necessary arrangement at your end to supply the subject medicine as soon as possible .
3. Your kind co\_operation is always appreciated .
4. Best regards.

Distribution :

External :

Action :

CGSO

Info :

UNAMIR Field Hospital

Internal :

Info :

FC

DFC

C Log Offr

*Moin Maj.*  
SHAIKH MOINUDDIN  
Major  
Senior Medical Officer



XKF-530

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

MAR 25 05:41

DATE: 24 March 1994

TO: BGEN Anyidoho, Acting FC, UNAMIR/KIGALI	FROM: M. Baril, UNATIONS, NY
FAX NO: 250 84265 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: (212) 963-9070
SUBJECT: Mine Detectors	
ATTN: Major Jerzy Maczka	ROOM NO 0927, EXT: 2627
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 1	

From: Paddy Blagden, Demining

Subject: Mine Detectors

1. Please prepare a requisition for the number of mine detectors you need.
2. The name Schiebel AN 19/2 is sufficient identification. No catalog number is necessary.
3. Please state that the detectors are required to search for low-metal content mines in Rwanda.
4. You should also say that the Schiebel detector is in UN use in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique and Somalia.
5. The name and address of the Schiebel Company is as follows:

Dipl. Ing. Hans Schiebel  
Electronische Gerate  
Gesellschaft m.b.H.  
A-1050 Wien, Austria  
Margaretenstrasse 112

Phone: (43 222) 546 26-0  
Fax: (43 222) 545 23 39

FC AFC OIC EDIR

G

27/02/1994

FROM : LIAISON OFFICER RPF/UNAMIR  
TO : D/FC - UNAMIR

INFO : FC - UNAMIR  
CMO - MILOBS  
COMDR KIGALI SECTOR  
COO UNAMIR

②  
JIC  
Have we given  
an answer to  
RPF LO on this?  
[Signature]  
11/3

**Subject : GROSS MISCONDUCT BY SOME UNMOS/UNAMIR TEAMS.**

1. Further to my verbal explanation to you this morning, I wish to formally register RPF's protest against misconduct by certain members of UNAMIR which is bound to strain RPF/UNAMIR relations.
2. The 3rd Bn RPA at CND has observed and reported to me that certain members of the UNAMIR treat them with a lot of contempt. This included some observers from MILOBS and a few others from the Force HQs. There also have been reports about similar behaviour by some of those operating on the RPF territory - The RPF sector.
3. I wish to point out that hitherto my approach has been to talk to these Officers individually and/or their immediate superiors, verbally, to ensure that the problems are ironed out at those levels. This I had hoped would also protect cvs of these individual Officers as they improve in their assistance mission. Only a few of these have been able to appreciate the RPF concerns and efforts and, accordingly, either apologised and / or changed their behaviour towards the RPF.
4. I wish at this juncture to point out that certain senior Officers in the UNAMIR have to my disappointment, been heard discussing with RGF Officers matters that are absolutely without any relationship to their mission.


Some of them have been heard whilst in the company of RGF Officers, making allegations against RPF LOs and involved in undue criticisms against RPF Officers generally - alleging indiscipline, illiteracy etc on the part of RPF Officers in the very language that one would have expected to hear from RGF details could be availed on request.

5. Enclosed herein Sir, are details of a specific case involving Major Medhat, a UNMO Officer originally from Egypt (the Team Leader) and Capt. Mbow from Senegal who conducted themselves in a manner that is bound to raise suspicion and concern and probably strain RPF/UNAMIR relations.

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF FC	
Date	28/2/94
No. 764	By SP

6. It is my earnest request that UNAMIR Officers do their utmost to conduct themselves in a manner that causes no suspicion and unlikely to cause unnecessary anger on the part of RPF Officers.
7. The RPF promises further to do all in her means to ensure that UNAMIR executes her mission.

Sincerely,



KARENZI KARAKE  
LT.COLONEL  
RPF/UNAMIR L.O

27/02/1994

**Subject : Major Medhat and Capt. Mbows' unfortunate conduct whilst on a mission on RPF territory.**

- (i) On 24th Feb. 94, I left Kigali for Mulindi with 18 soldiers, going for burial. I had with me one M/Benz car, a UNAMIR hired pickup carrying the Deadbody and a pickup from 3rd Bn RPA. Although, we had intended to leave Kigali as early as 0700B, we left Kigali at 1130B, and therefore reached Ngondore at about 1400B.
- (ii) On my advice the UNAMIR convoy, commanded by one Capt. Odoo Mensa left Ngondore immediately on our arrival back to Kigali with the understanding that the 18 soldiers and I would be picked up again the next day from Mulindi for Kigali.
- (iii) On 26 Feb. 94, at about 1300 Hrs a UNAMIR convoy composed of 02 Officers from MILOBs - one Medhat, not wearing peeps but later on understood to be a Major by Rank and originally from Egypt - and one Captain Mbow from Senegal and 02 (two) soldiers from KIGALI reached Mulindi, with a dual mission of picking up the 55 people that had been stranded on RPF territory (following the women's seminar held in Mulindi) and the 18 soldiers and one Officer that had spent a night in Mulindi after the burial of late Deo Butera.
- (iv) I understood also that Major Medhat and his team had specifically been told that :
  - (a) - the 55 people were women.
  - (b) - there were 04 buses in Mulindi to be brought along with the people, there were 04 Drivers.
- (v) I personally found Lt. Col. CK KAYIZARI and the UNMOS in Mulindi where the 55 people bordered the Buses. They had a disagreement because Lt. Col. CK KAYIZARI insisted that the total number of people to be picked up was 55 but specified that this number uncluded some 13 men that had participated in the coordination etc of the group from Kigali and 42 women. Maj. Medhat on the other hand, insisted he had to take 55 women and no men at all. I requested Lt. Col. CK KAYIZARI to accept that only the 42 women actually constituting part of the 55 people leave for Kigali, mean while a separate arrangement is made for the 13 men. We agreed on this and I therefore, took Maj. Medhat to do the physical counting of the women. He appeared satisfied and so we took off with the 04 buses and my 03 vehicles (one M/Benz and 02 pickups).
- (vi) On arrival at the site where armed escort parks (200 M or so from the point of embarkment for the women), Maj. Medhat informed me that the RPA soldiers on the pickups had rifle grenades, contrary to the KWSA. I approached the "Commander" of the 18 soldiers and he accepted having the rifle grenades owing to the previous attack on their



convoy during which the attackers actually used rifle grenades and that those rifle grenades would be surrendered to the UNMOS as we enter Kigali. Maj. Medhat indicated he would conduct another check at the last RPA checkpoint. We agreed and so we took off.

(vii) Maj. Medhat however, conducted another physical check on our way from Mulindi just as we approached the tarmac road about a kilometre away. again he appeared satisfied. We drove to Ngondore the last check point.

(viii) At Ngondore Maj. Medhat and Capt. Mbow now argued that we had 07 vehicles (one M/Benz, 02 P/ups and 04 Buses) instead of only 04 vehicles. I endeavoured to explain that the one Officer and 18 soldiers had left Kigali aboard 04 vehicles (one Benz and 02 pickups) whilst the 04 Buses had actually gone to Mulindi to pick up different people altogether. I took Maj. Medhat to one of the P/ups to prove to him it was UNAMIR hired. All this was in vain. Maj. Medhat insisted that the RPA soldiers who were providing escort should abandon their vehicles and jump on the buses.

When we attempted to make him understand that all this could cause difficulties should an ambush or any other problem arise on the Road, Maj. Medhat declared - " I do not care, that is not my problem". realising that Maj. Medhat was being very uncooperative, I turned to Capt. Mbow and to the 02 soldiers from KIGALI. Capt. Mbow declared that RGF had filed a complaint about that specific team and so they had to do every thing possible to ensure RGF did not complain. My efforts to explain that this should have limits and in no way should it make them do what was not right were fruit less. The KIGALI soldiers appreciated that the one Officer and 18 soldiers should be left to travel on their vehicles but said only Maj. Medhat could make that decision. KIBAT

(x) Maj. Medhat and Capt. Mbow at this juncture simply declared that the mission was cancelled. We said this was ok but asked them if the 42 women should not be taken back to Mulindi since Ngondore is in RGF's Arc of fire.

(xi) Amidst all these negotiations and counter - negotiations, one Capt. from the DMZ (name not known, but originally from Bangladesh) came to Ngondore RPF check point. He was whisked away by Maj. Medhat and Capt. Mbow as he began justifying the RPF escort team's travelling on the pickup's. He was also in the process of explaining of the composition as he had seen it the day before. Capt. Odoom mensah who had commanded the convoy that took the RPA soldiers and the deadbody also came on site, apparently , enroute to Gatuna for a different mission altogether. He too, held the view that the 04 buses (and the women's composition) should have nothing to do with leaving the pickups behind. One Maj. from the DMZ (apparently from Ghana) came on site and carried out another physical count of people and vehicles and he saw

no reason what so ever for not continuing with the mission which Maj. Medhat and his colleague had declared cancelled. Nobody wanted to listen to him.

Maj. Quist of the DMZ now decided to come in person . He listened to the various reports - Maj. Medhat's and that of the other UNAMIR members present (the Maj. and Capt. from the DMZ and that of the Capt. that had, the previous day, commanded the convoy) and the RPF side of the story and decided the convoy should continue to Kigali without further delay. He advised that he had contacted Kigali and was in touch with the RGF in Byumba and so there was no problem. Maj. Medhat and Capt. Mbow now informed him they took orders from else where not the DMZ. They went to "consult" amongst themselves " in Camera " I had meanwhile turned to the Force Hqrs, thru. 3Bn RPA at CND, to resolve this otherwise very obvious problem . All parties from UNAMIR too, appeared to be in contact with Kigali.

We were finally left to come with the 04 buses, 02 P/ups and 01 M/Benz and reached Kigali safely.

- (xii) It should be realised that in the course of Maj. Medhat establishing communications with his Hqrs, I realised that he was deliberately misinforming them more specifically on the question of the number of people coming to Kigali despite the physical count he had carried out in person on several counts and kept imputing "problems" encountered with the RPF in Mulindi. I realised also, that he did not at anytime want to communicate the proposals the RPF was making in respect of the mission in question, till I personally went to the escort group from KIGALI to request them to include our own proposals in the reports they were relaying. In short, there was an obvious, deliberate attempt on the part of Maj. Medhat and Capt. Mbow to ensure the mission flops. I don't know for what reasons !! It raises concern also when an escort, neutral escort team, declares with impunity, that it does not care what happens to those it is supposed to protect. This coupled with unreasonable excuses for delaying the Journey against a back ground of previous problems is bound to create suspicions and strain the RPF/UNAMIR relationships.

May I reiterate sir, that previously we chose to ignore misconduct by some of these Officers and either handled the problems with the individual Officers or simply their immediate superiors, in the hope that this amicable approach would smoothen our relation ships but in vain.

- (xiii) I intend to request that you appraise us (RPF) with your findings since this to us is a matter of grave concern.



Kigali, 19 April 94

Major General Paul Kagame  
Chairman RPA High Command  
Mulindi

Subject: LETTER OF PROTEST  
VIOLATION OF BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN  
UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS AND RPA/RGF TROOPS

This letter is forwarded to formally protest the illegal positioning of weapons close to UNAMIR installations.

In an earlier letter forwarded to you on the above subject is was stated clearly the distance that should be maintained between your troops and UNAMIR installations. Contrary to that it has been observed with deep concern that your troops have positioned mortars at the junction near Chez Lando Hotel which is about 200 metres from UNAMIR Headquarters. From this position they are firing at short intervals towards RGF troops locations.

This action is drawing heavy arms fire from the RGF troops into and around UNAMIR installations including the headquarters and RUTBAT location at the Amahoro Stadium. A number of fatalities and injuries have been sustained as a result of the continued shelling of UNAMIR installations.

I would like to remind you that in the earlier letter it was clearly stated that RPA Forces should respect a buffer zone of at least one hundred metres between yourselves and any UNAMIR installation be it during combat or taking up defensive positions. In addition no major or heavy direct fire systems should be positioned within 500 metres of our installations. Lastly all indirect weapon systems should not be positioned less than 1 kilometre from our installations.

I would like to stress that if this buffer zone is not respected it will incur very serious repercussions. I would like to remind you that I have the responsibility of ensuring the safety of all ranks under my command.

Please be assured of my cooperation and highest consideration at all times.

RA DALLAIRE  
Major General  
Force Commander



31 March 1994  
Kigali

Subject: LETTER OF PROTEST

Dear General,

This letter is forwarded to formally protest the illegal seizing of UNAMIR transport.

On at least two occasions, the RPF detained vehicles hired by UNAMIR to transport RPF personnel from Mulindi to Kigali.

On the first occasion, 21 February 1994, UNAMIR loaned buses from the Gendarmerie which were used to transport RPF personnel to Mulindi under UNAMIR escort. When the personnel could not come back to Kigali for obvious reasons, the RPF detained the buses at Mulindi despite every effort from the escort team to move them back to Kigali. The buses were kept in Mulindi for four days from 21 to 24 February 1994 in spite of repeated persuasion from UNAMIR Headquarters. This caused an embarrassment to UNAMIR and has consequently resulted in refusal of the Gendarmerie to loan their buses to UNAMIR.

On 24 March 1994, in expectation of an installation ceremony of the BBTG on 25 March 1994, UNAMIR rented local buses and moved them to Mulindi to facilitate early movement of the RPF VIPs to Kigali before 0830 hrs when the ceremony was expected to have started. When the installation ceremony was postponed, we needed to move those buses back to Kigali in accordance with our contract with the local bus company. The RPF refused to release the buses, and now UNAMIR is in violation of its contract and liable for penalty expenses in addition to the normal contractual fees. I need not over-emphasize the fact that UNAMIR does not hold any excess monies to be paying penalties of this nature. We have been simply overstretching our resources with the hope of getting positive results. It is, therefore, not fair for these gestures to be taken for granted. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult for us now to despatch any buses to Mulindi to convey RPF personnel. The financial implications, coupled with the uncooperative attitude stated above and the demoralizing effect on our troops, are a hinderance to UNAMIR's response in the future. I must state that New York has found it difficult to see justification in UNAMIR's hiring of buses to and from Mulindi when they know the RPF VIPs are in the CND. However, those of us on the ground try, under difficult conditions, to assist in whatever way possible.

I have brought these issues to your attention for a corrective action and, also, to regrettably inform you that we

Major-General Paul Kagame  
Chairman of the RPF High Command  
Mulindi

page 1 of 2



I have brought these issues to your attention for a corrective action and also to regrettably inform you that we may not be in a position to send buses to Mulindi in the future.

UNAMIR remains committed to providing security and when necessary material support to RPF.

Please be assured of my cooperation and highest consideration at all times.

H. Anhidoho  
Brigadier-General  
Acting Force Commander

UNAMIR

WELF/2000.3/WA/FPO

25 March 1994

See Distr

FORCE POST OFFICE PROHIBITED ARTICLES

Once again all military personnel who are entitled to Free Mail Services are being reminded that the underlisted articles are prohibited from being despatched through the service:

- a. Coins, banknotes, negotiable bonds payable to the bearer, platinum, gold, silver, precious stones, jewels, and archaeological specimens which are the property of the host country.
- b. Articles which by their nature or their packing may expose mail handlers or postal officials to danger or may soil or damage other mail.
- c. Explosives, ammunition, inflammable or corrosive materials.
- d. Living animals or insects.
- e. Opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, hashish or any other form of narcotic drug.
- f. Obscene or immoral articles, pornographic literature or photographs.
- g. Earth, sand, grass, straw, seeds or plants.
- h. Guns, pistols, rifles, grenades or military hardware souvenirs.

*JA*  
JA CHOUDHURY  
Lt Col  
CMPO

Distr list attached

Distr:

Action:

External:

MILOB GP HQ

Kigali Sect HQ

DMZ Sect HQ

RUTBAT

KIBAT

BYUBAT

TUN Coy

Engrs Coy

Log Coy

Mov Con Pl

Med Pl

MP Sec

Internal:

FC's Office

DF's Office

Ops Sec

Log Sec

Plans Sec

REPUBLICQUE RWANDAISE  
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE  
CABINET DU MINISTRE  
B.P 23 KIGALI  
CAT

①  
By MA  
David said the event  
is passed. GSE 3/13

PROTEST/Viol.  
G/12

KIGALI, le 23 Mars 1994

N° 0808 /06.1.9

Très Urgent

Monsieur le Commandant de la Force  
de la MINUAR  
KIGALI

OBJET : Plainte contre le FPR.

Monsieur le Commandant,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance un mauvais traitement par des militaires du FPR envers la délégation du Ministère de la Défense en zone FPR.

En effet, le FPR m'a fait parvenir une invitation me priant d'assister aux cérémonies de remise de certificats de fin d'études en date du 19 Mars 1994 à CYONDO, Commune KIYOMBE, Préfecture BYUMBA en zone contrôlée par le FPR. J' y ai envoyé une délégation conduite par mon Conseiller aux Affaires Techniques. La délégation escortée par les forces de la MINUAR est partie dans la colonne comprenant aussi des diplomates.

Arrivée au premier barrage du FPR à NGONDORE, la délégation a été identifiée par un Officier du FPR, le Colonel RWIGAMBA Endrew, apparemment préposé à la conduite de la colonne jusqu'à CYONDO. Avant d'arriver à CYONDO, à plus ou moins trois kilomètres, des militaires du FPR ont stoppé la délégation, laissant partir le reste de la colonne. La délégation a été soumise à une fouille inconsidérée, les véhicules ont été mis sens dessus-dessous. Des Officiers Supérieurs, pourtant identifiés et connus ainsi que les autres membres de la délégation ont été obligés d'exhiber leurs cartes d'identité de service par des soldats très énervés qui les ont gardés pendant une trentaine de minutes. L'Officier de la MINUAR qui commandait l'escorte a assisté à cette scène qui a duré une heure, au milieu d'un groupe de ± 30 militaires du FPR, armés de fusils et de grenades.

.../...



Au lieu de la fête, la délégation a fait de nouveau l'objet de fouille. Au cours des cérémonies, trois journalistes ont été éjectés du lieu, par des militaires sous les ordres d'un certain Major MUKASA et ont saisi sur eux deux appareils, un pour Vidéo et un autre pour photographie. Sur l'intervention des Officiers de la MINUAR, le Major MUKASA a remis les deux appareils, mais a gardé une cassette vidéo et un film en couleur.

C'est avec grande déception que je vous adresse cette plainte, tout en vous priant d'user de votre influence pour que le Ministère puisse recouvrer le matériel confusqué par le FPR à l'occasion de l'incident relaté. Je profite de l'occasion pour vous exprimer mon appréciation à l'endroit des Officiers de la MINUAR qui commandaient l'escorte. C'est grâce à leur attitude ferme que le pire a pu être évité. Je vous prie de leur transmettre mes remerciements et mes sentiments de profonde sympathie.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l'expression de ma franche collaboration.

Copie pour information :

- Son Excellence Madame  
le Premier Ministre  
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Président  
du Front Patriotique  
Rwandais  
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Ministre des  
Affaires Etrangères et de  
la Coopération  
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Chef d'Etat-  
Major de l'Armée Rwandaise  
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Chef d'Etat-  
Major de la Gendarmerie  
Nationale  
KIGALI.

Le Ministre de la Défense  
BIZIMANA Augustin





Kigali, 17 March 1994

Subject: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LETTER OF PROTEST

Reference: RPF Letter of Protest dated 10 March 1994

This letter is forwarded to acknowledge receipt of your official letter of protest dated 10 March 1994.

On 23 February 1994, the UNAMIR Force Commander, due to the seriousness of the incident in question, ordered a formal board of inquiry into the incident of 10 March 1994. The initial report of the board of inquiry was inconclusive and incomplete and has been returned to the board for further investigation. When the investigation of the board of inquiry is completed, our response to your protest will be forwarded for your information and any course of action you may deem open to you.

Any incident involving loss of life is regrettable. Any violent incident, like the incident in question, is clouded in the fog of battle and the facts can only be ascertained by an objective and impartial analysis of the situation and the facts. UNAMIR will conduct such an objective and impartial investigation and will place responsibility on whomever or whatever deserves the responsibility according to the facts.

Please be assured of my cooperation and highest consideration at all times.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. Anyidoho'.

HK Anyidoho  
Brigadier-General  
Acting Force Commander

Major-General P Kagame  
Chairman of the RPA High Command  
Mulindi, Rwanda

A/F C

Draft letter to RPF.

In your credit and approval.

BVB

MA

A/MA



# FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



10th March 1994

Brigadier General Dallaire  
Force Commander UNAMIR  
UNAMIR HQS  
KIGALI.

RE : LETTER OF PROTEST ON THE MURDER OF RPF SOLDIER.

We would like to register an official protest on the following incident.

On 22nd February 1994 at around 2000 HRS, a Joint escort of UNAMIR and RPF while coming from Mulindi was ambushed and attacked at Gashyata about five Kilometres from the City Centre on Byumba-Kigali Road by people believed to be RGF.

On arrival at Gashyata the convoy found a road block and the escorts were attacked after opening the road block. There was fire exchange for fourty minutes between RPF and the attackers. UNAMIR escorts and observers escaped from the scene reportedly with one wounded.

RPF lost one soldier and one injured, two vehicles were damaged and abandoned. It should be recalled that the attacked convoy was supposed to be escorting RPF VIPs who did not come that day.

We would appreciate if investigations were done and an explanation given about the cowardly act.

Yours Sincerely,

*Andrew Rwigamba*

Andrew RWIGAMBA  
Lt.Col.  
SECRETARY FOR RPA HIGH COMMAND.

who acted cowardly.

*A/MA*

I want you to prepare an appropriate reply to this insulting letter from me to send to the RPF High Command.

*13/3  
DFC/CO*

*2*

*A/MA  
We shall have to reply this letter. Perhaps you may wish to rehearse it.  
16/3  
DFC/CO*

*This is  
two like  
VIPs were  
advised to  
return. Advice  
given by  
UNAMIR.*





Kigali, March 1994

Subject: LETTER OF PROTEST -- DEPLOYMENT OF RPF TROOPS IN THE DMZ AND EXPULSION OF UNAMIR DUTY PERSONNEL FROM THE CND

Dear General,

This is forwarded to register an official protest concerning the following incidents:

On 25 February 1994, the Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion, located at the CND, refused to allow our Military Observers and armed escorts entry into the CND building to carry out their legitimate duties. He even threatened to drive out those already deployed on duty inside the CND building. This behaviour is a flagrant show of disrespect by the Commanding Officer to UNAMIR and the United Nations. It is also a violation of the Peace Agreement.

Reports reaching this Headquarters also indicate that RPA troops are deploying in the following locations in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The DMZ Sector Commander raised these violations with the RPF Liaison Officer in charge of these areas without any success. We discussed this subject yesterday at your Headquarters.

	Location	Grid
-	Gakoma	B2237
-	✓Murama	B0221
-	Rutete	B0224
-	Lyaruganzu	B1232
-	Nyabushingi Twa	B1231
-	Bungwe	B1433

These violations are causing an embarrassment to UNAMIR, which stands accused of condoning the RPA actions. The DMZ, as you are aware, is to be void of troops of both RGA and RPA in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement and the Kinyinya Accord and should be observed strictly. I strongly count on your full support to the DMZ Sector Commander in implementing the immediate withdrawal of the RPA troops from these locations.

Please accept, General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Roméo A. Dallaire  
Brigadier General  
Force Commander

Major General Paul Kagame  
Chairman RPA High Command  
Mulindi

Summary Pending Request for Translation

To: FC  
From: Bourgmestre of the Commune of Tumba  
Date: 3 February 1994  
Subject: Violations of DMZ by RPF

On 2 and 3 Feb. an armed RPF groups of 25 men entered Karama, Tumba Sectors and Tumba Commune.

The population is concerned and wants UNAMIR to boost security.

① FC

DMZ Sector has checked on the Tumba situation several times. People are simply scared and they have a good reason to be, having passed through war and random killings. There is, however, no such threat immediately in Tumba as at now

*[Signature]*

21/3  
DFC

③

DMZ Sector Command  
note FC's comments  
and act accordingly.  
*[Signature]*  
07/4  
DFC/CS

② DFC

Even if we are info on such cases/predators, we should respond to them with a letter showing our interest and what we are doing.

*[Signature]*  
FC  
1/4

TO: FC

FIRING FROM AND AROUND CND  
BUILDING BY RPF


Attache please find the re-joinder  
to what we received from RPF. It  
is a draft form for your perusal  
and approval sv.

C

@

DI-B

  
H/n



01-2-94

DFC/COS

- (a). This is not fact according to me. There is no ~~excuse~~<sup>excuse</sup> for firing. Did we do nothing to the crowd? Were they 10m away?
- b. Were they that close? Did we and gendarmes contain them at a distance?
- c. We could have used the other ~~route~~<sup>exit</sup>\* if these meetings were deemed essential once the situation was clear regarding the scale of the demonstrations. An outright cancellation of all meetings was not necessary and falls into the hands of the demonstrators. More attention to ways around the demonstrators must be found in the future.
- d. Not fully by Préfet
- e. He could wait and not barge\* through the demonstrators.
- f. Is this a correct fact?
- g. This is no excuse, they have no right to force their way through the barrier, especially without our consent and/or escort.
- h. This is not correct and we must tell them in strong ~~terms~~ words.
- i. What urgency? I asked to see him — did not create an urgent demand.
- j. This is new info that has not been raised before. Is this correct.?



2 February 1994

Subject: FIRING FROM IN AND AROUND CND BUILDING BY RWANDESE  
PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES

Dear Colonel Kwanyarenge,

In reference to your response letter on the firing by the RPF dated 28 January 1994, the points raised therein in response to our protest on the firing in and around the CND Building on 26 January 1994 are well noted. However, there are some issues which have been quoted out of context. These issues have to be addressed to avoid a repetition of the incident in question.

To be frank, there was absolutely no excuse for the firing. The crowd did not come any closer than 50 metres from the CND quarterguard. The Gendarmerie and UNAMIR were on the spot and monitoring the situation. A violent approach would have escalated the incident. It should be noted that the instructions on the 1.5 km radius around the CND complex free of demonstrations is not yet signed by the Préfet.

An outright cancellation of all the meetings stated in paragraph 3 of the referred letter was not necessary and rather seemed like a play into the hands of the demonstrators. The other exit could have been used if these meetings were deemed essential once the situation was clear regarding the scale of the demonstration. We have to identify ways around the demonstrators for future use. The FO could have waited until the crowd was brought under control and not barge through the demonstrators. The Force Commander only asked the FO to see him. There was no urgency to warrant him nor his soldiers forcing their way through the barrier, especially without our consent and/or escort. His action was an outright violation of the KWSA rules and a reflection of poor judgement.

UNAMIR has no proof that the Gendarmerie fired directly at the RPF as alleged in paragraph 6 of your letter. The firing was started by the FO and his soldiers which could not be termed "legitimate self-defence". His action was a clear violation of the KWSA rules and should not be condoned under any circumstances.

Please be assured of our usual co-operation at all times.

R. A. Dallaire  
Brigadier General  
Force Commander

Colonel Alexis Kwanvarenge  
Chairman  
Rwandese Patriotic Front





1 February 1994

Subject: FIRING FROM IN AND AROUND CND BUILDING BY RWANDESE  
PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES

Dear Colonel Kwanyarenge,

In reference to your response letter on the firing by the RPF dated 28 January 1994, the points raised therein in response to our protest on the firing in and around the CND Building on 26 January 1994 are well noted. However, there are some issues which have been quoted out of context. These issues have to be addressed to avoid a repetition of the incident in question.

To be frank, there was absolutely no excuse for the firing. The crowd did not come any closer than 50 metres from the CND quarterguard. The Gendarmerie and UNAMIR were on the spot appealing to the crowd to disperse. A violent approach would have escalated the incident. It should be noted that the instructions on the 1.5 km radius around the CND compound free of demonstrations was not fully signed by the Préfet.

An outright cancellation of all the meetings stated in paragraph 3 of the referred letter was not necessary and rather a <sup>play</sup> into the hands of the demonstrators. The other exit could have been used if these meetings were deemed essential once the situation was clear regarding the scale of the demonstrators. We have to identify ways around the demonstrators for future use. The LO could have waited until the crowd was brought under control and not necessarily barge through the demonstrators. The Force Commander only asked the LO to see him <sup>PTO</sup>. There was no urgency to warrant him and his soldiers forcing their way through the barrier, especially without an outright violation of the Peace Agreement.

UNAMIR has no proof that the Gendarmerie fired directly at the RPF as alleged in paragraph 6 of your letter. The firing was started by the LO and his soldiers which could not be termed "legitimate self-defence". His action is a clear violation of the KWSA accord and should not be condoned under any circumstances.

*Please be assured of our usual co operation  
at all times*

R.A. Dallaire  
Brigadier General  
Force Commander

Colonel Alexis Kwanyarenge  
Chairman  
Rwandese Patriotic Front

**unicef**



Cor 29 10157

MKE 163

mise - vis  
3/12

United Nations Children's Fund  
Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance  
Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia

Interoffice Memorandum

To : Mr Y Le Moal  
Designated Official a.i.

From : T. Franklin  
Representative  
UNICEF

Date : 29th January, 1994

Subject : ARMED THUGS AROUND THE HOUSE OF UNICEF STAFF MEMBER

Our staff member Felicité Mukashema reported the presence of a group armed with machets and sticks in her area the night of Friday 28th January 1994. UNAMIR military staff, who also live in the vicinity spotted the group in front of the staff members house. The group fled on seeing the UNAMIR vehicle. The UNAMIR staff advised the staff member of the danger and offered protection to the staff member and her family in their residence. The following morning 29th January the staff member was informed by other neighbours that the group entered adjacent houses. In one of the houses they threaten to kill a Tutsi woman. They only spared her on her plea that she is married to a Hutu. Our staff member is a Tutsi. By memo dated 14th December 1993 we reported a burglary in the same staff members house.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

1. Staff member was requested to make an official report to the local Gendarmerie.
2. UN Patrol No. 2 located in UNICEF Representative's house will make regular checks on the staff members house during the night.
3. UNAMIR Chief Security Officer was informed.

cc. F. Sguera  
Security Officer  
UNICEF/NY

General R. Dallaire  
Force Commander  
UNAMIR/Kigali

J.F. Faivre  
Security Officer  
UN/Kigali

③  
J. Sguera  
02/2 DFC/COS

FC CAO Chief Security Off.



*Avec les compliments de  
l' Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis  
d' Amérique - Kigali*



PRUDENCE BUSHNELL  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Prudence Bushnell assumed her duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs on June 1, 1993. She is responsible for promoting US policy objectives on transnational issues in Africa, which include democracy, human rights, conflict prevention, AIDS, narcotics, terrorism, and refugees. She also oversees the Bureau's relations with the Congress and international organizations.

Ms. Bushnell entered the Foreign Service in 1981 and most recently served as a member of the 35th Class of the Senior Seminar, the Department's flagship training seminar for selected federal executives. From 1989-92, she served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Dakar, Senegal. She directed the Department's management and leadership training as Chair of the Executive Development Division of the Foreign Service Institute from 1986-89. Before this tour she served for two years as Administrative Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Bombay, India. Her first overseas assignment from 1982-84 took her to Dakar, Senegal as the Embassy's Supervisory General Services Officer.

Before joining the Foreign Service, Ms. Bushnell had a successful ten year career as a training consultant in the public and non-profit sectors in Washington, D.C., New York and Texas.

Ms. Bushnell has received several State Department awards, including Superior Honor Awards and Meritorious Honor Awards. Her written works include "Leadership at State: The Neglected Dimension" published in the November 1989 Foreign Service Journal.

Ms. Bushnell was born in Washington, D.C. on November 26, 1946 and grew up in Germany, France, Pakistan and Iran. She studied at the University of Maryland (B.A. Liberal Arts 1969) and Russell Sage College in Albany, New York (M.S. Public Service 1979). She is married to Richard A. Buckley and has five step children.





*Embassy of the United States of America*

AMBASSADOR ARLENE RENDER  
Central African Affairs Director

Arlene Render recently served as Ambassador to the Republic of the Gambia, 1990-93. She was a member of the Senior Seminar, 1989-90. Before that, She was Deputy Chief of Mission in Accra, 1986-89.

Ms. Render joined the Foreign Service in 1970 and became Vice Consul in Cote d'Ivoire the following year. She was Vice Consul in Tehran, 1973-76. After a tour as Consul in Genoa, 1977-78, she was assigned to the Bureau for Intelligence and Research as a Political Officer in 1978. Next, she was an International Relations Officer in the Bureau of African Affairs, 1979-81. She was named Deputy Chief of Mission in Brazzaville in 1981. She served as Consul General in Kingston, 1984-86.

Ms. Render was born in Cleveland on August 16, 1943. She received a Bachelor's from West Virginia State in 1965 and a Master's from the University of Michigan in 1967. Her foreign languages are Italian and French. Before joining the Service, she was a health educator for the city of Cleveland. She has won two Meritotious Awards and a Superior Honor Award. She is single and has a son.





PATRICIA L. IRVIN  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Humanitarian & Refugee Affairs

Patricia L. Irvin is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs. Appointed by the President in June 1993, Ms. Irvin previously served on the National Security Cluster of President Clinton's Transition Team. As Deputy Assistant Secretary, Ms. Irvin is the principal policy-maker within the Defense Department with respect to issues relating to DOD involvement in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance mission throughout the world, as well as for alien migration issues.

Prior to joining Clinton Administration, Ms. Irvin was a partner in the New York City Office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, one of Wall Street's premier law firms. She became associated with that firm in 1979 and became a partner in 1988. She was a member of the firm's Capital Market's Group and headed its Municipal Finance Practice within that group. Her practice previously involved work in mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts, as well as corporate finance matters.

Ms. Irvin is a 1976 summa cum laude graduate of Princeton University and a 1979 graduate of Harvard Law School.

Ms. Irvin has served as a member of the Boards of Trustees of Princeton University and Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art. She also served on the Executive Committee of the Boards of Directors of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. and Legal Aid Society. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Law Justice. Ms. Irvin has also served as a trustee of the Democratic National Committee. In 1985, Ms. Irvin founded the Practicing Attorneys for the Law Students Program, which matches law students of color on the New York area with attorneys who act as their mentors and which provides workshops and counseling to the student participants.

Ms. Irvin's professional memberships include the National Association of Bond Lawyers, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the American Bar Association, the National Bar Association and the Metropolitan Bar Association.